The Strategic Costs of US Strikes Against Venezuela

Recent U.S. strikes on four ships in the Caribbean have led to accusations by domestic groups and foreign governments that the United States is engaging in illegal and bellicose behavior. Now there is discussion of greater U.S. military action, with reports that the Trump administration is considering strikes inside of Venezuela or a war to topple its leader, Nicolas Maduro. Any of the three routes currently being discussed – continuing to carry out strikes on non-combatant ships, escalating targeted attacks within Venezuela, or attempting outright regime change – would leave the United States in a worse position. The Trump administration’s approach is strategically unsound, risking increased regional instability and hostility towards the United States without identifiable benefits.   

The Trump administration has demonstrated its intent to unilaterally escalate in the region. In August, Trump signed a directive that authorized the use of the U.S. military against drug cartels in Latin America, and then went a step further in recent weeks by declaring drug cartel members “unlawful combatants.” These actions read as pretext for significant use of the U.S. military. South American leaders have reacted as such, with Venezuelan President Nicholas Maduro activating civilian militias while urging Venezuelans to “defend the fatherland.” Colombian President Gustavo Petro gave a fiery speech at the United Nations, calling for President Trump to face criminal repercussions for the strikes on ships, while Brazilian president Luiz (Lula) Inacio da Silva used his remarks at a recent BRICS summit to urge U.S. restraint in the Caribbean.  

As this commentary highlights, greater U.S. military action against Venezuela and in the Caribbean poses serious consequences for the United States, with exceedingly little upside. The Trump administration and Congress should reassess their approach or risk pariah status that will only exacerbate underlying issues like drug trafficking and migration.  

Three Bad Options

The Trump administration has not yet made clear its policy towards Venezuela and the Caribbean, but three options have so far been discussed: continuing strikes on ships in the Caribbean, carrying out targeted strikes within Venezuela, or an invasion of Venezuela for the purposes of regime change. This section takes each of the options in turn to discuss the repercussions of each for the United States.  

Ongoing Strikes on Caribbean Ships 

The United States has carried out at least four strikes on civilian ships in the Caribbean, killing a reported 21 people. President Petro said that the most recent strikes killed Colombian citizens and wrote in the aftermath that “A new war zone has opened up: the Caribbean.” Already, the United States is seeing some of the consequences of this approach. There has been widespread condemnation from countries in the region, along with diminishing commercial activity and the threat of legal action from victims’ families.  

If the United States maintains a policy of carrying out strikes against civilians who have received no due process and are not actively engaged in hostilities, there is likely to be additional sanction against the Trump administration along with increasingly hostile views from abroad. In his testimony to the U.S. Senate in 2022 on the value of drone strikes, Ambassador Nathan Sales, who served as Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Counterterrorism, warned: “Civilian casualties can also strain the United States’ relationships with important partner governments, causing them to lose public support and thereby risking instability in countries and regions that are vital to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests.” Given the absence of evidence to prove these boats’ affiliation with cartels, even governments that have previously coordinated on anti-drug efforts with the United States will perceive these policies as a provocation and threat: Already, Gustavo Petro went so far as to say that the strikes are a war against all of Latin America.

Moreover, President Maduro has used the strikes as evidence of U.S. imperialism and overreach, and additional strikes could perversely bolster his hold on power. He has activated Venezuela’s citizen militia in response to U.S. threats, giving him a more prominent image as resisting American aggression. Internationally, the sharp condemnations by other Latin American nations — even ones that did not recognize his election as legitimate — also allow Maduro to present himself as part of a united front against imperialism, complicating efforts to internationally isolate his regime.

Continued strikes would also impact commercial activity in the Caribbean. Fishing, shipping, and tourism could be negatively impacted by ongoing U.S. strikes, which would both hurt the United States directly but could also lead to further anger towards the United States by countries in the region. Concerns that the Trump administration is striking civilians, or using an opaque and illegal process for targeting, would only further impede commercial activities.  

Moreover, the benefits of such a policy in terms of reducing the trafficking of drugs into the United States are unclear. Venezuela does not produce fentanyl, and the major cocaine trafficking route to the United States is through the Pacific from Colombia. Even if strikes could successfully reduce the amount of cocaine shipped through the Caribbean, it’s unlikely that this would result in a reduction of the cocaine that arrives on American shores rather than simply prompting a redirection to other routes.

Strikes Inside Venezuela 

Trump himself and others in his administration have raised the prospect of escalating to carry out strikes on suspected drug cartels inside of Venezuela. Doing so would carry many of the same consequences as continuing the strikes on ships in the Caribbean, including creating grievances and bolstering Maduro, along with additional costs. There would likely be heightened solidarity with Venezuela by Latin American countries, political benefits to Maduro, and high operational costs and risks to U.S. aircraft, with little chance of meaningfully reducing the drug production of Venezuela.  

The United States has a long history of military intervention in Latin America, which still resonates throughout the region. Maduro has regularly invoked these acts, and Petro, Lula, and others have likewise spoken of the tendency of the United States to tread on Latin American sovereignty. Attacks on Venezuelan territory would give additional salience to these claims and threaten to fuel anti-American sentiment at a time in which the United States sees Latin America as a critical ground for its competition with China.  

Beyond lending credence to Maduro’s views of U.S. overreach, strikes inside of Venezuela could give Maduro an additional tool for going after political enemies. Venezuelan political analyst Anibal Sanchez Ismayel told NBC, “An attack on Venezuelan soil would have consequences from diplomatic protests to an increase in political persecutions of those they classify as collaborators, to further uniting the population with the need to defend sovereignty reaffirmed.”  

It is far from guaranteed that even with high-quality targeting information, the United States could successfully carry out a successful air campaign against Venezuelan targets. Venezuela has capable defense systems, including US-made F-16s, Israeli air-to-air missiles, and Russian S-300VM air defense. While the United States may be able to defeat these systems, the cost of doing so would be high, and fully eliminating their threat would require a massive attack on Venezuelan military infrastructure. That would constitute an undeniable act of war and risk escalation beyond air strikes.  

There is also a significant chance that strikes, even if able to avoid Venezuelan defense systems, do not accomplish the Trump administration’s goal to “stop drugs from flooding into our country and to bring those responsible to justice.” An air-only campaign would be unlikely to identify and successfully eliminate drug-producing facilities, which can quickly be rebuilt when destroyed. A study of the U.S. air campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan, which had the stated goal of restricting drug production in the country, found that the campaign “had a negligible effect on the Taliban’s finances, exacted little toll on drug trafficking organisations, and served to alienate the rural population in and around the areas where airstrikes were deployed.” In Venezuela, the United States would face more capable defenses, less on-the-ground presence, and little regional cooperation.  

And if the strikes escalate into an all-out conflict with the Venezuelan government, it is even more unlikely that attempts to halt drug trafficking will succeed — because of the lawlessness and chaos that prevails during wartime, scholars have found that not a single military campaign to reduce the supply of drugs during an ongoing conflict has succeeded.

Regime Change 

There has been growing discussion that the goal of the United States is not actually curtailing the drug trade, but instead deposing President Maduro. While Maduro is a tyrant who is responsible for the impoverishment and death of thousands of Venezuelans, the prospects of such an operation are horrendous, to put it mildly. Maduro has control over a powerful military, whose defeat would require a major war by the United States.

Just as concerningly, a litany of armed groups that are loosely affiliated with the Maduro government or simply opposed to the U.S. presence would doubtless initiate guerrilla campaigns to resist regime change. As the NSC’s senior director for Western hemisphere affairs during the Biden administration put it, “It’ll become the cause celebre for every kind of criminal or illegal armed group in the Americas … You’ll end up having people going to Venezuela to fight the Yankees.” This situation is exactly the kind of quagmire that the U.S. military has struggled to face and that American citizens have overwhelmingly disapproved of.

Even if that war was successful in removing Maduro, there is abundant evidence that foreign-imposed regime change is unlikely to improve a country. In Venezuela, any new leader would have to struggle against factions of the military, state institutions, and militias that are loyal to Maduro, creating mass instability. The chaos would very likely spill over into neighboring countries like Colombia, threatening fragile peace and jeopardizing anti-drug efforts in the rest of South America.

It would also be exceptionally expensive both due to operational costs and the impact on global oil and gas markets. Sector analyses have estimated that oil prices might increase by as much as 10%-20% in the event of a conflict, economically punishing American consumers. And an attempt to create regime change would require persistent presence and investment to stamp out resistance, incurring long-run costs.

Course Correction 

While there have already been consequences stemming from U.S. strikes in the Caribbean, it is not too late for restraint. With a darkening economic environment at home along with efforts to bolster Ukraine and deter China, the last thing the United States needs is conflict in the Western hemisphere. U.S. aggression will leave it internationally isolated and responsible for a costly war with prolific consequences. Simply stated, this is not a war the United States needs.

If the United States continues its current path of extrajudicial strikes against civilians, it risks becoming a pariah and further pushing Latin American countries towards China. Additional escalation would heighten that prospect, without offering any upside for partnership with the United States. Already, Latin American countries friendly to the United States like Argentina have engaged in trade with China, which is seen by Washington as a betrayal. The United States flagrantly disregarding international norms and the wishes of Latin American leaders will make such agreements even more likely, as countries come to see the United States as untrustworthy and opposed to their interests.  

A war against Venezuela would exacerbate the already dire conditions that have led 7.7 million to leave the country since 2014, according to the UN Refugee Agency. Brazil and Colombia, two important partners for the United States in Latin America, would shoulder a large part of the burden of mass displacement, which could lead to political repercussions and increased animosity towards the United States.  

If the Trump administration seriously wants to combat drug trafficking, it should recognize the importance of international collaboration and the consequences of destabilizing Venezuela. Information sharing and law enforcement cooperation with countries where drug traffickers operate are necessary to meaningfully curtail the drug trade. The destabilization of Venezuela will create more desperate people looking for ways to make money, and regional partners will be far less inclined to cooperate with the United States to intercept and disrupt smuggling. Measured against its own explicit goals of addressing the drug trade, the Trump administration’s approach to the Caribbean and Venezuela fails.  

Over the first two decades of the 21^st century, the United States involved itself in massively costly conflicts that yielded few positives and widespread discontent. The Trump administration risks extending that era of costly U.S. intervention, with repercussions for decades to come.