Since Russia’s February 2022 invasion, the United States has provided an astounding $27.2 billion in military assistance to Ukraine, by far the largest yearly total provided to another country since at least the end of the Cold War. In short, U.S. security assistance to Ukraine has broken all modern precedents. The billions of dollars in security assistance have been instrumental not only in sustaining Ukraine’s defense but also enabling Ukrainian counter-offensives that have reclaimed territory previously occupied by Russia. Over the course of the conflict, the scale, scope, and nature of U.S. and international assistance have evolved alongside battlefield demands, escalation concerns, and physical constraints. But while much of the public focus remains on the provision of new capabilities, a year on from Russia’s invasion, sustaining the myriad platforms and systems provided since February will be just as important and, in some ways, more challenging.
An Evolving Enterprise
Over the past year, the United States has led an iterative approach to Ukraine’s security assistance enterprise, expanding the volume of certain capabilities while periodically testing the value and consequences of escalating the sophistication of the weaponry on offer. From man-portable anti-armor and air systems, to heavy artillery, to sophisticated multi-launch rocket systems and now increasingly robust mobile armor, Washington has sought to manage concerns around escalation with Russia by pursuing methodical evolutions in its assistance effort while breaking taboos that make similar transfers from European partners more politically palatable.
Even so, the concerns around escalation and possible reprisals from Russia that shaped the debate in 2022 continue to constrain the choices of Ukraine’s international patrons. The United States and others have thus far refrained from providing manned fighter aircraft, more advanced unmanned aerial vehicles, and rocket artillery capable of longer-range fire, partly due to concerns that such a move would be too direct a provocation for Moscow or doubts that such systems would lend Ukraine a sufficient military edge to make the escalatory risks worthwhile.
Still, the West has steadily augmented its assistance effort, both as a signal of its political commitment as well as a matter of practical support. Ukraine’s backers have recently begun providing more sophisticated mobile armor platforms, overcoming reticence on the part of key partners to provision the most advanced battle tanks. In addition, in response to Russia’s strategic strike campaign on key civilian infrastructure, the United States and Western partners are scaling up their provisioning of increasingly sophisticated air defense systems, including a symbolically significant promise of an advanced Patriot air defense system from Washington.
Additionally, recognizing that force reconstitution and regeneration will also continue to be one of the fundamental variables that will determine the outcome of the conflict, the West has expanded its direct training efforts. This includes a new EU-led initiative that will train roughly 15,000 Ukrainian soldiers in the coming years as well as a U.S.-led effort that provides combined arms instruction to 500 Ukrainian service members a month, in addition to other existing instruction programs.
A New Challenge
As the winter freeze in Ukraine begins to thaw, expectations are of a renewed intensity in fighting, with Russia aiming to regain the initiative with spring offensives and Ukraine looking to revitalize the momentum it gained in late 2022. In either case, Ukraine’s need for international support is likely to increase.
But while much of the headlines are focused on the provisioning of new systems and the breaking of old taboos, the attritional nature of the fighting means that the sustainment, maintenance, and replacement of systems already in theater are likely to be even more important and, potentially, more challenging. For example, the utility of artillery, rocket platforms, and air defense systems that have proven so instrumental in Ukraine’s war effort extends only as far as the West’s ability to supply their associated munitions and replacement parts. Already, such efforts have strained the capacity of Ukraine’s backers to their limits – and possibly beyond – sparking debate about the sustainability of the assistance effort going forward.
Put simply, the Western defense industrial base is not able to keep pace with battlefield consumption in Ukraine, and the delivery of key systems and their consumables has depended on extraordinary measures that have drawn on the West’s strategic stockpiles of materiel. For example, of the $27.8 billion in assistance the United States has provided to Ukraine since January 2021, more than $18.3 billion has come from an unprecedented surge in Presidential Drawdowns, an emergency authority available to the president to transfer arms from existing U.S. stockpiles to foreign partners. At least 30 drawdowns have been invoked since August 2021. To put that in perspective, a Government Accountability Office report from 2016 suggested the authority was used just 13 times globally between FY2011 and FY2014.
In other words, well more than half of all the assistance provided to Ukraine during the Biden administration has come directly from stockpiles intended to ensure U.S. readiness in the event of conflict. Those drawdowns have been vital in rushing hardware to Ukrainian frontlines, cutting the time of conventional security assistance transfers from months and years to days or weeks. But the practice has severely depleted U.S. stocks, dropping them to volumes thought to be the minimum required for U.S. national security and, for some capabilities, possibly below. Such depletion could present acute readiness risks for the United States and limit Washington’s abilities to meet demands of potential unforeseen crises or contingencies.
While the challenge has no quick remedy, Washington and Ukraine’s other international partners have begun taking measures to augment defense production. In recent months, defense procurement leaders from the Ukraine Contact Group (a coalition spearheaded by the Department of Defense to coordinate international assistance to Ukraine) met in Brussels to discuss ramping up production of key systems and munitions, while another meeting in early October focused on rebuilding Ukraine’s own defense industrial base. In Washington, new funding is being allocated to massively expand output of key materiel, including a near tripling of artillery production and billions for other replenishment efforts. These initiatives illustrate concerns not just for meeting Ukraine’s urgent battlefield needs, but the capacity of the West to do so over the long term without sacrificing its own national security imperatives.
But reshaping the West’s industrial base will be a daunting task that will face physical and commercial constraints. In many cases, responding to long-dormant demand will require large capital investments from industry as well as time to develop the physical and human capital for production. Those investments require certain financial assurances from government that have thus far not adequately materialized. In any case, such a revamp will be years in the making, creating practical challenges as the West, and the United States in particular, considers how to support Ukraine, backfill years’ worth of material that has been siphoned from existing stocks, and deepen stores to contend with the realities of 21st century defense needs.
Conclusion
A year after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it is clear that the largest land war in Europe since the Second World War has reshaped U.S. policy in the region and its security cooperation imperatives. But as the war drags on, the assistance effort will have to evolve to remain sustainable and reflective of military and strategic realities. While Ukraine will continue to seek new capabilities, sustaining the systems provided since February 2022 will be both vital and pose unique challenges to the assistance effort.
Looking forward, the United States will have to consider how it balances the demands of the frontlines in Ukraine with its own readiness imperatives and interests. It will be a difficult square to circle, especially as Russia looks to reverse its fortunes in the new year. In this context, while new platforms and capabilities are certain to generate persistent interest and tactically important benefits, how Ukraine’s patrons sustain materiel that has already proven pivotal will be of both increasing importance and difficulty.
US Security Assistance to Ukraine: Where do we go from here?
By Elias Yousif
Conventional Arms
Since Russia’s February 2022 invasion, the United States has provided an astounding $27.2 billion in military assistance to Ukraine, by far the largest yearly total provided to another country since at least the end of the Cold War. In short, U.S. security assistance to Ukraine has broken all modern precedents. The billions of dollars in security assistance have been instrumental not only in sustaining Ukraine’s defense but also enabling Ukrainian counter-offensives that have reclaimed territory previously occupied by Russia. Over the course of the conflict, the scale, scope, and nature of U.S. and international assistance have evolved alongside battlefield demands, escalation concerns, and physical constraints. But while much of the public focus remains on the provision of new capabilities, a year on from Russia’s invasion, sustaining the myriad platforms and systems provided since February will be just as important and, in some ways, more challenging.
An Evolving Enterprise
Over the past year, the United States has led an iterative approach to Ukraine’s security assistance enterprise, expanding the volume of certain capabilities while periodically testing the value and consequences of escalating the sophistication of the weaponry on offer. From man-portable anti-armor and air systems, to heavy artillery, to sophisticated multi-launch rocket systems and now increasingly robust mobile armor, Washington has sought to manage concerns around escalation with Russia by pursuing methodical evolutions in its assistance effort while breaking taboos that make similar transfers from European partners more politically palatable.
Even so, the concerns around escalation and possible reprisals from Russia that shaped the debate in 2022 continue to constrain the choices of Ukraine’s international patrons. The United States and others have thus far refrained from providing manned fighter aircraft, more advanced unmanned aerial vehicles, and rocket artillery capable of longer-range fire, partly due to concerns that such a move would be too direct a provocation for Moscow or doubts that such systems would lend Ukraine a sufficient military edge to make the escalatory risks worthwhile.
Still, the West has steadily augmented its assistance effort, both as a signal of its political commitment as well as a matter of practical support. Ukraine’s backers have recently begun providing more sophisticated mobile armor platforms, overcoming reticence on the part of key partners to provision the most advanced battle tanks. In addition, in response to Russia’s strategic strike campaign on key civilian infrastructure, the United States and Western partners are scaling up their provisioning of increasingly sophisticated air defense systems, including a symbolically significant promise of an advanced Patriot air defense system from Washington.
Additionally, recognizing that force reconstitution and regeneration will also continue to be one of the fundamental variables that will determine the outcome of the conflict, the West has expanded its direct training efforts. This includes a new EU-led initiative that will train roughly 15,000 Ukrainian soldiers in the coming years as well as a U.S.-led effort that provides combined arms instruction to 500 Ukrainian service members a month, in addition to other existing instruction programs.
A New Challenge
As the winter freeze in Ukraine begins to thaw, expectations are of a renewed intensity in fighting, with Russia aiming to regain the initiative with spring offensives and Ukraine looking to revitalize the momentum it gained in late 2022. In either case, Ukraine’s need for international support is likely to increase.
But while much of the headlines are focused on the provisioning of new systems and the breaking of old taboos, the attritional nature of the fighting means that the sustainment, maintenance, and replacement of systems already in theater are likely to be even more important and, potentially, more challenging. For example, the utility of artillery, rocket platforms, and air defense systems that have proven so instrumental in Ukraine’s war effort extends only as far as the West’s ability to supply their associated munitions and replacement parts. Already, such efforts have strained the capacity of Ukraine’s backers to their limits – and possibly beyond – sparking debate about the sustainability of the assistance effort going forward.
Put simply, the Western defense industrial base is not able to keep pace with battlefield consumption in Ukraine, and the delivery of key systems and their consumables has depended on extraordinary measures that have drawn on the West’s strategic stockpiles of materiel. For example, of the $27.8 billion in assistance the United States has provided to Ukraine since January 2021, more than $18.3 billion has come from an unprecedented surge in Presidential Drawdowns, an emergency authority available to the president to transfer arms from existing U.S. stockpiles to foreign partners. At least 30 drawdowns have been invoked since August 2021. To put that in perspective, a Government Accountability Office report from 2016 suggested the authority was used just 13 times globally between FY2011 and FY2014.
In other words, well more than half of all the assistance provided to Ukraine during the Biden administration has come directly from stockpiles intended to ensure U.S. readiness in the event of conflict. Those drawdowns have been vital in rushing hardware to Ukrainian frontlines, cutting the time of conventional security assistance transfers from months and years to days or weeks. But the practice has severely depleted U.S. stocks, dropping them to volumes thought to be the minimum required for U.S. national security and, for some capabilities, possibly below. Such depletion could present acute readiness risks for the United States and limit Washington’s abilities to meet demands of potential unforeseen crises or contingencies.
While the challenge has no quick remedy, Washington and Ukraine’s other international partners have begun taking measures to augment defense production. In recent months, defense procurement leaders from the Ukraine Contact Group (a coalition spearheaded by the Department of Defense to coordinate international assistance to Ukraine) met in Brussels to discuss ramping up production of key systems and munitions, while another meeting in early October focused on rebuilding Ukraine’s own defense industrial base. In Washington, new funding is being allocated to massively expand output of key materiel, including a near tripling of artillery production and billions for other replenishment efforts. These initiatives illustrate concerns not just for meeting Ukraine’s urgent battlefield needs, but the capacity of the West to do so over the long term without sacrificing its own national security imperatives.
But reshaping the West’s industrial base will be a daunting task that will face physical and commercial constraints. In many cases, responding to long-dormant demand will require large capital investments from industry as well as time to develop the physical and human capital for production. Those investments require certain financial assurances from government that have thus far not adequately materialized. In any case, such a revamp will be years in the making, creating practical challenges as the West, and the United States in particular, considers how to support Ukraine, backfill years’ worth of material that has been siphoned from existing stocks, and deepen stores to contend with the realities of 21st century defense needs.
Conclusion
A year after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it is clear that the largest land war in Europe since the Second World War has reshaped U.S. policy in the region and its security cooperation imperatives. But as the war drags on, the assistance effort will have to evolve to remain sustainable and reflective of military and strategic realities. While Ukraine will continue to seek new capabilities, sustaining the systems provided since February 2022 will be both vital and pose unique challenges to the assistance effort.
Looking forward, the United States will have to consider how it balances the demands of the frontlines in Ukraine with its own readiness imperatives and interests. It will be a difficult square to circle, especially as Russia looks to reverse its fortunes in the new year. In this context, while new platforms and capabilities are certain to generate persistent interest and tactically important benefits, how Ukraine’s patrons sustain materiel that has already proven pivotal will be of both increasing importance and difficulty.
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