While most of the Middle East is enjoying a new “multialigned” momentum, Iran has regressed to pursuing a two-decade-old “Look to the East” policy at full speed.
Iran’s leaders have reacted to the apparent death of the 2015 nuclear deal and growing ostracism in Europe due to Iran’s military support for Russia’s war in Ukraine by seeking friends and partners among those sympathetic to its revisionist struggle. But with great powers that ultimately are self-interested and junior partners that have little to offer, the notion of building a successful anti-hegemonic front is more delusion than reality.
Today, the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy appears guided by three interconnected assumptions: first, a rupture from a recent past in which, according to the administration of President Ebrahim Raisi, Iran neglected its ties with China, Russia, and the developing world. Second, the not-so-openly-expressed idea that Tehran can substitute a new web of partnerships for economic and political relationships with Europe and Western-aligned Asian countries. Lastly, the perception that the global order, pushed by the Ukraine War, is shifting from a declining West to a powerful East, and that Iran has a leadership role to play in that arena. All these assumptions, however, seem more the product of an ideological worldview than of realistic calculation.
Internationalism and Third-Worldism have long been a key element of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy and it has participated actively in such fora as the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77. This activism reflects these countries’ ambition of building anti-hegemonic coalitions with like-minded partners, usually directed against the United States. China, for instance, has historically been the object of Iran’s courtship. Beijing has often echoed Tehran’s rhetoric but never fully embraced its militant anti-Americanism for the obvious reason that the U.S. and Chinese economies are closely interconnected.
Two years into its tenure and contending with widespread popular discontent, the Raisi government has tried to deflect attention from domestic problems by scoring successes abroad. Given that Raisi came to power with little-to-no international experience and appointed a foreign minister whose charisma and knowledge pales compared to that of his predecessor, Raisi nevertheless achieved a historic de-escalation agreement with Saudi Arabia and Iran’s full membership in the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Both achievements are consistent with the two foreign policy priorities the Raisi administration and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei have set: improving relations with neighboring countries and reviving the “Look to the East” policy.
The policy includes what amounts to a “pariah partnership” with Russia that at its core involves critical Iranian military help for the Kremlin’s war of aggression against Ukraine. This relationship gives Tehran the sense of being an essential partner to similarly sanction-burdened Moscow. Iran has also avidly pursued a closer relationship with China. Last February, Raisi embarked on the first state visit of an Iranian president to China since Mohammad Khatami in 2000. The trip paved the way for Beijing’s mediation between Iran and Saudi Arabia and Tehran’s long-awaited entry into the SCO. For the Raisi administration, it was also the chance to lay down the vision of a triangular partnership among Iran, China, and Russia.
Beyond this attempt to be seen as a key partner to two bigger powers, Raisi has also plunged headlong into the developing world. In the space of a month, he toured South America and Africa, stopping in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba, and then Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Excluding Kenya, all the other countries share Iran’s poor relations with the West and its revisionist ambitions. To varying degrees, all are subject to U.S. sanctions. The lure of a global coalition of revisionist, sanctioned states with Iran at their center was in full display.
Yet, despite some successes, cracks in these new and refurbished alignments have emerged. At different times in the past few months, China and Russia have both openly endorsed a long-standing claim by the United Arab Emirates to three Persian Gulf islands controlled by Iran since 1971. Such attacks on Iran’s sovereignty, which generated rage in Tehran, clearly suggest that, as put by Elaheh Koulaei, a professor of political science at Tehran University, great powers ultimately act to “enhance their national interests,” no matter how firm their partnerships are with Iran. At the same time, whether economic and transit cooperation between Russia and Iran will bear its promised fruits remains debatable.
The economy is also the crux of China-Iran relations. Despite periodic announcements, the effective implementation of a 25-year comprehensive strategic partnership remains distant, with bilateral trade and investment data showing continued underperformance. China is indeed importing record amounts of oil from Iran, but this offers only a meager lifeline to the Islamic Republic while underlining how much revenue Tehran is losing to circumvent U.S. sanctions. Iran also maintains political and economic ties with Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, but together they hardly amount to an economic powerhouse.
The truth is that Iran’s strategy — consolidating ties with China (and Russia), expanding Tehran’s global outreach, and betting on the emergence of stronger Eurasian institutions — loses significance when it is not part of a more balanced foreign policy. For Iran, neglecting the West and failing to resolve the nuclear crisis – thus remaining under the axe of Washington’s secondary sanctions – strongly limits Tehran’s opportunity to expand economic and financial relations with Eastern partners.
For now, the Iran-Saudi Arabia agreement is holding, and there are signs it might generate a domino effect that will lead to diplomatic reconciliation with Egypt and Bahrain. But the regional equilibrium remains fragile, and although the Middle East undoubtedly gains from a shot of stability, one could candidly ask what the concrete benefits are for Iran beyond the feat of defying international isolation. Again, without a foreign policy that balances the neighborhood, the East, and the West, Tehran risks losing the potential benefits of regional rapprochement.
Paradoxically, because of its latest, albeit Pyrrhic, victories, Iran’s foreign policy appears trapped in ideological self-satisfaction: the lure of successfully building the coveted anti-hegemonic front obscures the limits of a foreign policy that lacks balance and vision.
Jacopo Scita, PhD, is a Policy Fellow at the Bourse & Bazaar Foundation, where he researches China’s relations with the countries of the Middle East and Central Asia, especially Iran.
The Delusional Lure of Iran’s ‘Anti-Hegemonic’ Front
By Jacopo Scita
Middle East & North Africa
While most of the Middle East is enjoying a new “multialigned” momentum, Iran has regressed to pursuing a two-decade-old “Look to the East” policy at full speed.
Iran’s leaders have reacted to the apparent death of the 2015 nuclear deal and growing ostracism in Europe due to Iran’s military support for Russia’s war in Ukraine by seeking friends and partners among those sympathetic to its revisionist struggle. But with great powers that ultimately are self-interested and junior partners that have little to offer, the notion of building a successful anti-hegemonic front is more delusion than reality.
Today, the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy appears guided by three interconnected assumptions: first, a rupture from a recent past in which, according to the administration of President Ebrahim Raisi, Iran neglected its ties with China, Russia, and the developing world. Second, the not-so-openly-expressed idea that Tehran can substitute a new web of partnerships for economic and political relationships with Europe and Western-aligned Asian countries. Lastly, the perception that the global order, pushed by the Ukraine War, is shifting from a declining West to a powerful East, and that Iran has a leadership role to play in that arena. All these assumptions, however, seem more the product of an ideological worldview than of realistic calculation.
Internationalism and Third-Worldism have long been a key element of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy and it has participated actively in such fora as the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77. This activism reflects these countries’ ambition of building anti-hegemonic coalitions with like-minded partners, usually directed against the United States. China, for instance, has historically been the object of Iran’s courtship. Beijing has often echoed Tehran’s rhetoric but never fully embraced its militant anti-Americanism for the obvious reason that the U.S. and Chinese economies are closely interconnected.
Two years into its tenure and contending with widespread popular discontent, the Raisi government has tried to deflect attention from domestic problems by scoring successes abroad. Given that Raisi came to power with little-to-no international experience and appointed a foreign minister whose charisma and knowledge pales compared to that of his predecessor, Raisi nevertheless achieved a historic de-escalation agreement with Saudi Arabia and Iran’s full membership in the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Both achievements are consistent with the two foreign policy priorities the Raisi administration and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei have set: improving relations with neighboring countries and reviving the “Look to the East” policy.
The policy includes what amounts to a “pariah partnership” with Russia that at its core involves critical Iranian military help for the Kremlin’s war of aggression against Ukraine. This relationship gives Tehran the sense of being an essential partner to similarly sanction-burdened Moscow. Iran has also avidly pursued a closer relationship with China. Last February, Raisi embarked on the first state visit of an Iranian president to China since Mohammad Khatami in 2000. The trip paved the way for Beijing’s mediation between Iran and Saudi Arabia and Tehran’s long-awaited entry into the SCO. For the Raisi administration, it was also the chance to lay down the vision of a triangular partnership among Iran, China, and Russia.
Beyond this attempt to be seen as a key partner to two bigger powers, Raisi has also plunged headlong into the developing world. In the space of a month, he toured South America and Africa, stopping in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba, and then Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Excluding Kenya, all the other countries share Iran’s poor relations with the West and its revisionist ambitions. To varying degrees, all are subject to U.S. sanctions. The lure of a global coalition of revisionist, sanctioned states with Iran at their center was in full display.
Yet, despite some successes, cracks in these new and refurbished alignments have emerged. At different times in the past few months, China and Russia have both openly endorsed a long-standing claim by the United Arab Emirates to three Persian Gulf islands controlled by Iran since 1971. Such attacks on Iran’s sovereignty, which generated rage in Tehran, clearly suggest that, as put by Elaheh Koulaei, a professor of political science at Tehran University, great powers ultimately act to “enhance their national interests,” no matter how firm their partnerships are with Iran. At the same time, whether economic and transit cooperation between Russia and Iran will bear its promised fruits remains debatable.
The economy is also the crux of China-Iran relations. Despite periodic announcements, the effective implementation of a 25-year comprehensive strategic partnership remains distant, with bilateral trade and investment data showing continued underperformance. China is indeed importing record amounts of oil from Iran, but this offers only a meager lifeline to the Islamic Republic while underlining how much revenue Tehran is losing to circumvent U.S. sanctions. Iran also maintains political and economic ties with Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, but together they hardly amount to an economic powerhouse.
The truth is that Iran’s strategy — consolidating ties with China (and Russia), expanding Tehran’s global outreach, and betting on the emergence of stronger Eurasian institutions — loses significance when it is not part of a more balanced foreign policy. For Iran, neglecting the West and failing to resolve the nuclear crisis – thus remaining under the axe of Washington’s secondary sanctions – strongly limits Tehran’s opportunity to expand economic and financial relations with Eastern partners.
For now, the Iran-Saudi Arabia agreement is holding, and there are signs it might generate a domino effect that will lead to diplomatic reconciliation with Egypt and Bahrain. But the regional equilibrium remains fragile, and although the Middle East undoubtedly gains from a shot of stability, one could candidly ask what the concrete benefits are for Iran beyond the feat of defying international isolation. Again, without a foreign policy that balances the neighborhood, the East, and the West, Tehran risks losing the potential benefits of regional rapprochement.
Paradoxically, because of its latest, albeit Pyrrhic, victories, Iran’s foreign policy appears trapped in ideological self-satisfaction: the lure of successfully building the coveted anti-hegemonic front obscures the limits of a foreign policy that lacks balance and vision.
Jacopo Scita, PhD, is a Policy Fellow at the Bourse & Bazaar Foundation, where he researches China’s relations with the countries of the Middle East and Central Asia, especially Iran.
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