Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council for the past decade, left his position on May 22, 2023, and was replaced by Ali Akbar Ahmadian, a senior figure in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and a comrade of the late Quds Force commander Gen. Qasem Soleimani.
The shuffle followed prolonged rumors that Shamkhani was about to be replaced. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, who technically heads the council, appointed Ahmadian and Iran’s paramount leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, also appointed him as his representative on the council, which deliberates and tries to reach consensus on Iran’s most sensitive domestic and foreign policy matters. Ayatollah Khamenei has the final say on these decisions, but the council secretary often handles difficult negotiations with foreign officials.
Shamkhani, a former commander of the IRGC Navy, is known as a moderate and pragmatic figure who served as defense minister in the reformist government of Mohammad Khatami in the late 1990s and early 2000s and as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council during the tenure of Hassan Rouhani, himself a former national security adviser. Shamkhani had been under a cloud for some months due to reports of alleged corruption involving his sons and controversy over his former deputy Alireza Akbari, who was executed in January 2023 after he was convicted of spying for England.
During his tenure as secretary, Shamkhani oversaw important changes in Iran’s foreign policy including the conclusion of the 2015 nuclear deal and improving relations with Saudi Arabia. The nuclear agreement was negotiated by Iran’s Foreign Ministry but the Saudi negotiations, while begun by the ministry, deadlocked and were completed by Shamkhani with the mediation of China.
Although Iran’s macro foreign policy is a matter of consensus and the secretary of the council can be seen largely as an implementer, the role of individuals in the decision-making structure is not insignificant.
Shamkhani’s effectiveness aroused some jealousy and his Saudi mediation, in particular, caused disputes between the security council and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Shamkhani also reportedly fell afoul of the Front of Islamic Revolution Stability, a political faction that dominates the Raisi government.
With Shamkhani’s replacement, more power is likely to return to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Shamkhani was said to be a critic of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the effect of his removal on the deal, which has been on life support for several years, is unclear. Some experts, including Heshmatullah Falahatpisheh, a former member of parliament and chairman of the body’s Foreign Policy Commission, believe the JCPOA will now be shelved.
On the other hand, the right-wing Kayhan newspaper suggested that Shamkhani was a serious opponent of the JCPOA and that his removal might lead to its revival. Kayhan might have two motives: preparing public opinion for the revival of the JCPOA and sabotaging any chance that Shamkhani could run for president in 2025 as the standard bearer of reformists and pragmatists.
Shamkhani’s resignation can be evaluated as a result of competition in the Iranian power structure rather than a sign of change in Iran’s foreign policy. To some extent, this competition reflects a jockeying for influence over the course of Iranian affairs after the eventual passing of Ayatollah Khamenei.
Already, the competition for influence between the Front of Islamic Revolution Stability and other conservative groups, including supporters of Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, the current speaker of parliament, has increased. In the meantime, reformists have been removed from Iran’s power structure, and moderate figures such as Rouhani and Ali Larijani, a former parliament speaker, who acted as “surrogate wombs” for the reformists, have found it increasingly difficult to remain in the circle of power.
Accordingly, in the resignation of Shamkhani, the role of the Front of Islamic Revolution Stability should be considered. In a campaign against Shamkhani, Hamid Rasaee, a memberof the Front and close to former nuclear negotiator and hardliner Saeed Jalili, used the hashtags #payan_momashat (The end of appeasement) and #ousting_Shamkhani! on his Telegram channel. He urged the president to fire Shamkhani due to inefficiency.
Ahmadian, the new secretary of the Supreme Security Council, was Shamkhani’s successor as commander of the IRGC Navy. Ahmadian became one of the architects of modernizing the force after the Iran-Iraq war. He is credited as one of the first theoreticians of the idea of asymmetric defense and can be expected to focus on counteracting the U.S. Fifth Fleet, which has stepped up patrols through the Strait of Hormuz recently after tit-for-tat seizures of oil tankers.
In recent years, Ayatollah Khamenei has placed special emphasis on strengthening the navy. Based on this, it is expected that the priorities of this Council in defense areas will be enhanced.
Meanwhile, Iran’s de-escalation process with regional countries including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Bahrain is likely to continue as a decision of the entire establishment rather than the specific agenda of any government department or council.
Javad Heiran-Nia directs the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran. He is currently working on a book about Iran’s middle class. Follow him on Twitter: @J_Heirannia
Shamkhani Resignation: More About Iran’s Domestic Than Foreign Policy?
By Javad Heiran-Nia
Middle East & North Africa
Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council for the past decade, left his position on May 22, 2023, and was replaced by Ali Akbar Ahmadian, a senior figure in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and a comrade of the late Quds Force commander Gen. Qasem Soleimani.
The shuffle followed prolonged rumors that Shamkhani was about to be replaced. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, who technically heads the council, appointed Ahmadian and Iran’s paramount leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, also appointed him as his representative on the council, which deliberates and tries to reach consensus on Iran’s most sensitive domestic and foreign policy matters. Ayatollah Khamenei has the final say on these decisions, but the council secretary often handles difficult negotiations with foreign officials.
Shamkhani, a former commander of the IRGC Navy, is known as a moderate and pragmatic figure who served as defense minister in the reformist government of Mohammad Khatami in the late 1990s and early 2000s and as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council during the tenure of Hassan Rouhani, himself a former national security adviser. Shamkhani had been under a cloud for some months due to reports of alleged corruption involving his sons and controversy over his former deputy Alireza Akbari, who was executed in January 2023 after he was convicted of spying for England.
During his tenure as secretary, Shamkhani oversaw important changes in Iran’s foreign policy including the conclusion of the 2015 nuclear deal and improving relations with Saudi Arabia. The nuclear agreement was negotiated by Iran’s Foreign Ministry but the Saudi negotiations, while begun by the ministry, deadlocked and were completed by Shamkhani with the mediation of China.
Although Iran’s macro foreign policy is a matter of consensus and the secretary of the council can be seen largely as an implementer, the role of individuals in the decision-making structure is not insignificant.
Shamkhani’s effectiveness aroused some jealousy and his Saudi mediation, in particular, caused disputes between the security council and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Shamkhani also reportedly fell afoul of the Front of Islamic Revolution Stability, a political faction that dominates the Raisi government.
With Shamkhani’s replacement, more power is likely to return to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Shamkhani was said to be a critic of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the effect of his removal on the deal, which has been on life support for several years, is unclear. Some experts, including Heshmatullah Falahatpisheh, a former member of parliament and chairman of the body’s Foreign Policy Commission, believe the JCPOA will now be shelved.
On the other hand, the right-wing Kayhan newspaper suggested that Shamkhani was a serious opponent of the JCPOA and that his removal might lead to its revival. Kayhan might have two motives: preparing public opinion for the revival of the JCPOA and sabotaging any chance that Shamkhani could run for president in 2025 as the standard bearer of reformists and pragmatists.
Shamkhani’s resignation can be evaluated as a result of competition in the Iranian power structure rather than a sign of change in Iran’s foreign policy. To some extent, this competition reflects a jockeying for influence over the course of Iranian affairs after the eventual passing of Ayatollah Khamenei.
Already, the competition for influence between the Front of Islamic Revolution Stability and other conservative groups, including supporters of Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, the current speaker of parliament, has increased. In the meantime, reformists have been removed from Iran’s power structure, and moderate figures such as Rouhani and Ali Larijani, a former parliament speaker, who acted as “surrogate wombs” for the reformists, have found it increasingly difficult to remain in the circle of power.
Accordingly, in the resignation of Shamkhani, the role of the Front of Islamic Revolution Stability should be considered. In a campaign against Shamkhani, Hamid Rasaee, a memberof the Front and close to former nuclear negotiator and hardliner Saeed Jalili, used the hashtags #payan_momashat (The end of appeasement) and #ousting_Shamkhani! on his Telegram channel. He urged the president to fire Shamkhani due to inefficiency.
Ahmadian, the new secretary of the Supreme Security Council, was Shamkhani’s successor as commander of the IRGC Navy. Ahmadian became one of the architects of modernizing the force after the Iran-Iraq war. He is credited as one of the first theoreticians of the idea of asymmetric defense and can be expected to focus on counteracting the U.S. Fifth Fleet, which has stepped up patrols through the Strait of Hormuz recently after tit-for-tat seizures of oil tankers.
In recent years, Ayatollah Khamenei has placed special emphasis on strengthening the navy. Based on this, it is expected that the priorities of this Council in defense areas will be enhanced.
Meanwhile, Iran’s de-escalation process with regional countries including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Bahrain is likely to continue as a decision of the entire establishment rather than the specific agenda of any government department or council.
Javad Heiran-Nia directs the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran. He is currently working on a book about Iran’s middle class. Follow him on Twitter: @J_Heirannia
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