The ongoing Israel-Hamas War is a tragedy of immense proportions. Roughly 200 hostages have been taken, with well over 1,000 deaths incurred on each side. And there are many more likely to come. Yet the biggest drivers of the loss of human life — indirect deaths – are unlikely to make headlines or feature in the photo carousels of devastation displayed across news outlets and social media.
The Pardee Center at the University of Denver recently published three reports on the impact of conflict on human development in Yemen which used a quantitative tool called International Futures to simulate scenarios for Yemen. My colleagues’ analysis of the war in Yemen revealed that at the height of the conflict, a child under the age of 5 died every 12 minutes – mostly from non-combat injuries and ailments, such as malnutrition and infections. Of the estimated 233,000 dead through 2019, 56% of conflict-related deaths in Yemen were assessed to have been so-called indirect deaths, or those not directly linked to airstrikes, gunfire, and the like, but rather from other injuries and ailments that otherwise would have been treatable (and thus not fatal) had it not been for the conflict.
Although each conflict has its own unique circumstances and catastrophes, there are striking similarities between the situation of innocent Yemenis and today’s Gazans caught up in wars, not of their choosing. Israeli defense officials’ self-described siege of the Gaza strip has cut off humanitarian aid in much the way that Houthis had prevented United Nations aid flows to Yemen. There are also many similarities in the geographic and political circumstances – in Gazans’ case, closed borders with Israel and Egypt on three sides and a sea on the fourth; in Yemenis’ case, a sea on two sides, a belligerent on one side, and a harsh desert border on the other – have made it difficult to get out of harm’s way.
Poverty further complicates travel for those who lack the resources to flee conflict even if they have somewhere to go. The Israeli order to evacuate northern Gaza is an apparent attempt to limit civilian deaths in the event of a ground invasion. But limited resources, combined with Hamas’s call for Gazans to stay put, suggests that complying with the evacuation order will be an enormous hardship for the families attempting to escape the conflict with their lives, and some will be forced to simply stay put.
If past is prologue, it is safe to assume that whatever the official death toll will be once combat operations in Gaza have reached a lull, the true death toll – including indirect deaths – will be much higher. For a Gazan population of roughly 2 million – slightly less than the population of Houston, Texas, and confined to a land area one-fifth Houston’s size – the relative difference between direct and total deaths in terms of the percent of families who will have lost someone in the conflict once all is said and done could be immense. Whatever your projected estimate of what the human cost of the war is likely to be, double it.
Already, the present war can be expected to sow the seeds of future generational grievance, both for Israelis – who will long remember the horrific photographs and videos on social media of families being kidnapped and concert-goers being slaughtered – and Palestinians, the majority of whom will have had nothing to do with Hamas’s savagery but will pay a high price all the same from both combat and indirect deaths. The many causes of indirect deaths – whether from a lack of medical care, malnutrition due to little food and water, exposure, or something else – are likely to make this outcome all but guaranteed.
A key implication is that whatever the tactical and operational successes of Israel’s campaign against Hamas, fierce political – and at times violent – resistance by Palestinians will remain deeply embedded in the culture, potentially for generations to come. Indeed, the more severe the campaign, the more severe the long-term ramifications will be. As the Jewish people’s own multimillennial struggle for safety and self-determination illustrates, national and cultural memories are enduring.
There is a world – albeit one far removed from today’s reality – where Egypt would be willing and able to facilitate the evacuation of refugees and mitigate the direct and indirect harm they will face. Restoration of electricity and other essential services would also substantially reduce the indirect death toll, although that too appears unlikely as of this writing.
The war in Yemen set back human development by more than 20 years, according to my Pardee Center colleagues’ analysis. Those who survived – especially children – became far more likely to experience extreme poverty, malnutrition, and long-term education setbacks than would have been the case in the absence of conflict.
Will the same be said for Gaza? The magnitude of effects will, of course, depend on the duration and intensity of the conflict and the level of humanitarian aid, but this much is sure: the direct and indirect death toll, together with the less lethal impacts of the Israel-Hamas War, have already sent human development in Gaza backward. My colleagues have projected that even in the best-case scenario of a fully domestically- and internationally-coordinated recovery, it will likely take Yemen a full decade to get back on track to its pre-conflict path toward achieving select UN Sustainable Development Goals – a track that still leaves much to be desired. Even a short war in Gaza will demand similar integrated recovery efforts to avoid substantial, long-term human development setbacks. Sadly, such an integrated effort feels far from likely in the present international political climate. Moreover, as is often the case with the indirect effects of international crises, we can expect other unexpected second- and third-order effects to follow. If a butterfly flaps its wings in Brazil, the famous example goes, there may later be a tornado in Texas. If tens of thousands of more Gazans die due to the ongoing conflict than officially reported, future sociopolitical tornadoes are likely to appear, even if we cannot yet say precisely where and when.
The Indirect Toll of the Israel-Hamas War
By Collin Meisel
Grand Strategy
The ongoing Israel-Hamas War is a tragedy of immense proportions. Roughly 200 hostages have been taken, with well over 1,000 deaths incurred on each side. And there are many more likely to come. Yet the biggest drivers of the loss of human life — indirect deaths – are unlikely to make headlines or feature in the photo carousels of devastation displayed across news outlets and social media.
The Pardee Center at the University of Denver recently published three reports on the impact of conflict on human development in Yemen which used a quantitative tool called International Futures to simulate scenarios for Yemen. My colleagues’ analysis of the war in Yemen revealed that at the height of the conflict, a child under the age of 5 died every 12 minutes – mostly from non-combat injuries and ailments, such as malnutrition and infections. Of the estimated 233,000 dead through 2019, 56% of conflict-related deaths in Yemen were assessed to have been so-called indirect deaths, or those not directly linked to airstrikes, gunfire, and the like, but rather from other injuries and ailments that otherwise would have been treatable (and thus not fatal) had it not been for the conflict.
Although each conflict has its own unique circumstances and catastrophes, there are striking similarities between the situation of innocent Yemenis and today’s Gazans caught up in wars, not of their choosing. Israeli defense officials’ self-described siege of the Gaza strip has cut off humanitarian aid in much the way that Houthis had prevented United Nations aid flows to Yemen. There are also many similarities in the geographic and political circumstances – in Gazans’ case, closed borders with Israel and Egypt on three sides and a sea on the fourth; in Yemenis’ case, a sea on two sides, a belligerent on one side, and a harsh desert border on the other – have made it difficult to get out of harm’s way.
Poverty further complicates travel for those who lack the resources to flee conflict even if they have somewhere to go. The Israeli order to evacuate northern Gaza is an apparent attempt to limit civilian deaths in the event of a ground invasion. But limited resources, combined with Hamas’s call for Gazans to stay put, suggests that complying with the evacuation order will be an enormous hardship for the families attempting to escape the conflict with their lives, and some will be forced to simply stay put.
If past is prologue, it is safe to assume that whatever the official death toll will be once combat operations in Gaza have reached a lull, the true death toll – including indirect deaths – will be much higher. For a Gazan population of roughly 2 million – slightly less than the population of Houston, Texas, and confined to a land area one-fifth Houston’s size – the relative difference between direct and total deaths in terms of the percent of families who will have lost someone in the conflict once all is said and done could be immense. Whatever your projected estimate of what the human cost of the war is likely to be, double it.
Already, the present war can be expected to sow the seeds of future generational grievance, both for Israelis – who will long remember the horrific photographs and videos on social media of families being kidnapped and concert-goers being slaughtered – and Palestinians, the majority of whom will have had nothing to do with Hamas’s savagery but will pay a high price all the same from both combat and indirect deaths. The many causes of indirect deaths – whether from a lack of medical care, malnutrition due to little food and water, exposure, or something else – are likely to make this outcome all but guaranteed.
A key implication is that whatever the tactical and operational successes of Israel’s campaign against Hamas, fierce political – and at times violent – resistance by Palestinians will remain deeply embedded in the culture, potentially for generations to come. Indeed, the more severe the campaign, the more severe the long-term ramifications will be. As the Jewish people’s own multimillennial struggle for safety and self-determination illustrates, national and cultural memories are enduring.
There is a world – albeit one far removed from today’s reality – where Egypt would be willing and able to facilitate the evacuation of refugees and mitigate the direct and indirect harm they will face. Restoration of electricity and other essential services would also substantially reduce the indirect death toll, although that too appears unlikely as of this writing.
The war in Yemen set back human development by more than 20 years, according to my Pardee Center colleagues’ analysis. Those who survived – especially children – became far more likely to experience extreme poverty, malnutrition, and long-term education setbacks than would have been the case in the absence of conflict.
Will the same be said for Gaza? The magnitude of effects will, of course, depend on the duration and intensity of the conflict and the level of humanitarian aid, but this much is sure: the direct and indirect death toll, together with the less lethal impacts of the Israel-Hamas War, have already sent human development in Gaza backward. My colleagues have projected that even in the best-case scenario of a fully domestically- and internationally-coordinated recovery, it will likely take Yemen a full decade to get back on track to its pre-conflict path toward achieving select UN Sustainable Development Goals – a track that still leaves much to be desired. Even a short war in Gaza will demand similar integrated recovery efforts to avoid substantial, long-term human development setbacks. Sadly, such an integrated effort feels far from likely in the present international political climate. Moreover, as is often the case with the indirect effects of international crises, we can expect other unexpected second- and third-order effects to follow. If a butterfly flaps its wings in Brazil, the famous example goes, there may later be a tornado in Texas. If tens of thousands of more Gazans die due to the ongoing conflict than officially reported, future sociopolitical tornadoes are likely to appear, even if we cannot yet say precisely where and when.
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