In the 1987 comedy “Planes, Trains and Automobiles, Steve Martin famously tells his long-winded and abrasive travel partner, John Candy, “When you’re telling a story, here’s a good idea: have a point.”
The same sentiment can be applied to the January 3, 2026, U.S. military operation that captured Venezuela’s president, Nicolas Maduro: “When you’re attacking a country and deposing its leader, here’s a good idea: have a point.”
“Did the U.S. achieve its stated goals?” is a key criterion for assessing the success or failure of using military force.
Yet, in the three weeks since Maduro’s capture, the Trump administration has been unable to come up with a consistent explanation for why it launched the operation.
Nominally, the mission to bring Maduro to the United States was a law enforcement operation intended to enforce a 2020 indictment of the Venezuelan strongman for drug trafficking. The operation bears resemblance to 1989’s Operation Just Cause, when U.S. troops invaded Panama to capture President Manuel Noriega and bring him to the United States to also face drug trafficking charges.
However, just six weeks ago, President Trump pardoned former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernandez, who was convicted of drug trafficking and was serving time in a federal prison in the United States.
Moreover, approximately 1% of illegal drugs in the United States originate from Venezuela, so if the Trump administration is focused on stanching the flow of drugs to the United States, Venezuela is not the root of the problem.
However, even if narco-trafficking is just a fig leaf explanation, in the weeks since his capture, members of the Trump administration have been singing from very different hymnals when discussing the operation’s goals.
For example, at a meeting of the UN Security Council, U.S. Ambassador Mike Waltz declared,
“We’re not going to allow the Western Hemisphere to be used as a base of operation for our nation’s adversaries, and competitors, and rivals of the United States. You can’t turn Venezuela into the operating hub for Iran, for Hizballah, for gangs, for the Cuban intelligence agents and other malign actors that control that country. You cannot continue to have the largest energy reserves in the world under the control of adversaries of the United States, under the control of illegitimate leaders, and not benefiting the people of Venezuela, and stolen by a handful of oligarchs inside of Venezuela.”
Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Marco Rubio used similar language, noting “We’re not going to allow the Western Hemisphere to be a base of operation for adversaries, competitors, and rivals of the United States.”
This would suggest that the real goal of the Venezuela operation had little to do with Venezuela and was instead about sending a signal to nations like China and Russia that are looking to meddle in the region, or Latin American countries open to working with them.
Moreover, many national security analysts whom we spoke to have speculated that the real goal of the Maduro operation is linked to Rubio’s desire to liberate Cuba from more than 60 years of Communist rule.
Rubio, who is the child of Cuban immigrants, has been one of the loudest voices within the Trump administration pushing for regime change in Havana. Considering the close ties between Caracas and the Castro regime, removing Maduro could, in turn, further weaken Cuba. And according to recent reporting in the Wall Street Journal, “Trump officials privately say the brazen raid that extracted Maduro should serve as an implicit threat to Havana.”
Much of Rubio’s criticism of both Maduro and the regime in Cuba has focused on both countries’ authoritarian governments. This is consistent with a key U.S. policy objective in Latin America since the end of the Cold War: upholding democratic norms.
Indeed, Waltz said Maduro “unlawfully refused to peacefully cede power after the Venezuelan people voted him out of office in the 2024 election” and was therefore an illegitimate leader.
Yet, the Trump administration has not called for the presumed winner of that election, Edmundo González, to take office, or the ascendance of Nobel Peace Prize winner María Corina Machado, for whom González was generally seen as a stand-in.
In fact, President Trump publicly dismissed the idea of Machado taking office, claiming that she doesn’t have the “respect” of the Venezuelan people.
Even more discordant are claims made by President Trump that the United States intends to “run” Venezuela, even though there are no American troops on the ground. Trump has also said repeatedly that he expects the U.S. to take Venezuela’s oil – and he’s even claimed that Venezuela is providing millions of barrels of oil to the United States.
For Trump, the U.S. goals in Venezuela appear to be purely transactional — and bear little relationship to the statements made by Waltz and Rubio.
To be sure, this would hardly be the first time that U.S. officials had multiple objectives when employing military force. Views from the Pentagon, Foggy Bottom, or the White House can certainly differ, even if all parties supported intervention.
But rarely do policymakers offer such a hodgepodge of contradictory statements about the political objectives of a military operation.
What Are the Costs?
The U.S. raid to capture Maduro clearly accomplished its operational goals, and from that narrow perspective, one could certainly judge the mission a success.
Moreover, the limited nature of the military operation in Venezuela means that the likely impact on the U.S. and its national interests will be modest. Venezuela has been in economic freefall for some time, and while it has cultivated relations with Moscow and Beijing, it’s more a source of regional instability than influence.
However, there are direct and indirect costs to this conflict that policymakers ideally should have taken into account before using military force.
First, by removing Maduro, the US has introduced instability into what was an already uncertain situation. With a power vacuum emerging following Maduro’s departure, there is heightened potential for increased corruption, drug trafficking, and even large-scale migration.
That brings us back to the 1989 invasion of Panama. Unlike the Venezuela operation, U.S. policymakers didn’t simply ignore the power vacuum that would follow Noriega’s departure (though critics have argued that far less thought went into post-war planning than appropriate). U.S. troops were given constabulary responsibilities following the invasion, and a significant effort was made to ensure stability and security in Panama after U.S. troops departed.
None of these issues appear to have been addressed before Maduro’s capture. Indeed, according to reporting in Politico, “There was no interagency process to develop an after-action plan.”
So far, the situation in Venezuela has remained relatively calm, so it seems the people of Venezuela and its neighbors dodged a bullet … for now.
Second, while the United States is unlikely to bear significant direct economic or military costs for its Venezuelan foray, broader reputational issues are now in play.
Since the invasion of Panama, the U.S. has largely eschewed the type of gunboat diplomacy that once defined U.S. relations in Latin America.
As a result, the U.S. has built trust in the hemisphere – along with stronger economic and political relationships. While many in Latin America are cheering Maduro’s departure – and are likely wary of openly criticizing Trump’s action – the Venezuela operation could potentially strain U.S. bilateral relationships and erode confidence in the United States as a stable and respectful political and economic partner. (For several months, the U.S. has been saber-rattling with Colombia over drug trafficking and Colombian president Gustavo Petro’s left-wing politics.)
As Stimson Center Senior Fellow Benjamin Gedan has written, had the “military might been wielded for the good of the Venezuelan people, the implications for the U.S. image and its diplomatic relationships might be different. After all, the International Criminal Court was investigating Maduro for crimes against humanity. Now, however, it is the United States under scrutiny for violating international law. Many Latin Americans who had complained in recent decades of U.S. inattention might suddenly be nostalgic for the quiet era of benign neglect.”
It bears noting that just a year ago, Trump’s special envoy, Ric Grenell, met with Maduro, and there was talk within the administration of normalizing ties with the Venezuelan strongman. A year later, Maduro is in a jail cell in Brooklyn. Latin American leaders would have good reason to question whether they can trust U.S. officials’ statements or assume that U.S. policy in the region is consistent.
Perhaps this is a momentary hiccup and one that all sides will seek to paper over. But we don’t know, and the Trump administration, by its actions, has again introduced uncertainty and confusion into a region where U.S. policy had been remarkably consistent since the 1990s.
Third, one of the hallmarks of U.S. policy since the end of the Cold War has been support for democracy in the Western Hemisphere. Many remember that Secretary of State Colin Powell was in Peru on September 11, 2001. Less remembered is why he was there: to sign the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which enshrined the principle that “The peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it.”
The disinterest of Trump administration officials in a post-Maduro democratic transition, free and fair elections, or even installing the winner of last year’s election has blown up that long-standing policy goal. Would-be despots in the region may take note and conclude that the United States will not object to democratic backsliding as long as U.S. economic interests are protected. At the very least, the U.S. has signaled to the region that it no longer sees the maintenance of democratic rule as a key national security interest.
Fourth, many Democrats and some Republicans have claimed that Trump’s actions are patently illegal because of the lack of congressional input in the decision to use force. Trump is hardly the first president to use military force without congressional authorization. The question of how broadly the president may exercise the Constitution’s Article II powers remains a point of contention between the executive and legislative branches.
However, unlike previous military operations, the Trump administration didn’t notify Congress until after Maduro had been captured – a disregard of congressional prerogatives that is unique in recent history. Moreover, the administration had been publicly hinting at the potential use of military force in Venezuela for several months. The Trump administration had ample opportunity to seek congressional authorization, particularly given that Congress is controlled by Republicans. These factors suggest that the Venezuela operation, though small in scope, has further eroded Congress’ oversight of foreign policy.
Fifth, there is an idiosyncratic cost of this operation that merits attention: the impact on presidential decision-making.
According to reporting in the Wall Street Journal, which has been confirmed elsewhere, Trump feels emboldened by the Maduro operation, and it is influencing his relations with other countries. The Journal explains:
In the days since Maduro’s capture, Trump has renewed threats against Colombia, criticized Mexico’s leadership, predicted Cuba’s government would fall, and reiterated his desire to take over Greenland. Trump has privately told aides that he is thrilled with the outcome of the Venezuela operation… (Italics added) “He’s more resolved, not less, after this success,” Sen. Lindsey Graham (R., S.C.) said in an interview…“We need to clear up our backyard.” “The theme here is: securing the border is really important. We need to get to the source of the problem.”
The Atlantic offers a similar take:
“The president and his advisers believe that the strike both reignited his political momentum and underscored the lack of concrete limits on his ability to wield power at home and abroad.”
The US military’s success in Venezuela also seemingly encouraged Trump to ramp up his calls for Denmark to sell Greenland to the United States.
Certainly, this would not be the first time that a military victory contributed to hubris and overconfidence, but with Trump, that process seems to be unfolding in real time. And the impact is significant. Trump’s muscular rhetoric on seizing Greenland has strained ties between the U.S. and Europe more severely than at perhaps any other point in Trump’s presidency.
Success in Venezuela may also have contributed to Trump’s interest in using military force in support of pro-democracy protests in Iran, which may have, in turn, led protesters to believe that U.S. help was coming. (In a social media post, Trump encouraged Iranians to continue their protests and promised that help was on the way.)
In short, the limited Venezuela operation has already had a significant – and arguably negative – geopolitical and potentially humanitarian impact far beyond Latin America.
Benefits?
No discussion of the costs of a military operation is complete without considering potential benefits.
Again, it’s worth considering the aftermath of U.S. operations in Panama. Though hamstrung by a lack of planning, the United States ultimately facilitated Panama’s democratic transition, particularly the reconfiguring of its security forces. In doing so, it ensured Panama’s political stability, a vital concern given the Panama Canal’s importance to US. interests. By 1999, the U.S. had fulfilled its obligations under the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty and returned the waterway to Panamanian control.
So, one of the clear benefits to the U.S. of its foray into Panama was the enhanced regional stability it brought. It’s possible that, with Maduro’s departure, Venezuela will enjoy similar post-war success –but, considering the administration’s indifference to the situation in Venezuela, if that happens, it will occur despite, not because of, direct U.S. efforts.
From the standpoint of narco-trafficking, because of Venezuela’s minimal role in shipping illegal drugs to the United States, Maduro’s ouster will likely have little effect.
With respect to the claim that the Venezuela operation was necessary to blunt Chinese influence there and across the region, the evidence is unclear. It is possible that, with Venezuela under renewed U.S. military and economic pressure, the nation’s new leaders will eschew cultivating direct ties to Beijing or Moscow.
But the Maduro smash-and-grab could have wider ramifications that undermine that goal. If the United States is seen as an unstable and potentially predatory actor, willing to use force against leaders it doesn’t like, it could encourage Latin American governments to cover their bases by cultivating deeper economic and political relationships with China — a process that has already begun.
Today, China is the largest trading partner of Brazil, Peru, and Chile. Beijing has also made substantial economic investments in the region and is one of its largest arms suppliers. Already, China is reaping the rewards of this policy approach. After major Chinese investments in Panama, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic, all three countries cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan.
Even Trump’s own recent National Security Strategy acknowledged that “Some foreign influence [in the Western Hemisphere] will be hard to reverse.” In short, at a time when China is using soft power tools to build influence, the U.S. is falling back on hard power tactics that have, in the past, alienated Latin American countries.
If the White House wanted to blunt Chinese influence in Latin America, reducing tariffs and eschewing military forays that remind the region of America’s past meddling would have been a far better path.
Of course, events could also go in the opposite direction: Latin American countries could seek closer relations with the U.S. to avoid upsetting Trump. But the trend lines suggest that Trump’s actions will do little to stop China from playing a major role in the region’s future — and if anything, might accelerate that process.
For the administration, the best-case scenario for this operation is a continuation of the status quo in Venezuela and the country not descending into political turmoil. Moreover, if China is persuaded to pump the brakes on its economic and diplomatic forays into the region, and if Latin American countries are persuaded to do the same in their relationship with China, the Trump administration can count these developments as wins. But, at this point, those are major ifs.
Conclusion
The U.S. military mission in Venezuela was, on the surface, an overwhelming success. President Nicolas Maduro was captured and brought to the United States to stand trial. No American troops lost their lives in the mission (though dozens of Cubans and Venezuelans were killed), and while the U.S. action risked creating a political vacuum in Venezuela, so far the country has remained stable.
But as is often the case whenever military force is used, the unintended consequences loom large. Trump’s actions risk driving Latin American leaders into the arms of China, both economically and politically. They have undermined the U.S. position in the region, including U.S. support for democracy, and risk returning the relationship between the U.S. and Latin America to one of suspicion and mistrust. And, in the meantime, and most immediately, Maduro’s seizure has emboldened Trump on the world stage, pushing him into a needless confrontation with Europe and other key U.S. allies.
In short, even for a limited military mission, the unintended consequences of Trump’s military foray could be severe and far-reaching — all the more reason to ask if it is worth it before putting American troops in harm’s way.
Was Venezuela Worth It?
By Michael Cohen
Grand Strategy
While the U.S. operation against Maduro was undoubtedly a success from an operational perspective, there are still many unanswered questions about how it advances U.S. interests. This fits into a broader pattern for the use of force by the United States: Too often, the more subtle, long-term costs of going to war are discounted by policymakers. This piece assesses the benefits and costs of the Maduro operation and argues that the capture of Maduro does not meaningfully advance U.S. security and risks undermining the United States’ position in Latin America and the international system more broadly.
In the 1987 comedy “Planes, Trains and Automobiles, Steve Martin famously tells his long-winded and abrasive travel partner, John Candy, “When you’re telling a story, here’s a good idea: have a point.”
The same sentiment can be applied to the January 3, 2026, U.S. military operation that captured Venezuela’s president, Nicolas Maduro: “When you’re attacking a country and deposing its leader, here’s a good idea: have a point.”
“Did the U.S. achieve its stated goals?” is a key criterion for assessing the success or failure of using military force.
Yet, in the three weeks since Maduro’s capture, the Trump administration has been unable to come up with a consistent explanation for why it launched the operation.
Nominally, the mission to bring Maduro to the United States was a law enforcement operation intended to enforce a 2020 indictment of the Venezuelan strongman for drug trafficking. The operation bears resemblance to 1989’s Operation Just Cause, when U.S. troops invaded Panama to capture President Manuel Noriega and bring him to the United States to also face drug trafficking charges.
However, just six weeks ago, President Trump pardoned former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernandez, who was convicted of drug trafficking and was serving time in a federal prison in the United States.
Moreover, approximately 1% of illegal drugs in the United States originate from Venezuela, so if the Trump administration is focused on stanching the flow of drugs to the United States, Venezuela is not the root of the problem.
However, even if narco-trafficking is just a fig leaf explanation, in the weeks since his capture, members of the Trump administration have been singing from very different hymnals when discussing the operation’s goals.
For example, at a meeting of the UN Security Council, U.S. Ambassador Mike Waltz declared,
“We’re not going to allow the Western Hemisphere to be used as a base of operation for our nation’s adversaries, and competitors, and rivals of the United States. You can’t turn Venezuela into the operating hub for Iran, for Hizballah, for gangs, for the Cuban intelligence agents and other malign actors that control that country. You cannot continue to have the largest energy reserves in the world under the control of adversaries of the United States, under the control of illegitimate leaders, and not benefiting the people of Venezuela, and stolen by a handful of oligarchs inside of Venezuela.”
Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Marco Rubio used similar language, noting “We’re not going to allow the Western Hemisphere to be a base of operation for adversaries, competitors, and rivals of the United States.”
This would suggest that the real goal of the Venezuela operation had little to do with Venezuela and was instead about sending a signal to nations like China and Russia that are looking to meddle in the region, or Latin American countries open to working with them.
Moreover, many national security analysts whom we spoke to have speculated that the real goal of the Maduro operation is linked to Rubio’s desire to liberate Cuba from more than 60 years of Communist rule.
Rubio, who is the child of Cuban immigrants, has been one of the loudest voices within the Trump administration pushing for regime change in Havana. Considering the close ties between Caracas and the Castro regime, removing Maduro could, in turn, further weaken Cuba. And according to recent reporting in the Wall Street Journal, “Trump officials privately say the brazen raid that extracted Maduro should serve as an implicit threat to Havana.”
Much of Rubio’s criticism of both Maduro and the regime in Cuba has focused on both countries’ authoritarian governments. This is consistent with a key U.S. policy objective in Latin America since the end of the Cold War: upholding democratic norms.
Indeed, Waltz said Maduro “unlawfully refused to peacefully cede power after the Venezuelan people voted him out of office in the 2024 election” and was therefore an illegitimate leader.
Yet, the Trump administration has not called for the presumed winner of that election, Edmundo González, to take office, or the ascendance of Nobel Peace Prize winner María Corina Machado, for whom González was generally seen as a stand-in.
In fact, President Trump publicly dismissed the idea of Machado taking office, claiming that she doesn’t have the “respect” of the Venezuelan people.
Even more discordant are claims made by President Trump that the United States intends to “run” Venezuela, even though there are no American troops on the ground. Trump has also said repeatedly that he expects the U.S. to take Venezuela’s oil – and he’s even claimed that Venezuela is providing millions of barrels of oil to the United States.
For Trump, the U.S. goals in Venezuela appear to be purely transactional — and bear little relationship to the statements made by Waltz and Rubio.
To be sure, this would hardly be the first time that U.S. officials had multiple objectives when employing military force. Views from the Pentagon, Foggy Bottom, or the White House can certainly differ, even if all parties supported intervention.
But rarely do policymakers offer such a hodgepodge of contradictory statements about the political objectives of a military operation.
What Are the Costs?
The U.S. raid to capture Maduro clearly accomplished its operational goals, and from that narrow perspective, one could certainly judge the mission a success.
Moreover, the limited nature of the military operation in Venezuela means that the likely impact on the U.S. and its national interests will be modest. Venezuela has been in economic freefall for some time, and while it has cultivated relations with Moscow and Beijing, it’s more a source of regional instability than influence.
However, there are direct and indirect costs to this conflict that policymakers ideally should have taken into account before using military force.
First, by removing Maduro, the US has introduced instability into what was an already uncertain situation. With a power vacuum emerging following Maduro’s departure, there is heightened potential for increased corruption, drug trafficking, and even large-scale migration.
That brings us back to the 1989 invasion of Panama. Unlike the Venezuela operation, U.S. policymakers didn’t simply ignore the power vacuum that would follow Noriega’s departure (though critics have argued that far less thought went into post-war planning than appropriate). U.S. troops were given constabulary responsibilities following the invasion, and a significant effort was made to ensure stability and security in Panama after U.S. troops departed.
None of these issues appear to have been addressed before Maduro’s capture. Indeed, according to reporting in Politico, “There was no interagency process to develop an after-action plan.”
So far, the situation in Venezuela has remained relatively calm, so it seems the people of Venezuela and its neighbors dodged a bullet … for now.
Second, while the United States is unlikely to bear significant direct economic or military costs for its Venezuelan foray, broader reputational issues are now in play.
Since the invasion of Panama, the U.S. has largely eschewed the type of gunboat diplomacy that once defined U.S. relations in Latin America.
As a result, the U.S. has built trust in the hemisphere – along with stronger economic and political relationships. While many in Latin America are cheering Maduro’s departure – and are likely wary of openly criticizing Trump’s action – the Venezuela operation could potentially strain U.S. bilateral relationships and erode confidence in the United States as a stable and respectful political and economic partner. (For several months, the U.S. has been saber-rattling with Colombia over drug trafficking and Colombian president Gustavo Petro’s left-wing politics.)
As Stimson Center Senior Fellow Benjamin Gedan has written, had the “military might been wielded for the good of the Venezuelan people, the implications for the U.S. image and its diplomatic relationships might be different. After all, the International Criminal Court was investigating Maduro for crimes against humanity. Now, however, it is the United States under scrutiny for violating international law. Many Latin Americans who had complained in recent decades of U.S. inattention might suddenly be nostalgic for the quiet era of benign neglect.”
It bears noting that just a year ago, Trump’s special envoy, Ric Grenell, met with Maduro, and there was talk within the administration of normalizing ties with the Venezuelan strongman. A year later, Maduro is in a jail cell in Brooklyn. Latin American leaders would have good reason to question whether they can trust U.S. officials’ statements or assume that U.S. policy in the region is consistent.
Perhaps this is a momentary hiccup and one that all sides will seek to paper over. But we don’t know, and the Trump administration, by its actions, has again introduced uncertainty and confusion into a region where U.S. policy had been remarkably consistent since the 1990s.
Third, one of the hallmarks of U.S. policy since the end of the Cold War has been support for democracy in the Western Hemisphere. Many remember that Secretary of State Colin Powell was in Peru on September 11, 2001. Less remembered is why he was there: to sign the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which enshrined the principle that “The peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it.”
The disinterest of Trump administration officials in a post-Maduro democratic transition, free and fair elections, or even installing the winner of last year’s election has blown up that long-standing policy goal. Would-be despots in the region may take note and conclude that the United States will not object to democratic backsliding as long as U.S. economic interests are protected. At the very least, the U.S. has signaled to the region that it no longer sees the maintenance of democratic rule as a key national security interest.
Fourth, many Democrats and some Republicans have claimed that Trump’s actions are patently illegal because of the lack of congressional input in the decision to use force. Trump is hardly the first president to use military force without congressional authorization. The question of how broadly the president may exercise the Constitution’s Article II powers remains a point of contention between the executive and legislative branches.
However, unlike previous military operations, the Trump administration didn’t notify Congress until after Maduro had been captured – a disregard of congressional prerogatives that is unique in recent history. Moreover, the administration had been publicly hinting at the potential use of military force in Venezuela for several months. The Trump administration had ample opportunity to seek congressional authorization, particularly given that Congress is controlled by Republicans. These factors suggest that the Venezuela operation, though small in scope, has further eroded Congress’ oversight of foreign policy.
Fifth, there is an idiosyncratic cost of this operation that merits attention: the impact on presidential decision-making.
According to reporting in the Wall Street Journal, which has been confirmed elsewhere, Trump feels emboldened by the Maduro operation, and it is influencing his relations with other countries. The Journal explains:
In the days since Maduro’s capture, Trump has renewed threats against Colombia, criticized Mexico’s leadership, predicted Cuba’s government would fall, and reiterated his desire to take over Greenland. Trump has privately told aides that he is thrilled with the outcome of the Venezuela operation… (Italics added) “He’s more resolved, not less, after this success,” Sen. Lindsey Graham (R., S.C.) said in an interview…“We need to clear up our backyard.” “The theme here is: securing the border is really important. We need to get to the source of the problem.”
The Atlantic offers a similar take:
“The president and his advisers believe that the strike both reignited his political momentum and underscored the lack of concrete limits on his ability to wield power at home and abroad.”
The US military’s success in Venezuela also seemingly encouraged Trump to ramp up his calls for Denmark to sell Greenland to the United States.
Certainly, this would not be the first time that a military victory contributed to hubris and overconfidence, but with Trump, that process seems to be unfolding in real time. And the impact is significant. Trump’s muscular rhetoric on seizing Greenland has strained ties between the U.S. and Europe more severely than at perhaps any other point in Trump’s presidency.
Success in Venezuela may also have contributed to Trump’s interest in using military force in support of pro-democracy protests in Iran, which may have, in turn, led protesters to believe that U.S. help was coming. (In a social media post, Trump encouraged Iranians to continue their protests and promised that help was on the way.)
In short, the limited Venezuela operation has already had a significant – and arguably negative – geopolitical and potentially humanitarian impact far beyond Latin America.
Benefits?
No discussion of the costs of a military operation is complete without considering potential benefits.
Again, it’s worth considering the aftermath of U.S. operations in Panama. Though hamstrung by a lack of planning, the United States ultimately facilitated Panama’s democratic transition, particularly the reconfiguring of its security forces. In doing so, it ensured Panama’s political stability, a vital concern given the Panama Canal’s importance to US. interests. By 1999, the U.S. had fulfilled its obligations under the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty and returned the waterway to Panamanian control.
So, one of the clear benefits to the U.S. of its foray into Panama was the enhanced regional stability it brought. It’s possible that, with Maduro’s departure, Venezuela will enjoy similar post-war success –but, considering the administration’s indifference to the situation in Venezuela, if that happens, it will occur despite, not because of, direct U.S. efforts.
From the standpoint of narco-trafficking, because of Venezuela’s minimal role in shipping illegal drugs to the United States, Maduro’s ouster will likely have little effect.
With respect to the claim that the Venezuela operation was necessary to blunt Chinese influence there and across the region, the evidence is unclear. It is possible that, with Venezuela under renewed U.S. military and economic pressure, the nation’s new leaders will eschew cultivating direct ties to Beijing or Moscow.
But the Maduro smash-and-grab could have wider ramifications that undermine that goal. If the United States is seen as an unstable and potentially predatory actor, willing to use force against leaders it doesn’t like, it could encourage Latin American governments to cover their bases by cultivating deeper economic and political relationships with China — a process that has already begun.
Today, China is the largest trading partner of Brazil, Peru, and Chile. Beijing has also made substantial economic investments in the region and is one of its largest arms suppliers. Already, China is reaping the rewards of this policy approach. After major Chinese investments in Panama, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic, all three countries cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan.
Even Trump’s own recent National Security Strategy acknowledged that “Some foreign influence [in the Western Hemisphere] will be hard to reverse.” In short, at a time when China is using soft power tools to build influence, the U.S. is falling back on hard power tactics that have, in the past, alienated Latin American countries.
If the White House wanted to blunt Chinese influence in Latin America, reducing tariffs and eschewing military forays that remind the region of America’s past meddling would have been a far better path.
Of course, events could also go in the opposite direction: Latin American countries could seek closer relations with the U.S. to avoid upsetting Trump. But the trend lines suggest that Trump’s actions will do little to stop China from playing a major role in the region’s future — and if anything, might accelerate that process.
For the administration, the best-case scenario for this operation is a continuation of the status quo in Venezuela and the country not descending into political turmoil. Moreover, if China is persuaded to pump the brakes on its economic and diplomatic forays into the region, and if Latin American countries are persuaded to do the same in their relationship with China, the Trump administration can count these developments as wins. But, at this point, those are major ifs.
Conclusion
The U.S. military mission in Venezuela was, on the surface, an overwhelming success. President Nicolas Maduro was captured and brought to the United States to stand trial. No American troops lost their lives in the mission (though dozens of Cubans and Venezuelans were killed), and while the U.S. action risked creating a political vacuum in Venezuela, so far the country has remained stable.
But as is often the case whenever military force is used, the unintended consequences loom large. Trump’s actions risk driving Latin American leaders into the arms of China, both economically and politically. They have undermined the U.S. position in the region, including U.S. support for democracy, and risk returning the relationship between the U.S. and Latin America to one of suspicion and mistrust. And, in the meantime, and most immediately, Maduro’s seizure has emboldened Trump on the world stage, pushing him into a needless confrontation with Europe and other key U.S. allies.
In short, even for a limited military mission, the unintended consequences of Trump’s military foray could be severe and far-reaching — all the more reason to ask if it is worth it before putting American troops in harm’s way.
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