In October 2022, the Biden Administration released its plan aimed at addressing the arms diversion risks stemming from its unprecedented $18 billion military assistance effort to Ukraine. The plan reflects an implicit acknowledgment of the growing concern that American support to Ukraine’s war effort was proceeding without sufficient safeguards to ensure the thousands of armaments pouring into the country did not end up in the wrong hands. While the move reflects a welcome first step, it remains to be seen how effective the effort will be in mitigating the risks associated with the military aid effort to Ukraine.
Under normal circumstances, the U.S. government tracks its international arms transfers through a collection of end-use monitoring (EUM) programs, run either by the Department of State, Defense, or Commerce. Even under the best of circumstances, these programs suffer from severe limitations, not least of which is the fact that, despite their name, they do not monitor use, but rather, in a limited fashion, that certain weapons transferred remain in the command and control of the intended recipients. These programs can facilitate the physical inspection, inventorying, and accounting of sensitive military equipment the United States has sent abroad.
But the circumstances in Ukraine have almost entirely eliminated the viability of conventional EUM. Beyond the overwhelming scale and pace of transfers, their frequent in-country movement along front lines, the rate at which these arms are being used, expended, or destroyed, and the inability of inspectors to reach areas enveloped with severe fighting has meant only a small fraction of U.S. military hardware has been subject to any meaningful oversight.
In that chaotic, and fraught context, the risk of diversion becomes more severe, especially given the volume of materiel making its way into Ukraine. Even small leaks of an $18 billion enterprise could translate into significant risks, posing a security threat to Ukraine, the region, and beyond.
Past instances of illicit arms trafficking in Ukraine amplify the need for appropriate end-use monitoring and diversion mitigation. After the fall of the Soviet Union, stockpiles of Soviet weapons remaining in Ukraine were a profitable source of funding for nefarious actors. Estimates place Ukrainian military equipment losses between 1992 and 1998 at $32 billion. Some of these weapons made their way onto the illicit arms market and eventually to the front lines in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Afghanistan, among others.
The Administration’s announced EUM plan, while not replacing the need for actual monitoring of end-use, could add to the U.S. government’s efforts to pre-empt arms diversion in Ukraine and add layers of mitigation to the military assistance risks stemming from the conflict. Although the actual plan is classified, a public fact sheet describes three separate lines of effort:
- “Bolstering the ability of security forces in Ukraine and its neighboring states to account for and safeguard their arms and ammunition during transfer, in storage, and when deployed”;
- “Strengthening border management and security in Ukraine and its neighboring states”; and
- “Building the capacity of security forces, law enforcement officials, and border control agencies in Ukraine and its neighboring states to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking of certain advanced conventional weapons.”
The factsheet outlines a range of activities under these headings aimed at enhancing internal accounting and security of arms, bolstering border control measures, or enabling law enforcement detection, tracking, and interdiction. They include, but are not limited to:
- The development of enhanced reporting and tracking measures for Ukrainian officials;
- Expanding customs and border screening measures;
- Training for frontline officials on identifying weaponry and border crossing points;
- Improving and expanding information sharing and coordination between Ukraine and its neighbors;
- Deploy demining and explosive ordnance disposal teams;
- Counter-proliferation and counter-organized crime training for regional law enforcement authorities;
- Assessments of critical screening gaps at ports of entry;
- Re-introduction of EUM as appropriate in Ukraine and neighboring states.
These efforts follow other tailored measures the U.S. government has sought to implement amidst the conflict in Ukraine, including using digital scanners to inventory weapons and other protocols originally developed during the height of the COVID-pandemic.
However, the plan leaves unaddressed a number of concerns that could undercut the effort’s overall efficacy. First, while the plan’s prioritization of Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) and Anti-Tank/All-purpose Tactical Guided Missiles (ATGMs) is understandable given the highly sensitive nature of those systems and the potential capability evolution they could offer non-state actors, the focus on high-tech systems could divert attention away from the particularly acute risks posed by small arms and light weapons (SALW). Washington has transferred thousands of SALW to Ukraine, and millions of rounds of related ammunition. These kinds of materiel have long been a staple of the illicit arms market, are easily concealed and secreted across borders, are simple to use and maintain, and in high demand by illicit groups of all kinds. Moreover, SALW proliferation has consistently posed the most immediate global threat to civilian protection, be that from armed groups, criminal organizations, or others.
The public factsheet is also fairly light on the U.S. government’s post-conflict planning. Although the war’s end currently seems elusive, planning for that eventuality should be in place now, including measures to recover arms, account for armaments distributed to paramilitary forces, destruction of excess stockpiles, or plans for registering and cataloging the presence of weapons in the event that disarmament is not possible or desirable. This is especially important given the long shelf life of many of these systems, and the long-term diversion risks they can pose.
Lastly, although the State Department has said that the effort will be coordinated with partner States in the region, it is unclear what new efforts are being put in place by European arms exporters and the degree to which these plans are carefully integrated. The United States should endeavor to make its initiatives synergistic with European efforts in order to ensure that mitigation measures do not face loopholes and workarounds for illicit traffickers.
Currently, available reporting reveals scant evidence of any significant international diversion of arms provided to Ukraine since the start of the conflict. For the most part, the intensity of the fighting and the extreme battlefield demands have kept weaponry in the hands of Ukrainian security forces and outpaced any incentives for diversion. Moreover, the government in Kyiv is keenly aware that any such loss could threaten the arms supply it has depended on to defend against Russia’s invasion or limit future weapons transfers. Accordingly, while the risks remain severe, they may be less immediate. Still, the time for medium and long-term planning is now, and measures to prevent future leakage in the illicit market need to be taking root immediately to have the intended effect. The U.S. EUM plan is a welcome first step, but it should be accompanied by further measures to ensure arms provided to Ukraine now do not become a source of instability in the future.
A US Plan to Prevent Arms Diversion in Ukraine is Welcome But Just the First Step
By Elias Yousif • Rachel Stohl
Conventional Arms
In October 2022, the Biden Administration released its plan aimed at addressing the arms diversion risks stemming from its unprecedented $18 billion military assistance effort to Ukraine. The plan reflects an implicit acknowledgment of the growing concern that American support to Ukraine’s war effort was proceeding without sufficient safeguards to ensure the thousands of armaments pouring into the country did not end up in the wrong hands. While the move reflects a welcome first step, it remains to be seen how effective the effort will be in mitigating the risks associated with the military aid effort to Ukraine.
Under normal circumstances, the U.S. government tracks its international arms transfers through a collection of end-use monitoring (EUM) programs, run either by the Department of State, Defense, or Commerce. Even under the best of circumstances, these programs suffer from severe limitations, not least of which is the fact that, despite their name, they do not monitor use, but rather, in a limited fashion, that certain weapons transferred remain in the command and control of the intended recipients. These programs can facilitate the physical inspection, inventorying, and accounting of sensitive military equipment the United States has sent abroad.
But the circumstances in Ukraine have almost entirely eliminated the viability of conventional EUM. Beyond the overwhelming scale and pace of transfers, their frequent in-country movement along front lines, the rate at which these arms are being used, expended, or destroyed, and the inability of inspectors to reach areas enveloped with severe fighting has meant only a small fraction of U.S. military hardware has been subject to any meaningful oversight.
In that chaotic, and fraught context, the risk of diversion becomes more severe, especially given the volume of materiel making its way into Ukraine. Even small leaks of an $18 billion enterprise could translate into significant risks, posing a security threat to Ukraine, the region, and beyond.
Past instances of illicit arms trafficking in Ukraine amplify the need for appropriate end-use monitoring and diversion mitigation. After the fall of the Soviet Union, stockpiles of Soviet weapons remaining in Ukraine were a profitable source of funding for nefarious actors. Estimates place Ukrainian military equipment losses between 1992 and 1998 at $32 billion. Some of these weapons made their way onto the illicit arms market and eventually to the front lines in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Afghanistan, among others.
The Administration’s announced EUM plan, while not replacing the need for actual monitoring of end-use, could add to the U.S. government’s efforts to pre-empt arms diversion in Ukraine and add layers of mitigation to the military assistance risks stemming from the conflict. Although the actual plan is classified, a public fact sheet describes three separate lines of effort:
The factsheet outlines a range of activities under these headings aimed at enhancing internal accounting and security of arms, bolstering border control measures, or enabling law enforcement detection, tracking, and interdiction. They include, but are not limited to:
These efforts follow other tailored measures the U.S. government has sought to implement amidst the conflict in Ukraine, including using digital scanners to inventory weapons and other protocols originally developed during the height of the COVID-pandemic.
However, the plan leaves unaddressed a number of concerns that could undercut the effort’s overall efficacy. First, while the plan’s prioritization of Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) and Anti-Tank/All-purpose Tactical Guided Missiles (ATGMs) is understandable given the highly sensitive nature of those systems and the potential capability evolution they could offer non-state actors, the focus on high-tech systems could divert attention away from the particularly acute risks posed by small arms and light weapons (SALW). Washington has transferred thousands of SALW to Ukraine, and millions of rounds of related ammunition. These kinds of materiel have long been a staple of the illicit arms market, are easily concealed and secreted across borders, are simple to use and maintain, and in high demand by illicit groups of all kinds. Moreover, SALW proliferation has consistently posed the most immediate global threat to civilian protection, be that from armed groups, criminal organizations, or others.
The public factsheet is also fairly light on the U.S. government’s post-conflict planning. Although the war’s end currently seems elusive, planning for that eventuality should be in place now, including measures to recover arms, account for armaments distributed to paramilitary forces, destruction of excess stockpiles, or plans for registering and cataloging the presence of weapons in the event that disarmament is not possible or desirable. This is especially important given the long shelf life of many of these systems, and the long-term diversion risks they can pose.
Lastly, although the State Department has said that the effort will be coordinated with partner States in the region, it is unclear what new efforts are being put in place by European arms exporters and the degree to which these plans are carefully integrated. The United States should endeavor to make its initiatives synergistic with European efforts in order to ensure that mitigation measures do not face loopholes and workarounds for illicit traffickers.
Currently, available reporting reveals scant evidence of any significant international diversion of arms provided to Ukraine since the start of the conflict. For the most part, the intensity of the fighting and the extreme battlefield demands have kept weaponry in the hands of Ukrainian security forces and outpaced any incentives for diversion. Moreover, the government in Kyiv is keenly aware that any such loss could threaten the arms supply it has depended on to defend against Russia’s invasion or limit future weapons transfers. Accordingly, while the risks remain severe, they may be less immediate. Still, the time for medium and long-term planning is now, and measures to prevent future leakage in the illicit market need to be taking root immediately to have the intended effect. The U.S. EUM plan is a welcome first step, but it should be accompanied by further measures to ensure arms provided to Ukraine now do not become a source of instability in the future.
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