On July 12th, 2023, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi embarked on a tour of Africa. The trip marked the first time an Iranian president had visited the continent since Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a decade earlier. Over three days, Raisi and his delegation, including Iran’s foreign minister and business leaders, met with presidents and other top officials in Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. The aim was to expand economic and trade ties and explore political commonalities.
Since the beginning of his presidency, Raisi has prioritized resetting relations with Africa. His predecessor, Hassan Rouhani, had disengaged from the continent in his first term while focusing on nuclear negotiations with the United States and other world powers. That left the region open to diplomacy by Iran’s wealthy regional rivals, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Many African countries joined the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen and cut formal ties with Tehran when Riyadh did in 2016.
It was against this backdrop that Raisi sought to salvage relations as well as diminish Iran’s growing isolation since the U.S. withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal and reimposed sanctions against Iran in 2018. The Africa trip followed a Raisi mission to three Latin American states — Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba — that have been ostracized by the U.S.
Raisi sought to strengthen relations with the three African countries by leveraging opportunities in economics, geopolitics, ideology, and culture. However, sizeable obstacles will prevent relations from fully flourishing and Iran from dramatically shifting its foreign policy orientation southward.
It makes sense for Iran to focus on Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Next to South Africa, Kenya has ranked as Iran’s second-largest trading partner in Africa since before the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Kenya exports tea (its largest global export in 2021) to Iran and imports petroleum, chemicals, and carpets. Â
Zimbabwe and Uganda are relatively insignificant trading partners for Iran but still hold some commercial value. Since 2008, both have been the location of Iranian tractor manufacturing and assembly plants. Iran has exported tractors to Uganda, alongside South Africa and Sudan. Since 2008, Iran has also provided training to Uganda in developing fisheries.
In the area of agriculture, Uganda has been the site of extra-territorial food production for Iran since 2008 when Uganda, along with Senegal, transferred land to Iran to cultivate oil seeds and other crops. Raisi toured these farms and fields in Uganda during his recent trip.
In 2011, Ahmadinejad aspired to establish trade ties with Zimbabwe in agriculture and mining. Rouhani’s government also cooperated to some extent with both Uganda and Zimbabwe on promoting agricultural production, food security, and biodiversity, as well as combatting drought, desertification, and livestock disease.
Geopolitically, Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe have been of assistance to Iran. They have held seats and memberships in important multilateral institutions including the UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly, and the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Board of Governors. As such, they have occasionally been able to tone down pivotal votes, resolutions, and sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program and human rights record. Furthermore, Uganda and Zimbabwe produce and export uranium, the chief resource for Iran’s nuclear program. Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe have also tried to help Iran counteract U.S. sanctions. In 2017, anticipating the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal, Rouhani announced plans to reestablish banking and financial ties with Uganda, in addition to South Africa and Niger.Â
Ideologically and culturally, Iran has sought connections with African states. Like Ahmadinejad, and in light of Iran’s shared (semi-) colonial history, Raisi emphasized anti-imperialism (and in the case of Uganda anti-homosexuality) during his tour. In Zimbabwe, where the Islamic Republic had a longstanding relationship with the late President Robert Mugabe, such rhetoric resonated with a rogue state that has been similarly subjected to international sanctions and embargoes. Iran has also sought religious inroads in Kenya and Uganda, despite the fact that they are predominantly Christian, establishing associations and schools, distributing publications, training leaders, and converting some locals to Shi’ism.                  Â
Still, Iran’s connections with these countries pale by comparison with Iran’s Arab rivals and the United States. In 2021, the U.S. was Kenya’s third largest export partner, while the U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia were its top import partners. The U.A.E. was by far Uganda’s top export partner and its fifth largest import partner. Similarly, the U.A.E. was far and away Zimbabwe’s top export partner and its third largest import partner.
Historically, Iran’s trade with Africa – which averaged 2.51% of its total trade between 1962 and 2018 – suggests that Raisi’s tour is unlikely to be an economic game changer. Iran is a lower-middle-income country that is dealing with draconian sanctions and other serious challenges that limit its ability to invest overseas. Kenya and Zimbabwe (which is also under sanctions) share the same status, while Uganda is a low-income country.
Iran has exported small arms to Africa but Israel and Saudi Arabia do so as well and also provide agricultural, commercial, and other developmental assistance to the continent.
Ideologically and culturally, challenges also exist. While Iran’s revolutionary and anti-imperialist rhetoric may have been attractive to some, its Shia Muslim identity in Christian-majority countries is less appealing. In 1986 on a similar tour to Africa, then-President (now Supreme Leader) Ali Khamenei refused to shake hands with the women in Mugabe’s government. In 2014, Iran’s longtime ally, Sudan, closed Iran’s cultural center and expelled its cultural attaché and other officials for proselytizing Shiism in the Sunni-majority country. Sudan was also under Saudi pressure then to downgrade and subsequently sever ties with Iran during the Yemeni Civil War.
The recent China-brokered diplomatic agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia and ceasefire talks in Yemen should increase Africa’s diplomatic flexibility to develop closer ties with Iran, without being caught in zero-sum, Middle Eastern and sectarian rivalry. That said, reduced Middle East tensions will be insufficient to surmount the sizeable obstacles that restrict Africa’s relations with Iran, especially if Iran is unable to achieve relief from U.S. economic sanctions.
Eric Lob is an associate professor of politics and international relations at Florida International University and a non-resident scholar with the Middle East Institute Iran Program.
Raisi Goes to Africa in Search of Allies for Iran
By Eric Lob
Middle East & North Africa
On July 12th, 2023, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi embarked on a tour of Africa. The trip marked the first time an Iranian president had visited the continent since Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a decade earlier. Over three days, Raisi and his delegation, including Iran’s foreign minister and business leaders, met with presidents and other top officials in Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. The aim was to expand economic and trade ties and explore political commonalities.
Since the beginning of his presidency, Raisi has prioritized resetting relations with Africa. His predecessor, Hassan Rouhani, had disengaged from the continent in his first term while focusing on nuclear negotiations with the United States and other world powers. That left the region open to diplomacy by Iran’s wealthy regional rivals, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Many African countries joined the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen and cut formal ties with Tehran when Riyadh did in 2016.
It was against this backdrop that Raisi sought to salvage relations as well as diminish Iran’s growing isolation since the U.S. withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal and reimposed sanctions against Iran in 2018. The Africa trip followed a Raisi mission to three Latin American states — Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba — that have been ostracized by the U.S.
Raisi sought to strengthen relations with the three African countries by leveraging opportunities in economics, geopolitics, ideology, and culture. However, sizeable obstacles will prevent relations from fully flourishing and Iran from dramatically shifting its foreign policy orientation southward.
It makes sense for Iran to focus on Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Next to South Africa, Kenya has ranked as Iran’s second-largest trading partner in Africa since before the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Kenya exports tea (its largest global export in 2021) to Iran and imports petroleum, chemicals, and carpets. Â
Zimbabwe and Uganda are relatively insignificant trading partners for Iran but still hold some commercial value. Since 2008, both have been the location of Iranian tractor manufacturing and assembly plants. Iran has exported tractors to Uganda, alongside South Africa and Sudan. Since 2008, Iran has also provided training to Uganda in developing fisheries.
In the area of agriculture, Uganda has been the site of extra-territorial food production for Iran since 2008 when Uganda, along with Senegal, transferred land to Iran to cultivate oil seeds and other crops. Raisi toured these farms and fields in Uganda during his recent trip.
In 2011, Ahmadinejad aspired to establish trade ties with Zimbabwe in agriculture and mining. Rouhani’s government also cooperated to some extent with both Uganda and Zimbabwe on promoting agricultural production, food security, and biodiversity, as well as combatting drought, desertification, and livestock disease.
Geopolitically, Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe have been of assistance to Iran. They have held seats and memberships in important multilateral institutions including the UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly, and the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Board of Governors. As such, they have occasionally been able to tone down pivotal votes, resolutions, and sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program and human rights record. Furthermore, Uganda and Zimbabwe produce and export uranium, the chief resource for Iran’s nuclear program. Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe have also tried to help Iran counteract U.S. sanctions. In 2017, anticipating the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal, Rouhani announced plans to reestablish banking and financial ties with Uganda, in addition to South Africa and Niger.Â
Ideologically and culturally, Iran has sought connections with African states. Like Ahmadinejad, and in light of Iran’s shared (semi-) colonial history, Raisi emphasized anti-imperialism (and in the case of Uganda anti-homosexuality) during his tour. In Zimbabwe, where the Islamic Republic had a longstanding relationship with the late President Robert Mugabe, such rhetoric resonated with a rogue state that has been similarly subjected to international sanctions and embargoes. Iran has also sought religious inroads in Kenya and Uganda, despite the fact that they are predominantly Christian, establishing associations and schools, distributing publications, training leaders, and converting some locals to Shi’ism.                  Â
Still, Iran’s connections with these countries pale by comparison with Iran’s Arab rivals and the United States. In 2021, the U.S. was Kenya’s third largest export partner, while the U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia were its top import partners. The U.A.E. was by far Uganda’s top export partner and its fifth largest import partner. Similarly, the U.A.E. was far and away Zimbabwe’s top export partner and its third largest import partner.
Historically, Iran’s trade with Africa – which averaged 2.51% of its total trade between 1962 and 2018 – suggests that Raisi’s tour is unlikely to be an economic game changer. Iran is a lower-middle-income country that is dealing with draconian sanctions and other serious challenges that limit its ability to invest overseas. Kenya and Zimbabwe (which is also under sanctions) share the same status, while Uganda is a low-income country.
Iran has exported small arms to Africa but Israel and Saudi Arabia do so as well and also provide agricultural, commercial, and other developmental assistance to the continent.
Ideologically and culturally, challenges also exist. While Iran’s revolutionary and anti-imperialist rhetoric may have been attractive to some, its Shia Muslim identity in Christian-majority countries is less appealing. In 1986 on a similar tour to Africa, then-President (now Supreme Leader) Ali Khamenei refused to shake hands with the women in Mugabe’s government. In 2014, Iran’s longtime ally, Sudan, closed Iran’s cultural center and expelled its cultural attaché and other officials for proselytizing Shiism in the Sunni-majority country. Sudan was also under Saudi pressure then to downgrade and subsequently sever ties with Iran during the Yemeni Civil War.
The recent China-brokered diplomatic agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia and ceasefire talks in Yemen should increase Africa’s diplomatic flexibility to develop closer ties with Iran, without being caught in zero-sum, Middle Eastern and sectarian rivalry. That said, reduced Middle East tensions will be insufficient to surmount the sizeable obstacles that restrict Africa’s relations with Iran, especially if Iran is unable to achieve relief from U.S. economic sanctions.
Eric Lob is an associate professor of politics and international relations at Florida International University and a non-resident scholar with the Middle East Institute Iran Program.
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