Washington recognizes the importance of space to the country’s current and future power, hoping to lead and serve as the club’s gatekeeper. First and foremost, leadership means earning followers. Hence, in this new space age of economic competition, if the United States wants to attract other countries to follow its values, norms, and rules for lunar exploration and exploitation, it will need to offer them some managerial privileges — a partnership in the leadership — of the club.
Artemis Accords
The first American attempt to advance a coalition of countries toward a liberal order in space was the June 2020 Artemis Accords. The accords, coordinated by NASA and the U.S. Department of State, put forth a set of principles for operating on the moon that are intended to guide the conduct of countries seeking to establish a presence there in the future space economy. “With numerous countries and private sector players conducting missions and operations in cislunar space,” the accords read, “it’s critical to establish a common set of principles to govern the civil exploration and use of outer space.” Among its many provisions, the accords require participating states to commit to using outer space for peaceful purposes, transparency regarding space plans and policies, deconfliction of space activities, and managing orbital debris and spacecraft disposal. As of September 2023, 29 nations had joined the accords, including the four European countries with the largest space programs — France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom — as well as India and Japan.
Unsurprisingly, Russia and China have opposed these moves. And, like most other areas of geopolitics, the United States will have to contend with Moscow and Beijing in its bid for international leadership of the liberal order. China, like the United States, is focused on the economic aspects of space power, and it continues to reach significant technological milestones in outer space. During the last two years, China has announced its plans for expanded lunar and deep space exploration, including a permanent base on the moon, and has launched its own plans for cooperation and coalition-building on the moon, making it the United States’ primary competitor in outer space. Nevertheless, to date, China has not offered socio-technical mechanisms toward the governing of space.
A Winning Approach?
The future space race will be won not by those whose technological advancements are superior but by those who would offer the most innovative and attractive economic, legal, social, and political institutions to other spacefaring nations and entities. In this respect, the United States has a lead over China and Russia, but it has a long way to go in winning this contest. Despite having seemingly built a broad, multilateral coalition, several of the United States’ closest allies have been slow to join the accords; only ten of its 30 NATO allies, for example, have signed onto Artemis.
Although the accords themselves are relatively uncontentious, nonbinding, and explicitly tied to existing legal precedents, whether signees will obtain managerial privileges and become partners with the United States in leading the new order in space remain unanswered questions. In bypassing the “normal” channels of international space law — such as the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space — the United States has managed to alienate some countries. To many, the Artemis Accords come across as a unilateral attempt of a superpower to impose its will — and, by extension, its values — on the international system by unilaterally establishing principles guiding the future of humans’ enduring presence in space.
The United States has an opportunity to get other countries on board with its principles, but it needs to demonstrate that its vision for the future is built on meaningful trust and partnerships — vital elements in recruiting followers and partners for a prosperous and scalable economy. A successful effort would not only set the agenda and governance of space but would shape the balance of power in outer space for decades to come.
Deganit Paikowsky is a lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. She is a nonresident scholar at George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute and the author of The Power of the Space Club, published by Cambridge University Press.
Will the United States Establish a New Order in Outer Space?
By Deganit Paikowsky
Grand Strategy
In August 2023, India became the fourth country — after the United States, Russia (then the Soviet Union), and China — to join the exclusive moon-landing club. Furthermore, it was the first country to reach the lunar south pole. “This is a massive moment for India—and it bumps them up the space superpower list,” the BBC reported. “The mission could cement India’s status as a global superpower in space,” CNN trumpeted. Weeks later, Japan launched its own lunar mission, hoping to become the fifth country to touch down on the moon. The great powers continue to compete in space, making the “space club” relevant.
Washington recognizes the importance of space to the country’s current and future power, hoping to lead and serve as the club’s gatekeeper. First and foremost, leadership means earning followers. Hence, in this new space age of economic competition, if the United States wants to attract other countries to follow its values, norms, and rules for lunar exploration and exploitation, it will need to offer them some managerial privileges — a partnership in the leadership — of the club.
Artemis Accords
The first American attempt to advance a coalition of countries toward a liberal order in space was the June 2020 Artemis Accords. The accords, coordinated by NASA and the U.S. Department of State, put forth a set of principles for operating on the moon that are intended to guide the conduct of countries seeking to establish a presence there in the future space economy. “With numerous countries and private sector players conducting missions and operations in cislunar space,” the accords read, “it’s critical to establish a common set of principles to govern the civil exploration and use of outer space.” Among its many provisions, the accords require participating states to commit to using outer space for peaceful purposes, transparency regarding space plans and policies, deconfliction of space activities, and managing orbital debris and spacecraft disposal. As of September 2023, 29 nations had joined the accords, including the four European countries with the largest space programs — France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom — as well as India and Japan.
Unsurprisingly, Russia and China have opposed these moves. And, like most other areas of geopolitics, the United States will have to contend with Moscow and Beijing in its bid for international leadership of the liberal order. China, like the United States, is focused on the economic aspects of space power, and it continues to reach significant technological milestones in outer space. During the last two years, China has announced its plans for expanded lunar and deep space exploration, including a permanent base on the moon, and has launched its own plans for cooperation and coalition-building on the moon, making it the United States’ primary competitor in outer space. Nevertheless, to date, China has not offered socio-technical mechanisms toward the governing of space.
A Winning Approach?
The future space race will be won not by those whose technological advancements are superior but by those who would offer the most innovative and attractive economic, legal, social, and political institutions to other spacefaring nations and entities. In this respect, the United States has a lead over China and Russia, but it has a long way to go in winning this contest. Despite having seemingly built a broad, multilateral coalition, several of the United States’ closest allies have been slow to join the accords; only ten of its 30 NATO allies, for example, have signed onto Artemis.
Although the accords themselves are relatively uncontentious, nonbinding, and explicitly tied to existing legal precedents, whether signees will obtain managerial privileges and become partners with the United States in leading the new order in space remain unanswered questions. In bypassing the “normal” channels of international space law — such as the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space — the United States has managed to alienate some countries. To many, the Artemis Accords come across as a unilateral attempt of a superpower to impose its will — and, by extension, its values — on the international system by unilaterally establishing principles guiding the future of humans’ enduring presence in space.
The United States has an opportunity to get other countries on board with its principles, but it needs to demonstrate that its vision for the future is built on meaningful trust and partnerships — vital elements in recruiting followers and partners for a prosperous and scalable economy. A successful effort would not only set the agenda and governance of space but would shape the balance of power in outer space for decades to come.
Deganit Paikowsky is a lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. She is a nonresident scholar at George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute and the author of The Power of the Space Club, published by Cambridge University Press.
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