Issue Brief

International Nuclear Security Forum Project

Nuclear Security for Nuclear Newcomers: Exploring Türkiye’s Readiness

INSF COUNTRY UPDATE

Türkiye’s emerging nuclear security infrastructure works to overcome unique challenges as a nuclear newcomer

By Ali Alkış

Nonproliferation

August 14, 2023

As Türkiye inaugurates its first nuclear power plant, the country culminates a six-decades-long quest for nuclear energy. But what challenges has Türkiye had to overcome in its pursuit of nuclear power, and how has the country made strides to position itself as a leader in committing to global nuclear norms, rules, and laws? This policy memo explores sixty years of nuclear pursuit – and the terrorism threats, security issues, and nuclear smuggling risks that remain for the nuclear newcomer.

Introduction

On April 27th, 2023, Türkiye¹ inaugurated its first-ever nuclear power plant (NPP). This milestone was the culmination of Türkiye’s six-decade-long quest to achieve nuclear energy production, and it comes at a highly symbolic time – the 100th anniversary of the Republic of Türkiye.² Having such symbolic importance, nuclear energy will not only contribute to growing energy demands in Türkiye but also launch the country into the nuclear power league. Ankara has fundamental reasons and motivations for introducing nuclear energy, including a large economy, an adequate electricity grid, and rapidly growing electricity demand.³ This confluence of factors has resulted in the current strategy based on a ‘build-own-operate’ (BOO) agreement with the Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom (Rosatom). The intergovernmental agreement signed between Türkiye and Russia in 2010 has had to overcome a number of challenges, including significant delays that have left the project about four years behind schedule and which might have implications for nuclear security due to cost overruns.⁴

Indeed, establishing an NPP brings risks as well as benefits. Ankara has been fighting terrorism for decades and is located in a region that is a transit route for nuclear smuggling involving highly enriched uranium (HEU), especially between Bulgaria and Georgia.⁵ Furthermore, Türkiye shares borders with two conflict zones in Iraq and Syria.⁶ In this context, the scope of this country update will be mainly on the Turkish nuclear security approach to provide valuable insights for understanding the development of nuclear power and nuclear security in similar newcomer states.

Nuclear Sector – An Overview

Türkiye’s quest for nuclear energy can be traced back to the late 1950s with the motivation for economic growth and energy security. In addition, nuclear energy has been perceived as a symbol of modern Türkiye. Despite this desire, Ankara has made several attempts over the last six decades to introduce nuclear energy, all met with failure until recently.⁷

Initial Attempts

Çekmece Nuclear Research and Training Center (CNRTC) was established as the first nuclear research and training center in 1961 by installing a one-megawatt thermal (MWth) pool-type research reactor TR-1. However, during the 1960s, Ankara’s financial capabilities were insufficient to support the costs associated with hosting an NPP, as Türkiye’s gross domestic product (GDP) was under $20 billion. Consequent initial plans were postponed due to military coups in 1971 and 1980, with subsequent political and economic instability.⁸

In the 1980s, Türkiye’s GDP topped $60 billion, and the government made a new attempt after the 250 kilowatts thermal (kWth) Triga Mark II research reactor went operational in 1979. The TR-1 research reactor was shut down in 1977 and replaced by a five MWth pool-type research reactor TR-2 in 1981.⁹ At that time, Türkiye adopted a new strategy based on the ‘build, operate, and transfer’ (BOT) financial model.

According to the BOT model, a vendor is expected to pay construction costs (‘build’), recoup expenses through operation of the NPP (‘pay’), and then transfer ownership of said NPP to state ownership by Türkiye (‘transfer’) in return for a percentage of future profits. Nevertheless, the attempt failed due to a combination of factors –Ankara’s demands of 100 percent foreign financing, the 1986 Chornobyl¹⁰ disaster that resulted in growing domestic opposition to nuclear power, and international opposition due to suspicions that Turkish companies helped to transfer nuclear material to Pakistan, which had a nuclear weapons program. In 1994, Türkiye issued a tender for a turnkey project that was subsequently delayed several times for technical and economic reasons and was eventually abandoned in 2000.¹¹

A New Strategy for Nuclear Energy

In 2002, Türkiye issued a new international tender. For the first time, the motivation was partly due to the concerns over dependence on Russian gas. Nevertheless, the tender received only one bid from Rosatom, Russia’s state-controlled nuclear energy company. The bid was too expensive, and as a result, the BOT approach was frustrated a final time.. After five failed attempts, Türkiye shifted its strategy toward the BOO model in 2008.¹² This model allows vendors to sidestep competition rules and enables them to own and operate the plant. As a result, in 2010, Türkiye and Russia signed an inter-governmental agreement for establishing an NPP.¹³

As part of the agreement, Rosatom is authorized to build, own, and operate the Akkuyu NPP for 60 years of service life with a possible 20-year extension and will also be responsible for its eventual decommissioning. Rosatom will also supply the fuel and manage the waste generated while helping Ankara build the necessary human capital. In return, Türkiye provided the Akkuyu site free of charge and has committed to buy the electricity generated for 15 years at a fixed rate. In general, the Akkuyu NPP project is an economically well-negotiated agreement, considering the costs for the construction, operation, maintenance, and decommissioning, as well as for the management and transport of the waste.¹⁴

Turkish Nuclear Security Approach

With its first NPP scheduled to become operational in October 2023, Türkiye continues its efforts to adhere to international rules and norms as well as enhancing its domestic legislation to demonstrate its commitment to nuclear security, which is reflected in the NTI’s Nuclear Security Index where Türkiye increased its score for support for global efforts by 27 points since 2012.¹⁵ Decades of combating terrorism has raised Turkish awareness of the quintessential need to establish, implement, and sustain a sophisticated national nuclear security regime beyond its conventional security strategies. In this context, Ankara attaches great importance to effective nuclear security governance; measures for physical security, cyber security, and protection from insider threats; development of a design basis threat; and learning from international guidance and accepted best practices.¹⁶

Commitment to Global Nuclear Security Norms, Rules, and Laws

Türkiye has worked to strengthen and uphold international nuclear security norms by assuming international legal commitments to protect nuclear material. In this context, Türkiye promotes the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and regularly reports to the UN 1540 Committee on domestic implementation.¹⁷ In addition, Türkiye is a state party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) (1985) and its 2005 Amendment (2015), which commits parties to providing physical protection during the international transport of nuclear materials as well as cooperating in the protection and recovery of stolen nuclear material while also it also criminalizes offenses involving nuclear material.¹⁸

In addition, Türkiye is also a state party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), generally known as the Nuclear Terrorism Convention (2005), which criminalizes acts of nuclear terrorism and promotes cooperation with other states to prevent, investigate, and punish those acts.¹⁹

Besides these legal commitments, Ankara is also committed to voluntary actions supporting global nuclear security norms. For example, Türkiye has been an active member of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) since becoming one of the thirteen founder states in 2006.²⁰ Additionally, Ankara participates in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) and the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee to bolster the global nuclear security architecture.²¹

Strong Cooperation with the IAEA

Türkiye is an eager member of the IAEA regarding nuclear security. In this context, the IAEA conducted two International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions in 2003 and 2021.²² The IPPAS missions reviewed Türkiye’s legislative and regulatory framework for nuclear security and coordination between stakeholders involved in nuclear security.²³

As a result of the latest mission in 2021, the IAEA reported the existence of a national nuclear security regime based on essential elements of the IAEA’s fundamental nuclear security guidance. While the IAEA identified some good practices as examples to other Member States for their nuclear security activities, the organization also provided the government with an undisclosed report of recommendations and suggestions for Türkiye to further enhance and sustain its nuclear security regime.²⁴

As a part of its commitment, Türkiye subscribed to IAEA INFCIRC/869 in 2014 to strengthen its national nuclear security regime by implementing existing non-binding IAEA guidelines and taking more actions to improve security continuously. It is important to note that INFCIRC/869 resulted from the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation during the Hague 2014 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS).²⁵ Türkiye was among the first thirty-five states to subscribe to this document during the Summit, holding the perspective that nuclear security is a national responsibility, which requires each state to establish the legal framework and governance structure, as well as deploy measures to enhance nuclear security continuously.²⁶

Domestic Capacity

Turkish commitment to global nuclear security norms, rules, and laws is reflected in its domestic policies. In 2018, Türkiye established an independent body, the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NDK), to improve its nuclear regulatory system.²⁷ Nevertheless, it is important to note here that Turkish nuclear regulatory capacity goes back to 1956 and the establishment of the Turkish Atomic Energy Commission, which was replaced by the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK) in 1982. After transforming the TAEK into a research and development organization in 2018, Ankara established the NDK as an independent nuclear regulatory authority to comply fully with international requirements and expectations.²⁸ NDK’s legal status was finalized in March 2022 by the Nuclear Regulatory Law No. 7381 and Presidential Decree No. 95, which established that the NDK is the sole authority for nuclear security, safety, and safeguards as well as radiation safety, protection, and other relevant topics in Türkiye.²⁹

Since 2018, the NDK has been working extensively to revise and update regulations, including, but not limited to, the Regulation on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Materials, the Regulation on the Security of Nuclear Facilities and Materials, and the Regulation on Radiation Protection at Nuclear Facilities. The NDK also released Board Decisions regarding Nuclear Security Plans for constructing and operating nuclear facilities.³⁰

In addition to organizational level reconstruction, Ankara has also been revising and updating its domestic legislation and practices to bring them into line with the provisions of its international commitments, including the revision and update of the Turkish Penal Code, Design Basis Threat (DBT) documents, and repatriation of HEU research reactor fuel to the US. Additionally, training activities have been conducted regularly regarding the inspection and physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials.³¹

Risk Environment

Ankara’s domestic and global commitment to nuclear security stems not only from Türkiye’s adherence to international nuclear security norms but also from the risk environment in and around Turkish borders. As a state that has been fighting against domestic and international terrorism for nearly four decades, Türkiye is well-positioned to develop a strong security culture for its nuclear power plant infrastructure, where each stakeholder assumes an appropriate level of responsibility for nuclear security implementation. This is also indicated in its score for domestic commitments and capacity category in the NTI’s Nuclear Security Index in which Türkiye scored 100.³² As a result, this preemptive approach to nuclear security offers an advantage for Türkiye to integrate physical protection of nuclear materials into the existing security approach, as Turkish institutions, organizations, and authorities have long-standing experience in coordinating inter-organizational efforts to prevent security incidents or otherwise manage security crises.

As the Russian invasion of Ukraine demonstrated, nuclear facilities could be targets of armed attacks. As Akkuyu NPP is located in the south, potential armed attack scenarios from state actors in the region might involve states located on the southern border of Türkiye. Turkish military superiority in the region as well as the collective defense commitment of NATO make it highly unlikely that a neighboring state would launch a military offensive against Türkiye or its nuclear infrastructure.³³ Nevertheless, it could prove beneficial for Türkiye to re-consider its threat assessments in light of the current nuclear security crisis in Ukraine.

Another caution from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is how Russia captured and holds hostage the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station (ZNPP) and its staff, ignoring even requests from the IAEA to withdraw and create a safety and security zone. Under the BOO model adopted by Russia and Türkiye, the Akkuyu NPP will be owned, managed, and staffed by Russians. There is even reported to have been an early Russian proposal to license the Akkuyu NPP under Russian law, which would have undercut Turkish sovereignty and its ability to ultimately control the territory of the plant in case of emergency.³⁴ Ankara ultimately rejected this offer and assumed full regulatory responsibility under its own authority. The recent catastrophic earthquake also demonstrates how critical it will be for Türkiye to have control over access to the plant and to ensure that its international safeguards and security obligations are met.

Ultimately, the threats posed by terrorism and proxy war scenarios may be the most probable for several reasons. First, regional state-sponsored terrorism and proxy wars are regular and deniable hostile activities that inflict damage on rival states. In addition, as conventional warfare requires vast financial resources and causes political consequences, terrorism, and proxy war may seem comparatively cost-effective methods for geopolitical competition.³⁵

Lastly, the region hosts many terrorist organizations and violent non-state actors in and around Turkish borders, including various separatist and religious terrorist groups, i.e., the PKK, al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and ISIS.³⁶ These non-state actors might be interested in terrorist attacks against nuclear facilities for causing financial, physiological, and environmental damage to Türkiye as well as theft, given their interest in WMD capabilities.

Despite this risk environment, Türkiye has performed significantly in its nuclear security approach and increased its NTI Index score by 20 points, moving up from 50 in 2012 to 70 out of 100 in 2020 by improving its commitment to global norms, domestic legislature, and capabilities.³⁷ Furthermore, it also reduced the threats posed by its risk environment in terms of nuclear facilities and other radioactive sources. Overall, these efforts led Türkiye to become one of the states that meet minimum international nuclear security requirements.³⁸

Challenges

While Türkiye is committed to nuclear security, it might have to overcome some challenges, including the fact that Ankara will not have direct control over the Akkuyu NPP but indirect control through the regulator as the Akkuyu NPP – the first BOO project in the world –will be built, owned, and operated by Rosatom.³⁹

Rosatom might prioritize its financial concerns rather than investing continuously in nuclear security measures as construction is already behind schedule.⁴⁰ This concern is not necessarily unique to the BOO model. Still, in this case, a Russian company owns 100% of the NPP and shoulders all the financial risks and burdens, which might result in a reluctance to take timely and proactive nuclear security measures.

Another challenge is to draft a DBT document for the Akkuyu NPP, which requires Turkish authorities to share extensive intelligence analysis with Rosatom – in other words, with Moscow.⁴¹ Turks and Russians have been historical rivals in the region since the 17^th century, and there are still important intelligence and military clashes between Ankara and Moscow on critical issues, including, but not limited to, supporting opposing warring parties in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh.⁴² In addition, Türkiye has yet to gain experience in civilian nuclear power regulation. Rosatom, as the operator of the Akkuyu NPP, might therefore also provide inputs to authorities developing the DBT document as advised in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 10-G (Rev. 1).⁴³ These inputs could be influenced by financial or political concerns regarding the security measures against threat perceptions that Ankara has,⁴⁴ resulting in a less comprehensive DBT which could mean less holistic and comprehensive security measures.

One other challenge is the process for vetting the personnel working at the site, who are likely to include Russian staff for several years to come. It is reported that nearly 4,000 people will work at the Akkuyu NPP when it is fully functional, and that it could be 12 years until the NPP will be operated only by personnel from Türkiye.⁴⁵ The vetting process and ongoing background checks should be well-coordinated by Turkish and Russian intelligence services. However, Türkiye will still lack the ability to check and verify the information provided by Russian counterparts regarding the Russian personnel working on the site, raising questions about the transparency of the process.⁴⁶

Finally, Ankara should ensure that the NDK, the regulatory authority in Türkiye, is free from any political pressure regarding its mandate to inspect and, if necessary, sanction the operator, including suspending or even revoking the license in case of non-compliance.⁴⁷ Russia has already shown that it can use the Akkuyu NPP as a tool for a political bargain.⁴⁸ In this context, how Akkuyu is managed and secured should not be influenced by politics, while the NDK carries out its duties and regularly updates its requirements for nuclear security in cooperation with the IAEA and other relevant stakeholders.

Conclusion

While Türkiye is getting ready for its first NPP with a strong commitment to nuclear security both at domestic and global levels, it also demonstrates how a transition to nuclear energy should be well integrated into policies and practices considering not only nuclear safety and safeguards but also nuclear security. As a cost-effective, low-carbon and reliable energy source, nuclear energy will play a key role for Türkiye and possibly for many other states that have plans for nuclear energy in the future. As a result, there will be a greater need for robust national nuclear security approaches, as failures in nuclear security measures may lead to nuclear incidents with radiological consequences beyond national borders.

Thus, this country update has demonstrated that Türkiye has a long history of pursuing nuclear energy while integrating nuclear security measures step by step, even before its first operational NPP. Introducing the Turkish nuclear security approach may not necessarily be a universal model for holistic nuclear security understanding in similar or prospective newcomer states, but it might provide valuable insights to them.

Ali Alkış is the World Institute for Nuclear Security Ambassador to Türkiye and a Ph.D. candidate at Hacettepe University in Ankara, Türkiye. Alkış serves as the Gender Champion at the Odesa Center for Nonproliferation and is also a member of the Gender Champions in Nuclear Policy. Furthermore, Alkış is one of the emerging leaders of the NTI’s Global Dialogue on Nuclear Security Priorities, and he is among the few male members of the Black Sea Women in Nuclear Network. His research interests encompass nuclear security, non-proliferation, and nuclear terrorism as well as Turkish nuclear and foreign policies.

Notes

1
In 2022, the Turkish government requested that the United Nations and international organizations use Türkiye in English language communications, rather than Turkey – a change that has also been reflected in official diplomatic communications.
2
World Nuclear News, “Presidents Address Ceremony Inaugurating Turkey’s First Nuclear Plant,” World Nuclear News, April 27, 2023, https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Presidents-address-ceremony-inaugurating%C2%A0Turkey-s.
3
Jessica Jewell and Seyithan Ahmet Ateş, “Introducing Nuclear Power in Turkey: A Historic State Strategy and Future Prospects,” Energy Research & Social Science 10 (2015): 273–82, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2015.07.011.
4
Vladimir Slivyak, “Dreams and Reality of the Russian Reactor Export” (Moscow: Ecodefense, 2019), https://ecdru.files.wordpress.com/2019/03/rosatom-report2019.pdf.
5
Atomic Archive, “Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents,” Atomic Archive, 2023, https://www.atomicarchive.com/almanac/smuggling/smuggling_details.html.
6
Sinan Ülgen, “Introduction,” in Nuclear Security: A Turkish Perspective (İstanbul: Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies – EDAM, 2015), 3–4.
7
Muhammed Ali Alkış and Valeriia Gergiieva, “Why Russia May Control Turkey’s Nuclear Energy for the next 80 Years,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 21, 2023, https://thebulletin.org/2023/02/why-russia-may-control-turkeys-nuclear-energy-for-the-next-80-years/.
8
Mustafa Kibaroğlu, “Turkey’s Quest for Peaceful Nuclear Power,” The Nonproliferation Review 4, no. 3 (September 1, 1997): 33–44, https://doi.org/10.1080/10736709708436677.
9
Kibaroğlu.
10
Chornobyl is the Romanized Ukrainian spelling of the city where the power plant is located. Other names derived from different languages include Chernobyl, Čarnobyĺ, Tshernobl, and Czarnobyl.
11
Alkış and Gergiieva, “Why Russia May Control Turkey’s Nuclear Energy for the next 80 Years.”
12
Muhammed Ali Alkış, “Türkiye in the New World Order: The Nuclear Debate,” Geneva Centre for Security Policy, May 2023, 8, https://dam.gcsp.ch/files/doc/alumninotes-muhammedalialkis-may2023?_gl=1*6jagwa*_ga*MTk0MTg2NDQ0MC4xNjgwNzAxOTU3*_ga_Z66DSTVXTJ*MTY4NDIzNzU5NS40LjEuMTY4NDIzNzYzMC4wLjAuMA.
13
Alkış and Gergiieva, “Why Russia May Control Turkey’s Nuclear Energy for the next 80 Years.”
14
Alkış and Gergiieva.
15
NTI Nuclear Security Index, “Turkey,” NTI Nuclear Security Index, 2023, https://www.ntiindex.org/country/turkey/; Hurriyet Daily News, “Akkuyu to Come Online in 2023 as Planned: Minister – Latest News,” Hurriyet Daily News, May 12, 2023, https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/akkuyu-to-come-online-in-2023-as-planned-minister-183069.
16
Ülgen, “Introduction.”
17
Republic of Türkiye, “National Progress Report: Turkey,” The 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, March 31, 2016, http://www.nss2016.org/document-center-docs/2016/3/31/national-progress-report-turkey.
18
Republic of Türkiye, “Statement by H.E. Berat Albayrak, Minister of Energy and Natural Resourses of Turkey, at the IAEA 60th General Conference,” Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Permanent Mission in Vienna, October 5, 2016, http://bmviyana.dt.mfa.gov.tr/Mission/ShowAnnouncement/322719.
19
Republic of Türkiye, “National Progress Report: Turkey,” March 31, 2016.
20
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Arms Control and Disarmament,” 2022, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/arms-control-and-disarmament.en.mfa.
21
IAEA, “IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) – 2022 Factsheet,” International Atomic Energy Agency, accessed March 14, 2023, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/22/01/itdb-factsheet.pdf; Republic of Türkiye, “National Progress Report: Turkey,” US Department of State, March 27, 2012, https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/246209.pdf.
22
Turkish Nuclear Regulatory Authority, “The International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) Mission,” Turkish Nuclear Regulatory Authority, November 28, 2021, https://www.ndk.org.tr/en-US/news/the-international-physical-protection-advisory-service-ippas-mission.
23
IAEA, “IAEA Completes Nuclear Security Advisory Mission in Turkey,” Text, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, November 12, 2021), https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-completes-nuclear-security-advisory-mission-in-turkey.
24
IAEA.
25
NNTI, “The Joint Statement on ‘Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation’” (Washington, DC: Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2021), https://www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/INFCIRC869_Implementation_Guide.pdf.
26
IAEA, “E Joint Statement on ‘Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation’” (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 2014), https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/infcirc869.pdf.
27
Turkish Nuclear Regulatory Authority, “NDK Hakkında,” Turkish Nuclear Regulatory Authority, 2018, https://www.ndk.org.tr/ndk-hakkinda.
28
IAEA, “Turkey 2022,” International Atomic Energy Agency, 2022, https://cnpp.iaea.org/countryprofiles/Turkey/Turkey.htm.
29
Turkish Nuclear Regulatory Authority, “NDK Hakkında.”
30
Turkish Nuclear Regulatory Authority, “Mevzuat,” Turkish Nuclear Regulatory Authority, 2023, https://www.ndk.org.tr/mevzuat.
31
Republic of Türkiye, “National Progress Report: Turkey,” March 31, 2016; Republic of Türkiye, “Statement by H.E. Berat Albayrak, Minister of Energy and Natural Resourses of Turkey, at the IAEA 60th General Conference.”
32
NTI Nuclear Security Index, “Turkey.”
33
Doruk Ergun and Can Kasapoğlu, “Securing Turkey’s Prospective Nuclear Energy Program: A Strategic Nuclear Security Risk Analysis,” in Nuclear Security: A Turkish Perspective (İstanbul: Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies – EDAM, 2015), 5–50.
34
Findings from author interviews with various nuclear security stakeholders (March 2023).
35
Ergun and Kasapoğlu, “Securing Turkey’s Prospective Nuclear Energy Program: A Strategic Nuclear Security Risk Analysis.”
36
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “PKK,” Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/pkk.en.mfa; US Department Of State, “Turkey,” US Department of State, 2023, https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2020/turkey/; Ergun and Kasapoğlu, “Securing Turkey’s Prospective Nuclear Energy Program: A Strategic Nuclear Security Risk Analysis.”
37
NTI, “Turkey,” NTI Nuclear Security Index, 2023, https://www.ntiindex.org/country/turkey/.
38
Muhammed Ali Alkış, “Non-Western Approach to Nuclear Security,” Journal of Radiation Research and Applied Sciences 16, no. 2 (June 2023): 100535, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrras.2023.100535.
39
Alkış and Gergiieva, “Why Russia May Control Turkey’s Nuclear Energy for the next 80 Years.”
40
Findings from author interviews with various nuclear security stakeholders (March 2023).
41
Findings from author interviews with various nuclear security stakeholders (March 2023).
42
Güney Yıldız, “Turkish-Russian Adversarial Collaboration in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh,” SWP Comment, 2021, https://doi.org/10.18449/2021C22.
43
IAEA, “National Nuclear Security Threat Assessment, Design Basis Threats and Representative Threat Statements,” Implementing Guide (Vienna: INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, 2021), https://www.iaea.org/publications/13618/national-nuclear-security-threat-assessment-design-basis-threats-and-representative-threat-statements.
44
Ergun and Kasapoğlu, “Securing Turkey’s Prospective Nuclear Energy Program: A Strategic Nuclear Security Risk Analysis.”
45
World Nuclear News, “Akkuyu Construction to Be Completed by 2026, Says Project CEO: New Nuclear – World Nuclear News,” World Nuclear News, last modified February 10, 2021, accessed March 16, 2023, https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Akkuyu-fully-operational-by-2026,-says-project.
46
Findings from author interviews with various nuclear security stakeholders (March 2023).
47
Turkish Nuclear Regulatory Authority, Presidential Decree on Organization and Duties of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority, Presidential Decree No: 95, 2022, https://webim.ndk.gov.tr/file/d9c1feab-6177-4db6-b350-3120f5bbeb37.
48
Alkış and Gergiieva, “Why Russia May Control Turkey’s Nuclear Energy for the next 80 Years.”

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Nuclear Security for Nuclear Newcomers: Exploring Türkiye’s Readiness

By Ali Alkış

Nonproliferation

Introduction

Nuclear Sector – An Overview

Initial Attempts

A New Strategy for Nuclear Energy

Turkish Nuclear Security Approach

Commitment to Global Nuclear Security Norms, Rules, and Laws

Strong Cooperation with the IAEA

Domestic Capacity

Risk Environment

Challenges

Conclusion

Notes

Recent & Related

About Stimson

Transparency

People

Contact

Nuclear Security for Nuclear Newcomers: Exploring Türkiye’s Readiness

By Ali Alkış

Nonproliferation

Introduction

Nuclear Sector – An Overview

Initial Attempts

A New Strategy for Nuclear Energy

Turkish Nuclear Security Approach

Commitment to Global Nuclear Security Norms, Rules, and Laws

Strong Cooperation with the IAEA

Domestic Capacity

Risk Environment

Challenges

Conclusion

Notes

Recent & Related

About Stimson

Transparency

People

Contact

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