This book provides a critical and contemporary assessment of the programs intended to reduce the nuclear, biological and chemical weapons’ proliferation risks stemming from collapse of the Former Soviet Union (FSU). These risks include an alarming volume of unsecured materials that could be easily stolen by terrorists and used in weapons production, and the urgent need to redirect the focus of former weapons’ scientists toward civilian and commercial enterprises. The book offers a fresh and bold approach to building on programs created at the end of the Cold War aimed at dismantling Soviet-era weapon programs and engaging scientists in peaceful pursuits. Brian Finlay and Elizabeth Turpen review the origins and history of the Cooperative Nonproliferation Programs (CNP) and also identify the structural weaknesses and other shortcomings that result from shifting priorities, the inherent fatigue of programs that have been in place for 15 years, and some of the unintended consequences of decisions made early in the CNP history. The authors also explore ways in which to revitalize this important effort and propose new approaches to more productively engage the private sector and post-Soviet counterparts both in and outside of government.