Shifting Out of Neutral
Space security discussions have been stalled because of opposing views between two groups of major players on what constitutes the biggest threat to space security and stability and how to address it. On the one hand, Russia and China have argued that weapons placed in outer space pose the biggest threat and have proposed a new treaty banning them. On the other hand, the United States and its allies have strongly opposed the draft treaty on the grounds that it is unverifiable and that there was/is no weaponization of space taking place.
This dynamic has played itself out time and again at the United Nations (U.N.). Historically, discussions there approached space security through the lens of prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS), so the focus was on banning or limiting the placement of hardware in Earth orbit. In this debate, most developing countries tended to side with the Russian and Chinese position: that weapons in space were the biggest issue, with the United States being cast as the main protagonist for the weaponization of outer space. Russia and China had the diplomatic upper hand because they had proffered a draft treaty on preventing the placement of weapons in space (even though it is a fairly weak treaty that focuses on a threat that is hard to define and lacks verification) and could portray themselves as at least attempting to help. The United States opposed the draft Russia-China treaty without offering any alternatives. As a result, the United States often found itself playing diplomatic defense on major votes on space security within the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA).
That all began to change several years ago, when the United States and its allies changed tack and began talking about space security not in terms of how to classify space objects as weapons, but rather in terms of identifying behaviors deemed responsible (or not). In April 2022, the United States shook up the discussion when it announced a voluntary commitment not to conduct destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) missile tests. Since then, 34 additional countries have joined in this voluntary commitment, and it has gained widespread international support. In December 2022, the United States led a UNGA resolution supporting the commitment not to conduct DA-ASAT missile tests, which overwhelmingly passed by a vote of 155 in favor, nine against, and nine abstentions. In this case, Russia and China — two of the countries voting against — were on the losing side of a major U.N. vote on space security.
A Focus on Destructive DA-ASAT Missile Tests
This growing global focus on destructive DA-ASAT testing is in large part due to the long-lasting threat that orbital debris from such tests pose to satellites operated by all nations. The annual Global Counterspace Capabilities report that we co-edit documents the more than 6,850 pieces of orbital debris created by destructive ASAT testing in space during the last 60 years, of which more than 3,400 pieces are still in orbit and pose daily risks to critical satellites and human spaceflight. These tests have also created thousands of additional pieces of debris too small to be tracked that could still damage other spacecraft.
Focusing on destructive DA-ASAT testing has also been discussed in multilateral meetings on space security. Two years ago, this change in approach — specifically, the focus on actions, not necessarily technologies — led to the creation of a new Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) within the U.N. to discuss potential norms, principles, and rules of behavior to reduce space threats; more than 70 countries participated. The OEWG on reducing space threats took place during four, week-long sessions in 2022 and 2023; although the group was unable to reach consensus on the final report — largely due to intransigence by the Russian delegation —significant progress was made. The working group socialized the idea of focusing on behavior, brought many more countries into the discussion, and popularized the role of non-legally binding instruments as one tool in an overall toolkit to enhance space security. And, for the United States, the sessions demonstrated the value of participating in these discussions and putting legitimate proposals on the table, instead of just saying no to proposals that Washington cannot support.
A New Window of Opportunity
All told, these recent changes in the multilateral space security debate have opened a window of opportunity. More countries than ever are engaged and contributing on these issues, and support is growing for defining specific types of irresponsible behavior as the top priority, which could lead to legal bans on those behaviors. Given the rising support for identifying destructive DA-ASAT missile tests as irresponsible behavior, this is an opportune time to promote a treaty banning that type of test. Destructive DA-ASAT missile tests are relatively easy to define and attribute, and a verification regime could be created to promote compliance and accountability. Banning this activity would prevent the further creation of actual, existing threats to space security and stability — space debris, both trackable and too small to be tracked. And such a treaty would do this by asking states to give up the option of testing a type of weapon that has dwindling military utility, if any, in these days of widely proliferated constellations and an increasing ability to rapidly launch new satellites.
The only question, then, is whether the international community will seize this opportunity to take the next step and which country is willing to lead the charge.
Victoria Samson is the Director of Space Security and Stability for the Secure World Foundation and a member of the International Astronautical Federation (IAF) committee on space security and the Space Security Working Group of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM)’s Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC).
Dr. Brian Weeden is the Director of Program Planning for the Secure World Foundation and a former member and Chair of the World Economic Forum’s Council on the Future of Space Technologies.
A Window of Opportunity for Space Security?
By Victoria Samson • Brian Weeden
Grand Strategy
For decades, the global diplomatic debate on space security issues has been stuck in neutral, spinning in circles with little to show for it. But during the past several years, major actors have shifted their approach to space security, revitalizing the process enough that a previously unthinkable outcome — the creation of a new treaty banning the testing of destructive anti-satellite weapons — is a (albeit small) possibility.
Shifting Out of Neutral
Space security discussions have been stalled because of opposing views between two groups of major players on what constitutes the biggest threat to space security and stability and how to address it. On the one hand, Russia and China have argued that weapons placed in outer space pose the biggest threat and have proposed a new treaty banning them. On the other hand, the United States and its allies have strongly opposed the draft treaty on the grounds that it is unverifiable and that there was/is no weaponization of space taking place.
This dynamic has played itself out time and again at the United Nations (U.N.). Historically, discussions there approached space security through the lens of prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS), so the focus was on banning or limiting the placement of hardware in Earth orbit. In this debate, most developing countries tended to side with the Russian and Chinese position: that weapons in space were the biggest issue, with the United States being cast as the main protagonist for the weaponization of outer space. Russia and China had the diplomatic upper hand because they had proffered a draft treaty on preventing the placement of weapons in space (even though it is a fairly weak treaty that focuses on a threat that is hard to define and lacks verification) and could portray themselves as at least attempting to help. The United States opposed the draft Russia-China treaty without offering any alternatives. As a result, the United States often found itself playing diplomatic defense on major votes on space security within the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA).
That all began to change several years ago, when the United States and its allies changed tack and began talking about space security not in terms of how to classify space objects as weapons, but rather in terms of identifying behaviors deemed responsible (or not). In April 2022, the United States shook up the discussion when it announced a voluntary commitment not to conduct destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) missile tests. Since then, 34 additional countries have joined in this voluntary commitment, and it has gained widespread international support. In December 2022, the United States led a UNGA resolution supporting the commitment not to conduct DA-ASAT missile tests, which overwhelmingly passed by a vote of 155 in favor, nine against, and nine abstentions. In this case, Russia and China — two of the countries voting against — were on the losing side of a major U.N. vote on space security.
A Focus on Destructive DA-ASAT Missile Tests
This growing global focus on destructive DA-ASAT testing is in large part due to the long-lasting threat that orbital debris from such tests pose to satellites operated by all nations. The annual Global Counterspace Capabilities report that we co-edit documents the more than 6,850 pieces of orbital debris created by destructive ASAT testing in space during the last 60 years, of which more than 3,400 pieces are still in orbit and pose daily risks to critical satellites and human spaceflight. These tests have also created thousands of additional pieces of debris too small to be tracked that could still damage other spacecraft.
Focusing on destructive DA-ASAT testing has also been discussed in multilateral meetings on space security. Two years ago, this change in approach — specifically, the focus on actions, not necessarily technologies — led to the creation of a new Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) within the U.N. to discuss potential norms, principles, and rules of behavior to reduce space threats; more than 70 countries participated. The OEWG on reducing space threats took place during four, week-long sessions in 2022 and 2023; although the group was unable to reach consensus on the final report — largely due to intransigence by the Russian delegation —significant progress was made. The working group socialized the idea of focusing on behavior, brought many more countries into the discussion, and popularized the role of non-legally binding instruments as one tool in an overall toolkit to enhance space security. And, for the United States, the sessions demonstrated the value of participating in these discussions and putting legitimate proposals on the table, instead of just saying no to proposals that Washington cannot support.
A New Window of Opportunity
All told, these recent changes in the multilateral space security debate have opened a window of opportunity. More countries than ever are engaged and contributing on these issues, and support is growing for defining specific types of irresponsible behavior as the top priority, which could lead to legal bans on those behaviors. Given the rising support for identifying destructive DA-ASAT missile tests as irresponsible behavior, this is an opportune time to promote a treaty banning that type of test. Destructive DA-ASAT missile tests are relatively easy to define and attribute, and a verification regime could be created to promote compliance and accountability. Banning this activity would prevent the further creation of actual, existing threats to space security and stability — space debris, both trackable and too small to be tracked. And such a treaty would do this by asking states to give up the option of testing a type of weapon that has dwindling military utility, if any, in these days of widely proliferated constellations and an increasing ability to rapidly launch new satellites.
The only question, then, is whether the international community will seize this opportunity to take the next step and which country is willing to lead the charge.
Victoria Samson is the Director of Space Security and Stability for the Secure World Foundation and a member of the International Astronautical Federation (IAF) committee on space security and the Space Security Working Group of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM)’s Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC).
Dr. Brian Weeden is the Director of Program Planning for the Secure World Foundation and a former member and Chair of the World Economic Forum’s Council on the Future of Space Technologies.
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