Australia’s strategic significance for Japan stems from its status as one of the closest allies of the United States in the Indo-Pacific. During the Cold War, it was argued that Japan and Australia were the “northern and southern anchors” of U.S. Cold War strategy. Japan and Australia respectively hosted U.S. military bases and intelligence facilities, which contributed to the U.S. containment strategy in the region. Australia also sent troops to Korea and Vietnam, fighting “shoulder to shoulder” with the U.S. against the communists.
After the Cold War, both Japan and Australia agreed to expand their alliance roles from bilateral defense to broader security issues in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Japan and Australia jointly contributed to the U.S.-led “Global War on Terror” by sending troops to Afghanistan (or the Indian Ocean) and Iraq after 2001. Both allies also supported the Obama administration’s rebalancing policy to the Asia-Pacific and encouraged the Trump administration’s continuous engagement with the Indo-Pacific through the enhancement of bilateral, trilateral, and quadrilateral security cooperation with the United States and India.
Such roles of Japan and Australia as close U.S. allies have become more important as the great power competition intensifies. Whatever happens in the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Strait, or South China Sea, it is highly likely that the United States, Japan, and Australia will be directly or indirectly involved in those contingencies. In those cases, both Japan and Australia could utilize their enhanced defense and security cooperation through the recently concluded reciprocal access agreement (RAA), as well as through enhanced interoperability between the Self-Defense Forces and the Australian Defence Forces through several military trainings and exercises. The new joint security declaration between Japan and Australia, announced in October 2022, also involves an ANZUS-type sentence that commits to joint consultation and even joint response to “contingences that may affect [their] sovereignty and regional security interests.”
Australia’s status as a close U.S. ally is also demonstrated by the creation of AUKUS in September 2021. While Japan’s access to nuclear propulsion technology is unlikely due to political and strategic reasons, there are many overlaps in areas like artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and hypersonic missiles where Japan and AUKUS countries share common interests. A recent decision for joint development of a next generation fighter jet between Japan, the UK, and Italy has also demonstrated Japan’s ability and will to collaborate with non-U.S. partners to develop highly sensitive defense technologies. Indeed, Japan has sought closer defense industry cooperation with Australia despite the setback of the submarine deal in 2016, and recently agreed to enhance both countries’ defense industrial bases through supply chain cooperation.
Australia is also Japan’s stable and reliable supplier of industrial and energy resources. Australia supplies two thirds of Japan’s key industrial materials such as coal and iron ore. It is also Japan’s largest energy supplier, accounting for 34 percent of Japan’s total energy imports including coal and LNG in 2020. Australia’s role in this respect has become more important at a time when Japan seeks to diversify its supply chain and energy resources, especially from China and Russia.
Japan and Australia have also promoted clean energy and carbon-neutral cooperation. In June 2021, the two countries agreed to cooperate to facilitate their carbon-neutral goals under the Paris Agreement by announcing a “Japan-Australia Partnership on Decarbonisation through Technology.” In January 2022, Japan agreed to participate in the first round of the Australian Clean Hydrogen Trade Program, which will advance Australia’s export of hydrogen products through international investment. Under the initiative, Japan and Australia successfully transported hydrogen from Australia to Japan with the world’s first liquefied hydrogen tanker. Some assume that achieving Japan’s carbon-zero goals by its 2050 deadline would be impossible without Australia’s burgeoning green hydrogen industry.
Australia has been also an important partner for Japan to advance its vision for the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). Japan and Australia, along with other like-minded countries, have worked hard to promote rulemaking and norm-setting that stress the importance of safety and transparency, autonomy and integrity, and sustainability and human rights. They have also increased economic aid, infrastructure investment, and capacity-building assistance through bilateral, trilateral, and quadrilateral arrangements with the U.S. and India.
Japan and Australia have also strengthened their joint commitment to Pacific Island countries in areas like critical infrastructure, disaster recovery and resilience, maritime security, and climate change. To do so, both countries have committed to strengthening their cooperation with the Pacific Islands Forum and the Partners in the Blue Pacific, while encouraging the implementation of the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent.
To bring to fruition the new initiatives above, Japan needs to speed up its policymaking and the implementation of those policies. Indeed, bilateral cooperation often has been interrupted by Japan’s slow decision-making due to the ineffective bureaucratic procedures and sectionalism between different ministries and agencies. After all, it took nearly 10 years to conclude the RAA after Australia first proposed the idea. In fact, the RAA has not yet been ratified nor even discussed in the Japanese Diet.
Japan also needs to strengthen its security clearance system. Japan’s secrecy law, which came into force in 2014, prohibits the leak of information in defense, diplomacy, espionage, and terrorism but does not cover other areas such as technologies. This makes it impossible for other countries, including Australia, to share sensitive information with Japan in areas like emerging technologies.
There are also some regulatory barriers for closer defense and security cooperation between two countries. The most well-known is Paragraph 2 of Article 21 of the Constitution, which prohibits the government’s access to private internet communications and servers. If it strictly applies the rule, Japan may not be able to engage with “active cyber defense” (meaning cyber-attacks), nor share cybersecurity information with the U.S. or Australia.
In addition to these constraints, Japan needs to build up its defense industry to boost its cooperation with other countries and frameworks, including AUKUS. Some immediate measures, such as increasing the R&D budget related to the defense industry, promoting dual-use technologies by closer cooperation between the government and the private sector, and encouraging technological innovation by supporting start-up firms, are required to revive a Japanese defense industry that has continued to decline.
Most issues identified above are addressed in Japan’s new NSS. The question is to what extent and how fast Japan can implement those measures. The future of Japan’s security cooperation with other like-minded partners, including Australia, depends on whether and how fast Tokyo can reform those domestic problems.
Tomohiko Satake, Ph.D., is a Senior Fellow in the Defense Policy Division of the Policy Studies Department of the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo.
Japan-Australia Security Cooperation: Domestic Barriers to Deeper Ties
By Tomohiko Satake
Japan
Since the end of the Cold War, Japan’s security cooperation with Australia has become stronger than any other cooperation with non-U.S. allies and partners. Originally focused on non-military or non-traditional security cooperation, Japan’s strategic partnership with Australia has now become closer to alliance-type cooperation that assumes traditional and high-end security conflicts. Japan’s new National Security Strategy, published in December 2022, also named Australia as the top partner among Japan’s “like-minded countries.” Australia is also Japan’s stable and reliable supplier of industrial and energy resources, and it has been also an important partner for Japan to advance its vision for the Free and Open Indo-Pacific. But to bring cooperative initiatives with Australia to fruition, Japan needs to speed up its policymaking and implementation.
Australia’s strategic significance for Japan stems from its status as one of the closest allies of the United States in the Indo-Pacific. During the Cold War, it was argued that Japan and Australia were the “northern and southern anchors” of U.S. Cold War strategy. Japan and Australia respectively hosted U.S. military bases and intelligence facilities, which contributed to the U.S. containment strategy in the region. Australia also sent troops to Korea and Vietnam, fighting “shoulder to shoulder” with the U.S. against the communists.
After the Cold War, both Japan and Australia agreed to expand their alliance roles from bilateral defense to broader security issues in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Japan and Australia jointly contributed to the U.S.-led “Global War on Terror” by sending troops to Afghanistan (or the Indian Ocean) and Iraq after 2001. Both allies also supported the Obama administration’s rebalancing policy to the Asia-Pacific and encouraged the Trump administration’s continuous engagement with the Indo-Pacific through the enhancement of bilateral, trilateral, and quadrilateral security cooperation with the United States and India.
Such roles of Japan and Australia as close U.S. allies have become more important as the great power competition intensifies. Whatever happens in the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Strait, or South China Sea, it is highly likely that the United States, Japan, and Australia will be directly or indirectly involved in those contingencies. In those cases, both Japan and Australia could utilize their enhanced defense and security cooperation through the recently concluded reciprocal access agreement (RAA), as well as through enhanced interoperability between the Self-Defense Forces and the Australian Defence Forces through several military trainings and exercises. The new joint security declaration between Japan and Australia, announced in October 2022, also involves an ANZUS-type sentence that commits to joint consultation and even joint response to “contingences that may affect [their] sovereignty and regional security interests.”
Australia’s status as a close U.S. ally is also demonstrated by the creation of AUKUS in September 2021. While Japan’s access to nuclear propulsion technology is unlikely due to political and strategic reasons, there are many overlaps in areas like artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and hypersonic missiles where Japan and AUKUS countries share common interests. A recent decision for joint development of a next generation fighter jet between Japan, the UK, and Italy has also demonstrated Japan’s ability and will to collaborate with non-U.S. partners to develop highly sensitive defense technologies. Indeed, Japan has sought closer defense industry cooperation with Australia despite the setback of the submarine deal in 2016, and recently agreed to enhance both countries’ defense industrial bases through supply chain cooperation.
Australia is also Japan’s stable and reliable supplier of industrial and energy resources. Australia supplies two thirds of Japan’s key industrial materials such as coal and iron ore. It is also Japan’s largest energy supplier, accounting for 34 percent of Japan’s total energy imports including coal and LNG in 2020. Australia’s role in this respect has become more important at a time when Japan seeks to diversify its supply chain and energy resources, especially from China and Russia.
Japan and Australia have also promoted clean energy and carbon-neutral cooperation. In June 2021, the two countries agreed to cooperate to facilitate their carbon-neutral goals under the Paris Agreement by announcing a “Japan-Australia Partnership on Decarbonisation through Technology.” In January 2022, Japan agreed to participate in the first round of the Australian Clean Hydrogen Trade Program, which will advance Australia’s export of hydrogen products through international investment. Under the initiative, Japan and Australia successfully transported hydrogen from Australia to Japan with the world’s first liquefied hydrogen tanker. Some assume that achieving Japan’s carbon-zero goals by its 2050 deadline would be impossible without Australia’s burgeoning green hydrogen industry.
Australia has been also an important partner for Japan to advance its vision for the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). Japan and Australia, along with other like-minded countries, have worked hard to promote rulemaking and norm-setting that stress the importance of safety and transparency, autonomy and integrity, and sustainability and human rights. They have also increased economic aid, infrastructure investment, and capacity-building assistance through bilateral, trilateral, and quadrilateral arrangements with the U.S. and India.
Japan and Australia have also strengthened their joint commitment to Pacific Island countries in areas like critical infrastructure, disaster recovery and resilience, maritime security, and climate change. To do so, both countries have committed to strengthening their cooperation with the Pacific Islands Forum and the Partners in the Blue Pacific, while encouraging the implementation of the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent.
To bring to fruition the new initiatives above, Japan needs to speed up its policymaking and the implementation of those policies. Indeed, bilateral cooperation often has been interrupted by Japan’s slow decision-making due to the ineffective bureaucratic procedures and sectionalism between different ministries and agencies. After all, it took nearly 10 years to conclude the RAA after Australia first proposed the idea. In fact, the RAA has not yet been ratified nor even discussed in the Japanese Diet.
Japan also needs to strengthen its security clearance system. Japan’s secrecy law, which came into force in 2014, prohibits the leak of information in defense, diplomacy, espionage, and terrorism but does not cover other areas such as technologies. This makes it impossible for other countries, including Australia, to share sensitive information with Japan in areas like emerging technologies.
There are also some regulatory barriers for closer defense and security cooperation between two countries. The most well-known is Paragraph 2 of Article 21 of the Constitution, which prohibits the government’s access to private internet communications and servers. If it strictly applies the rule, Japan may not be able to engage with “active cyber defense” (meaning cyber-attacks), nor share cybersecurity information with the U.S. or Australia.
In addition to these constraints, Japan needs to build up its defense industry to boost its cooperation with other countries and frameworks, including AUKUS. Some immediate measures, such as increasing the R&D budget related to the defense industry, promoting dual-use technologies by closer cooperation between the government and the private sector, and encouraging technological innovation by supporting start-up firms, are required to revive a Japanese defense industry that has continued to decline.
Most issues identified above are addressed in Japan’s new NSS. The question is to what extent and how fast Japan can implement those measures. The future of Japan’s security cooperation with other like-minded partners, including Australia, depends on whether and how fast Tokyo can reform those domestic problems.
Tomohiko Satake, Ph.D., is a Senior Fellow in the Defense Policy Division of the Policy Studies Department of the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo.
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