Switzerland and the UN Security Council

Examining Swiss Perspectives and Approaches to Key Issues

Examining Swiss perspectives and approaches to enduring and emerging issues on the UN Security Council’s agenda.

In October 2020, after nearly two decades of close engagement and membership at the United Nations, Switzerland launched its first-ever campaign for a temporary seat on the Security Council for the 2023-2024 period. This Issue Brief investigates current policy priorities of the Swiss government and how those priorities would fit within the Security Council’s work on enduring and emerging issues related to international peace and security. To analyze Swiss views and approaches, the research centers on four thematic areas that represent a blend of enduring issues that have been on the Security Council’s agenda since its founding and emerging areas of focus among permanent and temporary members, including: (1) global health security and COVID-19 pandemic recovery; (2) arms control and disarmament; (3) conflict; and (4) climate change and security.

Introduction

As the birthplace of the League of Nations in 1919, Switzerland has been a key actor in multilateralism for over a century. Since then, and as the European headquarters of the United Nations (UN), Switzerland has hosted peace processes, disarmament conferences, and bodies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Following a popular vote in 2002, Switzerland officially became the 190th member of the United Nations. Since becoming a Member State, Switzerland has participated in most of the body’s activities, including the General Assembly, the Human Rights Council, and the Economic and Social Council, while maintaining an active role in issues such as humanitarian aid, peace processes, and international human rights, among others. In October 2020, after nearly two decades of close engagement at the UN, Switzerland launched its first-ever campaign for a non-permanent seat on the Security Council to fill one of two open seats available to countries from the Western European and Others Group (WEOG) for the 2023-2024 period. It is in this context that this Issue Brief investigates current policy priorities of the Swiss government and how those priorities fit within the Security Council’s work on enduring and emerging international peace and security issues across several thematic areas.

Switzerland’s Profile

UN Security Council Candidacy

Framing its candidacy as “A Plus for Peace,”1  Note: “A Plus for Peace,” https://www.aplusforpeace.ch/.    the Swiss campaign is oriented around five thematic issues:

  1. Peace
  2. Humanity
  3. Sustainable Development
  4. Multilateralism
  5. Innovation

Given its historically neutral stance, and experience as a mediator, Switzerland’s candidacy places a strong emphasis on the country’s efforts to provide third-party dispute settlement support – through good offices – and its goals to bolster UN tools such as peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and disarmament and non-proliferation dialogues. From a humanitarian perspective, the candidacy highlights Switzerland’s role in pioneering international humanitarian law (IHL), upholding human rights, and protecting civilians. As the home of the ICRC since its founding by Swiss citizens in 1863, Geneva and the conventions bearing the city’s name feature prominently in the candidacy’s call for small States to play an essential role in standing up for the rule of law and the rules-based international order.2  Note: “Switzerland United Nations Security Council 2023-2024: A Plus for Peace,” 2021, https://www.aplusforpeace.ch/sites/default/files/2021-01/Brochure–32%3BSwitzerland–32%3BUN–32%3BSecurity–32%3BCouncil–32%3B2023-24–32%3BENG.pdf, pp. 7.    Switzerland is a strong supporter of existing and developing international norms across its priority areas, which range from reinvigorating multilateralism to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). For example, building upon Paris Agreement commitments, Switzerland plans to reduce its net carbon emissions to zero by 2050. As part of its actions on the SDGs, Switzerland prioritizes sustainable financing to support economic growth, digital transformation, market development, and private-sector initiatives, especially in countries most impacted by climate change.

Swiss Foreign Policy Strategy 2020-2023 and International Cooperation

In addition to its campaign framework, the Swiss candidacy, and indeed the country’s engagement with the world, is guided by strategies adopted by the Swiss Federal Council. The current iteration of this strategy, the Foreign Policy Strategy 2020-2023 (FPS 20-23), clearly labels the country’s candidacy for a seat on the Security Council as key to the strategy’s peace and security thematic area. The strategy responds to what the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) refers to as “drivers of change,” which range from social, political, and economic fluctuations – such as identity and differentiation, great power competition, and the fourth industrial revolution – to environmental and technological factors like climate change and the rise of artificial intelligence. The strategy’s four thematic areas echo those included in the Security Council campaign; they include: (1) Peace and Security; (2) Prosperity; (3) Sustainability; and (4) Digitalization.

FPS 20-23 both identifies key areas of focus and describes how these priorities are meant to be operationalized vis-à-vis Europe, other regions of the world, and on the multilateral level. On issues of peace and security, Switzerland’s priority is to “help build a peaceful and safe world that allows people to live free from want and fear, where their human rights are protected and they can enjoy economic prosperity.”3  Note: Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA), “Foreign Policy Strategy 2020-23,” https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/eda/en/documents/publications/SchweizerischeAussenpolitik/Aussenpolitische-Strategie-2020-23_EN.pdf, pp. 9.    The key peace and security objectives of FPS 20-23 are to join the Security Council as a non-permanent member; contribute to the promotion of democracy, conflict prevention, mediation, and conflict resolution; reinforce human rights through international frameworks and institutions; deliver emergency humanitarian relief; campaign for the preservation of arms control and disarmament agreements; fight organized crime, cybercrime and terrorism; prevent the support and export of terrorism; and combat human trafficking.4  Note: FDFA, “Foreign Policy Strategy 2020-23,” https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/eda/en/documents/publications/SchweizerischeAussenpolitik/Aussenpolitische-Strategie-2020-23_EN.pdf, pp. 11.  

As part of the thematic follow-up to FPS 20-23, the Swiss FDFA and Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research (EAER) developed an International Cooperation Strategy (ICS) focused on creating decent local jobs, mitigating and adapting to climate change, reducing the causes of forced displacement and irregular migration, and promoting the rule of law and good governance.5  Note: FDFA, “Switzerland’s International Cooperation Strategy 2021-2024,” Bern, 2020, https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/deza/en/documents/die-deza/strategie/broschuere-IZA-strategie-2021-2024_EN.pdf, pp. 3.    Representing a financial commitment of over CHF 11 billion over four years, the ICS is a key foreign policy instrument and articulates criteria for Swiss development assistance interventions around the world.

Swiss Views Across Select Thematic Areas

To dig deeper into Switzerland’s views in light of its candidacy, our research focused on the following four thematic areas: (1) global health security and pandemic recovery; (2) arms control and disarmament; (3) conflict; and (4) climate change and security. In the author’s view, these topics represent in no particular order a sample blend of issues that have been on the Security Council’s agenda since its founding, emerging areas of focus that have gained momentum among permanent and elected members, and, of course, the COVID-19 pandemic – a key global challenge that the Security Council has recognized as having the potential to worsen the humanitarian impact of armed conflicts while also aggravating the socioeconomic drivers of violence and instability, especially in developing countries. The order in which these four issues are presented in this study should not be interpreted as a prioritization in terms of importance. To elucidate Swiss positions on these issues, Stimson conducted in-depth interviews with Swiss officials based in Bern, Geneva, Washington, D.C., and New York to supplement desk research.

Global Health Security and COVID-19 Pandemic Recovery

Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, the Security Council has considered the security concerns and challenges raised by the global health emergency, and, over the next 2-3 years, the Security Council will continue to address a range of global health security challenges, including the long-term implications of COVID-19. The pandemic has highlighted the relationships between equitable access to vaccines – and public health resources in general – and broader conflict prevention efforts. In response, the Swiss government has adopted a holistic approach that recognizes COVID-19 as more than just a health crisis but rather as a disruptor that will have deep economic, financial, and social consequences that run the risk of aggravating already-precarious situations in developing countries.6  Note: FDFA, “COVID-19: Switzerland’s international cooperation response,” https://www.eda.admin.ch/deza/en/home/sdc/aktuell/dossiers/alle-dossiers/covid-19-iza.html.    Viewing peace as a structural determinant for health, Switzerland is focused on the long-term implications of the COVID-19 pandemic, including the risk that its negative economic impact could translate into political tensions that create the conditions for conflict to intensify. Similarly, Swiss officials stressed the importance of the pandemic’s impact on livelihoods at the local level and how heightened economic and political tensions can cause people to look toward new livelihoods or alternatives abroad. Another key disruption of central concern for Switzerland is the destabilizing effect of a widening health equity gap caused by COVID-19. This inequity can be a potent conflict driver, and COVID-19 has caused this gap to grow in countries around the world, leading to distrust in health systems.

To mitigate some of these effects, Switzerland has emphasized multilateral mechanisms like the COVAX facility, an initiative aimed at accelerating the development, production, and equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines. The initiative, which is co-led by the World Health Organization (WHO), the Gavi Vaccine Alliance, and the Center for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, has supplied medical material and financial resources to countries hit hard by the virus. Through the Agency for Development and Cooperation and its Peace and Human Rights Division, Switzerland has focused on health, humanitarian aid, peace and security, and preserving livelihoods. As the host of Gavi, Switzerland places significant emphasis on the rollout of COVID-19 vaccines in lower- and middle-income countries. Through the COVAX Facility, Switzerland pledged CHF 125 million to support the Gavi COVAX Advance Market Commitment, a financing instrument to support the participation of 92 low- and middle-income economies in COVAX.7  Note: Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, “Switzerland Donor Profile,” https://www.gavi.org/investing-gavi/funding/donor-profiles/switzerland.    

In addition to global vaccination efforts, the Swiss government has prioritized the issue of COVID-19’s exacerbating impact on people displaced by armed conflict and natural disasters. In cooperation with the UN High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR), Switzerland supports projects to rehabilitate drinking water supply systems, improve reception facilities, and provide care and protection for children in refugee and internally displaced peoples (IDP) camps.8  Note: FDFA, “COVID-19 exacerbates situation for displaced people,” 19 June 2020, https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/fdfa/aktuell/newsuebersicht/2020/06/weltfluechtlingstag.html.    The pandemic has stressed these environments in several ways, including through the decreased presence of humanitarian and health workers due to COVID-19 measures. In response to the interplay of health and development issues with broader threats to international peace and security, Swiss officials said there may be room for the Security Council to continue to integrate health issues into its thematic and country-specific work. Responses to the pandemic have had spillover effects into other thematic areas, including conflict. For example, Swiss officials have noted the exacerbating effect the pandemic has had on nationalist rhetoric, and the way in which the pandemic has provided the pretext for crackdowns on freedoms and increased surveillance. Such issues will also have to be addressed in the aftermath of the initial pandemic response.

Arms Control and Disarmament

As the home to the Conference on Disarmament, which is hosted in Geneva, Switzerland is often at the center of arms control and disarmament discussions.9  Note: United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, “Disarmament in Geneva,” https://www.un.org/disarmament/disarmament-in-geneva/.    Throughout these discussions over the years, the Swiss government has made clear that it “considers it a fundamental principle that binding, universal agreements under international law take precedence over unilateral measures and arrangements that are only binding in political terms.”10  Note: FDFA, “Disarmament and non-proliferation,” updated 29 September 2021, https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/foreign-policy/security-policy/disarmament-non-proliferation.html.    This perspective will continue to guide Swiss engagement, including as a prospective Security Council member, as weapons of mass destruction can be expected to be a continued focus of the Security Council, including on DPRK and with regard to evolving discussions related to the future of  the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the nuclear program of Iran (JCPOA). In 2018, the Swiss Federal Council decided that Switzerland would not sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) that was negotiated at the UN in 2017, citing “risks in terms of both the continued advancement of disarmament diplomacy and Switzerland’s security policy interests.”11  Note: FDFA, “The Federal Council decides not to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons at the present time,” 15 May 2018, https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/fdfa/aktuell/news.html/content/eda/en/meta/news/2018/8/15/71821.html.    Looking ahead, Switzerland is currently serving on the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and will chair the Missile Technology Control Regime in 2022–23.12  Note: “A Plus for Peace,” https://www.aplusforpeace.ch/a-plus-for-peace.  

Switzerland’s national policy on arms control and disarmament seeks to preserve national security while pursuing non-proliferation of WMDs and protecting against destabilizing accumulations of conventional arms. In the past, Switzerland has consistently supported non-proliferation and disarmament efforts and dialogues at the international level. Two key features of Swiss non-proliferation priorities are confidence-building among States and support for verifiable arms control and disarmament mechanisms that do not discriminate against individual States or entities.13  Note: FDFA, “Disarmament and non-proliferation,” updated 29 September 2021, https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/foreign-policy/security-policy/disarmament-non-proliferation.html.    The issue of trust-building will remain a key focal point for Switzerland in part to address growing distrust that has emerged over the last two decades. To move beyond this trust deficit, Switzerland views basic issues around categorization and technical standards as possible avenues to look for agreement and build trust through joint work on issues that are less political and more factual.

The inability of existing arms control and disarmament frameworks to keep up with evolving weapons systems and the historical divide between States on arms control and disarmament efforts are key concerns for Switzerland. To develop new frameworks and expand on existing ones, Switzerland adopts an active, pragmatic, and facts-based approach, with an aim to be predictable but also innovative. Throughout arms control and disarmament debates, Switzerland strives to prevent further polarization by serving as a moderating voice without running the risk of landing on the lowest common denominator. A key element of the Swiss strategy of inclusive dialogue stems from Switzerland’s position as a small, non-NATO state with limited military capabilities; thus, Switzerland promotes its security by supporting the rules-based international order. In a similar vein, Switzerland is keenly aware that these critical arms control and disarmament discussions are taking place in an era defined by an intersection of governance challenges, normative gaps, and the reacceleration of great power competition, combined with technologies – both old and emerging – that remain unregulated.

Conflict

Several ongoing conflicts are likely to remain at the top of the Security Council’s agenda through the next temporary membership cycle, including the deteriorating situations in Afghanistan, Syria, and Myanmar, among others. A key challenge, according to Switzerland, will be the sheer number of conflicts that continue to either emerge or worsen, with few political settlements in sight. To address these challenges, Switzerland seeks to be an engaged member of the Security Council with a goal to strive for political solutions in the many country contexts of which it is already knowledgeable through existing peacebuilding, humanitarian, and development cooperation efforts. In responding to these crises and other conflict situations around the world, conflict-induced migration and humanitarian access are two prominent issues. From a humanitarian perspective, three major points emerge: First, the preservation and deepening of humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, universality and impartiality is a priority for Swiss engagement in conflict zones. Second, humanitarian access remains a challenge that will require attention if the Swiss are successful in their Security Council campaign. And third, the Swiss government continues to press for respect for IHL itself – especially amidst attacks on humanitarian and health workers.

Many of these conflicts have led to internal displacement, are complicated by the presence of non-state armed groups, and increasingly include elements of great power competition.  Amidst this backdrop of challenges, Swiss priorities include maintaining the shrinking humanitarian space, supporting peace mediation efforts, and pragmatically addressing the nexus of humanitarian aid and long-term development.

In terms of an overall approach, Switzerland is focused on first addressing the humanitarian situations – including securing access to vulnerable populations and advocating for IHL. Second, Switzerland seeks to identify how to make a positive contribution in the realm of conflict mediation and bringing parties together through good offices. This is an area in which Switzerland has historically excelled. Third, and thinking further along the conflict cycle, Switzerland is concerned with how to prevent States that are currently experiencing conflict from backsliding further and how to build resilience in States that are increasingly fragile.

To further illustrate Swiss perspectives and priorities on conflict management and resolution, the project posed questions to Swiss government officials on specific country contexts that have featured on the Security Council agenda in recent years and are likely to continue to do so.

Afghanistan

In light of the recent government collapse in Afghanistan, the issue of humanitarian access on the ground and the implications of a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan will feature prominently in the Security Council’s deliberations. Since the fall of Kabul in August 2021, Switzerland has prioritized humanitarian action and protection for displaced persons in Afghanistan and neighboring countries. In a statement from September 2021, the Swiss government highlighted that “the threat of economic collapse, the ongoing drought, and famine will further increase the number of people in need of humanitarian aid.14”  Note: SwissInfo, “Swiss boost aid to crisis-stricken Afghanistan,” 8 September 2021, https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/swiss-boosts-aid-to-crisis-stricken-afghanistan-/46930612.    The Swiss Federal Council also approved an additional contribution of CHF 33 million to bolster aid on the ground, and together with the 2022 regular budget, Swiss aid to Afghanistan and surrounding countries will amount to CHF 60 million through the end of 2022.15  Note: FDFA, “Afghanistan: Switzerland increases its humanitarian aid on the ground,” 8 September 2021, https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/fdfa/aktuell/news.html/content/eda/en/meta/news/2021/9/8/85023.    Swiss government officials stressed the unconditional and unbureaucratic nature of the aid they seek to provide Afghans.

Myanmar

The Swiss government has been intimately involved in the Myanmar peace process and adjacent bilateral cooperation in employment and vocational skills development, agriculture and food security, and health, social services, and local governance. Since the end of military rule in Myanmar in 2011, Switzerland had supported and mediated peace negotiations between ethnic groups, the government, and the military.16  Note: SwissInfo, “Switzerland mediates in Myanmar election process,” 27 June 2020, https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/switzerland-mediates-in-myanmar-election-process/45865210.    In response to the military coup in February 2021, Switzerland called for the military junta to suspend its actions, release government officials and civil society leaders, and resume dialogue. The Swiss government has also matched EU sanctions on members of the ruling junta who “participate in and support actions and policies that undermine democracy and the role of law in Burma, as well as actions that threaten the peace, security, and stability of the country.”17  Note: SwissInfo, “Switzerland applies fresh sanctions on Myanmar,” 1 July 2021, https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/switzerland-applies-fresh-sanctions-on-myanmar/46750962.    The main aim of current Swiss efforts is to rekindle dialogue and return to democratic governance, as well as address the plight of the Rohingya and those displaced in Bangladesh.

Syria

Since 2011, Switzerland has played a prominent role in responding to the conflict and dire humanitarian situation in Syria. The situation in Syria is also an issue Switzerland is likely to work on as a temporary member of the Security Council, from both a humanitarian access and peace perspective. Switzerland has engaged with the Syrian diaspora and ongoing accountability mechanisms that document human rights abuses in the country, including the International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism (IIIM).

Climate Change and Security

The issue of climate change and its potential implications for international peace and security have gained traction in the Security Council in recent years. Previously, the Security Council considered climate-related conflict risks, issues facing specific regions and countries, and the role of UN missions and offices. The Swiss government has adopted a broad approach to the issue, referring to climate change as a “risk multiplier” for security challenges. As an exacerbating factor, climate change impacts food security, water security, and, in some cases, the physical existence of low-lying island nations. The FDFA has analyzed the direct and indirect risks climate change poses to Switzerland, including price shocks, political instability, and increased migration flows stemming from the Mediterranean region.

In February 2021, the United Kingdom hosted an open debate on climate change and security which posed several questions, including: “How can efforts to build resilience and support adaptation also prevent conflict risks and support peacebuilding and stability?” and, “How can the Security Council best contribute to driving regional and transnational action to address risk and responses to climate-related conflict?”18  Note: What’s In Blue, “Climate and Security: High-level Open Videoconference Debate,” 22 February 2021, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2021/02/climate-and-security-high-level-open-videoconference-debate.php.    In his statement to the debate, Swiss Federal Councilor Ignazio Cassis reflected on his recent visits to climate-vulnerable and conflict-affected countries in West Africa and emphasized that the “consequences of climate change on international peace and security are profound,” adding that the effects of climate change have the potential to “cause conflicts or aggravate existing ones.”19  Note: FDFA, “Ensuring international peace and security: climate and security (virtual) (fr),” 23 February 2021, https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/fdfa/aktuell/news.html/content/eda/en/meta/news/2021/2/23/82441.    Cassis called on the Security Council to strengthen its commitment to conflict prevention through the implementation of the Paris Agreement and carbon neutrality. He also stressed the need for the Security Council to integrate recommendations from other UN bodies, stakeholders, and civil society such as the Peacebuilding Commission. Finally, Cassis called on the Security Council to consider and address the risks of climate change in its decisions, including the mandates of UN peace operations.20  Note: FDFA, “Ensuring international peace and security: climate and security (virtual) (fr),” 23 February 2021, https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/fdfa/aktuell/news.html/content/eda/en/meta/news/2021/2/23/82441.    The Swiss FDFA maintains a mandate to consistently apply a climate risk approach in every project it implements – an approach that could be adopted by the Security Council.

Conclusion

This research found that Switzerland views the four thematic areas discussed inter alia through a strong humanitarian lens. This perspective is likely to drive Swiss priorities going forward at the UN and to continue to feature prominently during its bid for temporary membership on the Security Council in 2023-2024. While other UN Member States and Security Council members may prioritize competition and key geopolitical and strategic concerns, the key driver of Swiss action is a desire to have real impact and to alleviate suffering for vulnerable populations in some of the most difficult environments. In other words, Switzerland does not seek involvement for involvement’s sake, but rather strives for solutions that can improve humanitarian conditions on the ground. While some interviewees did stress the importance of Switzerland addressing issues close to its own borders, higher order principles seem to motivate Swiss policy and action – a characteristic that will serve the Swiss candidacy and potential membership on the Security Council well as it seeks to break the deadlock that has mired the Security Council’s ability to act on pressing global challenges, including the long-term, exacerbating effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. 

Notes

  • 1
      Note: “A Plus for Peace,” https://www.aplusforpeace.ch/.  
  • 2
      Note: “Switzerland United Nations Security Council 2023-2024: A Plus for Peace,” 2021, https://www.aplusforpeace.ch/sites/default/files/2021-01/Brochure–32%3BSwitzerland–32%3BUN–32%3BSecurity–32%3BCouncil–32%3B2023-24–32%3BENG.pdf, pp. 7.  
  • 3
      Note: Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA), “Foreign Policy Strategy 2020-23,” https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/eda/en/documents/publications/SchweizerischeAussenpolitik/Aussenpolitische-Strategie-2020-23_EN.pdf, pp. 9.  
  • 4
      Note: FDFA, “Foreign Policy Strategy 2020-23,” https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/eda/en/documents/publications/SchweizerischeAussenpolitik/Aussenpolitische-Strategie-2020-23_EN.pdf, pp. 11. 
  • 5
      Note: FDFA, “Switzerland’s International Cooperation Strategy 2021-2024,” Bern, 2020, https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/deza/en/documents/die-deza/strategie/broschuere-IZA-strategie-2021-2024_EN.pdf, pp. 3.  
  • 6
      Note: FDFA, “COVID-19: Switzerland’s international cooperation response,” https://www.eda.admin.ch/deza/en/home/sdc/aktuell/dossiers/alle-dossiers/covid-19-iza.html.  
  • 7
      Note: Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, “Switzerland Donor Profile,” https://www.gavi.org/investing-gavi/funding/donor-profiles/switzerland.    
  • 8
      Note: FDFA, “COVID-19 exacerbates situation for displaced people,” 19 June 2020, https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/fdfa/aktuell/newsuebersicht/2020/06/weltfluechtlingstag.html.  
  • 9
      Note: United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, “Disarmament in Geneva,” https://www.un.org/disarmament/disarmament-in-geneva/.  
  • 10
      Note: FDFA, “Disarmament and non-proliferation,” updated 29 September 2021, https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/foreign-policy/security-policy/disarmament-non-proliferation.html.  
  • 11
      Note: FDFA, “The Federal Council decides not to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons at the present time,” 15 May 2018, https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/fdfa/aktuell/news.html/content/eda/en/meta/news/2018/8/15/71821.html.  
  • 12
      Note: “A Plus for Peace,” https://www.aplusforpeace.ch/a-plus-for-peace.  
  • 13
      Note: FDFA, “Disarmament and non-proliferation,” updated 29 September 2021, https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/foreign-policy/security-policy/disarmament-non-proliferation.html.  
  • 14
    ”  Note: SwissInfo, “Swiss boost aid to crisis-stricken Afghanistan,” 8 September 2021, https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/swiss-boosts-aid-to-crisis-stricken-afghanistan-/46930612.  
  • 15
      Note: FDFA, “Afghanistan: Switzerland increases its humanitarian aid on the ground,” 8 September 2021, https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/fdfa/aktuell/news.html/content/eda/en/meta/news/2021/9/8/85023.  
  • 16
      Note: SwissInfo, “Switzerland mediates in Myanmar election process,” 27 June 2020, https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/switzerland-mediates-in-myanmar-election-process/45865210.  
  • 17
      Note: SwissInfo, “Switzerland applies fresh sanctions on Myanmar,” 1 July 2021, https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/switzerland-applies-fresh-sanctions-on-myanmar/46750962.  
  • 18
      Note: What’s In Blue, “Climate and Security: High-level Open Videoconference Debate,” 22 February 2021, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2021/02/climate-and-security-high-level-open-videoconference-debate.php.  
  • 19
      Note: FDFA, “Ensuring international peace and security: climate and security (virtual) (fr),” 23 February 2021, https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/fdfa/aktuell/news.html/content/eda/en/meta/news/2021/2/23/82441.  
  • 20
      Note: FDFA, “Ensuring international peace and security: climate and security (virtual) (fr),” 23 February 2021, https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/fdfa/aktuell/news.html/content/eda/en/meta/news/2021/2/23/82441.  

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