Editor’s Note: Djallel Khechib is a geopolitical researcher and PhD candidate in Asian Studies and International Relations at the University of Algiers 3 (defense expected Spring 2026). He holds three master’s degrees from Algiers 3, Marmara University, and Luiss Guido Carli University, specializing in international relations and Mediterranean security.
Since 2020, he has been a research fellow at CIGA in Istanbul and has worked with research institutions across Turkey, the Arab world, and Europe. His research focuses on great and middle power politics and regional dynamics in Eurasia, North Africa, and the Mediterranean.
By Hafed Al-Ghwell, Senior Fellow and Director, North Africa Program
Since the outbreak of the Guerguerat crisis in November 2020, relations between Algeria and Morocco have steadily deteriorated, marked by a dangerous escalation. Several indicators highlight the seriousness of this trend, raising concerns that both states may be “sleepwalking into war.” Such instability could have significant repercussions not only for the Maghreb but also for the northern shores of the Mediterranean.
This precarious situation calls for a proactive European Union response grounded in what we call a strategy of “soft dual containment.” Through a policy of effective neutrality diplomacy, EU member states should maintain balance while promoting confidence-building and mutual interdependence between the two rivals. The aim would be to contain the escalation, mitigate its wider consequences, and lay the groundwork for a sustainable resolution.
“Sleepwalking into War”: Five Dangerous Levels of Escalation
Five concrete indicators highlight the gravity of the ongoing escalation between Algeria and Morocco.
Internationally, Algeria has deepened ties with Eurasian powers such as Russia and China, joined the BRICS-linked New Development Bank, and expanded outreach to Asia. Morocco, by contrast, aligns closely with the United States and Western partners, positioning itself as a key security actor in Africa. These opposing orientations reinforce divergent threat perceptions.
Regionally, the crisis centers on Western Sahara. Morocco claims sovereignty and labels the Polisario Front a separatist threat, while Algeria supports Sahrawi self-determination. Tensions intensified after Morocco normalized relations with Israel in 2020 in exchange for U.S. recognition of its sovereignty claim — an arrangement Algeria views as a strategic encirclement.
Militarily, both states lead Africa in arms imports, fueling a classic security dilemma. Algeria relies heavily on Russian systems, including advanced aircraft and submarines, while Morocco sources primarily from the U.S., France, and Israel, expanding missile and drone capabilities. The resulting arms race entrenches mutual suspicion.
Economically, minimal interdependence and the paralysis of the Arab Maghreb Union remove incentives for restraint. Bilateral trade has collapsed, and Algeria’s 2021 suspension of the Maghreb–Europe Gas Pipeline deepened the rupture. Lastly, culturally, disputes over shared heritage have fueled nationalist narratives and online hostility. Together, these dynamics evoke what historian Christopher Clark termed “sleepwalkers into war.”
How Does Escalation Harm EU Countries?
Due to the geographical proximity and dense human and economic interdependence, any Algeria–Morocco war would undermine the security of EU member states — especially Italy, France, and Spain. If European countries are perceived as backing one side, they risk harming relations with the other and facing retaliatory pressure. Consequently, European interests remain highly exposed. Over the past five years, escalating tensions between Algeria and Morocco have already demonstrated their negative impact on European interests.
For instance, the escalation that followed the Guerguerat crisis (after November 2020) endangered energy security and the stability of gas supplies to Spain. Following Algeria’s severance of diplomatic ties with Morocco in August 2021, it ceased using the Maghreb–Europe Gas Pipeline (MEG) in November. This pipeline, which passes through Morocco, had supplied around 12 billion cubic meters of gas annually to Spain.
Although the undersea Medgaz pipeline connecting Algeria directly to Spain was activated, it only supplies about 8 billion cubic meters annually — an amount insufficient to replace what was lost through the overland route via Morocco. Additionally, Algeria stipulated that Spain must not re-export any Algerian gas to Morocco, warning that any breach could lead to the termination of their contract — conditions Madrid viewed as a restriction on its sovereignty.
Tensions escalated further in March 2022 when Spain officially endorsed Morocco’s autonomy plan for Western Sahara. Algeria responded by immediately suspending the 2002 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain, which had committed both countries to collaboration in areas such as migration control. Algeria also imposed a partial ban on Spanish imports and restricted banking transactions with Spain. According to trade data, Spanish exports to Algeria dropped by 45.9% in 2022 compared to 2021, and the downward trend continued into early 2023.
Although Algeria ultimately avoided using gas supplies to pressure the Sánchez government, the episode nevertheless generated concerns in Spain about possible political pressure and cast doubts on Algeria’s reliability as an energy partner — especially in the context of Europe’s energy crisis following the Russia–Ukraine war.
Ironically, Spain’s pro-Moroccan stance in March 2022 was intended to ease the severe diplomatic crisis with Rabat that began in March 2021, when Spain admitted Polisario Front leader Brahim Ghali for COVID-19 treatment. In retaliation, Morocco used migration as leverage, pressuring Spain to arrest and prosecute Ghali for alleged human rights violations. Moroccan border forces turned a blind eye as more than 10,000 migrants crossed into the Spanish-controlled enclave of Ceuta in North Africa.
This crisis was only resolved after Madrid shifted its position on Western Sahara. Maintaining pragmatic relations with Morocco was deemed vital — not only for cooperation on migration and transit issues, but also for fishing rights in Moroccan-controlled waters off Western Sahara and investments in the region’s phosphate resources. Additionally, Morocco is a key EU partner in advancing green energy goals.
The complex relationship between Spain, Algeria, and Morocco serves as a practical example of the risks facing any European country amid continued tensions between Algiers and Rabat, and of the constraints on EU member states’ ability to act independently on North African issues — especially the Western Sahara conflict.
The recent diplomatic crisis between France and Algeria — sparked by Paris’ unequivocal recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara — offers further evidence of this volatility.
What Should the European Union Do?
A close examination of European states’ positions toward the Algerian-Moroccan dispute reveals the absence of a unified EU stance. Instead, each country pursues its own agenda, prioritizing national interests and bilateral ties with either Algeria or Morocco, often at the expense of broader EU coherence. While France and Spain currently support Morocco’s autonomy plan for Western Sahara, Italy and Germany maintain neutrality, leveraging their ties with Algeria, particularly in the energy sector.
This lack of coordination weakens the EU’s ability to act decisively on North Africa and undermines the EU’s capacity to act as a coherent bloc. It also risks eroding its liberal values when confronted with pressure to prioritize pragmatic national interests.
To mitigate the dangers of this escalating rivalry in the Maghreb, EU countries must adopt a proactive and unified vision centered on a “Soft Dual Containment” strategy. This approach prioritizes effective neutrality, fosters confidence-building between the two rivals, and reinforces mutual interests across the Mediterranean.
It seeks to maintain a balance in the EU’s relations with both competitors, avoiding coercive policies and overt alignment. Its aim is to deter escalation and moderate destabilizing behavior for the safeguarding of collective interests. This can be achieved through non-confrontational tools, including mediation diplomacy, effective neutrality, economic partnerships, and joint cultural initiatives.
To implement this approach, the EU must establish effective internal coordination, potentially through the creation of a mechanism within its External Action Service. This could include appointing a special envoy or forming a working group tasked with managing the Maghreb conflict in a consistent and unified manner. Moreover, the EU should impose strict conditions on its member states to prevent any of them from exploiting the crisis for unilateral gain — thus reinforcing the Union’s credibility as a neutral and trustworthy actor.
The EU might also consider deepening trade relations with both Algeria and Morocco on the condition of their willingness to enter negotiations and demonstrate genuine commitment to a mutually acceptable resolution. Simultaneously, it could offer development incentives linked to progress in diplomatic engagement.
A cornerstone of this approach lies in initiating joint economic projects that foster mutual interdependence, helping deter future crises. Algeria could be invited to participate in clean energy initiatives akin to those signed with Morocco in 2022 — enhancing energy security for Europe while ensuring shared benefits from the Maghreb’s solar and wind resources. Another initiative could be a green energy corridor linking Morocco, Algeria, and Italy. This would provide Algeria with access to both revenues and green energy flows, and potentially incentivize the reactivation of the Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline. Ensuring parity in transnational energy infrastructure would help deter any moves to disrupt such critical links.
In parallel, the EU should support confidence-building measures through Track II diplomacy. Such initiatives could be integrated with existing frameworks like the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) or platforms like the Union for the Mediterranean, which could fund joint cultural and educational programs that ease symbolic disputes related to heritage and cultural competition, and cultivate people-to-people connections that resist polarization and escalation.
A potentially impactful initiative would be for the EU to finance a Maghreb media outlet in Europe with a Mediterranean identity — staffed by Maghrebians and Europeans committed to promoting peaceful, diplomatic solutions to the conflict, in pursuit of the common good of both regions.
The EU should also consider revising its migration and mobility frameworks for the peoples and elites of both shores within the framework of a “Mediterranean Space.” Such reforms could reduce irregular migration and stimulate regional growth through mutual recognition of talent and the opening of joint labor and cooperation opportunities.
Most importantly, the EU must reaffirm liberal democratic values and norms as the guiding compass for its engagement with the Maghreb.
The evolving geopolitical landscape in the Mediterranean makes clear that neither ignoring the crisis between Algeria and Morocco nor taking sides is a sustainable strategic option for the EU.
In this context, the “Soft Dual Containment” approach offers a more credible and effective alternative — flexible enough to manage escalation, and firm enough to protect European interests. By combining effective neutrality diplomacy, trust-building initiatives, and economic interdependence, the EU can not only prevent short-term destabilization but also pave the way toward long-term resolution.
Only through this approach can the logic of confrontation be replaced by a logic of partnership — anchoring comprehensive security on both shores of the Mediterranean as a shared horizon, rather than a contested battleground.
The Maghreb Dilemma: Why the European Union Must Contain Escalating Tensions Between Algeria and Morocco
By Djallel Khechib
Middle East & North Africa
Escalating tensions between Algeria and Morocco are pushing the Maghreb toward a destabilizing confrontation with direct consequences for European security, energy supply, and migration management. Diverging geopolitical alignments, an intensifying arms race, and the collapse of economic interdependence are reinforcing a classic security dilemma that risks spiraling beyond bilateral control. The fallout is already visible in disrupted gas flows, trade retaliation, and migration pressures affecting countries like Spain, France, and Italy. A fragmented European response has further weakened its ability to manage the crisis, underscoring the need for a coordinated strategy built on neutrality, economic interdependence, and confidence-building measures.
Editor’s Note: Djallel Khechib is a geopolitical researcher and PhD candidate in Asian Studies and International Relations at the University of Algiers 3 (defense expected Spring 2026). He holds three master’s degrees from Algiers 3, Marmara University, and Luiss Guido Carli University, specializing in international relations and Mediterranean security.
Since 2020, he has been a research fellow at CIGA in Istanbul and has worked with research institutions across Turkey, the Arab world, and Europe. His research focuses on great and middle power politics and regional dynamics in Eurasia, North Africa, and the Mediterranean.
By Hafed Al-Ghwell, Senior Fellow and Director, North Africa Program
Since the outbreak of the Guerguerat crisis in November 2020, relations between Algeria and Morocco have steadily deteriorated, marked by a dangerous escalation. Several indicators highlight the seriousness of this trend, raising concerns that both states may be “sleepwalking into war.” Such instability could have significant repercussions not only for the Maghreb but also for the northern shores of the Mediterranean.
This precarious situation calls for a proactive European Union response grounded in what we call a strategy of “soft dual containment.” Through a policy of effective neutrality diplomacy, EU member states should maintain balance while promoting confidence-building and mutual interdependence between the two rivals. The aim would be to contain the escalation, mitigate its wider consequences, and lay the groundwork for a sustainable resolution.
“Sleepwalking into War”: Five Dangerous Levels of Escalation
Five concrete indicators highlight the gravity of the ongoing escalation between Algeria and Morocco.
Internationally, Algeria has deepened ties with Eurasian powers such as Russia and China, joined the BRICS-linked New Development Bank, and expanded outreach to Asia. Morocco, by contrast, aligns closely with the United States and Western partners, positioning itself as a key security actor in Africa. These opposing orientations reinforce divergent threat perceptions.
Regionally, the crisis centers on Western Sahara. Morocco claims sovereignty and labels the Polisario Front a separatist threat, while Algeria supports Sahrawi self-determination. Tensions intensified after Morocco normalized relations with Israel in 2020 in exchange for U.S. recognition of its sovereignty claim — an arrangement Algeria views as a strategic encirclement.
Militarily, both states lead Africa in arms imports, fueling a classic security dilemma. Algeria relies heavily on Russian systems, including advanced aircraft and submarines, while Morocco sources primarily from the U.S., France, and Israel, expanding missile and drone capabilities. The resulting arms race entrenches mutual suspicion.
Economically, minimal interdependence and the paralysis of the Arab Maghreb Union remove incentives for restraint. Bilateral trade has collapsed, and Algeria’s 2021 suspension of the Maghreb–Europe Gas Pipeline deepened the rupture. Lastly, culturally, disputes over shared heritage have fueled nationalist narratives and online hostility. Together, these dynamics evoke what historian Christopher Clark termed “sleepwalkers into war.”
How Does Escalation Harm EU Countries?
Due to the geographical proximity and dense human and economic interdependence, any Algeria–Morocco war would undermine the security of EU member states — especially Italy, France, and Spain. If European countries are perceived as backing one side, they risk harming relations with the other and facing retaliatory pressure. Consequently, European interests remain highly exposed. Over the past five years, escalating tensions between Algeria and Morocco have already demonstrated their negative impact on European interests.
For instance, the escalation that followed the Guerguerat crisis (after November 2020) endangered energy security and the stability of gas supplies to Spain. Following Algeria’s severance of diplomatic ties with Morocco in August 2021, it ceased using the Maghreb–Europe Gas Pipeline (MEG) in November. This pipeline, which passes through Morocco, had supplied around 12 billion cubic meters of gas annually to Spain.
Although the undersea Medgaz pipeline connecting Algeria directly to Spain was activated, it only supplies about 8 billion cubic meters annually — an amount insufficient to replace what was lost through the overland route via Morocco. Additionally, Algeria stipulated that Spain must not re-export any Algerian gas to Morocco, warning that any breach could lead to the termination of their contract — conditions Madrid viewed as a restriction on its sovereignty.
Tensions escalated further in March 2022 when Spain officially endorsed Morocco’s autonomy plan for Western Sahara. Algeria responded by immediately suspending the 2002 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain, which had committed both countries to collaboration in areas such as migration control. Algeria also imposed a partial ban on Spanish imports and restricted banking transactions with Spain. According to trade data, Spanish exports to Algeria dropped by 45.9% in 2022 compared to 2021, and the downward trend continued into early 2023.
Although Algeria ultimately avoided using gas supplies to pressure the Sánchez government, the episode nevertheless generated concerns in Spain about possible political pressure and cast doubts on Algeria’s reliability as an energy partner — especially in the context of Europe’s energy crisis following the Russia–Ukraine war.
Ironically, Spain’s pro-Moroccan stance in March 2022 was intended to ease the severe diplomatic crisis with Rabat that began in March 2021, when Spain admitted Polisario Front leader Brahim Ghali for COVID-19 treatment. In retaliation, Morocco used migration as leverage, pressuring Spain to arrest and prosecute Ghali for alleged human rights violations. Moroccan border forces turned a blind eye as more than 10,000 migrants crossed into the Spanish-controlled enclave of Ceuta in North Africa.
This crisis was only resolved after Madrid shifted its position on Western Sahara. Maintaining pragmatic relations with Morocco was deemed vital — not only for cooperation on migration and transit issues, but also for fishing rights in Moroccan-controlled waters off Western Sahara and investments in the region’s phosphate resources. Additionally, Morocco is a key EU partner in advancing green energy goals.
The complex relationship between Spain, Algeria, and Morocco serves as a practical example of the risks facing any European country amid continued tensions between Algiers and Rabat, and of the constraints on EU member states’ ability to act independently on North African issues — especially the Western Sahara conflict.
The recent diplomatic crisis between France and Algeria — sparked by Paris’ unequivocal recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara — offers further evidence of this volatility.
What Should the European Union Do?
A close examination of European states’ positions toward the Algerian-Moroccan dispute reveals the absence of a unified EU stance. Instead, each country pursues its own agenda, prioritizing national interests and bilateral ties with either Algeria or Morocco, often at the expense of broader EU coherence. While France and Spain currently support Morocco’s autonomy plan for Western Sahara, Italy and Germany maintain neutrality, leveraging their ties with Algeria, particularly in the energy sector.
This lack of coordination weakens the EU’s ability to act decisively on North Africa and undermines the EU’s capacity to act as a coherent bloc. It also risks eroding its liberal values when confronted with pressure to prioritize pragmatic national interests.
To mitigate the dangers of this escalating rivalry in the Maghreb, EU countries must adopt a proactive and unified vision centered on a “Soft Dual Containment” strategy. This approach prioritizes effective neutrality, fosters confidence-building between the two rivals, and reinforces mutual interests across the Mediterranean.
It seeks to maintain a balance in the EU’s relations with both competitors, avoiding coercive policies and overt alignment. Its aim is to deter escalation and moderate destabilizing behavior for the safeguarding of collective interests. This can be achieved through non-confrontational tools, including mediation diplomacy, effective neutrality, economic partnerships, and joint cultural initiatives.
To implement this approach, the EU must establish effective internal coordination, potentially through the creation of a mechanism within its External Action Service. This could include appointing a special envoy or forming a working group tasked with managing the Maghreb conflict in a consistent and unified manner. Moreover, the EU should impose strict conditions on its member states to prevent any of them from exploiting the crisis for unilateral gain — thus reinforcing the Union’s credibility as a neutral and trustworthy actor.
The EU might also consider deepening trade relations with both Algeria and Morocco on the condition of their willingness to enter negotiations and demonstrate genuine commitment to a mutually acceptable resolution. Simultaneously, it could offer development incentives linked to progress in diplomatic engagement.
A cornerstone of this approach lies in initiating joint economic projects that foster mutual interdependence, helping deter future crises. Algeria could be invited to participate in clean energy initiatives akin to those signed with Morocco in 2022 — enhancing energy security for Europe while ensuring shared benefits from the Maghreb’s solar and wind resources. Another initiative could be a green energy corridor linking Morocco, Algeria, and Italy. This would provide Algeria with access to both revenues and green energy flows, and potentially incentivize the reactivation of the Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline. Ensuring parity in transnational energy infrastructure would help deter any moves to disrupt such critical links.
In parallel, the EU should support confidence-building measures through Track II diplomacy. Such initiatives could be integrated with existing frameworks like the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) or platforms like the Union for the Mediterranean, which could fund joint cultural and educational programs that ease symbolic disputes related to heritage and cultural competition, and cultivate people-to-people connections that resist polarization and escalation.
A potentially impactful initiative would be for the EU to finance a Maghreb media outlet in Europe with a Mediterranean identity — staffed by Maghrebians and Europeans committed to promoting peaceful, diplomatic solutions to the conflict, in pursuit of the common good of both regions.
The EU should also consider revising its migration and mobility frameworks for the peoples and elites of both shores within the framework of a “Mediterranean Space.” Such reforms could reduce irregular migration and stimulate regional growth through mutual recognition of talent and the opening of joint labor and cooperation opportunities.
Most importantly, the EU must reaffirm liberal democratic values and norms as the guiding compass for its engagement with the Maghreb.
The evolving geopolitical landscape in the Mediterranean makes clear that neither ignoring the crisis between Algeria and Morocco nor taking sides is a sustainable strategic option for the EU.
In this context, the “Soft Dual Containment” approach offers a more credible and effective alternative — flexible enough to manage escalation, and firm enough to protect European interests. By combining effective neutrality diplomacy, trust-building initiatives, and economic interdependence, the EU can not only prevent short-term destabilization but also pave the way toward long-term resolution.
Only through this approach can the logic of confrontation be replaced by a logic of partnership — anchoring comprehensive security on both shores of the Mediterranean as a shared horizon, rather than a contested battleground.
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