This week’s NATO summit in Washington left no mistake that China is now a focus of the alliance: The final communiqué, approved by all 32 NATO members, called China a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war against Ukraine, expressed concern over its expanding nuclear arsenal, and accused Beijing of conducting “sustained and malicious cyber and hybrid activities” and employing “coercive tactics and efforts to divide the Alliance.” Lest there be any doubt that NATO has China in its sights, NATO reaffirmed that the “Indo-Pacific is important for NATO” and promised to continue to deepening cooperation with its Indo-Pacific partners—Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea, also known as the Indo-Pacific 4 (IP4)—on matters of shared security concerns involving China as well as Russia and North Korea. Put simply, NATO dispensed with the diplomatic niceties and fired a warning shot across the bow.
Predictably, China did not take the rebuke sitting down. “The declaration of the NATO summit in Washington is full of Cold War mentality and belligerent rhetoric, and China-related content is full of provocations, lies, incitement, and smears,” a spokesperson for China’s mission to the European Union responded. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson in Beijing likewise accused NATO of “malicious intent.” Earlier in the week, Beijing had sent its own strategic message to NATO, opting to the start bilateral military exercises with Belarus close to NATO ally Poland’s border on the eve of the summit. The timing was hardly a coincidence, nor was the message subtle: If NATO continues to extend its reach into China’s own backyard, Beijing can return the favor in kind.
Tragically, NATO and China seem locked into a classic security dilemma. Even though NATO’s motives are defensive, and its associated rhetoric and expanding practical cooperation with the IP4 is a response to China’s actions, such as its material backing of Russia’s war economy, its policies and statements still appear threatening to Beijing and elicit its backlash. At the same time, NATO increasingly view Beijing’s actions as actively undercutting the rules-based order, but it is unable or unwilling to acknowledge that its own policies, including its deepening cooperation with the IP4, amount to a change of the status quo as well—and something that provokes Beijing to act more aggressively toward the alliance, its member countries, and IP4 partners.
Take NATO’s interpretation of Beijing’s exercises with Belarus: When asked about the drills, NATO Jens Stoltenberg said, “The Chinese exercise together with Belarusian forces … just confirms how authoritarian regimes are aligning more and more, and also how China is coming closer to NATO, in Europe, in Africa and the Arctic and elsewhere.” In other words, Beijing’s message to NATO was lost in translation, and instead it succeeded in only hardening suspicions and feelings of European insecurity. Likewise, NATO’s sharp summit communiqué took an already tense situation, and made it worse, seeming to confirm in Beijing its worst fears about the alliance’s intentions. For NATO, as well as its Indo-Pacific partners, there are few upsides to continuing down this path: practical cooperation with the IP4 in areas like cybersecurity and disinformation will do little to strengthen deterrence against China in practice but it will be just enough to feed Beijing’s paranoia and further stoke tensions. Beijing’s support of Russia is a problem for NATO, and the IP4 face serious threats from China’s growing power and assertiveness in the region, but NATO’s tilt toward Asia could spark the very conflict the alliance is seeking to defuse.
Is NATO Making a Strategic Blunder?
By Kelly A. Grieco
Grand Strategy
This week’s NATO summit in Washington left no mistake that China is now a focus of the alliance: The final communiqué, approved by all 32 NATO members, called China a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war against Ukraine, expressed concern over its expanding nuclear arsenal, and accused Beijing of conducting “sustained and malicious cyber and hybrid activities” and employing “coercive tactics and efforts to divide the Alliance.” Lest there be any doubt that NATO has China in its sights, NATO reaffirmed that the “Indo-Pacific is important for NATO” and promised to continue to deepening cooperation with its Indo-Pacific partners—Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea, also known as the Indo-Pacific 4 (IP4)—on matters of shared security concerns involving China as well as Russia and North Korea. Put simply, NATO dispensed with the diplomatic niceties and fired a warning shot across the bow.
Predictably, China did not take the rebuke sitting down. “The declaration of the NATO summit in Washington is full of Cold War mentality and belligerent rhetoric, and China-related content is full of provocations, lies, incitement, and smears,” a spokesperson for China’s mission to the European Union responded. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson in Beijing likewise accused NATO of “malicious intent.” Earlier in the week, Beijing had sent its own strategic message to NATO, opting to the start bilateral military exercises with Belarus close to NATO ally Poland’s border on the eve of the summit. The timing was hardly a coincidence, nor was the message subtle: If NATO continues to extend its reach into China’s own backyard, Beijing can return the favor in kind.
Tragically, NATO and China seem locked into a classic security dilemma. Even though NATO’s motives are defensive, and its associated rhetoric and expanding practical cooperation with the IP4 is a response to China’s actions, such as its material backing of Russia’s war economy, its policies and statements still appear threatening to Beijing and elicit its backlash. At the same time, NATO increasingly view Beijing’s actions as actively undercutting the rules-based order, but it is unable or unwilling to acknowledge that its own policies, including its deepening cooperation with the IP4, amount to a change of the status quo as well—and something that provokes Beijing to act more aggressively toward the alliance, its member countries, and IP4 partners.
Take NATO’s interpretation of Beijing’s exercises with Belarus: When asked about the drills, NATO Jens Stoltenberg said, “The Chinese exercise together with Belarusian forces … just confirms how authoritarian regimes are aligning more and more, and also how China is coming closer to NATO, in Europe, in Africa and the Arctic and elsewhere.” In other words, Beijing’s message to NATO was lost in translation, and instead it succeeded in only hardening suspicions and feelings of European insecurity. Likewise, NATO’s sharp summit communiqué took an already tense situation, and made it worse, seeming to confirm in Beijing its worst fears about the alliance’s intentions. For NATO, as well as its Indo-Pacific partners, there are few upsides to continuing down this path: practical cooperation with the IP4 in areas like cybersecurity and disinformation will do little to strengthen deterrence against China in practice but it will be just enough to feed Beijing’s paranoia and further stoke tensions. Beijing’s support of Russia is a problem for NATO, and the IP4 face serious threats from China’s growing power and assertiveness in the region, but NATO’s tilt toward Asia could spark the very conflict the alliance is seeking to defuse.
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