Editor’s Note: Umer Karim is an associate fellow at the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies and a former Visiting Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, London. He is also a doctoral researcher in the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Birmingham. His academic research focuses on Saudi foreign policy and politics, in particular the Saudi regional policy outlook and the broader geopolitics of the Middle East. He is the author of “Regional Security in South Asia and the Gulf.”
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
In the past few weeks, Pakistan has emerged as a key interlocutor in trying to end the raging conflict between the United States and Iran.
While success remains uncertain as a fragile ceasefire struggles to take hold, Pakistan has played a central role in conveying messages between the two countries while attempting, alongside Egypt and Turkey, to bring them to the negotiating table. Pakistani decision-makers have put their political capital into this initiative and are presenting Islamabad as a venue for negotiations as they understand that a long-term conflict in their neighborhood would have serious political, economic, and security repercussions for Pakistan. Yet this initiative is undermined by Pakistan’s own political limitations vis-à-vis both Iran and the United States.
Pakistan’s attempts to court President Donald Trump in his second term did not have a positive start. After his election, close associates of Trump courted Pakistan’s opposition and pushed for the release of jailed former Prime Minister Imran Khan. A senior U.S. State Department official attended Pakistan’s Mineral Investment Forum in April 2025. However, the real breakthrough happened after a four-day conflict between India and Pakistan in May 2025. Pakistan appreciated President Trump’s role in helping to stop hostilities with India and later formally nominated him for a Nobel Peace Prize. This was followed by Pakistanis pitching deals to the U.S. president and his close associates in the crypto-currency sector, as well as initiating a partnership to provide critical minerals to the U.S. Both countries have also maintained a formidable counter-terrorism partnership. All of this eventually led to President Trump inviting Pakistan’s Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir to Washington. It was the first time that a Pakistani Armed Forces chief had visited the White House without being accompanied by a civilian government official.
Pakistan has also maintained longstanding strategic ties with Saudi Arabia, and a few months ago, signed a Mutual Strategic Defense Agreement with the Saudis which stipulates that any aggression against the Kingdom will be considered an aggression against Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistan’s relationship with its western neighbor Iran has improved, and security establishments on both sides have kept open channels of communication after tit-for-tat strikes in January 2024 following terrorist bombings in Kerman that Iran blamed on Pakistan-based militants. After the U.S. and Israeli military campaign against Iran started on February 28, Pakistan was the only regional state to condemn the attacks against Iran — although it did not specifically address the killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei — and expressed concern over the violation of international law.
These developments placed Pakistan in a unique position as a country that had the necessary connections within Washington, Tehran, and Riyadh to act as an intermediary. A phone call between President Trump and Pakistan’s Army Chief further affirmed Pakistan as a go-between conveying U.S. demands to Iran, with the U.S. leader commenting that Pakistan knew Iran well. Here, it is worth noting that Pakistani governments have offered their intermediary services in the past between Iran and Saudi Arabia, although those efforts did not receive a positive response. As the country with the largest Shi’ite Muslim population after Iran, Pakistan also has domestic motives to push for a ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran. Protests in Pakistan after the killing of Ayatollah Khamenei led to violence, with dozens of deaths and a curfew being imposed in the northern cities of Gilgit and Skardu. The Shi’ite community constitutes about 20% of Pakistan’s population, with a concentration in the strategic northern region bordering China.
Although Pakistan enjoys a better relationship with Tehran than many of Iran’s other neighbors, it is important to note that decision makers have mainly engaged with Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi during the recent diplomatic efforts. Pakistani officials have struggled to develop a direct channel of communication with the powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which, especially after the assassination of Khamenei, is considered to be the main entity at the helm of Iranian decision-making. The Pakistani military was particularly perturbed by Iranian attacks on Saudi Arabia’s Jubail Petrochemical Complex and feared it was a last-ditch attempt to derail talks. Within Pakistan’s strategic circles, it is generally understood that the January 2024 Iranian missile strikes on Pakistan were sanctioned by IRGC leaders, not the Iranian civilian government. Pakistan also blames the IRGC for recruiting Pakistani Shi’ites to fight in the Syrian civil war under the banner of the Zainabiyoun Brigade. More recently, the IRGC-linked media outlet Tasnim has been echoing the propaganda points of the Afghan Taliban who have been engaged in hostilities against Pakistan.
Although it appears that Riyadh has been on board with regard to Pakistan’s diplomatic initiative with Iran, if Iranian attacks restart against Saudi Arabia, Riyadh will expect Pakistan to actively contribute to its defense under their security agreement. This possibility appeared to be on the mind of Pakistan’s Army Chief when he recently addressed Pakistani Shi’ite religious scholars. It has been reported that he warned these scholars that violence in the country over events abroad will not be tolerated, a reference to the protests that followed the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader. Pakistani Shi’ites in general, as well as Iran-aligned groups, have severely criticized the statements coming out of this gathering.
The recent engagement between Pakistan and China and their March 31 joint statement proposing a five-point plan to end the war on Iran recognized Pakistan’s limitations as a mediator and the need for a major global actor to underpin its diplomatic efforts.
With a cold peace on its eastern border with India and recurring hostilities with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan on the west, Pakistan wants to maintain a peaceful status quo along its border with Iran and prevent a breakdown of central state authority in the Iranian province of Sistan-Baluchistan that could spread into Pakistan’s restive Balochistan. Moreover, Pakistan’s relationship with the United Arab Emirates has already been affected by this conflict, with the UAE demanding repayment of interest on a major loan. If the fragile US-Iran ceasefire falters, Pakistan’s balancing act among the U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia will likely become untenable.
The Motives and Constraints Behind Pakistan’s Mediation Between the US and Iran
By Umer Karim
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: Umer Karim is an associate fellow at the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies and a former Visiting Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, London. He is also a doctoral researcher in the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Birmingham. His academic research focuses on Saudi foreign policy and politics, in particular the Saudi regional policy outlook and the broader geopolitics of the Middle East. He is the author of “Regional Security in South Asia and the Gulf.”
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
In the past few weeks, Pakistan has emerged as a key interlocutor in trying to end the raging conflict between the United States and Iran.
While success remains uncertain as a fragile ceasefire struggles to take hold, Pakistan has played a central role in conveying messages between the two countries while attempting, alongside Egypt and Turkey, to bring them to the negotiating table. Pakistani decision-makers have put their political capital into this initiative and are presenting Islamabad as a venue for negotiations as they understand that a long-term conflict in their neighborhood would have serious political, economic, and security repercussions for Pakistan. Yet this initiative is undermined by Pakistan’s own political limitations vis-à-vis both Iran and the United States.
Pakistan’s attempts to court President Donald Trump in his second term did not have a positive start. After his election, close associates of Trump courted Pakistan’s opposition and pushed for the release of jailed former Prime Minister Imran Khan. A senior U.S. State Department official attended Pakistan’s Mineral Investment Forum in April 2025. However, the real breakthrough happened after a four-day conflict between India and Pakistan in May 2025. Pakistan appreciated President Trump’s role in helping to stop hostilities with India and later formally nominated him for a Nobel Peace Prize. This was followed by Pakistanis pitching deals to the U.S. president and his close associates in the crypto-currency sector, as well as initiating a partnership to provide critical minerals to the U.S. Both countries have also maintained a formidable counter-terrorism partnership. All of this eventually led to President Trump inviting Pakistan’s Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir to Washington. It was the first time that a Pakistani Armed Forces chief had visited the White House without being accompanied by a civilian government official.
Pakistan has also maintained longstanding strategic ties with Saudi Arabia, and a few months ago, signed a Mutual Strategic Defense Agreement with the Saudis which stipulates that any aggression against the Kingdom will be considered an aggression against Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistan’s relationship with its western neighbor Iran has improved, and security establishments on both sides have kept open channels of communication after tit-for-tat strikes in January 2024 following terrorist bombings in Kerman that Iran blamed on Pakistan-based militants. After the U.S. and Israeli military campaign against Iran started on February 28, Pakistan was the only regional state to condemn the attacks against Iran — although it did not specifically address the killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei — and expressed concern over the violation of international law.
These developments placed Pakistan in a unique position as a country that had the necessary connections within Washington, Tehran, and Riyadh to act as an intermediary. A phone call between President Trump and Pakistan’s Army Chief further affirmed Pakistan as a go-between conveying U.S. demands to Iran, with the U.S. leader commenting that Pakistan knew Iran well. Here, it is worth noting that Pakistani governments have offered their intermediary services in the past between Iran and Saudi Arabia, although those efforts did not receive a positive response. As the country with the largest Shi’ite Muslim population after Iran, Pakistan also has domestic motives to push for a ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran. Protests in Pakistan after the killing of Ayatollah Khamenei led to violence, with dozens of deaths and a curfew being imposed in the northern cities of Gilgit and Skardu. The Shi’ite community constitutes about 20% of Pakistan’s population, with a concentration in the strategic northern region bordering China.
Although Pakistan enjoys a better relationship with Tehran than many of Iran’s other neighbors, it is important to note that decision makers have mainly engaged with Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi during the recent diplomatic efforts. Pakistani officials have struggled to develop a direct channel of communication with the powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which, especially after the assassination of Khamenei, is considered to be the main entity at the helm of Iranian decision-making. The Pakistani military was particularly perturbed by Iranian attacks on Saudi Arabia’s Jubail Petrochemical Complex and feared it was a last-ditch attempt to derail talks. Within Pakistan’s strategic circles, it is generally understood that the January 2024 Iranian missile strikes on Pakistan were sanctioned by IRGC leaders, not the Iranian civilian government. Pakistan also blames the IRGC for recruiting Pakistani Shi’ites to fight in the Syrian civil war under the banner of the Zainabiyoun Brigade. More recently, the IRGC-linked media outlet Tasnim has been echoing the propaganda points of the Afghan Taliban who have been engaged in hostilities against Pakistan.
Although it appears that Riyadh has been on board with regard to Pakistan’s diplomatic initiative with Iran, if Iranian attacks restart against Saudi Arabia, Riyadh will expect Pakistan to actively contribute to its defense under their security agreement. This possibility appeared to be on the mind of Pakistan’s Army Chief when he recently addressed Pakistani Shi’ite religious scholars. It has been reported that he warned these scholars that violence in the country over events abroad will not be tolerated, a reference to the protests that followed the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader. Pakistani Shi’ites in general, as well as Iran-aligned groups, have severely criticized the statements coming out of this gathering.
The recent engagement between Pakistan and China and their March 31 joint statement proposing a five-point plan to end the war on Iran recognized Pakistan’s limitations as a mediator and the need for a major global actor to underpin its diplomatic efforts.
With a cold peace on its eastern border with India and recurring hostilities with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan on the west, Pakistan wants to maintain a peaceful status quo along its border with Iran and prevent a breakdown of central state authority in the Iranian province of Sistan-Baluchistan that could spread into Pakistan’s restive Balochistan. Moreover, Pakistan’s relationship with the United Arab Emirates has already been affected by this conflict, with the UAE demanding repayment of interest on a major loan. If the fragile US-Iran ceasefire falters, Pakistan’s balancing act among the U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia will likely become untenable.
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