Taiwan’s election results are in. But what does the selection of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Lai Ching-te mean for Taiwan-China relations and global stability? Stimson experts weigh in with the real-time analysis.
As Taiwan’s ruling DPP wins its third consecutive presidential victory with the selection of Lai, Stimson Center experts explore the likely regional and global ramifications on diplomatic efforts, economic stability, and the potential for all-out conflict with China.
China on the Post-Election Taiwan
By Yun Sun
Director, China Program
It is well-known that Lai has not been China’s favored candidate. Based on his past record, he is and will be “presumed guilty” of pursuing Taiwan independence by China. The question for Beijing is how far and how fast he will go. From his election campaign, the Chinese experts have drawn the conclusion that Lai most likely will not pursue key actions to change Taiwan’s status, such as a constitutional revision or a referendum. In fact, given that the constitutional revision will require a super majority and DPP only occupies 45% of the seats in the Legislative Yuan, such a revision will not be feasible for DPP anyway.
However, the problem for China is no less serious. As Lai put it in his interview with Bloomberg during the election season, the status of Taiwan for Lai is that “Taiwan is already a sovereign, independent country called the Republic of China.” For China, this means Lai has bypassed all the steps to pursue independence because he sees Taiwan as already independent. China did not react to his statement during the election season on the ground that 1) he was speaking as a candidate and 2) any major reaction by China would backfire. Now that he is elected, the reiteration of that position will most likely trigger major reactions from China.
As Lai is “presumed guilty” by China, Beijing very possibly will remove more if not all early harvest programs under Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) that gives preferential tariffs to Taiwanese products. China had ended such preferential treatment for 12 petrochemical products from Taiwan in December and the Ministry of Commerce announced three days before the election that similar actions on machines, textiles, car parts, farms and fish are planned. China has no option but to continue its import of Taiwan’s semi-conductor chips, but the ECFA suspension will focus more on agricultural and other industrial sectors of Taiwan with implications for different constituencies.
China’s default position in 2024 is to seek stability so as to prioritize its domestic problems, especially the sluggish economic growth. As such, military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait will not be China’s preference. However, it is foreseeable that China will maintain its military pressure to deter what it fears to be Lai’s potential attempts to inch forward and change Taiwan’s status.
The longer-term and more strategic question for China is that now DPP is going to have an unprecedented third term, can Beijing still refuse to engage DPP for another four years? China’s rejection in the past eight years has not advanced China’s agenda on Taiwan. If the whole premise of such engagement remains to be DPP’s embrace of 92 Consensus, Beijing will have difficulties to engage Lai. 92 Consensus, with its perceived equation to One Country Two Systems, has no market in Taiwan. Any engagement therefore has to be based on a new political narrative that so far has not seen creative solutions.
The TPP Will Control the Legislature’s Agenda
By Pam Kennedy
Deputy Director, China Program
Incumbent Vice President Lai Ching-te will be Taiwan’s next president, but whether he can pass his policy agenda will depend on the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) ability to strike a deal with one of the smallest parties in the Legislative Yuan (LY)—the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP).
A unicameral legislature, the LY has 113 members, necessitating a 57-member majority for a single party or a coalition to pass legislation. Before the January 13 election, the DPP had a narrow majority of 61 seats. Now the DPP has lost its majority for the first time in eight years, down to 51 seats, even less than the Kuomintang’s (KMT) 52 members. The TPP, however, has increased its seats from five to eight, making it the key partner for either of the larger parties to pass any legislation.
More specifically, cooperation with Ko Wen-je will be essential to avoid gridlock in the LY. Though his presidential bid failed and he himself is not a member of the LY, Ko is the center of gravity in his small party: He will play a major role in determining the policy positions of TPP legislators going forward, and this will give him an outsized influence in Taiwan’s politics for the next four years, including in the election of the president of the LY on February 1, 2024, the first day of the next legislative session.
For both the incoming Lai administration and the opposition KMT, this means that competing to court the TPP after a bitter campaign season will be the main challenge. While the TPP campaigned as an opposition party in 2023, even briefly attempting to form a joint ticket with the KMT in November, in the past Ko as an Independent politician depended on pan-Green votes, before he founded the TPP as the “White” alternative to the Blue-Green political spectrum. Therefore, both the KMT and the DPP have a chance to win over the TPP to enact their agendas, but likewise the TPP will have freedom to cooperate with either party, depending on Ko’s views on specific issues.
Given the mutability and vagueness of Ko’s platform during the campaign, and his populist instincts, it is difficult to predict where Ko will land on some of the most pressing domestic issues of the presidential race, which range from housing affordability to elder and childcare to judicial reforms. Even cross-Strait relations, which Lai has pledged to carry forward with Tsai Ing-wen’s nonprovocative approach, may see a shakeup if Ko decides to help the KMT push for closer economic relations with China.
Yet despite the potential paths forward, how effectively the TPP, DPP, and KMT can negotiate in the LY will merit close observation in the coming months. After all, at one point during his campaign, Ko said that he hated both major parties. Now he has a chance to influence the central politics of Taiwan if he can find a way to work with the DPP or KMT, and they with him. This is uncharted territory for all three parties.
Avoiding History’s Rhyme
By Mathew Burrows
Program Lead, Strategic Foresight Hub
It will be months before we know what the DPP victory means for Sino-US ties and world peace, but we should not shy away from anticipating what could be the worst case. Internationalized conflicts have increased nine-fold since 2004. Conflicts like Syria, Libya, Israel/Gaza, and Ukraine have become flashpoints among opposing external powers. DPP leader Lai campaigned on a promise of maintaining the status quo. In failing to win a parliamentary majority, the winning party must try to build a coalition with one of the opposing parties, most likely the smaller TPP one which has taken a moderate view of China. Lai’s own strong desire, however, for an independent Taiwan is well-known. And even before the election, the status quo that he wants to preserve was increasingly on shaky ground with a bipartisan US chorus backing if not urging Taiwan to declare independence and President Biden promising to defend Taiwan against China. China has increased dramatically its displays of military power, threatening to use force if necessary to prevent Taiwanese independence. Many Taiwanese appear to fear becoming the victim of both powers, US and China.
Talk of war whether in Washington and Beijing is no longer shied away from. All the fears in the Cold War about a collision between two nuclear powers have been forgotten by generations with little firsthand knowledge of the last big contest, World War II. For many in the US, there’s a belief China will back down, not wanting to deepen further the economic crisis at home, ignoring the possibility that in playing the nationalist card XI could distract his public from its current woes. For the Chinese establishment, there’s the belief that a 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis might be just the thing for convincing Washington that China’s interests should be respected. We know now that it was only because of the good judgment of a Soviet nuclear sub commander that nuclear war was avoided. Would we be so lucky again?
There are some uncanny parallels between today and the years leading up to the First World War that renown historians like Margaret Macmillan have written about. The 75 or so years since 1945 in which the US, Russia, Europe and China all avoided a direct conflict with one another smacks of that “extraordinary period of general peace since 1815” before the WWI outbreak. A key factor in laying the groundwork were the feelings of upheaval and loss at home. Before 1914, “landowning classes… saw their prosperity undermined by cheap agricultural imports abroad;” “in the cities, artisans and small shopkeepers whose services were no longer needed were also drawn to radical right-wing movements.” Anglo-German rivalry echoes the increasing Sino-US competition. A best-selling British pamphlet in 1896, “Made in Germany,” talked of “a gigantic commercial State…arising to menace our prosperity….” For Germans, Britain was standing in its way to become a global power. Cooler heads tried to “wind down” the rivalry but public opinion had turned jingoistic, fueling mutual enmity. When the July 1914 crisis hit, the German and Russian leaders had second thoughts shortly before the outbreak, but worried about losing face. Mark Twain reminds us, history doesn’t repeat, but it often rhymes.
Assessing China’s Reaction to Taiwan’s Election
By James Siebens and Pam Kennedy
Fellow, Reimaging US Grand Strategy Program; Deputy Director, China Program
In the past 30 years, China has repeatedly used military shows of force to convey warnings to Taiwan’s political leadership about the danger of any move toward a formal declaration of Taiwan independence. The winner of Taiwan’s 2024 presidential election, incumbent Vice President Lai Ching-te, has consistently claimed that Taiwan is already an independent sovereign nation, and therefore has no need to declare its independence. However, this is not a new position, and has in fact been the stated position of Taiwan’s leaders since 1999 when Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui described the cross-Strait relationship as “state-to-state” or “nation-to-nation.” This formulation represents a key point of disagreement between Taipei and Beijing, which sees the “one China” principle as a precondition for cross-Strait dialogue.
In the coming days and weeks, in the period between Mr. Lai’s election victory and his inauguration on May 20, we may confidently anticipate that Beijing will once again leverage military demonstrations to express its displeasure and deter Taiwan from formally declaring independence. In the absence of evidence of a much greater mobilization by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the United States should guard against the temptation to over-interpret the forthcoming demonstration of force as a near-term “threat” to invade. We should instead expect a purely performative display aimed not at threatening Taiwan with invasion under the status quo, but rather warning against further unilateral departures from it.
We see this pattern of similar PLA displays throughout Taiwan’s democratic history. In the runup to the first presidential election in 1996, Beijing spent almost a year gradually escalating military exercises and a series of diplomatic maneuvers in a failed effort to pressure voters not to elect Lee Teng-hui. Mr. Lee’s “state-to-state” comment in 1999 was likewise followed by months of military demonstrations and threats, including in the context of the presidential elections in 2000. These displays failed to convince Taiwan’s leaders to reject the “state-to-state” concept, though newly elected President Chen Shui-bian pledged “four noes,” including not declaring or holding a referendum on independence, and not adding “state-to-state” to Taiwan’s constitution so long as China doesn’t intend to attack Taiwan—this position largely defines the status quo, and the safe parameters of the cross-Strait relationship. Most recently, in 2022, Beijing warned repeatedly against a visit to Taiwan by then Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and conducted the most significant exercises since 1996 immediately following her trip.
As with past crises, the best response would be for the United States to send a subtle message of deterrence by temporarily increasing its naval presence near Japan and/or the Philippines, and to state clearly that the U.S. does not support Taiwan independence or any unilateral changes to the status quo. This combination of deterrence and reassurance is a winning formula for managing the heightened tensions that often accompany elections in Taiwan. The key is to respond to such demonstrative threats with both confidence and restraint: credibly reinforcing the U.S. position that any use of force across the Strait would be unacceptable, while reiterating that the United States’ “one China” policy includes calling on both sides to refrain from unilateral changes to the status quo, and assiduously avoiding interference in Taiwan’s politics.
What’s Next After the Taiwan Elections?
By Robert Manning
Distinguished Fellow, Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program
The first thing that must be said about the Taiwan elections is that the example of a thriving Chinese democracy fills the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with fear and loathing. Once again, Chinese pressure tactics – economic and military coercion, misinformation, bribery attempts – have backfired.
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Lai- Ching-te won a larger than expected 40.1% of the vote and an unprecedented third term for the ruling DPP. The opposition Kuomintang (KMT) candidate Hou Yu-ih won 33.5%, while the new Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je got 26.5%. It is tempting to ask what the outcome would have been if efforts to run one united opposition coalition had not failed.
The results also revealed an intriguing evolution of Taiwanese politics, with the legislature divided, as the opposition KMT won 52 seats to the DPP’s 51. The TPP won 8 seats and may emerge as the power broker. This will shape not only domestic policies, but possibly cross-straits relations as well.
The election split may help explain the relatively restrained reaction from Beijing, which warned against “Taiwan independence separatist actions” and tried to downplay the pluralistic result saying the DPP “doesn’t represent mainstream opinion.”
For his part, Lai sought to convey continuity with his predecessor, the current President Tsai Ing-wen, saying in his acceptance speech he will “act in accordance with the Republic of China constitutional order” and “maintain the status quo.” Lai’s reconciliatory tone, however, is unlikely to placate a deeply suspicious Beijing. Lai has on occasion made pro-independence remarks, reflecting DPP sentiments, that have set off Beijing and irked the Biden administration. One concern is that in the 118th Congress, where nearly 400 pieces of China legislation have been introduced, legislators eager to demonstrate how strongly they support Taiwan interaction with the Lai administration may unintentionally fuel an over-reaction from Beijing, ratcheting up US-China tensions.
Lai’s Victory Means Continuity in Japan-Taiwan Relations
By Yuki Tatsumi
Director, Japan Program
On January 13, Lai Ching-te (William Lai), Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate and the incumbent Vice President of Taiwan, emerged as a winner of Taiwan’s presidential election, garnering over 40% of support from the voters. Despite the speculation that the race among three candidates — Lai, Kuomintang (KMT) candidate Hou Yu-ih, and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je — would be a close race, Lai emerged as a winner with a much greater margin than had been anticipated.
Within hours of Lai’s victory, Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa issued a statement congratulating Lai’s victory. In her statement, Kamikawa reiterated Japan’s view of Taiwan as “an extremely crucial partner and an important friend, with which it shares fundamental values” and reaffirmed Tokyo’s willingness to continue to deepen Tokyo’s relationship with Taipei, albeit a “working relationship on the non-governmental basis”.
As Kamikawa’s statement suggests, Japan has maintained a close but unofficial relationship with Taiwan under its own “One China Policy” since 1972, with Japan’s relationship based on economic, cultural and personal exchanges. However, as Chinese pressure against Taiwan grows, particularly following then-U.S. Speaker of the House of Representative Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, Japan has increasingly begun to discuss peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as Japan’s own national security concern. Tokyo has also begun to articulate the importance it attaches to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait more in the global context. For instance, Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy, while still emphasizing that “Japan’s basic position regarding remains unchanged”, defines Taiwan as “an extremely important partner and a precious friend of Japan, with whom Japan shares fundamental values, including democracy”, arguing that peace and stability across Taiwan Strait is an “indispensable element for the security and prosperity of the international community.” All the more so, indeed, as Beijing’s pressure against Taipei escalates.
Indeed, even as Japan officially maintains its activities at the non-governmental level and focuses more on practical areas of cooperation, Tokyo has sought to deepen its relationship with Taipei on a number of fronts. At the political level, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) launched a consultative forum with DPP, which is expected to hold a regular consultation. Japan is also seeking to deepen its cooperation with Taiwan in its investment in semiconductors, as demonstrated by the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company’s (TSMC) growing investment in Japan for its manufacturing factories over the last year.
For Japan, Lai’s victory means that Tokyo’s relations with Taipei will remain on the current trajectory. Moving forward, Japan should continue to seek opportunities not only to build on existing cooperation, but also expand the areas in which both sides can pursue practical cooperation. In particular, given the likelihood of China increasing pressure against Taiwan in military and non-military fronts, it will be critical for Tokyo to begin to engage in dialogue not only with Taipei but also with the U.S. and other like-minded partners on how to counter various attempts of coercion by Beijing.
The Taiwan Elections: Implications for Europe
By Julian Mueller-Kaler
Director, Strategic Foresight Hub
Close diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China and subsequent adherence to a “one-China policy” have so far prevented any diplomatic or official engagement between European states and Taiwan. However intensifying economic relations have spurred an increase in the attention that European decision-makers have paid to the island in recent years; the current election – as well as the potential implications for cross-strait relations – was followed anxiously in European capitals. Following Singapore, Germany was the second largest foreign investor in Taiwan last year, according to the German Trade Office in Taipei, with infrastructure projects and cooperation on computer chips topping the list.
Irrespective of economic relations with the island itself, the biggest concern in Europe is, perhaps unsurprisingly, a further deterioration of relations between the United States and China following this weekend’s election in Taipei. Many European countries – first and foremost Germany – have equally important economic relations with the US and China, potentially positioning them, uncomfortably, in the middle of any future conflict. The threat of extraterritorial sanctions on exports, as well as looming US legislation on foreign direct investment screenings, particularly in the high-technology sector, have already caused implications for European firms. A cohesive policy on how to navigate this sensitive area is yet to be developed, with decision-makers in Paris, Berlin, and Brussels left with quite different ideas on how to navigate the increasingly complex environment of geo-economic competition, and what it might mean for the idea of European strategic autonomy.
Eyes on Taiwan: A Post-Election Analysis for the Region and the World
By Yun Sun • Pamela Kennedy • Mathew Burrows • James Siebens • Robert A. Manning • Yuki Tatsumi • Julian Mueller-Kaler
Asia & Indo-Pacific
Taiwan’s election results are in. But what does the selection of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Lai Ching-te mean for Taiwan-China relations and global stability? Stimson experts weigh in with the real-time analysis.
As Taiwan’s ruling DPP wins its third consecutive presidential victory with the selection of Lai, Stimson Center experts explore the likely regional and global ramifications on diplomatic efforts, economic stability, and the potential for all-out conflict with China.
China on the Post-Election Taiwan
By Yun Sun
Director, China Program
It is well-known that Lai has not been China’s favored candidate. Based on his past record, he is and will be “presumed guilty” of pursuing Taiwan independence by China. The question for Beijing is how far and how fast he will go. From his election campaign, the Chinese experts have drawn the conclusion that Lai most likely will not pursue key actions to change Taiwan’s status, such as a constitutional revision or a referendum. In fact, given that the constitutional revision will require a super majority and DPP only occupies 45% of the seats in the Legislative Yuan, such a revision will not be feasible for DPP anyway.
However, the problem for China is no less serious. As Lai put it in his interview with Bloomberg during the election season, the status of Taiwan for Lai is that “Taiwan is already a sovereign, independent country called the Republic of China.” For China, this means Lai has bypassed all the steps to pursue independence because he sees Taiwan as already independent. China did not react to his statement during the election season on the ground that 1) he was speaking as a candidate and 2) any major reaction by China would backfire. Now that he is elected, the reiteration of that position will most likely trigger major reactions from China.
As Lai is “presumed guilty” by China, Beijing very possibly will remove more if not all early harvest programs under Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) that gives preferential tariffs to Taiwanese products. China had ended such preferential treatment for 12 petrochemical products from Taiwan in December and the Ministry of Commerce announced three days before the election that similar actions on machines, textiles, car parts, farms and fish are planned. China has no option but to continue its import of Taiwan’s semi-conductor chips, but the ECFA suspension will focus more on agricultural and other industrial sectors of Taiwan with implications for different constituencies.
China’s default position in 2024 is to seek stability so as to prioritize its domestic problems, especially the sluggish economic growth. As such, military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait will not be China’s preference. However, it is foreseeable that China will maintain its military pressure to deter what it fears to be Lai’s potential attempts to inch forward and change Taiwan’s status.
The longer-term and more strategic question for China is that now DPP is going to have an unprecedented third term, can Beijing still refuse to engage DPP for another four years? China’s rejection in the past eight years has not advanced China’s agenda on Taiwan. If the whole premise of such engagement remains to be DPP’s embrace of 92 Consensus, Beijing will have difficulties to engage Lai. 92 Consensus, with its perceived equation to One Country Two Systems, has no market in Taiwan. Any engagement therefore has to be based on a new political narrative that so far has not seen creative solutions.
The TPP Will Control the Legislature’s Agenda
By Pam Kennedy
Deputy Director, China Program
Incumbent Vice President Lai Ching-te will be Taiwan’s next president, but whether he can pass his policy agenda will depend on the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) ability to strike a deal with one of the smallest parties in the Legislative Yuan (LY)—the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP).
A unicameral legislature, the LY has 113 members, necessitating a 57-member majority for a single party or a coalition to pass legislation. Before the January 13 election, the DPP had a narrow majority of 61 seats. Now the DPP has lost its majority for the first time in eight years, down to 51 seats, even less than the Kuomintang’s (KMT) 52 members. The TPP, however, has increased its seats from five to eight, making it the key partner for either of the larger parties to pass any legislation.
More specifically, cooperation with Ko Wen-je will be essential to avoid gridlock in the LY. Though his presidential bid failed and he himself is not a member of the LY, Ko is the center of gravity in his small party: He will play a major role in determining the policy positions of TPP legislators going forward, and this will give him an outsized influence in Taiwan’s politics for the next four years, including in the election of the president of the LY on February 1, 2024, the first day of the next legislative session.
For both the incoming Lai administration and the opposition KMT, this means that competing to court the TPP after a bitter campaign season will be the main challenge. While the TPP campaigned as an opposition party in 2023, even briefly attempting to form a joint ticket with the KMT in November, in the past Ko as an Independent politician depended on pan-Green votes, before he founded the TPP as the “White” alternative to the Blue-Green political spectrum. Therefore, both the KMT and the DPP have a chance to win over the TPP to enact their agendas, but likewise the TPP will have freedom to cooperate with either party, depending on Ko’s views on specific issues.
Given the mutability and vagueness of Ko’s platform during the campaign, and his populist instincts, it is difficult to predict where Ko will land on some of the most pressing domestic issues of the presidential race, which range from housing affordability to elder and childcare to judicial reforms. Even cross-Strait relations, which Lai has pledged to carry forward with Tsai Ing-wen’s nonprovocative approach, may see a shakeup if Ko decides to help the KMT push for closer economic relations with China.
Yet despite the potential paths forward, how effectively the TPP, DPP, and KMT can negotiate in the LY will merit close observation in the coming months. After all, at one point during his campaign, Ko said that he hated both major parties. Now he has a chance to influence the central politics of Taiwan if he can find a way to work with the DPP or KMT, and they with him. This is uncharted territory for all three parties.
Avoiding History’s Rhyme
By Mathew Burrows
Program Lead, Strategic Foresight Hub
It will be months before we know what the DPP victory means for Sino-US ties and world peace, but we should not shy away from anticipating what could be the worst case. Internationalized conflicts have increased nine-fold since 2004. Conflicts like Syria, Libya, Israel/Gaza, and Ukraine have become flashpoints among opposing external powers. DPP leader Lai campaigned on a promise of maintaining the status quo. In failing to win a parliamentary majority, the winning party must try to build a coalition with one of the opposing parties, most likely the smaller TPP one which has taken a moderate view of China. Lai’s own strong desire, however, for an independent Taiwan is well-known. And even before the election, the status quo that he wants to preserve was increasingly on shaky ground with a bipartisan US chorus backing if not urging Taiwan to declare independence and President Biden promising to defend Taiwan against China. China has increased dramatically its displays of military power, threatening to use force if necessary to prevent Taiwanese independence. Many Taiwanese appear to fear becoming the victim of both powers, US and China.
Talk of war whether in Washington and Beijing is no longer shied away from. All the fears in the Cold War about a collision between two nuclear powers have been forgotten by generations with little firsthand knowledge of the last big contest, World War II. For many in the US, there’s a belief China will back down, not wanting to deepen further the economic crisis at home, ignoring the possibility that in playing the nationalist card XI could distract his public from its current woes. For the Chinese establishment, there’s the belief that a 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis might be just the thing for convincing Washington that China’s interests should be respected. We know now that it was only because of the good judgment of a Soviet nuclear sub commander that nuclear war was avoided. Would we be so lucky again?
There are some uncanny parallels between today and the years leading up to the First World War that renown historians like Margaret Macmillan have written about. The 75 or so years since 1945 in which the US, Russia, Europe and China all avoided a direct conflict with one another smacks of that “extraordinary period of general peace since 1815” before the WWI outbreak. A key factor in laying the groundwork were the feelings of upheaval and loss at home. Before 1914, “landowning classes… saw their prosperity undermined by cheap agricultural imports abroad;” “in the cities, artisans and small shopkeepers whose services were no longer needed were also drawn to radical right-wing movements.” Anglo-German rivalry echoes the increasing Sino-US competition. A best-selling British pamphlet in 1896, “Made in Germany,” talked of “a gigantic commercial State…arising to menace our prosperity….” For Germans, Britain was standing in its way to become a global power. Cooler heads tried to “wind down” the rivalry but public opinion had turned jingoistic, fueling mutual enmity. When the July 1914 crisis hit, the German and Russian leaders had second thoughts shortly before the outbreak, but worried about losing face. Mark Twain reminds us, history doesn’t repeat, but it often rhymes.
Assessing China’s Reaction to Taiwan’s Election
By James Siebens and Pam Kennedy
Fellow, Reimaging US Grand Strategy Program; Deputy Director, China Program
In the past 30 years, China has repeatedly used military shows of force to convey warnings to Taiwan’s political leadership about the danger of any move toward a formal declaration of Taiwan independence. The winner of Taiwan’s 2024 presidential election, incumbent Vice President Lai Ching-te, has consistently claimed that Taiwan is already an independent sovereign nation, and therefore has no need to declare its independence. However, this is not a new position, and has in fact been the stated position of Taiwan’s leaders since 1999 when Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui described the cross-Strait relationship as “state-to-state” or “nation-to-nation.” This formulation represents a key point of disagreement between Taipei and Beijing, which sees the “one China” principle as a precondition for cross-Strait dialogue.
In the coming days and weeks, in the period between Mr. Lai’s election victory and his inauguration on May 20, we may confidently anticipate that Beijing will once again leverage military demonstrations to express its displeasure and deter Taiwan from formally declaring independence. In the absence of evidence of a much greater mobilization by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the United States should guard against the temptation to over-interpret the forthcoming demonstration of force as a near-term “threat” to invade. We should instead expect a purely performative display aimed not at threatening Taiwan with invasion under the status quo, but rather warning against further unilateral departures from it.
We see this pattern of similar PLA displays throughout Taiwan’s democratic history. In the runup to the first presidential election in 1996, Beijing spent almost a year gradually escalating military exercises and a series of diplomatic maneuvers in a failed effort to pressure voters not to elect Lee Teng-hui. Mr. Lee’s “state-to-state” comment in 1999 was likewise followed by months of military demonstrations and threats, including in the context of the presidential elections in 2000. These displays failed to convince Taiwan’s leaders to reject the “state-to-state” concept, though newly elected President Chen Shui-bian pledged “four noes,” including not declaring or holding a referendum on independence, and not adding “state-to-state” to Taiwan’s constitution so long as China doesn’t intend to attack Taiwan—this position largely defines the status quo, and the safe parameters of the cross-Strait relationship. Most recently, in 2022, Beijing warned repeatedly against a visit to Taiwan by then Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and conducted the most significant exercises since 1996 immediately following her trip.
As with past crises, the best response would be for the United States to send a subtle message of deterrence by temporarily increasing its naval presence near Japan and/or the Philippines, and to state clearly that the U.S. does not support Taiwan independence or any unilateral changes to the status quo. This combination of deterrence and reassurance is a winning formula for managing the heightened tensions that often accompany elections in Taiwan. The key is to respond to such demonstrative threats with both confidence and restraint: credibly reinforcing the U.S. position that any use of force across the Strait would be unacceptable, while reiterating that the United States’ “one China” policy includes calling on both sides to refrain from unilateral changes to the status quo, and assiduously avoiding interference in Taiwan’s politics.
What’s Next After the Taiwan Elections?
By Robert Manning
Distinguished Fellow, Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program
The first thing that must be said about the Taiwan elections is that the example of a thriving Chinese democracy fills the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with fear and loathing. Once again, Chinese pressure tactics – economic and military coercion, misinformation, bribery attempts – have backfired.
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Lai- Ching-te won a larger than expected 40.1% of the vote and an unprecedented third term for the ruling DPP. The opposition Kuomintang (KMT) candidate Hou Yu-ih won 33.5%, while the new Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je got 26.5%. It is tempting to ask what the outcome would have been if efforts to run one united opposition coalition had not failed.
The results also revealed an intriguing evolution of Taiwanese politics, with the legislature divided, as the opposition KMT won 52 seats to the DPP’s 51. The TPP won 8 seats and may emerge as the power broker. This will shape not only domestic policies, but possibly cross-straits relations as well.
The election split may help explain the relatively restrained reaction from Beijing, which warned against “Taiwan independence separatist actions” and tried to downplay the pluralistic result saying the DPP “doesn’t represent mainstream opinion.”
For his part, Lai sought to convey continuity with his predecessor, the current President Tsai Ing-wen, saying in his acceptance speech he will “act in accordance with the Republic of China constitutional order” and “maintain the status quo.” Lai’s reconciliatory tone, however, is unlikely to placate a deeply suspicious Beijing. Lai has on occasion made pro-independence remarks, reflecting DPP sentiments, that have set off Beijing and irked the Biden administration. One concern is that in the 118th Congress, where nearly 400 pieces of China legislation have been introduced, legislators eager to demonstrate how strongly they support Taiwan interaction with the Lai administration may unintentionally fuel an over-reaction from Beijing, ratcheting up US-China tensions.
Lai’s Victory Means Continuity in Japan-Taiwan Relations
By Yuki Tatsumi
Director, Japan Program
On January 13, Lai Ching-te (William Lai), Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate and the incumbent Vice President of Taiwan, emerged as a winner of Taiwan’s presidential election, garnering over 40% of support from the voters. Despite the speculation that the race among three candidates — Lai, Kuomintang (KMT) candidate Hou Yu-ih, and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je — would be a close race, Lai emerged as a winner with a much greater margin than had been anticipated.
Within hours of Lai’s victory, Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa issued a statement congratulating Lai’s victory. In her statement, Kamikawa reiterated Japan’s view of Taiwan as “an extremely crucial partner and an important friend, with which it shares fundamental values” and reaffirmed Tokyo’s willingness to continue to deepen Tokyo’s relationship with Taipei, albeit a “working relationship on the non-governmental basis”.
As Kamikawa’s statement suggests, Japan has maintained a close but unofficial relationship with Taiwan under its own “One China Policy” since 1972, with Japan’s relationship based on economic, cultural and personal exchanges. However, as Chinese pressure against Taiwan grows, particularly following then-U.S. Speaker of the House of Representative Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, Japan has increasingly begun to discuss peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as Japan’s own national security concern. Tokyo has also begun to articulate the importance it attaches to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait more in the global context. For instance, Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy, while still emphasizing that “Japan’s basic position regarding remains unchanged”, defines Taiwan as “an extremely important partner and a precious friend of Japan, with whom Japan shares fundamental values, including democracy”, arguing that peace and stability across Taiwan Strait is an “indispensable element for the security and prosperity of the international community.” All the more so, indeed, as Beijing’s pressure against Taipei escalates.
Indeed, even as Japan officially maintains its activities at the non-governmental level and focuses more on practical areas of cooperation, Tokyo has sought to deepen its relationship with Taipei on a number of fronts. At the political level, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) launched a consultative forum with DPP, which is expected to hold a regular consultation. Japan is also seeking to deepen its cooperation with Taiwan in its investment in semiconductors, as demonstrated by the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company’s (TSMC) growing investment in Japan for its manufacturing factories over the last year.
For Japan, Lai’s victory means that Tokyo’s relations with Taipei will remain on the current trajectory. Moving forward, Japan should continue to seek opportunities not only to build on existing cooperation, but also expand the areas in which both sides can pursue practical cooperation. In particular, given the likelihood of China increasing pressure against Taiwan in military and non-military fronts, it will be critical for Tokyo to begin to engage in dialogue not only with Taipei but also with the U.S. and other like-minded partners on how to counter various attempts of coercion by Beijing.
The Taiwan Elections: Implications for Europe
By Julian Mueller-Kaler
Director, Strategic Foresight Hub
Close diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China and subsequent adherence to a “one-China policy” have so far prevented any diplomatic or official engagement between European states and Taiwan. However intensifying economic relations have spurred an increase in the attention that European decision-makers have paid to the island in recent years; the current election – as well as the potential implications for cross-strait relations – was followed anxiously in European capitals. Following Singapore, Germany was the second largest foreign investor in Taiwan last year, according to the German Trade Office in Taipei, with infrastructure projects and cooperation on computer chips topping the list.
Irrespective of economic relations with the island itself, the biggest concern in Europe is, perhaps unsurprisingly, a further deterioration of relations between the United States and China following this weekend’s election in Taipei. Many European countries – first and foremost Germany – have equally important economic relations with the US and China, potentially positioning them, uncomfortably, in the middle of any future conflict. The threat of extraterritorial sanctions on exports, as well as looming US legislation on foreign direct investment screenings, particularly in the high-technology sector, have already caused implications for European firms. A cohesive policy on how to navigate this sensitive area is yet to be developed, with decision-makers in Paris, Berlin, and Brussels left with quite different ideas on how to navigate the increasingly complex environment of geo-economic competition, and what it might mean for the idea of European strategic autonomy.
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