Bullets Not Hugs? Mexico’s New Old Security Strategy

The high-profile killing of a cartel leader sheds light on the dynamics driving President Sheinbaum’s security policy

On Feb. 22, Mexicans felt a strong sense of déjà vu after the government announced the killing of Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, known as “El Mencho,” the leader of the Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). During the six-year presidency of Felipe Calderón (2006-2012), Mexican security forces routinely targeted organized crime bosses in a “kingpin strategy” designed to disrupt drug trafficking and other illegal activities.

That had become increasingly uncommon, however, especially under President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018-2024), whose “hugs, not bullets” policy sought to undermine gang recruitment by providing jobs to young people.

The new president, Claudia Sheinbaum, is López Obrador’s protégé, and she also prioritizes fighting poverty. But she has come under intense pressure from President Donald Trump to take down fentanyl smugglers, or see the U.S. military do it for her. The killing of “El Mencho” suggests that she got the message.

Yet for Mexicans, satisfying Trump is hardly the only objective of security policy. As the fallout from the daring raid on the CJNG stronghold comes into focus, it is not clear the Mexican government is prepared for persistent confrontations with cartels – or whether a militarized response will have any more success today than in the past.

What’s Old is New

Until recently, it was not entirely clear how much of López Obrador’s “hugs, not bullets” strategy survived under Sheinbaum. The firefight in Jalisco has made clear the breadth and scope of Sheinbaum’s shift. Decisions are made at the National Palace, not Palenque, her predecessor’s retirement home.

Part of the reason is foreign policy. Under López Obrador, who is known as AMLO, Mexico did not face a serious threat of unilateral U.S. military action, such as drone strikes, on Mexican territory. Nor did Mexico enjoy the type of security cooperation needed to take down a kingpin, above all cross-border intelligence sharing and interagency coordination. Sheinbaum, by contrast, is under intense U.S. pressure to act, but also enjoys close U.S. cooperation.

The other difference reflects Sheinbaum’s experience as mayor of Mexico City, where her approach to fighting organized crime relied less on social programs than on sophisticated criminal investigations. Her security chief in the capital city, Omar García Harfuch, now holds that title for the national government. Even before killing “El Mencho,” Sheinbaum had extradited over 100 high-ranking cartel operatives to the United States.

So far, murders appear to be falling nationally under Sheinbaum; in her first State of the Union, she said homicides were down by 25% between September 2024 and June 2025. But in the long term, replicating her successes as mayor will not be straightforward. For one, she must balance results with sovereignty narratives that resonate domestically. If cooperation with Uncle Sam is perceived as involuntary, it will generate political backlash. That is even more likely should Trump make Mexico’s security challenges a topic in midterm political campaigns and resume threats of tariffs and U.S. strikes.

There are also questions about the effectiveness of the “kingpin strategy.” The 2016 capture of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, leader of the Sinaloa Cartel, reminded the Mexican government that high-profile kingpin take-downs disrupt criminal command-and-control structures, but rarely dismantle a criminal enterprise, and often unleash violent splintering.

Those challenges will be even more pronounced in the case of the CJNG, given its decentralized structure and diversified revenue streams: synthetic drugs, fuel theft, extortion, and control of ports. The cartel has a presence in much of Mexico, with influence ranging from the local tortilla shop to the international arms and minerals trade. The raid on the CJNG hideout killed 25 Mexican National Guard members. Immediately after the death of “El Mencho,” violence broke out across Mexico, including the blockading of roadways, raising concerns about security during the World Cup this summer.

Serving Two Masters

Showy violence, such as the attack against “El Mencho,” wins applause in Washington. But Mexicans rightly expect Sheinbaum to develop a sustained approach to weakening cartels. That will require time and resources. Already, she is adopting intelligence-led policing, with specialized units under Harfuch adopting a surgical approach that emphasizes criminal investigations targeting money laundering networks, cartel logistics hubs, and corruption at Mexican ports.

Sheinbaum will also need to build state and municipal capacity. For a start, she is taking steps to expose and disrupt links between organized crime and state and local authorities, including in Operación Enjambre. Under this strategy, dozens of public officials — among them the mayor of Tequila in Jalisco state — have been detained on charges ranging from extortion and homicide to acting as liaisons to the CJNG.

Finally, Mexicans understand that the United States must also play a role, not merely by pressing Mexico to act, but by reducing the consumption of drugs that enriches cartels and interrupting the “iron river” of weapons flowing from the United States into the hands of cartel gunmen.

No matter what, Sheinbaum will face a delicate balance: demonstrate resolve to Mexico’s most important, and trigger happy, partner, while avoiding overreliance on a militarized strategy that has never shown durable results.

Header image: Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum at the 2025 Grito Ceremony. National Palace, Mexico City, Mexico. By EneasMx.

Recent & Related

Commentary
Emma Ashford • Evan Cooper • Kelly A. Grieco...
Podcast Episode 🎧
Melanie Marlowe • Zack Cooper • Kelly A. Grieco