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Global Governance
Innovation Network

Global Governance Innovation Report 2026

Advancing the Pact for the Future and a New Peace & Security Architecture

June 2026

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Please Cite this Publication As

Richard Ponzio, Rebecca Snyder, Nudhara Yusuf, Mark Johnson, Peter Hoffman, and William Durch. 2026. *Global Governance Innovation Report 2026.* The Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., USA

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June 2026

Global Governance Innovation Report 2026

Advancing the Pact for the Future and a New Peace & Security Architecture

> **This report encourages ambitious thinking on renewing global governance, advancing Pact for the Future implementation, and pursuing innovative approaches to strengthen United Nations peace and security governance.**

From armed conflicts in the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and Latin America to daily signs that the planet's health is failing and growing fears about emerging technologies, the need for effective global action has never been greater. Yet resources and political support for international organizations, and for global cooperation writ large, are fast declining. The erosion of global governance—and, in particular, of core institutions, values, and approaches fostered since the Second World War—is especially evident in the peace and security domain, where the United Nations' peacemaking and peacebuilding capacities are all-too-often enfeebled and marginalized. In response, world leaders adopted, in September 2024, the Pact for the Future, Global Digital Compact, and Declaration on Future Generations, designed to chart a new direction for global action to better meet the urgent needs and highest aspirations of humanity. *Global Governance Innovation Report 2026* (GGIR'26) offers refined tools for assessing and boosting implementation of these three global instruments, and ways to overcome obstacles to progress in the run-up to their official high-level reviews by September 2028. Drawing on specific Pact Actions, it further analyzes and recommends steps toward a bolder and more inclusive peace and security architecture to better manage 21st century threats and to revitalize the central aims and credibility of the UN. Against this backdrop, champion governments, motivated international civil servants, and dedicated civil society partners make slow yet steady headway on several of the Pact's major goals in defense of UN values. Increasingly, they look for a new kind of leadership in 2027 and beyond, with the vision, courage, and experience to transform the United Nations by realizing the Pact's full potential.

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Acknowledgements

The Report Team wishes to express its appreciation for the support and encouragement provided by the following individuals from the Stimson Center: Brian Finlay, Rachel Stohl, Vibha Bhatia, Jessie Swanseen, Justine Sullivan, Caitlin Goodman, Kaitlyn Hashem, Joaquin Matamis, and Rachel Palermo.

For peer review of earlier sections (in their personal or organizational capacity) of the report or agreeing to be interviewed for this project, we wish to thank: Kuniko Ashizawa, Tim Bartley, Lars Becker, Nycolas Candido, Marília Closs, Tad Daley, Chandrima Das, Dirk Druet, Michael Eyestone, Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Anne Marie Goetz, Juan Chaves-Gonzalez, Barry Herman, Jeffery Huffines, Miguel Candia Ibarra, Marcus King, Iain Levine, Adam Lupel, Christina McAllister, Erin McCandless, Lauren McGowan, Zachary Paikin, Allison Pytlak, Gaurav Redhal, Jenna Russo, Ishaan Shah, Rebecca Shoot, Aya Taqi, Calder Tsuyuki-Tomlinson, Vincent Valdmanis, Daniela Vargas, and Margaret Williams.

We also wish to acknowledge the substantive contributions of participants who joined the following discussions hosted, co-convened, or substantively contributed to by the Stimson Center and Global Governance Innovation Network: the June 2025 Academic Council on the UN System Annual Meeting, Global Policy Dialogue, and Second Annual Meeting of ANUMDI: the African Research Network on Regional and Global Governance Innovation in Nairobi; the June 2025 Hamburg Sustainability Conference; the July 2025 Informal Ambassadorial Level Roundtable on a Pact Innovation Forum co-sponsored by the Permanent Missions of Brazil, Costa Rica, Croatia, European Union, Germany, India, Jamaica, Japan, Namibia, Netherlands, Nigeria, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and Zambia; the July 2025 Global South Policy Dialogue convened by Plataforma CIPÓ in Vitoria, Brazil; the September 2025 High-Level UNGA80 Pact Innovation Forum Roundtable in New York; the October 2025 dialogue on Reimagining Global Order: Perspectives from Professor Amitav Acharya, Dr. Trita Parsi, and Heather Hurlburt; the November 2025 T20 South Africa Summit; the December 2025 Global Policy Dialogue Justice in Action: Greater MENA Perspectives on Global & Regional Governance Innovation; the November 2025 Pact Innovation Forum Retreat at the Pocantico Center near New York; the December 2025 MENA Global Policy Dialogue and two related Doha Forum roundtables; the February-April 2026 G20 and Global Governance Innovation E- Consultation co-organized by the Global Governance Innovation Network and T20 U.S.; the March 2026 Monitoring Global Governance Multilateral Agreements Expert Roundtable in New York; the March 2026 Pact Innovation Plan (2nd Edition) Luncheon Discussion co-hosted by the Global Governance Innovation Network, Mission of Germany, Mission of Namibia, Mission of India, Mission of Zambia, Mission of Singapore, Mission of the United Kingdom, Mission of Croatia, Mission of Portugal, Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, and Mission of Brazil; the April 2026 Launch of the T20 U.S. Workstreams Track in Washington, D.C.; and the June 2026 Global Solutions Summit in Berlin.

We wish to thank the State of Qatar, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and the Global Challenges Foundation for their financial support to produce the Global Governance Innovation Report 2026, as well as the Stimson Center's fellow co-sponsoring institutions of the Global Governance Innovation Network: the Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS), Plataforma CIPÓ, Leiden University, the Savannah Center for Diplomacy, Democracy and Development, the Global Institute for Strategic Research, and the Council on Energy, Environment, and Water.

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To Brian Finlay, whose leadership as president of the Stimson Center (2015–26) guided its growth into areas of increasing importance to humanity, from regional, environmental, and resource security to frontier technologies and the future of global governance. Brian fought hard for the think tank community—in Washington, D.C. and globally—to welcome diverse international perspectives and intergenerational voices. He knew that positive change in a complex world is hard to achieve, but he fought for it tirelessly.

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AI	Artificial Intelligence
COP	(UN Framework Convention on Climate Change) Conference of the Parties
COP30	30th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
ECOSOC	(UN) Economic and Social Council
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FfD4	(UN) Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GGIR	*Global Governance Innovation Report* (2023, 2024, 2025)
GNI	Gross National Income
G20	Group of Twenty (intergovernmental forum)
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IGN	Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reform
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LDC	Least Developed Country
MDB(s)	Multilateral Developed Bank
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NGO(s)	Non-Governmental Organizations
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ODA	Official Development Assistance
ODET	(UN) Office of Digital and Emerging Technologies
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	(UN) Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
PBAR	(UN) Peacebuilding Architecture Review
PBC	(UN) Peacebuilding Commission
PGA	United Nations President of the General Assembly
PIP	Pact Innovation Plan
PMT	Pact Monitoring Toolkit
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal(s)
SG	United Nations Secretary-General
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDDR	United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
U.K.	United Kingdom
U.S.	United States of America
WPS	Women, Peace and Security
WTO	World Trade Organization

Executive Summary

> ***"Given the gravity of today's most daunting challenges, we must together pursue the opportunities offered by the Pact for the Future ... Both present and future generations need today's leaders—across governments, the business community, civil society, and the multilateral system—to seize the moment with unrivaled courage, foresight, and a renewed commitment to act."***
>
> —María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés, 73rd President of the United Nations General Assembly, former Foreign and Defense Minister of Ecuador, and Executive Director of GWL Voices[1]

The world is presently witnessing the **highest number of active conflicts since 1946**, including the US-Israel war with Iran this year, and Russia's now five-year-old war with Ukraine. All cause immense human suffering, including large-scale forced displacements, countless deaths and injuries, and wanton material destruction of infrastructure, livelihoods, and the environment. Meanwhile, the international community continues to transgress the Earth's critical planetary boundaries, and emerging technologies both signal hope and generate shockwaves in economic, ecological, and security domains, nationally and globally.

Given these trends, the need for effective global action has never been greater. Yet resources and political support for international organizations, and for international law and global cooperation writ large, are fast declining. Official Development Assistance (ODA), for example, after steadily increasing over the past two decades, peaked in 2023 and then plunged 23.1% from 2024 to 2025. Fortunately, the commitments reached at the September 2024 Summit of the Future in New York—the **Pact for the Future**, **Global Digital Compact**, and **Declaration on Future Generations**—hold the promise of restoring confidence in the multilateral system, including renewed faith in international development assistance. When fully implemented, these innovations in global governance and cooperation could reverse present negative macrotrends and set humanity on a more peaceful, sustainable, and prosperous path.

PACT Multilateralism Under Challenge and the Future of the Pact

Against the backdrop of destructive wars, environmental decay, curtailments of human rights and democracy, violations of international law, and technological fears, *Global Governance Innovation Report 2026* (GGIR'26), "**Advancing the Pact for the Future and a New Peace & Security Architecture**," offers refined tools for assessing and boosting implementation of the Pact for the Future, Global Digital Compact, and Declaration on Future Generations. With special emphasis on the **United Nations' extreme liquidity crisis** and the Secretary-General's response (the "UN80 Initiative"), the report also recommends concrete measures for overcoming obstacles to progress in the run-up to the official high-level Pact, Compact, and Declaration reviews due by September 2028.

GGIR'26 further analyzes and recommends steps toward a bolder and more inclusive peace and security architecture to better manage 21st century threats within and between states, focused on specific Actions in the Pact for the Future. In particular, Pact Chapter Two ("International peace and security") adapts the "4P's" (**prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding**) to the changing character of war. Pact Chapter Five ("Transforming global governance") calls for making the **Security Council** more representative and expanding the contributions of the **General Assembly** and the **Peacebuilding**

Commission to sustaining peace. These efforts, together with the UN80 Initiative's wider innovation agenda, aim not only to **defend and reform multilateral institutions but also the international rules-based order**.

LOGFRAME

Monitoring the Pact for the Future: The Pact Monitoring Toolkit in Year Two

GGIR'26 expands upon the Pact Monitoring Toolkit's 2025 methodology by introducing two new features that enable an assessment to date of 452 Sub-Action indicators from 40 of the Pact's 56 Actions: **Most Recently Reported Data** to compare to baseline data, and a **Stoplight Dashboard** to judge each Sub-Action indicator's progress. GGIR'27 will cover all 56 Actions.

Total number of Sub-Action indicators assessed:	452
Total that show:	
Substantive Progress	132
Minimal Progress	120
No Progress	136
Regression	64

Source: Original table, Stimson Center.

On the whole, our comprehensive review found that: i) **more than half** of assessed Sub-Action indicators showed **some level of positive progress**; ii) sharp reductions in foreign aid and funding for international organizations (driven by political roadblocks) are, nevertheless, undermining continued progress; and iii) the Pact for the Future demonstrates continued momentum and relevance of multilateral cooperation. On the latter point, the Pact responds to critics by showing that: *first*, **broad international consensus can still be reached on urgent reforms** to make the global governance system deliver for all humanity; and *second*, Summit of the Future implementation efforts are yielding tangible and, in some instances, significant results (as elaborated in section four of this report).

PEACE

Rethinking the Peace and Security Architecture for a Changing World

To update and reimagine the collective security system, as well as the UN's wider conflict management toolkit, to keep pace with the changing nature of warfare and security, GGIR'26 recommends:

Collective Security Institutional Architecture Upgrades: Achieving a "**consolidated model**" (Pact Action 40) to get to text-based negotiations toward a more representative Security Council requires agreement on the number of membership categories of a reformed Council and its voting thresholds, as well as potentially limiting the veto. Another innovation (though not requiring a UN Charter amendment) is permitting the General Assembly to **recommend a set of defined consequences for a state found to have violated the UN Charter** by committing an illegal use of force.

Future of Peacemaking and Peacekeeping: The UN needs to **champion a peacemaker as its next leader**, who fully leverages UN Charter Chapter VI mediation and other peaceful settlement tools. Moreover, to better optimize peacekeeping, peace operations should revert to their original **fair witness and deterrent functions** rather than to peace enforcement.

Reimagining Prevention and Peacebuilding: Climate risk early warning is needed to better respond to the new frontier prevention concern of **climate change-induced conflicts**. Furthermore, the UN should establish a **Civilian Protection Support Mechanism** to ensure that protection (and wider peacebuilding) efforts continue during peacekeeping transitions.

INNOVATION

Accelerating Implementation through a Pact Innovation Plan

Advancing the Pact for the Future requires both political commitment and novel approaches to implementation. The Global Governance Innovation Network's **Pact Innovation Plan** (**PIP**) responds to this need by offering a structured yet flexible platform for generating creative, research-backed solutions across the Pact's 56 Actions. This year's "PIP Edition Two" aims, in particular, to stimulate strategic thinking around the Pact's most consequential Actions, creating space for diplomats, practitioners, and experts to consider a fundamental question:

When the international community looks back in 2028, what will be remembered among the most important achievements and legacy-building innovations flowing from the 2024 Summit of the Future?

In this spirit, GGIR'26 proposes **ten potential big-ticket "flagship commitments"** based on existing milestones, momentum, and political will ahead of 2028. The goal is to facilitate positive messaging across a clear track record of memorable, high-impact outcomes, to encourage greater momentum and high-level political support across the entire Pact, including: **Action 3** (End Hunger); **Action 4** (SDG Financing and related IFA reforms Actions 47-52); **Action 16** (Peacemaking); **Action 30** (STI for Human Rights, including the Scientific Panel and Global Dialogue on AI Governance); **Action 36** (Youth Participation); **Action 40** (Security Council Reform); **Action 42** (General Assembly Revitalization); **Action 46** (Human Rights for All); **Action 53** (Beyond GDP); and **Action 55** (Partnerships).

Despite heightened political divisions and mistrust among major powers, champion governments, motivated international civil servants, and dedicated civil society partners make slow yet steady headway on these and several other major Pact goals in defense of UN values. Increasingly, they **look for a new kind of leadership** in 2027 and beyond, with the vision, courage, and experience to transform the United Nations by realizing the Pact's full potential.

Across the Pact for the Future, the UN80 Initiative, and broader efforts to renew peace and security governance, a common thread emerges: today's interconnected crises can no longer be managed through fragmented, deadlocked, or reactive approaches. The years leading up to the 2028 Pact review, alongside preparations for the post-2030 development agenda and the transition to new UN leadership, represent a critical window for demonstrating that **inclusive multilateralism can still serve as an effective instrument for prevention, resilience, collective problem-solving, and just outcomes**. Ultimately, the success of these efforts will not be measured by the number of declarations adopted or new processes launched, but by whether the international community succeeds in renewing trust, reducing insecurity, and delivering a more peaceful, just, and sustainable future for current and future generations.

I. Multilateralism Under Challenge and the Future of the Pact

> ***"Our world is facing existential risks. From conflicts to climate change, from poverty to growing inequalities, these issues know no borders—they are global and can only be addressed globally. But we are not equipped to do so."***
>
> —Amina J. Mohammed, 5th Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations[2]

The need for global collective action has never been greater. On matters of war and peace, armed conflicts wreak havoc in the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and Latin America. Assuming that the latest Middle East war is limited in duration and scope, global economic growth is still projected to slow to 3.1%.[3] With climate change now exceeding 1.5°C and rampant signs of continued biodiversity loss and excessive pollution, the planet's health remains under immense strain too. Meanwhile, new and emerging technologies both hold the promise of tackling these and other monumental global challenges, alongside deep-seated fears that they may exacerbate them.

Yet, despite these ominous trends, resources and political support for international organizations, and for global cooperation writ large, are fast declining. The causes of eroding financial and political backing of the traditional institutions of global cooperation are multi-faceted, including growing populism in long-standing donor partner countries, an intensification in Great Power competition, expanding Global North-South distrust and division, and a weakening of the kinds of global norms and common rules that have deepened connections between countries over decades. Against this backdrop, however, a diverse cross-section of champion governments, motivated international civil servants, and dedicated civil society partners continue to vigorously defend the values of the United Nations (UN) and rules-based international order.

In this spirit, world leaders adopted, in September 2024, the Pact for the Future, Global Digital Compact, and Declaration on Future Generations, designed to chart a new direction for global action to better meet the urgent needs and highest aspirations of humanity. Together with its 56 Actions (and 363 Sub-Actions), the Pact, alongside the Compact and Declaration, present a generational opportunity to rebuild trust and address gaps in global governance; reaffirm the UN Charter, the 2030 Agenda, and other existing commitments; and renew the multilateral system to prepare for over-the-horizon challenges and opportunities. To accelerate implementation and monitoring of the Pact through policy research, innovation, and partnerships, the Global Governance Innovation Network established, in November 2024, the Pact Innovation Forum as an informal multistakeholder platform featuring new instruments showcased in this report (namely, a Pact Monitoring Toolkit and Pact Innovation Plan).

Three major developments that impact Pact implementation in the present context are:

First, the extreme liquidity crisis facing the UN today, leading Secretary-General (SG) António Guterres to launch, on March 12, 2025, his "UN80 Initiative," with a three-fold focus on improving staffing efficiencies, streamlining mandates, and rationalizing structures system-wide.[4] Elaborated in section four, deficits of roughly 20% in 2024 and 2025 have resulted in recent cuts for nearly a fifth of the UN Secretariat's workforce.[5] At the same time, and as argued in *Global Governance Innovation Report 2025*, many of the UN80 Initiative innovations are overdue and can reinforce the Pact for the Future by: i) focusing on the UN's core strengths; ii) fostering system-wide efficiencies; iii) relocating staff to where needs are greatest, and iv) encouraging a new Grand Bargain.[6]

Second, with the race to succeed Mr. Guterres now in full-swing, UN Member States and their citizens are, increasingly, looking for a new kind of leadership from January 2027, with the vision, courage, and experience to transform the United Nations by realizing the Pact's full potential. Fortunately, each of the officially nominated candidates for SG (as of mid-June 2026)—namely, Michelle Bachelet, María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés, Rafael Grossi, Rebeca Grynspan, Carolyn Rodrigues-Burkett, and Macky Sall—bring unique leadership qualities and experience suitable for sitting at the helm of the world body. In particular, delivering on the Pact will require an in-depth "insider-outsider" knowledge of the UN system, foresight with the ability to take quick corrective-actions, communications and political savvy, and the energy and skill to mobilize and sustain broad-based coalitions for change.

Third and finally, the next UN Secretary-General will also need to focus immediately on accelerating Pact implementation (and its "unfinished business" post-2028), alongside a final push to deliver on the Sustainable Development Goals while, simultaneously, laying the groundwork for an ambitious Post-2030 Development Agenda. More specifically, a carefully-designed "twinning approach" could ensure that the next round of nationally-owned development goals reinforce—if not fully integrate with—an equally urgent and necessary follow-through agenda to the September 2028 mandated high-level review of Summit of the Future (SOTF) outcomes (see figure 1.1). Specifically, this might entail:

i) reflecting on the false-dichotomies and mixed messaging that arose between the 2023 Sustainable Development Goals Summit and 2024 SOTF, to prevent their re-emergence;

ii) setting-up the new ambitious goals for success, by equipping the multilateral governance system with commensurate institutional innovations, mandates, staffing, operational tools, and resources to best partner with and support leadership by regional, national, and sub-national development actors; and

iii) establishing a joint monitoring and coordination mechanism to evaluate progress, take corrective actions, and encourage continuous "win-win" strategies in implementing these closely intertwined major global policy frameworks.

As detailed in the following pages, this report provides many of the knowledge building blocks for the next SG and her team to take forward and realize the full potential of the Pact for the Future, including through updated editions of the Pact Monitoring Toolkit and Pact Innovation Plan, as well as a deep-dive into the UN's peace and security architecture.

Figure 1.1: How the Post-2030 Development Agenda and Post-2028 SOTF Review Agenda Can Reinforce Each Other Through a "Twinning Approach"



Source: Original Figure, Stimson Center.

The Pact and the Future of Peace and Security Governance

Since 2023, both the analytical findings and institutional and policy reform proposals presented in the *Global Governance Innovation Report* (GGIR) series have sought to encourage more ambition in the negotiations shaping the September 2024 Summit of the Future and its follow-through. GGIR'23 showcased the theme "Redefining Approaches to Peace, Security & Humanitarian Action," GGIR'24 explored the topic of "Advancing Human Security through a New Global Economic Governance Architecture," and GGIR'25 focused on "Advancing the Pact for the Future and Environmental Governance." The world needs better ways for managing its many, growing problems—engaging new voices, instruments, networks, knowledge, and structures—through improved global governance in the service of human security, as well as just security too. The GGIR series defines global governance to mean the steering of institutions and resources to provide for global public goods and to tackle global challenges effectively.[7]

Global Governance Innovation Report '26, with a focus on "Advancing the Pact for the Future and a New Peace & Security Architecture," examines how both sets of issues and policy agendas are inextricably linked. Though Chapter 2 of the Pact is entitled "International peace and security" (Actions 13-27, incorporating insights and recommendations from the Secretary-General's *New Agenda for Peace*, including on the 4P's of prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding), peace and security commitments are reflected elsewhere in the Pact, Global Digital Compact, and Declaration on Future Generations.[8] Five noteworthy Actions found in Pact Chapter 5 on "Transforming global governance" are Actions 39 and 40 (Security Council reform), Actions 41 and 42 (the General Assembly's complementary peace and security role to the Council), and Action 44 (Peacebuilding Commission strengthening)—each considered in GGIR'26 section three.

The remainder of this section highlights global "macrotrends" in social and economic issues; peace, security, and humanitarian action; climate and broader environmental action; and human rights / inclusive governance, and how these four themes interrelate. Section two of the report presents Year Two of a logical framework methodology for monitoring progress in implementing the Pact for the Future. Section three analyzes and offers outside-the-box policy and institutional reform proposals toward a bolder and more inclusive peace and security architecture to better manage 21st century threats and revitalize the central aims and credibility of the UN. Finally, section four draws upon these analyses to chart new pathways through the Pact Innovation Plan Edition Two between now and September 2028, when the Pact's official, high-level review is mandated.

Global Macrotrends to Watch in 2026 & Beyond

Today's overlapping, urgent, complex, and even, at times, extreme problem-sets—across socioeconomic, security, humanitarian, environmental, legal, and governance dimensions—intersect and create immense challenges alongside hidden opportunities. We consider each of these dimensions, briefly, below.

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC ISSUES

The global social development landscape has been deeply impacted by declining aid and persistent economic challenges, such as tariff restrictions, wars, and climate change. Official Development Assistance (ODA) dropped by 23.1% from 2024 to 2025 ($174.3 billion in 2025 compared to $214.6 billion in 2024).[9] This brings ODA to where it stood in real terms in 2015, at the start of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development due to cuts, in particular, by five major providers of ODA (United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, and France), accounting for 95.7% of the total decline (see figures 1.2 and 1.3).[10] However, eight countries increased their total ODA (compared to 26 that decreased), and Norway, Denmark, Luxembourg, and Sweden exceeded the United Nation's ODA as a percentage of Gross National Income (GNI) target of 0.7%.[11] This is occurring against the backdrop of developing countries facing a $4.3 trillion annual financing gap for sustainable development, including $1.8 trillion for climate needs.[12] Furthermore, acute food insecurity has slightly risen from 22.7% in 2024 to 22.9% in 2025.[13]

Amid declining overall ODA, bilateral ODA for development programs, projects, and technical cooperation fell by 26.3% in 2025—the largest decline on record after years of growth —[14] underscoring how geopolitical fragmentation is weakening multilateral cooperation.[15] Between 2024 and 2025, multilateral ODA declined by 12.7% to $47.9 billion and by 21.3% since 2023, with core contributions to the UN declining by 27%.[16] The United States' reduction of 87.2% of its contributions to the UN was the primary driver, reducing funding from $17 billion annually in recent years to $2 billion in 2025.[17] This decline is impacting core UN mandates and services, with the Under-Secretary-General for Policy Guy Ryder telling Member States that the UN system is expected to contract by 30% in 2025, and the 2026 approved UN budget abolishes 2,900 posts.[18] While multilateral ODA has decreased, support to the World Bank and regional development banks increased by 11.9% in 2025.[19]

Figure 1.2: Net ODA from DAC Countries, 2020-2025 and 2026 (Projected)



Source: OECD, "A historic decline in foreign aid: Preliminary 2025 ODA data."

Figure 1.3: Official Development Assistance in 2025—DAC Countries



Source: OECD, "Official development assistance at a glance," accessed April 9, 2026.

INTERNATIONAL PEACE, SECURITY, AND HUMANITARIAN ACTION

2026 begins amidst intensifying militarization, eroding multilateral cooperation, and simultaneous conflicts spanning a wide geographic range. 2024 saw a historic surge in state-based armed conflict—with 61 active conflicts across 36 countries, the highest number recorded since 1946—and global conflict-related deaths remained above 200,000 in 2025, suggesting that 2026 is likely to see similar levels.[20] Increasing violence has led to mass displacement and deaths, exposing the failure of international prevention and protection mechanisms. As illustrated in figure 1.4, alongside global military spending climbing from $1.5 trillion in the early 2000s to $2.6 trillion in 2025, conflict-related deaths have also trended upward.[21] In early 2026, 136 million people were forcibly displaced or stateless globally, compared to 139.3 million in 2025, nearly double 2014 figures.[22] More than one-third of all forcibly displaced people originate from four countries: Sudan, Syria, Afghanistan, and Ukraine, each representing the failure of preventive diplomacy, civilian protection, and accountability mechanisms.[23] In Sudan alone, 15 million people remained displaced by April 2026, representing nearly one in three Sudanese.[24]

Figure 1.4: Relationship Between Battle Related Deaths and World Military Expenditure, 1989-2024



Source: UNODA, The Security We Need: Rebalancing Military Spending for a Sustainable and Peaceful Future, 35.

Globally, violence has been concentrated in contexts where state fragility, resource scarcity, and environmental stress are mutually reinforcing. In Gaza, Israeli military operations have displaced 1.7 million people, left entire cities under evacuation orders, and forced primary healthcare centers to suspend services.[25] In Sudan, no aid convoys have reached El Fasher since January 2025, while strikes on displacement

camps and civilian infrastructure, including a major Khartoum power outage, have worsened the world's largest displacement crisis. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, armed group violence remains acute: at least 3,861 civilians were killed in targeted violence in 2025, with an additional 602 recorded in 2026 to date.[26] Amid Haiti's deepening state collapse and expanding gang control, violence surged, causing over 5,519 deaths and 6,200 reported cases of gender-based violence in the first seven months of 2025.[27]

Across these contexts, conflict has caused mass casualties and destroyed vital infrastructure, complicating post-conflict recovery beyond the capacity of current humanitarian financing systems.[28] These figures reflect, as section three documents, the systematic erosion of the diplomatic and institutional architecture designed to contain conflict before it reaches scale. The fragmentation of multilateral cooperation has weakened conflict prevention and, simultaneously, hollowed out the humanitarian capacity needed to respond: In 2025, UNHCR received $3.52 billion in voluntary contributions against global funding needs of approximately $10.25 billion, leaving millions without adequate shelter, protection, or basic services.[29]

ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE AND CLIMATE ACTION

Environmental governance has struggled to keep pace as climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution intensify.[30] 2025 was confirmed by the World Meteorological Organization as one of the three warmest on record,[31] with CO_2 emissions hitting a record 38.1 billion tons.[32] In 2025, natural disasters were estimated to cause $202 billion in direct annual losses and up to $2.3 trillion in indirect losses.[33] This is alarming considering that the UN's Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage, established at COP28 to support vulnerable developing countries, has raised only $822.06 million in pledges.[34]

Advances in environmental governance include the January 2026 Treaty on Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction, the first legally binding framework to conserve and sustainably use marine biodiversity across the high seas.[35] In June 2025, 107 Member States in Punta del Este, Uruguay, established the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Panel on Chemicals, Waste, and Pollution, to provide independent scientific advice on chemicals, waste, and pollution prevention.[36] In August 2025, talks in Geneva on the first legally binding global plastics treaty failed, as oil and gas producing countries blocked limits on virgin plastic production.[37]

COP30 in November 2025 in Belém, Brazil produced no fossil fuel phase-out commitments, with the final Mutirão text removing such language despite support from over 80 countries.[38] COP31, planned for November 2026 in Antalya, Türkiye, presents the next critical moment for global climate ambition, being framed as the "COP of implementation," focusing on climate finance, full Nationally Determined Contributions submissions, and advancing fossil fuel transition language left unresolved at COP30.[39] However, COP30's own "COP of implementation" designation, and continued funding gaps well below 2030 targets, underscore the urgency of turning commitments into action.[40]

HUMAN RIGHTS, THE RULE OF LAW, INCLUSIVE GOVERNANCE, AND CIVIC SPACE

2025 marked the twentieth consecutive year of the decline of freedom worldwide, with 74% of the global population living under autocratic rule,[41] driven by executive overreach, rising authoritarianism, and weakening institutions, including reduced judicial independence in 61% of countries.[42] 68% of countries

experienced a decline in the rule of law in 2025, compared to 57% in 2024.[43] Electoral quality has deteriorated in 22 countries, up from 11 in 2005.[44] Alongside weakened due process, civic space is shrinking, with media and personal expression rights the most eroded.[45] Foreign agent laws increasingly restrict civil society's access to funding, networks, and ability to hold governments accountable.[46] Amid this negative outlook, there are cases of improvement—Malawi, Fiji, and Bolivia's general elections resulted in peaceful transfers of power, indicating the potential for democratic advancement amidst global decline.[47]

International mechanisms to counter democratic backsliding and human rights abuses continue to be hampered by decreasing financial commitments. Following its withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council in July 2025, the U.S. withdrew from 66 international organizations in January 2026, including 31 UN entities.[48] The subsequent reduction in financial support for democracy and development aid by major European donors, namely the U.K., Germany, and France, further hinders preventive and restorative measures.[49] While the UN as a whole faces a funding crisis, the human rights pillar is particularly affected by recent cuts. Eight Human Rights Council members failed to pay contributions last year, and despite receiving just 1% of total UN funding, the pillar saw further reductions in 2025.[50] The Office of Human Rights received $191.5 million of its approved $246 million budget, a shortfall of over 22%.[51] Rights abuses monitoring work operated at 50% through 2025, while key investigative bodies were operating at 30-60% capacity.[52]

***

In 2026, the global polycrisis is best understood through its intensifying impact on peace and security, as these interlinked macrotrends shape conflict dynamics, erode resilience, and complicate international responses to protracted and overlapping crises. These trends can both exacerbate instability—through rising geopolitical tensions, threats to peace, and climate-related insecurity—and create openings for more adaptive, preventive approaches to crisis management. The Pact for the Future reflects these realities, serving as a framework for revitalizing multilateral action on conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and global risk governance, while aligning with ongoing reform efforts such as the Secretary-General's UN80 Initiative, which prioritizes agility, foresight, and system-wide coherence. This report assesses progress in advancing these commitments by monitoring indicators that align with agreements reached in the Pact, alongside key policy developments and multilateral deliberations since the 2024 Summit of the Future, with a focus this year on their tangible implications for peace and security outcomes—the subject to which we now turn.

> ***These trends can both exacerbate instability...and create openings for more adaptive, preventive approaches to crisis management.***

II. Monitoring the Pact for the Future: The Pact Monitoring Toolkit in Year Two

> ***"Despite the promises we made in the Pact and the SDGs and in many, many more forums and documents, we all know that we are still falling short in delivery."***
>
> —Annalena Baerbock, 80th President of the United Nations General Assembly[53]

The Pact for the Future, the main outcome of the September 2024 Summit of the Future, is often described as a multilateral "to-do list" for achieving the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals and renewing global governance at large. Its five thematic chapters—i) Sustainable development and financing for development; ii) International peace and security; iii) Science, technology and innovation, and digital cooperation; iv) Youth and future generations; and v) Transforming global governance; and the annexed Global Digital Compact and Declaration on Future Generations—encompass 56 agreed Actions and 363 commitments ("Sub-Actions").[54] The Pact, however, does not include a cohesive monitoring mechanism to enable UN Member States, the Secretariat, civil society, and private sector partners to track implementation progress en route to the September 2028 high-level review at the UN General Assembly's (UNGA) 83rd session.[55] The Pact Monitoring Toolkit (PMT) outlined in this section is designed to fill that gap.

Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) is the methodology best suited to answer such essential questions as:

- What criteria should define success?
- Which Pact Actions and Sub-Actions, of which 80% require Member State leadership, demonstrate tangible progress toward success?
- What commitments show the least progress, and why?
- What evidence exists to support analysis?

Monitoring longitudinal data starting with September 2024 (baseline) through September 2028 (endline) allows us to:

- Know the level to which Pact Actions and Sub-Actions have been implemented.
- Observe short-term Action and Sub-Action change from the previous year.
- Compare change over time from September 2024 to September 2028.
- Identify the most successful implementation policies, programs, and institutional reform initiatives.
- Identify specific implementation, data collection, and reporting gaps.
- Enable accountability, corrective actions, and celebration of progress to generate momentum across the entire Pact.

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Pact Monitoring Through a Logical Framework

The foundation of M&E is the logical framework (logframe), a technical tool that defines success by assigning indicators and data sources to chart evidence to verify results. A logframe is not designed to push a political agenda or critique lapses; rather, it serves merely to document progress or show inadequacies in implementation.

The New School's Graduate Programs in International Affairs and the Stimson Center together developed a logical framework for last year's *Global Governance Innovation Report 2025* (GGIR'25) to monitor Pact implementation, and to complement formal, official efforts to gauge progress—or lack thereof—between now and September 2028. The Year One logical framework in GGIR'25 tracked 24 of 56 Pact Actions (see table 2.1), and Year Two GGIR'26 adds the 16 next most relevant and urgent Actions, drawn from all five Pact chapters, for a total of 40 now tracked. Sixteen Actions remain to be added to the Year Three GGIR'27 framework.

Table 2.1: Pact Monitoring Toolkit Timeline

	2024	2025			2026				2027		2028	
	Sept.	May	Sept.	Nov.	Mar.	May	Sept.	Nov.	May	Sept.	May	Sept.
Pact for the Future adopted												
Pact Monitoring Toolkit (PMT) logical framework launched, covering 24 Actions												
Civil Society consultations												
Member State consultations (Pact Innovation Forum Annual Pocantico Retreat)												
16 Actions added, for 40 Actions in total now												
Outputs added												
Add 16 Actions for full coverage of all 56 Actions												
Data updates												
PMT full logframe finalized and widely promoted worldwide												
Pact for the Future Official Review												

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center.

Box 2.1: The Pact Monitoring Portal

Considering the challenges in monitoring the Pact for the Future, and the logical framework's technical nature, an in-depth portal that tracks Pact implementation is needed. The proposed Pact Monitoring Portal will be user-friendly, featuring an online search function where users can select specific Pact Actions, Sub-Actions, chapters, or themes, and view progress against baseline data. By attaching themes to particular Actions, the Pact Monitoring Portal could help to highlight cross-cutting issues, such as gender, future generations, climate, and AI; which will allow the Executive Office of the Secretary-General efforts to track UN-mandated Pact Actions, and UN Mission staff and officials, alongside other Pact champions, to easily receive real-time updates, and quickly cite progress in related events and initiatives leading up to the 2028 review.

Source: Original Box, Stimson Center. Data Source: UN, "Overview of the UN's Progress," accessed April 8, 2026.

MASTER AND MINIATURE LOGICAL FRAMEWORKS

The GGIR'26 logical frameworks featured in this section are summary, miniature versions of a full logical framework available online (see box 2.1). This report's "mini-logframe" version contains the below row (with Action 3 as an example, in table 2.2) and column categories:

Table 2.2: Row and Column Categories in Mini-Logframes

Action 3. We will end hunger and eliminate food insecurity and all forms of malnutrition.					
Output	**Indicator**	**Target**	**Baseline: Sept. 2024 Data**	**Most Recently Reported Data**	**Progress (Stop-light Dashboard)**
Sub-Action (a1) Support countries and communities affected by food insecurity and all forms of malnutrition through coordinated action.					

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center

Row 1: **Pact Action statement** in the original language.

Row 3: Each Action in the mini-logframes contains in most cases two **Sub-Actions**, broken into component measurable elements. From a technical M&E perspective, however, some Pact objectives do not readily translate into measurables, as the language is aspirational rather than realistic. For example, Action 3 states, "We will end hunger and eliminate food insecurity and all forms of malnutrition." This is an admirable aim, but that threshold is impossible to document.[56]

Another example is language from Action 46, Sub-Action (a): "Enable UN human rights mechanisms' efficient and effective mandate delivery to respond to human rights challenges *with impartiality, objectivity and non-selectivity*,"[57] which speaks more to the principles that should inform implementation rather than defining

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specific policy and operational activities that can be concretely tracked. In such cases, this report relies on the "SMART" principle (Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant, and Timebound) to guide indicator creation.

Row 2 consists of:

- **Outputs**, the products of completed activities needed to achieve Sub-Actions, were added this year to flag this important step toward implementation.
- **Indicators** attach a specific measurement to define success for each Sub-Action. Where applicable, existing indicators and targets were utilized from other multilateral monitoring tools, such as the Sustainable Development Goals and Youth2030, to avoid replicating efforts. Where appropriate indicators do not exist, new ones were drafted.
- **Targets** are the indicator level or state of change that signals attainment of success.
- **Baseline September 2024 Data**: To measure Pact achievement and success in 2028, conditions at a baseline in 2024 must be established for comparison.
- **Most Recently Reported Data** features either Year One (to September 2025) or Year Two (to current date) reporting, whichever had more rigorous data. Data summaries prioritize global or regional aggregates rather than specific country (Member State) measures.
- **Progress**, a "**Stoplight Dashboard**" to judge each Sub-Action indicator's progress, determined against four categories defined below, in table 2.3, compares baseline to latest data:

.Table 2.3: Categories for the Stoplight Dashboard

Substantive Progress	Trending upward, at least 5% increase from baseline toward target.
Minimal Progress	Some movement, some action that has a slight uptick, less than 5%.
No Progress	Data exhibits no significant change from the established baseline.
Regression	Shows at least 5% reversal from baseline.

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center.

The full Pact Monitoring Toolkit logical framework methodology is elaborated in GGIR'26 Annex 1.

Year Two: Pact for the Future Monitoring

The 20 mini-logframes and the discussion that follows on the pages below discuss the selected 40 Actions in GGIR'26: six from Chapter 1; eight from Chapter 2; all six Actions from Chapter 3; all four in Chapter 4; and sixteen from Pact Chapter 5—*which, arguably, includes the Pact's most novel ideas*.

PACT CHAPTER 1: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND FINANCING FOR DEVELOPMENT

Action 3. We will end hunger, eliminate food insecurity and all forms of malnutrition.

Action 3 is directly related to Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 2. In 2024, an estimated one in twelve people (roughly 733 million globally), faced hunger, and an estimated 2.33 billion people faced moderate to severe food insecurity, driven significantly by the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic.[58] Economic inequality has worsened hunger as inflation and conflict drive up food and fuel prices, including in Ukraine, Sudan, Gaza, and the Persian Gulf. Climate disasters have also impacted food security, with an estimated $3.26 trillion in agricultural losses worldwide.[59] Relevant intergovernmental fora that will discuss food insecurity and malnutrition this year are the UNFSS+4 Stocktake in July 2025 in Ethiopia and the World Food Forum in October 2026 in the United States.

The GGIR'26 full logframe for Action 3 identifies ten specific Sub-Action initiatives and corresponding Indicators, Outputs, Targets, Baseline Data, and available Year One and Two data. The mini-logframe below highlights three especially noteworthy Sub-Actions:

Table 2.4: Action 3 Mini-Logframe

Action 3. We will end hunger and eliminate food insecurity and all forms of malnutrition.				
Indicator	**Target**	**Baseline: Sept 2024 Data Summary**	**Most Recently Reported Data**	**Progress**
Sub-Action (a) Support countries and communities affected by food insecurity and all forms of malnutrition through coordinated action.				
Number of points in FAO Food Supply Index, a measure of monthly change in international prices of a basket of food commodities	100 points is considered a benchmark for a positive food price rate.	As of Sept. 2024, the FAO Food Price Index, a measure of monthly change in international prices of a basket of food commodities, was 124.6 points.	As of Feb. 2026, the FAO Food Price Index increased 0.9% to 125.3 points.	**Minimal Progress**
Sub-Action (b) Assist countries in debt distress to manage volatility in international food markets.				
SDG Indicator 12.1.1 Number of countries developing, adopting or implementing policy instruments aimed at supporting the shift to sustainable consumption and production	SDG Target 12 Implement the 10-Year Framework of Programmes on Sustainable Consumption and Production Patterns, all countries taking action, with developed countries taking the lead, taking into account the development and capabilities of developing countries	From 2019 to 2023, 63 Member States recorded 516 policy instruments related to sustainable consumption and production.	As of Apr. 2025, 71 countries recorded 530 policy instruments related to sustainable consumption and production.	**Substantive Progress**
Sub-Action (c) Promote equitable, resilient, inclusive and sustainable agrifood systems so that everyone has access to safe, affordable, sufficient and nutritious food.				
SDG Indicator 2.4.1 Proportion of agricultural area under productive and sustainable agriculture	SDG Target 2.4 By 2030, ensure sustainable food production systems and implement resilient agricultural practices that increase productivity and production, that help maintain ecosystems, that strengthen capacity for adaptation to climate change, extreme weather, drought, flooding and other disasters and that progressively improve land and soil quality	As of 2024, the world is at moderate achievement in productive and sustainable agriculture with a score of 3.4 out of 5 (on a scale from 1 to 5, 1 meaning deterioration away from productive and sustainable agriculture and 5 meaning substantive improvement toward productive and sustainable agriculture).	As of 2025, there was a slight decline to 3.3 out of 5.	**No Progress**

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data Sources: FAO, "Food Price Index," accessed March 31, 2026; UN, The Sustainable Development Goals Extended Report 2025; and UN, *The Sustainable Development Goals Extended Report 2024*.

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Action 4. We will close the Sustainable Development Goal financing gap in developing countries.

With just 18% of the SDGs on track for achievement as of 2025, there is growing urgency around calls for a substantial SDG stimulus to close the persistent financing gap and accelerate implementation as we near 2030.[60] The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) found that the five largest providers (U.S., U.K., Japan, France, and Germany) accounted for 95.7% of the total decline in Official Development Assistance (ODA), with the U.S. alone driving three-quarters of the decline in 2025.[61] At the same time, only four countries (Sweden, Denmark, Luxembourg, and Norway) delivered on the UN target of 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) of ODA.[62] The U.S. reduced its total ODA by 56.9%, to $44.79 billion in 2025, contributing to a $60 billion worldwide ODA funding deficit, significantly larger than in previous years.[63] Moreover, global debt, as of September 2025, amounted to $251 trillion, severely impacting developing countries' ability to invest in services related to the SDGs.[64] The Sevilla Commitment (FfD4), adopted by consensus in July 2025, laid a path to close the $4 trillion annual SDG financing gap in developing countries by using trade as an engine for development, addressing the debt crisis, and strengthening blended finance mechanisms.[65] Among this year's intergovernmental fora that address Action 4 are the High-Level Political Forum (July 2026) and UNGA High-Level Week (September 2026).

In the GGIR'26 full logframe, Action 4 identifies 24 specific Sub-Action initiatives across thirteen different Sub-Actions. One especially noteworthy Sub-Action is:

Table 2.5: Action 4 Mini-Logframe

Action 4. We will close the Sustainable Development Goal financing gap in developing countries.				
Indicator	**Target**	**Baseline: Sept 2024 Data Summary**	**Most Recently Reported Data**	**Progress**
Sub-Action (f) Create a more enabling environment at the global, regional and national levels to increase the mobilization of domestic resources and enhance the capacities, institutions and systems of developing countries at all levels to achieve this goal, including through international support, to increase investment in sustainable development.				
SDG Indicator 17.1.1 Total government revenue as a proportion of GDP, by source	SDG Target 17.1 Strengthen domestic resource mobilization, including through international support to developing countries, to improve domestic capacity for tax and other revenue collection	As of 2024, the average overall taxation rate among advanced economies was 26% of GDP, while the "fiscal burden" was 36%. Most countries' grant revenue is 3% of GDP, with some outliers.	As of 2025, among advanced economies, the average overall rate of taxation is 25% of GDP, while the "fiscal burden" is 36%.	**No Progress**
SDG Indicator 17.1.2 Proportion of domestic budget funded by domestic taxes	SDG Target 17.1 Strengthen domestic resource mobilization, including through international support to developing countries, to improve domestic capacity for tax and other revenue collection	As of 2024, following the COVID-19 pandemic, the proportion of government expenditure funded by taxes in 130 countries sharply declined from the previous year, due in part to increased spending on policy measures combined with a decrease in tax revenues. This sharp decline was later reversed, although not completely, in the following years.	As of May 2026, fiscal redistribution has increased slightly in all country groups, following the trend since COVID-19.	**Minimal Progress**

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data Sources: UN, The Sustainable Development Goals Extended Report 2024; UN, The Sustainable Development Goals Extended Report 2025; and UN, Financing for Sustainable Development Report 2026.

The drop in international development assistance, lending, and assessed contributions to the UN has constrained progress on the SDGs. Anticipated additional funding cuts risk triggering a renewed wave of disinvestment in multilateral institutions, further undermining global cooperation.[66] As of late March 2026, the UN continued to face severe financial strain, as unpaid dues threatened its programs and capacity to deliver on global challenges.[67]

Action 5. We will ensure that the multilateral trading system continues to be an engine for sustainable development.

Action 5 addresses the need to accelerate financing for sustainable development. Negotiations to address trade imbalances and reform the multilateral trading system managed by the World Trade Organization (WTO) have been underway since 2018.[68] The WTO's 14th Ministerial Conference (March 2026, in Cameroon) failed to agree on a reform plan, due to Member State deadlock on e-commerce and U.S. disagreement on trade negotiations.[69] The WTO's value has been questioned since turmoil in U.S. tariffs and the ongoing conflict with Iran greatly impacted global trade. Relevant intergovernmental fora that will discuss the multilateral trading system in 2026 are the UN High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development in July, UNGA High-Level Week in September, and G20 leaders summit in Miami in December.

The GGIR'26 full logframe identifies six specific Sub-Action initiatives across three Sub-Actions for Action 5. Two noteworthy Sub-Actions are:

Table 2.6: Action 5 Mini-Logframe

Action 5. We will ensure that the multilateral trading system continues to be an engine for sustainable development.				
Indicator	**Target**	**Baseline: Sept 2024 Data Summary**	**Most Recently Reported Data**	**Progress**
Sub-Action (c) Facilitate accession to the World Trade Organization especially for developing countries, and promote trade and investment liberalization and facilitation.				
# of WTO graduating status of LDC's	Increase in # of graduating LDC's	A total of 8 countries have graduated from LDC status: Botswana (1994), Cabo Verde (2007), Maldives (2011), Samoa (2014), Equatorial Guinea (2017), Vanuatu (2020), Bhutan (2023), and São Tomé and Príncipe (2024).	As of 2025, 44 more countries are on the path to graduation, while the core 8 graduates remain the same.	**Minimal Progress**
% of Trade Facilitation Agreements (TFA) implemented	Increase in Trade Facilitation Agreement ratifications	As of 2024, 160 WTO members ratified the TFA.	As of 2025, there was one more ratification, making the total 161 countries.	**Minimal Progress**

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data sources: WTO, "Graduating from the status of least-developed country (LDC)," accessed March 31, 2026; and WTO, "Timeline of ratifications received to date," accessed March 31, 2026.

The WTO must address unresolved issues surrounding least-developed countries' (LDCs) graduation status, along with emerging challenges such as digital trade, expanding industrial subsidies, and environmental and other new forms of protectionism.[70] Since the WTO's inception in 1995, eight countries have graduated from LDC status and become full WTO members with voting power, while 44 more are currently on the path to graduation. Countries pursuing graduation often lack the technical capacity to comply with WTO rules on areas such as customs regulations and intellectual property enforcement, hindering their ability to achieve graduation status.[71]

Action 10. We will accelerate our efforts to restore, protect, conserve and sustainably use the environment.

Action 10 speaks directly to SDGs 14 and 15, relating to efforts to restore, protect, conserve, and sustainably use the environment. Reversing global environmental degradation will require increased ODA for conservation and biodiversity.[72] In this regard, members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee

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(DAC) have steadily expanded funding for climate adaptation and mitigation, with climate-related ODA accounting for 35.6% of total bilateral allocable ODA in 2024.[73] Meanwhile, COP30, held in November 2025 in Belém, Brazil, saw countries commit a total of $9 billion for the Global Implementation Accelerator, a program intended to align public, private, and philanthropic capital into national project accelerators, while also stewarding forests, oceans, and biodiversity for the 2030 Agenda.[74] Developments from the COP30 agenda have created the Baku to Belém Roadmap, a plan to mobilize $1.3 trillion in climate funding.[75] Relevant intergovernmental fora that will discuss Action 10 in 2026 include the Our Ocean Conference in Kenya in June 2026, Climate Week in New York in September, and COP31 in Antalya, Türkiye in November.

The GGIR'26 full logframe for Action 10 identifies fourteen specific initiatives across six Sub-Actions; one such initiative is highlighted here:

Table 2.7: Action 10 Mini-Logframe

Action 10. We will accelerate our efforts to restore, protect, conserve and sustainably use the environment.				
Indicator	**Target**	**Baseline: Sept 2024 Data Summary**	**Most Recently Reported Data**	**Progress**
Sub-Action (d) Accelerate efforts to address the pollution of air, land and soil, fresh water and the ocean, including the sound management of chemicals, and work towards the conclusion of an international legally binding instrument on plastic pollution, including in the marine environment, with the ambition of completing negotiations by the end of 2024.				
SDG Indicator 13.2.2 Total greenhouse emissions (GHG) per year	SDG Target 13.2 Integrate climate change measures into national policies, strategies and planning	In 2024, global GHG emissions reached 53.2 gigatons of Carbon Dioxide equivalent CO_2, an increase of 1.3%.	As of Jan. 2026, GHG emissions totaled 5.3 billion tons CO_2e, an increase of 0.3% compared to Jan. 2025.	**No Progress**

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data sources: European Commission, GHG emissions of all World Countries 2025 Report; and Climate Trace, "Climate TRACE Releases January 2026 Emissions Data."

Multilateral instruments such as the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) and ongoing negotiations to create the first legally binding treaty on plastic pollution are examples of progress.[76] The GBF aims to reach four overarching goals by 2050, and to halt and reverse nature loss by 2030, by emphasizing ecosystem and sustainable diversity. It is not a legally binding instrument, however, and most countries have not aligned national strategies with these global targets.[77]

PACT CHAPTER 2: INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

Action 16. We will promote cooperation and understanding between Member States, defuse tensions, seek the pacific settlement of disputes and resolve conflicts.

Besides reaffirming their obligations under international law and the UN Charter, Action 16 urges Member States to take effective measures against threats to international peace and security, using tools such as mediation and diplomacy, confidence-building measures, early warning systems, regional cooperation, and the good offices of the Secretary-General (SG)—many laid out in the Charter's Chapter VI. The majority of its seven Sub-Actions have marked minimal to no progress due to conflict escalation, increased numbers of non-state armed groups involved in conflicts, and repeated ceasefire agreement violations.[78] Relevant intergovernmental fora related to Action 16 are the Security Council (UNSC) annual briefing on UN Peacekeeping in April 2026; the SG Report on Peace Operations due in May; and multiple Security Council meetings on Kosovo, Libya, Syria, DRC, South Sudan, Colombia, Yemen, Haiti, Western Sahara,

the Middle East, and Palestine, as well as on maritime security (including sensitive developments in the Strait of Hormuz), in early 2026.[79]

In the GGIR'26 full logframe, Action 16 is monitored through thirteen specific initiatives across seven Sub-Actions, of which two are:

Table 2.8: Action 16 Mini-Logframe

Action 16. We will promote cooperation and understanding between Member States, defuse tensions, seek the pacific settlement of disputes and resolve conflicts.					
Output	**Indicator**	**Target**	**Baseline: Sept 2024 Data Summary**	**Most Recently Reported Data**	**Progress**
Sub-Action (b) Take effective collective measures, in accordance with the Charter, for the prevention and removal of threats to international peace and security, and revitalize and implement existing tools and mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes.					
Good offices and special political missions	# of good offices special political missions deployments by the SG	Increase in # of special political missions deployments	In 2024, there were 23 active special political missions.	In 2025, there were 21 active special political missions.	**Regression**
Sub-Action (c) Develop and implement mechanisms as required for the pacific settlement of disputes, confidence-building, early warning and crisis management, at the subregional, regional and international levels to address new and emerging threats to international peace and security.					
Peacekeeping Operations	# of peacekeeping operations	Increase in # of active peacekeeping operations	In 2024, there were 11 active peacekeeping operations led by the Department of Peace Operations.	As of Dec. 2025, there were 11 active peacekeeping operations led by the Department of Peace Operations.	**Minimal Progress**
Multi-Hazard Early Warning Systems (MHEWS)	# of Member States with early warning and risk assessment systems	Increase in # of Member States with early warning and risk assessment systems	As of Mar. 2024, 108 countries reported having MHEWS.	As of Apr. 2025, 119 countries reported the existence of MHEWS.	**Substantive Progress**
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programs	# of active Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs	Increase in the # of active Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programs	Over past 35 years, the UN has supported DDR processes across more than 30 countries and integrated DDR into more than 20 peace operations.	From Jan. to June 2025, the DDR Section in the DPO was deployed to over 35 contexts worldwide to support national authorities, regional organizations, the UN system, partners, and stakeholders.	**Minimal Progress**

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data sources: UN, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization; UNDGC, "UN Peacekeeping Factsheet"; ACLED, Raleigh Report; UNDRR, "DRR Monitor," accessed March 15, 2026; and UNDDR, "The DDR Bulletin."

Military expenditures and state-sponsored wars have been on the rise in recent years, causing repeated breaches of territorial integrity and state sovereignty (in Ukraine, Iran, Lebanon, and Venezuela), and eroding respect and trust in international law and the UN Charter. The growing consensus that climate change is a root cause of conflict (see section three) has fostered an increase in the number of Member States adopting Multi-Hazard Early Warning Systems (MHEWS). As of March 2024, 108 countries reported having such systems, increasing to 119 a year later.[80] Meanwhile, some UN observers are questioning the quality and effectiveness of special political mission deployments, peacekeeping operations, and DDR programs.[81] Tracking quantitative shifts in the number of mechanisms does not measure their effectiveness; rather, it is illustrative of continued efforts to advance the pacific settlement of disputes. For substantive progress of specific mechanisms to be fully assessed, monitoring and evaluation tools, such as the Integrated DDR Standards, should be strengthened and expanded to examine the durability of results, the misuse of the program for political interests, or misalignment with initial mandates.[82]

Action 17. We will fulfil our obligation to comply with the decisions and uphold the mandate of the International Court of Justice in any case to which our State is a party.

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Action 17 reaffirms the International Court of Justice (ICJ) mandate as an organ for the peaceful settlement of disputes, aligning with SDG 16 on strong institutions and complementing Chapter 5 of the Pact on "Transforming global governance."

In the GGIR'26 full logframe, Action 17 is monitored through one Sub-Action Initiative:

Table 2.9: Action 17 Mini-Logframe

Action 17. We will fulfill our obligation to comply with the decisions and uphold the mandate of the International Court of Justice in any case to which our State is a party.					
Output	**Indicator**	**Target**	**Baseline: Sept 2024 Data Summary**	**Most Recently Reported Data**	**Progress**
Sub-Action (a) Take appropriate steps to ensure that the International Court of Justice can fully and effectively discharge its mandate and promote awareness of its role in the peaceful settlement of disputes.					
Advisory Opinions	# of Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)	Increase in # of Advisory Opinions issued by the ICJ	From 1948 until 2023, the ICJ had issued 27 Advisory Opinions in total.	In 2025, major Advisory Opinions on Israel/Palestine and the climate crisis were issued (2 in total).	**Substantive Progress**
Third party interventions in ICJ Genocide Convention cases	# of Member States that seek to intervene as third parties (as per Articles 62 and 63 of ICJ Statute)	Increase in # of Member States that seek to intervene as third parties	Throughout 2023, the ICJ accepted 32 country requests to back Ukraine's genocide case against Russia. In Dec. 2024, South Africa accused Israel in the ICJ of genocide in the Gaza Strip, violating the UN's 1948 Genocide Convention. Throughout 2024, 14 countries announced their intention to intervene in the context of South Africa's complaint.	In July 2025, the ICJ admitted 4 additional Article 63 declarations in The Gambia v Myanmar after the Court's first wave in July 2024. In Mar. 2026, Iceland and the Netherlands filed declarations to intervene in South Africa's ICJ genocide case against Israel, bringing the number of countries seeking to participate in the proceedings to 18.	**Substantive Progress**

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data sources: Exaras, "Heavy caseload reflects 'sign of trust' from governments, says World Court president"; UN Regional Information Centre for Western Europe, "South Africa vs Israel: 14 other countries intend to join the ICJ case"; Adnan, "Article 63 as Evidence Law: The Gambia v Myanmar and the Missing Intervener"; and Asem, "Iceland and Netherlands intervene in ICJ South Africa v. Israel genocide case."

Between May 1947 and September 2025, 201 cases were entered in the General List of the ICJ, marking overall limited, yet steady progress regarding engagement of Member States with the organ, and trust in its responsibility to mediate the peaceful settlement of disputes.[83] During the past three years though, the ICJ has, for instance, published advisory opinions more frequently. Despite the fact that advisory opinions are not legally binding, they are of political and normative significance, as they judicialize international issues that would otherwise face procedural barriers to judicial review due to lack of state consent.[84] From 1948 to 2023, the ICJ issued 27 advisory opinions, without consistency or significant frequency. Moreover, the ICJ had not issued more than one advisory opinion in a single year since 1996. However, this changed in 2025, when it issued two advisory opinions on the Occupied Palestinian Territories and climate change, upholding the ICJ's role in guiding state behavior and UN action.[85] There has also been significant progress in the number of third party interventions in Genocide Convention cases by Member States (as per Articles 62 and 63 of the ICJ Statute), including *South Africa v. Israel* (Gaza Genocide Case) and *Gambia v. Myanmar* (Rohingya Genocide Case).[86]

Action 19. We will accelerate the implementation of our commitments on women, peace and security.

Action 19 addresses the gap between formal adoption of commitments under the Women, Peace and Security (WPS, anchored by UN Security Council Resolution 1325) agenda and their effective implementation across national and international contexts. While the WPS agenda has achieved broad

political recognition, progress remains uneven, with persistent challenges that include limited funding, weak accountability mechanisms, and deeply ingrained cultural resistance.[87] Structural constraints, limited resources, and ongoing conflict continue to hinder the realization of meaningful outcomes for women and girls, including their full, equal, safe, and meaningful participation in peace and security decision-making.[88] These commitments continue to be reviewed across key intergovernmental fora, including the UN Security Council's Women, Peace and Security agenda, the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), and the Women, Peace and Security Focal Points Network.

In the GGIR'26 full logframe, Action 19 is monitored through four Sub-Actions and ten corresponding initiatives. Two of them are:

Table 2.10: Action 19 Mini-Logframe

Action 19. We will accelerate the implementation of our commitments on women, peace and security.					
Output	**Indicator**	**Target**	**Baseline: Sept 2024 Data Summary**	**Most Recently Reported Data**	**Progress**
Sub-Action (a) Redouble our efforts to achieve gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls.					
Women, Peace and Security (WPS) National Action Plans (NAPs) adopted	# of countries and territories with NAPs on WPS	Increase in # of countries and territories with adopted NAPs on WPS	As of 2024, 110 countries and territories had adopted NAPs on WPS.	By 2026, 117 countries and territories had adopted NAPs on WPS.	**Substantive Progress**
	# of Member State and regional organizations participating in WPS Focal Points Network	Increase in active engagement of Member State and regional organizations within the Network	As of 2024, the WPS Focal Points Network included 93 Member States and 10 regional organizations.	By 2026, the network comprises 98 Member States and 10 regional organizations.	**Substantive Progress**
Sub-Action (b) Deliver on our commitments to ensure that women can fully, equally, safely and meaningfully participate in all United Nations-led mediation and peace processes.					
	% of women engaged in formal peace processes (negotiators, mediators, and signatories)	Increase in women's representation in formal peace processes	In 2023, women made up only 9.6% of negotiators globally, 19% in UN-led processes; women represented only 13.7% of mediators in over 50 analyzed peace processes; 26.6% of agreements had women signatories (this drops to 1.5% if Colombia is excluded).	In 2024, women made up only 7% of negotiators and 14% of mediators in formal peace processes, and many talks included no women. Although women accounted for 20% of signatories, this figure is largely driven by cases such as Colombia and the Philippines.	**Regression**
Women's groups included as signatories in peace agreements	% of peace agreements signed by women's groups or representatives of women's civil society	Increase in share of peace agreements signed by women's groups	In 2023, no peace or ceasefire agreements included a women's group or civil society representative as a formal signatory. During that period, women's representation in negotiating delegations stood at 19%.	In 2024, only 1 of 18 global peace agreements (6%) included a signatory from a women's group. Women comprised 18% of negotiators in UN-supported processes, down from 19% in 2023 and 23% in 2020. Despite 45% representation in UN mediation teams, participation in signatory roles remains limited.	**Minimal Progress**

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data sources: UN, Women and Peace and Security: Report of the Secretary-General, S/2024/67; UN, Women and Peace and Security: Report of the Secretary-General, S/2025/556; and UN Women, "Facts and Figures: Women, Peace and Security."

While the number of countries adopting WPS National Action Plans (NAPs) increased from 110 in 2024 to 117 in 2026, progress in implementation remains uneven.[89] The most significant gap is women's underrepresentation in peace processes, where they are largely limited to consultative roles rather than decision-making positions (despite earlier international commitments). In 2024, women represented only 7% of negotiators and 14% of mediators in formal peace processes, and many peace talks still include no

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women negotiators.[90] At the same time, conflict-related sexual violence is on the rise, with more than 4,500 cases reported in 2024—a 25% increase from 2023—and women and girls comprising 92% of the victims.[91] Together, these trends highlight a persistent gap between commitments to inclusion and protection under the WPS agenda and actual outcomes, suggesting that increases in participation and institutional engagement remain largely symbolic and have not translated into substantive influence in actual decision-making.

Action 20. We will accelerate the implementation of our commitments on youth, peace and security.

Action 20 addresses the gap between aspirations of the Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) agenda and the meaningful inclusion of youth in decision-making processes for conflict prevention and resolution. An estimated 47% of the global youth population have experienced living in countries affected by high or extreme levels of violence; however, drawing on this may be limited given that "the widespread deficit in age-disaggregated data represents a major obstacle to analyzing progress in the implementation of the agenda."[92] Although youth participation is increasingly reflected in peace and security frameworks, progress toward systematic and meaningful engagement remains uneven, particularly at the implementation level. At the same time, Resolution 2807 (2025) reaffirmed "the positive role of youth" and emphasized the importance of their "full and meaningful participation" in peace and security efforts.[93] Youth commitments continue to be advanced across key intergovernmental fora, including the Peacebuilding Commission, the Economic and Social Council Youth Forum, and the General Assembly's Third Committee.

In the GGIR'26 full logframe, Action 20 is monitored through six initiatives, across three Sub-Actions. Two of these initiatives are represented below:

Table 2.11: Action 20 Mini-Logframe

Action 20. We will accelerate the implementation of our commitments on youth, peace and security.					
Output	**Indicator**	**Target**	**Baseline: Sept 2024 Data Summary**	**Most Recently Reported Data**	**Progress**
Sub-Action (a1) Take concrete voluntary measures to increase the inclusive representation of youth in decision-making related to conflict prevention and conflict resolution.					
Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) National Action Plans (NAPs) and formal youth participation mechanisms adopted	# of Member States with formal mechanisms for youth participation in peace and security decision-making	Increase the # of Member States with YPS mechanisms	As of 2024, 5 Member States and 2 regional organizations (African Union and European Union) adopted YPS NAPs.	By 2025, 11 Member States and 2 regional organizations (African Union and European Union) have adopted YPS NAPs, but 9% of them are currently outdated, having expired in 2025 or before.	**Substantive Progress**
Sub-Action (a2) Take concrete voluntary measures to increase opportunities for youth participation in relevant intergovernmental deliberations at the United Nations.					
	# of UN-led processes or platforms that include youth participation	Increase # of UN-led processes with youth participation	As of 2023, 27 UN entities reported implementing the fifth Youth2030 priority on peace and resilience building, while 39 UN Country Teams (UNCTs) engaged youth networks in conflict-affected contexts. In parallel, 94% (124 of 132) of UNCTs included youth-related results in their UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks, reflecting broad integration of youth participation across UN-led planning processes.	In 2024, 92% (121 of 132) of UNCTs included youth-related results in their Cooperation Frameworks, indicating sustained integration, while at least 41 UN-supported peacebuilding projects (2018–2022) incorporated youth participation.	**Minimal Progress**

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data sources: YPS Monitor, "Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) National Action Plans Database"; University of Glasgow, "References to Youth in Peace Agreements, 1990–2022"; UNSC, Youth, Peace and Security: Report of the Secretary-General, S/2024/207; and UNSC, Resolution 2807, S/RES/2807.

As of 2025, eleven Member States and two regional organizations have adopted Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) National Action Plans (NAPs), reflecting continued—though still limited—efforts to institutionalize youth participation in peace and security decision-making at the national level. In many instances, youth remain excluded from key national political processes, peace and transition mechanisms, and development of youth policies and strategies that are meant to respond to their needs and aspirations.[94] At the same time, evidence suggests gradual institutional integration of youth participation across UN-supported frameworks, with 94% (124 of 132) of UN Country Teams (UNCT) including youth-related results in their UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks (UNSDCF) in 2023, and 92% (121 of 132) continuing to do so in 2024. Youth briefings to the Security Council also remain limited (nine in 2020, six in 2021, three in 2022, and four in 2023), and the number of references to young people in Security Council resolutions have decreased.[95]

Action 25. We will advance the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Action 25 calls on Member States to recommit to the total elimination of nuclear weapons and strengthen the disarmament and non-proliferation architecture by mapping compliance to relevant treaties and sustaining nuclear weapons-free-zones.[96] Action 25 calls for completion of disarmament efforts and the enduring elimination of the danger of nuclear war by strengthening international cooperation in nuclear non-proliferation.[97] Prominent 2026 intergovernmental fora related to nuclear non-proliferation include the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which held its latest five-year review from April 27 to May 22 in New York, and the Conference on Disarmament based in Geneva.

In the GGIR'26 full logframe, Action 25 is monitored through nine specific initiatives across five Sub-Actions. Two noteworthy initiatives are:

Table 2.12: Action 25 Mini-Logframe

Action 25. We will advance the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.					
Output	**Indicator**	**Target**	**Baseline: Sept 2024 Data Summary**	**Most Recently Reported Data**	**Progress**
Sub-Action (a) Recommit to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.					
Ratification of the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)	# of ratifications of TPNW	Increase in # of ratifications of TPNW	In 2023, there were 93 signatories and 69 states parties to the Treaty.	As of Sept. 2025, there are 74 states parties, as well as a further two signatories (95 in total), following Kyrgyzstan's signature and Ghana's ratification.	**Substantive Progress**
National policy to reduce nuclear weapons	# of nuclear weapons in the world	Decrease in # of nuclear weapons in the world	In 2024, there were 12,121 nuclear weapons in the world.	By Jan. 2025, there were 12,241 nuclear weapons in the world.	**No Progress**
Nuclear disarmament policy implementation on the national level	# of countries with nuclear weapons	Decrease in # of countries in possession of nuclear weapons	At the start of 2024, 9 countries (U.S., Russia, UK, France, China, India, Pakistan, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea [North Korea] and Israel) had nuclear weapons.	As of Mar. 2026, 9 countries are known to have nuclear weapons. Moreover, on May 22, 2026, the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) concluded without agreement on a consensus outcome document amid rising nuclear risks.	**No Progress**
Sub-Action (c) Honour and respect all existing security assurances undertaken, including in connection with the treaties and relevant protocols of nuclear-weapon-free zones.					
Nuclear-weapon-free-zones (NWFZs)	# of existing and active treaties and relevant protocols of NWFZs	Maintain (and increase) NWFZs	As of Mar. 2022, regions covered under NWFZ agreements include: Latin America (the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific (the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga), Southeast Asia (the 1995 Treaty of Bangkok), Africa (the 1996 Treaty of Pelindaba), and Central Asia (the 2006 Treaty of Semipalatinsk).	As of May 2026, there were no changes in agreements or the number of zones.	**No Progress**

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Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data sources: International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, "TPNW signatureand ratification status Database," accessed March 22, 2026; SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2025: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security - Summary; and Arms Control Association, "Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) At a Glance."

Between 2023 and 2025, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) gained five fully-ratified state parties (for a total of 74) and two additional signatories (for a total of 21 states that have signed but not ratified).[98] The number of countries in possession of nuclear weapons has not changed (the U.S., Russia, U.K., France, China, India, Pakistan, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and Israel), and the number of potentially available nuclear weapons (about 3,900 deployed and 5,700 in storage, with the remainder in the assembly or disassembly pipeline) is relatively stable—but several nuclear states have warhead modernization programs underway, and China is advancing the number of weapons deployed.[99] Member State reluctance to abolish nuclear arsenals reflects the realpolitik logic of an increasingly militarized and precarious global order, in which deterrence, large-scale war capacity, and territorial defense take precedence over collective action on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.[100] Action 25 also addresses the issue of honoring and respecting existing treaties and relevant protocols of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs), which showcase the significance of regional agreements for the protection of international peace and security.[101] Marking no progress, existing NWFZs have been maintained but without an increase in their number, or relevant treaties.[102]

PACT CHAPTER 3: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION AND DIGITAL COOPERATION

Action 28. We will seize the opportunities presented by science, technology and innovation for the benefit of people and planet.

Action 28 promotes cooperative environments for science, technology, and innovation development, increased use of science, and talent mobility, while highlighting uneven progress between developed and developing states (despite incremental global improvements in relevant infrastructure). For instance, per capita access to fixed broadband subscriptions increased slightly from 2024 to 2025, and the percentage of people with internet access also rose, from 71% to 74%.[103] In September 2024, the UN also agreed on the Global Digital Compact, leading to the creation of the Office of Digital and Emerging Technologies (ODET) and the Digital Cooperation Portal to track progress related to digital transformation and emerging technologies.[104] Additionally, international agreements and regional partnerships, such as the Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa, ASEAN Digital Masterplan 2025, and the European Union's 2030 Digital Compass, have emphasized the need for international cooperation, partnerships, and development financing for the digital economy.[105]

Greenfield projects, a form of foreign direct investment (FDI) involving development on previously undeveloped land, have been significant in the digital economy, as evidenced in 2025 when global investments in data centers—a backbone for the development and deployment of artificial intelligence (AI)—surged alongside the rapid proliferation of AI, ultimately accounting for one-fifth of all greenfield investments and totaling $125 billion. Of this figure, developing countries within the top 10 of announced data center projects accounted for just $30 billion.[106] Between 2020 and 2024, developing countries attracted $531 billion in FDI in the digital economy, although nearly 80% of greenfield investment in the Global South was located in just 10 countries. However, data center investment globally is mainly concentrated in a handful of Global North host countries, driven heavily by France, the U.S., and South Korea.[107] This, in effect, undermines international cooperation on digital infrastructure as envisioned in the Pact, exacerbating the global digital divide.

In the GGIR'26 full logframe, Action 28 is monitored through nine specific initiatives across three Sub-Actions. Two noteworthy initiatives are:

Table 2.13: Action 28 Mini-Logframe

Action 28. We will seize the opportunities presented by science, technology and innovation for the benefit of people and planet.					
Output	**Indicator**	**Target**	**Baseline: Sept 2024 Data Summary**	**Most Recently Reported Data**	**Progress**
Sub-Action (b) Ensure that complex global challenges are addressed through interdisciplinary collaboration.					
Open science policies in national governments	# of countries with Open Science Policies	100 countries implementing open scientific imformation policies	As of 2023, 11 countries implemented appropriate policies, strategies, and legislative frameworks. 4 countries included the principles of open science in their domestic science policies, and 10+ are currently developing open science policies, based on UNESCO's recommendation, notably in Africa, but also in Latin America and Europe.	As of 2026, 66 countries have open access to scientific information policies, and 74 countries have open data policies.	**Substantive Progress**
Sub-Action (c) Provide suitable educational and working conditions and opportunities for local workforce.					
Increase in international ICT skills	SDG Indicator 4.4.1 Proportion of youth and adults with information and communications technology (ICT) skills, by type of skill	SDG Target 4.4 By 2030, substantially increase the number of youth and adults who have relevant skills, including technical and vocational skills, for employment, decent jobs and entrepreneurship	As of 2024, youth ICT skills in country categories were: Low-Income (43%), Low-Middle-Income (71%), Upper-Middle-Income (97%), and High-Income (99%).	As of 2025, youth ICT skills in country categories were: Low-Income (38%), Low-Middle-Income (80%), Upper-Middle-Income (97%), and High-Income (99%).	**Minimal Progress**

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data sources: UNESCO, "Open Science Outlook 1"; UNESCO, "Open Access to Scientific Information"; ITU, "ITU Facts and Figures 2024"; and ITU, "ITU Facts and Figures 2025."

Action 30. We will ensure that science, technology and innovation contribute to the full enjoyment of human rights by all.

Action 30 measures the intersection between ethical concerns, private sector development, and people in vulnerable situations on the one hand, and emerging technologies on the other. Through the UN's Global Dialogue on AI governance, Independent International Scientific Panel on Artificial Intelligence, Global Digital Compact, and the UN's ODET, the institutionalization of discussions on the global governance of AI has commenced.[108] With AI projected to capture 29% of the global frontier technology market by 2033, the risk of job loss will also likely rise.[109] The implications for emerging technologies' impact on human rights extend beyond labor displacement: The OHCHR links generative AI to potential harms to privacy, equality and non-discrimination, freedom of expression and access to information, public participation, children's rights, and cultural rights, with higher risk for marginalized groups and Global South contexts.[110] Countries with stronger digital infrastructure are better equipped to develop and govern new technologies, but declining FDI and limited resources may leave the Global South behind the Global North in emerging digital markets.[111] Besides the above UN instruments and intergovernmental fora, the recent "AI Impact Summit" series (hosted to date in the UK, South Korea, France, and this past February in India) represents another critical annual convening on AI governance.

In the GGIR'26 full logframe, Action 30 is monitored through eleven specific Initiatives across four Sub-Actions. Three especially noteworthy Sub-Action initiatives are:

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Table 2.14: Action 30 Mini-Logframe

Action 30. We will ensure that science, technology and innovation contribute to the full enjoyment of human rights by all.					
Output	**Indicator**	**Target**	**Baseline: Sept 2024 Data Summary**	**Most Recently Reported Data**	**Progress**
Sub-Action (b) Integrate a human rights perspective into regulatory and norm setting processes for new and emerging technologies.					
Capacity for governments to regulate responsible AI	Integrate international ethical frameworks into national AI policies	Increase	Readiness Assessment Methodology for national AI policy is created in 2023.	As of 2026, 80 countries worldwide have implemented the Readiness Assessment Methodology.	**Substantive Progress**
Regulatory bodies established by UN	International organizations working to establish AI regulations and governance	Increase	Global Digital Compact Objective 3. Foster an inclusive, open, safe and secure digital space that respects, protects and promotes human rights	In 2026, the SG appointed 40 individuals to serve on the new Independent International Scientific Panel on AI.	**Minimal Progress**
Sub-Action (c) Ensure that those in vulnerable situations benefit from application of science, technology and innovation.					
Higher proportion of global population with access to ICT infrastructure	Access to the internet and 5G networks	Increase	In 2024, internet usage was reported at 5.5 billion people worldwide, or 68% of the global population. 51% of the world's population was covered by 5G.	In 2025, internet usage was reported at 6 billion people worldwide, or 74% of the global population. 55% of the world's population is covered by 5G mobile networks.	**Substantive Progress**
Sub-Action (d) Seize on opportunities provided by new and emerging technologies to empower and advance equity for persons with disabilities.					
Growth of the assistive technology market	Total value of global spending on assistive technologies	Increase	Global Assistive Technology Market was valued at approximately $21.95 billion in 2022.	Global Assistive Technology Market size and share revenue was valued at approximately $28.2 billion in 2024 and is expected to reach $30.4 billion in 2025	**Minimal Progress**

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data sources: UNCTAD, *Technology and Innovation Report 2025: Inclusive artificial intelligence for development*; WIPO, *World Intellectual Property Report 2026: Technology on the Move*; UNESCO, "AI Readiness Assessment to boost ethical governance of AI in Thailand, Host Country of 2025 Global Forum"; and ODET, "UN Open Source Week 2026," accessed February 24, 2026.

An increasing number of countries are adopting frameworks for the safe regulation of AI. As of 2026, 80 countries have implemented UNESCO's Readiness Assessment Methodology (RAM), a framework to enhance AI readiness, integrating RAM into national AI policies in areas such as governance, data infrastructure, human capital, economic development, and regulatory capacity. This is an increase from 60 countries in 2024 and a major jump from its creation in 2023.[112] With the inception of ODET, the UN has begun to establish itself as a global platform builder on digital cooperation issues, hosting events such as the Science, Technology, and Innovation (STI) Forum Action Day (May 2025), UN Digital Cooperation Day (September 2025), "Building the Commons" initiative (December 2025), participation in the AI Impact Summit (February 2026), and UN Open Source Week (June 2026). Meanwhile, between 2024 and 2025, internet access globally increased from 5.5 billion to 6 billion people, and 5G coverage increased from 51% to 55% of the world's population, highlighting how global connectivity is increasing overall.[113]

Action 31. We will ensure that science, technology and innovation improve gender equality and the lives of all women and girls.

Action 31 highlights the importance of STI in improving gender equality and the lives of women and girls, and some of its risks. Between 2024 and 2025, regular access to the internet increased from 65% to 71% of women globally, and from 70% to 77% of men—a persistent gap in the digital divide.[114] According to

UNESCO, women comprise 35% of graduates in STEM fields globally.[115] Furthermore, other troubling developments signal ongoing challenges, such as AI as a rapidly emerging source of deepfake pornography that disproportionately targets women and girls, who constitute 99% of those depicted.[116] It has been reported that technologically facilitated gender-based violence, including non-consensual imagery, deepfake abuse, and other forms of harassment threaten gender equality, freedom of expression, and personal safety, targeting women, in particular, engaged in politics, media, and activism.[117]

In the GGIR'26 full logframe, Action 31 is monitored through ten specific initiatives derived from two Sub-Actions. Two especially noteworthy initiatives are:

Table 2.15: Action 31 Mini-Logframe

Action 31. We will ensure that science, technology and innovation improve gender equality and the lives of all women and girls.					
Output	**Indicator**	**Target**	**Baseline: Sept 2024 Data Summary**	**Most Recently Reported Data**	**Progress**
Sub-Action (a) Improve employment opportunities for all women and girls in science, technology and innovation.					
Women and girls have increased internet access worldwide	Internet access for women and girls globally	Increase internet access for women and girls to 75%	As of 2024, global data shows 65% of women and 70% of men have access to the internet.	As of 2025, 71% of women had access to the internet, while 77% of men had access. Country data highlighted a disparity between Low-Income (18% of women and 29% of men) and Lower-Middle-Income (57% of women and 69% of men) people with access to the internet.	**Minimal Progress**
Sub-Action (b) Address trafficking of persons brought about by the use of technologies.					
International policy adopted on prevention of trafficking aided through digital technologies	UN resolutions on cybercrime and human trafficking	100 Member States become signiatories of the UN Convention Against Cybercrime	As of Dec. 2024, the UN Convention against Cybercrime was adopted by consensus through General Assembly resolution 79/243. States will complete their internal domestic processes to implement the Convention.	As of May 2026, the UN Convention Against Cybercrime has been formally signed by 76 UN Member States and 3 countries completed formal ratification.	**Minimal Progress**

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data sources: ITU, "ITU Facts and Figures 2025"; UNESCO, "Advancing gender equality in STEM education: Inspiring girls to pursue"; UN Office on Drugs and Crime, "United Nations Convention against Cybercrime"; UN Women, "Tipping Point: The Chilling Escalation Of Online Violence Against Women In The Public Sphere"; and UNDP, "Unite to end digital violence against all women and girls."

Growing recognition of online violence against women and girls is reflected in initiatives by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the 2025 UN Convention Against Cybercrime, which address risks of human trafficking and exploitation exacerbated by emerging technologies. By May 2026, 76 countries had signed the convention, though only three have ratified it (note: 40 ratifications are needed to bring it into force).[118] A 2025 joint statement by digital and human rights organizations warned that the convention's broad surveillance and cross-border data-sharing provisions lacked adequate safeguards and insufficiently discussed gender-related harms.[119] Meanwhile, the IOM's Digital Identity Toolkit supports policymakers in developing digital identity frameworks to protect migrants and migrant workers. As of 2025, 117 countries had adopted measures to address online violence against women and girls, highlighting initiatives by the global community to address this kind of asymmetric violence.[120]

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PACT CHAPTER 4: YOUTH AND FUTURE GENERATIONS

Action 36. We will strengthen meaningful youth participation at the national level.

Action 36 addresses the gap between formal recognition of youth participation and their meaningful integration into national policymaking. While global frameworks such as Youth2030 and the Pact for the Future emphasize inclusive governance, progress toward meaningful youth participation remains uneven, particularly at the national level, where existing participation arrangements still limit youth influence over decision-making.[121] While several countries have taken steps to promote youth participation—through quotas, youth parliaments, and targeted policy reforms—progress remains uneven.[122] The absence of a consolidated global dataset on formal youth engagement mechanisms reflects a broader limitation in tracking youth participation, as available evidence remains fragmented. At the same time, youth participation continues to be advanced across intergovernmental fora, including the ECOSOC Youth Forum (April 15-17, 2025; also convened, in 2026, from April 14-16), the High-Level Review of the World Programme of Action for Youth (September 2025), and the UNCTAD Youth Forum (October 20–23, 2025).

In the GGIR'26 full logframe, Action 36 is monitored through twelve initiatives across four Sub-Actions. The mini-logframe features three of those initiatives:

Table 2.16: Action 36 Mini-Logframe

Action 36. We will strengthen meaningful youth participation at the national level.				
Indicator	**Target**	**Baseline: Sept 2024 Data Summary**	**Most Recently Reported Data**	**Progress**
Sub-Action (a1) Encourage and support the establishment of mechanisms at the national level to consult with young people.				
% of countries with formal youth engagement mechanisms at the national level	Increase formal youth engagement mechanisms at the national level	In 2025, approximately 33% of countries have formal mechanisms to engage youth in decision-making processes and education discussions.	In 2026, about one-third of countries have formal mechanisms in place to engage youth in decision-making.	**No Progress**
% of UN Country Teams (UNCT) supporting the strengthening of national institutional mechanisms for multisectoral youth coordination	Increase in UNCT support to national youth coordination mechanisms	In 2023, 85% (112 of 131) of UNCTs reported strengthening national institutional mechanisms for multisectoral and multistakeholder coordination of youth programs, up from 79% (103 out of 130) in 2020.	In 2024, 86% of UNCTs (113 out of 132) reported strengthening national institutional mechanisms for multisectoral and multistakeholder coordination of youth programs.	**Minimal Progress**
Sub-Action (a2) Provide young people with meaningful opportunities to engage in national policymaking and decision-making processes, supported upon request by the United Nations system and in line with national legislation and policies.				
% of UN Country Teams (UNCT) engaging youth in national development planning processes	Increase UNCT engagement of youth in national development planning	In 2023, 94% of UNCTs (124 out of 132) reported engaging youth in their United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF).	In 2024, 84% (111 of 132) of UNCTs reported engaging youth in their UNSDCF processes.	**Regression**
Sub-Action (c) Improve the representation of all youth, including young women, young persons with disabilities, young persons of African descent and those in vulnerable situations, in formal political structures.				
% of parliamentary seats held by young people (aged 30 or under)	Increase parliamentary representation of young people	In 2023, 2.8% of members of Parliament worldwide are aged 30 or under.	In 2024, youth representation in national parliaments stalled, with only 2.8% of the world's parliamentarians aged 30 and under, which is the same as in 2023; however, it is 75% higher than in 2014 (1.6%).	**No Progress**

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data sources: UNESCO, Global Education Monitoring Report 2026: Lead with Youth; UN, Youth2030: Global Progress Report 2024; UN, Youth2030: Global Progress Report 2025; IPU, Youth Participation in National Parliaments: 2023; and IPU, "Youth Participation in National Parliaments 2025 Infographic."

In 2024, 113 out of 132 of UNCTs reported supporting the strengthening of national institutional mechanisms for multisectoral youth coordination, reflecting sustained UN efforts to build enabling structures for coordination—and the development and update—of national plans on youth.[123] Similarly, 85% of UNCTs supported governments in mainstreaming youth engagement in sectoral program design, monitoring, and review processes. These trends are consistent with system-wide findings showing strengthened institutional and technical capacities for youth engagement, including enhanced coordination mechanisms and mainstreaming of youth across sectoral programming.[124] These gains, however, are not consistently reflected in participation outcomes. Youth engagement in UNSDCFs declined from 94% of UNCTs in 2023 to 84% in 2024, suggesting that youth engagement remains structurally constrained, including insufficient resourcing.[125] Barriers to participation remain particularly acute for youth in vulnerable situations, including those affected by poverty, conflict, displacement, and discrimination. Taken together, these trends indicate that expanding institutional frameworks and capacity-building efforts are not yet translating into consistent, inclusive, and effective youth participation.

PACT CHAPTER 5: TRANSFORMING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Actions 39–41. UN Security Council Reforms

Action 39. We will reform the Security Council, recognizing the urgent need to make it more representative, inclusive, transparent, efficient, effective, democratic and accountable.

Action 40. We will strengthen our efforts in the framework of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reform as a matter of priority and without delay.

Action 41. We will strengthen the response of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security and its relationship with the General Assembly.

Actions 39, 40, and 41 collectively address Security Council reform, which the Secretary-General has characterized as "the strongest on Security Council reform in a generation, and the most concrete step toward Council enlargement since 1963."[126] Implementation remains stalled with no agreement on membership, regional representation, size of an enlarged Council, the future of the veto, or Council working methods.[127] Preparation of a "consolidated model," as mentioned in Action 40 Sub-Action (a), remains the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reform's clear overarching objective. The June 2025 Elements Paper, produced by the IGN's Co-Chairs at the time (from Kuwait and Austria; currently, the Permanent Representatives of Kuwait and The Netherlands Co-Chair the IGN), seeks meaningful progress on Council reform in the 80th session of the General Assembly. As of mid-June 2026, however, neither a consolidated model nor its guiding parameters have been made public.

In the GGIR'26 full logframe, Actions 39, 40, and 41 are monitored through initiatives across thirteen Sub-Actions, and nineteen initiatives. Three such initiatives are highlighted here:

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Table 2.17: Actions 39–41 Mini-Logframe

Output	Indicator	Target	Baseline: Sept 2024 Data Summary	Most Recently Reported Data	Progress
Action 39. We will reform the Security Council, recognizing the urgent need to make it more representative, inclusive, transparent, efficient, effective, democratic and accountable.					
Sub-Action (g) The question of the veto is a key element of Security Council reform. We will intensify efforts to reach an agreement on the future of the veto.					
Intergovernmental Negotiations on veto modification convened	# of Intergovernmental Negotiations on veto modification	Increase in # of Intergovernmental Negotiations on veto modification	Since 2008, the IGN has convened over 40 sessions that referenced the need to curb misuse of the P5's veto authority, especially in cases involving the threat or realization of mass atrocities.	On Nov. 25 and Dec. 4, 2024, dedicated discussions on limitation of the veto were held for the first time in IGN history. The Co-Chairs convened two rounds of informal informal discussions "Taxel Talks" (informals).	**Minimal Progress**
Proposals adopted by UNGA to curb the veto's misuse	# of relevant proposals adopted by UNGA to curb veto misuse	Increase in relevant # of proposals adopted	GA Resolution A/77/L.52 (Apr. 2022), the "Liechtenstein Veto Initiative" (followed shortly by GA Resolution 76/262) established a mechanism through which the PGA convenes the GA within 10 days of a P5 veto to discuss the topic. The mechanism was triggered 10 times since adoption.	No new further veto proposals were adopted in the Oct. 24 - Sept. 25 period.	**Minimal Progress**
Action 40. We will strengthen our efforts in the framework of the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform as a matter of priority and without delay.					
Sub-Action (a) Encourage the submission of further models and the revision of already presented models by States and Groups of States for the structured dialogues with a view to developing a consolidated model in the future based on convergences on the five clusters, and the models presented by Member States.					
Agreed consolidated model	Proposed consolidated UNSC reform model introduced for formal "text-based" IGN negotiations	Progress in adoption of a consolidated model on UNSC reform	As of Sept. 2024, delegations remain split on process between text-based negotiations via a single consolidated document/ model (the L.69, Benelux, G4, and Nordic Group) and insisting on agreed reform principles and model first (Uniting for Consensus, African, and Arab Groups).	As noted in the convergence document by the co-chairs in June 2025, the consolidated model is now a clear IGN objective, intended to provide a concrete basis for text-based negotiations, with co-chairs working to reconcile differences across the 5 interlinked clusters: size, categories, veto, regional representation, and working methods.	**Minimal Progress**
Action 41. We will strengthen the response of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security and its relationship with the General Assembly.					
Sub-Action (c) Actively reinforce the ongoing efforts of the Security Council to review and enhance its working methods, including, inter alia, penholding and co-penholding arrangements, and strengthen the cooperation and communication between the Security Council and the General Assembly and its subsidiary bodies, including the Peacebuilding Commission, as well as the Economic and Social Council and regional and subregional arrangements, including by continuing to fully implement and make use of Assembly resolutions 377 A (V) of 3 November 1950 on uniting for peace and 76/262 of 26 April 2022 on the veto initiative.					
General Assembly sessions convened under veto initiative resolution 76/262	# of GA Sessions invoked under resolution 76/262 on the veto initiative	Increase in # of times GA resolution 76/262 on the veto initiative was invoked	Since adoption in Apr. 2022, the resolution has been invoked 17 times in the previous 3 years, with 10 cases triggering special emergency GA sessions.	As of Apr. 28, 2026, the resolution was invoked 18 times, with 10 cases triggering special emergency GA sessions under the "veto initiative."	**Substantive Progress**

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data sources: UNGA, UN Meeting Records – Digital Library, accessed March 24; UN, Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) on Security Council Reform, informal meeting of the plenary, New York; Missions of Kuwait and Austria (Co-Chairs, Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reform), IGN Co-Chairs Timeline of Meetings—79th Session; Benelux, Statement by H.E. Mr. Olivier Maes on behalf of the Benelux countries, IGN on Security Council Reform; Missions of Kuwait and Austria (Co-Chairs, Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reform), Revised Co-Chairs' Elements Paper on Convergences and Divergences on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Related Matters; UN News, "General Assembly Debates Security Council's Rising Veto Use"; and UNGA, Veto Must Not End UN Action, Speakers Stress in General Assembly Debate, as President Warns Against Perception of "Our Collective Failure to Act."

Action 41 calls for strengthening of linkages between the General Assembly and Security Council on international peace and security. For example, the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review resolution, A/RES/80/11, includes language that reinforces Security Council and General Assembly cooperation, reflecting an emerging consensus on the principle of enhanced coordination of UN bodies.[128] At the same time, the General Assembly has continued to take independent action on issues where the Security Council is deadlocked, as in the cases of Gaza[129] and Sudan.[130] The General Assembly has further engaged on matters of international peace and security by increasing the number of meetings hosted under resolution 76/262, the 2022 *Liechtenstein Veto Initiative*, which holds the Permanent Five accountable to the General Assembly for their use of the veto. Since 2022, it has been invoked 18 times, with 10 cases triggering special emergency GA sessions.[131] A much older General Assembly resolution, *377A(V)* 1950, *Uniting for Peace,* discussed under Action 42, enables the General Assembly to act in place of a paralyzed Security Council.

> ***...the General Assembly has continued to take independent action on issues where the Security Council is deadlocked, as in the cases of Gaza and Sudan.***

Action 42. We will increase our efforts to revitalize the work of the General Assembly.

Action 42 highlights the UN General Assembly's role and authority in meeting global challenges, including the maintenance of international peace and security. It also stresses the need for fairness and transparency in the selection and appointment of the Secretary-General. The latter process formally began in November 2025 with a joint letter from the President of the General Assembly (PGA) and the Security Council inviting Member States to submit nominations.[132] The President of the General Assembly held initial interactive dialogues between candidates, Member States, and civil society on April 21-22, 2026 (with more to follow on June 15, 2026), with Security Council deliberations expected to begin in July, and the forwarding of its nominee to the General Assembly later in the year.[133]

In the GGIR'26 full logframe, Action 42 is monitored through four initiatives across three Sub-Actions. One such initiative is highlighted here:

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Table 2.18: Action 42 Mini-Logframe

Action 42. We will increase our efforts to revitalize the work of the General Assembly.					
Output	**Indicator**	**Target**	**Baseline: Sept 2024 ata Summary**	**Most Recently Reported Data**	**Progress**
Sub-Action (b) Enhance ways in which the General Assembly can contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, in particular by taking action in accordance with the UN Charter.					
Emergency Special Sessions convened under Uniting for Peace resolution	# of Emergency Special Sessions held under resolution 377A(V) "Uniting for Peace"	Increase in # of Emergency Special Sessions convened	Between Oct. 2023 - Sept. 2024, 4 Emergency Special Sessions were convened.	Between Oct. 2024 - Sept. 2025, 5 Emergency Special Sessions were convened.	**Minimal Progress**
GA debates triggered by Security Council vetoes under resolution 76/262	# of GA debates triggered by Security Council vetoes under GA resolution 76/262 ("veto initiative")	Consistent # of relevant GA debates in relation to UNSC vetoes not addressed by an Emergency Special Session	Between the adoption of resolution 76/262 (Apr. 2022) and Sept. 2024, the General Assembly convened 9 plenary debates under the veto initiative, one for each of the 9 vetoes cast in the Security Council during that period not addressed by an Emergency Special Session.	Between Oct. 2023 - Sept. 2024, 3 GA debates were convened under the veto initiative, corresponding to 5 Security Council vetoes. Subsequently, Russia's two Ukraine amendment vetoes (24 Feb. 2025) were addressed in a single debate, as were the two Nov. 2024 vetoes on Sudan and Gaza.	**Substantive Progress**
GA requests for ICJ advisory opinions submitted	# of GA requests for an International Court of Justice advisory opinion	Increase in # of relevant GA requests	The UNGA has requested an ICJ advisory opinion in 7 previous instances with the last one being in March 2023. No other opinions were requested in the Oct. 2023 - Sept. 2024 period.	One advisory opinion requested (A/RES/79/232) in the Oct. 2024 - Sept. 2025 period.	**Substantive Progress**

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data sources: UNGA, Record of UNGA Emergency Special Sessions, accessed March 12, 2025; United Nations Digital Library, UN Meeting Records; UNU-CPR, Assembly for Peace: A Digital Handbook on the UN General Assembly's Past Practice on Peace and Security; and UNGA, A/RES/79/232, Request for an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Obligations of Israel in Relation to the Presence and Activities of the United Nations, Other International Organizations and Third States.

The General Assembly convened four sessions between October 2023 and September 2024 under *Uniting for Peace,* and five between October 2024 and September 2025.[134] Palestine remained the most frequent item with eight meetings convened, while one meeting was convened with respect to Ukraine. Action on Palestine in 2025 prompted the General Assembly to request an advisory opinion of the ICJ in resolution 79/232,[135] the eighth ICJ advisory opinion ever requested, and the first since March 2023. On the matter of the *Veto Initiative,* nine meetings were convened between October 2023 and September 2024 and five between October 2024 and September 2025.[136] While these mechanisms demonstrate that the General Assembly is responding more actively to situations where the Security Council fails to act, they do not

yet indicate that the Council's behavior has been influenced by these interventions. On the other hand, the General Assembly's request for an ICJ opinion represents a more substantive use of the General Assembly's authority that moves beyond solely debate and into the use of legal and institutional tools.

Action 43. We will strengthen the Economic and Social Council to accelerate sustainable development.

Action 43 seeks greater cooperation between the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), International Financial Institutions (IFIs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the ECOSOC Youth Forum. Although the PBC advisory role to ECOSOC has been increasingly recognized, it has issued a declining number of advisory documents in recent years (three in 2024, none in 2025).[137] Regarding ECOSOC's efforts to strengthen engagement with NGOs, a significant backlog in processing NGOs' applications for consultative status left the list of NGOs granted consultative status unchanged in 2025. Some ECOSOC members also raised concerns that "politicized deferrals and repeated questions continue to obstruct civil society's access to the UN."[138] The annual Forum on Financing for Development (FfD), an intergovernmental meeting hosted by ECOSOC with the Executive Directors of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank,[139] and the June-July 2025 Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4),[140] highlight ECOSOC engagement with the IFIs. However, tracking progress in enhancing cooperation, an abstract concept that eludes specific and measurable indicators, by simply adopting the number of meetings as proxy metric, has not produced substantive data. Given this methodological challenge, it is hoped that, in 2027, the *Global Governance Innovation Report* will have gathered more compelling evidence to assess the UN-system response to deliver on Action 43.

Action 44. We will strengthen the Peacebuilding Commission.

The effectiveness of the Peacebuilding Commission, as an advisory rather than operational body, has always been limited by UN Member State and, in particular, Security Council member willingness to act on its recommendations. The UNGA and UNSC resolutions adopting the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review resolutions gave new momentum to the PBC by integrating UN resident coordinators, country teams, and IFIs into PBC country-focused deliberations.[141] A new annual "Peacebuilding Week" each June was also established as part of the PBAR resolution, to foster dialogue and broaden participation in the Peacebuilding Architecture's work.

The effectiveness of the Peacebuilding Commission, as an advisory rather than operational body, has always been limited by UN Member State and, in particular, Security Council member willingness to act on its recommendations.

The GGIR'26 full logframe for Action 44 measures fifteen initiatives across four Sub-Actions. Three such initiatives are highlighted here:

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Table 2.19: Action 44 Mini-Logframe

Action 44. We will strengthen the Peacebuilding Commission.					
Output	**Indicator**	**Target**	**Baseline: Sept 2024 Data Summary**	**Most Recently Reported Data**	**Progress**
Sub-Action (a) Enhance the role of the Commission as a platform for building and sustaining peace, including through sharing good practices among Member States and mobilizing political and financial support for national prevention, sustaining peace and peacebuilding efforts, in particular to avoid possible relapse into conflict, in accordance with the mandate of the Commission.					
Peacebuilding compliance	# of countries improving or deteriorating in the Global Peace Index (GPI) "Safety and Security" domain	Increase in # of countries improving in the GPI "Safety and Security" domain, with improvements exceeding deteriorations	In the 2024 Global Peace Index, the Safety and Security domain was the only GPI domain to improve; 81 countries improved and 77 deteriorated.	In the 2025 Global Peace Index, although the overall Safety and Security domain improved (slightly); only 74 countries improved compared to 87 that deteriorated.	**Regression**
Peacebuilding Fund contributions	Total annual financial contributions to the UN Peacebuilding Fund	Reach at least 60% of the PBF annual target	In 2023, the Peacebuilding Fund approved a $202.5 million budget but received only $131.8 million in contributions (still, this is roughly $10 million more than reaching 60% of the annual target).	Voluntary contributions declined to $132.3 million in 2025, an 8% decrease from 2024 (and only 52% of the $250 million target / approved budget).	**Regression**
Sub-Action (b) Make greater use of the Commission to support Member States' progress in their nationally owned and nationally-led peacebuilding, sustaining peace and prevention efforts, and strengthen the advisory, bridging and convening role of the Commission, and encourage the Commission to consult with civil society, nongovernmental organizations, including women's organizations, and the private sector engaged in peacebuilding activities, as appropriate, in line with the mandate of the Commission.					
Increase of resources channelled for nationally-owned and nationally-led peacebuilding actors and efforts	# of countries engaged by the Commission	Increase # of countries supported	In 2023, the Commission supported 10 country- and region-specific settings, including 5 first-time engagements, bringing its total to 31 countries and regions since 2005.	In 2025, the Commission engaged 7 countries, including the first meeting on Haiti, jointly with ECOSOC. It also hosted an ambassadorial-level engagement on the peaceful settlement of Central Asian border disputes.	**Minimal Progress**

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data sources: IEP, Global Peace Index Report 2024; IEP, Global Peace Index Report 2025; UN PBC, Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its Seventeenth Session; UN PBC, Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its Nineteenth Session; UNSG, Peacebuilding Fund: Report of the Secretary-General. A/79/790; DPPA, Secretary-General's Peacebuilding Fund Strategy Extension 2025–2026; and PBSO, Secretary-General's Peacebuilding Fund: Fund Status Q4 2025.

In 2024, the Peacebuilding Fund received $143 million in contributions, as compared to a $385 million annual target, and contributions declined further in 2025 to $132.3 million, as did the funding target ($250 million).[142] As of April 2026, $98 million had been committed toward the 2026 voluntary contributions target of $300 million. Despite these constraints, in 2024, the PBC increased, from 31 to 34, the number of countries it has engaged since its inception.[143] In 2025, the Peacebuilding Commission

directly engaged seven countries, including its first meeting on Haiti (held jointly with ECOSOC), and it closed the year with an ambassadorial-level engagement on the peaceful settlement of border disputes in Central Asia.[144] Global Peace Index (GPI) data convey the broader state of peacebuilding worldwide with mixed results in 2024 and 2025. GPI's measures of Safety and Security showed more countries improving than deteriorating, but the number improving declined from 81 in 2024 to 74 in 2025. In 2025, the measures of ongoing conflicts show a continuing 17-year deterioration and the largest single-year drop with 87 countries' situations deteriorating.[145] While these metrics do not directly measure the PBC's work, they point to worldwide backsliding in peacebuilding, which is of concern at a time of severe global multilateral budget cuts.

Action 46. We will ensure the effective enjoyment by all of all human rights and respond to new and emerging challenges.

Action 46 addresses the universal enjoyment of human rights, focusing on ensuring adequate and sustainable financing for UN human rights mechanisms and strengthening coordination among relevant UN entities. The Action requests the Secretary-General to assess the need for adequate, predictable, increased, and sustainable financing of human rights mechanisms, including the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), to facilitate efficient and effective responses to the range of human rights challenges facing the international community. At the same time, due to the Secretary-General's UN80 Initiative (detailed in sections one and four of this report), his September 2025 revised budget proposal called for a 15.2% reduction to OHCHR's 2026 budget, from $420.1 million to $377.7 million.[146]

The July 2025 *UN80 Report of the Mandate Implementation Review* found 36% of mandates cited in the UN Secretariat Programme Budget for 2026 are duplicates.[147] In the case of OHCHR, the newly created Mandate Source Registry (still in beta version) identifies 852 OHCHR-related source documents, of which 414, or about 49%, are also cited by other UN entities.[148] While this may suggest overlap, it does not by itself demonstrate duplication, and further analysis is needed to determine the specific meaning and significance of these overlaps. The report also notes that the Secretary-General will make better use of system-wide coordination platforms to avoid duplication and ensure the strategic use of resources.[149] However, the results of these efforts remain to be seen, and as such the data at this stage remains preliminary.

The forthcoming UN Human Rights Report (scheduled for release on May 31, 2026, following finalization of GGIR'26) may provide further insight into the changes in human rights mechanisms following the Secretary-General's assessment, while the broader UN80 Initiative, including ongoing discussions on mandate coordination and a Mandate Source Registry, may strengthen the basis for assessing progress. It is hoped that, in 2027, the *Global Governance Innovation Report* will have gathered sufficient data to assess further progress on Action 46.

Actions 47-52. International Financial Architecture Reforms

Action 47. We will accelerate reform of the international financial architecture to address the challenges of today and tomorrow.

Action 48. We will accelerate reform of the international financial architecture to strengthen the voice

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and representation of developing countries.

Action 49. We will accelerate reform of the international financial architecture to mobilize additional financing for the Sustainable Development Goals, respond to the needs of developing countries and direct financing to those most in need.

Action 50. We will accelerate the reform of the international financial architecture so that countries can borrow sustainably to invest in their long-term development.

Action 51. We will accelerate the reform of the international financial architecture to strengthen its capacity to support developing countries more effectively and equitably during systemic shocks and make the financial system more stable.

Action 52. We will accelerate the reform of the international financial architecture so that it can meet the urgent challenge of climate change.

Actions 47 through 52 provide a snapshot of international financial architecture reform discussions, pivotal to accelerating implementation of the 2030 Agenda and its SDGs. In the face of an already large annual SDG financing gap set to grow by 2030[150] and steadily decreasing ODA from many OECD Development Assistance Committee member countries,[151] progress toward enhancing developing country representation in IFI decision-making is slow. The World Bank 2025 Shareholding Review yielded no changes in voting power allocations.[152] The International Monetary Fund (IMF), whose last member quotas increased 50% in 2023, extended, in November 2025, the period of consent for quota increases to May 2026.[153] A meaningful quota increase is urgently needed to expand member countries' access to IMF resources and to reduce the Fund's reliance on borrowing from its members. A realignment of quotas is also needed to "better reflect members' relative positions in the world economy" and to enhance the poorest members' voice in organization decision-making.[154]

The creation of a 25th IMF chair for Sub-Saharan Africa (November 1, 2024) also aims to improve regional IMF Executive Board balance and to strengthen Africa's voice and representation, recognizing the continent's progress and increasingly important role in the global economy.[155] Notably, the last Executive Board expansion took place in 1992 with two chairs added to represent new member countries from the former Soviet Union block.[156] Relevant intergovernmental fora driving efforts to reform the international financial architecture are the follow-through to the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (June 30-July 3rd, 2025), ECOSOC Special Meeting on Financial Integrity (February 4, 2026), ECOSOC Special Meeting on Credit Ratings (March 30, 2026), Financing for Development Forum (April 20-24, 2026), as well as the Spring and Annual Meetings of the IMF and the World Bank Group in 2026, COP30 (November 9-20, 2026), and the Development Cooperation Forum in 2027.

> ***A meaningful quota increase is urgently needed to expand member countries' access to IMF resources and to reduce the Fund's reliance on borrowing from its members***

In the GGIR'26 full logframe, Actions 47 through 52 are monitored through 46 specific Sub-Action initiatives. Noteworthy examples of Sub-Actions on IFA reform are:

Table 2.20: Actions 47-52 Mini-Logframe

Output	Indicator	Target	Baseline: Sept 2024 Data Summary	Most Recently Reported Data	Progress
Action 48. We will accelerate reform of the international financial architecture to strengthen the voice and representation of developing countries.					
Sub-Action (a) Encourage the Board of the International Monetary Fund to take further steps to continue to support a strong, quota-based and adequately resourced institution.					
Compromises, negotiations on quota size	Quota size in Special Drawing Rights	Conduct General Review of Quotas every five years	In Dec. 2023, the IMF Board of Governors concluded the 16th General Review of Quotas and approved an increase of IMF member quotas by 50%—SDR 238.6 billion, or $320 billion.	As of Nov. 7, 2025, the IMF did not increase its quotas; its Executive Board approved another six-month extension of the period to consent to the quota increase under the 16th General Review of Quotas (GRQ), through May 15, 2026.	**No Progress**
Action 50. We will accelerate the reform of the international financial architecture so that countries can borrow sustainably to invest in their long-term development.					
Sub-Action (a) Enable countries with high and unsustainable debt burdens to escape debt overhang and prioritize government expenditure on the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals.					
Debt servicing paused, innovative debt relief mechanisms in place	Developing countries' dollar expenditure to cover debt-service	Decrease	In 2023, developing countries' interest payments to service their total external debt reached about $406 billion.	In 2024, developing countries' interest payments reached $415.4 billion.	**No Progress**
Debt servicing paused; innovative debt relief mechanisms in place	SDG 17.4.1 Debt service as a proportion of exports of goods, services and primary income	SDG 17.4 Assist developing countries in attaining long-term debt sustainability through coordinated policies aimed at fostering debt financing, relief and restructuring.	In 2024 total external debt in developing countries rose to $11.7 trillion.	In 2025, total external debt in developing countries reached a record $12.1 trillion.	**No Progress**
Action 52. We will accelerate the reform of the international financial architecture so that it can meet the urgent challenge of climate change.					
Sub-Action (a) Call on multilateral development banks and other development finance institutions to increase the availability, accessibility and impact of climate finance to developing countries, while safeguarding the additionality of climate finance to support developing countries to implement their national plans and strategies to address climate change.					
National governments' expenditures for climate finance to developing countries	Annual amount of climate finance disbursed to developing countries for climate adaptation and mitigation	Increase	In 2023, the World Bank Group provided $38.6 billion in climate financing.	In 2025, the World Bank Group provided $39.2 billion in climate financing.	**Minimal Progress**
Agreements between national governments and the World Bank	# of countries that are drawing on Climate Resilient Debt Clauses with the World Bank	Increase	As of Nov. 2024, 14 of 45 countries eligible for Climate Resilient Debt Clauses (set of options that helps countries invest in crisis preparedness and response) have included this clause in loan agreements.	As of Apr. 2025, 17 of 45 countries eligible for Climate Resilient Debt Clauses included this clause.	**Substantive Progress**

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data Sources: IMF, *IMF Board of Governors Approves Quota Increase Under 16th General Review Quotas*; IMF, *Extension of the Period for Consent to Increase Quotas under the 16th General Review of Quotas*, 1; World Bank, *World Bank International Debt Report 2024*, x; World Bank, *World Bank International Debt Report 2025*, xviii; UNCTAD, *External Debt Sustainability and Development 2025*, 4; OECD, *Global Debt Report 2026*, 11; World Bank, *Climate Finance Fiscal Year 2024 Snapshot*; World Bank, *World Bank Climate Finance 2025*, 1; World Bank, *World Bank Expands Lifeline to Small States hit by Disasters*; and World Bank, *World Bank Small States Newsletter*, 3.

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In December 2024, the World Bank Group unveiled a record $100 billion replenishment for the International Development Association covering July 2025–July 2028, marking a major step in development financing.[157] In 2024, Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) allocated $85.1 billion to climate finance, including $58.8 billion for mitigation and $26.3 billion for adaptation.[158] Meanwhile, developing countries' external debt rose to a record $12.1 trillion in 2025, with debt servicing costs increasing to $415.4 billion in 2024, constraining investment in the SDGs.[159] Debt restructuring efforts under the Common Framework for Debt Treatments remain ongoing,[160] with Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Zambia applying for assistance by 2025.[161] Additional initiatives under the Sevilla Platform for Action include: the Debt Swaps for Development Hub, led by Spain and the World Bank; a Debt-for-Development Swap Programme, led by Italy to convert €230 million debt obligations of African countries into investments in development projects; and a Debt "Pause Clause" Alliance, a coalition of countries and MDBs which strive to include "pause clauses" in their lending to suspend debt service payments during crises.[162] On April 15, 2026, during the IMF-WB Spring Meetings, developing countries also launched a new Borrowers' Platform to jointly tackle debt challenges.[163]

Action 53. We will develop a framework on measures of progress on sustainable development to complement and go beyond gross domestic product.

Action 53 speaks to ongoing efforts to overcome the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)-centered approach to measuring economic progress, and tracks key steps toward a new set of indicators that recognize the multidimensional nature of economic growth. The Secretary-General proposed the establishment of a High-level Expert Group on Beyond GDP in his 2021 *Our Common Agenda Report*.[164] GDP's narrow focus on economic output overlooks environmental and social dimensions of well-being, limiting recognition of the links between welfare and prosperity and affecting developing countries' access to finance and development support.[165] Action 53 builds on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the SDGs, the UN Development Programme's Human Development Index, the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), the World Bank's measurements of environmental degradation and inclusive wealth, and the work on inclusive growth carried out by the OECD. Key intergovernmental fora that are addressing these topics include: the 2026 High-Level Forum on Official Statistics (March 2, 2026); two UNGA informal briefings for Member States (May 13, 2025 and March 4, 2026); and the 2026 High-Level Political Forum (July 7-15, 2026).

> ***GDP's narrow focus on economic output overlooks environmental and social dimensions of well-being ...***

In the GGIR'26 full logframe, Action 53 is monitored through four specific Sub-Action initiatives and corresponding indicators. Two noteworthy Sub-Action initiatives are:

Table 2.21: Action 53 Mini-Logframe

Action 53. We will develop a framework on measures of progress on sustainable development to complement and go beyond gross domestic product.					
Output	**Indicator**	**Target**	**Baseline: Sept 2024 Data Summary**	**Most Recently Reported Data**	**Progress**
Sub-Action (a1) Request the Secretary-General to establish an independent high-level expert group to develop recommendations for a limited number of country-owned and universally applicable indicators of sustainable development that complement and go beyond gross domestic product.					
Assessment of potential candidates, contacts with candidates, definition of mandate	SG steps to establish High-Level Expert Group on Beyond GDP	Appoint High-Level Expert Group on Beyond GDP	In May 2023, SG proposed establishment of a high-level expert group of independent experts with a mandate to produce key indicators that go beyond GDP.	On May 7, 2025, the SG appointed an independent High-Level Expert Group on Beyond GDP.	**Substantive Progress**
Sub-Action (a2) An independent high-level expert group to develop recommendations for a limited number of country-owned and universally applicable indicators of sustainable development that complement and go beyond gross domestic product, in close consultation with Member States and relevant stakeholders, and to present the outcome of its work during the eightieth session of the General Assembly.					
Online consultations with civil society, NGOs, academia, private sector, government representatives via a survey held November 5-30, 2025	Hold consultations by November 2025	Hold consultations by November 2025	As of Sept. 2024, High-Level Expert Group on Beyond GDP not established.	In Nov. 2025, the High-Level Expert Group on Beyond GDP opened multistakeholders consultations from Nov. 5-30, 2025 and published its interim report (Final Report released on May 7, 2026).	**Substantive Progress**

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data Sources: EOSG, *Valuing What Counts: Framework to Progress Beyond Gross Domestic Product*; UN, *UN Secretary-General appoints High-Level Expert Group on Beyond GDP*; UNSG, Secretary-General's remarks to the General Assembly - on Priorities for 2026; UN High-Level Expert Group on Beyond GDP, "Online Consultations by the High-Level Expert Group on Beyond GDP," accessed March 24, 2026; and UN, *High-Level Expert Group on Beyond GDP Interim Progress Report*.

In May 2025, the Secretary-General appointed a 14-member independent High-level Expert Group (HLEG) on Beyond GDP with the mandate of presenting its final report during the 80th session of the General Assembly. In November 2025, the *High-Level Expert Group on Beyond GDP Interim Progress Report* was published,[166] identifying "core domains" of well-being, such as material well-being, education, subjective well-being, sustainability, social capital, and governance to inform new metrics that are universally accepted and tailored to countries' needs and circumstances. After the HLEG on Beyond GDP released its final report *Counting What Counts: A Compass of Progress for People and Planet* during consultations hosted by co-facilitators Guyana and Spain on May 7, 2026, an intergovernmental process will now develop a consensus-based global framework on new sustainable, equitable, and inclusive global indicators to complement GDP and to accelerate the implementation of SDG 17, target 17.9.[167] These new measures of progress are also meant to contribute to international financial architecture reform efforts (see Pact Actions 47-52 above), including with respect to credit rating agencies and debt financing.[168]

Action 54. We will strengthen the international response to complex global shocks.

Action 54 calls for a coherent, coordinated multilateral response to global shocks such as pandemics, climate disasters, food, energy, and economic crises, while avoiding duplication across existing mechanisms. Financing is essential to support the UN's ability to respond to global emergencies, especially innovative

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finance that enhances effectiveness and fosters anticipatory approaches.[169] The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) finds that total funding to respond to humanitarian crises dropped from $37.13 billion in 2024 to $27.60 billion in 2025, against a funding requirement of $45.48 billion for 2025,[170] severely hurting the delivery of humanitarian support in emergency situations.[171] Relevant intergovernmental fora related to complex global shocks are the World Economic Forum's January Annual Meetings, EU-OECD High-level Forum "Secure Connectivity for Economic Resilience" (February 2026), UNEP's Finance Initiative Global Roundtable (June 2026), and COP31 (November 2026).

In the GGIR'26 full logframe, Action 54 is monitored through two specific Sub-Action initiatives and corresponding indicators:

Table 2.22: Action 54 Mini-Logframe

Action 54. We will strengthen the international response to complex global shocks.					
Output	**Indicator**	**Target**	**Baseline: Sept 2024 Data Summary**	**Most Recently Reported Data**	**Progress**
Sub-Action (a1) Consider approaches to strengthen the United Nations system response to complex global shocks, within existing authorities and in consultation with Member States.					
Contributing countries' allocations to Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)	Amount of financial resources to support enhanced capacity for climate complex global shocks	Increase	In 2024, CERF allocated $10.5 million for a dedicated climate action funding envelope.	In 2025, CERF allocated $9.5 million for a dedicated climate action funding envelope.	**Regression**
Allocated funds	Amount of financial resources to support enhanced capacity for complex global shocks	Increase	As of Oct. 17, 2024, the Pandemic Fund's Governing Board approved $547 million grants through 2 funding rounds.	As of Nov. 2025, the Pandemic Fund awarded $885 million in grants.	**Substantive Progress**
Sub-Action (a2) Consider approaches to strengthen the United Nations system response to complex global shocks, within existing authorities and in consultation with Member States, and with full respect for the mandated coordination role of the United Nations in response to humanitarian emergencies.					
Allocated funds	Amount of financial resources to support the exisiting UN system response to humanitarian emergencies	Decrease the	In 2024, UNOCHA's Financial Tracking Service reported $37.13 billion total funding to respond to humanitarian crises.	In 2025, UNOCHA's Financial Tracking Service reported $27.60 billion total funding to respond to humanitarian crises (a 26% decrese from 2024).	**Regression**
Member States' contributions to Central Emergency Response Fund	Amount of financial resources to support the exisiting UN system response to humanitarian emergencies	Increase	In 2024, CERF committed over $120 million in funding for anticipatory action.	As of Nov. 2025, CERF committed $124.7 million in funding for anticipatory action.	**Minimal Progress**

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data Sources: UNDRR, *Snapshot of Sendai Framework Monitoring*; UNDRR, "Snapshot of SFM"; OCHA, "Financial Tracking Service, Total reported funding 2024," accessed March 24, 2024; OCHA, "Total reported funding 2025," accessed May 8, 2026; CERF, *CERF Annual Results Report 2024*, 4; and CERF, *CERF at the forefront of anticipatory action.*

To expand anticipatory action and help communities prepare for predictable climate emergencies, the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) launched the Climate Action Account at COP28.[172] Established in 2023 to break the cycle of costly short-term responses, CERF funded life-saving assistance with dedicated climate action funding of $10.5 million in 2024 and $9.5 million in 2025.[173] In 2025, CERF committed $124.7 million for anticipatory action, up from $120 million in 2024.[174] The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction Snapshot indicates that the number of countries with early warning systems has increased from 108 in 2024 to 119 in 2025.[175] Early warning systems that predict and help to counter increasingly frequent and severe climate impacts are crucial for saving lives and reducing losses.[176] Moreover, people-centered and locally led approaches are necessary to ensure that Multi-Hazard Early Warning Systems meet local needs, especially in the face of barriers to local communities' uptake of climate information.[177]

Action 56. We will strengthen international cooperation for the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all humanity.

In the GGIR'26 full logframe, Action 56 is monitored through two Sub-Actions and three initiatives, with two highlighted here:

Table 2.23: Action 56 Mini-Logframe

Action 56. We will strengthen international cooperation for the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all humanity.					
Output	**Indicator**	**Target**	**Baseline: Sept 2024 Data Summary**	**Most Recently Reported Data**	**Progress**
Sub-Action (a1) Reaffirm the importance of the widest possible adherence to and full compliance with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.					
Member's accessions and ratifications	# of States Party to the Outer Space Treaty	Increase in Member State signatories	As of Jan. 2024, the Outer Space Treaty had 114 States Parties.	As of Dec. 2025, the Outer Space Treaty counted 118 States Parties.	**Minimal Progress**
Meetings held	# of UN regulations fostering full compliance with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty	UN Security Council Resolution to prevent an arms race	In votes in Apr. and May 2024, the Security Council failed to adopt a resolution on outer space to introduce the obligation of all State Parties to fully comply with Outer Space Treaty and to prevent an outer space arms race.	On Dec. 1, 2025, the UN General Assembly adopted the Resolution on preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS).	**Minimal Progress**
Sub-Action (a2) Discuss the establishment of new frameworks for space traffic, space debris and space resources through the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.					
Members signing the Zero Debris Charter	# of signatories to the Zero Debris Charter	Become debris-neutral by 2030	In May 2024, the European Space Agency and 12 European countries signed the Zero Debris Charter, based on ESA's Zero Debris approach for space debris mitigation to achieve debris-neutrality by 2030.	As of Jan. 2026, the Zero Debris Charter has over 210 signatories across 34 countries, including 21 national governments.	**Substantive Progress**

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data Sources: COPUOS, *Growth of Committee membership and universalisation of the five United Nations treaties on space law*, 2; UNODA, "Latest Treaty Actions," accessed April 4, 2026; UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, "For Second Time Since Late April Security Council Fails to Adopt First-Ever Resolution on Preventing Arms Race in Outer Space"; UNGA, *Weapons of mass destruction in outer space*; UNGA, *Open-ended working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects*; UNGA, *Prevention of an arms race in outer space*; European Space Agency, "Zero Debris Charter"; Asociación Española de Derecho Aeronáutico y Espacial, "Achievements in Q1 2025: The Zero Debris Charter: A Growing Global Commitment," accessed April 9, 2026; and European Space Agency, "Zero Debris Community," accessed April 9, 2026.

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Action 56 emphasizes cooperation in outer space to maintain international peace and security, yet rising geopolitical tensions today are driving greater outer space military use, increased interference with existing space systems, and growing interest in counterspace attacks.[178] The Pact aims to enhance adherence to and compliance with the 1967 *Outer Space Treaty*.[179] The number of country signatories to the Treaty increased from 114 in 2024 to 118 in 2025.[180] Often overlooked, Action 56 also highlights concerns about the growing role of private and commercial space activities and their implications, underscoring the need for consensus on new regulations regarding space debris, traffic, and resources. Relevant intergovernmental fora addressing outer space governance are the UN Office on Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA); World Space Forum (December 2024); UNIDIR Outer Space Security Conference 2025 (September 2025); UNOOSA Space Law Conference (November 2025); and the commercial Space Summit (Singapore, February 2026).

Recent efforts to establish frameworks for outer space shifted focus toward preventing an arms race, with the adoption of the UN General Assembly Resolution on preventing an arms race in outer space (PAROS) and the establishment of an open-ended working group on PAROS in December 2024.[181] In 2024, the Security Council failed to adopt a resolution to affirm the obligation of all States Parties to fully comply with the Outer Space Treaty, which would have also emphasized the need for specific measures to prevent an arms race in outer space.[182] In December 2025, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 80/19, reaffirming the nexus between the pursuit of peaceful and sustainable use of outer space and the prevention of an arms race.[183]

While there are no binding international regulations to address the consequences of space traffic, including the risks of collisions and debris generation, states and international organizations have adopted a range of voluntary standards, instruments, and measures to mitigate space debris.[184] For example, The Zero Debris Charter was signed in 2024 as part of an inter-community initiative led by the European Space Agency to advance global orbital debris mitigation and remediation for a debris-neutral space environment by 2030.[185] The fragmented normative landscape emphasizes the need for a new global consensus on space governance.

Major Takeaways from Year Two, Planning for Years Three and Four

Now a year and a half into implementing the Pact for the Future, several trends and noteworthy takeaways are emerging, including:

- ***More than half of the Pact's Sub-Actions show some level of positive progress:*** As expected in Year Two, assessed Sub-Actions saw more implementation progress compared to Year One. The below figures 2.1 and 2.2 show that 252 of 452 Sub-Action indicators (based on 40 out of 56 total Actions), or 56%, demonstrate some level of advance—29% with substantive progress and 27% with minimal progress—while 30% indicate no progress. Regrettably, 14% of Sub-Action indicators reveal regression. While 80% of Pact implementation was mandated to Member States, 20% was mandated to the UN system to be tracked by the Secretary-General's office. According to the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, 53.2% of UN-mandated Sub-Action "milestones" have been met.[186]

  Notable progress was made in 2026 through the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4), which helped to sustain momentum on international financial architecture reforms (Pact Actions 47-52); the Global Dialogue on AI governance and appointment of 40 members to the new Independent International Scientific Panel on AI (Action 30) have shown progress on AI governance globally; the Beyond GDP final report and indicator dashboard created by the High-Level Expert Group on Beyond GDP pushed forward the Action 53 agenda; and the Secretary-General's report

on rising military expenditure impact on sustainable development played a vital role for Action 13 and contributed to analysis relevant to Chapter 2 (Actions 13-27). Noteworthy progress on the digital divide in rural-urban internet use (Action 27) saw rural access increase substantially between 2024 and 2025 (from 48% to 58%), while urban access increased only slightly (83% to 85%) in the same period.[187]

Figure 2.1: Percentage of Assessed Sub-Action Indicators by Level of Progress



Figure 2.2: Number of Assessed Sub-Action Indicators by Level of Progress



Source: Original Figures, Stimson Center.

Considered thematically, while there has been progress in some areas, the regress in other areas is telling: The data shows regress in 12% of indicators for Chapter 1 (Sustainable development and financing for development), almost 7% of Chapter 3 (Science, technology and innovation and digital cooperation), and 10% of Chapter 4 (Youth and future generations), which compare favorably with regress on 20% of Chapter 2 (International peace and security) and 17% of Chapter 5 (Transforming global governance). The major areas of concern (with zero progress or regression) are financing for development through ODA, as well as persistent political deadlocks on key areas of peace and security architecture reform (as elaborated in GGIR'26 section three). Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show that, despite waning multilateral cooperation, elements of the Pact demonstrate durable and growing areas of collaboration across a range of global governance issues, with two years to go until the September 2028 high-level review of progress.

- ***Sharp reductions in foreign aid and funding for international organizations are undermining continued progress:*** Further steep funding cuts are anticipated and have already harmed Pact implementation across the board, as many countries pull back from foreign aid and international organization financing. In short, the UN remains on the verge of financial collapse, with roughly $1.57 billion in outstanding UN Secretariat regular budget dues at the end of 2025 and the 2026 UN budget cutting some 2,900 posts.[188] The General Assembly-approved $5.38 billion budget for UN peacekeeping operations in 2025-26 is a sharp decline from $6.1 billion (for 2023-24) and $5.6 billion (for 2024-25), a trend expected to continue.[189] The SG's revised 2026 overall budget specifically reduced OHCHR's budget by 15.2%, from $420.1 million to $377.7 million, raising serious concerns about the UN's ability to fulfil its human rights mandate.[190]

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- ***The Pact for the Future demonstrates continued momentum and relevance of multilateral cooperation:*** The Pact responds to critics of the United Nations and other multilateral institutions by demonstrating two key points: *first*, that broad international consensus can still be reached on urgent reforms to make the global governance system fit for the future; and *second*, that Summit of the Future implementation efforts are yielding tangible and, in some instances, significant results (as elaborated in section four of this report). While the geopolitical landscape has changed, the Pact remains a framework that retains both political and normative weight. As an agreement reached by Member States, it serves as a critical reference point for sustaining momentum and holding stakeholders accountable for advancing its commitments. The Pact serves as a proxy for governments and non-state actors seeking to reinvest in multilateral approaches to global problem-solving. Importantly, the concrete Actions tracked in this report do not depend on expanding bureaucracy or significantly increasing financial burdens, aligning with ongoing efforts to modernize the UN system and increase its efficiency. These efforts are reinforced by the Secretary-General's UN80 Initiative, which is working to update UN structures, priorities, and operations for the 21st century. Together, the Pact for the Future and the UN80 Initiative are mutually reinforcing: the former sets out a shared vision and agenda, while the latter provides an operational pathway to deliver a more agile, cost-effective, and impactful multilateral system.

Global Governance Innovation Report 2026 conclusions help form the analytical basis for the report's Pact Innovation Plan Edition Two (see section four), by informing policymakers of where innovative measures are taking root, and which Pact Actions may require new implementation approaches, resources, or partnerships. In subsequent years (2027 and 2028), as lessons learned are integrated and indicators and data sources take shape by tracking additional longitudinal data, the 2027 edition of this report will analyze all 56 Actions, comprising comprehensive tracking before the September 2028 review of the Pact for the Future.

While Pact implementation involves a diverse range of actors globally, some of its chief protagonists at UN Headquarters in New York (each elaborated in section four) include:

- The UN Secretary-General's principals-led Steering Committee, six Working Groups and Two Task Teams; and

- The President of the General Assembly's overseen 21 Intergovernmental Negotiating Tracks and, in 2026, two Interactive Dialogues with Member States on Pact implementation (one on the UN80 Initiative and the Pact's connections in April; the second around the High-Level Political Forum in July, focused on "Taking Stock of the Pact for the Future")

Each of these, alongside many more distinct efforts worldwide, has contributed to the above three main takeaways. Considerable challenges, threats, and opportunities await for 2027 and beyond. Before turning, in section four, to creative ways to maximize the catalytic and broader leadership roles performed across the UN system and by UN Member States with civil society partners, a significant lacuna in the Pact for the Future—especially in terms of advancing meaningful policy and institutional innovations—is the subject of this report's next section. Indeed, a failure to effectively prioritize peace and security governance, and reinvigorate the United Nations' role in prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding (the 4P's), can undermine continued anticipated progress within most of the Pact's 56 Actions and 363 Sub-Actions, as well as its Global Digital Compact and Declaration on Future Generations.

III. Rethinking the Peace and Security Architecture for a Changing World

> ***"In each instance of a threat to the peace, the United Nations projects itself directly into the area of conflict by sending United Nations representatives to the area for the purpose of mediation and conciliation."***
>
> —Ralph Bunche, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate[191]

The 1992 *An Agenda for Peace* and later 2023 *A New Agenda for Peace* pioneered how the United Nations approaches the "4P's" of prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding.[192] Unlike 1992, the world of 2023 confronts the specter of another Cold War, facilitated by artificial intelligence (AI), drones, and other cutting-edge technologies.

Given the sheer scale and changing nature of war and political violence, Great Power tensions, renewed concerns about encroachments on national sovereignty, and the intensified financial pressures placed on traditional UN peace and security donor countries, the time is ripe—in the context of Pact for the Future follow-through (especially Chapter Two on "International peace and security," but also Chapter Five on "Transforming global governance")—to pursue updated versions of these powerful concepts and their associated practical instruments.[193] Doing so can best position the world body to foster more sustainable and just representations of peace in a period of heightened uncertainty and fear.

This section begins by highlighting major challenges and drivers of protracted violent conflict in today's ever-more intertwined world. It then examines the international community's response to date, exposing institutional shortcomings and the improbability of meaningful improvement without innovative and forward-looking policy interventions backed by visionary leadership. Governance reforms are then proposed, first in connection with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and General Assembly (UNGA)—the backbone of the world's peace and security architecture—and then at the operational level, centered around the UN's 4P's approach to dealing with war, security, and political violence that informs its ever-evolving conflict management toolbox.

Challenges

The world's governments have committed to ending poverty, ensuring universal healthcare, and halting catastrophic climate change. Yet by 2024, the global cost of violence had reached $19.97 trillion, equivalent to 11.6% of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP), as military spending displaces the social and environmental investments those commitments require.[194]

GROWING MILITARIZATION AND ITS IMPACT ON PEOPLE AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

2026 opened amid a distinct shift in global security dynamics, shaped by militarization, geopolitical rivalry, open interstate military aggression, and a broader crisis of international authority in which the legitimacy and capacity of multilateral institutions are increasingly under strain.

A key indicator of this change was the expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the last remaining arms control agreement between the United States and Russia.[195] For over a decade, it capped deployed warheads, mandated data sharing, and enabled on-site inspections.[196] Without the START treaty, neither America nor Russia's nuclear weapons inventories are under effective constraint; although the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons opened for signature in 2017 and came into force in 2021, it is not recognized or adhered to by any of the nuclear-armed states.[197]

The prospects for nuclear arms control were further diminished when, in the middle of negotiations over Iran's nuclear program (where by all accounts, Iran was prepared to make meaningful concessions), Israel and the United States launched a military assault upon its negotiating partner (where, as of April 2026, negotiations have resumed).[198] Moreover, on May 22, 2026, the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) concluded without agreement on a consensus outcome document amid rising nuclear risks.[199]

According to the 2025 assessment from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), global military expenditures reached unprecedented levels, approximately U.S. $2.7 trillion in 2024, and continue to rise,[200] displacing development spending as governments shift fiscal and political priorities.[201] The UN Secretary-General's (SG) September 2025 report, *The Security We Need: Rebalancing Military Spending for a Sustainable and Peaceful Future* (mandated by Action 13 of the Pact for the Future), further warns that this surge directly undermines SDG financing, with rising military budgets diverting resources from social expenditure, slowing economic growth, deepening inequality, and contributing to greenhouse gas emissions in ways that widen existing development gaps in low- and middle-income countries (see figure 3.1).[202]

The *Global Peace Index 2025* further contextualizes the impact of violence on the global economy at the individual level, estimating the cost at $2,455 per person—equivalent to 11.6% of global GDP.[203] Growing economic vulnerability further compounds these pressures. The *World Economic Situation and Prospects 2026* report projects global economic growth slowing to approximately 2.7% from 2.9% in 2025.[204]

Cost-of-living pressures persist, particularly in developing economies already burdened by debt, exacerbated by unequal financing conditions and surcharge policies.[205] As growth slows and fiscal pressures intensify, governments face trade-offs between defense spending and social investment (the old "guns-versus-butter" debate), often at the expense of public services and social protection. Expanding military budgets can come at the expense of development goals and securing basic human rights, including access to education, healthcare, and a healthy, clean, and sustainable environment.[206] Compounding these fiscal trade-offs, the character of warfare itself is changing: The SIPRI Yearbook 2025 finds that contemporary armed conflict now spans air, land, sea, cyber, space, and information domains, with the convergence of advanced technologies shortening decision-making timelines and introducing new pathways for escalation that existing security frameworks were not designed to manage.[207]

Figure 3.1: What the Past Decade of Military Investments Could Have Purchased



Note:
a Total military expenditure over the past decade estimated at $21.9 trillion (2015-2024 in constant 2023 dollars).
b The range is $45.51 to $129.57 per child (UNICEF, 2024).
c Estimate uses the World Bank's revised international poverty line of $3.00/day (June 2025 update), and the Our World in Data "total shortfall from extreme poverty" series (values in 2021, international dollars), which sums the global poverty gap or the theoretical cash transfers needed to bring everyone to the line. The latest global nowcast (2024–2025) implies around $230 billion to $280 billion per year.

Source: UNSG, The Security We Need: Rebalancing Military Spending for a Sustainable and Peaceful Future.

Increased militarization and mass human rights violations have accompanied and, in many cases, intensified active and long-running conflicts around the world. Israeli government and Israeli settler assaults in the Gaza Strip, Occupied Palestinian Territories, and Lebanon continue to generate civilian casualties, mass displacement, and humanitarian crises.[208] Russia's war on Ukraine continues, with ongoing frontline violence and civilian infrastructure destruction.[209] In Sudan, the rivalry between armed factions has escalated into a prolonged and increasingly fragmented conflict marked by widespread atrocities and sexual assaults against civilians, mass displacement, and severe humanitarian crises.[210] In Haiti, the almost complete disappearance of state authority has enabled armed criminal groups to expand territorial control, deepening insecurity, institutional breakdown, and humanitarian need.[211]

Meanwhile, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, renewed fighting in the east involving both state military forces and local militias continues to drive displacement and regional tension.[212] Military strikes earlier this year between the U.S., Israel, and Iran across the Persian Gulf region disrupted maritime security and global energy markets.[213] Across Asia, the enduring strife between India and Pakistan and increasing military and political pressure by mainland China on Taiwan illustrate the regional dimensions of geopolitical rivalry and its potential for escalation.[214]

In all of these conflicts, civilians are the primary casualties: In 2024, for instance, 59,524 civilians were victims of explosive weapons (the highest number since 2010), and broader patterns of armed violence, exacerbated by the widespread use of small arms and light weapons, continue to drive high civilian mortality levels.[215] Global conflict monitoring data show that the number of active state-based conflicts reached a historic high in 2024, while battle-related deaths and one-sided violence continue to impose severe costs on civilian populations.[216] Civilians are disproportionately harmed by urban warfare, siege tactics, airstrikes, proxy fighting, and attacks on infrastructure, increasing risk, disrupting essential services, and fueling humanitarian crises, while threatening international peace and security.[217]

About 65.6 million people are forcibly displaced worldwide—over half of whom are children.[218] The financial burdens of conflict are staggering, costing the global economy as much as $19.1 trillion annually.[219] Prevention, by contrast, is far less expensive, with estimated savings ranging from $5 billion to $70 billion per year, yet prevention-related activities remain chronically underfunded relative to crisis response and reconstruction.[220]

ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF WAR FOR THE ENVIRONMENT

Environmental pressures further compound these political and socioeconomic challenges. Extreme weather events (such as prolonged droughts, flooding, heatwaves, and storms), biodiversity loss, ecosystem collapse, and pollution strain food systems, impair water access, propel forced displacement, and rank at the top of global risk assessments.[221]

In many contexts, environmental stressors are not only contributing factors *but underlying drivers of conflict*, as resource scarcity, livelihood disruption, and displacement generate conditions of instability that can trigger or intensify violence. Climate change acts as a threat multiplier, stressing governance weaknesses and heightening the risk of instability where institutions are under strain. Persistent divisions over responsibility and implementation, evident at COP30 last November in Brazil, continue to constrain collective action, as disagreements over burden-sharing, financing commitments, and timelines for action leave climate financing gaps unresolved and commitments unevenly distributed.[222]

Beyond climate-related stress, warfare itself is generating long-term environmental damage with significant human rights implications. Recent UN reporting has highlighted the growing threat posed by the toxic remnants of war, including contamination from unexploded ordnance, heavy metals, damaged industrial sites, and destroyed infrastructure.[223] Such environmental contamination can persist for years or decades, polluting soil and water sources, undermining agricultural production, and exposing civilian populations to severe health risks. Damage to energy facilities, water treatment plants, and sanitation systems further erodes public health and economic stability, complicating post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding efforts.[224] These consequences extend far beyond the battlefield, shaping livelihoods, displacement patterns, food security, and long-term governance capacity.

Protection of civilians is increasingly difficult as warfare shifts into cities and relies on advanced technologies that expand the scale, speed, and reach of violence. These conditions blur the line between civilians and combatants, disrupt essential services, and weaken accountability in politically polarized environments. At the same time, competition over and extraction of natural resources, such as diamonds, cobalt, and other minerals that fuel conflict economies, intensify environmental damage and economic fragility—further complicating recovery and peacebuilding efforts. Civilians bear the greatest burden through displacement, violence, and diminished prospects for long-term stability, underscoring the need to understand these interconnected pressures when considering international responses.

The fragmentation of multilateralism, expanding militarization, economic vulnerability, and environmental stress are not distinct phenomena. They are mutually reinforcing drivers of instability, creating feedback loops that are difficult to reverse. Underlying these trends is a broader authority crisis: Institutions are losing legitimacy, long-standing rules are applied inconsistently, and powerful states are increasingly bypassing, deadlocking, or manipulating the very frameworks meant to constrain escalation. The traditional pillars of prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding are operating under mounting strain in this context, and, as detailed below, each becomes harder when cooperation declines.[225]

International Community's Response to Date

Global and regional multilateral institutions are facing heightened pressures sometimes bordering on existential crises. Consensus within the Security Council remains elusive, and cooperation on transnational threats has weakened.[226] The World Economic Forum's *Global Cooperation Barometer 2026* highlights a measurable slowdown in international collaboration across trade, climate governance, security, and technological regulation.[227] Rather than relying on UN fora, states are increasingly turning to bilateral and plurilateral agreements to advance their interests.

THE RETREAT OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The international community's lack of capacity for civilian protection is reflected in the declining deployment of UN Peace Operations. In 2015, 107,088 UN peacekeepers operated 16 missions; in 2025, the number decreased to 61,197 peacekeepers in 11 operations.[228] The number of Special Political Missions is also declining, in part due to local authorities' requests. This was the case of the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), closed in February 2024, and in Yemen, where the UN Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) closed in March 2026.[229] The failures of global institutions to prevent or resolve conflicts at a political level can have direct and damaging results at the country or regional level.

The closure of these missions reflects more than operational failures. As Security Council divisions have deepened, generating a political deadlock for its authority and undermining resolutions carrying the weight of binding, international law, host governments are growing more brazen and willing to expel a formal UN presence. At the same time, political, resource, and other constraints impede the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs' (DPPA) ability to undertake a more proactive diplomatic engagement in many countries and regions. The result is a growing vacuum of UN political engagement, precisely in contexts where preventive diplomacy is most urgently needed.[230]

To support a more proactive and especially preventive approach to diplomacy, the UN should build upon past, including recent, successes. For instance, the Black Sea Grain Initiative demonstrated the UN's mediation role (alongside Türkiye) in a sensitive series of negotiations between two warring factions, Russia and Ukraine, that helped to tackle immediate food insecurity concerns, especially in the Global South.[231] Another case is the UN's Colombia verification mission, which was requested to provide political support to the country's peace process by verifying the implementation of the Final Peace Agreement between the government and the former FARC-EP.[232]

Finally, the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) recently reached $1 billion in contributions, and alongside the growing involvement of UN Resident Coordinators in prevention roles, they together represent UN achievements in support of more effective conflict prevention.[233] Moreover, 2025 marked the latest Peacebuilding Architecture Review (PBAR), a periodic (five-year) review mandated by the UNGA and UNSC (see Action 44 of the Pact for the Future) to assess the effectiveness, financing, and system-wide coherence of the UN's peacebuilding architecture. Integral to this review, the UNGA and UNSC adopted twin resolutions (A/RES/80/11 and S/RES/2805), reaffirming a shared framework for peacebuilding across the UN system, and linking the Organization's peace and security, development, and human rights pillars through institutions such as the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Support Office, and the PBF.[234]

HUMANITARIAN BUDGET IN CRISIS

The need for a new system of funding United Nations humanitarian operations, now almost solely dependent upon voluntary contributions by capricious national governments, has never been more apparent. Since 2022, funding for humanitarian action has decreased, from $43 billion in 2022 to $20 billion in 2025.[235] This significant budget reduction is mainly due to the United States' pause in foreign assistance and the increase in military expenditure worldwide. As of April 2026, unpaid assessed contributions to UN peacekeeping operations had reached $3.5 billion, including $2.9 billion for active missions and $684 million for closed missions, prompting the Secretary-General to implement a 15% reduction in peacekeeping spending and delay some contingent-owned equipment payments.[236] The results of these measures will constitute an impediment to achieving, in particular, Actions 14, 15, and 21 of the Pact of the Future.

Two cases reflect the consequences of budget cuts and what they represent on the ground. One of the agencies facing resource constraints is the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), which has only met 23% of its annual budget requirements by June 2025, impacting core operations on the ground.[237] Consequently, Uganda currently hosts nearly 2 million refugees from the conflicts in Sudan, South Sudan, and the DRC, becoming Africa's largest refugee-hosting country. The individual cost of a refugee in Uganda is estimated at approximately $16 per month; however, funding constraints will reduce this to $5 per month.[238]

Another case that illustrates the humanitarian system's failure is Haiti, where the United Nations Stabilization Mission (MINUSTAH) operated from 2004 to 2017 without resolving gang violence and political instability. Presently, more than 217,000 children face malnutrition in Haiti, in the least funded of the underfunded countries. The Haitian humanitarian response plan has received less than 9% of the $908 million required.[239] The Multinational Security Support (MSS), authorized by the Security Council by resolution 2699 (2023)—but not as a UN peace operation, was to help the Haitian National Police counter gangs, restore security, and create conditions for free and fair elections. But as the situation worsened, in September 2025, the Security Council decided to transition the MSS to a "Gang Suppression Force," authorizing participating Member States to conduct counter-gang operations, independently or alongside Haitian government police or military personnel.[240]

THE VETO AS THE RULE

The Security Council has faced a legitimacy crisis in recent years. While the number of conflicts has expanded over time, the Security Council has had only a limited role in their prevention, management, or resolution. This is underscored by a dwindling consensus among the Permanent Five (P5)—indeed 2025 marks the fifth year of a downward trend in the number of resolutions the Council has approved.[241] In this context, the veto has become a standard mechanism rather than an exceptional one. Between 1990 and 2015, the number of veto votes averaged 1.4 per year. Between 2016 and 2025, that average nearly quadrupled, to 5.2 (see figure 3.2).[242]

Figure 3.2: Vetoes Per Year by Permanent Members



Source: Original Figure, Stimson Center. Data Source: Peace Security Data Hub, "Security Council Data - Vetoes Since 1946," accessed April 22, 2026.

The current structure of the Security Council is one of the causes of its dysfunction. First, there is a lack of worldwide population representation; for instance, Asia accounts for 60% of the world's population, but it has just one of the Security Council's five permanent seats and disproportionately fewer rotating seats.[243] The gap between the population and other metrics of the Security Council's membership (including emerging powers, such as Brazil and India, lacking a permanent seat) continues to grow.

Member States have proposed different mechanisms to improve the accountability of the P5 and to reduce the misuse of their veto authority. One is the "Veto Initiative," introduced by Liechtenstein in 2022, which states that in the event of a veto, the UNGA will meet within 10 working days to "hold a debate on the situation as to which the veto was cast," inviting the UNSC to submit a special report on that use of the veto 72 hours in advance of the UNGA debate.[244]

Way Forward: Global Policy Framework Major Elements

Responding to the above complex and politically fraught diagnosis, this section presents recommendations and roadmaps for dealing with the changing character of violent conflict and security in an increasingly interconnected world. The United Nations collective security architecture, anchored by the Security Council though increasingly buoyed by an assertive General Assembly, urgently requires an overhaul to increase its representativeness, legitimacy, and effectiveness. Operationally speaking, the UN's conflict management toolbox, centered around the 4P's (namely, prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding), is in urgent need of creative innovation and visionary leadership too, to keep pace with new technological, environmental, and other trends. Together, these proposals envision a bold, coherent, and more inclusive peace and security architecture for better navigating 21st century threats and challenges, both within and between states.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE UPGRADES

Responding to contemporary peace and security challenges requires major global governance innovations in relation to Security Council reform and General Assembly revitalization. With the diffusion away from the normative, multilateral conflict management in favor of alternative structures, such as the "Board of Peace" (box 3.1), it is even more vital that steps are urgently undertaken to upgrade and reinvigorate the mission of the UN Charter-based collective security architecture.

Getting to Text-Based Negotiations on Security Council Reform

The Security Council has yet to evolve to fully reflect contemporary global power dynamics. While it added four non-permanent elected members in the 1960s, its roster of permanent, veto-wielding members has remained unchanged since 1945.[245] Repeated use of the veto by permanent Council members (see figure 3.2 above) has prevented action to halt or at least impede conflicts worldwide, leading to repeated calls for structural reform.[246] Achieving such reform is the goal of Action 39 of the Pact for the Future, with Sub-Action: (b) specifically committing to the enlargement of the Council to ensure better representation of Member States; and Sub-Action (g) addressing the future of the veto.[247] Action 40 commits to intensifying efforts on the UNSC's intergovernmental negotiation (IGN) reform process through the finalization of a "consolidated model" ahead of text-based negotiations.[248]

The IGN, established in 2008 as the formal mechanism for dialogue on Security Council reform, has yet to result in specific amendments to the Charter.[249] It received an increasing number of proposals in 2023 and 2024, indicative of continued and growing concern of Member States.[250] The appetite for reform is visible, as expressed in General Assembly statements made by leaders explicitly pressing for Council reforms during the UNGA High-Level Week in 2024 and 2025, as well as a deeper engagement with the IGN process than in previous years.[251] However, while all P5 members agree on the need for reform in principle, they are less committed than other Member States, if not hostile, to pushing for change for fear of losing the exclusive influence their position currently affords.

Given that amending the UN Charter requires not only two-thirds of the General Assembly (128 votes) but also the consent of the "constitutional processes" of all permanent members of the Council, procedural innovation is a more promising avenue for change, given the current political environment (although UN Charter amendment should not be forever cast aside as a possibility).[252] More recent non-amendment reforms have included the Veto Initiative, as discussed above.

Achieving a consolidated model is the current chief focus of the IGN process.[253] Efforts are focused on the creation of a single document which brings together the work of the five negotiating clusters of countries and proposals of individual Member States. The document would act as the starting point for text-based negotiations. As of April 2026, six models have been formally presented for discussion, with the most recent presented by the African Group on April 7, 2026.[254] As the Stimson Center and partners have recently argued, key attributes of a strengthened Security Council should include:

- An expanded membership, both permanent and non-permanent, from the existing 15 to no more than 25 members.
- The permissible re-election of non-permanent members to consecutive terms.
- The introduction of a formal consultative mechanism that establishes dialogues between Council members and civil society.[255]

These changes would build a Security Council that is more representative of the UN membership as a whole, and that is incentivized to act fairly, fostering legitimacy among its members and the wider global community.[256] Reform is ultimately going to be in the P5's interest: the Security Council provides them with a privileged position in the international order, and if the Council fails to reform to keep up with the times (e.g., a changing balance of power), then it will lose its legitimacy.[257] Moreover, in a multipolar world, the P5 are in competition with one another over who can appear to be the best defender of the interests of the so-called "Global Majority."[258]

It is not expected that agreement will be reached on a consolidated model in 2026, with progress toward text-based reform currently frustrated by disagreement between blocs over the negotiation procedure, and the entrenched positions held by Member States, notably the Uniting for Consensus Group and the G4.[259] For instance, the Uniting for Consensus Group, the African Group, and the Arab Group, among others, seek agreement on the five pillars of reform ahead of finalizing a consolidated text. This practice allows greater room for future discussion of alternatives. However, a bloc comprising the L.69, Benelux, G4, and the Nordic states, among others, insists on progressing to text-based negotiations to provide states with a foundational document from which to proceed.[260] Key issues remain obstacles in the negotiation process:

most notably, major differences between Member States on the number of membership categories of a reformed Council and its voting thresholds; and the question of the veto and its potential limitations.

Box 3.1: The Board of Peace — A Weak Competitor that the UN Needs to Take Seriously

The Board of Peace was originally proposed by the U.S. to oversee the implementation of the Gaza Peace Plan, as endorsed by Security Council Resolution 2803 on November 18, 2025. However, the Board's Charter, published in February 2026, indicates a change in scope that could challenge the authority and legitimacy of the UN, especially the Security Council. Namely, it presents the Board as an alternative multilateral body that responds to the perceived failure of existing international peacebuilding efforts.

Still, it remains uncertain how the new ambition and approach of the Board of Peace will operate. Significant issues surround the selection criteria for member countries—its Charter states that members are selected by U.S. President Donald Trump in his position as lifelong Chairman, and permanent membership requires a donation of $1 billion. By imposing a monetary requirement to membership, the Board's membership criteria risk skewing its selection process.

The process by which conflicts are selected for attention by the Board and how budget decisions are made are unclear, with concern that its broader formulation will undermine the political attention and technical and financial resources required for Gaza Peace Plan implementation. Given President Trump's centrality to the Board's creation, a change in U.S. administration is likely to place its future in doubt. At the same time, the creation of an alternative global conflict resolution structure could divert significant funding crucial for peace operations and humanitarian action away from the UN at a time when the world body faces an existential liquidity crisis.

But the Board of Peace may still present an opportunity for the UN to demonstrate its legitimacy and effectiveness as a complementary international peacebuilding body. Specifically, by pooling the UN's expansive peacebuilding operational knowledge with the Board's resources and international sway, the two bodies could loosely coordinate to achieve concrete advances toward the original intentions of the Gaza Peace Plan. On the other hand, cooperation between the Board and the UN risks legitimizing the Board, along with its hierarchy, exclusivity, and changing aims.

Source: Original Box, Stimson Center. Data Sources: Borger, "Trump's board of peace is an imperial court completely unlike what was proposed"; Jones, "Trump's 'Board of Peace' and the multilateral order"; Sidło, "The Board of Peace, Gaza, and the cost of being inside the room"; Better World Campaign, "The Board of Peace: What We Know About Its Role, Reach and Limits;" Mansour, "Why is Trump's Gaza Board of Peace facing a funding shortfall?;" and UNSC, "Letter dated 15 May 2026 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council."

Revisiting the UN General Assembly's Peace and Security Toolkit

As the "chief deliberative, policy-making and representative organ" of the UN, the General Assembly's peace and security role rests largely on dialogue and recommendations of collective measures, as stipulated by Article 10 and 12 of the UN Charter.[261] It also has the power to create fact-finding missions and investigatory bodies and has budgetary oversight of the Security Council. In line with the UN80 initiative's commitment to streamlining and strengthening the Assembly's normative role, the General Assembly should consider aligning such fact-finding missions with those of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. This will increase complementarity of actions, necessary for strengthening the UNGA's oversight role.[262]

Adopted in 1950, the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution empowers the General Assembly to convene emergency sessions to discuss threats to global peace and security on which the UNSC is divided and to issue

recommendations for collective responses.[263] In 2025, the UNGA held several consultations in response to P5 vetoes. However, only one emergency consultation led to a resolution.[264] To also ensure that the Veto Initiative continues to act as an accountability mechanism for the UNSC, the UNGA should implement a procedure to issue resolutions post-discussion to demonstrate action.

Another alternative, non-amendment reform calls for a General Assembly resolution to recommend a set of defined consequences for a state found to have violated the UN Charter by committing an illegal use of force.[265] After all, a widespread consensus has emerged that two of the five permanent Security Council members have done just that in this decade alone. The General Assembly is within its powers to establish an investigative body charged with determining whether the crime was committed, which could lead to the suspension of the Member State from a body, the Member State being barred from raising issues at the General Assembly, or the Member State losing funds, using an escalatory framework.[266]

FUTURE OF PEACEMAKING AND PEACEKEEPING

In tandem with the global militarization and conflict trends (as detailed above), the international commitment and funding to peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts have steadily eroded. Revitalizing both will require renewed political will, coupled with technological and other innovations in how peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts are undertaken.

Make Peacemaking the United Nations' Highest Priority

Peacemaking represents an effort to facilitate solutions to violent conflict through negotiation, enquiry, mediation, reconciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, and other peaceful means, each underscored in Chapter VI of the UN Charter on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes.[267] Ideally, peacemaking approaches are tailored for each conflict, inclusive, credible, and proactive. Frequently, peacemaking is marked by confusion, inefficiencies, and a dilution of efforts. This is mainly due to a retreat from international institutions in favor of *ad-hoc* mediating frameworks, increased complexity, the powerful drivers of conflict, a lack of political will, and special interests.[268]

Combating these challenges will require a reaffirmation of the founding principles of the UN Charter and will rely upon considerable Member State buy-in, especially from the Great Powers. Fostering this reaffirmation can be done with strong UN leadership, so the election of the next Secretary-General comes at a crucial moment. The UN needs to champion a peacemaker as its next leader, who commits to prioritizing a robust peace and security agenda. As the UN system's chief executive, the next Secretary-General should effectively communicate a peace-focused vision for the organization, one that garners broad-based support from UN Member States.[269]

The next SG can also better leverage fundamental UN peacemaking capabilities by reinvigorating the High-Level Advisory Board on Mediation and the Standby Team of Senior Mediation Advisers. Established at the beginning of Secretary-General António Guterres' first term, the High-Level Advisory Board has yet to be effectively deployed. This could be remedied by reconstituting it shortly after the next Secretary-General takes office, deploying its seasoned and high-profile members (including former heads of state and UN agency leads) as mediators, who can bring a surge capacity to UN Special Political Missions and Peace Operations when warranted. For the Standby Team of Senior Mediation Advisors, the UN DPPA (Mediation

Support Unit) should buttress this important capability with specialized skills in the area of humanitarian mediation from UN humanitarian agencies to complement the Standby Team's roster, to better address current and over-the-horizon humanitarian challenges.[270]

Compared to the UN's prevention and wider peacebuilding efforts (see next sub-section below), the present Secretary-General has seemed reluctant to insert himself or his senior staff in providing good offices, mediation, and other direct forms of UN Charter Chapter VI engagement in some of the most high-profile and consequential violent conflicts. Two notable exceptions (with an emphasis on the economic byproducts of war) are:

- **Black Sea Grain Initiative (2022-2023)**: Shortly after the start of the full-blown Russia-Ukraine War (February 24, 2022 to the present), the United Nations partnered with Türkiye to help the two parties to the conflict negotiate the Black Sea Grain Initiative. Though only lasting from July 2022 until July 2023, the initiative succeeded in safely transporting almost 33 million metric tons of grain and other foodstuffs to nearly 50 countries across three continents.[271] At the same time, the UN failed to capitalize in turning this momentum into a potent confidence- and security-building measure for achieving further gains toward a ceasefire, let alone the more ambitious goal of a just and lasting peace.

- **Strait of Hormuz Fertilizer and Humanitarian Initiative**: Shortly after the start of the military assault by the United States and Israel upon Iran, at a Security Council Emergency Session held on February 27, 2026, Secretary-General Guterres called for an immediate end to hostilities and for all parties to come to the negotiating table; once again, however, the UN did not capitalize on the SG's good offices.[272] One month later, Mr. Guterres did announce the creation of a crisis task force (led by UNOPS, the UN Conference on Trade and Development, the International Maritime Organization, and the International Chamber of Commerce) focused on the transfer of fertilizer and critical humanitarian goods through the Strait of Hormuz.[273] As of May 2026, the SG's proposal has garnered insufficient buy-in from key stakeholders. Although Jorge Moreira da Silva, the Executive Director of UNOPS, and Jean Arnault, the SG's Personal Envoy to the Middle East, have pursued discussions in New York and around the Middle East, key nations have continued to remain silent on the initiative.

The next Secretary-General must more actively employ the "good offices" inherent with his or her position, in accordance with Chapter VI of the Charter. Good offices are the methods by which Secretaries-General and their personal envoys negotiate in an attempt to stop conflict from arising, escalating, or spreading, an approach that has been largely undervalued in recent years.[274] A more "Activist" approach to peacemaking (table 3.1) will follow the footsteps of certain predecessors at the helm of the United Nations, such as Dag Hammarskjöld and Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, in pursuing peace.

Fulfillment of this more robust approach could follow, for instance, from making greater use of Article 99 of the Charter, which entrusts the Secretary-General with bringing "to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security."[275] Such tools as this in the UN's conflict management-related toolkit are also typically far more cost-effective than having to deploy expensive peace operations, a topic to which we now turn.

Table 3.1: The Secretary-General's "Good Offices"—Three Distinct Approaches

Activist: *personally negotiating between conflicting parties*	**Arbiter:** *appointing proxies who negotiate on behalf of Secretary-General*	**Administrator**: *appointing proxies on the direction of the Security Council or General Assembly*
• Dag Hammarskjöld promoted, in 1956, an armistice between Israel and the Arab states. Between 1960 and his mysterious death in 1961, Hammarskjöld frequently traveled to the Congo to mediate the ongoing civil war. • Javier Pérez de Cuéllar led negotiations between the United Kingdom and Argentina in the 1982 Falkland conflict, and throughout the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), he brought the parties together.	• In 2014, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed Staffan de Mistura as a Special Envoy to Syria after successive resignations of joint Arab League-UN Special Representatives.	• In 1978, the Security Council requested that the Secretary-General appoint a Special Representative for Namibia to ensure a free and credible independence vote. • In 2017, in the wake of the Rohingya Genocide, the General Assembly passed Resolution 72/248, calling on the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Envoy on Myanmar. The most recent Special Envoy was appointed in 2024.
Instead of appointing proxies and assuming a limited role focused on humanitarian issues, Secretary-General Guterres could travel to the Middle East to negotiate a peaceful settlement between Iran and the US-Israel.	While Mr. Guterres showed initiative in appointing a crisis task force to facilitate the transiting of fertilizer and humanitarian goods, neither the task force nor his recently appointed Personal Envoy for the Middle East Conflict and Its Consequences has demonstrated tangible progress (*as of May 2026*).	Given US-Israeli strikes on Iran in June 2025, the Security Council or General Assembly, in 2026, could have called upon the Secretary-General to appoint a proxy to negotiate confidence and security-building measures, which may have even averted the latest US-Israel war with Iran.

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data Sources: UN Archive, "Dag Hammarskjöld: the UN Years," accessed February 26, 2026; Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, "Suez and the Congo: Hammarskjöld's Lasting Legacy"; Hume, "Perez de Cuellar and the Iran-Iraq War"; UN News, "Javier Pérez de Cuéllar : Leading the UN during a Decade of Upheaval," accessed May 6, 2026; Council on Foreign Relations, "The Role of the UN Secretary-General," accessed September 17, 2025; UN News, "UN chief appoints Staffan de Mistura as special envoy for Syria crisis"; UNSG, "Julie Bishop, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar"; UNGA, *Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar*; and UNSC, *Security Council resolution 431 (1978) [requesting the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative for Namibia*].

Optimizing Peacekeeping for the 21st Century

Although universally recognized as a hallmark function of the UN, peacekeeping is not in the UN Charter. Rather, it represents an adaptive practice born out of need, thereby setting a precedent for today when new needs demand new adaptations and practices. The Secretary-General's 2023 report, *A New Agenda for Peace*, identifies, for instance, new challenges to peace from a changing geopolitical order, as well as emerging new threats involving environmental, technological, and other factors.[276] These obstacles to effective peacekeeping are compounded by a lack of broad-based buy-in from Member States.

Strengthening Member State buy-in requires that the UN and its Member States finally acknowledge, and aim to alter, those elements of Security Council peacekeeping mandates that have exceeded the organization's implementing capacity (as demonstrated over the past 10-to-15 years). These include, in particular, heavy "stabilization" mandates in intractable, long-standing conflict environments in large countries (as witnessed, in recent years, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali).[277]

Reverting to a role that is closer to peacekeeping's original *fair witness and deterrent functions* than to peace enforcement could allow the UN to, in effect, reinvent peacekeeping. At the same time, it could do so while still accessing all of the direct observation, distant monitoring, and analytical capabilities that modern technology can make available—from drones and satellite surveillance to artificial intelligence.[278] Greater transparency achieved through these new technologies could serve to garner greater confidence among the parties to a violent dispute, facilitating overall peace implementation efforts.

This renewed access and emphasis on modern technology in peacekeeping should begin with air operations. In 2025, air operations were the highest line-item expense (approximately U.S. $461 million) in the operational requirement category of the proposed peacekeeping operations budget (approximately U.S. $1.5 billion), making up nearly one-third of the cost of the operational requirements.[279] This high cost is partly due to an outdated model using outdated technology. Currently, the air support system relies mostly on manned aerial systems—some from the Soviet era—operating through traditional air bases, paying for "hours flown."[280] However, some missions, like resupplies or monitoring, can be accomplished using uncrewed systems. Increasing the use of these systems will cut down on air base cost and supply cost.

Capital can also be mobilized with an increase in compliance of assessed contributions from donor countries. If UN Peacekeeping can demonstrate a more efficient model that delivers for humanity, donor countries may be more likely to continue to fund operations. This would, in turn, increase the capacity to leverage essential emerging technologies for peace operations going forward. Specifically, to give the UN Secretary-General a more capable rapid cash-flow mechanism, steps to expand over time the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund are necessary.[281]

Recommitting to peacekeeping financing, in the context of adaptive peacekeeping practice, has the potential to capitalize on both the burden-sharing capability of the UN and the information-gleaning and sharing capacities of cutting-edge technology—in this case devoted to maintaining and restoring peace and stability and reducing the risk and overall cost of war. The Secretary-General, Security Council, and General Assembly are all poised to shape this new narrative: peace can be made more affordable if we re-invest in effective UN conflict management tools, such as the decades-old practice of peacekeeping, in thoughtful and deliberate new ways.

Incorporating recommendations from the forthcoming (June) 2026 review by the Secretary-General of all forms of UN peace operations, it is within the purview of the next Secretary-General, in leveraging the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, to lead the United Nations in pursuit of this updated vision. Indeed, this is another reason why the selection of the next Secretary-General is so crucial to forging a just and durable peace in many fragile and conflict-affected settings worldwide.

REIMAGINING PREVENTION AND PEACEBUILDING

A key element of the Pact for the Future is its commitment to "build and sustain peace" (Actions 13 and 18), including a call to finance prevention and peacebuilding efforts.[282] The Pact provides an important starting framework for rethinking how prevention and peacebuilding must evolve in response to planetary

risks, including the climate crisis. This commitment is reflected in the General Assembly decision to expand UN Peacebuilding Fund (A/RES/79/1) resources with the provision of an additional $50 million annually in assessed contributions, beginning January 1, 2025 (A/RES/78/257).[283]

To Prevent Climate Change-Induced Conflicts, Institutionalize Climate Risk Early Warning

At its core, the Pact reflects a recognition that the international system is confronting a "profound global transformation" and rising catastrophic risks, including climate change (Action 9).[284] The UN Secretary-General has warned that climate change now poses unprecedented risks across every region.[285] Of the 120 million people forcibly displaced worldwide, three-quarters live in countries heavily impacted by climate change, and half face the combined pressures of conflict and climate hazards.[286] Yet conflict-affected countries receive only a fraction of global climate adaptation finance—about U.S. $1.79 per capita compared to U.S. $7.62 in stable contexts.[287]

Acknowledging these implications for peace and security, the DPPA has elevated climate-related security risks as a strategic priority in its 2023-2026 Strategic Plan.[288] Operationalizing this plan requires moving beyond traditional conflict prevention models and recognizing the disproportionate impacts of climate insecurity, particularly for fragile and conflict-affected settings. UNDP estimates that by 2030, climate change could push up to 130 million more people into poverty, exacerbating food and water insecurity, socio-economic fragility, and political grievances, with climate-related security risks disproportionately affecting women.[289]

As elaborated earlier in this section of the report too, climate change can also compound additional structural vulnerabilities, such as political grievances and large-scale displacement.[290] In fragile settings, these cascading effects may interact with weak governance and amplify instability. Notably, 70% of countries in the bottom quartile of vulnerability to climate change (those most vulnerable) are also in the bottom quartile for state fragility.[291] Climate change is also amplifying geopolitical tensions in the Arctic, where temperatures are rising four times faster than the global average, creating a new domain for competition over resources and transit.[292]

To adapt to a changing global landscape and rising vulnerability, conflict prevention efforts must place greater emphasis on the climate-conflict nexus across the peace and security architecture.[293] This does not suggest military responses to climate insecurity but the need for an integrated response between conflict prevention, peacebuilding, climate change adaptation, development, and humanitarian aid.

For instance, the DPPA has taken steps to integrate the climate-conflict nexus into its prevention work, including by spearheading a new UN interagency Climate Security Mechanism (CSM). The CSM seeks to strengthen system-wide analysis and coordinated responses to climate-related security risks across political, development, and peace operations.

Greater attention should now be paid to deepening the CSM's climate-sensitive prevention impact across the UN's peace, development, and human rights pillars.[294] In particular, its toolbox should be systematically embedded in the UN conflict early warning tools, Common Country Analyses, and mission planning frameworks.[295] Political reporting to the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission should likewise integrate climate-related risk pathways as core elements of conflict analysis.

Strengthening prevention can also reduce conflict-related emissions and help to break the reinforcing cycle between climate change and insecurity. Building on models like the Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobility, UN approaches should prioritize locally-led adaptation, culturally appropriate and regionally coordinated responses, and rights-based approaches to climate mobility.[296] This also ensures that climate-sensitive prevention reflects local needs and agency.

To strengthen its climate-sensitive conflict prevention instruments further, the UN should focus on optimizing for data integration from external bodies that generate large volumes of climate-conflict data, rather than relying solely on in-house capacity. This includes building structured partnerships around climate modeling, earth observation, and early warning systems to translate scientific data into actionable insights for decision-makers.[297]

Lessons can also be drawn from initiatives such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence in Montreal, which, despite limited staffing, demonstrates advanced capacities in forecasting and data-driven risk analysis.[298] However, such models remain geographically and politically bounded; the UN's Climate Security Mechanism should, therefore, build a broader, more inclusive universal framework that incorporates these technical strengths, while maintaining global legitimacy. In parallel, this more comprehensive approach should be closely linked to climate finance mechanisms, ensuring that adaptation funding (through the World Bank and other major actors) is deployed in ways that are conflict-sensitive and prevention-oriented.[299]

Strengthen Peacebuilding by Protecting Civilians

The 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review's (also referenced above, in line with Action 44 of the Pact for the Future) subsequent twin resolutions in the General Assembly and Security Council introduced several recommendations aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and visibility of the UN's peacebuilding architecture.[300] One would strengthen the role of the PBC by integrating its bridging, advisory, and convening roles across the UN system, such as with the UNSC, UNGA, and ECOSOC.

The resolutions also emphasized improving the measurable impact of UN peacebuilding efforts, including stronger monitoring and assessment of peacebuilding activities. In this regard, the Peacebuilding Support Office's nascent Peacebuilding Impact Hub may play an important role in generating evidence-based analyses that better demonstrate the effectiveness of the UN's peacebuilding work.

Additionally, the General Assembly and Security Council's recent peacebuilding resolutions highlighted the importance of improving collaboration between peace operations and peacebuilding efforts. These priorities carry important implications for civilian protection, particularly in ensuring that protection efforts are sustained beyond the lifespan of peacekeeping missions and into longer-term peacebuilding efforts.

Strengthening UN civilian capacity and rapid crisis response mechanisms are critical to peacebuilding efforts that effectively respond to global shocks and large-scale crises.[301] Specifically, attention is needed toward filling the gap in civilian protection that often emerges during transitions from peacekeeping to longer-term peacebuilding. Consistent with Action 21 of the Pact, this would also align with the priorities of the 2025 PBAR, which highlights the importance of strengthening the peacekeeping-peacebuilding nexus.[302] Moreover, civilian protection is a critical component of this transition, as the withdrawal of peacekeeping missions can leave communities vulnerable, if both protection responsibilities and associated new rapid

reaction capabilities are not effectively integrated into peacebuilding strategies.[303] The withdrawal of the MINUSMA peacekeeping mission in Mali (2023) and MONUSCO mission in South Kivu, DRC (2024) provide two illustrative case examples.[304]

To address this gap, the UN should establish a Civilian Protection Support Mechanism to ensure that protection (and wider peacebuilding) efforts continue during peacekeeping transitions. In practice, the Mechanism would deploy teams of specialized civilian experts capable of supporting rapid reaction functions, alongside longer-term capacity-building, drawing on lessons from the Civilian Capacity Initiative (CIVCAP) and the idea of a Standing Civilian Protection Service (SCPS).[305] It would serve to make the United Nations' life-saving capabilities indispensable, even in complex and politically fraught environments such as today's Gaza (box 3.2).

Box 3.2: Gaza Reconstruction—Pitfalls and Opportunities

An International Stabilization Force (ISF) has been proposed as an integral part of Gaza's reconstruction plan by the new Board of Peace (see box 3.1 above), subsequently reaffirmed by UN Security Council Resolution 2803. Despite the plan's formal advancement, the political and security landscape on the ground remains highly volatile and contested. This proposal emerges amid an ongoing cycle of escalatory violence in Gaza, where repeated breakdowns in ceasefire arrangements, large-scale civilian harm, and the fragmentation of governance structures have intensified both humanitarian need and political deadlock.

At the same time, parallel aid delivery mechanisms such as the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation have drawn criticism for their limited transparency, unclear accountability structures, and potential to sideline established UN-led coordination frameworks (led by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees, UNRWA), raising concerns about the politicization and fragmentation of humanitarian response. While the momentum behind UNSC Resolution 2803 presents an opportunity for the UN to demonstrate its commitment and capacities for international peacebuilding, it offers limited clarity on the long-term political future for Palestinians or the broader resolution of the conflict through ongoing peacemaking activities. For the ISF to effectively support peacebuilding and reconstruction, it must clearly define its mandate, composition, and deployment parameters, including troop levels and the scope of civilian protection. Crucially, it must also ensure the meaningful inclusion of Palestinian agency in its decision-making.

The ISF would operate within a complex and overlapping field of actors, including the US-backed Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC), UNRWA, EU missions such as the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories and European Union Border Assistance Mission to Rafah, Egyptian- and Jordanian-supported police training initiatives, and the Israel Defense Forces, which continue to occupy well over half of the Gaza Strip. In this fragmented environment, mandate clarity and coordination will be essential.

Peace processes are only durable when they are shaped and sustained by the communities most affected by a conflict. This means ensuring that Palestinian representation is meaningfully included in decision-making on reconstruction, governance, and civilian protection. The absence of Palestinian representation in senior-level Board of Peace decision-making represents a critical gap in the current approach. Without inclusive Palestinian participation, stabilization efforts risk being perceived as externally imposed and are unlikely to produce durable, let alone just, peace.

Source: Original Box, Stimson Center. Data Sources: Cousin, Boutellis, Russo, and Abu Mousa, Stabilizing Gaza and Shaping a Political Horizon: Conditions for an Effective International Stabilization Force; Security Council Report, Twin Resolutions on the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review.

Oversight could be situated within the DPPA or the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), depending on whether the deployment is anchored in supporting chiefly a political transition or humanitarian protection coordination. Comprising a total of 2,400 additional personnel worldwide and far less-costly than deploying Blue Helmet peacekeepers, these teams from the new Civilian Protection Support Mechanism would contribute distinct civilian expertise to peacebuilding efforts, support institution-building to strengthen national capacities for civilian protection, and assist community-based protection initiatives. The Mechanism could also leverage the Peacebuilding and Peace Support Office's (PBSO) Peacebuilding Impact Hub to support continued monitoring, follow-up, and evidence-based assessment of civilian protection efforts after peacekeeping missions conclude.[306]

Navigating Potential Spoilers and Bottlenecks

Reimagining and upgrading the UN collective security architecture, as well as its operational conflict management toolkit (prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding), have and will continue to encounter stiff resistance. Potential spoilers and bottlenecks include, in particular, veto-wielding permanent members of the Security Council, developing countries seeing potential threats to their sovereignty, and the intensification of financial constraints caused by multiple factors, including a diversion of resources from traditional UN conflict management donors to both defending Ukraine against Russia and enhancing European and East Asian defenses in an era when uncertainty abounds around long-standing U.S. security guarantees.

More specifically, the case for renewed investment in preventive action—which holds out the potential of saving major countries billions (as detailed above)—faces perennial difficulties in proving when such measures are indeed effective, especially given growing pressures on the public finances of poor and rich nations alike. Compared to the latter 20th century, mediation has fared poorly in ending protracted armed conflicts;[307] this requires the United Nations to adapt both to how it provides peacemaking services (from direct mediation to facilitator and "enabler" functions) and to the kinds of new conflict-inducing factors it seeks to address, whether in the form of new technologies, environmental changes, or other causes.

In short, great powers and donor countries will find it more compelling to renew their political commitments to and financial investments in multilateral prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding efforts, when they view the United Nations as actively changing to meet contemporary conflict management demands and vital needs. This further entails redirecting scarce global public resources toward enabling the world body's field staff to better develop national and local capacities for peace. Through efforts underway to deliver on the Pact for the Future (especially Chapter Two on "International peace and security," but also Chapter Five on "Transforming global governance"), the United Nations holds out the potential of embracing this shift, including through consideration of the above proposals. New tactics and strategies for taking the entire Pact forward, between now and the official, high-level review in September 2028, are explored in the next section, including through a novel Pact Innovation Plan.

IV. Accelerating Implementation through a Pact Innovation Plan

> ***"More than ever before in human history, we share a common destiny. We can master it only if we face it together. And that, my friends, is why we have the United Nations."***
>
> –Kofi Annan, 7th Secretary-General of the United Nations [308]

Advancing the Pact for the Future requires both political commitment and novel approaches to implementation. The Global Governance Innovation Network's (GGIN) Pact Innovation Plan (PIP) responds to this need by offering a structured yet flexible platform for generating creative, research-backed solutions, fostering multistakeholder collaboration, and identifying concrete entry points to operationalize the Pact's 363 commitments across 56 Actions. The latest iteration of the PIP described in this section aims to spark a more forward-looking conversation among Member States and stakeholders about what meaningful implementation could look like in practice. PIP Edition Two aims to stimulate strategic thinking around the Pact's most consequential actions, creating space for diplomats, practitioners, and experts to consider a fundamental question:

When the international community looks back in 2028, what will be remembered among the most important achievements and legacy-building innovations flowing from the 2024 Summit of the Future?

Despite persistent funding constraints and a crisis of confidence, dedicated governments, international officials, and civil society partners have continued to make incremental progress toward many of the Pact's central aims, while upholding UN values. Increasingly, they are also seeking a leader with the credibility, courage, and strategic vision to fully realize the Pact's ambitions and drive meaningful UN reform. This section begins by considering the major challenges and opportunities in taking the Pact forward, including its interactions with the UN80 Initiative. It then maps the current landscape for Pact follow-up, and finally, it seeks to identify opportunities for momentum and garner further political will for taking the Pact forward.

Challenges and Opportunities in Taking Forward the Pact for the Future and UN80 Initiative

In connection with the Pact for the Future's implementation, the United Nations has launched another major reform effort: the UN80 reform initiative, leveraging the ongoing liquidity crisis to increase the UN system's long-term efficiency.[309] In considering how the Pact relates to UN80 and the Sustainable

Development Goals (SDGs), GGIN consultations with UN Missions and other stakeholders have yielded a range of perspectives, including: "The SDGs are the what, and the Pact is the how" and that "The Pact is the what, and the UN80 is the how."[310] To be sure, all of these efforts are parts of the "how." The SDGs are *how* we create well-being for humanity and future generations, the Pact for the Future is *how* we renew our multilateral architecture to achieve those goals, and the UN80 initiative is *how* we renew the United Nations to exist sustainably at the heart of that multilateral system.

At the April 24, 2026 President of the General Assembly's (PGA) interactive dialogue on Pact follow-through, the UN Secretary-General (SG) presented the Pact and UN80 Initiative jointly as a "strategy of renewal" to restore trust in multilateralism with five areas of convergence: i) strengthening the three UN pillars (peace, development, human rights); ii) future-oriented inclusive multilateralism; iii) digital transformation and innovation; iv) financing and value for money; and v) country-level delivery as the locus of impact.[311]

While a clear and coherent narrative is important to support coordination across these efforts, persistent challenges must still be addressed in taking forward these reform innovations.

THE LIQUIDITY CRISIS

In recent years, the UN's liquidity has deteriorated due to the non-payment or delayed payment of Member State assessed contributions for its regular budget, with deficits of roughly 20% for 2024 and 2025. The UN's regular budget has been reduced from an estimated $3.72 billion in 2025 to $3.45 billion, in 2026. This decision entails abolishing nearly a fifth of the workforce (2,900 staff positions), as well as cutting 21% of staff allocations for special political missions.[312]

In Africa, where five UN peacekeeping missions remain active, a mandated 15% expenditure reduction is translating into a 25% cut in uniformed and civilian peacekeeping personnel, equivalent to 13,000-14,000 troops and police being repatriated from the field.[313] Operationally, these reductions mean fewer patrols to monitor fragile ceasefires, diminished civilian protection, the closure of field offices, and reduced logistics and air support. They also weaken support for humanitarian actors operating in insecure environments.[314] Additionally, the wider cut in global aid funding has increased competition for funds at the cost of less collaboration. Under such constraints, reform needs to both be efficient itself and to increase overall efficiency, while using agreed roadmaps such as the Pact for the Future as a north star toward the end goal of reform.

RISING GREAT POWER TENSIONS AND CONFLICT

Intensifying geopolitical competition and shifting national priorities, including among permanent members of the Security Council, complicate consensus-building and weaken collective commitment to multilateral reforms. The current crisis in the Middle East has directly influenced policy debates in Europe. French President Emmanuel Macron has suggested the possibility of stationing French nuclear assets in Germany and other European countries, labelled "groundbreaking" by the media, alongside the announcement of expanding its nuclear arsenal, which currently stand at approximately 290 warheads.[315] In 2024, global military spending increased 9%, year over year, reaching $2.7 trillion,[316] while the financing

gap for achieving the SDGs stands at $4 trillion.[317] Moreover, ODA declined 9% in 2024, and it is projected to decrease 9-17% in 2025–26, especially with the spillover effects from the Iran war.[318]

Growing geopolitical tensions, security crises, and shifting national interests risk weakening political commitment to implementing the Pact for the Future, with Member States prioritizing short-term national or regional agendas over collective long-term commitments. Generating new political will becomes increasingly difficult in this context, which highlights the need to pinpoint key Pact Actions on which to focus to deliver results. The increased support for multilateralism from Middle Powers provides an opportunity to do so.[319]

LEADERSHIP TRANSITION

Effective January 1, 2027, a new Secretary-General takes the helm of the United Nations, presenting a raft of challenges and opportunities. The selection process is shaped by strong civil society advocacy, such as the "1 for 8 Billion" campaign calling for the appointment of the first woman Secretary-General[320] (aligning with the Action 8 [b] of the Pact for the Future), as well as differing positions among the Permanent Members of the Security Council.[321] Early positioning points to candidates sharing a vision of pragmatic reform, greater institutional effectiveness, restored trust in multilateralism, and the ability to operate amid geopolitical tensions and financial constraints. Candidates also stress management and consensus-building skills, thus far, with relatively little emphasis on the Pact for the Future as a central organizing agenda for long-term reform.[322]

At the same time, the leadership transition presents a renewed opportunity, its process creating space to rethink how the UN Secretariat sets priorities, aligns mandates with resources—through the UN80 mandate review process, and operates more coherently across funds and programs. The moment invites a shift toward a sharper strategic focus, clearer accountability, and more disciplined execution, ensuring that the system is not just setting norms but is consistently able to translate global commitments into measurable results on the ground.[323]

Sustained momentum for the successful delivery of UN80 and the Pact for the Future will require multistakeholder efforts across several fora, while at the same time distilling the vast information space into clear visions and goals. Currently, with 31 work packages for the UN80 initiative, alongside multiple parallel follow-up tracks to the Pact (including intergovernmental processes, thematic reviews, and agency-level implementation frameworks), the landscape of commitments, reporting requirements, and policy discussions is complex and often fragmented. While several UN80 work packages align closely with existing Pact actions and could be advanced in a more integrated manner, the proliferation of overlapping processes, nonetheless, risks duplication and diluted strategic focus, particularly for smaller UN field missions with limited capacity to engage across multiple reform agendas. There is a growing need for more streamlined coordination, clearer prioritization and sequencing, and targeted support to help actors across the UN system to effectively digest information, align positions, and participate meaningfully in shaping and delivering on shared priorities.

Mapping a Landscape for Pact Implementation

In its second year of mapping, the PIP supports Pact implementation by helping stakeholders identify momentum, translate commitments into action, and navigate key milestones across the UN and broader global governance system, including significant intergovernmental negotiations. It combines targeted policy research with practical tools—such as milestone mapping, visualizations, and concise outputs—to make the Pact more accessible and actionable, while fostering informal dialogues and connections to the broader Pact Innovation Forum and Pact Monitoring Toolkit (section two) efforts.

This subsection maps four key timelines, highlighting major milestones for follow-up: i) Intergovernmental Processes and General Assembly (UNGA) timelines; ii) UN Secretariat follow-up; iii) wider global governance fora; and iv) civil society-led fora, also available on the new interactive Pact Innovation Forum website.

MAPPING INTERGOVERNMENTAL PROCESSES AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY TIMELINES

Table 4.1 lists 24 intergovernmental processes across the 80th General Assembly cycle. Critical intergovernmental negotiations for Pact follow-through include: the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) on Security Council reform; the Global Dialogue on Artificial Intelligence Governance (held, in 2026, in connection with the AI for Good Summit in Geneva); the Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Revitalization of the Work of the General Assembly; the review of ECOSOC and High-Level Political Forum arrangements; and steps to build upon the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review, together forming a dense calendar of milestones shaping Pact implementation and political momentum.

In accordance with General Assembly Resolution 79/327, the PGA is convening interactive dialogues with all SG candidates. The transition period ahead (from January 2027) for the next SG may slow Pact follow-through slightly, but this should not be mistaken for a lack of commitment from the UN system. Key UNGA Pact follow-up events (figure 4.1) held this year include the First PGA Dialogue on Pact for the Future Follow-through and Linkages to the UN80 Initiative (April 24), and the Second PGA Dialogue on PGA Dialogue on Taking Stock of the Pact for the Future (July 14).[324]

> [*The Pact Innovation Plan*] ***combines targeted policy research with practical tools—such as milestone mapping, visualizations, and concise outputs—to make the Pact more accessible and actionable ...***

Table 4.1: UN80th General Assembly Intergovernmental Negotiating Tracks

	Intergovernmental Process	Co-Facilitators/Co-Chairs (Permanent Representatives of)	Relevant Resolution(s)
1	Review of the implementation of the outcomes of the World Summit on Information Society	H.E. Mr. Ekitela Lokaale (Kenya) H.E. Ms. Suela Janina (Albania)	A/RES/ 79/277
2	Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) on the Security Council	H.E. Mr. Tareq M. A. M. Albanai (Kuwait) H.E. Ms. Lise Gregoire-van Haaren (Kingdom of the Netherlands)	A/RES/62/557
3	First Global Dialogue on Artificial Intelligence Governance	H.E. Ms. Egriselda López (El Salvador) H.E. Mr. Rein Tammsaar (Estonia)	A/RES/79/325
4	Working Group on the Strengthening and Revitalizing of the Work of the General Assembly	H.E. Mr. Cornel Feruță (Romania) H.E. Ms. Mutryce Agatha Williams (Saint Kitts and Nevis)	A/RES/79/327
5	Implementation of the New Urban Agenda	H.E. Mr. Krzysztof Maria Szczerski (Poland) H.E. Mrs. Agnes Mary Chimbiri Molande (Malawi)	A/RES/79/214
6	Co-chairs of the Open-ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea	H.E. Mr. Milan J. N. Meetarbhan (Mauritius) H.E. Ms. Anna Jóhannsdóttir (Iceland)	A/RES/54/33 A/RES/78/69
7	Intergovernmental negotiations on a declaration agreed by consensus on sea level rise	H.E. Mr. James Martin Larsen (Australia) H.E. Ms. Tania Serafim Yvonne Romualdo (Cabo Verde)	A/RES/78/558
8	High-level meeting on improving global road safety	H.E. Mrs. Aida Kasymalieva (Kyrgyz Republic) H.E. Mr. Peter Hulényi (Slovak Republic)	A/RES/76/294
9	ECOSOC and HLPF Review of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development at the global level	H.E. Mr. François Jackman (Barbados) H.E. Ms. Natasha Meli (Malta)	A/RES/78/285 A/RES/75/290 A A/RES/75/290 B
10	9th review of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy	H.E. Ms. Elina Kalkku (Finland) H.E. Mr. Omar Hilale (Morocco)	A/RES/77/298
11	Steering Committee on Partnerships for Small Island Developing States (SIDS)	H.E. Mr. Rui Vinhas (Portugal) H.E. Ms. Janine Coye-Felson (Belize)	A/RES/70/202
12	Human Rights Council	H.E. Mr. Fergal Mythen (Ireland) H.E. Mr. Coly Seck (Senegal)	A/RES/65/281
13	International Migration Review Forum	H.E. Mr. Erastus Lokaale (Kenya) H.E. Mr. Olivier Maes (Luxembourg)	A/RES/73/326
14	High-level United Nations Conference on South South Cooperation	H.E. Mr. Lukman Abdulraheem Al Faily (Iraq) H.E. Ms. Gergana Karadjova (Bulgaria)	A/RES/80/156
15	High level meeting on HIV/AIDS - modalities	H.E. Mr. David Bakradze (Georgia) H.E. Mr. Charles Masole (Botswana)	A/RES/75/284
16	Negotiations on a progress declaration to be adopted at the high-level meeting on improving global road safety on 20 and 21 July 2026	H.E. Mrs. Aida Kasymalieva (Kyrgyz Republic) H.E. Mr. Peter Hulényi (Slovak Republic)	A/RES/80/247
17	High-level meeting on universal health coverage	H.E. Mr. Cherdchai Chaivaivid (Thailand) H.E. Mr. Joan Forner Rovira (Andorra)	A/RES/78/4
18	Participation of Indigenous People in meetings of relevant United Nations bodies on issues affecting them	H.E. Mr. Walton Alfonso Webson (Antigua and Barbuda) H.E. Mr. Pendapala Andreas Naanda (Namibia)	A/RES/78/328
19	High-level meeting on pandemic prevention, preparedness and response	H.E. Mr. Paruyr Hovhannisyan (Armenia) H.E. Mr. Karoli Martin Ngoga (Rwanda)	A/RES/79/333
20	Second International Decade for People of African Descent	H.E. Mr. Domingos Estêvão Fernandes (Mozambique)	A/RES/69/16
21	Beyond GDP	H.E. Ms. Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett, Permanent (Guyana) H.E. Mr. Hector Gómez Hernández (Spain)	A/RES/79/1
22	High-level meeting on HIV/AIDS	H.E. Mr. Charles Masole (Botswana) H.E. Mr. David Bakradze (Georgia)	A/RES/80/256
23	United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture Review	H.E. Osama Mahmoud Abdelkhalek Mahmoud (Egypt) H.E. Samuel Žbogar (Slovenia)	A/RES/80/15
24	Informal ad hoc working group on the Mandate Implementation Review	H.E. Mr. Brian Wallace (Jamaica) H.E. Ms. Carolyn Schwalger (New Zealand)	A/RES/79/571

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data Source: UN, "Co-facilitators and Co-chairs for the intergovernmental processes in the 80th session of the General Assembly," accessed April 23, 2026.

Figure 4.1: UNGA Pact Follow-Up Timeline

(Jan–Dec 2026)*

Pact Chapter Key

- Sustainable Development and Financing for Development
- International Peace and Security
- Science, Technology and Innovation and Digital Cooperation
- Youth and Future Generations
- Transforming Global Governance

JAN / FEB

JANUARY 26–28 AND 30, 4–6 AND FEBRUARY 20

Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations
A7, A16, A46, A55

FEBRUARY 2–13

Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on the United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation, Fourth session
A4, A24, A47-52

FEBRUARY 2–20

Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Ninety-second session
A7, A8, A18, A31, A46

FEBRUARY 4

ECOSOC Special Meeting on Financial Integrity
A1, A2, A4, A5, A6, A9, A10, A12, A24, A34, A43, A47-A53

MAR

MARCH 9–19

Commission on the Status of Women
A7, A8, A19, A31, A46

MARCH 31

Report release by the Informal Ad Hoc Working Group on the Mandate Implementation Review of UN80, led by Jamaica and New Zealand
Whole Pact

DEADLINE MARCH 31

Technical cooperation initiated with select Member States, upon request, to support implementation of the Declaration
A34-37

APR

APRIL 21–22

Webcast Interactive Dialogues with Candidates in the General Assembly
Whole Pact

APRIL 24

First PGA Interactive Dialogue: The Pact for the Future and the UN80 Initiative: From Commitments to Delivery
Whole Pact

APRIL 20–24

2026 Financing for Development (FfD) Forum
A2, A4, A5, A6, A47-A52

APRIL 27 TO MAY 22

2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
A25

MAY

MAY 6

11th Multi-stakeholder Forum on Science, Technology and Innovation for the Sustainable Development Goals
A28-A33

DEADLINE MAY 31

Presentation of the SG's Report on the Future of Peace Operations
A21

JUNE

JUNE 9–11

Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Nineteenth session
A7, A46

JUNE 17–19

ECOSOC Humanitarian Affairs Segment
A1, A2, A6, A7, A15, A46, A54

ANTICIPATED JUNE

Ad Hoc Working Group on the Revitalization of the work of the General Assembly
A38, A42, A45

JULY

JULY 6–10

World Summit on the Information Society
A28-A33

JULY 7–15

High-Level Political Forum 2026 – SDGs 6, 7, 9, 11, 17
SDG 6 - Water and Sanitation - A6, A10
SDG 7 - Energy - A6, A9, A52
SDG 9 - Industry - A4, A29
SDG 11 - Sustainable Transport - A6, A9
SDG 17 - Partnerships - A4, A5, A47-52, A55

JULY

Global Dialogue on AI Governance in Geneva
A28-A33

JULY

Second PGA Dialogue on Second PGA Dialogue on Taking Stock of the Pact for the Future
Whole Pact

SEPT

SEPTEMBER 8–22

81st Session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA 81) Opening and General Debate
A1, A9, A13, A38, A39, A45, A47, A54, A55

SEPTEMBER 26

International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons
A25, A26

SEPTEMBER

General Assembly, Second Committee, 80th session: Economic and Financial
A1, A2, A4, A5, A6, A9, A10, A12, A24, A34, A43, A47-A53

SEPTEMBER

General Assembly, First Committee, 80th session: Disarmament and International Security
A13, A14, A18-A27, A41, A44, A56

SEPTEMBER

General Assembly, Fourth Committee, 80th session: Special Political and Decolonization
A18, A21, A44, A56

SEPTEMBER

General Assembly, Third Committee, 80th session: Social, Humanitarian and Cultural
A2, A6, A7, A8, A11, A13, A14, A15, A19, A20, A23, A24, A27, A34, A35, A36, A37, A46

SEPTEMBER

General Assembly, Sixth Committee, 80th session: Legal
A17, A22, A23, A24

SEPTEMBER

General Assembly, Fifth Committee, 80th session: Administrative and Budgetary
A4, A21, A39, A40, A45

OCT

OCTOBER 24

81st Anniversary of UN Day
Whole Pact

NOV / DEC

NOVEMBER 9–20

2026 UN Climate Change Conference (UNFCCC COP31)
A9, A10, A52

NOVEMBER 20

World Children's Day
A34, A35

NOVEMBER 25

International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women
A31

DECEMBER 3

International Day of Persons with Disabilities
A45

DECEMBER 10

Human Rights Day
A46 and Whole Pact

Source: Original Figure, Stimson Center. **Dates accurate as of May 7, 2026.*

UN SECRETARIAT FOLLOW-UP TO THE PACT FOR THE FUTURE

Pact follow-up by the UN Secretariat and wider UN system is anchored by tools like the Pact for the Future progress tracker, which consolidates actions and tracks delivery across the system. Early data from the tracker indicates that the UN Secretariat is directly responsible for 41 action points and 111 milestones, with just over half of the milestones already completed.[325] The Secretariat is also advancing internal coherence through the UN80 Initiative and cross-agency coordination, while supporting Member States through country-level engagement and thematic processes, aiming for measurable, system-wide results ahead of the 2028 review.

THE PACT IN OTHER INTERGOVERNMENTAL FORA

Beyond formal UN processes, a wide range of intergovernmental and multi-stakeholder fora in 2026 will play a critical role in advancing Pact follow-through (table 4.2). In particular, G20 tracks, including Sherpa meetings and the Leaders' Summit, will be central venues for advancing key Pact actions, given the G20's influence over, for instance, global economic governance, development finance, and emerging issues such as digital and AI governance.

Table 4.2: Illustrative Mapping of other Intergovernmental Fora for Pact Follow-up (Jan.–Dec. 2026)

Date	Event	Pact Action(s)
Dec. 15–16, 2025	Sherpa Meeting I [G20]	1 - 12, 28 - 33, 38 - 56
Jan. 19	Internet Governance Forum 2026 NRIs Meeting I	29
Jan. 19–23	World Economic Forum	1, 29
Jan. 29–30	Trinidad and Tobago Internet Governance Forum	29
Feb. 16–20	2026 AI Action Summit in India	29
April 16	Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting [G20] on the margins of the 2026 Spring Meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group.	1 - 12, 28 - 33, 38 - 56
May 6–7	11th Multi-stakeholder Forum on Science, Technology and Innovation for the Sustainable Development Goals	28, 29, 30
June 29–30	Hamburg Sustainability Conference	1-12, 47 - 52
June 29–30	Sherpa Meeting II [G20]	1 - 12, 28 - 33, 38 - 56
Aug. 29–30	Finance and Central Bank Deputies Meeting [G20]	1 - 12, 28 - 33, 38 - 56
Aug. 31–Sept. 1	Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Ministerial [G20]	1 - 12, 28 - 33, 38 - 56
Oct. 1–2	Sherpa Meeting III [G20]	1 - 12, 28 - 33, 38 - 56
Oct. 15	Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting [G20] on the margins of the 2026 Annual Meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group	1 - 12, 28 - 33, 38 - 56
Oct. 12–18	World Bank Group Annual Meeting	47–51
Oct. 30–31	Foreign Ministers' Meeting [G20]	1 - 12, 28 - 33, 38 - 56
Nov. 5–6	Armenia Internet Governance Forum	29
Nov. 9–20	Conference of the Parties (COP31)	4, 9 - 10, 28 - 29, 47 - 52
Dec. 5–7	Doha Forum	13 - 27, 30
Dec. 11–12	Sherpa Meeting IV [G20]	1 - 12, 28 - 33, 38 - 56
Dec. 14–15	G20 Leaders' Summit	1 - 12, 28 - 33, 38 - 56

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data Sources: linked within the image. *Dates accurate as of April 23, 2026.

CIVIL SOCIETY-LED MOMENTS COMPLEMENTING INTERGOVERNMENTAL PACT FOLLOW-UP

Figure 4.2 presents an updated mapping of the roadmap toward the High-Level Review of the Pact for the Future. The top half of the timeline captures key intergovernmental processes, alongside select recommendations (clearly marked), including a series of Annual PGA Dialogues on Pact Follow-up in 2026, 2027, and 2028. The bottom half highlights complementary civil society engagement, including major convenings such as the Academic Council on the UN system's 2026 annual meeting in Lisbon and the Coalition for the UN We Need's Global Futures Forum in New York, both of which contribute to shaping discourse and sustaining momentum around Pact implementation. Furthermore, a milestone co-led civil society and UN event on July 9 2026, We the Peoples: Shaping the Future of the UN, will seek to clarify the vision of the UN post-Pact and UN80 reforms and whether the world body is adequately equipped for current and over-the-horizon 21st century challenges, threats, and opportunities.

Figure 4.2: Roadmap to the September 2028 High-Level Review of the Pact



*Only select actual and recommended activities listed. Source: Original Figure, Stimson Center.

Identifying and Supporting Political Will through the Pact Innovation Plan

Edition Two of the PIP helps to translate emerging political signals into actionable coordination by tracking how Pact priorities appear within ongoing negotiations and related institutional processes, as well as identifying 10 big-ticket "flagship commitments" to build momentum around implementation across the entire Pact. The Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4) provides a clear example of how existing diplomatic fora can serve as implementation platforms for Pact commitments.[326]

Figure 4.3: Implementation References to Pact for the Future Actions in the FfD4 Outcome



Source: Original Figure, Stimson Center. Data Source: UN, *Outcome Document of the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4)*.

The FfD4 outcome document demonstrates strong political will to operationalize the Pact for the Future, with clear implementation follow-up across multiple actions. As reflected in the distribution of references in figure 4.3, Pact Action 4 (Closing the SDG Financing Gap) is by far the most frequently referenced action in the outcome document, indicating that financing and means-of-implementation commitments are central to its implementation framework.[327] The text stresses Official Development Assistance (ODA), domestic resource mobilization, international tax cooperation, concessional finance, and efforts to address illicit financial flows. It also advances financial architecture reform (Pact Actions 47-52), strengthens partnership and cooperation mechanisms under Pact Action 55, and reinforces climate, environmental, and

governance-related commitments. The pattern and depth of references make FfD4 a key implementation platform for the Pact's financing and institutional reform pillars. Box 4.1 considers lessons learned from the overall Pact implementation process to date.

Box 4.1: Lessons Learned from Implementing Pact Actions (2024-early 2026)

Early implementation of the Pact for the Future demonstrates that near-term, clearly defined Actions can deliver visible results and build credibility for the Pact as a whole (see section two).

Several "quick wins" led by the UN system, including high-level reports, expert groups, and new institutional mechanisms, show that targeted, time-bound deliverables can be achieved and communicated effectively. These outcomes, in effect, help to sustain political attention and provide proof of concept for the Pact's broader ambitions.

However, translation into Member State action remains uneven. Structural challenges, particularly financing gaps, reduced peacebuilding capabilities, and uneven political will continue to constrain implementation, especially in more complex or resource-intensive areas of the Pact, Global Digital Compact, and Declaration on Future Generations.

A further lesson is that monitoring and accountability systems for Pact Actions to be undertaken by Member States lag behind ambition. Data gaps, delayed reporting, and the difficulty of measuring qualitative commitments (for example, on governance and multilateral engagement) weaken the ability to demonstrate progress and sustain momentum. Strengthening credible, accessible data, and reporting tools (drawing upon the Pact Monitoring Toolkit featured in this report) is, therefore, essential to reinforcing trust and incentivizing action.

Importantly, early experience underscores that visibility, coherence, and cross-cutting integration, involving such themes as climate, gender, human rights, and future generations, are critical to maintaining the Pact's relevance and political traction.

The Pact process highlighted the importance of political capital and deliberate prioritization—the strong collective investment in financing outcomes during FfD4 enabled significant progress on Pact follow-up. The experience showed that while not all Actions can be mobilized with equal force, focused political commitment can generate outsized results.

Source: Original Box, Stimson Center.

Suggested "Big 10" Actions for Member States on the Road to 2028

History shows that certain major milestones come to define global summits. The 2005 World Summit, for example, is widely remembered for the creation of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture Review, the Human Rights Commission's upgrade to a Council, and the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect.[328] Pact Innovation Plan Edition Two aims to help identify and shape similar breakthroughs emanating from the 2024 Summit. Through historical analysis, narrative messaging, visual tools, and a focused, forward-looking exploration of a small set of "Big 10" Actions, this iteration of the PIP intends to ignite a constructive conversation; seeking to further raise ambition, encourage creative thinking based on empirical evidence and globally identified needs, and take concrete steps toward the full realization of the Pact's most transformative commitments.

The following proposed actions are presented for discussion and feedback as potential big-ticket "flagship commitments" for Member States. The goal is to facilitate positive messaging on a clear track record of memorable, high-impact outcomes to encourage greater momentum and high-level political support across the entire Pact for the Future, **based on existing pipelines for success ahead of 2028.**

Action 3. End hunger and eliminate food insecurity and all forms of malnutrition.

Select opportunities for momentum before 2028:

- Building off the G20 South Africa's Food Security Task force, 2025, and G20 Brazil's initiation, in 2024, of the Global Alliance Against Poverty and Hunger
- Building off the UN Food Systems Summit +4 Stocktake (UNFSS+4), July 27–29, 2025, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, co-hosted by Ethiopia and Italy
- UN80 New Humanitarian Compact and Shared Platform Initiative Work Packages, 2026 onwards
- World Food Forum, October 8–16, 2026, Rome, Italy
- UN Committee on World Food Security (annual plenary), October 19–23, 2026, Rome, Italy
- 2027 SDG Summit, September 2027, at UN High-Level Week in New York connected to SDG 2 (Zero Hunger)

LESSONS LEARNED

Pact Action 3 highlights that, despite global commitments, progress toward ending hunger remains uneven and, in some regions, is reversing.[329] The persistence of armed conflict, economic instability, and climate-related shocks has exposed structural vulnerabilities; in particular, disruptions to supply chains, rising food prices, and declining agricultural productivity have disproportionately affected low- and middle-income countries.[330]

The interlinkages between food insecurity and other systemic challenges—such as forced displacement, health crises, and inequality—demonstrate that hunger cannot be addressed in isolation. A lack of coordination between humanitarian, development responses, and conflict prevention limits long-term progress.

RAISING AMBITION

Short-term goals (milestones) until 2028:
Priorities include scaling up emergency food assistance and nutrition programs in vulnerable and conflict-affected regions, increasing investment in climate-resilient agriculture, and strengthening food supply chains to reduce shocks and price volatility.[331] Efforts, including through the UN80 New Humanitarian Compact and Shared Services Work Package, should also focus on expanding social protection systems, improving early warning and data systems for food insecurity, and mobilizing additional financing through international cooperation and public-private partnerships to address the growing funding gap.[332] Durable food security strongly depends on the strengthening of women's access and autonomy regarding family planning information and tools.

Long-term goals (institutional reform):
Achieving sustainable food security requires a systemic transformation of global food systems, shifting from short-term crisis response to long-term resilience and sustainability. Embedding food security within broader frameworks of human security and sustainable development will help to tackle root causes such as inequality, environmental degradation, and political instability.[333] Strengthening accountability mechanisms and reinforcing Member States' commitments to SDG 2 on achieving Zero Hunger can, ultimately, ensure more equitable access to food and nutrition, while enhancing resilience against future global shocks.

Action 4. We will close the Sustainable Development Goal financing gap in developing countries (including International Financial Architecture Reform, Actions 47-52).

Select opportunities for momentum before 2028:

- Building off the 2023 SDG Summit commitment to an SDG Stimulus
- Building off the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4), July 2025, Seville, Spain
- Building off Financing for Development Week 2026, April 20-24, ECOSOC, UN HQ New York
- World Bank & International Monetary Fund (IMF) Annual and Spring Meetings
- G20 Finance Ministers Track, 2026, Miami, United States
- 2027 SDG Summit, September 2027, UN High-Level Week in New York review of SDG commitments.
- Negotiations on the UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation, 2025-2027

LESSONS LEARNED

The objectives of Pact Action 4 are counteracted by growing securitization and militarization. Combining Action 4 with Action 13 (seeking peaceful, inclusive, and just societies) showcases how an increase in military expenditure can compromise investment in sustainable development and increase the overall SDG financing and investment gap.[334] While UN DESA recommends looking at an enabling environment for public and private investment,[335] without significant reform, the current ($2.5 to $4 trillion SDG financing gap) will swell to $6.4 trillion by 2030.[336] This undermines the cross-cutting priorities that run through all chapters of the Pact, such as gender, human rights, future generations, climate, and peace.

RAISING AMBITION

Short-term goals (milestones) until 2028:
Scale-up concessional and multilateral development financing, including expanding World Bank Group and regional development bank lending capacity. While multilateral development bank lending has grown significantly, with annual disbursements increasing from $30 billion in 2000 to $137 billion in 2024, annual SDG financing needs in developing countries remain nearly 30 times larger than current MDB lending levels and could rise to nearly 50 times larger by 2030 without significant reform of the international financial architecture.[337] To shrink that gap, Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) should be leveraged by re-channeling unused SDRs to vulnerable countries. Greater private sector funding for the SDGs should also be mobilized, promoting SDG-aligned investment standards at the national level. Additionally, leveraging innovative regional resource mobilization approaches allows for more flexible financing.[338] UN Member States should build directly on successful recent multilateral outcomes, such as FfD4, to further strategic intergovernmental convenings.

Long-term goals (institutional reform):
Progress toward closing the SDG financing gap would contribute to reducing global inequalities, while addressing multidimensional disparities between developed and least developed countries.[339] For the above steps to be feasible, progress with International Financial Architecture reform (Pact Actions 47-52) is essential to improve fairness, representation, and access to financing, enabling all countries to invest in long-term progress toward achieving the 2030 Agenda.

Action 16. We will promote cooperation and understanding between Member States, defuse tensions, seek the pacific settlement of disputes and resolve conflicts.

Select opportunities for momentum before 2028:

- Peacebuilding Architecture Review, 2025 (next in 2030)
- Security Council annual briefing on UN Peacekeeping in April 2026
- PBC: Expert-level Meeting on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), May 19, 2026
- Secretary-General Report on Peace Operations due in June 2026
- 39th African Union Summit, February 14-15, 2026, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
- 11th RevCon of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review, April 27–May 22, 2026, New York

LESSONS LEARNED

Pact Action 16 is a response to the steadily high number of recent armed conflicts, which, combined with ongoing developments in the Middle East, and a rise in climate change-induced conflict and forced displacement, can significantly undermine Pact Chapter One Actions and related SDG goals for sustainable agriculture and food security.[340] Regression or stalemate in matters of international peace and security can seriously undermine objectives of Action 53 (new measures of sustainable development) too, while also impeding efforts to tackle the root causes of conflict (Action 13).[341]

RAISING AMBITION

Short-term goals (milestones) until 2028:
Member States should champion and raise the profile of the preventive diplomacy work of the Secretary-General (UN Charter Chapter VI tools) with the support of his UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs—including its Mediation Support Unit—and related parts of the UN system. Strengthen regional early-warning systems of the African Union and European Union.[342] They should also work to build out National Prevention Strategies directly linked to current and ongoing national frameworks, as well as to request or welcome both UN and regional good offices and related mediation services. This includes building momentum around recommendations from the upcoming June 2026 Peace Operations Review from the Secretary-General. Governments should also increase reporting on military expenditure to build trust through greater transparency. Moreover, they can redouble Security Council reform efforts through text-based Intergovernmental Negotiations working, ideally, from a "consolidated model," while continuing to innovate the General Assembly's complementary role on matters of international peace and security (see also Pact Actions 40 and 42 below, as well as Actions 14 and 41).[343]

Long-term goals (institutional reform):
The trajectory of global order increasingly arcs toward fragmentation, as interstate, regional, and transnational conflicts intensify and spread.[344] This status quo calls for the recommitment of Member States to the pacific settlement of disputes (UN Charter Chapter VI). With the upcoming election of a new Secretary-General, Pact Action 16 reaffirms the importance of the Secretary-General's good offices role for the protection of international peace and security.[345]

Action 30. We will ensure that science, technology and innovation contribute to the full enjoyment of human rights by all.

Select opportunities for momentum before 2028:

- Building off the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS)+20 Review (2024–2025)
- Report of the Independent International Scientific Panel on AI, July 2026, Geneva
- First Global Dialogue on AI Governance, July 2026, Geneva
- 12th Multi-stakeholder Forum on Science, Technology and Innovation for the SDGs, May 5, 2027
- Second Global Dialogue on AI Governance, May 2027, New York
- 4th UNESCO Global Forum on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence, September 14-17, 2026 Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
- G20 track on Pioneering Innovations in AI and Emerging Technologies, 2026, Miami, United States
- 2027 SDG Summit, September 2027, UN High-Level Week in New York connected to SDGs 11-15

LESSONS LEARNED

Pact Action 30 reacts to technology's outpacing of governance frameworks, leaving regulatory gaps and inconsistent human rights protections. The rapid deployment of AI and other emerging technologies has, in some cases, reinforced biases, enabled mass surveillance, and deepened the digital divide.

Lack of coordination on these issues between Member States, international organizations, and the private sector has limited the effectiveness of their responses. Voluntary guidelines and fragmented regulatory approaches have fallen short in addressing the boundary-spanning nature of these technologies, highlighting the urgent need for more effective accountability mechanisms, inclusive governance, and a proactive approach to integrating human rights.

RAISING AMBITION

Short-term goals (milestones) until 2028:
With a special focus on Sub-Action (b) on human rights, Member States should require human-rights impact assessments for emerging technologies, such as AI and biometric systems. They can further build assessment mechanisms into the 2028 review of the Global Digital Compact, in partnership with the Global Dialogue on AI Governance and Independent International Scientific Panel on AI. Integrating human rights standards into national AI and digital governance frameworks is a necessary step to ensure their complementarity with National Human Rights Institutions.[346] The UN should also actively engage the private sector, especially at the July 2026 second convening (in Geneva) and May's 2027 third convening (in New York) of the Global Dialogue on AI Governance. The UN should also build guardrails around resource extraction linked to emerging technologies, aligning approaches with relevant SDG frameworks (SDGs 11-15).

Long-term goals (institutional reform):
In the long-term, Pact Action 30 calls for the development of coherent and universally applied governance frameworks that embed human rights into technological innovation, including strengthening the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights; enhancing cooperation; and harmonizing regulatory standards. It also requires integrating environmental safeguards into technology-related resource extraction, ensuring alignment with key SDGs.

Action 36. We will strengthen meaningful youth participation at the national level.

Select opportunities for momentum before 2028:

- Building off the Youth Peace and Security language in the Peacebuilding Architecture Review, 2025 (next in 2030)
- UNCTAD Youth Forum (October 20-23, 2025)
- Youth2030 Progress Report 2025
- Building off the High-Level Review of the World Program of Action for Youth, 2025
- Building off the Core Principles for Meaningful Youth Participation in Intergovernmental Processes and Across the Work of the UN
- UN ECOSOC Youth Forum, April 14-16, 2026

LESSONS LEARNED

Pact Action 36 seeks replacement of the symbolic (tokenistic) inclusion of youth with meaningful policy participation. Limited access to decision-making spaces, lack of funding, and insufficient institutional support, continue to keep young people—particularly those from marginalized backgrounds—from fully engaging in decision-making and governance processes.[347] Moreover, present youth participation mechanisms are often fragmented and inconsistent across countries, with limited follow-up or integration into policy outcomes. This disconnect risks early undermining of trust in institutions and reduction in long-term civic engagement.

RAISING AMBITION

Short-term goals (milestones) until 2028:
UN Member States should promote the creation of national youth advisory councils linked to government ministries or parliaments, and these councils should focus on delivering the 2030 Agenda and realizing commitments in the World Program of Action on Youth.[348] UN Missions can further foster youth participation by investing in younger generation staff and Youth Delegate programs. Moreover, in the short-term, they can provide financial and institutional support to youth-led organizations seeking to participate in the UN agenda. Countries can support ways for young people to learn about and directly engage international policy-making, including through Model UN, Parliamentary Debate, and Youth Caucuses or Citizen Assemblies. They can further help to boost national youth representation at global and regional multilateral fora. Finally, Member States can embed the recently produced Core Principles for Meaningful Youth Participation in Intergovernmental Processes, from the UN Youth Office, in efforts to facilitate youth engagement in global and regional multilateral fora. They are well-placed to position these principles as a template for youth participation at the national level, including through National Action Plans on Youth Peace and Security.

Long-term goals (institutional reform):
In the long-term, strengthening youth participation requires embedding it as a permanent and institutionalized component of governance systems, whether at sub-national, national, regional, and global levels. This includes creating inclusive pathways for future leaders from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds, fostering sustained intergenerational dialogue, and ensuring continuous youth engagement with the UN and multilateral processes.

Action 40. We will strengthen our efforts in the framework of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform as a matter of priority and without delay.

Select opportunities for momentum before 2028:

- IGN on Security Council Reform
- 2027 Sustainable Development Goals Summit (Goal 16 on peace, justice, and inclusive governance), September 2026, during UN High-Level Week in New York

LESSONS LEARNED

Pact Action 40 demonstrates that the prolonged stagnation of Security Council reform has increasingly undermined the legitimacy, representativeness, and effectiveness of the Council. Existing structural imbalances—particularly regarding membership and veto power misuse—have limited the Council's ability to respond decisively to contemporary global peace and security challenges.

The slow pace of the IGN and diverging national interests have generated only incremental change, leading to growing frustration among Member States and reduced trust in the Council. These challenges and the Council's shaky future utility highlight the need for renewed commitment to more structured (and especially text-based) negotiations and greater transparency to move negotiations toward concrete outcomes.

RAISING AMBITION

Short-term goals (milestones) until 2028:
Member States should advance the IGN toward text-based negotiations working from a "consolidated model" to move discussions from principles and a focus only on working methods to the adoption of concrete structural reforms intended to strengthen the Council's effectiveness and level of representation to better align with present-day realities.[349] Moreover, they can promote improvements in Security Council working methods, transparency, and accountability, while strengthening coordination with the General Assembly when the Council is deadlocked. Countries should further institute a formal consultative mechanism for periodic dialogues between Council members and civil society—building on the successful Arria-formula dialogues conducted since 1992. Sustaining political momentum through the good offices of the Secretary-General, ministerial engagement, diplomatic dialogue, and partnerships with civil society can further support incremental, yet irreversible, progress toward a more representative and effective Council.

Long-term goals (institutional reform):
Security Council reform is a politically sensitive and complex process, achieving only slow progress over the years. Consensus and political alignment among Member States is challenging to establish. A vigorous commitment to IGN-led diplomatic negotiations is key to a positive way forward.[350] Lack of progress on Action 40 has direct implications for the broader peace and security priorities outlined in the Pact, including reducing the number of active conflicts, decreasing conflict-related fatalities, strengthening the protection of women and children in conflict, and reinforcing respect for decisions of the ICJ and ICC.[351]

Action 42. Increase our efforts to revitalize the work of the General Assembly.

Select opportunities for momentum before 2028:

- Building off the commitments in Resolution 80/251 on Mandate Creation, April 2026
- UN80 mandates Review, the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reform, and UN progress on a Mandates Registry and digital tracking tools, 2026
- Ad hoc working group on General Assembly Revitalization

LESSONS LEARNED

Despite its universal membership and formal authority, the General Assembly's impact has often been limited by procedural inefficiencies, overlapping mandates, and a lack of follow-through on resolutions. Its role in global governance has, at times, been overshadowed by other UN bodies, most often in areas related to peace and security.

Additionally, fragmented debates, duplicative reporting requirements, and insufficient coordination have reduced the effectiveness of its work and contributed to perceptions of diminished relevance. At the same time, the General Assembly's potential as a platform for inclusive dialogue and norm-setting remains underutilized, highlighting the need for reforms.

RAISING AMBITION

Short-term goals (milestones) until 2028:
Member States should undertake a comprehensive General Assembly mandate review as proposed by the UN80 Initiative's open-ended ad hoc working group and arrive at concrete recommendations as a critical input into the September 2028 high-level review of the Pact. In particular, they should consolidate overlapping debates and reporting requirements found within many new and recurring General Assembly mandates. Countries should also continue to pursue working methods reforms through the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Revitalization of the Work of the General Assembly.[352] They should position the General Assembly to serve as a central platform for constructive middle power diplomacy in support of conflict mediation, economic stabilization, and climate governance. They should further build the capacity of the General Assembly through greater engagement of external experts in its deliberations.[353] Moreover, governments can center the Assembly as a primary vehicle for discussing and advancing Pact commitments, including through annual PGA Pact Follow-Through Dialogues and preparations for the September 2028 comprehensive review of the Pact during UNGA High-Level Week.

Long-term goals (institutional reform):
By strengthening the role of the General Assembly and reaffirming its importance for multilateral negotiations, Member States will re-institutionalize its role as a global space for dialogue and for the construction of political consensus. Reinvigorating the work of the General Assembly will counterbalance the highly uneven distribution of power amongst Member States, as often manifested in the Security Council, and it will facilitate the inclusion of smaller Member States, protecting the principle of sovereign equality, as per Article 2 of the Charter.[354]

Action 46. We will ensure the effective enjoyment by all of all human rights and respond to new and emerging challenges.

Select opportunities for momentum before 2028:

- Human rights records of 14 States to be examined by Universal Periodic Review mechanism, May 4-15, 2026
- UN80 Human Rights Group Work Package, 2026 onwards
- United Nations Human Rights Council Sessions
- Second Global Dialogue on AI Governance, July 2026, Geneva
- Third Global Dialogue on AI Governance, May 2027, New York

LESSONS LEARNED

Pact Action 46 highlights that, despite the existence of comprehensive international human rights frameworks, implementation worldwide remains inconsistent and often undermined by political constraints and insufficient resources. Increasing global instability, protracted conflicts, and emerging challenges have exposed gaps in both the reach and responsiveness of current mechanisms.[355]

Moreover, the reliance on voluntary funding has limited the capacity of key institutions like the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to effectively fulfill their mandates. In some cases, Member State actions have directly contradicted international human rights obligations, pointing to the need for stronger accountability and enforcement mechanisms.

RAISING AMBITION

Short-term goals (milestones) until 2028:
Priorities include securing sustainable and predictable financing for the OHCHR and related mechanisms, strengthening system-wide coordination across UN bodies—including through UN80 work package 9, and enhancing monitoring and reporting capacities to respond to emerging human rights challenges.[356] Efforts should also focus on supporting Member States in implementing human rights obligations, expanding protection for vulnerable groups such as refugees and displaced populations, and reinforcing early warning and response systems to prevent violations.

Long-term goals (institutional reform):
Ensuring the effective enjoyment of human rights requires reinforcing the reliability, independence, and political backing of UN human rights mechanisms, enabling them to fully implement their mandates. This includes strengthening the UN's role in monitoring compliance with international human rights obligations and responding to state policies and practices that undermine those commitments. It also requires advancing a human security-centered approach that prioritizes the protection and dignity of individuals facing interconnected risks, including conflict, displacement, climate impacts, and digital threats, while ensuring consistent protection of human rights at both the national and international levels. Enhancing institutional resilience and strengthening coordination is key to maintaining the UN's credibility and effectiveness in addressing existing and emerging human rights challenges.

Action 53. We will develop a framework on measures of progress on sustainable development to complement and go beyond gross domestic product.

Select opportunities for momentum before 2028:

- High-Level Expert Group on Beyond GDP Reports, November 2025 and May 2026
- High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF), July 7-15, 2026
- OECD Global Forum on Well-being and Inclusive Growth, 2024 & 2028
- World Economic Forum Annual Meeting, January 19–23, 2026, Davos, Switzerland
- World Bank & IMF Annual and Spring Meetings, 2026-2028

LESSONS LEARNED

Pact Action 53 reflects the concern that overreliance on GDP as the primary measure of economic progress has led to incomplete assessments of development. GDP growth has not consistently translated into improved well-being of populations, reduced inequality, or promoted environmental sustainability, highlighting significant gaps in how progress is measured and understood.

Existing alternative frameworks—such as the Human Development Index (HDI), the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), and well-being indicators developed by the OECD—have shown promise but remain fragmented and unevenly applied across countries.[357] These challenges highlight the need for a more coherent, universally adaptable framework that captures the full spectrum of sustainable development, while remaining practical for national implementation.

RAISING AMBITION

Short-term goals (milestones) until 2028:
Member States should expand data collection on environmental sustainability, inequality, well-being, and resilience. They can work in cooperation with the High-Level Expert Group on Beyond GDP, building on their November 2025 interim report and their final report released on May 7, 2026, to develop concrete recommendations in the run-up to the September 2028 high-level review of the Pact. Along with UN system partners, they should further consolidate lessons learned from similar existing frameworks, such as the Human Development Index, in developing a consensus-based global framework on new measures of progress on sustainable development for possible voluntary adoption in many UN Member States. Countries should employ these new measures of progress to shape, over time, the functioning of credit rating agencies and debt financing systems. Through these new measures of progress, participating Member States can also incorporate novel well-being indicators into their national development strategies, as well as integrate multidimensional indicators into national SDG reporting efforts.

Long-term goals (institutional reform):
Action 53 calls for the establishment of a consensus-based international measurement framework that complements GDP and enables a more holistic measurement of sustainable development at present and beyond 2030 (with the anticipated development of a follow-on post-2030 development agenda).

Action 55. We will strengthen our partnerships to deliver on existing commitments and address new and emerging challenges.

Select opportunities for momentum before 2028:

- Academic Council on the UN System Annual Meeting and Global Policy Dialogue on "Multilateralism Under Challenge and the Future of the Pact," July 1-3, 2026, Lisbon
- We the Peoples: Shaping the Future of the UN, July 2026, New York
- Coalition for the UN We Need's Global Futures Forum, July 2026, New York
- High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF), July 7-15, 2026
- T20 U.S. Summit, November 18-19, 2026, New York
- 2027 SDG Summit, September 2027
- PGA Interactive Dialogues in 2026, 2027, and 2028
- Preparations for the 2028 Review of the Pact for the Future

RAISING AMBITION

Pact Action 55 highlights that while partnerships are widely recognized as essential, they often remain fragmented, underfunded, or insufficiently coordinated. Gaps in communication, overlapping mandates, and unequal power dynamics between stakeholders have limited the effectiveness of collaborative efforts.

Additionally, partnerships have not always been inclusive, with limited participation from developing countries, local actors, and civil society organizations. This has reduced their ability to address context-specific challenges and ensure equitable outcomes. These lessons underscore the need for more structured, transparent, and inclusive partnership frameworks that enhance accountability and maximize collective impact.

RAISING AMBITION

Short-term goals (milestones) until 2028:
Priorities should include: i) strengthening coordination between Member States, UN entities, and external (civil society and private sector) stakeholders; ii) expanding inclusive partnerships with civil society and the private sector; and iii) improving resource mobilization through innovative financing mechanisms. Efforts should also focus on: iv) enhancing information-sharing platforms; v) aligning partnership initiatives with SDG priorities; and vi) building capacity at national and local levels to ensure more effective implementation of global commitments.

Long-term goals (institutional reform):
In the long-term, strengthening partnerships requires the institutionalization of inclusive, transparent, and accountable cooperation frameworks across the multilateral system. This includes improving coordination among global and regional actors, ensuring equitable participation of all stakeholders, and embedding partnership approaches into the core functioning of international institutions. Such reforms can enhance the effectiveness, legitimacy, inclusivity, and adaptability of the global system in addressing both current and future challenges, including in support of the 56 Pact for the Future Actions, Global Digital Compact, and Declaration on Future Generations.

A PATH FORWARD FOR INCLUSIVE AND ADAPTIVE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

The proposals and pathways outlined throughout this report ultimately point toward a single overarching conclusion: the future of effective multilateralism will depend less on rhetorical commitments and more on the capacity of institutions, governments, civil society, and international partners to translate shared principles into coordinated action. Across the Pact for the Future, the UN80 Initiative, and broader efforts to renew peace and security governance, a common thread emerges: today's interconnected crises can no longer be managed through fragmented, deadlocked, or reactive approaches. From financing gaps and climate insecurity to democratic backsliding, technological disruption, and escalating armed conflict, the international system faces a defining test of whether it can evolve quickly enough to remain legitimate, responsive, and capable of delivering tangible results for people on the ground. The Pact Innovation Plan, Pact Monitoring Toolkit, and proposals showcased in this report too for a renewed peace and security architecture seek, together, to provide practical mechanisms for bridging this gap between ambition and implementation.

At the same time, GGIR'26 underscores that meaningful reform will require political courage, sustained investment, and broader coalitions of leadership extending beyond traditional power centers. While geopolitical fragmentation and financial pressures continue to strain international cooperation, they have also reinforced the urgency of building more inclusive, networked, and adaptive forms of global governance. The years leading up to the 2028 Pact for the Future official review, alongside preparations for the Post-2030 Development Agenda and the transition to new UN leadership, represent a critical window for demonstrating that inclusive multilateralism can still serve as an effective instrument for prevention, resilience, collective problem-solving, and just outcomes. Ultimately, the success of these efforts will not be measured by the number of declarations adopted or new processes launched, but by whether the international community succeeds in renewing trust, reducing insecurity, and delivering a more peaceful, just, and sustainable future for current and future generations.

> ***The years leading up to the 2028 Pact for the Future official review, alongside preparations for the Post-2030 Development Agenda and the transition to new UN leadership, represent a critical window for demonstrating that inclusive multilateralism can still serve as an effective instrument for prevention, resilience, collective problem-solving, and just outcomes.***

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Annex 1: Pact Monitoring Toolkit Logical Framework Methodology

The Pact Monitoring Toolkit (PMT) outlined in Section Two is a cohesive tracking mechanism for the Pact for the Future, allowing UN Member States, the Secretariat, civil society, and private sector partners to track progress at the official, high-level review of the Pact in September 2028 during the UN General Assembly's High-Level Week.

The New School's Graduate Programs in International Affairs and Stimson Center first developed the Pact logical framework—monitoring and evaluation's (M&E) foundational, technical tool that identifies indicators to define success, and data sources to chart evidence and verify results—for last year's *Global Governance Innovation Report 2025*. The Year One GGIR'25 logframe tracked 24 of 56 Pact Actions, and this year's GGIR'26 adds 16 of the next most relevant and urgent Actions, drawn from all five chapters, for a total of 40 now tracked. Sixteen Actions remain to be added to the year three GGIR'27 effort.

Methodology—Year Two GGIR'26

GGIR'26 has two logical framework versions: a full version available online, and the miniature versions that appear in Section Two. This second iteration, following multilateral and civil society consultations, built out the below additional matrix columns in the full version to fill out and solidify evidence, with the below column categories:

Chapter				**Baseline - Sept. 2024**		**Year 1 - Oct. 24-Sept. 25**		**Year 2 - Oct. 25-Sept. 26**		
Sub-Action Initiative	Output	Indicator	Target	Data Source	Data Summary	Data Source	Data Summary	Data Source	Data Summary	Progress
A	**B**	**C**	**D**	**E**	**F**	**G**	**H**	**I**	**J**	**K**

Column A, Sub-Action Initiative: From an M&E standpoint, the action and detail is in the multifaceted Sub-Actions, which, to be monitored, must be separated into specific components labeled "Sub-Action Initiatives."

Column B, Output: Outputs are the products of completed implementation activities needed to achieve Sub-Actions. Outputs can be difficult for external parties to determine; some can be derived from the Sub-Action statement or indicator, while some require expert opinion.

Column C, Indicator: Indicators attach a specific measurement to define success for each Sub-Action. Where applicable, pre-existing indicators and targets were utilized from other multilateral monitoring tools, such as the Sustainable Development Goals andYouth2030, to avoid replicating processes. For SDG indicators or targets, a comprehensive mapping linking SDGs to Pact Actions was referenced. Where appropriate, indicators did not match an official indicator, or SDG indicators were found to be weak (or simply lacked reliable baseline data), the report's authors drafted new, more precise indicators.

Proxy indicators: Where Sub-Action Initiatives cannot be measured directly, proxy indicators were assigned. For example, Action 13, Sub-Action Initiative (a) seeks to "Address the drivers and root causes of armed conflict, violence, and instability." As a direct measure does not exist for *drivers and root causes of* armed conflict, violence, and instability, SDG Indicator 16.1.2 "Conflict-related deaths per 100,000 population, by sex, age and cause," is used as a proxy indicator.

Column D, Target: The indicator level or state of change that signals attainment of success. Most Targets were identified by experts, including as a replacement for weak SDG Targets.

Columns F-J: Lays out the five data periods leading to September 2028. To measure Pact achievement and success in 2028, conditions at baseline in 2024 must be established. Subsequent annual data collections will reference the baseline as a point of comparison to measure progress toward Pact goals. In all data summaries, global or regional aggregates were prioritized rather than specific country (Member State) measures.

- **Column E, Baseline Data Source (or Means of Verification):** A reliable, recognized data source to gather Indicator measures and compare year-to-year data.
- **Column F, Baseline Data:** Literature review and expert interviews were used to identify associated and credible data for the period leading up to September 2024.
- **Column G and H, Year One Data Source and Data Summary:** Data was collected, analyzed, and summarized for the one-year period following September 2024.
- **Column I and J, Year Two Data Source and Data Summary:** Though the GGIR'26 compilation period falls halfway into Year Two, most reports for this year were not released as of publication, but will be updated in the online Master logframe. Years Three and Four, up to Endline period September 2028, will be added in following years.
- **Column K, Progress:** To illustrate each Sub-Action indicator progress, or lack of, a "Stoplight" dashboard with four categories was added to compare baseline to latest data:

Substantive Progress	Trend moving upward, at least 5% increase from baseline toward Target.
Minimal Progress	Some movement, some action that has a slight uptick, less than 5%.
No Progress	Data is roughly at same level as baseline.
Regression	Shows at least 5% reversal from baseline.

Miniature Logframes

For this report in Section Two, the reader will see condensed versions of the full logical framework highlighting significant information from selected Pact Actions.

Output	Indicator	Target	Baseline: Sept 2024 Data	Most Recently Reported Data	Progress (Dashboard)

The condensed mini-logframe columns are:

- **Outputs**, the products of completed activities needed to achieve Sub-Actions.
- **Indicators**, a specific measurement to define Sub-Action success.
- **Targets**, the indicator level or state of change that signals attainment of success.
- **Baseline Data** summary establishing conditions for the period leading up to September 2024.
- **Most Recently Reported Data** as a follow-up top Baseline Data featuring either Year One or Two data, whichever was more robust. Though the GGIR'26 compilation period falls halfway into Year Two, updated reporting is not yet released, so most Miniature logframe data is from Year One.
- **"Stoplight" dashboard** to illustrate Sub-Action indicator level of progress.

In both Full and Miniature logframes, Pact Action and Sub-Action statements are presented in the original language.

Action 39. We will reform the Security Council, recognizing the urgent need to make it more representative, inclusive, transparent, efficient, effective, democratic and accountable.
Sub-Action (a) Redress the historical injustice against Africa as a priority and, while treating Africa as a special case, improve the representation of the underrepresented and unrepresented regions and groups, such as Asia-Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean.

From a technical M&E perspective, some Pact objectives—Action 3 for example—"We will end hunger and eliminate food insecurity and all forms of malnutrition" is an admirable aim, but must be considered aspirational rather than realistic. Another common example is language likely meant more for implementing guidance than tracking, such as that from Action 46, Sub-Action (a): Enable UN human rights mechanisms' efficient and effective mandate delivery to respond to human rights challenges *with impartiality, objectivity and non-selectivity*. In both cases, this report relies on the core "SMART" principle (Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant, and Timebound) to guide the creation of indicators.

Annex 2: Pact Innovation Resources

- United Nations Summit of the Future website
- Pact Innovation Forum
- Pact Innovation E-Consultation Summary Brief
- Coalition for the UN We Need's ImPact Coalitions Tracker
- 2024 UN Civil Society Conference
- People's Pact for the Future
- UN80 SOTF Informational Clearing House Bulletin
- Promotion in New Zealand of the Pact for the Future
- Promotion amongst 180 member parliament in Uzbekistan
- WSIS+20 High-level Event, to be held in Geneva between 7–11 July this year
- G20's Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty
- 1 for 8 Billion campaign's public dashboard
- UN for the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit's Agenda for Humanity
- *Global Governance Innovation Report 2024: Advancing Human Security through a new Global Economic Architecture*
- Future of International Cooperation Report 2024: The Innovation Imperative: Tech-Governance, Development, & Security at a Crossroads
- *Report of the Climate Governance Commission: Governing Our Planetary Emergency*
- Civil Society Townhall with PGA at 79th Session–on ImPact Coalitions
- *Governing AI for the Future of Humanity: Connecting the Declaration on Future Generations with the Global Digital Compact*
- *Biennial UN-G20+ Summit: Bridging the Global Economy Governance Gap*
- *Report of the High-Level Advisory Board for Effective Multilateralism: A Breakthrough for People and Planet*
- The Africa We Want and the UN We Need
- International Peace Institute, The Declaration on Future Generations: Moving from Vision to Reality
- Taking Stock - Moving Forward: Opportunities and Shortcomings from the Pact for Future's 'International Peace and Security' Actions
- The Good—and Bad—News About the UN's Summit of the Future
- *Global Peace Index 2024*
- UN Necessary Podcast
- Pact Decoded
- How Spotlight Initiative supports the Pact for the Future
- The Girls' Pact for the Future
- Summit of the Future Action Days (September 2024)
- ICH special bulletin on the pact for the future – Chapter 5: transforming global governance (September 2024)
- ICH special bulletin on the pact for the future – Chapter 1: sustainable development and financing for development (September 2024)
- ICH special bulletin on the pact for the future, chapeau (September 2024)
- ICH special bulletin on the pact for the future – chapter 3: science, technology, innovation, and digital cooperation (September 2024)
- ICH special bulletin on the global digital compact (September 2024)
- ICH special bulletin on the declaration on future generations (September 2024)
- ICH special bulletin on the pact for the future – chapter 4 – youth and future generations (September 2024)
- Comparing the Rev. 4 of chapter 2 on international peace and security to the Rev. 3 (September 2024)
- The UN's New Pact for the Future: A Milestone that can set a Path for Change
- Informal meeting of the plenary to hear a briefing by the Secretary-General on the UN80 Initiative (May 2025)
- *Global Governance Innovation Report 2025: Advancing the Pact for the Future and Environmental Governance*
- *Future of International Cooperation Report 2025: Justice in Action: Beyond Promises to Progress*
- PGA Remarks at the Interactive Dialogue: The Pact for the Future and the UN80 Initiative: From Commitments to Delivery (April 2026)

Annex 3: List of Relevant Global Governance Resources

REPORTS AND BOOKS:

- Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance (June 2015)
- Just Security in an Undergoverned World (Oxford University Press, 2018)
- An Innovation Agenda for UN75: The Albright-Gambari Commission Report and the Road to 2020 (June 2019)
- Reimagining Governance in a Multipolar World (co-published by the Doha Forum and Stimson Center, September 2019)
- UN 2.0: Ten Innovations for Global Governance – 75 Years beyond San Francisco (June 2020)
- Coping with New and Old Crises: Global and Regional Cooperation in an Age of Epidemic Uncertainty (co-published by the Doha Forum and Stimson Center, December 2020)
- Fulfilling the UN75 Declaration's Promise: An Expert Series' Synthesis of Major Insights and Recommendations (June 2021)
- Beyond UN75: A Roadmap for Inclusive, Networked & Effective Global Governance (June 2021)
- Building Back Together and Greener: Twenty Initiatives for a Just, Healthy and Sustainable Global Recovery (co-published by the Doha Forum and Stimson Center, September 2021)
- Road to 2023: Our Common Agenda and the Pact for the Future (June 2022)
- Rethinking Global Cooperation: Three New Frameworks for Collective Action in an Age of Uncertainty (co-published by the Doha Forum and Stimson Center, September 2022)
- Global Governance Survey 2023: Finding Consensus in a Divided World (June 2023)
- Global Governance Innovation Report 2023: Redefining Approaches to Peace, Security & Humanitarian Action (June 2023)
- Future of International Cooperation Report 2023: Building Shared Futures: Innovating Governance for Global and Regional Problem Solving (co-published with Doha Forum and the Global Institute for Strategic Research, September 2023)
- 2023 Report of the Climate Governance Commission: Governing Our Planetary Emergency (Climate Governance Commission, November 2023)
- Global Governance Innovation Report 2024: Advancing Human Security through a New Global Economic Governance Architecture (June 2024)
- Future of International Cooperation Report 2024: The Innovation Imperative: Tech-Governance, Development & Security at a Crossroads (co-published with Doha Forum and the Global Institute for Strategic Research, September 2024)
- Global Governance Innovation Report 2025: Advancing the Pact for the Future and Environmental Governance (June 2025)
- Future of International Cooperation Report 2025: Justice in Action: Beyond Promises to Progress (co-published with Doha Forum and the Global Institute for Strategic Research, September 2025)

LATEST ACTION PLANS FROM THE GLOBAL POLICY DIALOGUES SERIES:

- Roadmap for the Future We Want & UN We Need: A Vision 20/20 for UN75 & Beyond (UN75 Global Governance Forum, September 2020)
- Global Policy Dialogue on the Triple Planetary Crisis (Recife, Brazil: Plataforma CIPÓ, January 2023)
- Global Policy Dialogue on the Africa we Want and the UN we Need (Abuja, Nigeria: Savannah Center for Diplomacy, Democracy and Development, February 2024)
- Global Policy Dialogue on Advancing Human Security through a New Global Economic Governance Architecture (Tokyo, Japan, as part of the 2024 ACUNS Annual Meeting)

- Global Policy Dialogue on the Triple Planetary Crisis and Future of Environmental Governance at the ACUNS Annual Meeting (Nairobi, Kenya, as part of the 2025 ACUNS Annual Meeting)
- Global Policy Dialogue on Promoting Climate Finance and Just Transitions in the Lead-Up to COP30 (Vitória, Brazil, July 2025)
- Earth System Governance: Ensuring Human Flourishing in the Anthropocene (Seoul, South Korea, October 2025)
- Justice in Action: Greater MENA Perspectives on Global & Regional Governance Innovation (Doha, Qatar, December 2025)

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE INNOVATION NETWORK LATEST POLICY BRIEFS:

- Multilateralism for Chronic Risks (June 2020)
- Towards Multiple Security Councils (June 2020)
- Closing the Governance Gap in Climate, Security, and Peacebuilding (September 2020)
- Strengthening the Rules-Based Global Order: The Case for an International Rule of Law Package (September 2020)
- Responsibility Chains—Building Global Governance for Forest Risk Commodity Chains (August 2022)
- Bolstering Arms Control in a Contested Geopolitical Environment (November 2022)
- Enhancing Preventative Measure for Money Laundering and Corruption (April 2024)
- The Our Common Agenda as Inspiration for International Organizations (April 2024)
- Revising the United Nations Charter (April 2024)
- From Commitments to Results: Strengthening the G20's Role in Promoting Global Climate Action (July 2024)
- Biennial UN-G20+ Summit: Bridging the Global Economy Governance Gap (August 2024)
- Complex Global Shocks, Emergency Platforms, and United Nations Reform (September 2024)
- Governing AI for the Future of Humanity: Connecting the Declaration on Future Generations with the Global Digital Compact (March 2025)
- Options for Strengthening Accountability Mechanisms in Global Environmental Governance (May 2025)
- Policy Brief on Climate Finance: Review of the current global landscape in financing mechanisms for climate change (August 2025)
- Priorities for Africa: Artificial Intelligence Governance at the Global and National Level (April 2026)
- Two-Tier Climate Multilateralism: The Legacy of COP30 (May 2026)
- Negotiation Process-Design Is Key for Article 109 UN Charter Review (June 2026)

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Global Governance Innovation Report 2026

Advancing the Pact for the Future and a New Peace & Security Architecture

"Given the gravity of today's most daunting challenges, we must together pursue the opportunities offered by the Pact for the Future ... [and] to seize the moment with unrivaled courage, foresight, and a renewed commitment to act."

—María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés, 73rd President of the United Nations General Assembly, former Foreign and Defense Minister of Ecuador, and Executive Director of GWL Voices

From armed conflicts in the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and Latin America to daily signs that the planet's health is failing and growing fears about emerging technologies, the need for effective global action has never been greater. Yet resources and political support for international organizations, and for global cooperation writ large, are fast declining. The erosion of global governance—and, in particular, of core institutions, values, and approaches fostered since the Second World War—is especially evident in the peace and security domain, where the United Nations' peacemaking and peacebuilding capacities are all-too-often enfeebled and marginalized. In response, world leaders adopted, in September 2024, the Pact for the Future, Global Digital Compact, and Declaration on Future Generations, designed to chart a new direction for global action to better meet the urgent needs and highest aspirations of humanity. *Global Governance Innovation Report 2026* (GGIR'26) offers refined tools for assessing and boosting implementation of these three global instruments, and ways to overcome obstacles to progress in the run-up to their official high-level reviews by September 2028. Drawing on specific Pact Actions, it further analyzes and recommends steps toward a bolder and more inclusive peace and security architecture to better manage 21st century threats and to revitalize the central aims and credibility of the UN. Against this backdrop, champion governments, motivated international civil servants, and dedicated civil society partners make slow yet steady headway on several of the Pact's major goals in defense of UN values. Increasingly, they look for a new kind of leadership in 2027 and beyond, with the vision, courage, and experience to transform the United Nations by realizing the Pact's full potential.

Figure 4.2: Roadmap to the September 2028 High-Level Review of the Pact



*Only select actual and recommended activities listed. Source: Original Figure, Stimson Center.

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