Redefining Strategic Stability in Post-New START Reality: A Pivotal Role of Missile Defense

In February 2023, Russia suspended the last of U.S.-Russian arms control agreements: the New START Treaty. The suspension means the cessation of the inspection regime and data exchange on telemetry, deployment, movement, and production of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the number of deployed nuclear warheads and strategic means of delivery stay at the same level, and the ballistic missile launch notification regime is still operational. Among reasons for the suspension President Putin mentioned an attack on Russian strategic nuclear bomber bases amid Washington’s active military support to Kiev which included intelligence, surveillance, and target data. Putin also mentioned the need to expand the scope of arms control framework with the inclusion of France and the U.K.¹The author is not a representative of the Russian government ²Послание Президента Федеральному Собранию (Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly). Президент России, 21.02.2023. Available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70565 (accessed 10.04.2023).

On one hand, the situation is going to be dangerous not only in terms of crisis stability but also in terms of arms race stability. On the other hand, it will take time for both sides to undertake measures which could change the current nuclear balance. This means that strategic nuclear arms race is not unavoidable. If both sides reach an understanding on the need for “guard rails,” or rules of confrontation in the form of arms control agreements, preparations should be made regarding new negotiation agendas and possible solutions.

A new accord in the form of a treaty seems useless under the current conditions, since such a treaty is unlikely to be ratified by the U.S. Senate where there is a bipartisan anti-Russian consensus. In order to prevent an arms race and to strengthen crisis stability, it is necessary to work out a new set of different types of agreements instead of New START Treaty: executive agreements, unilateral obligations, or other forms that do not require ratification by a legislative branch.

Russia has insisted that the new “strategic equation” takes into account all strategic weapons, including non-nuclear and defensive ones. The U.S. adheres to the position that only nuclear weapons, both strategic and tactical, should be limited. For a long time, the U.S. administration repeated that non-nuclear strategic weapons and missile defense systems could not be included into the discussion or be limited in any way. Russia, in turn, objected to the inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons in the negotiations agenda, primarily because these systems do not threaten U.S. territory.

Experts have argued that the discussion on the U.S.-Russia strategic weapons negotiations agenda should lead to a modernization of the definition of strategic stability³Bogdanov K. (2022) Сигнальный компонент в стратегиях ограниченного применения ядерного оружия (The Signal Component in Strategies of Limited Nuclear Employment), World Economy and International Relations, vol. 66, no. 5, pp. 5-13. (In Russian). In 1990, it was defined as the lack of incentives for any side to launch a first nuclear strike (namely a massive nuclear strike). However, it did not take into account at least two scenarios: there is the danger of using non-nuclear strategic weapons in a political-military crisis involving nuclear powers and the limited use of nuclear weapons during such a crisis.

Russian arms control experts believe that a new agreement should not necessarily lead to lower ceilings on the number of deployed nuclear warheads and means of delivery. It is much more important to achieve a wider coverage of arms control issues⁴Arbatov A. (2021) Проблемы и дилеммы следующего договора СНВ (Problems and Dilemmas of the New START Treaty), World Economy and International Relations, vol. 65, no. 6, pp. 5-20. (In Russian). The following issues should be considered for inclusion along with traditional strategic nuclear capabilities (ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers): tactical nuclear weapons (including U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe), non-nuclear strategic weapons, missile defense systems (U.S. homeland and regional missile defense, Russian aerospace defense), a moratorium on the land-based intermediate-range missile deployment (for example, in Europe), a ban on destructive anti-satellite weapons (in order to prevent an increase of space debris problem for space assets like early warning satellites), the non-use of cyber weapons against elements of strategic nuclear forces and early warning systems, and last but not the least – doctrinal issues that can cause serious security risks (e.g., limited nuclear weapons use, multi-domain operations, missile defense left-of-launch measures, etc.).

Russian civil and military officials periodically say that Russian strategic nuclear forces will overcome U.S. missile defenses, both current and future⁵Послание Президента Федеральному Собранию (Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly). Президент России, 1.03.2018. Available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957 (accessed 12.04.2023); Russian official says it is impossible to intercept Yars missile with existing systems. TASS, 29.11.2019. Available at: https://tass.com/defense/1093997 (accessed 12.04.2023).. Actually, Western experts agree with that assessment, and the purpose of U.S. missile defenses as currently configured and planned is not to be able to shoot down all Russian missiles at once. Future U.S. missile defense architecture will not be capable of protecting against a simultaneous strike of more than a thousand nuclear warheads. But the problem lies with the possible effectiveness of missile defense against the limited use of strategic non-nuclear and nuclear weapons. Nuclear war between Russia and the U.S. could only be the result of gradual escalation of a regional crisis to the strategic nuclear level. During a political-military crisis, the missile defense factor would impact the decision-making process of both sides at every level of escalation (regional non-nuclear, strategic non-nuclear, regional nuclear, strategic nuclear). So, the development of missile defense capabilities and the concepts of limited conventional strikes or nuclear use can exacerbate the situation, for example, in Europe. Thus, missile defense deployment should be limited one way or another.

The evolution of the U.S. official approach to missile defense in 2022

Certain changes took place in the official approach of the United States to the missile defense problem. First, in April 2022, the U.S. announced a unilateral moratorium on destructive anti-satellite tests. Second, the 2022 Missile Defense Review (2022 MDR) officially recognized the threat posed by non-nuclear strategic weapons to U.S. territory for the first time.⁶2022 Missile Defense Review. U.S. Department of Defense. P. 6. Available at: https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF (accessed 20.10.2023). Theoretically, this official recognition could help Washington agree with Moscow’s position on American non-nuclear strategic weapons and the need to account for them in arms control negotiations today. Third, the 2022 MDR also introduced a provision on transparency in missile defense for the first time. “Strengthening mutual transparency and predictability with regard to these systems could help reduce the risk of conflict.”⁷2022 Missile Defense Review, p. 6. But transparency can take many forms; for example, an agreement on notifications and inspections, or only on non-interference in the work of national technical means of observation.

The 2022 National Defense Authorization Act provided a certification to delegations from Russia and China for the inspection of certain objects of the U.S. missile defense architecture (Section 1667). At the same time, the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act made the ban on the transfer of sensitive information on missile defense to Russia or China permanent (Section 1653). Therefore, the contentious House of Representatives will most likely block the funding for implementation of the executive agreement on transparency in missile defense. This was the case in 2013, when the GOP/Republican Party blocked funding for the implementation of any agreements with Russia regarding missile defense.

Fourth, the 2022 MDR was the first missile defense review to mention the 2010 New START preamble’s provision on the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive systems.⁸2022 Missile Defense Review, p. 6. While this relationship has been recognized as part of an “integrated approach to deterrence,” this is an important change in the official U.S. approach to missile defense. This needs to be taken into account with the fact that, unlike 2010 or 2019, there is no mention of the inadmissibility of any restrictions on U.S. missile defense in the current Missile Defense Review. In theory, this could help develop a common understanding between Russia and the United States on missile defense limitations, if not in the form of a treaty or an executive agreement, at least in the form of unilateral steps by both sides to limit their missile defense (and aerospace defense) architectures.

It seems that, unlike Moscow, Washington is significantly less concerned about its potential to impose unacceptable damage as a response to a first nuclear strike. It explains the lack of concerns in the U.S. about the development of Russian strategic missile defense. The U.S. administration mentions Russian strategic missile defense only as part of an answer to Russian objections regarding the U.S. missile defense development.⁹Soofer R. The case for a layered missile defense of the US homeland, The Hill, 04.06.2020. Available at: https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/501231-the-case-for-a-layered-missile-defense-of-the-us-homeland (accessed 12.04.2023).

Russian counterspace capabilities are more concerning for the U.S. There is a connection between missile defense and space capabilities. Any significant improvement in missile defense effectiveness can only be made through space assets (e.g., sensors to detect missile launches, track missiles during all phases of their flight, discrimination of real warheads from decoys, targeting of interceptors, and assessment of an intercept attempt). This means that counterspace capabilities (space-based or terrestrial) potentially impact missile defense systems’ performance; so, they should be taken into account in connection with missile defense.

In the long term, the following developments in the U.S. missile defense architecture could be dangerous for U.S.-Russia strategic stability:

• The quantitative and qualitative development of Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system with Next-Generation Interceptors (NGI) (including multi-object kill vehicles) if and when this system can intercept multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) of ICBMs;
• The quantitative and qualitative development of Aegis system (both land- and sea-based) with SM-3 Block IIA interceptors which were tested against ICBM-target;
• The development of hypersonic defense systems like the Glide-Phase Interceptor;
• The development of the Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture in which some sensors could help discriminate real warheads from decoys and track hypersonic and ballistic missiles during every phase of their flight, and some sensors could track the movements of road-mobile ICBMs;
• The development of space-based missile defense systems (either kinetic interceptors or directed energy weapons).

The current political environment does not create any possibility for a treaty or even an executive agreement between Russia and the U.S. on limitations or transparency in missile defense. Hence, the only measure to prepare for new Russia-U.S. arms control negotiations seems to be unilateral steps by both sides.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the following unilateral steps could be taken by the U.S. and Russia around missile defense:

• The U.S. could declare a self-imposed moratorium on the deployment of space-based interceptors or space-based directed energy missile defense systems.
• Russia could consider a unilateral ban on destructive anti-satellite tests that generate debris in space. Russia could repurpose its ASAT missiles to ICBM interceptors and still preserve the potential to use terrestrial-based dazzling lasers and electronic warfare against satellites. (And the U.S. as well can use dazzling lasers and electronic warfare against satellites.)
• The U.S. could consider a disclosure of SM-3 Block IIA burnout velocity.¹⁰“Critics in the U.S. would probably argue, as they did in 2011, that permitting Russia to measure the burnout speed of a U.S. interceptor would disclose classified information that could compromise national security. Yet, as the Obama administration concluded back then, this information would not meaningfully help Russia (or any third party to which Russia disclosed this information) to defeat U.S. defenses.” See Acton et al., Reimagining Nuclear Arms Control, 2021, pp. 6, 46. It can be defined as non-sensitive information and, hence, the transfer of this information is not prohibited by Section 1642 of the FY 2021 NDAA.¹¹Conference Report of the FY 2021 National Defense Authorization Act. P. 1730. https://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20201207/CRPT-116hrpt617.pdf . About “providing sensitive information” see Conference Report of the 2019 NDAA. P. 1066. https://www.congress.gov/115/crpt/hrpt874/CRPT-115hrpt874.pdf
• The U.S. could consider self-imposed limits on Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) numbers. The number of strategic interceptors (GBI and NGI) planned to be 64 by 2030s.¹²Defense Budget Overview. U.S. Department of Defense. FY 2024 Budget Request. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, March 2023. P. 3-3. Available at: https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2024/FY2024_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf (accessed 20.04.2023). 64 could be a ceiling for U.S. strategic interceptors.
• The U.S. could also consider self-imposed limits on the quantity of Aegis systems (both sea- and land-based) capable of launching SM-3 Block IIA interceptors, without limiting the quantity of those interceptors. Currently the U.S. plan to have 53 Aegis ships by the end of FY 2024.¹³Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service, August 28, 2023. Available at: https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/RL33745.pdf (accessed 10.09.2023). There are also no more than two Aegis Ashore sites. All those ships and sites are capable of launching SM-3 Block IIA interceptors. 60 could be a ceiling for Aegis systems.
• Russia could consider self-imposed limits on interceptors in A-235 missile defense system and on launchers of future S-400/500 missile defense systems without limitations on those interceptors’ numbers. For example, Russia has 68 strategic interceptors in the Moscow missile defense system¹⁴2019 Missile Defense Review, p. 20.. 68 could be a ceiling for those Russian strategic interceptors.
• It seems that there is no possibility to limit the deployment of Russian or US space-based sensors. But these could be used by both sides for verifying the implementation of the unilateral steps mentioned above. These national technical means include various space-based, or sea-, air-, land-based sensors.

Oleg Krivolapov is a senior research fellow at the Georgy Arbatov Institute for the U.S. and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN). His research interests and publications are about the U.S. missile defense policy, U.S.-Russia relations, arms control, strategic stability, and regional security.

Notes

• 1
  The author is not a representative of the Russian government
• 2
  Послание Президента Федеральному Собранию (Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly). Президент России, 21.02.2023. Available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70565 (accessed 10.04.2023).
• 3
  Bogdanov K. (2022) Сигнальный компонент в стратегиях ограниченного применения ядерного оружия (The Signal Component in Strategies of Limited Nuclear Employment), World Economy and International Relations, vol. 66, no. 5, pp. 5-13. (In Russian)
• 4
  Arbatov A. (2021) Проблемы и дилеммы следующего договора СНВ (Problems and Dilemmas of the New START Treaty), World Economy and International Relations, vol. 65, no. 6, pp. 5-20. (In Russian)
• 5
  Послание Президента Федеральному Собранию (Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly). Президент России, 1.03.2018. Available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957 (accessed 12.04.2023); Russian official says it is impossible to intercept Yars missile with existing systems. TASS, 29.11.2019. Available at: https://tass.com/defense/1093997 (accessed 12.04.2023).
• 6
  2022 Missile Defense Review. U.S. Department of Defense. P. 6. Available at: https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF (accessed 20.10.2023).
• 7
  2022 Missile Defense Review, p. 6.
• 8
  2022 Missile Defense Review, p. 6.
• 9
  Soofer R. The case for a layered missile defense of the US homeland, The Hill, 04.06.2020. Available at: https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/501231-the-case-for-a-layered-missile-defense-of-the-us-homeland (accessed 12.04.2023).
• 10
  “Critics in the U.S. would probably argue, as they did in 2011, that permitting Russia to measure the burnout speed of a U.S. interceptor would disclose classified information that could compromise national security. Yet, as the Obama administration concluded back then, this information would not meaningfully help Russia (or any third party to which Russia disclosed this information) to defeat U.S. defenses.” See Acton et al., Reimagining Nuclear Arms Control, 2021, pp. 6, 46.
• 11
  Conference Report of the FY 2021 National Defense Authorization Act. P. 1730. https://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20201207/CRPT-116hrpt617.pdf . About “providing sensitive information” see Conference Report of the 2019 NDAA. P. 1066. https://www.congress.gov/115/crpt/hrpt874/CRPT-115hrpt874.pdf
• 12
  Defense Budget Overview. U.S. Department of Defense. FY 2024 Budget Request. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, March 2023. P. 3-3. Available at: https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2024/FY2024_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf (accessed 20.04.2023).
• 13
  Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service, August 28, 2023. Available at: https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/RL33745.pdf (accessed 10.09.2023).
• 14
  2019 Missile Defense Review, p. 20.