Editor’s note: While the Stimson Center rarely publishes anonymous work, the author of this commentary is a Tehran-based analyst who has requested anonymity out of legitimate concern for their personal safety. The writer is known to appropriate staff, has a track record of reliable analysis, and is in a position to provide an otherwise unavailable perspective.
On June 29, 2023, Canada, Britain, Sweden, and Ukraine announced that they would bring a case against Iran in the International Court of Justice to seek accountability for the 2020 shootdown of a Ukrainian passenger jet that killed all 176 passengers and crew on board. The challenge is the latest of many facing Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that alone or collectively could pose a serious risk to his regime.
Khamenei’s hand-picked president Ebrahim Raisi is under fire for incompetence. Critics blame him for “provoking more protests by mismanaging the country affairs” and failing to improve the economic situation. On July 1, Iran’s venerable newspaper Ettela’at lampooned Raisi’s remarks to “…resolve the water shortage problem in two years,” noting that “Mr. President, if you want to resolve the water problem in two years, you will have to order the clouds to rain more often.”
Pressures on dissidents have not subsided. In early 2023, Khamenei announced a large-scale parole of those arrested in widespread protests after the death of Mahsa Amini in police custody. But many of those released on parole were re-arrested. In June, for example, the number of those arrested rose 57 percent over the previous month, with the majority from ethnic minorities.
Iran’s foreign policy has also faced challenges. A dispute with Afghanistan has led to the blockage of water from the Hirmand River into southeastern Iran, causing an environmental catastrophe in the politically sensitive Sistan-Baluchestan province. Iran has also struggled to de-escalate tensions with its northern neighbor Azerbaijan.
Even reports of progress in talks aimed at capping Iran’s nuclear program and forestalling the provision of ballistic missiles to Russia can be viewed as a sign of weakness. The understanding, if successfully concluded, would contradict Khamenei’s prior insistence that Iran’s regional defense policies are off-limits without a durable nuclear deal first.
The recent mutiny by the Wagner group has compounded Khamenei’s headaches. Raisi’s telephone call to Vladimir Putin, pledging Iran’s “full support for Russia,” came only after the mutiny had ended. Critics of the Raisi government called the Wagner mutiny “a warning for Iran not to play with the Russian card.” Even a former conservative member of parliament said that “high-ranking decision makers” should not tie Iran’s fate to Putin’s in the Ukraine war because “Putin is not a reliable partner.” Some analysts went so far as to predict a similar mutiny in Iran.
Khamenei has always relied on Iran’s security forces to solve his problems, be they foreign or domestic. But there have been signs of dissension among these forces. A recent conference of security entities, interior minister Ahmad Vahidi, the new secretary of the High Council of National Security Ali Akbar Ahmadian, and civilian and military chiefs of staff was held to formulate strategies to prevent or confront protests expected to reignite in September on the first anniversary of the death of Amini. The conference was supposed to be confidential, but the news leaked before the meeting ended. According to Etemad newspaper, Khamenei in a message to the conference pointed to “disparities and divergences at certain levels” and asked for “real efforts by everyone to implement this cooperation and understanding at all levels.” Ahmadian reportedly told the meeting that “there is no room for possible errors. We should all make an effort to formulate a single strategy.”
Such talk of disagreements among security entities is unprecedented in the Islamic Republic given that their members are supposed to be the most loyal to Khamenei.
The worst crisis of all for Khamenei would be the emergence of a viable alternative to his regime. Despite intense repression, civil society entities in Iran have proven that they cannot be uprooted or destroyed. Since last year, a genuine and indigenous dialogue has started in Iran about a post-theocratic future political system. The most prevalent demand is for a referendum on the constitution with the ultimate objective of forcing the regime to accept revision. The goal is a non-violent and step-by-step regime change through democratic means rather than another revolution and resulting anarchy.
In a recent discussion on the telephone app Clubhouse that lasted for two days, participants agreed that the existing constitution is no longer viable. Even parts of the reformist camp that used to stress parliamentary elections to bring about meaningful change embraced the referendum demand. Judging by the composition of the participants in the conference, which called itself the “Dialogue for the Future of Iran,” the new framework has the support of a large number of prominent political, civil and social activists, lawyers, human rights advocates, and labor and professional unions and syndicates. Among the topics discussed were the need to guarantee the rights of women, minorities, labor, and the professions, adopting international standards of human rights, and most importantly, formulating a framework for a future political system.
Khamenei’s reaction to the dialogue was predictable: more repression. Some of the participants, including prominent human rights activist and American Pen award winner Narges Mohammadi, who sent messages from jail, were given tougher prison conditions. Others, like journalists Keyvan Samini and Vida Rabbani and activist Ali-Reza Shirazi, were arrested and jailed for their comments at the Clubhouse gathering.
Khamenei, who has been in power for 34 years, is facing a dilemma. On March 1, 2024, Iran is set to hold elections for parliament and the Assembly of Experts, a body that nominally chooses the successor to the Supreme Leader. But turnout is likely to be extremely low, further depriving the regime of even a veneer of legitimacy. Even a Raisi supporter in parliament, Jalil Rahimi Jahanabadi, said that “because of the support we have given to Raisi, people are totally disappointed with both the government and the parliament.” The anti-election voices have become so loud that security forces have contacted some former parliamentarians who were disqualified in previous elections to ask them to register again before the registration period officially starts.
The reformist camp has already stated that it will not take part in the parliamentary elections and will not settle for anything less than a referendum. Khamenei has rejected the notion of a referendum, asserting that ordinary people “do not have the ability to analyze the issues.”
Khamenei is in the middle of his worst years in power. Not only is his health fragile, but international and domestic political conditions are working against him, too. His president, who was supposed to help relieve some of the pressures, has done exactly the opposite, shifting even more blame to Khamenei. At 84 years old, the Supreme Leader thought he could engineer upcoming elections to ensure a smooth transfer of power to his second son, Mojtaba. But the foundations of the regime are shakier than ever.
Khamenei Faces Multiple Crises as Anniversary of Iran Protests Nears
By Anonymous
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s note: While the Stimson Center rarely publishes anonymous work, the author of this commentary is a Tehran-based analyst who has requested anonymity out of legitimate concern for their personal safety. The writer is known to appropriate staff, has a track record of reliable analysis, and is in a position to provide an otherwise unavailable perspective.
On June 29, 2023, Canada, Britain, Sweden, and Ukraine announced that they would bring a case against Iran in the International Court of Justice to seek accountability for the 2020 shootdown of a Ukrainian passenger jet that killed all 176 passengers and crew on board. The challenge is the latest of many facing Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that alone or collectively could pose a serious risk to his regime.
Khamenei’s hand-picked president Ebrahim Raisi is under fire for incompetence. Critics blame him for “provoking more protests by mismanaging the country affairs” and failing to improve the economic situation. On July 1, Iran’s venerable newspaper Ettela’at lampooned Raisi’s remarks to “…resolve the water shortage problem in two years,” noting that “Mr. President, if you want to resolve the water problem in two years, you will have to order the clouds to rain more often.”
Pressures on dissidents have not subsided. In early 2023, Khamenei announced a large-scale parole of those arrested in widespread protests after the death of Mahsa Amini in police custody. But many of those released on parole were re-arrested. In June, for example, the number of those arrested rose 57 percent over the previous month, with the majority from ethnic minorities.
Iran’s foreign policy has also faced challenges. A dispute with Afghanistan has led to the blockage of water from the Hirmand River into southeastern Iran, causing an environmental catastrophe in the politically sensitive Sistan-Baluchestan province. Iran has also struggled to de-escalate tensions with its northern neighbor Azerbaijan.
Even reports of progress in talks aimed at capping Iran’s nuclear program and forestalling the provision of ballistic missiles to Russia can be viewed as a sign of weakness. The understanding, if successfully concluded, would contradict Khamenei’s prior insistence that Iran’s regional defense policies are off-limits without a durable nuclear deal first.
The recent mutiny by the Wagner group has compounded Khamenei’s headaches. Raisi’s telephone call to Vladimir Putin, pledging Iran’s “full support for Russia,” came only after the mutiny had ended. Critics of the Raisi government called the Wagner mutiny “a warning for Iran not to play with the Russian card.” Even a former conservative member of parliament said that “high-ranking decision makers” should not tie Iran’s fate to Putin’s in the Ukraine war because “Putin is not a reliable partner.” Some analysts went so far as to predict a similar mutiny in Iran.
Khamenei has always relied on Iran’s security forces to solve his problems, be they foreign or domestic. But there have been signs of dissension among these forces. A recent conference of security entities, interior minister Ahmad Vahidi, the new secretary of the High Council of National Security Ali Akbar Ahmadian, and civilian and military chiefs of staff was held to formulate strategies to prevent or confront protests expected to reignite in September on the first anniversary of the death of Amini. The conference was supposed to be confidential, but the news leaked before the meeting ended. According to Etemad newspaper, Khamenei in a message to the conference pointed to “disparities and divergences at certain levels” and asked for “real efforts by everyone to implement this cooperation and understanding at all levels.” Ahmadian reportedly told the meeting that “there is no room for possible errors. We should all make an effort to formulate a single strategy.”
Such talk of disagreements among security entities is unprecedented in the Islamic Republic given that their members are supposed to be the most loyal to Khamenei.
The worst crisis of all for Khamenei would be the emergence of a viable alternative to his regime. Despite intense repression, civil society entities in Iran have proven that they cannot be uprooted or destroyed. Since last year, a genuine and indigenous dialogue has started in Iran about a post-theocratic future political system. The most prevalent demand is for a referendum on the constitution with the ultimate objective of forcing the regime to accept revision. The goal is a non-violent and step-by-step regime change through democratic means rather than another revolution and resulting anarchy.
In a recent discussion on the telephone app Clubhouse that lasted for two days, participants agreed that the existing constitution is no longer viable. Even parts of the reformist camp that used to stress parliamentary elections to bring about meaningful change embraced the referendum demand. Judging by the composition of the participants in the conference, which called itself the “Dialogue for the Future of Iran,” the new framework has the support of a large number of prominent political, civil and social activists, lawyers, human rights advocates, and labor and professional unions and syndicates. Among the topics discussed were the need to guarantee the rights of women, minorities, labor, and the professions, adopting international standards of human rights, and most importantly, formulating a framework for a future political system.
Khamenei’s reaction to the dialogue was predictable: more repression. Some of the participants, including prominent human rights activist and American Pen award winner Narges Mohammadi, who sent messages from jail, were given tougher prison conditions. Others, like journalists Keyvan Samini and Vida Rabbani and activist Ali-Reza Shirazi, were arrested and jailed for their comments at the Clubhouse gathering.
Khamenei, who has been in power for 34 years, is facing a dilemma. On March 1, 2024, Iran is set to hold elections for parliament and the Assembly of Experts, a body that nominally chooses the successor to the Supreme Leader. But turnout is likely to be extremely low, further depriving the regime of even a veneer of legitimacy. Even a Raisi supporter in parliament, Jalil Rahimi Jahanabadi, said that “because of the support we have given to Raisi, people are totally disappointed with both the government and the parliament.” The anti-election voices have become so loud that security forces have contacted some former parliamentarians who were disqualified in previous elections to ask them to register again before the registration period officially starts.
The reformist camp has already stated that it will not take part in the parliamentary elections and will not settle for anything less than a referendum. Khamenei has rejected the notion of a referendum, asserting that ordinary people “do not have the ability to analyze the issues.”
Khamenei is in the middle of his worst years in power. Not only is his health fragile, but international and domestic political conditions are working against him, too. His president, who was supposed to help relieve some of the pressures, has done exactly the opposite, shifting even more blame to Khamenei. At 84 years old, the Supreme Leader thought he could engineer upcoming elections to ensure a smooth transfer of power to his second son, Mojtaba. But the foundations of the regime are shakier than ever.
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