Europe’s largest nuclear power plant, the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), has been occupied by Russian forces for the past 355 days. Since taking it over on March 4, 2022, Russian forces remain at the facility, using it as a military base and shield. Ongoing shelling and military activity have created persistent disruptions to the power supply at the facility and an unending heightened risk of a nuclear accident. With a radiological catastrophe in Europe remaining a threat one year on, active diplomacy and action by countries around the world is needed. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has demonstrated that it is able to support a country swiftly during an active conflict. Its member states need to do the same.
IAEA Assistance
The IAEA, the world’s hub for nuclear cooperation and monitoring, has been tireless in its efforts to assist Ukraine maintain safe operations at its nuclear facilities during the conflict, both from afar and on-site. The IAEA’s International Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC) has remained on the highest alert level since Russian forces entered ZNPP on March 4, and its staff have been actively engaged in providing technical support to Ukrainian operators and regulators at Ukraine’s request. The IAEA is also coordinating extrabudgetary voluntary contributions by eleven member states (as of November) to support the extraordinary efforts of the Agency in delivering technical assistance and support to Ukraine and delivering equipment donated by member states to Ukrainian facilities.
The presence of the IAEA is vital in providing an independent, on-the-ground assessment to the global community on the status of nuclear material and activities in Ukraine. At the end of March, the IAEA’s first support and assistance mission was carried out at the South Ukraine NPP, followed by two on-site visits to Chornobyl and the Exclusion Zone (April 25 – 28 and May 30 – June 4, 2022) and then to Zaporizhzhya (August 29 – September 3). These on-site missions enable the IAEA to take environmental samples, radiation measurements, assess physical damage and equipment needs, and establish the flow of nuclear safeguards information.
In October 2022, the IAEA responded quickly to Ukraine’s request to send inspectors to three facilities after allegations were made by Russian President Vladimir Putin that the three facilities were part of a Ukrainian plot to employ a radioactive dirty bomb in a false flag attack to be pinned on Russia. After on-site visits to the Institute for Nuclear Research in Kyiv, the Eastern Mining and Processing Plan in Khovti Kody, and Production Association Pivdennyi Machine-Building Plant in Dnipro, the IAEA concluded on November 3 that there were no indications of undeclared nuclear activities and materials at the three locations.
Despite the challenging circumstances, the Agency has been able to implement safeguards in Ukraine in accordance with its safeguards agreements and the annual implementation plan it established for 2022. From the beginning of the war until November 6, the IAEA conducted 20 safeguard missions to verify declared nuclear material at locations and nine missions to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. According to the Director General’s November report, “the Agency has not found any indication that would give rise to a proliferation concern.”
In January 2023, the IAEA and Ukraine deployed permanent, on-site IAEA teams to all of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants (Khmelnistky, Rivne, South Ukraine, Zaporizhzhya, and at Chornobyl). Since January 19, the flag of the IAEA stands alongside the Ukrainian flag at all 5 facilities, with on-site teams assessing needs, providing technical assistance and advice, and reporting findings directly to the Agency in Vienna. At Zaporizhzhya, the IAEA has maintained a continued presence at the site since August 29, with IAEA experts rotating every 3-4 weeks. The Agency has underscored that the presence of its experts “do[es] not change, or substitute for, the respective responsibilities of the operator and the regulator of Ukraine in relation to the safe and secure operation of the ZNPP.”
Nuclear Diplomacy
Talks on the establishment of a nuclear safety and security protection zone at Zaporizhzhya began in September between the IAEA, Ukraine, and Russia. The negotiations are complex. A protection zone would mean the ZNPP would become a military-free zone, providing an agreed-upon buffer for the safety of staff and the safe and secure operations of the reactors as designed and licensed. In a statement on February 10, the IAEA Director General remained hopeful after talks in Moscow that week, but there is considerable urgency, as military action continues to put ZNPP at risk of a serious radiological accident and has delayed the rotation of IAEA experts on-site. The statement also described the situation at ZNPP as “dangerous, precarious, and challenging,” with the plant’s staff operating under “relentless levels of stress and pressure.”
There is only so far a technical international organization can go in brokering a demilitarized zone during active conflict without strong and broad support from its member states. Russia is not only a permanent member of the UN Security Council, but also a major actor in the global nuclear fuel cycle, and therefore impossible to ignore. Its share of global nuclear energy has grown since it began expanding its civilian nuclear program almost two decades ago. Today, Russia provides almost 40 percent of the conversion market and nearly 50 percent of enrichment services. Russia is also the world’s largest exporter of reactor designs abroad. Between 2012 and 2021, Rosatom began construction of 15 reactors abroad, far ahead of South Korea, which began constructing four during the same period, and China and France, each building two abroad.
Russia’s edge is its international promotion of its nuclear sector, led by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and backed by a competitive, bundled offer to Build, Own, Operate (BOO), which delivers nuclear energy as a package: financing, construction, operation services, and, most importantly, supplying fuel and removing its waste. Today, there are currently 42 reactors outside of Russia using Soviet-designed VVER (water-water energetic reactors, or vodo-vodyanoi enyergeticheskiy reaktory in Russian), with 21 out of the 52 reactors being built globally (excluding those in Russia) being VVER reactor designs.
Ukraine has been calling for the European Union and its 10th package of sanctions to include restrictions on Russia’s nuclear industry, including Rosatom. Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban has already said he will veto any plan by the 27-member Union for nuclear sanctions. Approximately 50 percent of Hungary’s electricity generation comes from nuclear, all of which is supplied by Russia. Any nuclear sanctions on Russia are also particularly challenging in reaching a multilateral deal on resuming the Joint Cooperation Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran. In March 2022, US State Department spokesman Ned Price confirmed: “We, of course, would not sanction Russian participation in nuclear projects that are part of resuming full implementation of the JCPOA.” By January 2023, hopes for reviving the JCPOA seem to have faded, with reports of one European diplomat suggesting there can be no more progress on the nuclear deal until there is a resolution of the Ukrainian war.
Shifting Supply Chains
Without a resolution, and in the absence of sanctions, European countries are preparing for a long war and taking steps toward diversifying and reducing their nuclear energy reliance on Russia. Ukraine began collaborating with Westinghouse Electric Co. in 2005 on an alternative to Russian fuel, and by 2022, Westinghouse provided nearly half of the fuel used in Ukraine’s nuclear power plants. In June 2022, Ukraine’s national nuclear power company, Energoatom, signed an agreement for Westinghouse to supply fuel to all of Ukraine’s VVERs, as well as building nine AP1000 plants.
In February 2023, Energoatom also signed an agreement with Canada’s Cameco to supply 100 percent of uranium hexafluoride to the Rivne, Khmelnitsky, and South Ukraine NPPs, starting in 2024. The contract will also include an option for Cameco to supply Zaporizhzhya NPP when it returns to Ukraine’s control. Others, namely Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, and Slovakia, have recently announced tenders for fuel supplies or signed agreements with Westinghouse and France’s Framatome for VVER fuel starting as early as next year. Soon, Hungary will be the sole EU country with VVER units running on Russian fuel.
Other suppliers are also starting to shift their supply chains. Russia’s invasion has sped-up plans by various fuel suppliers to produce high-assay low-enriched uranium fuel (HALEU) for future advanced reactors while Kazatomprom, the world’s largest supplier of uranium ore concentrates (UOC), is taking steps to bypass Russia’s territory in its UOC exports. In December last year, Kazakhstan and Canada completed a delivery of uranium ore concentrates using the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, paving the way for future UOC transports from Kazakhstan through Azerbaijan and Georgia to Europe, North America, and Asia.
Many other countries are still maintaining Rosatom contracts. Russia is currently building the first nuclear power plants for Egypt, Turkey, and Bangladesh, as well as additional reactors in India and China. Armenia signed an agreement continuing its fuel supply from TVEL in August 2022, and in Iran, Russian construction at Bushehr 2 is currently underway. Indeed, research suggests that Russia’s sales abroad actually rose more than 20% in 2022.
The slow pace of exits from Russian fuel supply market is a frustration for Ukraine, particularly as Russia continues to hold a nuclear power plant hostage, prolonging the threat of a radiological catastrophe in Europe. During his recent visit to Brussels, Ukrainian President Zelensky raised the contradiction by asking: “Is this normal?”
The New Abnormal
The interconnectedness of the global nuclear fuel cycle, alongside contractual obligations and licensing/regulatory applications and approvals, translate into long lead times for nuclear utilities seeking to shift their supply chains. In Europe, which has been experiencing an energy crisis since 2021, keeping the lights on at a reasonable cost to consumers is a daunting challenge, particularly after gas and electricity bills nearly doubled in winter 2022. Although Russia’s nuclear sector will not be included in the EU’s tenth package of sanctions, the bloc is taking steps to divest itself from Russia’s nuclear energy market. Over the long run, these alternatives will shrink Russia’s overall share of global fuel and technology services, at least in the west. This will lead to a bifurcated market and even more complex supply routes, purchasing agreements, and export controls for operators and regulators to navigate.
At the same time, a radiological catastrophe continually threatens Europe and its neighbors, requiring active diplomacy and action by countries around the world. The IAEA has demonstrated that it is able to support a country swiftly during an active conflict. Its member states need to do the same by increasing contributions to support the IAEA’s assistance missions in Ukraine and to work in tandem to prioritize a protective zone around the ZNPP. Any nuclear accident resulting from active combat during this war will have devastating impact on humans, the environment, nuclear industry, climate targets, and world markets. The collective objective must be a safe, stable nuclear order.
Nuclear Annexation: The New Abnormal
By Cindy Vestergaard
Nonproliferation
Europe’s largest nuclear power plant, the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), has been occupied by Russian forces for the past 355 days. Since taking it over on March 4, 2022, Russian forces remain at the facility, using it as a military base and shield. Ongoing shelling and military activity have created persistent disruptions to the power supply at the facility and an unending heightened risk of a nuclear accident. With a radiological catastrophe in Europe remaining a threat one year on, active diplomacy and action by countries around the world is needed. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has demonstrated that it is able to support a country swiftly during an active conflict. Its member states need to do the same.
IAEA Assistance
The IAEA, the world’s hub for nuclear cooperation and monitoring, has been tireless in its efforts to assist Ukraine maintain safe operations at its nuclear facilities during the conflict, both from afar and on-site. The IAEA’s International Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC) has remained on the highest alert level since Russian forces entered ZNPP on March 4, and its staff have been actively engaged in providing technical support to Ukrainian operators and regulators at Ukraine’s request. The IAEA is also coordinating extrabudgetary voluntary contributions by eleven member states (as of November) to support the extraordinary efforts of the Agency in delivering technical assistance and support to Ukraine and delivering equipment donated by member states to Ukrainian facilities.
The presence of the IAEA is vital in providing an independent, on-the-ground assessment to the global community on the status of nuclear material and activities in Ukraine. At the end of March, the IAEA’s first support and assistance mission was carried out at the South Ukraine NPP, followed by two on-site visits to Chornobyl and the Exclusion Zone (April 25 – 28 and May 30 – June 4, 2022) and then to Zaporizhzhya (August 29 – September 3). These on-site missions enable the IAEA to take environmental samples, radiation measurements, assess physical damage and equipment needs, and establish the flow of nuclear safeguards information.
In October 2022, the IAEA responded quickly to Ukraine’s request to send inspectors to three facilities after allegations were made by Russian President Vladimir Putin that the three facilities were part of a Ukrainian plot to employ a radioactive dirty bomb in a false flag attack to be pinned on Russia. After on-site visits to the Institute for Nuclear Research in Kyiv, the Eastern Mining and Processing Plan in Khovti Kody, and Production Association Pivdennyi Machine-Building Plant in Dnipro, the IAEA concluded on November 3 that there were no indications of undeclared nuclear activities and materials at the three locations.
Despite the challenging circumstances, the Agency has been able to implement safeguards in Ukraine in accordance with its safeguards agreements and the annual implementation plan it established for 2022. From the beginning of the war until November 6, the IAEA conducted 20 safeguard missions to verify declared nuclear material at locations and nine missions to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. According to the Director General’s November report, “the Agency has not found any indication that would give rise to a proliferation concern.”
In January 2023, the IAEA and Ukraine deployed permanent, on-site IAEA teams to all of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants (Khmelnistky, Rivne, South Ukraine, Zaporizhzhya, and at Chornobyl). Since January 19, the flag of the IAEA stands alongside the Ukrainian flag at all 5 facilities, with on-site teams assessing needs, providing technical assistance and advice, and reporting findings directly to the Agency in Vienna. At Zaporizhzhya, the IAEA has maintained a continued presence at the site since August 29, with IAEA experts rotating every 3-4 weeks. The Agency has underscored that the presence of its experts “do[es] not change, or substitute for, the respective responsibilities of the operator and the regulator of Ukraine in relation to the safe and secure operation of the ZNPP.”
Nuclear Diplomacy
Talks on the establishment of a nuclear safety and security protection zone at Zaporizhzhya began in September between the IAEA, Ukraine, and Russia. The negotiations are complex. A protection zone would mean the ZNPP would become a military-free zone, providing an agreed-upon buffer for the safety of staff and the safe and secure operations of the reactors as designed and licensed. In a statement on February 10, the IAEA Director General remained hopeful after talks in Moscow that week, but there is considerable urgency, as military action continues to put ZNPP at risk of a serious radiological accident and has delayed the rotation of IAEA experts on-site. The statement also described the situation at ZNPP as “dangerous, precarious, and challenging,” with the plant’s staff operating under “relentless levels of stress and pressure.”
There is only so far a technical international organization can go in brokering a demilitarized zone during active conflict without strong and broad support from its member states. Russia is not only a permanent member of the UN Security Council, but also a major actor in the global nuclear fuel cycle, and therefore impossible to ignore. Its share of global nuclear energy has grown since it began expanding its civilian nuclear program almost two decades ago. Today, Russia provides almost 40 percent of the conversion market and nearly 50 percent of enrichment services. Russia is also the world’s largest exporter of reactor designs abroad. Between 2012 and 2021, Rosatom began construction of 15 reactors abroad, far ahead of South Korea, which began constructing four during the same period, and China and France, each building two abroad.
Russia’s edge is its international promotion of its nuclear sector, led by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and backed by a competitive, bundled offer to Build, Own, Operate (BOO), which delivers nuclear energy as a package: financing, construction, operation services, and, most importantly, supplying fuel and removing its waste. Today, there are currently 42 reactors outside of Russia using Soviet-designed VVER (water-water energetic reactors, or vodo-vodyanoi enyergeticheskiy reaktory in Russian), with 21 out of the 52 reactors being built globally (excluding those in Russia) being VVER reactor designs.
Ukraine has been calling for the European Union and its 10th package of sanctions to include restrictions on Russia’s nuclear industry, including Rosatom. Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban has already said he will veto any plan by the 27-member Union for nuclear sanctions. Approximately 50 percent of Hungary’s electricity generation comes from nuclear, all of which is supplied by Russia. Any nuclear sanctions on Russia are also particularly challenging in reaching a multilateral deal on resuming the Joint Cooperation Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran. In March 2022, US State Department spokesman Ned Price confirmed: “We, of course, would not sanction Russian participation in nuclear projects that are part of resuming full implementation of the JCPOA.” By January 2023, hopes for reviving the JCPOA seem to have faded, with reports of one European diplomat suggesting there can be no more progress on the nuclear deal until there is a resolution of the Ukrainian war.
Shifting Supply Chains
Without a resolution, and in the absence of sanctions, European countries are preparing for a long war and taking steps toward diversifying and reducing their nuclear energy reliance on Russia. Ukraine began collaborating with Westinghouse Electric Co. in 2005 on an alternative to Russian fuel, and by 2022, Westinghouse provided nearly half of the fuel used in Ukraine’s nuclear power plants. In June 2022, Ukraine’s national nuclear power company, Energoatom, signed an agreement for Westinghouse to supply fuel to all of Ukraine’s VVERs, as well as building nine AP1000 plants.
In February 2023, Energoatom also signed an agreement with Canada’s Cameco to supply 100 percent of uranium hexafluoride to the Rivne, Khmelnitsky, and South Ukraine NPPs, starting in 2024. The contract will also include an option for Cameco to supply Zaporizhzhya NPP when it returns to Ukraine’s control. Others, namely Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, and Slovakia, have recently announced tenders for fuel supplies or signed agreements with Westinghouse and France’s Framatome for VVER fuel starting as early as next year. Soon, Hungary will be the sole EU country with VVER units running on Russian fuel.
Other suppliers are also starting to shift their supply chains. Russia’s invasion has sped-up plans by various fuel suppliers to produce high-assay low-enriched uranium fuel (HALEU) for future advanced reactors while Kazatomprom, the world’s largest supplier of uranium ore concentrates (UOC), is taking steps to bypass Russia’s territory in its UOC exports. In December last year, Kazakhstan and Canada completed a delivery of uranium ore concentrates using the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, paving the way for future UOC transports from Kazakhstan through Azerbaijan and Georgia to Europe, North America, and Asia.
Many other countries are still maintaining Rosatom contracts. Russia is currently building the first nuclear power plants for Egypt, Turkey, and Bangladesh, as well as additional reactors in India and China. Armenia signed an agreement continuing its fuel supply from TVEL in August 2022, and in Iran, Russian construction at Bushehr 2 is currently underway. Indeed, research suggests that Russia’s sales abroad actually rose more than 20% in 2022.
The slow pace of exits from Russian fuel supply market is a frustration for Ukraine, particularly as Russia continues to hold a nuclear power plant hostage, prolonging the threat of a radiological catastrophe in Europe. During his recent visit to Brussels, Ukrainian President Zelensky raised the contradiction by asking: “Is this normal?”
The New Abnormal
The interconnectedness of the global nuclear fuel cycle, alongside contractual obligations and licensing/regulatory applications and approvals, translate into long lead times for nuclear utilities seeking to shift their supply chains. In Europe, which has been experiencing an energy crisis since 2021, keeping the lights on at a reasonable cost to consumers is a daunting challenge, particularly after gas and electricity bills nearly doubled in winter 2022. Although Russia’s nuclear sector will not be included in the EU’s tenth package of sanctions, the bloc is taking steps to divest itself from Russia’s nuclear energy market. Over the long run, these alternatives will shrink Russia’s overall share of global fuel and technology services, at least in the west. This will lead to a bifurcated market and even more complex supply routes, purchasing agreements, and export controls for operators and regulators to navigate.
At the same time, a radiological catastrophe continually threatens Europe and its neighbors, requiring active diplomacy and action by countries around the world. The IAEA has demonstrated that it is able to support a country swiftly during an active conflict. Its member states need to do the same by increasing contributions to support the IAEA’s assistance missions in Ukraine and to work in tandem to prioritize a protective zone around the ZNPP. Any nuclear accident resulting from active combat during this war will have devastating impact on humans, the environment, nuclear industry, climate targets, and world markets. The collective objective must be a safe, stable nuclear order.
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