Reforms to Indian Space Policy
Given the growing spectrum of demands on India’s space program, which the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), India’s civil space agency, may not be able to meet, there has been a budding appreciation for capacities and talent outside of ISRO. This has led to the loosening up of ISRO’s approach in how it perceives the role of private industry in India’s space trajectory. Although this has been occurring in a haphazard manner for a few years, there is now a more concerted push by the government. Policy changes announced by Prime Minister Narenda Modi and Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman in 2020 have been reflected in the April 2023 Indian Space Policy.
In June 2020, the central government declared a series of reform measures that would permit the Indian private sector to offer end-to-end services in outer space. The establishment of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe) in 2020 facilitated the much-needed interface between ISRO and the private sector. The Minister of State in the Prime Minister’s Office, Dr. Jitendra Singh, stated in the Indian Parliament that IN-SPACe was tasked with “promoting, handholding, authorising and licensing private players to carry out space activities.” The ISRO “will also nurture Indian space industries by sharing its experiences on quality and reliability protocols, documentation, [and] testing procedures.” Further, the NewSpace India Limited (NSIL), a body created in 2019 with the goal of strengthening private-sector participation, is responsible for “transfer[ring] the matured technologies developed by ISRO to Indian industries.” Many of these measures have been formalized and announced in the new Indian Space Policy 2023. This new policy is a crucial step, but it has important gaps.
Although national security considerations have become pertinent in India’s space plans, the policy mentions the word “security” just once in the 11-page document, suggesting that the focus of the Indian Space Policy continues to be on peaceful and civilian pursuits. Of course, a policy issued by the civilian agency cannot address the military and security aspects of India’s space program. In fact, India has developed a reasonable amount of assets for space-based intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, military communication, positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities. The space policy also ignores the fact that India conducted an anti-satellite test in March 2019, in addition to establishing a Defence Space Agency in 2019 and Defence Space Research Organisation, akin to the Defence Research and Development Organisation in the conventional military domain. Given the expansive nature of military and security activities and institutional setups, Indian space policy cannot ignore the country’s defense space policy goals and priorities. But for this topic to appear in a policy document, the policy cannot be issued by a civilian space agency. Instead, it should be issued by the Ministry of External Affairs or the Prime Minister’s Office so that the resulting policy can be an overarching, comprehensive one.
Such a policy articulation is important in the context of significant changes in the space domain. Interplanetary missions, such as to Mars, Mangalyaan, or deep space missions such as the moon mission, Chandrayaan-3, were not part of the original ISRO mandate. Nor were growing Indian military space activities. But these have all become important in the context of budding space competition.
India Enters the Lunar Space Race
The recent successful Chandrayaan-3 mission — which made India the fourth country to successfully land on the moon and the first to do so near the lunar south pole — is a major triumph for India and its scientific establishment. But the mission was not without its political significance. That India became only the fourth country to achieve such a feat demonstrates that it is now part of a small and exclusive group of countries that can undertake such advanced, complex missions.
Even though the Indian lunar missions are a natural progression of the country’s space program, New Delhi is also responding to the renewed space race in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Space has become one more arena of major-power competition.
Lunar space is becoming the hot destination for many space players. The United States’ NASA has undertaken several crewed missions under the Apollo program, and others, such as the Soviet Union/Russia, the European Space Agency (ESA), Japan, China, and India have also conducted uncrewed missions. In December 2017, U. S. President Donald Trump stated that the United States was restarting its human space missions to the moon as well as to Mars and beyond.
But the United States is not the only country focusing on these ambitious missions. China has its eyes set on the moon. China’s soft landing of the Chang’e 4 on the far side of the moon in January 2019 was impressive, but Beijing revealed big plans for more lunar missions including its goals for a possible research base on the moon.
In addition, both Japan and India have been tracking China’s military space program expansion under the People’s Liberation Army’s leadership. The shifting balance of power in Asia, along with the baggage of history among key Asian powers, have made outer space affairs a lot more contested. For example, China’s achievements in space are pushing India and Japan to combine their efforts in order to catch up. Cooperation on space within groupings like the Quad is also a direct result of China’s growing space prowess.
Rules of the Road?
Even as the space programs driven by geopolitical interests continue, some rules of the road are necessary for lunar activities so that states and other stakeholders engage with outer space in a safe and sustainable manner. With growing lunar and cislunar activities, space situational awareness (SSA) and space traffic management (STM) are essential. Cislunar SSA and STM are relatively new issues, and far from the near-Earth realm. Without discounting the importance of cislunar SSA and STM, a more troubling facet is the political and competitive dynamics among the major lunar players. But any stakeholder who has an interest in lunar exploration and cislunar activities must engage in building certain collaborative arrangements to share information about their own activities, upcoming missions, and any other information that could possibly result in harmful interference.
Efforts to develop practical norms of responsible behavior to moderate the kinds of activities that states engage in in lunar space must be made, although there have been more disappointments than accomplishments in developing global governance measures. The recent completion of the U.N. Open-Ended Working Group on space security without a consensus report is a case in point. Given the lack of consensus among major space powers, the initial focus should be on developing smaller technical agreements rather than overarching legal instruments.
Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan is the director of the Centre for Security, Strategy, & Technology at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, India.
Indian Space Policy and the New Lunar Space Race
By Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan
Grand Strategy
Outer space is gaining more attention in India, as in other countries. Access to space and reliance on space-based services have become more widespread both in India and across the world. Space exploration is no longer just about observing the Earth, or meeting the telecommunication needs of a growing country. India’s security managers are demanding greater involvement in space for military purposes. These multiple requirements are driving some changes in India’s space policy. In addition to the growing demands for access to space, India wants to explore the moon for resources or even to make the moon a base for interplanetary missions to Mars and Venus. With more activities and more players in lunar space, certain ground rules are necessary, without which safe and secure access to lunar space cannot be guaranteed.
Reforms to Indian Space Policy
Given the growing spectrum of demands on India’s space program, which the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), India’s civil space agency, may not be able to meet, there has been a budding appreciation for capacities and talent outside of ISRO. This has led to the loosening up of ISRO’s approach in how it perceives the role of private industry in India’s space trajectory. Although this has been occurring in a haphazard manner for a few years, there is now a more concerted push by the government. Policy changes announced by Prime Minister Narenda Modi and Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman in 2020 have been reflected in the April 2023 Indian Space Policy.
In June 2020, the central government declared a series of reform measures that would permit the Indian private sector to offer end-to-end services in outer space. The establishment of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe) in 2020 facilitated the much-needed interface between ISRO and the private sector. The Minister of State in the Prime Minister’s Office, Dr. Jitendra Singh, stated in the Indian Parliament that IN-SPACe was tasked with “promoting, handholding, authorising and licensing private players to carry out space activities.” The ISRO “will also nurture Indian space industries by sharing its experiences on quality and reliability protocols, documentation, [and] testing procedures.” Further, the NewSpace India Limited (NSIL), a body created in 2019 with the goal of strengthening private-sector participation, is responsible for “transfer[ring] the matured technologies developed by ISRO to Indian industries.” Many of these measures have been formalized and announced in the new Indian Space Policy 2023. This new policy is a crucial step, but it has important gaps.
Although national security considerations have become pertinent in India’s space plans, the policy mentions the word “security” just once in the 11-page document, suggesting that the focus of the Indian Space Policy continues to be on peaceful and civilian pursuits. Of course, a policy issued by the civilian agency cannot address the military and security aspects of India’s space program. In fact, India has developed a reasonable amount of assets for space-based intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, military communication, positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities. The space policy also ignores the fact that India conducted an anti-satellite test in March 2019, in addition to establishing a Defence Space Agency in 2019 and Defence Space Research Organisation, akin to the Defence Research and Development Organisation in the conventional military domain. Given the expansive nature of military and security activities and institutional setups, Indian space policy cannot ignore the country’s defense space policy goals and priorities. But for this topic to appear in a policy document, the policy cannot be issued by a civilian space agency. Instead, it should be issued by the Ministry of External Affairs or the Prime Minister’s Office so that the resulting policy can be an overarching, comprehensive one.
Such a policy articulation is important in the context of significant changes in the space domain. Interplanetary missions, such as to Mars, Mangalyaan, or deep space missions such as the moon mission, Chandrayaan-3, were not part of the original ISRO mandate. Nor were growing Indian military space activities. But these have all become important in the context of budding space competition.
India Enters the Lunar Space Race
The recent successful Chandrayaan-3 mission — which made India the fourth country to successfully land on the moon and the first to do so near the lunar south pole — is a major triumph for India and its scientific establishment. But the mission was not without its political significance. That India became only the fourth country to achieve such a feat demonstrates that it is now part of a small and exclusive group of countries that can undertake such advanced, complex missions.
Even though the Indian lunar missions are a natural progression of the country’s space program, New Delhi is also responding to the renewed space race in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Space has become one more arena of major-power competition.
Lunar space is becoming the hot destination for many space players. The United States’ NASA has undertaken several crewed missions under the Apollo program, and others, such as the Soviet Union/Russia, the European Space Agency (ESA), Japan, China, and India have also conducted uncrewed missions. In December 2017, U. S. President Donald Trump stated that the United States was restarting its human space missions to the moon as well as to Mars and beyond.
But the United States is not the only country focusing on these ambitious missions. China has its eyes set on the moon. China’s soft landing of the Chang’e 4 on the far side of the moon in January 2019 was impressive, but Beijing revealed big plans for more lunar missions including its goals for a possible research base on the moon.
In addition, both Japan and India have been tracking China’s military space program expansion under the People’s Liberation Army’s leadership. The shifting balance of power in Asia, along with the baggage of history among key Asian powers, have made outer space affairs a lot more contested. For example, China’s achievements in space are pushing India and Japan to combine their efforts in order to catch up. Cooperation on space within groupings like the Quad is also a direct result of China’s growing space prowess.
Rules of the Road?
Even as the space programs driven by geopolitical interests continue, some rules of the road are necessary for lunar activities so that states and other stakeholders engage with outer space in a safe and sustainable manner. With growing lunar and cislunar activities, space situational awareness (SSA) and space traffic management (STM) are essential. Cislunar SSA and STM are relatively new issues, and far from the near-Earth realm. Without discounting the importance of cislunar SSA and STM, a more troubling facet is the political and competitive dynamics among the major lunar players. But any stakeholder who has an interest in lunar exploration and cislunar activities must engage in building certain collaborative arrangements to share information about their own activities, upcoming missions, and any other information that could possibly result in harmful interference.
Efforts to develop practical norms of responsible behavior to moderate the kinds of activities that states engage in in lunar space must be made, although there have been more disappointments than accomplishments in developing global governance measures. The recent completion of the U.N. Open-Ended Working Group on space security without a consensus report is a case in point. Given the lack of consensus among major space powers, the initial focus should be on developing smaller technical agreements rather than overarching legal instruments.
Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan is the director of the Centre for Security, Strategy, & Technology at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, India.
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