After months of delay, the Biden administration identified the 17 governments it determined were complicit in the use or recruitment of child soldiers. Simultaneously, the administration announced that nine of these governments would be prohibited from receiving certain U.S. arms sales and military assistance due to their complicity in child soldier recruitment or use, while an additional seven would face partial restrictions.
These decisions reflect the administration’s latest efforts to implement the Child Soldiers Prevention Act (CSPA), a potentially powerful tool that can play a critical role in discouraging the use of children as weapons of war. These decisions also advance U.S. child soldier prevention efforts in important ways, despite the Biden administration’s unprecedented delay in identifying the governments complicit in these practices and its decision to waive many of the law’s prohibitions. Now, with the waiver determinations announced, it will be important to see how the use of these waivers, which have been heavily relied upon by previous administrations, will be accompanied by diplomatic efforts to stop this heinous practice.
The Child Soldiers Prevention Act
While child soldiers have been used for generations, children caught in conflict are now under increasing threat. The United Nations verified a record-high number of grave violations against children in conflict in 2022, including the recruitment and use of 7,622 child soldiers—a 21 percent increase compared to 2021.
Passed in 2008, the Child Soldiers Prevention Act provides a framework for leveraging global demand for U.S. weapons, equipment, and training to incentivize governments to prevent child soldier recruitment and use. The CSPA requires the administration to publish an annual list of governments whose armed forces, police or other security forces, or government-backed armed groups, recruit or use child soldiers. Governments included on the CSPA list, as it is known, are prohibited from receiving certain types of U.S. arms sales and military assistance the following fiscal year, absent a presidential waiver or other exception. These exceptions allow the U.S. to provide certain assistance (including certain Peacekeeping Operations assistance, military education and training, or non-lethal supplies) without the need for a presidential waiver—though in some cases only if the U.S. certifies that the recipient is taking steps to address the issue of child soldiers and that the assistance will support military professionalism.
2023 CSPA List and Waiver Determinations
The Biden administration released the current CSPA list on September 15—almost three months past the legislatively required deadline—as an update to its previously-released 2023 Trafficking in Persons Report. The list identifies 17 governments that the State Department determined either recruited or used child soldiers between April 2022 and March 2023 or supported armed groups that did so. Fifteen of these governments are repeat offenders that have been listed in years past (including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, and Yemen, which have appeared on every list since 2010) while two were listed for the first time this year (Egypt and Eritrea).
The administration also announced on September 15 that it was invoking its authority under the CSPA to waive some of the law’s prohibitions where it was “in the national interest” to do so, and with respect to governments that it certified “are taking effective and continuing steps to address the problem of child soldiers.” The administration issued waivers for eight of the 17 governments on this year’s CSPA list, which allows them to receive certain types of otherwise-restricted arms or assistance in FY2024. While the administration issued a full waiver for one government (Egypt), seven received partial waivers (the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Libya, Russia, Somalia, Turkey, and Yemen).
These partial waivers have the effect of lifting some of the CSPA’s restrictions while keeping the remainder in place. Most of this year’s partial waivers lifted restrictions on International Military Education and Training (IMET), Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) assistance, or licenses for Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) of certain defense articles or services. Most of the DCS waivers were limited in scope, with Russia’s, for example, only allowing for sales related to the International Space Station. Other, less common waivers included those allowing the Department of Defense to train and equip Libya, Somalia, and Turkey’s security forces and to provide support to these governments in connection with the conduct of operations.
In announcing his waiver determinations, President Biden also empowered the Secretary of State to issue additional waivers for Rwanda and Turkey if he determines that they are taking sufficient steps to address child soldiering. Rwanda is currently prohibited from receiving any CSPA-relevant arms sales or military assistance, and Turkey is only eligible for those President Biden already waived (namely, IMET, PKO, DCS, and certain train-and-equip and operational support).
Taking Stock of the CSPA’s Implementation and Impact
The Biden administration’s use of the CSPA this year marks progress in advancing U.S. child soldier prevention efforts. At the same time, notable gaps in how the administration implemented the law threaten to undermine its impact.
CSPA List
One marker of progress, albeit somewhat counterintuitively, is the inclusion of a record high number of governments on this year’s CSPA list, several of which are close U.S. security partners. To be sure, this serves as a deeply troubling indicator of how much work remains to be done to end the recruitment and use of child soldiers worldwide. So long as these practices persist, however, global actors cannot shy away from acknowledging them, no matter how politically sensitive that may be. The UN Secretary-General’s annual list of parties to armed conflict who commit grave violations against children, for example, has been criticized for its consistent and repeated omissions based on political considerations. Against this backdrop, the record-breaking size of this year’s CSPA list and its inclusion of several close U.S. security partners are encouraging signs of the administration’s willingness to apply a rigorous, fact-based approach to assessing the scope of global child soldier recruitment and use.
Also encouraging is the inclusion of governments such as Egypt, Rwanda, Turkey, and Venezuela which may not have recruited or used child soldiers themselves, but which the State Department determined provided support to armed groups that engaged in these practices. Egypt, for example, was listed for the first time this year following reports that it “coordinated and conducted joint operations with a militia in the Sinai Peninsula that allegedly recruited and used children, including some in direct hostilities.” Including these governments in CSPA lists is important, as the law’s prohibitions may encourage them to step up their efforts to combat child soldier recruitment and use by armed groups that the U.S. may have little direct influence over.
That said, several governments that the State Department previously implicated in the recruitment or use of child soldiers in 2022 do not appear on the list. Ethiopia, for example, is not listed, despite the State Department observing in its 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices that there were credible reports of Ethiopian government forces recruiting or using child soldiers over the course of the year. Similarly, neither the United Arab Emirates (UAE) nor Saudi Arabia appear in this year’s CSPA list, despite the 2022 Human Rights Reports noting documented cases of child soldier recruitment and use by UAE-backed militias and Saudi-led coalition forces in Yemen in 2022. While it is possible that these governments were omitted due to the State Department determining that these reports were unsubstantiated or that the conduct in question occurred outside the reporting period for the 2023 CSPA list, their absence raises questions as to the completeness of this year’s list.
Additionally, by failing to release this year’s CSPA list until September 15, the Biden administration not only failed to comply with a key provision of the law but also limited opportunities for oversight and input surrounding its implementation. Secretaries of State are statutorily required to include the annual CSPA lists in that year’s Trafficking in Persons Report, which must be submitted to Congress by June 30. This deadline allows ample time for lawmakers, civil society experts, and other stakeholders to review and provide feedback on the list in advance of the administration finalizing and announcing its waiver determinations in September. This was not possible this year, as the Biden administration—for the first time in the law’s history—released the CSPA list late, and in conjunction with its waiver determinations.
Finally, while the robustness of the list demonstrates the seriousness with which the United States takes these issues, the fact that most of the governments included have appeared on CSPA lists for years calls into question how effective the U.S. and the global community have been in bringing about meaningful change in complicit government behavior. The U.S. government must ensure that high-level diplomatic engagement accompanies a government’s inclusion on the CSPA list and should invest in multiple strategies to encourage these repeat offenders to put an end to these practices.
Waiver Determinations
The Biden administration should be commended for subjecting a record-high number of governments to the full extent of the CSPA’s prohibitions this year. President Biden chose not to waive any CSPA restrictions with respect to nine governments on this year’s CSPA list (Afghanistan, Burma, Eritrea, Iran, Mali, Rwanda, South Sudan, Syria, and Venezuela). Never before has a president declined to issue waivers for that many CSPA-listed governments in a single year. Even if the Secretary of State decides to exercise his authority to issue a waiver for Rwanda, the remaining eight governments would still represent a record-high number of CSPA-listed governments to not receive a waiver.
Upon closer examination, however, this year’s waiver determinations are not as progressive as they first appear. Although the administration subjected more governments than ever to the full scope of CSPA restrictions this year, it actually issued waivers for a larger share of CSPA-listed governments this year (47 percent) than in 2022 (42 percent). Moreover, most of the nine governments that did not receive a waiver (including Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, and Venezuela) are either ineligible or unlikely to receive much if any CSPA-relevant arms sales or military assistance in FY2024. Their inclusion on this year’s CSPA list, while an important official acknowledgement of their complicity in child soldiering, is likely to have little to no impact on the arms sales or military assistance they receive.
With the administration issuing partial waivers for seven governments and issuing a full waiver for just one, it has contributed to a continued and encouraging shift away from full waivers and towards more thoughtful, carefully tailored ones. While President Obama consistently issued more full waivers than partial waivers, partial waivers have accounted for an increasing share of CSPA waivers issued in the years since—particularly under President Biden, whose administration issued more partial waivers than full waivers during each of his first three years in office.
Despite the administration’s encouraging shift towards partial, as opposed to full, waivers, it appears these waivers will nonetheless have the practical effect of lifting restrictions on the vast majority of arms and assistance subject to the CSPA. The true impact of these waivers won’t be known for some time given the limited availability of FY2024 arms sales and military assistance data. However, we do know based on publicly available data what impact they will have on the amount of assistance the State Department has requested for CSPA-listed countries in FY2024 under three funding authorities which, in years past, have made up the bulk of assistance subject to the CSPA: Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). The data reveal that these waivers will allow a combined total of more than $1.5 billion in otherwise prohibited FMF, IMET, and PKO assistance to be provided to a total of seven governments (the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Libya, Somalia, Turkey, and Yemen). The bulk of this assistance is intended for Egypt, including $1.3 billion in FMF and $2 million in IMET. By contrast, just $550 thousand in IMET assistance to Rwanda will be restricted, which represents less than one percent of the total requested amount subject to the law. This reflects a continued trend. Since the CSPA took effect, prohibitions on more than $6.3 billion in CSPA-relevant arms sales and military assistance have been waived, or approximately 97 percent of the total amount that could have been prohibited under the law.
Looking Ahead
Presidents have all too often failed to take full advantage of the CSPA’s unique ability to leverage fierce global demand for U.S. arms, equipment, and training to incentivize an end to the recruitment and use of child soldiers. Against that backdrop, the scope of this year’s CSPA list, the attention it pays to governments that support armed groups that exploit children as tools of war, and the Biden administration’s more nuanced use of national interest waivers are encouraging developments with potential to greatly enhance U.S. child soldiers prevention efforts. Still, the potential omissions from this year’s CSPA list, the issuance of waivers that will likely have the practical effect of lifting restrictions on the vast majority of CSPA prohibitions, and the unprecedented failure to comply with the law’s reporting requirements show that there is still more work to be done.
To ensure the CSPA lives up to its full potential in the months ahead, it will be critical for the Biden administration to engage in tough conversations with CSPA-listed governments to ensure that the law’s restrictions and allowances translate into meaningful changes in state behavior. The administration should undertake targeted diplomatic efforts to leverage the waivers it issued—and those it may issue in the future—to encourage governments to do more to prevent the recruitment and use of child soldiers. These efforts should be buttressed by more robust Congressional oversight and involvement. Lawmakers have an important role to play in monitoring CSPA implementation to ensure the administration is faithfully and effectively executing the law and should push back when—as was the case this year—the administration falls short of fulfilling its CSPA obligations. With children in conflict facing increasingly severe threats around the globe, the U.S. cannot afford to lose momentum around the use of this critically important child soldiers prevention tool.
Taking Stock of Biden’s Delayed – but Encouraging – Progress on Child Soldiers Prevention
By Ryan Fletcher
Human Rights & IHL
Presidents have all too often failed to take full advantage of the Child Soldiers Prevention Act’s unique ability to leverage fierce global demand for U.S. arms, equipment, and training to incentivize an end to the recruitment and use of child soldiers. The Biden administration’s CSPA list and waiver determinations represent progress in U.S. child soldiers prevention efforts, but also make clear that there is still much work to be done.
After months of delay, the Biden administration identified the 17 governments it determined were complicit in the use or recruitment of child soldiers. Simultaneously, the administration announced that nine of these governments would be prohibited from receiving certain U.S. arms sales and military assistance due to their complicity in child soldier recruitment or use, while an additional seven would face partial restrictions.
These decisions reflect the administration’s latest efforts to implement the Child Soldiers Prevention Act (CSPA), a potentially powerful tool that can play a critical role in discouraging the use of children as weapons of war. These decisions also advance U.S. child soldier prevention efforts in important ways, despite the Biden administration’s unprecedented delay in identifying the governments complicit in these practices and its decision to waive many of the law’s prohibitions. Now, with the waiver determinations announced, it will be important to see how the use of these waivers, which have been heavily relied upon by previous administrations, will be accompanied by diplomatic efforts to stop this heinous practice.
The Child Soldiers Prevention Act
While child soldiers have been used for generations, children caught in conflict are now under increasing threat. The United Nations verified a record-high number of grave violations against children in conflict in 2022, including the recruitment and use of 7,622 child soldiers—a 21 percent increase compared to 2021.
Passed in 2008, the Child Soldiers Prevention Act provides a framework for leveraging global demand for U.S. weapons, equipment, and training to incentivize governments to prevent child soldier recruitment and use. The CSPA requires the administration to publish an annual list of governments whose armed forces, police or other security forces, or government-backed armed groups, recruit or use child soldiers. Governments included on the CSPA list, as it is known, are prohibited from receiving certain types of U.S. arms sales and military assistance the following fiscal year, absent a presidential waiver or other exception. These exceptions allow the U.S. to provide certain assistance (including certain Peacekeeping Operations assistance, military education and training, or non-lethal supplies) without the need for a presidential waiver—though in some cases only if the U.S. certifies that the recipient is taking steps to address the issue of child soldiers and that the assistance will support military professionalism.
2023 CSPA List and Waiver Determinations
The Biden administration released the current CSPA list on September 15—almost three months past the legislatively required deadline—as an update to its previously-released 2023 Trafficking in Persons Report. The list identifies 17 governments that the State Department determined either recruited or used child soldiers between April 2022 and March 2023 or supported armed groups that did so. Fifteen of these governments are repeat offenders that have been listed in years past (including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, and Yemen, which have appeared on every list since 2010) while two were listed for the first time this year (Egypt and Eritrea).
The administration also announced on September 15 that it was invoking its authority under the CSPA to waive some of the law’s prohibitions where it was “in the national interest” to do so, and with respect to governments that it certified “are taking effective and continuing steps to address the problem of child soldiers.” The administration issued waivers for eight of the 17 governments on this year’s CSPA list, which allows them to receive certain types of otherwise-restricted arms or assistance in FY2024. While the administration issued a full waiver for one government (Egypt), seven received partial waivers (the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Libya, Russia, Somalia, Turkey, and Yemen).
These partial waivers have the effect of lifting some of the CSPA’s restrictions while keeping the remainder in place. Most of this year’s partial waivers lifted restrictions on International Military Education and Training (IMET), Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) assistance, or licenses for Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) of certain defense articles or services. Most of the DCS waivers were limited in scope, with Russia’s, for example, only allowing for sales related to the International Space Station. Other, less common waivers included those allowing the Department of Defense to train and equip Libya, Somalia, and Turkey’s security forces and to provide support to these governments in connection with the conduct of operations.
In announcing his waiver determinations, President Biden also empowered the Secretary of State to issue additional waivers for Rwanda and Turkey if he determines that they are taking sufficient steps to address child soldiering. Rwanda is currently prohibited from receiving any CSPA-relevant arms sales or military assistance, and Turkey is only eligible for those President Biden already waived (namely, IMET, PKO, DCS, and certain train-and-equip and operational support).
Taking Stock of the CSPA’s Implementation and Impact
The Biden administration’s use of the CSPA this year marks progress in advancing U.S. child soldier prevention efforts. At the same time, notable gaps in how the administration implemented the law threaten to undermine its impact.
CSPA List
One marker of progress, albeit somewhat counterintuitively, is the inclusion of a record high number of governments on this year’s CSPA list, several of which are close U.S. security partners. To be sure, this serves as a deeply troubling indicator of how much work remains to be done to end the recruitment and use of child soldiers worldwide. So long as these practices persist, however, global actors cannot shy away from acknowledging them, no matter how politically sensitive that may be. The UN Secretary-General’s annual list of parties to armed conflict who commit grave violations against children, for example, has been criticized for its consistent and repeated omissions based on political considerations. Against this backdrop, the record-breaking size of this year’s CSPA list and its inclusion of several close U.S. security partners are encouraging signs of the administration’s willingness to apply a rigorous, fact-based approach to assessing the scope of global child soldier recruitment and use.
Also encouraging is the inclusion of governments such as Egypt, Rwanda, Turkey, and Venezuela which may not have recruited or used child soldiers themselves, but which the State Department determined provided support to armed groups that engaged in these practices. Egypt, for example, was listed for the first time this year following reports that it “coordinated and conducted joint operations with a militia in the Sinai Peninsula that allegedly recruited and used children, including some in direct hostilities.” Including these governments in CSPA lists is important, as the law’s prohibitions may encourage them to step up their efforts to combat child soldier recruitment and use by armed groups that the U.S. may have little direct influence over.
That said, several governments that the State Department previously implicated in the recruitment or use of child soldiers in 2022 do not appear on the list. Ethiopia, for example, is not listed, despite the State Department observing in its 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices that there were credible reports of Ethiopian government forces recruiting or using child soldiers over the course of the year. Similarly, neither the United Arab Emirates (UAE) nor Saudi Arabia appear in this year’s CSPA list, despite the 2022 Human Rights Reports noting documented cases of child soldier recruitment and use by UAE-backed militias and Saudi-led coalition forces in Yemen in 2022. While it is possible that these governments were omitted due to the State Department determining that these reports were unsubstantiated or that the conduct in question occurred outside the reporting period for the 2023 CSPA list, their absence raises questions as to the completeness of this year’s list.
Additionally, by failing to release this year’s CSPA list until September 15, the Biden administration not only failed to comply with a key provision of the law but also limited opportunities for oversight and input surrounding its implementation. Secretaries of State are statutorily required to include the annual CSPA lists in that year’s Trafficking in Persons Report, which must be submitted to Congress by June 30. This deadline allows ample time for lawmakers, civil society experts, and other stakeholders to review and provide feedback on the list in advance of the administration finalizing and announcing its waiver determinations in September. This was not possible this year, as the Biden administration—for the first time in the law’s history—released the CSPA list late, and in conjunction with its waiver determinations.
Finally, while the robustness of the list demonstrates the seriousness with which the United States takes these issues, the fact that most of the governments included have appeared on CSPA lists for years calls into question how effective the U.S. and the global community have been in bringing about meaningful change in complicit government behavior. The U.S. government must ensure that high-level diplomatic engagement accompanies a government’s inclusion on the CSPA list and should invest in multiple strategies to encourage these repeat offenders to put an end to these practices.
Waiver Determinations
The Biden administration should be commended for subjecting a record-high number of governments to the full extent of the CSPA’s prohibitions this year. President Biden chose not to waive any CSPA restrictions with respect to nine governments on this year’s CSPA list (Afghanistan, Burma, Eritrea, Iran, Mali, Rwanda, South Sudan, Syria, and Venezuela). Never before has a president declined to issue waivers for that many CSPA-listed governments in a single year. Even if the Secretary of State decides to exercise his authority to issue a waiver for Rwanda, the remaining eight governments would still represent a record-high number of CSPA-listed governments to not receive a waiver.
Upon closer examination, however, this year’s waiver determinations are not as progressive as they first appear. Although the administration subjected more governments than ever to the full scope of CSPA restrictions this year, it actually issued waivers for a larger share of CSPA-listed governments this year (47 percent) than in 2022 (42 percent). Moreover, most of the nine governments that did not receive a waiver (including Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, and Venezuela) are either ineligible or unlikely to receive much if any CSPA-relevant arms sales or military assistance in FY2024. Their inclusion on this year’s CSPA list, while an important official acknowledgement of their complicity in child soldiering, is likely to have little to no impact on the arms sales or military assistance they receive.
With the administration issuing partial waivers for seven governments and issuing a full waiver for just one, it has contributed to a continued and encouraging shift away from full waivers and towards more thoughtful, carefully tailored ones. While President Obama consistently issued more full waivers than partial waivers, partial waivers have accounted for an increasing share of CSPA waivers issued in the years since—particularly under President Biden, whose administration issued more partial waivers than full waivers during each of his first three years in office.
Despite the administration’s encouraging shift towards partial, as opposed to full, waivers, it appears these waivers will nonetheless have the practical effect of lifting restrictions on the vast majority of arms and assistance subject to the CSPA. The true impact of these waivers won’t be known for some time given the limited availability of FY2024 arms sales and military assistance data. However, we do know based on publicly available data what impact they will have on the amount of assistance the State Department has requested for CSPA-listed countries in FY2024 under three funding authorities which, in years past, have made up the bulk of assistance subject to the CSPA: Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). The data reveal that these waivers will allow a combined total of more than $1.5 billion in otherwise prohibited FMF, IMET, and PKO assistance to be provided to a total of seven governments (the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Libya, Somalia, Turkey, and Yemen). The bulk of this assistance is intended for Egypt, including $1.3 billion in FMF and $2 million in IMET. By contrast, just $550 thousand in IMET assistance to Rwanda will be restricted, which represents less than one percent of the total requested amount subject to the law. This reflects a continued trend. Since the CSPA took effect, prohibitions on more than $6.3 billion in CSPA-relevant arms sales and military assistance have been waived, or approximately 97 percent of the total amount that could have been prohibited under the law.
Looking Ahead
Presidents have all too often failed to take full advantage of the CSPA’s unique ability to leverage fierce global demand for U.S. arms, equipment, and training to incentivize an end to the recruitment and use of child soldiers. Against that backdrop, the scope of this year’s CSPA list, the attention it pays to governments that support armed groups that exploit children as tools of war, and the Biden administration’s more nuanced use of national interest waivers are encouraging developments with potential to greatly enhance U.S. child soldiers prevention efforts. Still, the potential omissions from this year’s CSPA list, the issuance of waivers that will likely have the practical effect of lifting restrictions on the vast majority of CSPA prohibitions, and the unprecedented failure to comply with the law’s reporting requirements show that there is still more work to be done.
To ensure the CSPA lives up to its full potential in the months ahead, it will be critical for the Biden administration to engage in tough conversations with CSPA-listed governments to ensure that the law’s restrictions and allowances translate into meaningful changes in state behavior. The administration should undertake targeted diplomatic efforts to leverage the waivers it issued—and those it may issue in the future—to encourage governments to do more to prevent the recruitment and use of child soldiers. These efforts should be buttressed by more robust Congressional oversight and involvement. Lawmakers have an important role to play in monitoring CSPA implementation to ensure the administration is faithfully and effectively executing the law and should push back when—as was the case this year—the administration falls short of fulfilling its CSPA obligations. With children in conflict facing increasingly severe threats around the globe, the U.S. cannot afford to lose momentum around the use of this critically important child soldiers prevention tool.
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