For one, Russia’s attempt to invade Ukraine—the first time in postwar history that a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) waged war against a non-permanent UNSC member—exposed international law’s limited ability to enable collective action in response to such a situation. This was not only a fresh reminder of the importance of universal norms and principles such as rule of law, but it also encouraged Japan to double down on its advocacy for UN reform, particularly the reform of the UNSC.
More importantly, Ukrainians’ clear and unambiguous will to fight for their country and defend the democracy that allowed its prosperity triggered the international community’s collective support of Ukraine. Japan needs to be able to demonstrate a similar will to fight to defend itself and develop its capability to do just that. In particular, Russia’s failure to secure immediate victory—driven in large part by weakened supply lines and logistical capabilities—heightened what was already a high level of concern about the need to invest in the resiliency of the Japan Self-Defense Force and salvage the country’s decaying domestic defense industrial base.
Finally, Russia’s attempt to intimidate North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries by hinting at the potential use of nuclear weapons after the Biden administration took U.S. direct military intervention off the table raised renewed concerns about being overly dependent on U.S. extended deterrence. In fact, this resulted in the resurgence of a debate over Japan’s nuclear future.
Even before the war in Ukraine, Japan believed that the security environment surrounding it had been considerably aggravated in the last decade. Tokyo’s concerns included increasing pressure from China, particularly against Taiwan, as well as a renewed intensity of North Korean provocations, including a record-high number of missile tests. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine only aggravated Tokyo’s perceptions of its own security environment.
As a result, these factors worked to propel domestic debate within Japan on the policy issues that had been considered “taboo” due to their heightened political sensitivity in Japan, including defense spending increases and the acquisition of counterstrike capabilities. More broadly, they also facilitated a discussion within the government of an all-of-government approach to shape effective responses in areas including economic security, space, and cybersecurity.
Japan’s “Three National Security Documents” collectively provide an answer to how Japan will respond to the Russo-Ukrainian War and reorient its national security policy approaches.
For example, the 2022 NSS clearly identified China as ”the greatest strategic challenge in ensuring the peace and security of Japan and the peace and stability of the international community, as well as in strengthening the international order based on the rule of law.” This is a notable departure from Tokyo’s past approach to China, in which Tokyo had sought to strike a balance between calling China out for its bad behavior while trying to engage in other areas.
Secondly, the Three National Security Documents collectively put Japan on a path to acquire new capabilities that have long been considered “taboo” in the domestic discourse on national security policy, such as counterstrike capability. Tokyo’s explicit interest in rehabilitating its indigenous defense industry and its commitment to essentially double its defense spending in the next five years is another example of how Japan is shattering politically self-imposed constraints in its postwar national security policy.
Thirdly, the Three National Security Documents collectively embrace the broader definition of national security. In particular, the focus on economic security in the NSS is noteworthy, as it focused not only on critical economic issues—such as supply chain resilience—but also on economic issues that have long been neglected (or only paid lip service), such as safeguarding the procurement of critical infrastructure, data/information protection, and industrial security.
However, Tokyo faces formidable challenges in actualizing these new policy directions. From a defense budget increase to the reorganization of the Japan Self-Defense Forces, Japan needs a strong leader with a clear vision to complete such a transformation. However, given the absence of a visionary like late former prime minister Shinzo Abe, the future of its implementation is anything but certain.
How Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Changed Japan’s Approach to National Security
By Yuki Tatsumi
Japan
On December 16, 2022, Japan released its three key national security strategy planning documents. Collectively referred to as “Three National Security Documents” (Anpo San Bunsho), these documents include: an updated National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS) and Defense Build-up Plan (DBP). Taken together, they represent a significant reorientation of Japan’s national security policy.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 happened just as Japan was diving into the process of shaping these documents. As such, the conflict deeply impacted the thinking of policymakers in Tokyo involved in the formulation of the NSS, NDC and DBP. To put it simply, the Russian invasion of Ukraine was a rude wake-up call for Japan.
For one, Russia’s attempt to invade Ukraine—the first time in postwar history that a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) waged war against a non-permanent UNSC member—exposed international law’s limited ability to enable collective action in response to such a situation. This was not only a fresh reminder of the importance of universal norms and principles such as rule of law, but it also encouraged Japan to double down on its advocacy for UN reform, particularly the reform of the UNSC.
More importantly, Ukrainians’ clear and unambiguous will to fight for their country and defend the democracy that allowed its prosperity triggered the international community’s collective support of Ukraine. Japan needs to be able to demonstrate a similar will to fight to defend itself and develop its capability to do just that. In particular, Russia’s failure to secure immediate victory—driven in large part by weakened supply lines and logistical capabilities—heightened what was already a high level of concern about the need to invest in the resiliency of the Japan Self-Defense Force and salvage the country’s decaying domestic defense industrial base.
Finally, Russia’s attempt to intimidate North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries by hinting at the potential use of nuclear weapons after the Biden administration took U.S. direct military intervention off the table raised renewed concerns about being overly dependent on U.S. extended deterrence. In fact, this resulted in the resurgence of a debate over Japan’s nuclear future.
Even before the war in Ukraine, Japan believed that the security environment surrounding it had been considerably aggravated in the last decade. Tokyo’s concerns included increasing pressure from China, particularly against Taiwan, as well as a renewed intensity of North Korean provocations, including a record-high number of missile tests. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine only aggravated Tokyo’s perceptions of its own security environment.
As a result, these factors worked to propel domestic debate within Japan on the policy issues that had been considered “taboo” due to their heightened political sensitivity in Japan, including defense spending increases and the acquisition of counterstrike capabilities. More broadly, they also facilitated a discussion within the government of an all-of-government approach to shape effective responses in areas including economic security, space, and cybersecurity.
Japan’s “Three National Security Documents” collectively provide an answer to how Japan will respond to the Russo-Ukrainian War and reorient its national security policy approaches.
For example, the 2022 NSS clearly identified China as ”the greatest strategic challenge in ensuring the peace and security of Japan and the peace and stability of the international community, as well as in strengthening the international order based on the rule of law.” This is a notable departure from Tokyo’s past approach to China, in which Tokyo had sought to strike a balance between calling China out for its bad behavior while trying to engage in other areas.
Secondly, the Three National Security Documents collectively put Japan on a path to acquire new capabilities that have long been considered “taboo” in the domestic discourse on national security policy, such as counterstrike capability. Tokyo’s explicit interest in rehabilitating its indigenous defense industry and its commitment to essentially double its defense spending in the next five years is another example of how Japan is shattering politically self-imposed constraints in its postwar national security policy.
Thirdly, the Three National Security Documents collectively embrace the broader definition of national security. In particular, the focus on economic security in the NSS is noteworthy, as it focused not only on critical economic issues—such as supply chain resilience—but also on economic issues that have long been neglected (or only paid lip service), such as safeguarding the procurement of critical infrastructure, data/information protection, and industrial security.
However, Tokyo faces formidable challenges in actualizing these new policy directions. From a defense budget increase to the reorganization of the Japan Self-Defense Forces, Japan needs a strong leader with a clear vision to complete such a transformation. However, given the absence of a visionary like late former prime minister Shinzo Abe, the future of its implementation is anything but certain.
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