The BRICS bloc, consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, has extended invitations to six developing countries – Saudi Arabia, Iran, Ethiopia, Egypt, Argentina, and the United Arab Emirates – to join its ranks. The new bloc would collectively represent 46 percent of the world’s population and contribute 37 percent of global GDP when measured at purchasing power parity.
As stated by South African President Cyril Ramaphosa during the BRICS summit held in Johannesburg from August 22-24, 2023, the six new candidates are set to officially become members on January 1, 2024.
While the bloc as a whole perceives this move as an effort to reshuffle a global order that they deem outdated, disparities in the members’ foreign policy perspectives exist.
Brazil and India maintain closer ties with the West, while China and Russia may interpret the role of the bloc differently, particularly in the current context. Amid escalating tensions between Russia and the West due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and deteriorating relations between the U.S. and China, Beijing and Moscow are amplifying their efforts to position BRICS as a counterforce against the Western bloc. The inclusion of the anti-American Iranian government within BRICS could be interpreted as a direct result of these efforts.
Russia’s stance is unequivocal; it is locked in a high-stakes confrontation with the West, particularly the United States. The Ukrainian conflict has further deepened ties between Russia and Iran, evident in their military cooperation, such as Iran supplying unmanned combat aerial vehicles to Russia.
On August 26, in response to some reports indicating that Washington has requested the Iranian government to halt the sale of drones to Moscow, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated, “There are no changes, and cooperation with Iran will continue. We are independent states and do not succumb to the dictates of the United States and its satellites.” On the same day, Iranian defense ministry spokesperson Reza Talaei-Nik remarked, “None of the transactions (regarding drones) that we have had … with other countries, such as Russia, have been cancelled.”
China, despite internal unrest and heightened civil struggles in Iran, which have raised questions about the system’s legitimacy at the international level, has also chosen to extend its unwavering support to the Iranian government.
As reported by Xinhua News Agency, the official state news agency of the People’s Republic of China, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Chinese President Xi Jinping met on the sidelines of the BRICS summit. During the meeting, Xi conveyed that “China is ready to consolidate its friendship with Iran, deepen mutual trust, continue to support each other on issues concerning respective core interests, and push for more progress in the China-Iran comprehensive strategic partnership.”
In fact, among the six newly invited nations, the addition of Iran could hold a unique significance. Cobus van Staden, a researcher with the China Global South Project, told the New York Times, “Iran, obviously, is a complicated choice. I can imagine that some of the other members worry that it might increase geopolitical tensions with Western powers.”
This concern holds merit. During his meeting with Xi, Iran’s President Raisi said, “Iran’s membership in the bloc is opposition to American unilateralism.”
Iranian conservatives, who wield full control over all three branches of the government, as well as the monopolized, state-controlled radio and television broadcasts, are enthusiastically celebrating the invitation to join BRICS. This fervor extends to their online platforms and social media pages, particularly those associated with the Revolutionary Guards.
They are actively involved on two fronts: lauding Raisi and his “revolutionary administration,” while concurrently discrediting the former president Hassan Rouhani, a moderate, and his foreign minister, Javad Zarif, for their role in negotiating the 2015 nuclear deal with world powers. The deal aimed to limit Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for relief from UN, European Union, and U.S. sanctions.
Vahid Yaminpour, a prominent media activist from the conservative camp with over 250,000 Twitter followers, expressed in a tweet: “The new world order; Membership [of Iran] in #BRICS after Shanghai. How many years did the country waste on dreams and wishful thinking over the past decade?” This reference alludes to the period when Rouhani held office.
The government of Iran could benefit on two fronts should its membership in BRICS come to fruition. First, from a political standpoint, the legitimacy of Iran’s government, which suffered significant setbacks on the international stage due to last year’s monumental uprising, could potentially gain a degree of restoration.
What’s more, this endorsement wouldn’t solely come from China and Russia, which are already at odds with the Western powers and thus aligned with Iran. Rather, countries like India, Brazil, South Africa, and others that will join BRICS, would technically accept this government within their cooperative alliance, even despite its oppressive theocratic nature.
Still, one factor that could overshadow the system’s restoration of legitimacy at the international level is the recurrence of another large-scale upheaval on the one-year anniversary of the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini. Amini’s death in police custody on September 16, 2022 sparked months of protests that were brutally repressed. Iran’s hardline ruling elites and the military-security apparatus are apprehensive about the potential recurrence of protests in September. Hossein Salami, the commander of the Revolutionary Guards, along with several high ranking officials, has cautioned, “The enemy is planning to incite sedition once again on the anniversary of the events of the fall of 2022.”
Secondly, from an economic standpoint, the government could broaden its trade relations with the BRICS member states. This potential would be particularly advantageous if the Iranian government could sell oil at its desired volume. Practically speaking, the U.S. faces a significant challenge in imposing sanctions on several nations once they are engaged in trade with Iran, as BRICS will collectively represent nearly half of the world’s population. However, a particularly notable challenge emerges from U.S. sanctions which would prevent Iran from selling oil in U.S. dollars.
The idea of de-dollarization and the creation of a common currency has gained traction, supported not only by Vladimir Putin, for obvious reasons, but also by Brazilian President Lula da Silva during the recent BRICS gathering. However, the feasibility of such a scenario in the near term remains uncertain.
That being said, the Iranian government still has the potential to boost its oil and non-oil exports to BRICS members using the Chinese yuan, local currencies, and barter arrangements. This strategy could mitigate a substantial portion of the pressure stemming from U.S. sanctions. The influence of the Chinese yuan might grow, especially considering that five nations that will be in BRICS —Argentina, Brazil, Iran, Russia, and Saudi Arabia—already include yuan in their payments. Nonetheless, economists indicate that the U.S. dollar will likely maintain its dominance among the BRICS countries.
There’s another challenge. The Iranian government requires that convertible currencies, mainly the U.S. dollar and euro, be transferred to Iran to stabilize its currency by injecting them into the free market. Since 2018, when Donald Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal, the Iranian rial has been plummeting.
Davood Manzoor, head of Iran’s Plan and Budget Organization said on August 27, “In the field of oil, efforts were made to reduce problems and increase oil sales, but there are still problems in the field of currency returning [into the country].” It remains to be seen how this can be handled once Iran’s membership in BRICS is finalized.
Regardless, the impact of current U.S. sanctions on Iran is likely to diminish. However, if Iran aims to leverage its BRICS membership to counteract U.S. sanctions by pursuing and/or accelerating its nuclear program, the three European nations (Germany, France, and Britain) that negotiated the 2015 nuclear deal could potentially activate the snapback mechanism.
Embedded within the deal, this mechanism holds a veto-proof nature. Once triggered, it would lead to the reinstatement of all UN sanctions on Iran that were in place prior to the conclusion of the agreement. Should such a scenario unfold, the enthusiasm surrounding Iran’s BRICS membership might not be as vibrant as anticipated by the conservatives. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in the last moments of the recent gathering suggested that BRICS admission should be contingent on a country not being subject to international sanctions.
Thus, while China and Russia seem eager for the inclusion of Iran in BRICS, other members of the bloc might hold a less enthusiastic stance. Given that BRICS’ decisions need unanimous agreement, should UN sanctions snap back or massive new protests erupt that mirror the length and chaos of last year’s events, it is unlikely that BRICS members would swiftly welcome Iran into their fold.
Shahir Shahidsaless is an Iranian-Canadian political analyst and freelance journalist writing about Iranian domestic and foreign affairs, the Middle East, and the U.S. foreign policy in the region. He is the co-author of Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace. He is a contributor to several websites with focus on the Middle East. He tweets @SShahidsaless.
The Implications of Iran’s Inclusion in BRICS
By Shahir Shahidsaless
Middle East & North Africa
The BRICS bloc, consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, has extended invitations to six developing countries – Saudi Arabia, Iran, Ethiopia, Egypt, Argentina, and the United Arab Emirates – to join its ranks. The new bloc would collectively represent 46 percent of the world’s population and contribute 37 percent of global GDP when measured at purchasing power parity.
As stated by South African President Cyril Ramaphosa during the BRICS summit held in Johannesburg from August 22-24, 2023, the six new candidates are set to officially become members on January 1, 2024.
While the bloc as a whole perceives this move as an effort to reshuffle a global order that they deem outdated, disparities in the members’ foreign policy perspectives exist.
Brazil and India maintain closer ties with the West, while China and Russia may interpret the role of the bloc differently, particularly in the current context. Amid escalating tensions between Russia and the West due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and deteriorating relations between the U.S. and China, Beijing and Moscow are amplifying their efforts to position BRICS as a counterforce against the Western bloc. The inclusion of the anti-American Iranian government within BRICS could be interpreted as a direct result of these efforts.
Russia’s stance is unequivocal; it is locked in a high-stakes confrontation with the West, particularly the United States. The Ukrainian conflict has further deepened ties between Russia and Iran, evident in their military cooperation, such as Iran supplying unmanned combat aerial vehicles to Russia.
On August 26, in response to some reports indicating that Washington has requested the Iranian government to halt the sale of drones to Moscow, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated, “There are no changes, and cooperation with Iran will continue. We are independent states and do not succumb to the dictates of the United States and its satellites.” On the same day, Iranian defense ministry spokesperson Reza Talaei-Nik remarked, “None of the transactions (regarding drones) that we have had … with other countries, such as Russia, have been cancelled.”
China, despite internal unrest and heightened civil struggles in Iran, which have raised questions about the system’s legitimacy at the international level, has also chosen to extend its unwavering support to the Iranian government.
As reported by Xinhua News Agency, the official state news agency of the People’s Republic of China, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Chinese President Xi Jinping met on the sidelines of the BRICS summit. During the meeting, Xi conveyed that “China is ready to consolidate its friendship with Iran, deepen mutual trust, continue to support each other on issues concerning respective core interests, and push for more progress in the China-Iran comprehensive strategic partnership.”
In fact, among the six newly invited nations, the addition of Iran could hold a unique significance. Cobus van Staden, a researcher with the China Global South Project, told the New York Times, “Iran, obviously, is a complicated choice. I can imagine that some of the other members worry that it might increase geopolitical tensions with Western powers.”
This concern holds merit. During his meeting with Xi, Iran’s President Raisi said, “Iran’s membership in the bloc is opposition to American unilateralism.”
Iranian conservatives, who wield full control over all three branches of the government, as well as the monopolized, state-controlled radio and television broadcasts, are enthusiastically celebrating the invitation to join BRICS. This fervor extends to their online platforms and social media pages, particularly those associated with the Revolutionary Guards.
They are actively involved on two fronts: lauding Raisi and his “revolutionary administration,” while concurrently discrediting the former president Hassan Rouhani, a moderate, and his foreign minister, Javad Zarif, for their role in negotiating the 2015 nuclear deal with world powers. The deal aimed to limit Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for relief from UN, European Union, and U.S. sanctions.
Vahid Yaminpour, a prominent media activist from the conservative camp with over 250,000 Twitter followers, expressed in a tweet: “The new world order; Membership [of Iran] in #BRICS after Shanghai. How many years did the country waste on dreams and wishful thinking over the past decade?” This reference alludes to the period when Rouhani held office.
The government of Iran could benefit on two fronts should its membership in BRICS come to fruition. First, from a political standpoint, the legitimacy of Iran’s government, which suffered significant setbacks on the international stage due to last year’s monumental uprising, could potentially gain a degree of restoration.
What’s more, this endorsement wouldn’t solely come from China and Russia, which are already at odds with the Western powers and thus aligned with Iran. Rather, countries like India, Brazil, South Africa, and others that will join BRICS, would technically accept this government within their cooperative alliance, even despite its oppressive theocratic nature.
Still, one factor that could overshadow the system’s restoration of legitimacy at the international level is the recurrence of another large-scale upheaval on the one-year anniversary of the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini. Amini’s death in police custody on September 16, 2022 sparked months of protests that were brutally repressed. Iran’s hardline ruling elites and the military-security apparatus are apprehensive about the potential recurrence of protests in September. Hossein Salami, the commander of the Revolutionary Guards, along with several high ranking officials, has cautioned, “The enemy is planning to incite sedition once again on the anniversary of the events of the fall of 2022.”
Secondly, from an economic standpoint, the government could broaden its trade relations with the BRICS member states. This potential would be particularly advantageous if the Iranian government could sell oil at its desired volume. Practically speaking, the U.S. faces a significant challenge in imposing sanctions on several nations once they are engaged in trade with Iran, as BRICS will collectively represent nearly half of the world’s population. However, a particularly notable challenge emerges from U.S. sanctions which would prevent Iran from selling oil in U.S. dollars.
The idea of de-dollarization and the creation of a common currency has gained traction, supported not only by Vladimir Putin, for obvious reasons, but also by Brazilian President Lula da Silva during the recent BRICS gathering. However, the feasibility of such a scenario in the near term remains uncertain.
That being said, the Iranian government still has the potential to boost its oil and non-oil exports to BRICS members using the Chinese yuan, local currencies, and barter arrangements. This strategy could mitigate a substantial portion of the pressure stemming from U.S. sanctions. The influence of the Chinese yuan might grow, especially considering that five nations that will be in BRICS —Argentina, Brazil, Iran, Russia, and Saudi Arabia—already include yuan in their payments. Nonetheless, economists indicate that the U.S. dollar will likely maintain its dominance among the BRICS countries.
There’s another challenge. The Iranian government requires that convertible currencies, mainly the U.S. dollar and euro, be transferred to Iran to stabilize its currency by injecting them into the free market. Since 2018, when Donald Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal, the Iranian rial has been plummeting.
Davood Manzoor, head of Iran’s Plan and Budget Organization said on August 27, “In the field of oil, efforts were made to reduce problems and increase oil sales, but there are still problems in the field of currency returning [into the country].” It remains to be seen how this can be handled once Iran’s membership in BRICS is finalized.
Regardless, the impact of current U.S. sanctions on Iran is likely to diminish. However, if Iran aims to leverage its BRICS membership to counteract U.S. sanctions by pursuing and/or accelerating its nuclear program, the three European nations (Germany, France, and Britain) that negotiated the 2015 nuclear deal could potentially activate the snapback mechanism.
Embedded within the deal, this mechanism holds a veto-proof nature. Once triggered, it would lead to the reinstatement of all UN sanctions on Iran that were in place prior to the conclusion of the agreement. Should such a scenario unfold, the enthusiasm surrounding Iran’s BRICS membership might not be as vibrant as anticipated by the conservatives. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in the last moments of the recent gathering suggested that BRICS admission should be contingent on a country not being subject to international sanctions.
Thus, while China and Russia seem eager for the inclusion of Iran in BRICS, other members of the bloc might hold a less enthusiastic stance. Given that BRICS’ decisions need unanimous agreement, should UN sanctions snap back or massive new protests erupt that mirror the length and chaos of last year’s events, it is unlikely that BRICS members would swiftly welcome Iran into their fold.
Shahir Shahidsaless is an Iranian-Canadian political analyst and freelance journalist writing about Iranian domestic and foreign affairs, the Middle East, and the U.S. foreign policy in the region. He is the co-author of Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace. He is a contributor to several websites with focus on the Middle East. He tweets @SShahidsaless.
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