The Democratization of Space in Japan
In the 2000s, a diverse range of Japanese universities began to launch small satellites. In 2003, both the University of Tokyo and the Tokyo Institute of Technology independently succeeded in developing and operating the world’s first 10-cm square, 1-kg CubeSats. The advent of such satellites, with their affordable production and launch costs, ushered in an era in which not only the government and corporations, but also university laboratories, could develop satellites. Twenty years later, some 25 Japanese universities have launched nanosatellites and microsatellites, contributing to the cultivation of a specialized domestic workforce and leading to the creation of space startups.
The democratization of space is intensifying in Japan, especially with the growing presence of commercial space operators. Since the 2010s, Japanese companies have increasingly developed and operated satellites weighing well under 1,000 kg. Japanese commercial satellite operations began in the 1980s, but whereas in the past, most involved large communications satellites placed in geostationary orbit, Japanese firms now also operate much smaller satellites in low Earth orbit. In 2013, the weather service provider Weathernews began operating WNISAT-1 (10 kg), an optical Earth observation satellite developed in partnership with Axelspace, a University of Tokyo startup. Its successor satellite, WNISAT-1R (43 kg), also jointly developed by the two companies, was launched in 2017. A year later, in 2018, NEC Corporation, a legacy space company, launched ASNARO-2 (570 kg), a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellite, and its affiliate began selling the 1-meter resolution images produced by the satellite. Axelspace also began launching small optical satellites, viz. GRUS (100 kg) the same year and now operates five satellites capable of capturing images with a resolution of 2.5 meters. These developments indicate that the new space business trend, often referred to as New Space, has arrived in Japan.
The growth of Japan’s space industry is likely to accelerate. Companies that plan to operate constellations of satellites in low Earth orbit are emerging. Axelspace intends to increase the number of GRUS satellites to 12 by 2025. iQPS, a Kyushu University startup, launched a small SAR satellite, AMATERU-III (100-kg-class), in 2023 and aims to increase the number of satellites to 36 after 2025. Synspective, a startup that intends to commercialize joint research and development by the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, the University of Tokyo, the Tokyo Institute of Technology, and Keio University, plans to launch 30 100-kg-class SAR satellites by about 2026. When these satellites become operational, the number of Japanese commercial satellites will increase significantly.
Notably, businesses are emerging in Japan that aim to operate novel space systems. Space Compass and Warpspace are each developing satellites to provide optical data relay services to operators of Earth observation satellites like Axelspace. Astroscale and other companies are developing satellites for on-orbit servicing (OOS), such as active debris removal and satellite refueling. Another Japanese company, ispace, is seeking to launch landers and rovers to provide transportation services to the moon and extract resources there.
In addition to the rising number of companies developing and operating various spacecraft, commercial launch service providers are also appearing in Japan. SPACE ONE completed the construction of Japan’s first private satellite launch site in 2021 and plans to launch 20 small satellites per year with its KAIROS rocket by the mid-2020s.
Strengthening Domestic Governance
In response to the democratization of space at home, Japan has markedly strengthened its space governance since the late 2010s. In 2016, the government passed the Space Activities Act. By then, more than 20 countries had enacted domestic legislation to ensure the implementation of Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, which makes states responsible for space activities conducted by governmental agencies or the private sector. With the 2016 legislation, Japan established licensure regulations for launches and satellite operations, resolving a long-standing gap in Japan’s space governance.
In 2016, the Japanese government followed the example of the United States, Germany, France, and Canada in passing its Remote Sensing Data Act, which sets rules for satellite remote sensing by the private sector. The government’s primary goal in passing the law was to prevent the misuse of high-resolution commercial imagery by states of concern and terrorist organizations. The law includes stipulations that prohibit the provision of data with respect to the specific scope and duration (what’s known as “shutter control”) if the use of the data could have an adverse effect on ensuring peace among the members of the international community, among other things.
Beyond developing these foundational domestic laws, Japan has started working on more novel rulemaking. In 2021, Japan joined the United States, Luxembourg, and the United Arab Emirates in enacting the Space Resources Act, which recognizes the ownership of space resources. This legislation was promulgated in response to Japanese companies’ plans to develop resources on the moon.
Also in 2021, the Cabinet Office issued Guidelines on a license to operate spacecraft performing OOS, thus accommodating the development of such satellites by domestic companies. The guidelines require transparency in the operation of servicer spacecraft and appropriate security measures to prevent their hijacking.
In addition, Tokyo is increasing its efforts to support the stable operation of commercial space systems. In 2022, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry published Guidelines on Cybersecurity Measures for Commercial Space Systems for the first time. In 2023, the Ministry of Defense began operating the space situational awareness (SSA) system and providing the collected data to commercial operators to prevent their satellites from colliding with other satellites or space debris. Later in the same year, the Cabinet Office announced the establishment of a council to promote cooperation and information sharing between the public and private sectors to ensure the stable use of space.
Challenges Ahead
Although domestic space governance has made rapid progress in Japan, some issues still need to be addressed. One of these is the response to intentional interference with commercial space systems. The Japanese government has made it clear that it will actively support the development of commercial space systems with high dual-use capabilities and expand the use of commercial services by the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces. In this regard, the National Security Strategy (NSS), issued by the government at the end of 2022, aims to support and foster the domestic space industry, thereby realizing a cycle in which commercial space technology is used for defense purposes, which in turn further promotes the development of the industry.
Based on the NSS, the Space Security Initiative (SSI), released in June 2023, calls for the government to expand its comprehensive support to high-dual-use areas, including OOS, small SAR and optical satellites, optical communications satellites, and small rockets. The SSI also states that the government should promote the use of commercial space services for national security, particularly in the areas of communications, Earth observation, and data solutions, where private-sector innovation is accelerating.
Owing to the increased use of commercial space systems for defense purposes, such systems could become higher-value targets in the eyes of potential adversaries, increasing the risk of harmful interference with commercial space systems. Indeed, attacks on the user and link segments of commercial space systems employed by the Ukrainian military have already occurred.
Therefore, there is a critical need for Japan to prepare for disruptions against its commercial space systems. In this respect, the 2022 NSS stipulates establishing a framework for government decision-making in unforeseen circumstances, and the SSI specifies promoting information sharing among relevant ministries and agencies, the Self-Defense Forces, and private operators. The aforementioned SSA service of the Ministry of Defense and the Council of the Cabinet Office are expected to play a key role in sharing information with the private sector.
Another issue is strengthening global space governance. Space is a shared domain, and national space governance alone cannot ensure the stable use of commercial space systems. One of Japan’s aims in issuing the OOS guidelines and enacting the Space Resources Act was to lead the development of international governance in these areas. Similarly, in 2022 Japan followed the United States and other countries in declaring that it will not conduct destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing. It is important for Japan to advocate for the expansion of the number of countries participating in this commitment because space debris generated by such tests could indiscriminately hinder the stable use of commercial space systems by all space actors.
Yasuhito Fukushima, Ph.D., is a Senior Research Fellow at the Global Security Division, the Policy Studies Department, the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo. He is a former Visiting Scholar at the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and also a former Visiting Scholar at the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the organization to which the author belongs.
A Japanese Perspective on the Democratization of Space
By Yasuhito Fukushima
Grand Strategy
The democratization of space—that is, the opening of satellite launches and operations to a wider range of actors, including developing countries as well as nonstate entities such as universities and private companies—has presented new opportunities and challenges for Japan. The growth of Japan’s private space industry is strong, and the government is developing its space policies to help the industry become more competitive and its space operations more stable. But space is also growing more contested and congested, creating an urgent need for Japan to both prepare for disruptions against its commercial space systems and work toward more effective global space governance.
The Democratization of Space in Japan
In the 2000s, a diverse range of Japanese universities began to launch small satellites. In 2003, both the University of Tokyo and the Tokyo Institute of Technology independently succeeded in developing and operating the world’s first 10-cm square, 1-kg CubeSats. The advent of such satellites, with their affordable production and launch costs, ushered in an era in which not only the government and corporations, but also university laboratories, could develop satellites. Twenty years later, some 25 Japanese universities have launched nanosatellites and microsatellites, contributing to the cultivation of a specialized domestic workforce and leading to the creation of space startups.
The democratization of space is intensifying in Japan, especially with the growing presence of commercial space operators. Since the 2010s, Japanese companies have increasingly developed and operated satellites weighing well under 1,000 kg. Japanese commercial satellite operations began in the 1980s, but whereas in the past, most involved large communications satellites placed in geostationary orbit, Japanese firms now also operate much smaller satellites in low Earth orbit. In 2013, the weather service provider Weathernews began operating WNISAT-1 (10 kg), an optical Earth observation satellite developed in partnership with Axelspace, a University of Tokyo startup. Its successor satellite, WNISAT-1R (43 kg), also jointly developed by the two companies, was launched in 2017. A year later, in 2018, NEC Corporation, a legacy space company, launched ASNARO-2 (570 kg), a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellite, and its affiliate began selling the 1-meter resolution images produced by the satellite. Axelspace also began launching small optical satellites, viz. GRUS (100 kg) the same year and now operates five satellites capable of capturing images with a resolution of 2.5 meters. These developments indicate that the new space business trend, often referred to as New Space, has arrived in Japan.
The growth of Japan’s space industry is likely to accelerate. Companies that plan to operate constellations of satellites in low Earth orbit are emerging. Axelspace intends to increase the number of GRUS satellites to 12 by 2025. iQPS, a Kyushu University startup, launched a small SAR satellite, AMATERU-III (100-kg-class), in 2023 and aims to increase the number of satellites to 36 after 2025. Synspective, a startup that intends to commercialize joint research and development by the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, the University of Tokyo, the Tokyo Institute of Technology, and Keio University, plans to launch 30 100-kg-class SAR satellites by about 2026. When these satellites become operational, the number of Japanese commercial satellites will increase significantly.
Notably, businesses are emerging in Japan that aim to operate novel space systems. Space Compass and Warpspace are each developing satellites to provide optical data relay services to operators of Earth observation satellites like Axelspace. Astroscale and other companies are developing satellites for on-orbit servicing (OOS), such as active debris removal and satellite refueling. Another Japanese company, ispace, is seeking to launch landers and rovers to provide transportation services to the moon and extract resources there.
In addition to the rising number of companies developing and operating various spacecraft, commercial launch service providers are also appearing in Japan. SPACE ONE completed the construction of Japan’s first private satellite launch site in 2021 and plans to launch 20 small satellites per year with its KAIROS rocket by the mid-2020s.
Strengthening Domestic Governance
In response to the democratization of space at home, Japan has markedly strengthened its space governance since the late 2010s. In 2016, the government passed the Space Activities Act. By then, more than 20 countries had enacted domestic legislation to ensure the implementation of Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, which makes states responsible for space activities conducted by governmental agencies or the private sector. With the 2016 legislation, Japan established licensure regulations for launches and satellite operations, resolving a long-standing gap in Japan’s space governance.
In 2016, the Japanese government followed the example of the United States, Germany, France, and Canada in passing its Remote Sensing Data Act, which sets rules for satellite remote sensing by the private sector. The government’s primary goal in passing the law was to prevent the misuse of high-resolution commercial imagery by states of concern and terrorist organizations. The law includes stipulations that prohibit the provision of data with respect to the specific scope and duration (what’s known as “shutter control”) if the use of the data could have an adverse effect on ensuring peace among the members of the international community, among other things.
Beyond developing these foundational domestic laws, Japan has started working on more novel rulemaking. In 2021, Japan joined the United States, Luxembourg, and the United Arab Emirates in enacting the Space Resources Act, which recognizes the ownership of space resources. This legislation was promulgated in response to Japanese companies’ plans to develop resources on the moon.
Also in 2021, the Cabinet Office issued Guidelines on a license to operate spacecraft performing OOS, thus accommodating the development of such satellites by domestic companies. The guidelines require transparency in the operation of servicer spacecraft and appropriate security measures to prevent their hijacking.
In addition, Tokyo is increasing its efforts to support the stable operation of commercial space systems. In 2022, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry published Guidelines on Cybersecurity Measures for Commercial Space Systems for the first time. In 2023, the Ministry of Defense began operating the space situational awareness (SSA) system and providing the collected data to commercial operators to prevent their satellites from colliding with other satellites or space debris. Later in the same year, the Cabinet Office announced the establishment of a council to promote cooperation and information sharing between the public and private sectors to ensure the stable use of space.
Challenges Ahead
Although domestic space governance has made rapid progress in Japan, some issues still need to be addressed. One of these is the response to intentional interference with commercial space systems. The Japanese government has made it clear that it will actively support the development of commercial space systems with high dual-use capabilities and expand the use of commercial services by the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces. In this regard, the National Security Strategy (NSS), issued by the government at the end of 2022, aims to support and foster the domestic space industry, thereby realizing a cycle in which commercial space technology is used for defense purposes, which in turn further promotes the development of the industry.
Based on the NSS, the Space Security Initiative (SSI), released in June 2023, calls for the government to expand its comprehensive support to high-dual-use areas, including OOS, small SAR and optical satellites, optical communications satellites, and small rockets. The SSI also states that the government should promote the use of commercial space services for national security, particularly in the areas of communications, Earth observation, and data solutions, where private-sector innovation is accelerating.
Owing to the increased use of commercial space systems for defense purposes, such systems could become higher-value targets in the eyes of potential adversaries, increasing the risk of harmful interference with commercial space systems. Indeed, attacks on the user and link segments of commercial space systems employed by the Ukrainian military have already occurred.
Therefore, there is a critical need for Japan to prepare for disruptions against its commercial space systems. In this respect, the 2022 NSS stipulates establishing a framework for government decision-making in unforeseen circumstances, and the SSI specifies promoting information sharing among relevant ministries and agencies, the Self-Defense Forces, and private operators. The aforementioned SSA service of the Ministry of Defense and the Council of the Cabinet Office are expected to play a key role in sharing information with the private sector.
Another issue is strengthening global space governance. Space is a shared domain, and national space governance alone cannot ensure the stable use of commercial space systems. One of Japan’s aims in issuing the OOS guidelines and enacting the Space Resources Act was to lead the development of international governance in these areas. Similarly, in 2022 Japan followed the United States and other countries in declaring that it will not conduct destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing. It is important for Japan to advocate for the expansion of the number of countries participating in this commitment because space debris generated by such tests could indiscriminately hinder the stable use of commercial space systems by all space actors.
Yasuhito Fukushima, Ph.D., is a Senior Research Fellow at the Global Security Division, the Policy Studies Department, the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo. He is a former Visiting Scholar at the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and also a former Visiting Scholar at the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the organization to which the author belongs.
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