Within the span of a week, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia in a rare trip abroad since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. He also hosted a summit in the Kremlin with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi.
Moscow’s diplomacy in the Middle East is an indicator of the West’s inability to isolate Russia as well as a vivid sign of the rise of middle powers that are increasingly successful at juggling for leverage among the bigger geopolitical players.
The Iranian delegation had a constellation of issues to discuss with Russian officials, starting with the war in Gaza. For long-sanctioned Tehran, it is critical to seek Russia’s solidarity on international issues. The Islamic Republic especially seeks to drive a bigger wedge between Russia and Israel, which had maintained cordial relations until recently.
Despite historic grievances and a general lack of mutual trust, Russia and Iran have drawn closer since 2022, largely driven by antagonism toward the West. Iran and Russia now increasingly find each other to be critical partners in areas including military, trade, and infrastructure projects. In Moscow, Raisi talked about the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) which runs from Russian ports to Iran’s southern coast. The parties have also reportedly finally reached a deal on the purchase of Russian SU-35 fighter jets as well as Mi-28 attack helicopters, and pilot training aircraft in return for Iranian drones.
Before the summit with Raisi, Putin flew to the UAE and Saudi Arabia. With the leaders of the two countries, Putin talked about investments, OPEC, and ways to boost oil prices so vital to Moscow’s war effort in Ukraine. He also sought to build momentum for a diplomatic counteroffensive against Kyiv’s and the West’s efforts to win over the Global South. This may have been in part a reaction to the Saudi hosting In August of Ukraine talks which included Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky but not Putin.
For Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Putin’s visit increased their international profile as powerbrokers and facilitators in potential peace negotiations. With increasing dissension in the US about continued military aid to Ukraine and rising anger in the Arab world at what is perceived as a US blank check to Israel in the Gaza war, geopolitical winds are beginning to blow the UAE and Saudi Arabia into embracing a more diversified and multi-vectorial foreign policy.
The Saudis and the Emiratis also see themselves as middle powers endeavoring to expand their geopolitical influence within their immediate vicinity and, at times, play a crucial role in broader regional dynamics. They view this pursuit as a continuous effort, extending beyond fleeting initiatives, and reflecting a strategic, long-term vision.
As true middle powers, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are wary of becoming entangled in the intense rivalry between China and the US, or the fight between the West and Russia. By steering clear of these conflicts, they can flourish amid the East-West divide by charting their own, seemingly independent paths, aimed at boosting their own geopolitical strength.
A common strategy for the two Persian Gulf countries is to avoid becoming overly reliant on any major power. This has been evident in Saudi Arabia’s rapprochement with Iran, as it seeks to reduce its overall dependence on the US and gain an insurance policy against Iranian and Yemeni Houthi attacks and subversion. A similar calculus is driving the UAE.
In the context of the rivalry between the West and Russia, middle powers perceive both challenges and opportunities. For instance, Saudi and Emirati increasingly close ties with Russia are part of a broader strategy to gain greater concessions from the West. The longer the war in Ukraine continues, the bigger the balancing act and ensuing opportunities for Middle Eastern powers to enhance their status as key regional players. Even a more isolated Iran has adopted a similar approach by trying to diversify its ties with China, Russia, India, and Saudi Arabia and at times, still talking to the West including the US.
Middle Eastern middle powers are primarily driven by their own national interests. As their relative power increases, they become more attractive to the US, China, and Russia. Indeed, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are not aligned with any specific side in disputes among the big powers; they have their own goals and regional aspirations. For them, non-alignment and a multifaceted foreign policy are increasingly seen as effective responses to the complexities of the current global environment.
The Saudi and Emirati calculus regarding Russia, therefore, is a direct result of the changing world order, which is becoming increasingly multipolar. The big powers also understand that whoever manages to woo the Global South will hold the key to shaping a future world order. But since no single big power possesses enough leverage to achieve this, the pool of opportunities for Saudi Arabia and UAE will only multiply.
Seen from this global perspective, Russia might be realizing that it is has passed a critical moment in its foreign policy. If in the beginning the invasion of Ukraine did not go as well as planned and the West regained the initiative by strengthening positions against Moscow’s aggression, by the end of 2023 it has become clear that Putin and his associates might have been right at banking on long-term fatigue in the West.
Russian diplomacy is on the offensive and a critical element is being played out in the Middle East. Putin’s visit to the Persian Gulf countries and meeting with Raisi served this purpose. While the media mostly pays attention to how well Russian diplomacy has played, the summits also speak volumes about the growing leverage of Middle East powers in an ongoing redistribution of global power.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of silk roads.
Russia Plays the Middle East Card
By Emil Avdaliani
Middle East & North Africa
Within the span of a week, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia in a rare trip abroad since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. He also hosted a summit in the Kremlin with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi.
Moscow’s diplomacy in the Middle East is an indicator of the West’s inability to isolate Russia as well as a vivid sign of the rise of middle powers that are increasingly successful at juggling for leverage among the bigger geopolitical players.
The Iranian delegation had a constellation of issues to discuss with Russian officials, starting with the war in Gaza. For long-sanctioned Tehran, it is critical to seek Russia’s solidarity on international issues. The Islamic Republic especially seeks to drive a bigger wedge between Russia and Israel, which had maintained cordial relations until recently.
Despite historic grievances and a general lack of mutual trust, Russia and Iran have drawn closer since 2022, largely driven by antagonism toward the West. Iran and Russia now increasingly find each other to be critical partners in areas including military, trade, and infrastructure projects. In Moscow, Raisi talked about the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) which runs from Russian ports to Iran’s southern coast. The parties have also reportedly finally reached a deal on the purchase of Russian SU-35 fighter jets as well as Mi-28 attack helicopters, and pilot training aircraft in return for Iranian drones.
Before the summit with Raisi, Putin flew to the UAE and Saudi Arabia. With the leaders of the two countries, Putin talked about investments, OPEC, and ways to boost oil prices so vital to Moscow’s war effort in Ukraine. He also sought to build momentum for a diplomatic counteroffensive against Kyiv’s and the West’s efforts to win over the Global South. This may have been in part a reaction to the Saudi hosting In August of Ukraine talks which included Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky but not Putin.
For Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Putin’s visit increased their international profile as powerbrokers and facilitators in potential peace negotiations. With increasing dissension in the US about continued military aid to Ukraine and rising anger in the Arab world at what is perceived as a US blank check to Israel in the Gaza war, geopolitical winds are beginning to blow the UAE and Saudi Arabia into embracing a more diversified and multi-vectorial foreign policy.
The Saudis and the Emiratis also see themselves as middle powers endeavoring to expand their geopolitical influence within their immediate vicinity and, at times, play a crucial role in broader regional dynamics. They view this pursuit as a continuous effort, extending beyond fleeting initiatives, and reflecting a strategic, long-term vision.
As true middle powers, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are wary of becoming entangled in the intense rivalry between China and the US, or the fight between the West and Russia. By steering clear of these conflicts, they can flourish amid the East-West divide by charting their own, seemingly independent paths, aimed at boosting their own geopolitical strength.
A common strategy for the two Persian Gulf countries is to avoid becoming overly reliant on any major power. This has been evident in Saudi Arabia’s rapprochement with Iran, as it seeks to reduce its overall dependence on the US and gain an insurance policy against Iranian and Yemeni Houthi attacks and subversion. A similar calculus is driving the UAE.
In the context of the rivalry between the West and Russia, middle powers perceive both challenges and opportunities. For instance, Saudi and Emirati increasingly close ties with Russia are part of a broader strategy to gain greater concessions from the West. The longer the war in Ukraine continues, the bigger the balancing act and ensuing opportunities for Middle Eastern powers to enhance their status as key regional players. Even a more isolated Iran has adopted a similar approach by trying to diversify its ties with China, Russia, India, and Saudi Arabia and at times, still talking to the West including the US.
Middle Eastern middle powers are primarily driven by their own national interests. As their relative power increases, they become more attractive to the US, China, and Russia. Indeed, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are not aligned with any specific side in disputes among the big powers; they have their own goals and regional aspirations. For them, non-alignment and a multifaceted foreign policy are increasingly seen as effective responses to the complexities of the current global environment.
The Saudi and Emirati calculus regarding Russia, therefore, is a direct result of the changing world order, which is becoming increasingly multipolar. The big powers also understand that whoever manages to woo the Global South will hold the key to shaping a future world order. But since no single big power possesses enough leverage to achieve this, the pool of opportunities for Saudi Arabia and UAE will only multiply.
Seen from this global perspective, Russia might be realizing that it is has passed a critical moment in its foreign policy. If in the beginning the invasion of Ukraine did not go as well as planned and the West regained the initiative by strengthening positions against Moscow’s aggression, by the end of 2023 it has become clear that Putin and his associates might have been right at banking on long-term fatigue in the West.
Russian diplomacy is on the offensive and a critical element is being played out in the Middle East. Putin’s visit to the Persian Gulf countries and meeting with Raisi served this purpose. While the media mostly pays attention to how well Russian diplomacy has played, the summits also speak volumes about the growing leverage of Middle East powers in an ongoing redistribution of global power.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of silk roads.
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