An underlying challenge the war in Ukraine has highlighted for New Delhi and Washington is in their contrasting views of Russia and preferred responses to its actions. From the U.S. standpoint, Russia “poses an immediate threat to the free and open international system, recklessly flouting the basic laws of the international order today, as its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine has shown.” A united opposition to Russia’s invasion is key to both limiting Moscow’s effectiveness on the battlefield and deterring similar territorial grabs elsewhere. This includes the Indo-Pacific, where China is widely believed to be watching U.S. and partner responses to the war in Ukraine to assess the resistance it would face in a similar attempt on Taiwan or other disputed territories.
To India, however, Russia is a longstanding partner that has both supported India’s interests on the world stage through its seat on the UN Security Council and served as a source of advanced weaponry. Any attempt to isolate Russia, in the Indian view, risks driving Russia more firmly into China’s grasp and weakening its ability and willingness to support India’s interests when they conflict with those of China. This includes in ongoing India-China tensions along their shared border, where renewed clashes broke out in 2020. While Russia has remained neutral in recent years, it sided with Beijing in the 1962 India-China war by providing Beijing diplomatic and intelligence support and delaying the delivery of MiG fighter jets to India. By this logic, continued diplomatic ties as well as energy and trade linkages are critical to slowing the development of the so-called “no limits” Russia-China partnership and securing India’s interests. Â
Despite some early friction, Washington and New Delhi have taken a pragmatic approach in navigating these differences, building further trust in the process. India has pursued its own interests in massively increasing its imports of Russian oil – which grew from near-zero pre-war to a high of nearly 2 billion barrels per day in July 2023. U.S. officials noted that this helped to stabilize global energy markets, which would otherwise have created price spikes in non-Russian-origin crude. India has also managed a difficult balancing act in maintaining its multi-aligned stance with membership in both the U.S.-India-Japan-Australia Quad grouping and the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa BRICS forum. Of particular note was its deft diplomacy as the 2023 G20 host, where it defied the odds in winning both U.S. and Russian agreements on Ukraine-related language in the joint declaration.
One key area of U.S.-India alignment that has strengthened post-Ukraine is India’s urgent need to diversify beyond Russian-origin defense platforms. Stimson Center researchers found that New Delhi relies on Russian equipment for 85 percent of its major weapons systems. The Ukraine war has highlighted this dependency as a key vulnerability for India, which experienced delays in the delivery of Russian systems post-invasion. In response, India has accelerated its shift away from Moscow in the defense space and is increasingly turning to other sources including the U.S., France, and Israel for hardware purchases. India’s main focus in this effort has been to build up its domestic defense production capabilities under its Make in India push, including co-development and co-production deals with Western suppliers. The recently announced deal between GE Aerospace and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited to co-produce F414 jet engines in India is a landmark in this effort with an unprecedented level of technology transfer.
Looking ahead, the U.S.’s recent ask of New Delhi to pressure Moscow to refrain from sending nuclear weapons to space suggests Washington sees value in Indian-Russian ties even as differences remain. As the war in Ukraine enters its third year, India stands as one of the few players with positive relations with both sides – so much so that Kyiv has called for it to take a more active role in diplomatic efforts to end the conflict. India’s Foreign Minister recently suggested the time wasn’t yet right for such an effort while noting that India was “deeply convinced and committed to bringing the Ukraine war to an end.” Further friction between Washington and New Delhi over Russia will no doubt emerge in the coming year, but both have gained valuable experience in managing their differences while more closely aligning on a growing number of mutual interests.
Pragmatism Prevails in US-India Ties Despite Ukraine Differences
By Elizabeth Threlkeld
South Asia
An underlying challenge the war in Ukraine has highlighted for New Delhi and Washington is in their contrasting views of Russia and preferred responses to its actions. From the U.S. standpoint, Russia “poses an immediate threat to the free and open international system, recklessly flouting the basic laws of the international order today, as its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine has shown.” A united opposition to Russia’s invasion is key to both limiting Moscow’s effectiveness on the battlefield and deterring similar territorial grabs elsewhere. This includes the Indo-Pacific, where China is widely believed to be watching U.S. and partner responses to the war in Ukraine to assess the resistance it would face in a similar attempt on Taiwan or other disputed territories.
To India, however, Russia is a longstanding partner that has both supported India’s interests on the world stage through its seat on the UN Security Council and served as a source of advanced weaponry. Any attempt to isolate Russia, in the Indian view, risks driving Russia more firmly into China’s grasp and weakening its ability and willingness to support India’s interests when they conflict with those of China. This includes in ongoing India-China tensions along their shared border, where renewed clashes broke out in 2020. While Russia has remained neutral in recent years, it sided with Beijing in the 1962 India-China war by providing Beijing diplomatic and intelligence support and delaying the delivery of MiG fighter jets to India. By this logic, continued diplomatic ties as well as energy and trade linkages are critical to slowing the development of the so-called “no limits” Russia-China partnership and securing India’s interests. Â
Despite some early friction, Washington and New Delhi have taken a pragmatic approach in navigating these differences, building further trust in the process. India has pursued its own interests in massively increasing its imports of Russian oil – which grew from near-zero pre-war to a high of nearly 2 billion barrels per day in July 2023. U.S. officials noted that this helped to stabilize global energy markets, which would otherwise have created price spikes in non-Russian-origin crude. India has also managed a difficult balancing act in maintaining its multi-aligned stance with membership in both the U.S.-India-Japan-Australia Quad grouping and the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa BRICS forum. Of particular note was its deft diplomacy as the 2023 G20 host, where it defied the odds in winning both U.S. and Russian agreements on Ukraine-related language in the joint declaration.
One key area of U.S.-India alignment that has strengthened post-Ukraine is India’s urgent need to diversify beyond Russian-origin defense platforms. Stimson Center researchers found that New Delhi relies on Russian equipment for 85 percent of its major weapons systems. The Ukraine war has highlighted this dependency as a key vulnerability for India, which experienced delays in the delivery of Russian systems post-invasion. In response, India has accelerated its shift away from Moscow in the defense space and is increasingly turning to other sources including the U.S., France, and Israel for hardware purchases. India’s main focus in this effort has been to build up its domestic defense production capabilities under its Make in India push, including co-development and co-production deals with Western suppliers. The recently announced deal between GE Aerospace and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited to co-produce F414 jet engines in India is a landmark in this effort with an unprecedented level of technology transfer.
Looking ahead, the U.S.’s recent ask of New Delhi to pressure Moscow to refrain from sending nuclear weapons to space suggests Washington sees value in Indian-Russian ties even as differences remain. As the war in Ukraine enters its third year, India stands as one of the few players with positive relations with both sides – so much so that Kyiv has called for it to take a more active role in diplomatic efforts to end the conflict. India’s Foreign Minister recently suggested the time wasn’t yet right for such an effort while noting that India was “deeply convinced and committed to bringing the Ukraine war to an end.” Further friction between Washington and New Delhi over Russia will no doubt emerge in the coming year, but both have gained valuable experience in managing their differences while more closely aligning on a growing number of mutual interests.
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