Acknowledgments
The paper was authored by Elias Yousif, Fellow and Deputy Director of the Stimson Center’s Conventional Defense program, with support from Rachel Stohl, Stimson’s Senior Vice President for Research Programs and Director of the Conventional Defense Program. This paper was funded by generous support from the Center for Civilians in Conflict in partnership with the Open Society Policy Center. Thanks also go to those who generously agreed to review early drafts of this paper.
Introduction
The United States is the world’s largest arms exporter.  By some measures, it commands 42% of the global arms trade, eclipsing the market share of the next seven largest exporters combined.1Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2023,” Pieter D. Wezeman, Katarina Djokic, Dr. Mathew George, Zain Hussain, and Siemon T. Wezeman, (2024) page 2. https://www.sipri.org/publications/2024/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-international-arms-transfers-2023. The effects of U.S. transfers can be profound.  Responsibly managed security cooperation and assistance can contribute to stability, deterrence, and the development of closer strategic partnerships. But irresponsible or poorly conceived security cooperation and assistance can do the opposite: fuel violence, enable abuse, or feed corruption.
Given its unmatched scale and scope and the outsize role it plays in shaping global political, security, and human rights landscapes, the U.S. security cooperation and assistance2For more on the definition of security cooperation and assistance, please see: United States Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Chapter 1: Security Cooperation Overview and Relationships.” https://samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-1. and United States Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “ESAMM Glossary.” https://samm.dsca.mil/listing/esamm-glossary. (SCA) enterprise demands the highest standards of oversight and accountability.  But meaningful oversight and accountability can only be realized through good faith transparency that empowers lawmakers, the public, and civil society with the information they need to scrutinize and shape U.S. arms transfer decisions and practices.Â
Despite these imperatives, the U.S. arms trade remains excessively opaque. Data and information on various SCA programs are largely classified, obscured, untimely, or otherwise inaccessible. In the absence of meaningful transparency, key stakeholders are circumscribed in their ability to influence, guide, or inform U.S. arms transfer decisions and policies, exacerbating the inherent risks of U.S. arms transfers and undermining efforts to improve the strategic utility of SCA. These are not just theoretical concerns. There are numerous examples of SCA efforts that have empowered predatory governments, enabled violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, and undermined U.S. national interests.
This paper explores the critical role of transparency in U.S. security cooperation and assistance (SCA) – not only as a matter of oversight and accountability but also as a means of strengthening U.S. policy and practice.3Citation for security cooperation and assistance pullout box: United States Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Chapter 1: Security Cooperation Overview and Relationships.” https://samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-1. It assesses the current state of transparency in SCA programming, examines how transparency practices have evolved, and identifies the key practical and political barriers to advancing transparency.  The paper concludes with recommendations for reforms to improve transparency in the U.S. arms trade.4United States Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Chapter 1: Security Cooperation Overview and Relationships.” https://samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-1.
Methodology
Findings, insights, and recommendations in this paper are based on desk research as well as interviews, consultations, and meetings with arms trade and transparency experts, U.S. government officials, and those engaged in addressing the risks and harms associated with the U.S. arms trade.
The paper is further informed by the author’s extensive professional experience working on U.S. security cooperation and assistance research, which includes the collection and analysis of SCA data as well as frequent engagement with government and legislative representatives involved in arms trade policy and practice.
Desk research included reviews of primary U.S. government documents, including the Government Accountability Office, Congressional Research Service, budget documents, SCA reports, and others. Interviews were held under the Chatham House rule.
Notes
- 1Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2023,” Pieter D. Wezeman, Katarina Djokic, Dr. Mathew George, Zain Hussain, and Siemon T. Wezeman, (2024) page 2. https://www.sipri.org/publications/2024/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-international-arms-transfers-2023.
- 2For more on the definition of security cooperation and assistance, please see: United States Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Chapter 1: Security Cooperation Overview and Relationships.” https://samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-1. and United States Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “ESAMM Glossary.” https://samm.dsca.mil/listing/esamm-glossary.
- 3Citation for security cooperation and assistance pullout box: United States Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Chapter 1: Security Cooperation Overview and Relationships.” https://samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-1.
- 4United States Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Chapter 1: Security Cooperation Overview and Relationships.” https://samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-1.