Introduction
Two years after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the war’s profile has diminished in the minds of the American public and even many U.S. policymakers. Other crises, particularly in the Middle East, have drawn attention away from the heavy fighting that continues across a wide front in Ukraine’s east and a record-setting U.S. military assistance effort that has totaled $44.2 billion since the start of the war. In recent weeks, much of the public discourse on the war has centered less on the evolving contours of the conflict and instead on domestic political horse-trading that has effectively dried the well of U.S. security assistance.
The lack of attention to the continued fighting in Ukraine poses real risks, not just for the sustainability of Ukraine’s defense against Russia’s invasion, but also for ensuring a responsible, accountable, and effective military aid effort. In the early days of the conflict, we outlined potential risks of military assistance to Ukraine as well as risk mitigation measures that could support a more sustainable security cooperation partnership between Washington and Kyiv. As we mark the grim two-year anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion, it is worth revisiting those risks, benchmarking the administration’s efforts to address them, and considering how the aid effort must evolve to meet the interests of both the United States and Ukraine.
Escalation and Conflict Spillover
Avoiding an escalatory spiral with Russia has been one of the defining imperatives of the U.S. military aid effort to Ukraine. Russian threats in the first months of its invasion, including claims that it would consider those providing military aid to Ukraine as party to the conflict, stoked global anxieties that efforts to enable Kyiv’s defense could spark a wider war. Russia’s poor battlefield performance added to those fears – a desperate Moscow, it was thought, facing defeat in the field, may make the risky choice to directly target Kyiv’s patrons in an effort to sever the country’s essential military lifeline. Russia’s historical willingness to employ cyber and irregular warfare instruments as well as President Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling only magnified the risks of miscalculation.
But despite several especially tense moments, the feared escalatory spiral has remained at bay. While there are many, and in some cases conflicting, explanations for why the conflict has remained relatively contained, the methodical and well-telegraphed approach of the U.S. military assistance effort has been cited as a contributing factor.
Though Ukraine, quite reasonably, pleaded for urgent delivery of every possible capability and military platform, the United States adopted an iterative approach with incremental and temporally dispersed increases in the sophistication of its assistance. The approach had its critics, but it offered some clear benefits. First, it allowed Washington to monitor the Kremlin’s reaction to the evolving aid effort, providing space for the administration to assess whether any particular transfer had crossed the proverbial, invisible, and likely variable “red line” for Moscow. Additionally, by proceeding predictably and consistently, and by telegraphing upcoming transfers, the Biden administration effectively habituated the Kremlin to the U.S. military aid effort and dulled the potential shocks an evolution in assistance might cause. It also allowed for effective consensus building among Ukraine’s supporters and helped prevent ruptures in the alliance over military aid.
Critics have said that the administration’s concern over escalation was exaggerated, and unduly constrained military aid in a way that hampered Ukraine’s military operations and undermined its ability to react effectively to battlefield developments. Still, the fact that U.S. assistance has not triggered a wider war is noteworthy. Some analysts suspect the moment of highest risk has passed – a Russian collapse that might have dramatically altered Moscow’s risk calculus seems highly unlikely. Moreover, the Kremlin’s apparent strategy of “outlasting” Kyiv and its allies is likely to create disincentives for escalation.
Nevertheless, even the remote risk of escalation carries significant consequences that merit enduring attention from U.S. policymakers. In particular, Ukraine’s increasing use of long-range strike capabilities to hit targets inside Russia may change Moscow’s calculus and create pressure for a more confrontational response to Kyiv’s allies.
Diversion
Though no arms transfer is without diversion risk, the unprecedented scale and scope of the military aid effort to Ukraine added substantially to the challenge. Amounting to tens of billions of dollars in military hardware, the surge in transfers raised questions about Ukraine’s absorptive capacity, oversight mechanisms, and history of poor weapons stewardship. Adding to those concerns were the transfers of certain capabilities that have long been thought of as posing the most acute diversion risks, including small arms and light weapons, man-portable air defense systems, and anti-tank/all-purpose tactical guided missiles.
Fortunately, available evidence suggests that Ukraine has avoided the sort of large-scale illicit weapons diversion that many had feared in the short term. The most cited reason for the relative paucity of illicit transfers has been the enormous frontline demands for materiel, undercutting incentives that might exist to co-opt transfers from foreign backers. Additionally, Ukraine’s political and military leadership are surely very aware of how instances of diversion might jeopardize their foreign assistance and add to the political headwinds opposing continued U.S. aid. Faced with such an existential threat, Ukraine has made notable efforts to mitigate diversion risks and reassure allies of its determination to maintain control of foreign-provided stocks.
The Biden administration has also taken steps to address diversion risks. In October of 2022, the Department of State announced a plan to address illicit diversion risks stemming from U.S. military assistance, which included a multi-stage and multi-year effort focused on building the stewardship capacity of Ukraine, improving border security regionally, and enhancing the monitoring, detection, and interdiction capabilities of neighboring authorities. Additionally, the administration launched an interagency working group to provide broad and comprehensive oversight of the U.S. response to Russia’s invasion with a significant focus on security aid.
Most immediately, the administration has also modified its various end-use monitoring (EUM) programs to reflect the operational environment in Ukraine, including efforts to adapt in-person inventory checks, the use of phone-based apps, and the introduction of barcode scanners.
But despite the important and valuable investments made in diversion mitigation, huge challenges remain, especially as risks evolve with changing circumstances. Firstly, despite substantial government effort, U.S. end-use monitoring of arms transfers to Ukraine remains insufficient. A January inspector general report found that the Department of Defense had failed to meet enhanced end-use monitoring requirements for approximately $1 billion worth of military equipment provided to Kyiv, representing 59% of defense articles designated for enhanced scrutiny. Media reports indicating the theft of U.S.-provided equipment as well as well-documented cases of enemy capture of U.S.-origin defense articles add to the concerns.
Additionally, new risk vectors are likely to emerge. For example, the many hundreds of thousands of artillery rounds expelled over the past two years coupled with the extensive use of cluster munitions in recent months will leave behind literal tons of unexploded ordnance that could easily be repurposed for unintended uses by illicit actors.
Moreover, the weapons currently being transferred to Ukraine have long shelf lives that may extend well beyond the duration of this conflict. And as incentive structures that have thus far acted as a constraint on weapons diversion evolve, so too will the risks. Long after the guns fall silent, these durable goods will present enduring stewardship challenges – there are plenty of examples where the cessation of hostilities preceded a surge in illicit weapons flows, something the United States should be focused on preventing. Accordingly, the U.S. government will need to remain vigilant and responsive to the evolving landscape for the long term.
Misuse
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been characterized by a wonton disregard for international humanitarian law and human rights. Its extrajudicial killings, use of cluster munitions in urban environments, liberal employment of landmines, strategic strike campaigns against civilian infrastructure, and large-scale massacres have all rightfully drawn scorn from the international community. However, while Russia bears overwhelming responsibility for the human suffering wrought by its invasion, Ukraine has also engaged in activities that violate its international obligations and contribute inordinately to civilian harm.
To be sure, Ukraine has been far more restrained in its military conduct than Russia. For its part, the United States has made efforts to ensure assistance is not made available to those units with troubling reputations or history of unprofessional conduct. Still, civilian protection practices remain flawed. In a conflict that features near constant artillery fires, exchanges in civilian areas are especially risky. Reports of Ukraine’s shelling of an urban center in Russian-occupied Donetsk that killed a number of civilians are particularly troubling and could portend badly if more static frontlines result in artillery duels between opposing forces in civilian areas. Similarly, Ukrainian long-range strikes directed at targets in Ukraine and Russia could pose a risk to civilians and to conflict escalation. Regardless of whether such strikes are conducted with U.S. weapons, given the scope of Washington’s political and material support for Kyiv, such actions still risk American complicity in civilian harm and violations of international law.
Additionally, the U.S. provision of cluster munitions to make up for shortages in conventional artillery shells poses an inherent civilian protection risk that will persist for decades. Used extensively during Ukraine’s most recent offensive, these munitions will leave behind tens of thousands of unexploded sub-munitions, contaminating large swaths of the country’s east. Coupled with Ukraine’s reported use of antipersonnel landmines – in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty to which it is a party – this unexploded ordnance will present a lasting threat to civilians for years to come.
Conclusion
Two years after the invasion of Ukraine, the Biden administration and the Ukrainian government deserve praise for their largely successful efforts to mitigate risks posed by one of the largest security assistance efforts ever undertaken. However, the risks we discussed at the start of the conflict remain and require steadfast attention and an evolving mitigation approach. Although continued assistance to Ukraine is caught up in a political and partisan fight in Congress, the Biden administration can still take several steps to ensure that U.S. security assistance continues to support U.S. interests and the long-term safety and security of Ukraine, its citizens, and U.S. allies.
While the sense of immediate escalation risks has ebbed, the Biden administration should continue its monitoring of Russian behavior and reaction to continued U.S. assistance, particularly with respect to deliveries of qualitatively new capabilities. Additionally, the administration should consider carefully the practical utility of more sophisticated transfers, especially when many analysts have said that the most urgent frontline needs are the basics at scale.
With respect to diversion, the administration should continue to implement adapted EUM regimes, which should include more regular on-site visits when circumstances permit, the implementation of technical and procedural innovations, as well as more robust interagency coordination and information gathering, especially with U.S. and allied intelligence communities. Additionally, the administration should ensure synchronization and de-confliction with any parallel European diversion mitigation plans and play a coordinating role for others engaged in the assistance effort. Vitally, the administration should provide publicly available progress reports on its diversion mitigation plan’s implementation – it has been 16 months since the plan was first announced, yet little information has been provided on what the approach has looked like in practice.
The Biden administration should also double down on efforts to ensure the highest standards of Ukrainian compliance with international humanitarian law and civilian protection obligations. Continued U.S. assistance should be conditioned on appropriate use and include reasonable constraints on Ukraine’s long-range strike efforts. In the event that assurances cannot be provided or there manifests a pattern of inappropriate behavior, the administration must be willing to suspend or refrain from certain transfers. This will require more robust monitoring of how U.S.-origin weapons are used – something that EUM, despite its moniker, is not functionally designed to do. This may include effective utilization of the newly announced Civilian Harm Incident Response Guidance, but must also incorporate an active, government-wide approach to monitoring.
In addition, having made the decision to transfer cluster munitions of various kinds to Ukraine, the United States must make every effort to mitigate the easily foreseeable risks these weapons will pose to civilians for the long term. The use of landmines by both Russian and Ukrainian forces across vast expanses of territory will add to the challenge of mapping cluster munition use, necessitating substantial investments in demining initiatives to take place now and long after the war concludes.
To support all these mitigation approaches, the administration should commit to an ethos of public transparency. U.S. military assistance too frequently takes place away from public view, undermining the ability of the public, lawmakers, and civil society to ensure accountability, conduct oversight, or support efforts to minimize risk. Thus far, the administration has been surprisingly transparent about its military aid effort, especially in comparison to its more routine assistance partnerships. This is laudable, but more can be done. Publishing more comprehensive and methodologically robust factsheets, improving the specificity of reports, and providing updates on EUM and other mitigation efforts should be a priority.
U.S. assistance has been indispensable in enabling Ukraine’s defense against Russia’s revanchist invasion. But aid delivered irresponsibly or without the appropriate safeguards serves no one’s interests. Diligent and comprehensive risk mitigation efforts are vital to ensuring assistance is effective, does not contribute inordinately to harm, instability, or even broader conflict, and is sustainable, both practically and politically.
Ukraine Risks Revisited
By Elias Yousif • Rachel Stohl
Conventional Arms
Introduction
Two years after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the war’s profile has diminished in the minds of the American public and even many U.S. policymakers. Other crises, particularly in the Middle East, have drawn attention away from the heavy fighting that continues across a wide front in Ukraine’s east and a record-setting U.S. military assistance effort that has totaled $44.2 billion since the start of the war. In recent weeks, much of the public discourse on the war has centered less on the evolving contours of the conflict and instead on domestic political horse-trading that has effectively dried the well of U.S. security assistance.
The lack of attention to the continued fighting in Ukraine poses real risks, not just for the sustainability of Ukraine’s defense against Russia’s invasion, but also for ensuring a responsible, accountable, and effective military aid effort. In the early days of the conflict, we outlined potential risks of military assistance to Ukraine as well as risk mitigation measures that could support a more sustainable security cooperation partnership between Washington and Kyiv. As we mark the grim two-year anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion, it is worth revisiting those risks, benchmarking the administration’s efforts to address them, and considering how the aid effort must evolve to meet the interests of both the United States and Ukraine.
Escalation and Conflict Spillover
Avoiding an escalatory spiral with Russia has been one of the defining imperatives of the U.S. military aid effort to Ukraine. Russian threats in the first months of its invasion, including claims that it would consider those providing military aid to Ukraine as party to the conflict, stoked global anxieties that efforts to enable Kyiv’s defense could spark a wider war. Russia’s poor battlefield performance added to those fears – a desperate Moscow, it was thought, facing defeat in the field, may make the risky choice to directly target Kyiv’s patrons in an effort to sever the country’s essential military lifeline. Russia’s historical willingness to employ cyber and irregular warfare instruments as well as President Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling only magnified the risks of miscalculation.
But despite several especially tense moments, the feared escalatory spiral has remained at bay. While there are many, and in some cases conflicting, explanations for why the conflict has remained relatively contained, the methodical and well-telegraphed approach of the U.S. military assistance effort has been cited as a contributing factor.
Though Ukraine, quite reasonably, pleaded for urgent delivery of every possible capability and military platform, the United States adopted an iterative approach with incremental and temporally dispersed increases in the sophistication of its assistance. The approach had its critics, but it offered some clear benefits. First, it allowed Washington to monitor the Kremlin’s reaction to the evolving aid effort, providing space for the administration to assess whether any particular transfer had crossed the proverbial, invisible, and likely variable “red line” for Moscow. Additionally, by proceeding predictably and consistently, and by telegraphing upcoming transfers, the Biden administration effectively habituated the Kremlin to the U.S. military aid effort and dulled the potential shocks an evolution in assistance might cause. It also allowed for effective consensus building among Ukraine’s supporters and helped prevent ruptures in the alliance over military aid.
Critics have said that the administration’s concern over escalation was exaggerated, and unduly constrained military aid in a way that hampered Ukraine’s military operations and undermined its ability to react effectively to battlefield developments. Still, the fact that U.S. assistance has not triggered a wider war is noteworthy. Some analysts suspect the moment of highest risk has passed – a Russian collapse that might have dramatically altered Moscow’s risk calculus seems highly unlikely. Moreover, the Kremlin’s apparent strategy of “outlasting” Kyiv and its allies is likely to create disincentives for escalation.
Nevertheless, even the remote risk of escalation carries significant consequences that merit enduring attention from U.S. policymakers. In particular, Ukraine’s increasing use of long-range strike capabilities to hit targets inside Russia may change Moscow’s calculus and create pressure for a more confrontational response to Kyiv’s allies.
Diversion
Though no arms transfer is without diversion risk, the unprecedented scale and scope of the military aid effort to Ukraine added substantially to the challenge. Amounting to tens of billions of dollars in military hardware, the surge in transfers raised questions about Ukraine’s absorptive capacity, oversight mechanisms, and history of poor weapons stewardship. Adding to those concerns were the transfers of certain capabilities that have long been thought of as posing the most acute diversion risks, including small arms and light weapons, man-portable air defense systems, and anti-tank/all-purpose tactical guided missiles.
Fortunately, available evidence suggests that Ukraine has avoided the sort of large-scale illicit weapons diversion that many had feared in the short term. The most cited reason for the relative paucity of illicit transfers has been the enormous frontline demands for materiel, undercutting incentives that might exist to co-opt transfers from foreign backers. Additionally, Ukraine’s political and military leadership are surely very aware of how instances of diversion might jeopardize their foreign assistance and add to the political headwinds opposing continued U.S. aid. Faced with such an existential threat, Ukraine has made notable efforts to mitigate diversion risks and reassure allies of its determination to maintain control of foreign-provided stocks.
The Biden administration has also taken steps to address diversion risks. In October of 2022, the Department of State announced a plan to address illicit diversion risks stemming from U.S. military assistance, which included a multi-stage and multi-year effort focused on building the stewardship capacity of Ukraine, improving border security regionally, and enhancing the monitoring, detection, and interdiction capabilities of neighboring authorities. Additionally, the administration launched an interagency working group to provide broad and comprehensive oversight of the U.S. response to Russia’s invasion with a significant focus on security aid.
Most immediately, the administration has also modified its various end-use monitoring (EUM) programs to reflect the operational environment in Ukraine, including efforts to adapt in-person inventory checks, the use of phone-based apps, and the introduction of barcode scanners.
But despite the important and valuable investments made in diversion mitigation, huge challenges remain, especially as risks evolve with changing circumstances. Firstly, despite substantial government effort, U.S. end-use monitoring of arms transfers to Ukraine remains insufficient. A January inspector general report found that the Department of Defense had failed to meet enhanced end-use monitoring requirements for approximately $1 billion worth of military equipment provided to Kyiv, representing 59% of defense articles designated for enhanced scrutiny. Media reports indicating the theft of U.S.-provided equipment as well as well-documented cases of enemy capture of U.S.-origin defense articles add to the concerns.
Additionally, new risk vectors are likely to emerge. For example, the many hundreds of thousands of artillery rounds expelled over the past two years coupled with the extensive use of cluster munitions in recent months will leave behind literal tons of unexploded ordnance that could easily be repurposed for unintended uses by illicit actors.
Moreover, the weapons currently being transferred to Ukraine have long shelf lives that may extend well beyond the duration of this conflict. And as incentive structures that have thus far acted as a constraint on weapons diversion evolve, so too will the risks. Long after the guns fall silent, these durable goods will present enduring stewardship challenges – there are plenty of examples where the cessation of hostilities preceded a surge in illicit weapons flows, something the United States should be focused on preventing. Accordingly, the U.S. government will need to remain vigilant and responsive to the evolving landscape for the long term.
Misuse
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been characterized by a wonton disregard for international humanitarian law and human rights. Its extrajudicial killings, use of cluster munitions in urban environments, liberal employment of landmines, strategic strike campaigns against civilian infrastructure, and large-scale massacres have all rightfully drawn scorn from the international community. However, while Russia bears overwhelming responsibility for the human suffering wrought by its invasion, Ukraine has also engaged in activities that violate its international obligations and contribute inordinately to civilian harm.
To be sure, Ukraine has been far more restrained in its military conduct than Russia. For its part, the United States has made efforts to ensure assistance is not made available to those units with troubling reputations or history of unprofessional conduct. Still, civilian protection practices remain flawed. In a conflict that features near constant artillery fires, exchanges in civilian areas are especially risky. Reports of Ukraine’s shelling of an urban center in Russian-occupied Donetsk that killed a number of civilians are particularly troubling and could portend badly if more static frontlines result in artillery duels between opposing forces in civilian areas. Similarly, Ukrainian long-range strikes directed at targets in Ukraine and Russia could pose a risk to civilians and to conflict escalation. Regardless of whether such strikes are conducted with U.S. weapons, given the scope of Washington’s political and material support for Kyiv, such actions still risk American complicity in civilian harm and violations of international law.
Additionally, the U.S. provision of cluster munitions to make up for shortages in conventional artillery shells poses an inherent civilian protection risk that will persist for decades. Used extensively during Ukraine’s most recent offensive, these munitions will leave behind tens of thousands of unexploded sub-munitions, contaminating large swaths of the country’s east. Coupled with Ukraine’s reported use of antipersonnel landmines – in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty to which it is a party – this unexploded ordnance will present a lasting threat to civilians for years to come.
Conclusion
Two years after the invasion of Ukraine, the Biden administration and the Ukrainian government deserve praise for their largely successful efforts to mitigate risks posed by one of the largest security assistance efforts ever undertaken. However, the risks we discussed at the start of the conflict remain and require steadfast attention and an evolving mitigation approach. Although continued assistance to Ukraine is caught up in a political and partisan fight in Congress, the Biden administration can still take several steps to ensure that U.S. security assistance continues to support U.S. interests and the long-term safety and security of Ukraine, its citizens, and U.S. allies.
While the sense of immediate escalation risks has ebbed, the Biden administration should continue its monitoring of Russian behavior and reaction to continued U.S. assistance, particularly with respect to deliveries of qualitatively new capabilities. Additionally, the administration should consider carefully the practical utility of more sophisticated transfers, especially when many analysts have said that the most urgent frontline needs are the basics at scale.
With respect to diversion, the administration should continue to implement adapted EUM regimes, which should include more regular on-site visits when circumstances permit, the implementation of technical and procedural innovations, as well as more robust interagency coordination and information gathering, especially with U.S. and allied intelligence communities. Additionally, the administration should ensure synchronization and de-confliction with any parallel European diversion mitigation plans and play a coordinating role for others engaged in the assistance effort. Vitally, the administration should provide publicly available progress reports on its diversion mitigation plan’s implementation – it has been 16 months since the plan was first announced, yet little information has been provided on what the approach has looked like in practice.
The Biden administration should also double down on efforts to ensure the highest standards of Ukrainian compliance with international humanitarian law and civilian protection obligations. Continued U.S. assistance should be conditioned on appropriate use and include reasonable constraints on Ukraine’s long-range strike efforts. In the event that assurances cannot be provided or there manifests a pattern of inappropriate behavior, the administration must be willing to suspend or refrain from certain transfers. This will require more robust monitoring of how U.S.-origin weapons are used – something that EUM, despite its moniker, is not functionally designed to do. This may include effective utilization of the newly announced Civilian Harm Incident Response Guidance, but must also incorporate an active, government-wide approach to monitoring.
In addition, having made the decision to transfer cluster munitions of various kinds to Ukraine, the United States must make every effort to mitigate the easily foreseeable risks these weapons will pose to civilians for the long term. The use of landmines by both Russian and Ukrainian forces across vast expanses of territory will add to the challenge of mapping cluster munition use, necessitating substantial investments in demining initiatives to take place now and long after the war concludes.
To support all these mitigation approaches, the administration should commit to an ethos of public transparency. U.S. military assistance too frequently takes place away from public view, undermining the ability of the public, lawmakers, and civil society to ensure accountability, conduct oversight, or support efforts to minimize risk. Thus far, the administration has been surprisingly transparent about its military aid effort, especially in comparison to its more routine assistance partnerships. This is laudable, but more can be done. Publishing more comprehensive and methodologically robust factsheets, improving the specificity of reports, and providing updates on EUM and other mitigation efforts should be a priority.
U.S. assistance has been indispensable in enabling Ukraine’s defense against Russia’s revanchist invasion. But aid delivered irresponsibly or without the appropriate safeguards serves no one’s interests. Diligent and comprehensive risk mitigation efforts are vital to ensuring assistance is effective, does not contribute inordinately to harm, instability, or even broader conflict, and is sustainable, both practically and politically.
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