On August 18, 2023, President Biden met with South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida at Camp David for the first-ever stand-alone U.S.-Japan-ROK summit to reaffirm cooperation and the advancement of security and prosperity in the region.
The August 18 Camp David Summit marked a new era in trilateral relations among the United States, Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea), and Japan, underscoring tectonic shifts in the regional security dynamics in Northeast Asia over the past years. As U.S.-China relations have become more adversarial and North Korea’s nuclear capabilities have continued to advance, the impetus for trilateral security cooperation among the United States and its key Asian allies has become palpable, and the leadership in Seoul and Tokyo especially have forged a path for it to take hold.
Even with this newfound rapprochement between South Korea and Japan, it was clear from the summit’s Joint Statements that the sustainability of cooperation was of central concern. Efforts to regularize and institutionalize multiple levels of trilateral meetings and consultations, including an annual leaders’ summit, reflect how fragile this cooperation has been in the past and set forward a plan for making the process more resilient to domestic political fluctuations in all three countries. While Seoul and Tokyo have been able to push past some of the historical and nationalistic disputes for now, those issues are far from resolved and will continue to test the durability of ROK-Japan relations. Moreover, while the Biden administration has been eager to restore and strengthen U.S. alliances around the world, that too could change in the future, as we saw under the Trump administration. Developing institutions, patterns, and habits of cooperation now may help leaders in all three countries justify continued collaboration in the future, beyond these three leaders.
While there are clear mutual benefits to greater trilateral cooperation, it does not come without risk. In the past, Seoul has been hesitant to engage in such clear alignment and the appearance of a trilateral alliance forming to avoid damaging its relations with China, a critical economic partner. However, with this summit, a new sense of collective security among the three allies has emerged, including a trilateral commitment to consult and coordinate responses on regional challenges, provocations, and threats. Already, this new arrangement has been criticized by both China and North Korea for shifting the balance of power in the region. How that plays out in the coming months and years, both in terms of how Beijing and Pyongyang ramp up their own defenses and security cooperation, as well as how they plan to test the resolve of the trilateral commitments, is yet to be seen.
Moving forward, the U.S., South Korea, and Japan have sent a clear message about the current strength and depth of their bilateral alliances (U.S.-ROK, U.S.-Japan) and the political will to work together toward common interests and goals. How long that can last, however, will depend largely on how much support can be won in each of their respective publics, especially when tested.
The U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral Summit on August 18 was a historic occasion that signifies the top-down, summit-level commitment, elevating the trilateral framework as one of the anchors to realize a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. By institutionalizing the trilateral framework, the summit also reflects the three leaders’ efforts to stymie potential attempts to abandon the commitments made at Camp David. Over the last few decades, the United States has sought to utilize this trilateral framework to deal with security threats in Northeast Asia. However, such efforts have often been met with bad blood in the Japan-ROK relationship, whether from historical issues or from happenstance like the 2018 radar lock-on dispute.
Additionally, reluctance from leaders—U.S. President Donald Trump and ROK President Moon Jae-in for instance—has further inhibited closer trilateral cooperation.
Given what we have seen in the domestic politics of each country, it was a very wise decision for the three leaders to adopt safeguard measures against potential volatility in the relationship, as it makes the trilateral cooperation more predictable. Furthermore, the two deliverables—the “Spirit of Camp David” joint statement and the Camp David Principle—collectively brought ROK firmly into the broader Indo-Pacific strategic landscape. Prior to the Yoon administration, one of the challenges in the U.S.-ROK alliance has been to broaden its scope beyond the bilateral security treaty, which has historically focused solely on North Korea. With the trilateral framework encompassing the Indo-Pacific, the U.S.-ROK alliance will naturally follow suit, departing from its historically narrow focus on the Korean Peninsula.
The direct reference to China and the Taiwan Strait in the deliverables—though the tone was measured—was also significant, as it signaled three countries’ commitment to the Free and Open Indo-Pacific. For example, the United States, Japan, and ROK are now embarking on initiatives with the explicit goal of countering China’s predatory economic activities in the Indo-Pacific, such as increased economic security cooperation and the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII). Moreover, their symbolic gestures of reiterating their shared commitment to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific without any unilateral attempt to use force to change the status quo as well as the peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait should not be understated.
Moving forward, it will be interesting to see the dynamics of the U.S.-Japan-ROK framework interacting with other regional minilaterals that are also anchored in U.S. regional alliances, such as the Quad. As many of these minilateral frameworks have similar cooperative agendas—such as maritime security cooperation in Southeast Asia and Pacific Islands—ensuring synergy among them will be critical for advancing their shared goals of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific.
Photo: The Republic of Korea Office of the President. Official Photographer: Kim Yong Wii.
Takeaways from the Camp David Summit
By Jenny Town • Yuki Tatsumi
Asia & Indo-Pacific
On August 18, 2023, President Biden met with South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida at Camp David for the first-ever stand-alone U.S.-Japan-ROK summit to reaffirm cooperation and the advancement of security and prosperity in the region.
Charting a New Era in Trilateral Relations
The August 18 Camp David Summit marked a new era in trilateral relations among the United States, Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea), and Japan, underscoring tectonic shifts in the regional security dynamics in Northeast Asia over the past years. As U.S.-China relations have become more adversarial and North Korea’s nuclear capabilities have continued to advance, the impetus for trilateral security cooperation among the United States and its key Asian allies has become palpable, and the leadership in Seoul and Tokyo especially have forged a path for it to take hold.
Even with this newfound rapprochement between South Korea and Japan, it was clear from the summit’s Joint Statements that the sustainability of cooperation was of central concern. Efforts to regularize and institutionalize multiple levels of trilateral meetings and consultations, including an annual leaders’ summit, reflect how fragile this cooperation has been in the past and set forward a plan for making the process more resilient to domestic political fluctuations in all three countries. While Seoul and Tokyo have been able to push past some of the historical and nationalistic disputes for now, those issues are far from resolved and will continue to test the durability of ROK-Japan relations. Moreover, while the Biden administration has been eager to restore and strengthen U.S. alliances around the world, that too could change in the future, as we saw under the Trump administration. Developing institutions, patterns, and habits of cooperation now may help leaders in all three countries justify continued collaboration in the future, beyond these three leaders.
While there are clear mutual benefits to greater trilateral cooperation, it does not come without risk. In the past, Seoul has been hesitant to engage in such clear alignment and the appearance of a trilateral alliance forming to avoid damaging its relations with China, a critical economic partner. However, with this summit, a new sense of collective security among the three allies has emerged, including a trilateral commitment to consult and coordinate responses on regional challenges, provocations, and threats. Already, this new arrangement has been criticized by both China and North Korea for shifting the balance of power in the region. How that plays out in the coming months and years, both in terms of how Beijing and Pyongyang ramp up their own defenses and security cooperation, as well as how they plan to test the resolve of the trilateral commitments, is yet to be seen.
Moving forward, the U.S., South Korea, and Japan have sent a clear message about the current strength and depth of their bilateral alliances (U.S.-ROK, U.S.-Japan) and the political will to work together toward common interests and goals. How long that can last, however, will depend largely on how much support can be won in each of their respective publics, especially when tested.
Efforts to Shape the Indo-Pacific Landscape
The U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral Summit on August 18 was a historic occasion that signifies the top-down, summit-level commitment, elevating the trilateral framework as one of the anchors to realize a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. By institutionalizing the trilateral framework, the summit also reflects the three leaders’ efforts to stymie potential attempts to abandon the commitments made at Camp David. Over the last few decades, the United States has sought to utilize this trilateral framework to deal with security threats in Northeast Asia. However, such efforts have often been met with bad blood in the Japan-ROK relationship, whether from historical issues or from happenstance like the 2018 radar lock-on dispute.
Additionally, reluctance from leaders—U.S. President Donald Trump and ROK President Moon Jae-in for instance—has further inhibited closer trilateral cooperation.
Given what we have seen in the domestic politics of each country, it was a very wise decision for the three leaders to adopt safeguard measures against potential volatility in the relationship, as it makes the trilateral cooperation more predictable. Furthermore, the two deliverables—the “Spirit of Camp David” joint statement and the Camp David Principle—collectively brought ROK firmly into the broader Indo-Pacific strategic landscape. Prior to the Yoon administration, one of the challenges in the U.S.-ROK alliance has been to broaden its scope beyond the bilateral security treaty, which has historically focused solely on North Korea. With the trilateral framework encompassing the Indo-Pacific, the U.S.-ROK alliance will naturally follow suit, departing from its historically narrow focus on the Korean Peninsula.
The direct reference to China and the Taiwan Strait in the deliverables—though the tone was measured—was also significant, as it signaled three countries’ commitment to the Free and Open Indo-Pacific. For example, the United States, Japan, and ROK are now embarking on initiatives with the explicit goal of countering China’s predatory economic activities in the Indo-Pacific, such as increased economic security cooperation and the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII). Moreover, their symbolic gestures of reiterating their shared commitment to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific without any unilateral attempt to use force to change the status quo as well as the peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait should not be understated.
Moving forward, it will be interesting to see the dynamics of the U.S.-Japan-ROK framework interacting with other regional minilaterals that are also anchored in U.S. regional alliances, such as the Quad. As many of these minilateral frameworks have similar cooperative agendas—such as maritime security cooperation in Southeast Asia and Pacific Islands—ensuring synergy among them will be critical for advancing their shared goals of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific.
Photo: The Republic of Korea Office of the President. Official Photographer: Kim Yong Wii.
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