The war in Ukraine thus suggests that some realist theories are not as helpful as they could be during a time of global geopolitical upheaval; realists have the broad contours of the war in Ukraine right but get many of the details wrong. This is particularly unfortunate, as other approaches to the world—most notably the variants of liberal internationalism that dominated so much of the post–Cold War period—have also been found wanting. Yet the debates over Ukraine, and over U.S. foreign policy more broadly, are in many ways simply rehashing long-running criticisms of realist or restraint-minded thinkers. Because most realists emphasize prudence above all else, it is much easier for them to criticize than it is to offer a different, affirmative policy as a replacement. As a result, there is no one realist policy. Yet even if realism is largely present in today’s policy debates as a foil, pushing U.S. foreign policymakers to justify their choices and perhaps adopt slightly more pragmatic options, that may enough.
Read the full article in Foreign Affairs.
