An Overview
The first NATO-Japan exchange started in the 1980s and was regularized in the 1990s, but it remained nothing more than an exchange of views until recently. The quality of exchange has improved greatly in recent years. During the war against terror after the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, NATO and Japan collaborated more in Afghanistan. However, since Japan’s commitment in Afghanistan remained largely civilian except for the fueling activities by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) in the Indian Ocean, it did not lead to deeper military cooperation. Prime Minister Abe visited NATO headquarters in 2014 and signed the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP) with NATO, which was subsequently renewed in 2018 and 2020.
Japan’s security and defense relationship with the EU also began to deepen in the same period as their collaboration in the coastal area of Somalia. Around the same time the EU decided to launch Operation Atalanta by sending EUNAVFOR in 2008, Japan decided to send its MSDF. In 2009, Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) was set up to coordinate international efforts, and the EU and Japan found natural partners in this operation.
As the U.S. shifted its interest towards the Indo-Pacific, Europe was also encouraged to extend its attention further east beyond the Middle East. Gradually, several European countries started adopting Indo-Pacific Strategies, and the EU itself adopted the “EU Strategy for Cooperation with the Indo-Pacific” in September 2021. The EU mentioned the concept of the Indo-Pacific in this strategy and its interest in “[promoting] an open and rules-based regional security architecture, including secure sea lines of communication, capacity-building and enhanced naval presence by EU Member States in the Indo-Pacific.”
Among the European countries, Japan has developed the closest relationships with the UK and France. As maritime nations, they have a natural interest in a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, and have increased their activities in the region. Italy and the UK now have a joint development program with Japan for fighter jets. Germany remains a latecomer, but 2+2 talks were set up in 2021. The German frigate Bayern visited Tokyo in 2021, and Luftwaffe fighter jets followed in 2022.
The start of the war in Ukraine in 2022 brought about the “Zeitenwende” for Germany, marking a turning point in its relationship with Russia. But with regard to China, the country has a different attitude. In a Foreign Affairs article, Chancellor Olaf Scholz has made very clear that he does not want a new Cold War and does not consider decoupling an option. Certainly, there are different positions in Europe concerning how best to deal with China. When it comes to implementing policies, however, they are bound to include a combination of deterrence and engagement: some risk hedging within a still very closely integrated economic relationship. Nobody is sure about the right balance between these components, so the difference in position is probably not so great as the language might suggest at first sight.
Looking Ahead
Japan and Europe have a lot of homework to do, and some can be better done together. Missile defense, aerial defense, and intermediate-range missiles are concrete issues where cooperation is beneficial. Japan announced plans to procure domestic and foreign intermediate-range missiles in the new security document released at the end of 2022.
Several U.S. allies are also talking about acquiring Tomahawks. The UK already has them on submarines, but Australia, Japan, and Canada are all candidates as well. Because of the INF Treaty, medium-range missiles do not exist in large numbers in any of the Western countries, but this will soon be on the agenda in NATO countries as well. This may be an area for cooperation in developing concepts for better production, logistics and strategies.
Japan is launching a huge arms buildup program. If the Europeans are serious, they probably need to do the same, which means a huge global investment in armaments. But at the same time, it is imperative to invest in dialogues. Japan and Europe should show their intention to stop building up arms if there are sufficient signs that the threat is decreasing, and it is probably wise to start this in the field of missiles. Japan and its partners should offer China and Russia, just like at the time of the 1979 NATO Double-Track Decision, their intention to discuss disarmament in the field of medium-range missiles, a “global Double-Track proposal” that will give both China and Russia an opportunity to sit at the same table as stakeholders in a stable environment. It would be ideal to have North Korea engaged in missile talks in some way too, but it is unclear how the country might be induced to cooperate.
Previously, I advocated that Japan should push to institutionalize NATO plus AP4, which has met mixed reactions. There may be European countries who feel that this is a trap to drag them into the Indo-Pacific or, worse, to a conflict in the Far East. But the war in Ukraine has shown how much partners need to help each other in crisis situations, and even more to deter potential crises. If Putin had foreseen the extent of cooperation Ukraine would get from the West, he would have thought much longer before invading Ukraine.
Japan and its partners should also try to initiate some sort of “Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia,” a CSCA in the spirit of Helsinki CSCE process starting in 1973. This would be a place to ground developing Eurasian countries in common values and principles. Here the discussion can begin about rules that should guide the region, alongside concrete topics like conventional arms control, confidence-building measures, cybersecurity and non-traditional security threats. It would be an effort to unite the region on common principles, in which developing countries anxious to avoid antagonizing Russia or China could feel safe to participate. It will be a challenge to find Helsinki in Asia, but Mongolia, as a non-aligned member of OSCE neighboring both Russia and China, may serve as an ideal venue. An Ulaanbaatar Process for the Asian future may not seem to be around the corner, but it is worth the effort.
Yoko Iwama, Ph.D., is a Professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Japan.
The Evolution & Future of Japan-Europe Ties
By Yoko Iwama
Japan
An Overview
The first NATO-Japan exchange started in the 1980s and was regularized in the 1990s, but it remained nothing more than an exchange of views until recently. The quality of exchange has improved greatly in recent years. During the war against terror after the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, NATO and Japan collaborated more in Afghanistan. However, since Japan’s commitment in Afghanistan remained largely civilian except for the fueling activities by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) in the Indian Ocean, it did not lead to deeper military cooperation. Prime Minister Abe visited NATO headquarters in 2014 and signed the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP) with NATO, which was subsequently renewed in 2018 and 2020.
Japan’s security and defense relationship with the EU also began to deepen in the same period as their collaboration in the coastal area of Somalia. Around the same time the EU decided to launch Operation Atalanta by sending EUNAVFOR in 2008, Japan decided to send its MSDF. In 2009, Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) was set up to coordinate international efforts, and the EU and Japan found natural partners in this operation.
As the U.S. shifted its interest towards the Indo-Pacific, Europe was also encouraged to extend its attention further east beyond the Middle East. Gradually, several European countries started adopting Indo-Pacific Strategies, and the EU itself adopted the “EU Strategy for Cooperation with the Indo-Pacific” in September 2021. The EU mentioned the concept of the Indo-Pacific in this strategy and its interest in “[promoting] an open and rules-based regional security architecture, including secure sea lines of communication, capacity-building and enhanced naval presence by EU Member States in the Indo-Pacific.”
Among the European countries, Japan has developed the closest relationships with the UK and France. As maritime nations, they have a natural interest in a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, and have increased their activities in the region. Italy and the UK now have a joint development program with Japan for fighter jets. Germany remains a latecomer, but 2+2 talks were set up in 2021. The German frigate Bayern visited Tokyo in 2021, and Luftwaffe fighter jets followed in 2022.
The start of the war in Ukraine in 2022 brought about the “Zeitenwende” for Germany, marking a turning point in its relationship with Russia. But with regard to China, the country has a different attitude. In a Foreign Affairs article, Chancellor Olaf Scholz has made very clear that he does not want a new Cold War and does not consider decoupling an option. Certainly, there are different positions in Europe concerning how best to deal with China. When it comes to implementing policies, however, they are bound to include a combination of deterrence and engagement: some risk hedging within a still very closely integrated economic relationship. Nobody is sure about the right balance between these components, so the difference in position is probably not so great as the language might suggest at first sight.
Looking Ahead
Japan and Europe have a lot of homework to do, and some can be better done together. Missile defense, aerial defense, and intermediate-range missiles are concrete issues where cooperation is beneficial. Japan announced plans to procure domestic and foreign intermediate-range missiles in the new security document released at the end of 2022.
Several U.S. allies are also talking about acquiring Tomahawks. The UK already has them on submarines, but Australia, Japan, and Canada are all candidates as well. Because of the INF Treaty, medium-range missiles do not exist in large numbers in any of the Western countries, but this will soon be on the agenda in NATO countries as well. This may be an area for cooperation in developing concepts for better production, logistics and strategies.
Japan is launching a huge arms buildup program. If the Europeans are serious, they probably need to do the same, which means a huge global investment in armaments. But at the same time, it is imperative to invest in dialogues. Japan and Europe should show their intention to stop building up arms if there are sufficient signs that the threat is decreasing, and it is probably wise to start this in the field of missiles. Japan and its partners should offer China and Russia, just like at the time of the 1979 NATO Double-Track Decision, their intention to discuss disarmament in the field of medium-range missiles, a “global Double-Track proposal” that will give both China and Russia an opportunity to sit at the same table as stakeholders in a stable environment. It would be ideal to have North Korea engaged in missile talks in some way too, but it is unclear how the country might be induced to cooperate.
Previously, I advocated that Japan should push to institutionalize NATO plus AP4, which has met mixed reactions. There may be European countries who feel that this is a trap to drag them into the Indo-Pacific or, worse, to a conflict in the Far East. But the war in Ukraine has shown how much partners need to help each other in crisis situations, and even more to deter potential crises. If Putin had foreseen the extent of cooperation Ukraine would get from the West, he would have thought much longer before invading Ukraine.
Japan and its partners should also try to initiate some sort of “Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia,” a CSCA in the spirit of Helsinki CSCE process starting in 1973. This would be a place to ground developing Eurasian countries in common values and principles. Here the discussion can begin about rules that should guide the region, alongside concrete topics like conventional arms control, confidence-building measures, cybersecurity and non-traditional security threats. It would be an effort to unite the region on common principles, in which developing countries anxious to avoid antagonizing Russia or China could feel safe to participate. It will be a challenge to find Helsinki in Asia, but Mongolia, as a non-aligned member of OSCE neighboring both Russia and China, may serve as an ideal venue. An Ulaanbaatar Process for the Asian future may not seem to be around the corner, but it is worth the effort.
Yoko Iwama, Ph.D., is a Professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Japan.
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