North Korea conducted a satellite launch on November 21, first reported by Japanese and South Korean sources. The next day, North Korean media announced a successful launch from the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground of the “Chollima -1” space-launch vehicle (SLV) orbiting the “Malligyong-1” reconnaissance satellite. This was the first successful launch of the Chollima-1 SLV after two previous failures. Based on images of the launch, there do not appear to have been any external changes to the SLV over the three launches, and Pyongyang probably regards the Chollima-1 as ready for further satellite launches.
The Malligyong-1 has been confirmed in orbit, making it North Korea’s first reconnaissance satellite, but it has not yet been confirmed to be functioning and in communication with the ground. Pyongyang has already obtained domestic and international prestige and propaganda value from orbiting the satellite, including by beating South Korea to the punch, but the Malligyong-1’s substantive contribution to North Korea’s military capabilities will depend on the resolution of its imaging system and how many such satellites the North eventually maintains in orbit simultaneously.
Although South Korea has claimed Russia assisted with the launch in the wake of Kim Jong Un’s September 13 summit with President Vladimir Putin, it is highly unlikely that any new equipment or technology could have been provided, installed and checked out in the relatively short time before the launch. While this success was almost certainly due to North Korea’s own engineering and development work, Russian assistance does have the potential to permit Pyongyang to develop more capable satellites and SLVs in the future.
The military contribution of North Korea’s current-generation imaging satellites will probably be modest in light of the satellites’ likely moderate resolution; the availability of better-quality imagery from China, Russia and commercial sources; and the probable substantial contribution of signals intelligence, human sources and open sources. However, as North Korea gains more experience operating its own imagery satellites, adds more satellites (as it has already announced it intends to do), and improves its satellite capabilities, it will likely come to see its imaging satellites as worthwhile and important. Improved satellites will probably will also require larger SLVs to orbit them, and there is already evidence North Korea is working on them.
Read the full analysis on 38 North.
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This article was originally published on 38 North.
North Korea conducted a satellite launch on November 21, first reported by Japanese and South Korean sources. The next day, North Korean media announced a successful launch from the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground of the “Chollima -1” space-launch vehicle (SLV) orbiting the “Malligyong-1” reconnaissance satellite. This was the first successful launch of the Chollima-1 SLV after two previous failures. Based on images of the launch, there do not appear to have been any external changes to the SLV over the three launches, and Pyongyang probably regards the Chollima-1 as ready for further satellite launches.
The Malligyong-1 has been confirmed in orbit, making it North Korea’s first reconnaissance satellite, but it has not yet been confirmed to be functioning and in communication with the ground. Pyongyang has already obtained domestic and international prestige and propaganda value from orbiting the satellite, including by beating South Korea to the punch, but the Malligyong-1’s substantive contribution to North Korea’s military capabilities will depend on the resolution of its imaging system and how many such satellites the North eventually maintains in orbit simultaneously.
Although South Korea has claimed Russia assisted with the launch in the wake of Kim Jong Un’s September 13 summit with President Vladimir Putin, it is highly unlikely that any new equipment or technology could have been provided, installed and checked out in the relatively short time before the launch. While this success was almost certainly due to North Korea’s own engineering and development work, Russian assistance does have the potential to permit Pyongyang to develop more capable satellites and SLVs in the future.
The military contribution of North Korea’s current-generation imaging satellites will probably be modest in light of the satellites’ likely moderate resolution; the availability of better-quality imagery from China, Russia and commercial sources; and the probable substantial contribution of signals intelligence, human sources and open sources. However, as North Korea gains more experience operating its own imagery satellites, adds more satellites (as it has already announced it intends to do), and improves its satellite capabilities, it will likely come to see its imaging satellites as worthwhile and important. Improved satellites will probably will also require larger SLVs to orbit them, and there is already evidence North Korea is working on them.
Read the full analysis on 38 North.
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