After a decade of bloodshed and destruction, the Syrian civil war seems to have been settled in favor of Bashar al-Assad. His political survival has been secured and at the time of this writing, his regime controls 70 percent of Syria, including the major cities of Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs. The region and the wider world have grudgingly accepted him as an unsavory but undeniable political reality. On May 19, he attended an Arab League summit in Saudi Arabia, signifying an end to more than a decade of ostracism from his Arab brethren.
While Middle Eastern nations such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, which once supported Syrian rebels, normalize their relations with Damascus, Assad’s loyal allies who stood with him during the height of the civil war want a good return on their investment. Iran, which spent about $30 billion to bolster Assad and lost more than 2,000 men during the war, is probably the most relieved party, next to Assad himself.
However, Tehran’s current composure is not turbulence-free, and there are various factors that still worry Iran, for starters, Syria’s profound economic crisis. A decade of war has decimated the Syrian economy, killing tens of thousands, displacing millions, and turning Syrian towns and cities into rubble. Some 90 percent of the Syrian people live in poverty, and the value of the Syrian pound against the US dollar has depreciated by almost 90 percent, fueling massive inflation. While the civil war as such has ended, public anger has led to periodic protests across the country. Tellingly, most have occurred in regions traditionally aligned with Assad’s family. For instance, in December 2022, the Druze-populated city of Sweida, which remained under Assad’s control during the entire civil war, faced bloody anti-government protests that quickly spread throughout southern Syria.
So far, pro-Assad forces have suppressed the protests, but the regime got the message that there could be a new civil war if the situation does not improve. Iran is concerned that its massive investment in Assad could be threatened by new waves of nation-wide protest. Hence, in May 2023, Iran concluded multiple long-term trade agreements with Syria over oil exports and agriculture, linking Iran’s railroad system to Syria’s Mediterranean port of Latakia, and establishing free trade zones. These agreements are intended to secure for Iran what it regards as its fair share of the spoils of wars.
The Iranian government has been worried that Russia, which intervened on Assad’s side with decisive air power in 2015, might compete with Iran for post-war contracts. These fears escalated in 2016 when Damascus agreed to give Russia priority in reconstruction contracts and in 2019 when Assad granted Russia exclusive rights to produce gas and oil in Syria. The recent bilateral Syria-Iran agreements, to some extent, have eased Iran’s concerns regarding its post-war position in Syria.
Iranian investment can help Syria address its economic crisis. However, a financially challenged and internationally isolated Iran has insufficient resources to single-handedly lift Syria from poverty. Russia and China are not much help either. The Kremlin is too exhausted by the war in Ukraine and faces its own economic sanctions, while China has shown little interest in reconstructing Syria. The only solution is to attract other potential investors, which underlines the importance of Syria restoring relations with the wealthy Arab countries on the Persian Gulf.
The normalization of relations with Arab states could potentially ease the economic pressure on Assad’s regime. Already, the United Arab Emirates has assisted Syria in the wake of a devastating earthquake, dispatching 181 aid flights to Syria to expedite relief efforts.
Iran also hopes that Syria’s normalization of relations with the Arab world will resolve the “northern issue.” About one third of Syria remains outside Assad’s control. The north and east of Syria are variously under the rule of the US-backed Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, the Turkey-led Syrian Interim Government, and the Syrian Salvation Government (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham). To make matters worse for pro-Assad factions, the southeast of Syria, the al-Tanf region, is under the control of the US military. Thus, even though Assad controls most of the country, there remains potential for new rounds of conflict emanating from the areas that are outside his power, which is also a concern for Iran. In this vein, Syria’s normalization of relations with the Arab world is vital to pre-empt a new generation of cash and supplies to Syrian rebels.
Iran’s concerns about a new outbreak of fighting in Syria have grown during the last year since Russia pulled out a significant number of its troops from Syria to reinforce its campaign in Ukraine. Russian air power allowed Iran-backed militias to recapture much of Syria from rebel groups. Russia’s redeployment of air power and other forces to Ukraine threatens to put Assad in a vulnerable position, which has increased Iran’s workload in Syria, as Iranian troops are replacing Russians to fill the power vacuum of in Syria.
Thus one of Iran’s motivations in de-escalating tensions with Saudi Arabia is to create a détente between a Shi’ite Muslim bloc and the Sunni-led Arab states of the Persian Gulf, to make sure that while Shi’ite forces in Syria continue to contend with periodic Israeli air strikes, they will not also have to confront a new front sponsored by Saudi Arabia.
So far, Tehran has done what it could to prevent a reprise of the Arab-backed front in Syria, managing the security vacuum that Russians left behind, and securing contracts to begin to repair Syria’s collapsed economy. However, there are still many factors that Iran does not control, including post-presidential election Turkey’s position, the future of the US military presence in Syria, and the degree of Arabs states’ willingness to test US sanctions by assisting Syrian reconstruction.
Arman Mahmoudian is a lecturer and scholar of international relations, focusing on Russia and the Middle East, at the University of South Florida (USF). Follow Arman on Twitter @MahmoudianArman.
Iran’s Victory in Syria is Not Worry Free
By Arman Mahmoudian
Middle East & North Africa
After a decade of bloodshed and destruction, the Syrian civil war seems to have been settled in favor of Bashar al-Assad. His political survival has been secured and at the time of this writing, his regime controls 70 percent of Syria, including the major cities of Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs. The region and the wider world have grudgingly accepted him as an unsavory but undeniable political reality. On May 19, he attended an Arab League summit in Saudi Arabia, signifying an end to more than a decade of ostracism from his Arab brethren.
While Middle Eastern nations such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, which once supported Syrian rebels, normalize their relations with Damascus, Assad’s loyal allies who stood with him during the height of the civil war want a good return on their investment. Iran, which spent about $30 billion to bolster Assad and lost more than 2,000 men during the war, is probably the most relieved party, next to Assad himself.
However, Tehran’s current composure is not turbulence-free, and there are various factors that still worry Iran, for starters, Syria’s profound economic crisis. A decade of war has decimated the Syrian economy, killing tens of thousands, displacing millions, and turning Syrian towns and cities into rubble. Some 90 percent of the Syrian people live in poverty, and the value of the Syrian pound against the US dollar has depreciated by almost 90 percent, fueling massive inflation. While the civil war as such has ended, public anger has led to periodic protests across the country. Tellingly, most have occurred in regions traditionally aligned with Assad’s family. For instance, in December 2022, the Druze-populated city of Sweida, which remained under Assad’s control during the entire civil war, faced bloody anti-government protests that quickly spread throughout southern Syria.
So far, pro-Assad forces have suppressed the protests, but the regime got the message that there could be a new civil war if the situation does not improve. Iran is concerned that its massive investment in Assad could be threatened by new waves of nation-wide protest. Hence, in May 2023, Iran concluded multiple long-term trade agreements with Syria over oil exports and agriculture, linking Iran’s railroad system to Syria’s Mediterranean port of Latakia, and establishing free trade zones. These agreements are intended to secure for Iran what it regards as its fair share of the spoils of wars.
The Iranian government has been worried that Russia, which intervened on Assad’s side with decisive air power in 2015, might compete with Iran for post-war contracts. These fears escalated in 2016 when Damascus agreed to give Russia priority in reconstruction contracts and in 2019 when Assad granted Russia exclusive rights to produce gas and oil in Syria. The recent bilateral Syria-Iran agreements, to some extent, have eased Iran’s concerns regarding its post-war position in Syria.
Iranian investment can help Syria address its economic crisis. However, a financially challenged and internationally isolated Iran has insufficient resources to single-handedly lift Syria from poverty. Russia and China are not much help either. The Kremlin is too exhausted by the war in Ukraine and faces its own economic sanctions, while China has shown little interest in reconstructing Syria. The only solution is to attract other potential investors, which underlines the importance of Syria restoring relations with the wealthy Arab countries on the Persian Gulf.
The normalization of relations with Arab states could potentially ease the economic pressure on Assad’s regime. Already, the United Arab Emirates has assisted Syria in the wake of a devastating earthquake, dispatching 181 aid flights to Syria to expedite relief efforts.
Iran also hopes that Syria’s normalization of relations with the Arab world will resolve the “northern issue.” About one third of Syria remains outside Assad’s control. The north and east of Syria are variously under the rule of the US-backed Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, the Turkey-led Syrian Interim Government, and the Syrian Salvation Government (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham). To make matters worse for pro-Assad factions, the southeast of Syria, the al-Tanf region, is under the control of the US military. Thus, even though Assad controls most of the country, there remains potential for new rounds of conflict emanating from the areas that are outside his power, which is also a concern for Iran. In this vein, Syria’s normalization of relations with the Arab world is vital to pre-empt a new generation of cash and supplies to Syrian rebels.
Iran’s concerns about a new outbreak of fighting in Syria have grown during the last year since Russia pulled out a significant number of its troops from Syria to reinforce its campaign in Ukraine. Russian air power allowed Iran-backed militias to recapture much of Syria from rebel groups. Russia’s redeployment of air power and other forces to Ukraine threatens to put Assad in a vulnerable position, which has increased Iran’s workload in Syria, as Iranian troops are replacing Russians to fill the power vacuum of in Syria.
Thus one of Iran’s motivations in de-escalating tensions with Saudi Arabia is to create a détente between a Shi’ite Muslim bloc and the Sunni-led Arab states of the Persian Gulf, to make sure that while Shi’ite forces in Syria continue to contend with periodic Israeli air strikes, they will not also have to confront a new front sponsored by Saudi Arabia.
So far, Tehran has done what it could to prevent a reprise of the Arab-backed front in Syria, managing the security vacuum that Russians left behind, and securing contracts to begin to repair Syria’s collapsed economy. However, there are still many factors that Iran does not control, including post-presidential election Turkey’s position, the future of the US military presence in Syria, and the degree of Arabs states’ willingness to test US sanctions by assisting Syrian reconstruction.
Arman Mahmoudian is a lecturer and scholar of international relations, focusing on Russia and the Middle East, at the University of South Florida (USF). Follow Arman on Twitter @MahmoudianArman.
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