Iran has long used religious cards to try to gain greater influence in the Balkans. Yet in a part of Europe often referred to as the Middle East’s western flank, Orthodox Christian-majority Serbia — not Muslim Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) or Kosovo — is now Iran’s best friend.
Iran and Serbia went from being enemies to friends in a relatively short span of time. They were adversaries during the 1992-95 war in BiH. During that period, Iran helped the Bosniaks fight Bosnian-Serb forces backed by Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević’s regime, which Tehran saw as racist and responsible for instigating the mass killing of Muslims.
Iran sent volunteer fighters to support the Bosniaks at a time when the West was imposing an arms embargo on the newly established Muslim-majority country. Yet, in the ensuing years, BiH shifted into closer alignment with NATO and the European Union while Iran’s influence in Sarajevo decreased. As a result, Belgrade replaced Sarajevo as the Balkans’ most Iran-friendly capital.
The intractable Serbia-Kosovo dispute is the main reason why Belgrade values its relationship with Tehran. Iran — unlike Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar — has never recognized Kosovo’s independence. From Iran’s perspective, Kosovo is an outpost of U.S. militarism and the country’s independence is an outcome of NATO’s aggressive eastward expansion. Tehran’s stance on the Kosovo issue, the most important international dossier to Belgrade, has secured Iran significant goodwill in Serbia.
Iran in turn values its relationship with Serbia at a time when Iranian relations with most other European countries have deteriorated because of Iran’s supply of weapons to Russia to use against Ukraine. Serbia has broken with the rest of Europe by not only refusing to implement sanctions against Iran but condemning the West’s financial warfare against Tehran.
In April 2021, Serbia’s then-foreign minister Nikola Selaković went to Iran, expressed gratitude to Tehran for its stance on Kosovo, and discussed ways to boost bilateral trade. Iran’s foreign minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian returned the visit and met with his Serbian counterpart Ivica Dačić in Belgrade in December 2022. Since then, high-ranking Serbian officials, including deputy minister of foreign affairs Goran Aleksic and parliament speaker Vladimir Orlić, have visited Tehran.
An additional factor bolstering relations is Serbia’s normalized relationship with Syria—another way in which Belgrade has broken from the European consensus on an issue of significant importance to Tehran. (That Belgrade also recognizes Hezbollah as a terrorist organization has seemingly not been an impediment to Iran-Serbia ties.)
Cordial political ties have not translated into a major economic relationship in part because of banks’ overcompliance with Western sanctions on Iran. Serbia, which has been a candidate for accession to the European Union since 2012, has been cautious toward commercial and economic engagement with Iran since the Trump administration pulled out of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal in 2018 and reimposed sanctions.
With Russia’s subsequent full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Serbia has come under growing pressure from the West to distance itself from Moscow. Although Serbia has not implemented sanctions on Russia, the EU’s oil embargo on seaborne Russian oil, which was implemented in December 2022, resulted in Serbia having to stop importing Russian oil via the seaports of EU members. This has led to Belgrade having increased interest in Iran’s oil.
Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS), Serbia’s Russian-owned oil giant, increased its imports of Iranian heavy crude oil from 126,000 metric tons in 2021 to 267,000 metric tons the following year, according to NIS’s website. So far, however, Iran’s oil sales to Serbia have not caused much of a reaction from Washington.
Like his predecessor, President Biden and his administration have been accommodating toward Serbia, viewing it as a necessary partner in trying to achieve stability in the Western Balkans. Within this context, Serbia has been able to engage Iran in ways that the U.S. does not like but tolerates given other considerations.
Aside from increased oil imports from Iran, Serbia has been cautious about trade that could trigger sanctions. For example, while there were reports that Belgrade was interested in buying Iran’s Shahed 136 drones, this is unlikely to happen under current circumstances, especially with Russia using Iranian drones in Ukraine. Even in non-military domains such as civilian air flights, Serbia has hesitated to cooperate with Iran for fear of being penalized by Western partners.
The Iran-Serbia relationship is not the only one in which Tehran has prioritized geopolitics over religious affinity. For example, Iran has historically sided with Christian Armenia over Muslim Azerbaijan and has not allowed China’s repression of Uyghur Muslims to be an impediment to Iran-China ties.
On the Serbian side, despite current constraints caused by Western sanctions, Belgrade appears to be thinking long-term about Iran with the aim of securing preferential treatment for Serbian companies in Iran when the West’s sanctions are eventually lifted, or at least significantly eased.
In a wider context, Serbia and Iran see shifts in the global geopolitical order through a somewhat similar lens. Both have considered themselves victims of American/NATO aggression and welcome the emergence of a more multipolar world in which Russia and China are increasingly influential and U.S. hegemony is reduced.
With its roots in the Tito era of Yugoslavia’s non-aligned foreign policy, Serbia, which has observer status in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), avoids siding with any one geopolitical bloc. Belgrade thus keeps its options open to work with countries in the West, the East, and the Global South. Iran, a long-time member of the NAM, is focused on weakening the West’s capacity to pressure and isolate the Islamic Republic. It regards Serbia as a rare European country that respects Iran’s sovereignty and can help it advance its interests.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct fellow at the American Security Project.
Iran Forges an Unusual Alliance in the Balkans
By Giorgio Cafiero
Middle East & North Africa
Iran has long used religious cards to try to gain greater influence in the Balkans. Yet in a part of Europe often referred to as the Middle East’s western flank, Orthodox Christian-majority Serbia — not Muslim Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) or Kosovo — is now Iran’s best friend.
Iran and Serbia went from being enemies to friends in a relatively short span of time. They were adversaries during the 1992-95 war in BiH. During that period, Iran helped the Bosniaks fight Bosnian-Serb forces backed by Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević’s regime, which Tehran saw as racist and responsible for instigating the mass killing of Muslims.
Iran sent volunteer fighters to support the Bosniaks at a time when the West was imposing an arms embargo on the newly established Muslim-majority country. Yet, in the ensuing years, BiH shifted into closer alignment with NATO and the European Union while Iran’s influence in Sarajevo decreased. As a result, Belgrade replaced Sarajevo as the Balkans’ most Iran-friendly capital.
The intractable Serbia-Kosovo dispute is the main reason why Belgrade values its relationship with Tehran. Iran — unlike Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar — has never recognized Kosovo’s independence. From Iran’s perspective, Kosovo is an outpost of U.S. militarism and the country’s independence is an outcome of NATO’s aggressive eastward expansion. Tehran’s stance on the Kosovo issue, the most important international dossier to Belgrade, has secured Iran significant goodwill in Serbia.
Iran in turn values its relationship with Serbia at a time when Iranian relations with most other European countries have deteriorated because of Iran’s supply of weapons to Russia to use against Ukraine. Serbia has broken with the rest of Europe by not only refusing to implement sanctions against Iran but condemning the West’s financial warfare against Tehran.
In April 2021, Serbia’s then-foreign minister Nikola Selaković went to Iran, expressed gratitude to Tehran for its stance on Kosovo, and discussed ways to boost bilateral trade. Iran’s foreign minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian returned the visit and met with his Serbian counterpart Ivica Dačić in Belgrade in December 2022. Since then, high-ranking Serbian officials, including deputy minister of foreign affairs Goran Aleksic and parliament speaker Vladimir Orlić, have visited Tehran.
An additional factor bolstering relations is Serbia’s normalized relationship with Syria—another way in which Belgrade has broken from the European consensus on an issue of significant importance to Tehran. (That Belgrade also recognizes Hezbollah as a terrorist organization has seemingly not been an impediment to Iran-Serbia ties.)
Cordial political ties have not translated into a major economic relationship in part because of banks’ overcompliance with Western sanctions on Iran. Serbia, which has been a candidate for accession to the European Union since 2012, has been cautious toward commercial and economic engagement with Iran since the Trump administration pulled out of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal in 2018 and reimposed sanctions.
With Russia’s subsequent full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Serbia has come under growing pressure from the West to distance itself from Moscow. Although Serbia has not implemented sanctions on Russia, the EU’s oil embargo on seaborne Russian oil, which was implemented in December 2022, resulted in Serbia having to stop importing Russian oil via the seaports of EU members. This has led to Belgrade having increased interest in Iran’s oil.
Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS), Serbia’s Russian-owned oil giant, increased its imports of Iranian heavy crude oil from 126,000 metric tons in 2021 to 267,000 metric tons the following year, according to NIS’s website. So far, however, Iran’s oil sales to Serbia have not caused much of a reaction from Washington.
Like his predecessor, President Biden and his administration have been accommodating toward Serbia, viewing it as a necessary partner in trying to achieve stability in the Western Balkans. Within this context, Serbia has been able to engage Iran in ways that the U.S. does not like but tolerates given other considerations.
Aside from increased oil imports from Iran, Serbia has been cautious about trade that could trigger sanctions. For example, while there were reports that Belgrade was interested in buying Iran’s Shahed 136 drones, this is unlikely to happen under current circumstances, especially with Russia using Iranian drones in Ukraine. Even in non-military domains such as civilian air flights, Serbia has hesitated to cooperate with Iran for fear of being penalized by Western partners.
The Iran-Serbia relationship is not the only one in which Tehran has prioritized geopolitics over religious affinity. For example, Iran has historically sided with Christian Armenia over Muslim Azerbaijan and has not allowed China’s repression of Uyghur Muslims to be an impediment to Iran-China ties.
On the Serbian side, despite current constraints caused by Western sanctions, Belgrade appears to be thinking long-term about Iran with the aim of securing preferential treatment for Serbian companies in Iran when the West’s sanctions are eventually lifted, or at least significantly eased.
In a wider context, Serbia and Iran see shifts in the global geopolitical order through a somewhat similar lens. Both have considered themselves victims of American/NATO aggression and welcome the emergence of a more multipolar world in which Russia and China are increasingly influential and U.S. hegemony is reduced.
With its roots in the Tito era of Yugoslavia’s non-aligned foreign policy, Serbia, which has observer status in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), avoids siding with any one geopolitical bloc. Belgrade thus keeps its options open to work with countries in the West, the East, and the Global South. Iran, a long-time member of the NAM, is focused on weakening the West’s capacity to pressure and isolate the Islamic Republic. It regards Serbia as a rare European country that respects Iran’s sovereignty and can help it advance its interests.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct fellow at the American Security Project.
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