Issue Brief

International Nuclear Security Forum Project

How Doing Justice to Ukraine Can Help Win the Battle for the Future of Nuclear Security

INSF COUNTRY UPDATE

Russia’s occupation of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant has serious implications for nuclear security: urgent action is needed to mitigate risk

By Valeriia Hesse

Nonproliferation

October 3, 2023

The Russian occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in Ukraine has created unprecedented risk in an era of increasing geopolitical tension. Deterring future attacks against nuclear facilities during armed conflict is an essential component of reducing nuclear risk and supporting nuclear industry – but how can this be achieved at a time when international cooperation has waned to new lows? This issue brief explores how the international nuclear security system must avoid nuclear disaster at ZNPP, end the Russian occupation of the plant, and prevent similar high-risk events from taking place in the future.

Introduction

Previously regarded as a state with high levels and standards of nuclear security, Ukraine found itself hosting “the most dangerous place in the world”– Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).¹

Russia’s invasion and occupation of the plant has put nuclear security and safety under threat. Nuclear security issues turned out to affect a broader and deeper range of affairs than the world had thought. It is no longer only about keeping unauthorized non-state actors away from nuclear facilities but also about dealing with the threats coming from a state actor, whose brutal actions have had a ripple effect on the whole nuclear industry, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as the geopolitics of fuel supplies, once again highlighting the importance of energy security and diversification of suppliers.

There are a multitude of issues that need to be addressed to mitigate the drastic consequences of the invasion for global nuclear security. This memo aims to provide analysis and recommendations along the lines of the following policy goals:

short term – to avoid nuclear accident at ZNPP
medium term – to end the occupation of the plant
long term – to prevent similar situations in the future.

How a Nuclear Power Plant Became Weaponized

Ukraine’s State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate notified the IAEA of the imposition of martial law on February 24, 2022.² Over a week later on March 4, the world held its breath as Russian troops shelled the ZNPP site, hitting the plant’s training center a few hundred meters from the reactor units with a projectile, starting a fire, and eventually occupying the facility.³ ⁴

According to reports, Russia ended up stationing more than 500 troops, deploying heavy artillery batteries, and laying anti-personnel mines along the shores of the Kakhov reservoir near the plant.⁵ Furthermore, it established a State-run Joint Stock Company (JSC) “Operating Organization of the ZNPP” in October 2022 in an attempt to formalize operational control.⁶ The risks are unprecedented: for the first time in history, a country with such a large and well-established nuclear industry is war-torn, and one of its nuclear power plants is occupied by a state actor, putting nuclear security and safety under imminent threat.

The war influences the interface between nuclear security and safety of peaceful nuclear infrastructure.⁷ The safety of operation depends on the functionality of all systems, especially freedom from physical damage by military action, as well as on the psychological state of the individual operators. The instability of a war zone and the actions of the Russian military and Rosatom⁸ do not provide a reliable security environment. The very presence of unauthorized military personnel on the territory of ZNPP violates the essence of nuclear security. ZNPP was severely affected by shelling, air attacks, reduced staffing levels, difficult working conditions, frequent losses of off-site power, disruption to the supply chain, and the lack of spare parts, as well as deviations from planned activities and normal operations.⁹ The human factor played a huge role in both the Chornobyl and Fukushima accidents, and the reported abductions, beatings, coercion of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant personnel presented elevated risks of another manmade radiological emergency.¹⁰ With only one out of 6 power lines available — the Dniprovska 750 kV – the ZNPP’s off-site power supply remains highly vulnerable in terms of its redundancy and reliability.¹¹

The attacks on and seizure of this nuclear power facility signify the weaponization of this type of critical infrastructure in Ukraine¹² and the instrumentalization of radiophobia. Radiophobia is a phenomenon widely observed since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, through Chornobyl in 1986 and Fukushima in 2011, and can be defined as extreme risk perception in relation to ionizing radiation.¹³ Its sociopsychological effects can be exploited for military compellence and intimidation purposes. By occupying the plant, Russian forces got a strategic advantage of being able to conduct military activities against Ukrainian forces on the opposite shore of Kakhov Reservoir, knowing that they would have a hard time fighting back.¹⁴ Ukrainian authorities shared a common understanding that one of the goals of Russia’s actions is to intimidate the state and society in order to achieve concessions and to influence Ukraine’s partners with the aim of weakening their support for Ukraine.¹⁵ Ukrainian institutions conveyed the position that threats are taken seriously, but intimidation would not work. At the same time, the population must be prepared for any emergency situations, and the state must provide an action plan.¹⁶

How Mitigating the Risks Is Complicated

It was previously commonly believed that the threats to nuclear security stemmed from non-state actors. Russia’s war against Ukraine taught the world that states can also pursue irresponsible nuclear behaviors. There is no comprehensive, legally binding international document addressing attacks on nuclear facilities yet. Still, it would be a mistake to claim they are not regulated. Attacks on nuclear installations are explicitly prohibited under international humanitarian law through Additional Protocols I and II to Geneva Conventions (1977).¹⁷ Ratification by over 170 states suggests this is a widely accepted international norm and standard of behavior. Though the United States, for example, did not ratify, it is a signatory to Protocol I and is bound not to violate it. Russia ratified the protocol but withdrew from it in 2019, which should have raised questions.¹⁸ At the same time, the protocols include vaguely phrased caveats that can be interpreted to a perpetrator‘s liking and make a case for why attacks are allowed.¹⁹

Additionally, non-binding recognized instruments supplement the international legal framework. The most recent is the 2009 IAEA General Conference (GC) decision on the prohibition of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations during operation or under construction that builds upon previous GC resolutions of 1990 and 1985.²⁰ In 1985, the GC called on all IAEA member states to individually make every possible effort through competent international organs for the adoption of binding international rules prohibiting such attacks.²¹ The 1987 GC Resolution 475 authorized the IAEA Director General to assist the work of the Conference on Disarmament and other competent international organs by undertaking studies within the technical competence and statutory responsibilities of the IAEA.²² However, since the 1990s, there have been no substantive discussions on these issues at the Conference on Disarmament (CD).²³ No progress was reached in pursuing a legally binding instrument, even though the UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a resolution on the Prohibition of Attacks on Nuclear Facilities in 1990²⁴ and CD re-established the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons in 1991, whose Contact Group B was to consider the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities.²⁵ The United States refused to include attacks on nuclear facilities in a radiological weapons convention, which became a major stumbling block for further conversations.²⁶

As a result of failed initiatives, the international community is unprepared for the challenges that Russia’s war against Ukraine has created. After outlining the Seven Indispensable Pillars for nuclear safety and security during armed conflict (Seven Pillars),²⁷ the IAEA initiated further review work in April 2022 and established a working group to review challenges in the application of IAEA safety standards and nuclear security guidance in armed conflicts. The work is underway, with the first phase of the review completed on December 22, 2022, and the second phase to be completed by the end of 2023.²⁸

Throughout the year, it has been obvious how impactful nuclear security’s influence is on international order and how significantly international order influences nuclear security. Russia blocked or manipulated several documents of global importance at such events as the NPT Review Conference and IAEA GC because of references to the ZNPP occupation. The Review Conference draft final document included many points that addressed the current situation and called for abiding by the prohibition of armed attacks or the threat of armed attacks on nuclear installations, as well as for ensuring control by the competent authorities of Ukraine over nuclear facilities within its recognized borders.²⁹ The document expressed opinions with which all other states were ready to agree upon, but was blocked by Russia. Because Russia thwarted the adoption of the document, Russia can be held responsible for undermining progress at the NPT Review Conference, adding to its reputation as an irresponsible actor.³⁰ The IAEA GC adopted several resolutions and decisions in 1985, 1987, 1990, and 2009 regarding armed attacks against nuclear installations, making it remarkable that the GC 2022 not only failed to adopt a standalone resolution of a similar type, but also that its safety and security resolutions were vaguely worded under Russian pressure. The only phrase that made it into the documents stated “the importance of nuclear safety and security regarding peaceful nuclear facilities and materials in all circumstances.”³¹

The IAEA Secretariat developed ad hoc mitigation solutions after a series of shellings in late July and August 2022. Ukraine lauded the “courage and professionalism” of the IAEA mission that was as a result deployed at ZNPP.³² Their presence correlated with a significant reduction of military activities around the plant starting from November 2022,³³ although fighting-induced power cuts continued to pose severe safety risks.³⁴ The IAEA negotiated and deployed a permanent mission to ZNPP and all other Ukrainian nuclear power plants. However, it showed a limited capacity to mitigate the situation, partially because no previous internationally approved action plan existed. Energoatom authorities noted the absence of benefits from IAEA’s early visits to Ukraine and suspected bias due to the presence of 1/4 (about 100) Russian nationals in its leadership, and condemned the initial absence of calls from the IAEA for Russia to demilitarize the territory of the station and return full control to Ukraine.³⁵ (While the IAEA has since launched a concerted effort to negotiate a safety and security zone around ZNPP, the initiatives have yet to bear fruit. ³⁶) The IAEA also neither confirmed nor denied the allegations of torture³⁷ of Ukrainian ZNPP personnel by Russian forces. However, it did admit that the Ukrainian staff is under constant high stress and pressure, with some even being detained.³⁸ Meanwhile, with time passing, the IAEA’s attempted neutral language in its reports on the topic, even if inadvertently, normalizes the occupation in readers’ minds³⁹ and, consequently, sends biased signal.

This not only exposes the gaps in the existing nuclear security order, but also highlights the biggest flaws in implementing international norms. The international security architecture showed limited capabilities to mitigate the situation due to the absence of workable enforcement mechanisms, especially when it involves the interests of major states. Additionally, all key security decisions go through the UN Security Council, which has been deadlocked by the Russian veto since the beginning of the war. ⁴⁰ Other multilateral efforts show very limited success as well.

How to Achieve the Short, Medium, and Long-Term Goals

The international community has expressed substantial support for Ukraine and emphasized that it has been operating its nuclear facilities safely and reliably for decades, adhering to all internationally recognized principles. Providing justice to Ukraine can help win the battle for the future of nuclear safety and security. Russia’s brutal actions against Ukraine’s nuclear industry should not be tolerated, otherwise the world risks opening Pandora’s box by normalizing the weaponization of nuclear facilities. To that end, the short-term key goal is to avoid a nuclear accident at the occupied ZNPP, the medium-term goal is to end the occupation of the plant, and the long-term goal is to prevent similar dramatic events from happening in the future through devising enforceable, legally binding regulation.

Short-term Goal: Avoid a Nuclear Accident. As has recently become known, Ukraine made an unsuccessful attempt to retake the plant in October 2022 with only infantry.⁴¹ The Ukrainians expected that the Russians would not use artillery against their ground troops, since using artillery on the premises of or around a nuclear plant poses severe risks.⁴² However, when the Ukrainians approached, Russian forces began shelling them on the water of Kakhovka Reservoir using tanks and artillery.⁴³ The Russians created similar conditions to a game of chicken traditionally applied to nuclear weapons: the more rational actor must back off and therefore loses – Ukraine was forced to retreat from the plant in order to avoid nuclear disaster.⁴⁴ The tactic and strategy Russia used can become a dangerous precedent, and has a possibility to be abused again in similar contexts of conflict. Ukraine has all rights to retake its territory according to UN Charter Article 51.⁴⁵ However, to avoid an accident in the current circumstances, the only solution is for the warring parties to agree that the plant’s future will depend on the outcome of the surrounding military action. IAEA’s work ensuring that ZNPP is neither attacked nor used to launch attacks from⁴⁶ appears to be the best available option, given that the safety and security zone negotiations failed.

Medium-term Goal: End ZNPP Occupation. The first step in this direction is a verifiable removal of all Russian military personnel and equipment from ZNPP premises. Although Ukraine’s speech at the 66th General Conference of the IAEA was revealing and bold, it lacked proposals for practical steps to de-occupy the ZNPP.⁴⁷ Russia’s ubiquitous influence impeded the adoption of meaningful resolutions for ZNPP at GC 2022. Nonetheless, on November 17, the IAEA Board of Governors (BoG) called on Russia to “immediately cease all actions against and at nuclear facilities in Ukraine.”⁴⁸ The Board is an expert body of 35 rotating members, unlike the IAEA GC, where delegations from all member states participate.

To ensure the de-occupation of ZNPP and send the right signals globally, it is imperative to reduce Russia’s influence within the IAEA and exert pressure in response to its violation of the spirit of the organization. Stripping Russia of privileges and immunities due to systemic violations of the Statute is a prudent tactic because attempting to exclude Russia completely may backfire. Given the role and large share of the Russian Federation in the global nuclear industry, an actual expulsion could lead to the collapse of the IAEA and the establishment of alternative bilateral instruments of export control that existed before the Agency.

Ukraine should prioritize increasing its permanent representation in Vienna and the share of Ukrainians in the IAEA secretariat, which will strengthen Ukraine’s position with the Agency relative to Russia. Connecting with civil society engaged in non-proliferation research through professional discussions or establishing a consultation mechanism will also allow Ukraine to have a more comprehensive overview of the situation and options as well as to devise a more targeted and complex foreign policy. Ukraine should also encourage partners to set up a special relief fund for nuclear safety and security, which would allow the hiring of Ukrainian cost-free experts and junior professional officers to the IAEA. It could later be expanded to hire personnel from other underrepresented countries and avoid the domination of particular nationalities within the Agency, which would also benefit global nuclear security.

The expansion of sanctions against the Russian state corporation Rosatom and its affiliated companies and institutions would exert further pressure for Russia to de-occupy ZNPP, especially if lifting such sanctions is conditional on ZNPP de-occupation. The European Parliament’s resolution that includes a call to the nuclear sector to extend sanctions against Russia is a positive development.⁴⁹ However, imposition of sanctions will depend on diversification capabilities to replace the Russian market segment. Generally, the EU and US are more than 20% dependent on Russia for nuclear supplies and services. Russia is a major uranium supplier and is even more dominant in conversion and enrichment (46% of the world’s enrichment capacity).⁵⁰ The new G7 nuclear fuel deal aims to reduce Russia’s influence. Canada, France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States have identified potential areas of nuclear fuel cooperation to maintain a stable supply and create a global commercial nuclear fuel market (uranium mining, conversion, enrichment, and production).⁵¹ Generally, there is a need for more attention to global policy aspects surrounding the nuclear industry and closer cooperation, for example, with the biggest uranium miners like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Namibia, and Niger.

Long-term Goal: Preventing Attack Against Nuclear Facilities. Finally, international law needs rules that do not merely state the prohibition of attacks on nuclear installations, but that outline an enforcement plan. Ukraine has found itself in the center of international attention given its unprecedented experience. Ukraine could leverage this position to design a legally binding document to prohibit attacks on nuclear installations, becoming a leader in reducing the risks to nuclear security. There is a clear need for adopting new legally binding norms that could, for example, foresee immediate imposition of sanctions against the perpetrator’s nuclear industry, or authorize instant deployment of IAEA safety and security missions to the victim’s facilities alongside a UNGA-approved security forces deployment. Luckily, the initiative to convene the UN General Assembly whenever UNSC members exercise their veto power and its support by the US was a decent first step towards a broader discussion on transferring decision-making to the UNGA.⁵²

Some experts say there is no need for a new legally binding instrument because such instruments already exist.⁵³ However, this analysis suggests strong evidence that the existing norm does not provide a solid basis for deterring or reacting to military attacks against nuclear facilities in a war. Additionally, arguing that an improved regulation will weaken the current one is comparable to a claim that there was no need to invent modern judicial systems and that the Code of Hammurabi was good enough.^{⁵⁴“Code of Hammurabi.” Britannica, accessed April 22, 2023, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Code-of-Hammurabi.}Nuclear industries and individual facilities have become much more complex since 1977. It is in the world’s interest to make a new binding instrument regulating their protection from military attacks that is unambiguous and covers different types of nuclear infrastructure and activities to reflect all its complexities. Some states already recognize the need for precise and clear rules and the need to record lessons learned from Ukraine, and are working closely with the IAEA to anticipate and respond to future challenges.⁵⁵

Conclusion: Action Plan

The IAEA made a laudable ad hoc effort in protecting the third pillar of the NPT and exercising nuclear diplomacy by announcing the seven pillars of nuclear safety and security, setting up missions at all nuclear power plants across Ukraine, and continuously working on ensuring protection from military attacks from and on ZNPP. At the same time, the situation clearly calls for developing special norms on nuclear safety and security in war zones and, most importantly, ensuring the possibility of their implementation (in the case of a rogue actor refusing to follow them). Ultimately, the situation highlights the importance of reforming how the international security architecture functions today.

The Russian Federation should bear responsibility for violations of international nuclear norms, particularly the IAEA Statute. Its military takeover of the nuclear power plant is setting a horrifying precedent in history, and if the state does not face drastic consequences for its actions, others may be willing to mimic such behavior in the future. The immediate goal of the global community is to exclude the possibility of a military action-induced nuclear accident. Therefore, all efforts should be aimed at removing Russia’s military personnel and equipment from the plant. The end of the occupation of ZNPP will mostly depend on the surrounding military action. Still, states’ solidarity will also play a key role in exerting pressure by imposing sanctions on the Russian nuclear industry and diversifying supplies and services. At the same time, the CD-based renegotiation of a legally binding instrument to prohibit military attacks on nuclear infrastructure should not only focus on setting the rules but also on their implementation. For example, it could provide for the automatic establishment of an IAEA safety and security zone, automatic sanctions against the aggressor’s nuclear industry, and UNGA approval of the security and protection forces mission to the country at war.

Ukraine’s prevalence against a rogue actor as a victim of aggression on its nuclear industry would benefit the international community. It would show that irresponsible nuclear behavior will not be tolerated no matter who and how influential the perpetrator is. This can be called ‘pragmatic internationalism:’ a system based on the deep understanding (and proper reasoning) that enhancing security and prosperity anywhere in the world is not just a noble goal but a security, economic, and environmental necessity.

Valeriia Hesse is a non-resident fellow at the Odesa Centre for Nonproliferation (OdCNP), a research consultant at Open Nuclear Network (ONN), and a management and research consultant at Atomic Reporters (AR). She specializes in international organizations and regimes in nuclear nonproliferation (focusing on nuclear safeguards and security), analyses Russia’s nuclear policy as well as the potential future scenarios for risk reduction, nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament.

She is a certified PRINCE2 project manager with extensive experience in international educational event and conference management, eager to improve and innovate. Ms. Hesse was a visiting researcher at the James Martin Centre for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), a consultant at the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS), and an intern at the Division of Concepts and Planning at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Department of Safeguards and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Valeriia is a Fulbright scholar. She obtained her Master’s degree in Nonproliferation and International Security from the University of Georgia (USA) and has a Bachelor’s and a Master’s in International Relations from Odesa I.I. Mechnykov National University (Ukraine).

Ms. Hesse is the Annual Meeting Plenary Committee Chair & Diversity Committee member at the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), and a member of Women in Nuclear (WiN) IAEA and Black Sea Women in Nuclear Network (BSWN).

Notes

1
“Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plant Zaporizhzhia May Be World’s Most Dangerous Place Right Now.” CBS News. November 21, 2022. Video, https://www.cbsnews.com/video/zaporizhzhia-rafael-mariano-grossi-iaea-60-minutes-video-2022-11-20/.
2
Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine. 2023. Vienna: IAEA, p.1., accessed September 8 https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/23/02/nuclear-safety-security-and-safeguards-in-ukraine-feb-2023.pdf.
3
Ibid., p.4. Unfortunately, Ukraine was insufficiently prepared for the threat of occupation of a nuclear facility, although there had been a precedent with the research reactor in Sevastopol.
4
Chumak, Dmytro. 2016. “The Implications of the Ukraine Conflict for National Nuclear Security Policy.” EU Non-Proliferation Consortium Non-Proliferation Papers (53): 1-16, p.2, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Implications-Ukraine-conflict-national-nuclear-security-policy.pdf.
5
Hinshaw, Drew and Joe Pakinson. 2022. “Russian Army Turns Ukraine’s Largest Nuclear Plant into a Military Base.” Wall Street Journal, July 5, 2022 accessed April 22, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-army-turns-ukraines-largest-nuclear-plant-into-a-military-base-11657035694.
6
Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine. 2023. Vienna: IAEA., p.5.
7
Security – physical security from unauthorized actors; safety – Safe functioning of all systems from technological standpoint.
8
Tirone, Jonathan. 2022. “Russia Forcing Ukraine Workers into Rosatom After Nuclear Theft.” Bloomberg, September 30, 2022, accessed April 22, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09-30/russia-forcing-ukraine-workers-into-rosatom-after-nuclear-theft?leadSource=uverify%20wall.
9
Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine. 2023. Vienna: IAEA., p.5.
10
Parkinson, Joe and Drew Hinshaw. 2022. “‘The Hole’: Gruesome Accounts of Russian Occupation Emerge from Ukrainian Nuclear Plant.” Wall Street Journal, November 18, 2022, accessed April 22, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-occupation-of-nuclear-plant-turns-brutal-with-accusations-of-torture-and-beatings-11668786893?mod=hp_lead_pos3; Badiuk, Olena. “‘Yaderna VʼYaznytsya’: Yak Rosiya Peretvoryla ZAES Na Velyku Kativnyu, Zaluchyvshy Rosatom [‘Nuclear Prison’: how Russia Turned the ZNPP into a Large Torture Chamber by Involving Rosatom].” Radio Svoboda. Radio Svoboda, September 19, 2023. https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/novyny-pryazovya-rosatom-sanktsiyi-zaporizka-aes-kativnya/32597882.html.
11
“Update 153 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine.” International Atomic Energy Agency, last modified April 13, accessed April 22, 2023, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-153-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine?fbclid=IwAR30O5reEYxmm5D9Htjp-GdP1iH5XmlTRXjt4VgbEhcm1YfNFcPaMrNcB5w.
12
Diaz-Maurin, François. 2022. “A Ukrainian Expert Assesses the Possible Impact of a Military Attack on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, September 2, 2022, accessed April 22, 2023. https://thebulletin.org/2022/09/a-ukrainian-expert-assesses-the-possible-impact-of-a-military-attack-on-the-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant/.
13
Lindberg, John C. H. and Denali Archer. 2022. “Radiophobia: Useful Concept, or Ostracising Term?” Progress in Nuclear Energy 149: 104280. doi:10.1016/j.pnucene.2022.104280. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S014919702200155X.
14
Ibid.
15
“Kuleba: Ryzyk Vchynennya Rosiyeyu Teraktu Na ZAES Stavytʹ Pid Zahrozu Vesʹ Prostir OBSE [Kuleba: The Risk of Russia Committing a Terrorist Attack at the ZNPP Endangers the Entire OSCE Area].” Interfax-Ukraiina. Interfax-Ukraiina, June 28, 2023. https://interfax.com.ua/news/general/919657.html; “Rosiya Mozhe Vlashtuvaty Terakt Na ZAES, Shchob Zalyakaty Svit Naslidkamy Viyny Y Politychno Vplynuty Na Kontrnastup Ukrayiny [Russia May Stage a Terrorist Attack on the ZNPP to Intimidate the World with the Consequences of War and Politically Influence Ukraine’s Counteroffensive].” President of Ukraine. President of Ukraine, July 1, 2023. https://www.president.gov.ua/news/rosiya-mozhe-vlashtuvati-terakt-na-zaes-shob-zalyakati-svit-83993; “”Na Vore Shapka Horyt”: Reznikov Rizko Vidpoviv Na Zayavy RF Pro “Brudnu Bombu” [Reznikov Sharply Responded to the Russian Federation’s Statements about the “Dirty Bomb”].” RBC-Ukraine. October 23, 2022. https://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/na-vore-shapka-gorit-reznikov-rizko-vidpoviv-1666555846.html.
16
Zelenskyy, Volodymyr. “10 steps to peace negotiations with the Russian Federation. “Peace formula” from Zelensky at the G20 summit [10 krokiv do perehovoriv pro myr z RF. “Formula myru” vid Zelensʹkoho na samiti G20]” Evropeiska Pravda, last modified November 15, accessed April 22, 2023, https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2022/11/15/7150645/.; “Speech of the Delegation of Ukraine at the General Debate of the First Committee of the 77th Session of the UN General Assembly.” Permanent representation of Ukraine at the UN, last modified October 4, 2022, accessed April 22, 2023, https://ukraineun.org/press-center/802-vystup-delegatsiy-ukrayny-na-zagalnyh-debatah-pershogo-komitetu-77-y-sesiy-ga-oon/.; The National Security Council issued instructions on how to act in the event of a nuclear attack “How to Save Yourself from a “Dirty Bomb”, the use of Nuclear Weapons Or an Accident at a Nuclear Power Plant [Yak Vryatuvatysʹ Vid “brudnoyi Bomby”, Zastosuvannya Yadernoyi Zbroyi Chy Avariyi Na AES].” Dovidka.info, accessed April 22, 2023, https://dovidka.info/yak-diyaty-v-razi-zastosuvannya-brudnoyi-bomby-yadernoyi-ataky-chy-avariyi-na-aes/.
17
“Article 56 – Protection of Works and Installations Containing Dangerous Forces.” International Humanitarian Law Databases. ICRC, Accessed September 8, 2023. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-56.
18
Moore, George. 2022. “How International Law Applies to Attacks on Nuclear and Associated Facilities in Ukraine.” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March 6, 2022, accessed April 22, 2023, https://thebulletin.org/2022/03/how-international-law-applies-to-attacks-on-nuclear-and-associated-facilities-in-ukraine/.
19
Moore, George. 2022. “Why the World must Protect Nuclear Reactors from Military Attacks. Now.” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, December 15, 2022, accessed April 22, 2023, https://thebulletin.org/2022/12/why-the-world-must-protect-nuclear-reactors-from-military-attacks-now/.
20
GC(53)/DEC/13 Prohibition of Armed Attack Or Threat of Attack Against Nuclear Installations, during Operation or Under Construction, 2009. IAEA. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc53dec-13_en.pdf.
21
GC(XXIX)/RES/444 Protection of Nuclear Installations Devoted to Peaceful Purposes Against Armed Attacks, 1985. IAEA. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc29res-444_en.pdf.
22
GC(XXX3)/RES/475 Measures to Strengthen International Co-Operation in Nuclear Safety and Radiological Protection, 1987. IAEA. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc31res-475_en.pdf.
23
Carlson, John. 2022. Prohibition of Military Attacks on Nuclear Facilities. September 12, 2022, accessed April 22, 2023, https://vcdnp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Attacks-on-nuclear-facilities_Carlson-updated.pdf; GC(XXXV)/INF/297 Measures to Strengthen International Co-Operation in Matters Relating to Nuclear Safety and Radiological Protection, 2022. IAEA. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc35inf-297_en.pdf.
24
A/RES/45/58/J Prohibition of Attacks on Nuclear Facilities, 1990. UNGA. http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/UNGA/1990/94.pdf.
25
GC(XXXV)/INF/297 Measures to Strengthen International Co-Operation in Matters Relating to Nuclear Safety and Radiological Protection, 2022. IAEA. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc35inf-297_en.pdf.
26
Moore, George. 2022. “How International Law Applies to Attacks on Nuclear and Associated Facilities in Ukraine.” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March 6, 2022, accessed April 22, 2023, https://thebulletin.org/2022/03/how-international-law-applies-to-attacks-on-nuclear-and-associated-facilities-in-ukraine/.
27
Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine. 2023. Vienna: IAEA., p.6.
28
Ibid., p.28-33.
29
NPT/CONF.2020/CRP.1/Rev.2 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2022, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2022/documents/CRP1_Rev2.pdf.
30
Rosa, Gabriela. 2022. “Updates from the 10th NPT Review Conference.” Arms Control Association, August 26, 2022, accessed April 22, 2023, https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2022/updates-10th-NPT-RevCon.
31
Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine. 2023. Vienna: IAEA., p.32.
32
“Speech of the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the UN Serhiy Kyslytsia at the Meeting of the UN Security Council regarding the Situation at the Zaporizhzhia NPP [Vystup Postiynoho Predstavnyka Ukrayiny Pry OON Serhiya Kyslytsi Na Zasidanni RB OON Shchodo Sytuatsiyi Na Zaporizʹkiy AES] .” Permanent representation of Ukraine at the UN, last modified September 6, 2022, accessed April 22, 2023, https://ukraineun.org/press-center/794-vystup-postiynogo-predstavnyka-ukrayny-pry-oon-sergiya-kyslytsi-na-zasidanni-rb-oon-shchodo-sytuatsiy-na-zaporizkiy-aes/.
33
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