Over the last two decades, there have been an increasing number of incidents in which state actors arrest civilian foreign and dual nationals to gain leverage over other states.
In 2022 alone, the U.S. government secured the safe recovery of at least 13 U.S. nationals in exchange for political and economic concessions or in humanitarian swaps of prisoners. It has become such a prevalent issue that the Biden administration recently declared the wrongful and unlawful detentions of U.S. nationals abroad a national emergency. This practice, often referred to as hostage diplomacy, is an increasingly common foreign policy tool for some states, including the Islamic Republic of Iran. Yet the reasons states engage in this practice and what could be done to prevent its growing use have not gone through rigorous study.
For the purposes of this article, “hostage diplomacy” is defined as the practice of a state using detained civilian foreign and dual nationals to diplomatically engage with or gain leverage over the foreign policy of another state. In a recent research project for the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, we assessed the factors and conditions that motivate Iran, among other major players in this space, to detain foreign and dual nationals. We examined U.S. negotiations with Iran, what factors encouraged Iran to detain foreign and dual nationals, and how hostage diplomacy is evolving. Iran, which recently swapped a Belgian aid worker for an Iranian diplomat convicted in a bomb plot, has a relatively long history of engaging in hostage diplomacy. This means that enough cases existed on a long enough timeline to distinguish trends in the practice.
Our research examined reports of Iranian hostage-taking from January 1, 2000, to April 17, 2023. Based on our findings, we discovered that the reasons why Iran detains an individual are circumstantial and depend on context. However, we did notice some general trends. Over the course of the two decades we studied, hostage diplomacy has shifted from an opportunistic, responsive tactic, in which an individual arrested for domestic political reasons came to be used in negotiations, to a more strategic approach, in which Iran sought out foreign and dual nationals to obtain external concessions from their home states. Iran transitioned from being an opportunistic actor to using hostage diplomacy as a strategic foreign policy tool. We also found that foreign and dual nationals taken for strategic purposes are kept for longer, complicating the negotiations for their release.
Given the seizure of US diplomats as hostages after the 1979 revolution, it could be said that Tehran wrote the playbook on using hostages to extract concessions from other states. However, domestic factors also incentivize this behavior including political factionalism and internal power struggles. Figure 1 displays the number of detainees taken per year by Iran from 2003 to 2022. Based on patterns such as the length of detention and concessions for release, we determined the time period of 2000 to 2014 to be Iran’s opportunistic phase of hostage diplomacy. During the early 2000s, elements of the Iranian regime accused the United States of staging a “soft revolution” and claimed that there was a larger plot to destabilize the Iranian government. These allegations gained ground following President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s disputed re-election in 2009 and the rise of the Green Movement. The international pressure and sanctions imposed by the United States on Iran over its advancing nuclear program also increased tensions, making it more difficult to negotiate the release of hostages.
Figure 2 displays the number of detainees Iran released between the years 2003 to 2022. During the opportunistic phase, Iran typically released prisoners after receiving domestic political gains and/or financial concessions, and foreign and dual nationals were detained for relatively short periods of time. A shift was seen after 2014, at which point detainees were held for longer and generally released in prisoner exchanges. This was the turning point when Iran transitioned into making hostage taking a strategy. Continued engagement with Washington in light of the lack of diplomatic relations with the U.S. was another likely motivating factor.
Iran’s hostage-taking behavior likely evolved from opportunistic to strategic as a result of the concessions obtained from its initial phase. Ironically, Iran’s strategic phase began in 2015, when relations between Iran and the United States were relatively good, characterized by bilateral and multilateral negotiations that led to a landmark nuclear agreement. The nuclear negotiations were commonly mentioned by former detainees and related actors as a possible motivation. Even Jason Rezaian, who was detained in Iran from 2014 to 2016, mentioned in his memoir: “…Obama’s foreign policy adviser Ben Rhodes apologized for my release taking so long [which was awkward but fulfilling], acknowledging that I was a victim of the nuclear negotiations.”
Domestic strife also appears to be a prevalent feature in many of the detentions as in the decision to hold onto Siamak Namazi even as other American hostages were released when the nuclear agreement was implemented in January 2016. Anti-American sentiment in important quarters of the Iranian government has deepened since the Trump administration quit the agreement unilaterally in 2018 and re-imposed punishing economic sanctions. At present, Namazi remains a hostage along with dual nationals Emad Shargi and Morad Tahbaz. The U.S. has reportedly offered to give South Korea the green light to release $7 billion in frozen Iranian assets to be used for humanitarian purchases. But the deal has yet to be finalized.
While countries such as Russia and China are also increasingly taking Americans hostage, Iran remains the foremost practitioner of hostage diplomacy. Iran has seen the success of this practice and consequently is likely to continue engaging in it.
Brittany Dimock, Jimin Gim, Ashar Omer, and Lili Rao are graduate students at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University.
Iran’s Strategic Shift in Hostage Diplomacy
By Brittany Dimock • Jimin Gim • Ashar Omer • Lili Rao
Middle East & North Africa
Over the last two decades, there have been an increasing number of incidents in which state actors arrest civilian foreign and dual nationals to gain leverage over other states.
In 2022 alone, the U.S. government secured the safe recovery of at least 13 U.S. nationals in exchange for political and economic concessions or in humanitarian swaps of prisoners. It has become such a prevalent issue that the Biden administration recently declared the wrongful and unlawful detentions of U.S. nationals abroad a national emergency. This practice, often referred to as hostage diplomacy, is an increasingly common foreign policy tool for some states, including the Islamic Republic of Iran. Yet the reasons states engage in this practice and what could be done to prevent its growing use have not gone through rigorous study.
For the purposes of this article, “hostage diplomacy” is defined as the practice of a state using detained civilian foreign and dual nationals to diplomatically engage with or gain leverage over the foreign policy of another state. In a recent research project for the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, we assessed the factors and conditions that motivate Iran, among other major players in this space, to detain foreign and dual nationals. We examined U.S. negotiations with Iran, what factors encouraged Iran to detain foreign and dual nationals, and how hostage diplomacy is evolving. Iran, which recently swapped a Belgian aid worker for an Iranian diplomat convicted in a bomb plot, has a relatively long history of engaging in hostage diplomacy. This means that enough cases existed on a long enough timeline to distinguish trends in the practice.
Our research examined reports of Iranian hostage-taking from January 1, 2000, to April 17, 2023. Based on our findings, we discovered that the reasons why Iran detains an individual are circumstantial and depend on context. However, we did notice some general trends. Over the course of the two decades we studied, hostage diplomacy has shifted from an opportunistic, responsive tactic, in which an individual arrested for domestic political reasons came to be used in negotiations, to a more strategic approach, in which Iran sought out foreign and dual nationals to obtain external concessions from their home states. Iran transitioned from being an opportunistic actor to using hostage diplomacy as a strategic foreign policy tool. We also found that foreign and dual nationals taken for strategic purposes are kept for longer, complicating the negotiations for their release.
Given the seizure of US diplomats as hostages after the 1979 revolution, it could be said that Tehran wrote the playbook on using hostages to extract concessions from other states. However, domestic factors also incentivize this behavior including political factionalism and internal power struggles. Figure 1 displays the number of detainees taken per year by Iran from 2003 to 2022. Based on patterns such as the length of detention and concessions for release, we determined the time period of 2000 to 2014 to be Iran’s opportunistic phase of hostage diplomacy. During the early 2000s, elements of the Iranian regime accused the United States of staging a “soft revolution” and claimed that there was a larger plot to destabilize the Iranian government. These allegations gained ground following President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s disputed re-election in 2009 and the rise of the Green Movement. The international pressure and sanctions imposed by the United States on Iran over its advancing nuclear program also increased tensions, making it more difficult to negotiate the release of hostages.
Figure 2 displays the number of detainees Iran released between the years 2003 to 2022. During the opportunistic phase, Iran typically released prisoners after receiving domestic political gains and/or financial concessions, and foreign and dual nationals were detained for relatively short periods of time. A shift was seen after 2014, at which point detainees were held for longer and generally released in prisoner exchanges. This was the turning point when Iran transitioned into making hostage taking a strategy. Continued engagement with Washington in light of the lack of diplomatic relations with the U.S. was another likely motivating factor.
Iran’s hostage-taking behavior likely evolved from opportunistic to strategic as a result of the concessions obtained from its initial phase. Ironically, Iran’s strategic phase began in 2015, when relations between Iran and the United States were relatively good, characterized by bilateral and multilateral negotiations that led to a landmark nuclear agreement. The nuclear negotiations were commonly mentioned by former detainees and related actors as a possible motivation. Even Jason Rezaian, who was detained in Iran from 2014 to 2016, mentioned in his memoir: “…Obama’s foreign policy adviser Ben Rhodes apologized for my release taking so long [which was awkward but fulfilling], acknowledging that I was a victim of the nuclear negotiations.”
Domestic strife also appears to be a prevalent feature in many of the detentions as in the decision to hold onto Siamak Namazi even as other American hostages were released when the nuclear agreement was implemented in January 2016. Anti-American sentiment in important quarters of the Iranian government has deepened since the Trump administration quit the agreement unilaterally in 2018 and re-imposed punishing economic sanctions. At present, Namazi remains a hostage along with dual nationals Emad Shargi and Morad Tahbaz. The U.S. has reportedly offered to give South Korea the green light to release $7 billion in frozen Iranian assets to be used for humanitarian purchases. But the deal has yet to be finalized.
While countries such as Russia and China are also increasingly taking Americans hostage, Iran remains the foremost practitioner of hostage diplomacy. Iran has seen the success of this practice and consequently is likely to continue engaging in it.
Brittany Dimock, Jimin Gim, Ashar Omer, and Lili Rao are graduate students at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University.
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