From March 28 – April 1, 2022, States Parties, international organizations, industry representatives and civil society stakeholders gathered in Vienna, Austria to attend the Conference of the Parties to the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (A/CPPNM). The A/CPPNM is the fundamental international legal instrument for protecting nuclear facilities and nuclear material in domestic use and storage and in domestic and international transport. The convention also strengthens global efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism by normalizing approaches to combatting criminal acts involving nuclear materials and facilities and strengthening international cooperation in managing materials out of regulatory control. Although the ramification of the expanded Russian invasion of Ukraine pushed some of the substantive issues to the periphery, dozens of State Parties used the Conference to highlight recent efforts to strengthen their legal frameworks to secure nuclear and radiological materials and otherwise implement the Convention, and to raise issues for further consideration, including increasing challenges with cybersecurity, disinformation, diversity, small modular reactors, limited reporting on implementation, and climate change. Although the States Parties framed the A/CPPNM as adequate as an instrument, a required number of States requested the IAEA Director General to hold another conference. For more information on the Conference, see the Outcome Document and other materials at https://www.iaea.org/events/acppnm2022.
International Nuclear Security Forum (INSF) coordination team members, Director Richard T. Cupitt, Senior Fellow at the Henry L. Stimson Center, and INSF Coordinator Sneha Nair, also of the Stimson Center, attended the conference in Vienna, Austria. Several of the Forum’s 80+ member organizations and 270+ individual members were also in attendance at the Conference, including at the official session for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) on March 29. Nair also hosted an INSF side event at the Conference highlighting the role of civil society in strengthening nuclear security, where several INSF members spoke.
Check out the comprehensive list of INSF activities at the Conference.
INSF Statement at the NGO Session
“I extend my thanks to the Co-Presidents, your Excellencies, Delegates, and the Director General and staff of the IAEA for holding this NGO session and allowing me to speak on the matter of collaboration.
The Henry L. Stimson Center is an independent research organization headquartered in Washington, DC, with staff in Brussels and Moscow. The Center has several programs, including ones on nuclear safeguards, nuclear security, and nuclear nonproliferation, that support the objectives of this Conference. Each of these programs contains a range of projects, most of which have developed tools to facilitate implementation of obligations of international nonproliferation instruments like the A/CPPNM. These include our Assistance Support Initiative and its database of assistance programs and projects, SLAFKA, the world’s first blockchain prototype for nuclear safeguards, and our radiological risk reduction project where we are developing a searchable online database of national legal measures to secure radiological materials.
I want, however, to focus my remarks on the International Nuclear Security Forum, funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, which the Stimson Center hosts, in which I serve as Director and where several of the panelists today are also members, including some who serve on the Advisory Board of the Forum. The International Nuclear Security Forum was born out of the need for NGO collaboration in supporting the Nuclear Security Summit process. Members of the Forum are committed to continuing that collaboration, sharing ideas and best practices, and promoting education on nuclear security. The Forum currently has 210 individual members and 82 institutional members from more than 20 countries.
In 2021, one product of this collaboration was a catalogue of civil society nuclear security assistance activities, highlighting 64 activities by 18 NGOs. These activities covered many of the topics raised at this Conference as well as two activities that helped State Parties and others prepare for the Conference itself. We had the good fortune to deliver this catalogue to Director General Grossi late last year.
Such catalogues don’t just highlight the work of civil society in nuclear security, but help all stakeholders know what is being done where, and by whom. This can help our community coordinate, collaborate, and focus activities to support nuclear security.
Let me encourage you to see nuclear security NGOs as a complement to the efforts of States Parties to promote and implement the Convention. We encourage NGOs from all States here to join the INSF, especially as we hope to nurture more voices from the Global South considering the likely expansion of peaceful uses of nuclear technology worldwide.
There is plenty of work for everyone in promoting nuclear security. NGOs have some especially helpful characteristics that can complement efforts by States Parties and IGOs. NGOs often have greater alacrity than government actors, as we face fewer constraints in our actions; we can be more risk acceptant in pursuing new ideas and technologies; we can be more transparent in our activities, but at the same time create safe spaces for a freer flow of ideas; and we can provide long-term expertise and sustained commitment to nuclear security that staff turnover and the day-to-day pressures in government can restrict.
As many delegates to this Conference mentioned in their statements, it is critical for us to work together to keep us from working at cross purposes while concomitantly considering different points of view.
My thanks again to all of you. I look forward to our increased collaboration in the years ahead.
Richard Cupitt, on behalf of the Stimson Center and the INSF
INSF Side Event
The INSF, in partnership with the Stimson Center, also hosted an event on March 29, 2022, on the margins of the A/CPPNM review conference. The hybrid event, “Ways Non-Governmental Organizations and Civil Society Support Global and Regional Nuclear Security,” reviewed the pilot edition of the Catalogue of Civil Society Activities Strengthening Nuclear Security to examine how NGOs and civil society have contributed to nuclear security through a diverse range of research topics and programs. In reflecting on these contributions, Cupitt moderated a panel discussion with Matthew Bunn from Harvard’s Project on Managing the Atom and Elena Sokova from the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP) to explore how civil society-stakeholder cooperation efforts could be further improved to create a stronger, more robust global nuclear security program. A detailed synopsis of the panelists’ opening remarks and of the Q&A session follows:
Opening Remarks – Elena Sokova, VCDNP
Sokova highlighted diversity as a strength that NGOs bring to the nuclear security field, taking as examples both her own organization and the INSF, which spans multiple continents and countries with a wide range of civil society stakeholders. Sokova’s point on the role of NGOs in strengthening nuclear security is threefold: NGOs can act as stopgaps in the field, have flexibility and freedom to engage with a diverse range of stakeholders, and act as capacity builders. Sokova emphasized that governments often lack the time and ability to focus deeply on an issue and dissect each detail in-depth. Think tanks have the expertise and flexibility to understand issues beyond the surface in a way that fills a critical gap in the field. Sokova also noted that NGOs have a privilege and capacity to facilitate dialogues between stakeholders outside the political and bureaucratic constraints that can hamper governments and international organizations. NGOs also build capacity on several levels: preparing specialists in the next generation through focus programs, fostering curiosity in students, and offering professional development programs to encourage new voices within and outside of government. While various governments and international organizations offer capacity building measures, NGOs can blend policy and technical expertise in unique ways that allow for a closer look at an issue.
Sokova also praised the role of civil society as a de facto accountability mechanism for governments and international organizations. NGOs can prepare reports and research that critically analyze government programs to gauge the effectiveness of policy. Furthermore, civil society stakeholders can chart a path forward for government as they look to enhance their policy implementation capabilities. In the case of the A/CPPNM, the VCDNP has worked closely to analyze the amended convention to understand how the agreement can be more effective, identifying policy gaps and changes in the international landscape that must be addressed.
Think tanks and NGOs also provide multidisciplinary approaches to nuclear security and nuclear policy challenges. Sokova outlined the value in connecting nuclear security, nuclear governance, nonproliferation, and other seemingly distinct issue areas to provide a more holistic view of future challenges. The VCDNP, for example, assembled a group of government representatives, regional representatives, and academics to look at the opportunities and challenges in expanding peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology. VCDNP has also looked at the linkages of nuclear security and research to understand how nuclear security, nuclear safety, and nuclear governance contribute to an expansion of nuclear research for peaceful purposes.
Opening Remarks – Matthew Bunn, Managing the Atom
Bunn noted that NGOs can highlight the dangers that nuclear security measures are designed to address, can offer ideas for next steps, and nudge governments to act. NGOs can track progress and hold government accountable, educate the next generation of policy professionals, promote dialogue and partnerships, help with nuclear security implementation, and in some cases, fund initial steps.
Noting the importance of civil society actors working to highlight the dangers nuclear security measures aim to address, Bunn pointed to Harvard’s Managing the Atom Program’s recent nuclear security report which focused high-level policymakers, including then-Vice President Joe Biden, on how acute some nuclear security dangers are. Bunn also noted Graham Allison’s book, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, as a major influence on President Obama’s perceptions of nuclear security and terrorism and as the inspiration for the Nuclear Security Summits.
NGOs can also offer ideas for next steps. Bunn shared the success of the partnership between Managing the Atom and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) to build capacity within the IAEA, which led to a “challenge grant” and the founding gift of the Nuclear Security Fund. This initiative provided proof of the possibility for governments to meaningfully invest resources in the IAEA and in nuclear security measures.
Bunn also noted that civil society can enhance and contribute to dialogue. Echoing Sokova’s remarks, he outlined how NGOs can help organize confidential meetings among stakeholders to explore ideas more freely than officials representing government positions are able to do. Bunn raised NTI’s “Global Dialogue,” as an example of this approach which has helped to lay the foundation for discussions in formal settings.
NGOs can also track the progress of government initiatives and policies. Bunn noted that the Nuclear Security Summit process produced a series of papers that assessed whether governments were implementing their commitments from the Summit process. These papers helped to motivate governments to move forward on their commitments.
Discussion Session
NGOs can be more risk-accepting than government agencies or representatives, which separates them from the official community. How do we as NGOs improve our efforts to be more inclusive and diverse among ourselves and the larger community?
The panelists concurred that the topic of diversity and inclusivity continues to be a part of the agenda within the government and non-governmental communities, with nuclear security being a traditionally male-dominated field. NTI’s Gender Champions in Nuclear Policy initiative was highlighted as a particularly notable endeavor within the NGO community that also spurred some government engagement with civil society. Within the International Gender Champions Network, a leadership network made up of heads of international organizations, permanent missions and civil society organizations that work to break down gender barriers and make gender equality a working reality in their spheres of influence, several of these Gender Champions have committed to measures to strengthen diversity. A variety of specific commitments to improve gender parity was considered particularly helpful as a tool to confront how civil society groups and individuals communicate with various organizations and stakeholders. Participants also highlighted the need to engage more effectively with the next generation of nuclear security professionals and provide a platform for emerging voices. Prioritizing geographic diversity and engagement with talent from the Global South was also emphasized as a diversity commitment that the nuclear security NGO community as a whole needs to focus on more acutely.
Is there any self-assessment tool that can assist in better understanding the gaps in areas with regard to safety, security, safeguards, and the responsibility of NGOs?
Participants shared various self-assessment tools and platforms that could support NGO activities relating to nuclear safety, security, and safeguards. The World Institute for Nuclear Security was highlighted as an NGO that offers a wide range of nuclear security self-assessment tools for operators. The United States Department of State’s Public-Private Partnerships enable the government to share information that would not otherwise be public with partner NGOs to facilitate their participation in government activities. This creates spaces for conversations that are constrained by classification or limited sharing of information. NTI’s Nuclear Security Index assesses a number of metrics of nuclear security implementation around the world. Discussion identified potential value in cross-walking the Index against the INSF’s Catalogue of Civil Society Activities to Strengthen Nuclear Security to analyze how well NGO work addresses the priorities identified in the Index.
Discussion also highlighted the need for better tools to assess integration nuclear safety, security, and safeguards. It was noted that these “three S’s” are still siloed at both the international and the state level. VCDNP held a workshop with Ghana which found that creating a coordinating group for all three S’s created opportunities for interaction and learning that could serve as a model for other countries to create stronger and more integrated nuclear security, safety, and safeguards measures.
The IAEA was recognized as a particularly strong advocate for NGO partnerships and engagement with experts from the Global South to diversify the voices given a platform to participate and make decisions in the nuclear security space.
NGOs are often wholly or partly funded by governments. What tensions does that create and how do you deal with them?
Panelists agreed that heavy reliance on government funding creates the possibility of tension. NGOs serve the purpose of analyzing, critiquing, and influencing government policies and the strings that come with government funding can create conflicts of interest. Participants highlighted a need for funding source diversification, as similar tensions can emerge from industry funding as well. NGOs need to diversify funding sources in order to retain their independence and their ability to adhere to their core values and mission.
What are the implications of new and emerging technologies for nuclear security from an NGO perspective?
Emerging technologies were framed more as a factor that changes the landscape of the nuclear security field, rather than the role of NGOs in the space. Advocacy for nuclear security for new developments, such as small modular reactors, was outlined as a specific role for civil society contributions to the field. NGOs will have a role in forcing this conversation into the open, rather than keeping it behind closed doors. NGOs will also be able to advocate for the opportunities that new technologies offer industry for nuclear security itself. Participants highlighted the benefits of parts that would be more difficult to melt down, thus becoming more secure from insider threats. Significant developments were also noted in robotic armament and defensive drones, as well as in computer modeling to determine onsite defense and security requirements .
NGOs, including VCDNP and the Stimson Center, have also created fora for discussing the implications of new and emerging technologies for nuclear security – both as threats and assets. Workshop series on the impacts of advanced nuclear technologies, emerging technologies, safeguards and export controls, and nuclear security have all contributed to awareness of potential opportunities and challenges for the nuclear security space.
What challenges do you see for NGOs in the nuclear security space?
The impact of COVID-19 on the NGO community was raised as a continuing challenge. In-person participation of civil society stakeholders in conferences like the A/CPPNM and other international instruments has continued to be challenging, especially as the exclusion of NGOs from virtual consultations created new precedent to exclude civil society.
Another challenge raised was the dramatic decline in civil society focus on nuclear security since the end of the Nuclear Security Summit. There are fewer NGOs doing serious work on security for nuclear materials facilities. The situation in Ukraine is an opportunity for NGOs to re-engage in nuclear security and re-evaluate the role of military forces and security for nuclear facilities.
Panelists
Elena Sokova is the Executive Director of the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. Her primary research areas are international organizations and nonproliferation regime, fissile materials security and control, nuclear nonproliferation issues in Eurasia, nonproliferation and disarmament education and training. Prior to her post in Vienna, Elena was Deputy Director, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. Her early career started at the Soviet/Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Elena Sokova authored numerous articles, book chapters, reports, and other publications on nonproliferation and nuclear security.
Matthew Bunn is the James R. Schlesinger Professor of the Practice of Energy, National Security, and Foreign Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School. He also serves as co-principal investigator for the Belfer Center’s Project on Managing the Atom. His research interests include nuclear theft and terrorism; nuclear arms control and strategic stability; nuclear proliferation and measures to control it; the future of nuclear energy and its fuel cycle; and innovation in energy technologies. Before coming to Harvard, Bunn served as an adviser to the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, as a study director at the National Academy of Sciences, and as editor of Arms Control Today. He is the author or co-author of more than 25 books or major technical reports and over 150 articles.
Richard T. Cupitt is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Partnerships in Proliferation Prevention program at the Henry L. Stimson Center. He also serves as the Executive Director of the International Nuclear Security Forum (INSF) and is a member of the U.S. National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine’s Committee on Advanced Reactors. Prior to joining Stimson, among other posts, he served as the Special Coordinator for U.N. Security Council resolution 1540 in the U.S. Department of State and for eight years was an expert for the UN Security Council’s 1540 Committee, the main nonproliferation subsidiary body of the Council.
