



ANNUAL REPORTS 2023:

Positive Trends and Enduring
Challenges in ATT Reporting

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The Stimson Center's Arms Trade Treaty-Baseline Assessment Project (ATT-BAP)

aims to assist States in understanding the obligations of the ATT and to promote effective implementation. ATT-BAP supports efforts to assist States in implementing the treaty and to ensure that reporting on the ATT is comprehensive and robust. ATT-BAP has developed tools to help provide a baseline for assessing State progress in implementing the ATT and to enable measurement of the treaty's impact and long-term effectiveness. These tools are also utilized for identifying State capacity and resource needs, including the identification of critical gaps and available resources to implement the ATT. The tools include a Ratification Checklist, Implementation Checklist and Assistance Assessment, the ATT-BAP Baseline Assessment Survey, guidance for completing initial and annual reports, and numerous analytical reports.

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INTRODUCTION

This year marks the 10th anniversary of the entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), the first global, legally binding instrument to regulate the international trade in conventional arms. As we celebrate the treaty's first decade, we have the opportunity to reflect on the ways in which the ATT has — and has not — achieved its originating object and purpose.

The major normative achievement of the treaty's adoption was the establishment of a connection between the regulation of the conventional arms trade and international peace, security, and stability. The ATT operationalizes this purpose (the reduction of human suffering due to illicit and irresponsible arms transfers) through the establishment of common minimum standards to regulate the global trade in conventional arms.

To ensure States Parties are complying with the ATT's obligations, and to promote “cooperation, transparency and responsible action by States Parties in the international trade in conventional arms, thereby building confidence among States Parties,” the ATT established a framework for reporting on conventional arms transfers and national transfer control systems. States Parties to the ATT are required under Article 13(1) of the treaty to, first, provide an initial report on measures undertaken to implement the treaty, and second, to report annually to the treaty Secretariat on exports and imports of conventional arms covered under Article 2(1) that occurred during the previous calendar year.

ATT Annual Reporting Obligation

Article 13(3): Each State Party shall submit annually to the Secretariat by 31 May a report for the preceding calendar year concerning authorized or actual exports and imports of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1). Reports shall be made available, and distributed to States Parties by the Secretariat. The report submitted to the Secretariat may contain the same information submitted by the State Party to relevant United Nations frameworks, including the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Reports may exclude commercially sensitive or national security information.

ATT reporting has the potential to significantly enhance transparency around the global conventional arms trade. ATT annual reports deliver valuable information on State compliance with ATT obligations, provide visibility into regional and global arms flows, and assist in detecting potentially destabilizing weapons accumulations.

Now, given a total of nine years of ATT reporting, we can identify key trends and reporting approaches. This report analyzes the ATT annual reports submitted in 2024 (covering the arms exports and imports that occurred during the 2023 calendar year), as well as reporting trends across the first nine years of ATT reporting.

The report is organized into five sections. Section 1 examines the status of 2023 ATT annual report submissions and their implications for trends in reporting compliance. Section 2 provides insight into rates of private reporting, report formats and templates, the withholding of commercially sensitive and/or national security information, “nil” reporting, and national definitions of weapons categories. Section 3 discusses

States Parties' reporting practices when preparing 2023 reports, specifically appraising whether and how States Parties reported on their arms exports and imports. Section 4 compares reporting under the ATT with reporting under the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA). The concluding section reflects on enduring challenges to ATT reporting, progress made over the past year, and the opportunities and resources the ATT community may use to support more widespread and robust reporting moving forward.

METHODOLOGY

Unless otherwise noted, the ATT reporting data reflected in this report are based on data provided by the ATT Secretariat's website as of 8 October 2024 and from interviews with ATT Secretariat staff.¹ Where this report provides information on the content of these reports, it does so based solely on those that are publicly available, and thus does not reflect the content of reports that States Parties chose to make available only to the Secretariat and other States Parties.² To facilitate comparative analyses, this report also relies on UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) reporting data as provided on the UNODA and UNROCA websites as of 8 October 2024 and information gleaned from interviews with UNODA staff.³ Percentages in this report are rounded to the nearest whole number and, as a result, may not equate to 100 percent in all cases.



¹ ATT Secretariat, "Annual Reports," <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/annual-reports.html?templateId=209826>.

² Finland submitted a "hybrid" report, in which it reported publicly on its exports and privately on its imports. As a result, the analysis in this report will be based upon the number of States Parties that reported publicly on exports (50 total 2023 reports), rather than the number of States Parties that submitted entirely public reports (49 total reports).

³ UN Office of Disarmament Affairs, "United Nations Register of Conventional Arms," <https://www.unroca.org/>; UN Office of Disarmament Affairs, "UN Register of Conventional Arms," <https://disarmament.unoda.org/convarms/register/>.


SECTION 1: STATUS OF 2023 REPORTING

This section provides an overview of the 2023 ATT annual reports submitted by 8 October 2024, contextualizes 2023 report compliance by comparing it with prior years of reporting, and examines the status of ATT reporting as a whole.

REPORTING COMPLIANCE OF 2023 REPORTS

Of the 115 States Parties to the ATT, 112 were required to submit an annual report in 2024 on their arms exports and imports that occurred in the 2023 calendar year.⁴ According to the ATT Secretariat’s website, as of 8 October 2024, sixty-five States have submitted annual reports, reflecting a 58 percent compliance rate for the 2023 reporting period.⁵ This is a slight decrease from the 61 percent of 2022 annual reports submitted by 5 October 2023, but aligns with the general trends of reporting compliance noted by previous ATT-BAP reports (see Figure 1).⁶ If reporting remains stagnant this would represent a record low compliance rate, but it is likely that, as States Parties continue to submit required reports in the coming months, the 58 percent reporting compliance rate will see a modest increase.

Figure 1: Annual Reports Due and Submitted by Stimson Report Cut-off Date*



*Stimson’s cut-off date when assessing compliance rates for the 2017 to 2023 report years ranges from mid-September to early October. In 2015 and 2016 Stimson used cut-off dates of 31 August 2016 and 31 August 2017, respectively.

Although consistent with previous years, reporting compliance rates remain woefully lower than would be expected from a legally mandated treaty obligation. The percentage of submitted annual reports


⁴ Andorra, Gambia, and Malawi — the three newest ATT States Parties — are not yet required to submit an annual report. Andorra’s first annual report, covering transfers made in 2024, is due by 31 May 2025. Gambia and Malawi’s first due date, with respect to their 2025 transfers, is 31 May 2026.

⁵ The 65 States Parties that submitted 2023 annual reports as of 8 October 2024 are: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Côte D’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, the State of Palestine, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Uruguay.

⁶ Fletcher and Stohl, “2022 Arms Trade Treaty Annual Reporting: In the Shadow of Ukraine.” *The Stimson Center*, 31 October 2023, pp. 3, <https://www.stimson.org/2023/2022-arms-trade-treaty-annual-reporting/>.


has decreased nearly every year since reporting began in 2015 (see Figure 2). Historically, the highest compliance rate is 87 percent for submissions of 2015 reports and the lowest compliance rate is 65 percent for submissions of 2022 reports.

Figure 2: Annual Reports Due and Submitted (as of 8 October 2024)



Article 13(3) of the ATT requires States Parties to submit their reports by 31 May each year. In practice, the ATT Secretariat grants a seven-day grace period, allowing for a de-facto deadline of 7 June. As of this year’s deadline of 7 June 2024, 49 States Parties (or 44 percent of those due to report) had submitted their 2023 annual reports.⁷ This figure is higher than the 35 percent record-low rate of on-time compliance in 2023 (for submissions of annual reports for 2022) and is more in line with the rate of 2020 and 2021 report submissions (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: Annual Reports Due and Submitted On Time



As of 8 October 2024, forty-seven States Parties, or 42 percent of the 112 required to report this year, have yet to submit their 2023 annual reports.⁸ This is a small increase from the same time last year, in which 39 percent (43 States Parties) of the 110 required to report on 2022 transfers had yet to report.

⁷ 16 States Parties submitted reports for the 2023 calendar year between 7 June 2024 and 8 October 2024. These States Parties are: Barbados, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, the Dominican Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, the Maldives, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, the Republic of Moldova, South Africa, and the United Kingdom.

⁸ The 47 States Parties that have yet to submit their required 2023 ATT annual reports are: Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, the Bahamas, Belize, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Dominica, France, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Iceland, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Liberia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Niue, Palau, Paraguay, Philippines, Republic of North Macedonia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, São Tomé and Príncipe, the Seychelles, Slovakia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, and Zambia.

Looking at the States Parties with outstanding reports in 2023 by geographic region, 18 (38 percent) are in Africa, 13 (28 percent) are in the Americas, 4 (9 percent) are in Asia, 8 (17 percent) are in Europe, and 4 (9 percent) are in Oceania. Just under 62 percent of these States (29 in hard numbers) are among the world's least developed countries, small island developing States, or both, according to United Nations classifications.⁹ Specifically, 11 of the States Parties yet to report on 2023 transfers are considered least developed countries, 15 are small island developing States, and 3 (Guinea Bissau, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Tuvalu) are both.¹⁰

Of the 47 States Parties yet to report on 2023 transfers, 22 have submitted at least one annual report in prior years, but 13 of those 22 have not submitted an annual report in two or more years.¹¹ Notably, several European States Parties with consistent histories of reporting (Austria, France, Greece, Malta, and Slovakia) have yet to report on their 2023 transfers.

Two States Parties — the Philippines and Gabon, which acceded to the treaty on 22 June 2022 and 20 December 2022, respectively — were due to submit their first annual reports this year.¹² As of 8 October 2024, neither have submitted these required annual reports.¹³

On a positive note, Suriname, which has been required to report since 2021 (on transfers that occurred in 2020), has submitted its first-ever annual report this year, on 2023 transfers. Further, this report is both public and contains a correctly submitted “nil” report, examples of good reporting practice to be discussed in the following sections of this report.

OVERALL REPORTING COMPLIANCE

As of 8 October 2024, 60 States Parties (or 54 percent of the 112 States required to have submitted at least one annual report) have submitted each of their required annual reports,¹⁴ and 27 (or 24 percent) have submitted at least one, but not all, of their required annual reports.¹⁵ 25 States Parties (or 22 percent) have never submitted a required annual report.¹⁶

Since Stimson's November 2023 report on ATT annual reports, “2022 Arms Trade Treaty Annual Reporting: In the Shadow of Ukraine,” five additional States Parties (Denmark, Nigeria, the Republic of Moldova, the

⁹ UN Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States, “List of Small Island Developing States (SIDS).” *United Nations*, <https://www.un.org/ohrlls/content/list-sids>; UN Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States, “List of Least Developed Countries (LDCs).” *United Nations*, <https://www.un.org/ohrlls/content/list-ldcs>.

¹⁰ The eleven 2023 non-reporting least-developed countries are: Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Chad, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Togo, and Zambia. The fifteen 2023 non-reporting small island developing States are: Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Belize, Cabo Verde, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Niue, Palau, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, the Seychelles, and Trinidad and Tobago.

¹¹ The 22 States Parties yet to report on 2023 transfers that have submitted at least one prior ATT annual report are: Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Cameroon, France, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, Kazakhstan, Liberia, Mali, Malta, Niger, Palau, Paraguay, the Republic of North Macedonia, Samoa, the Seychelles, Slovakia, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, and Zambia. The 13 of these that have not submitted an annual report in two or more years are: Antigua and Barbuda, Cameroon, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, Kazakhstan, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Paraguay, Samoa, Tuvalu, and Zambia.

¹² ATT Secretariat, “States Parties to the ATT (in order of deposit of instrument of ratification, approval, acceptance, or accession).” 12 August 2024, <https://bit.ly/3Bi5i97>.

¹³ While not the focus of this report, the Philippines has submitted an ATT initial report to the ATT Secretariat, while Gabon has yet to do so.

¹⁴ The 60 States Parties that have submitted each of their required annual reports are: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Côte D'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, the Maldives, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, the State of Palestine, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Uruguay.

¹⁵ The 27 States Parties in partial compliance with their annual report obligations are: Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, France, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, Kazakhstan, Liberia, Mali, Malta, Niger, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, the Republic of North Macedonia, Samoa, the Seychelles, Slovakia, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, and Zambia.

¹⁶ The 25 States Parties that have never submitted a required annual report are: Afghanistan, the Bahamas, Belize, Cabo Verde, the Central African Republic, Chad, Dominica, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Lebanon, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niue, the Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Togo.

Seychelles, and Trinidad and Tobago) have submitted reports for the 2022 calendar year.¹⁷ States Parties also submitted reports covering prior years: two States submitted reports on transfers occurring in 2021, two States submitted 2020 reports, and two reports were submitted for the 2019 and 2018 calendar years. Submitting past-due reports demonstrates good practice and should be highlighted as a reminder that it is never too late to submit annual reports.

Compliance with the ATT’s annual reporting obligation poses a particular challenge to States in Africa and the Americas, as shown by the regional breakdown in Figure 4 of States Parties that have never submitted a required annual report (African States comprise 12, or 48 percent of non-reporters, and the Americas make up 8, or 32 percent). Interestingly, while African States represent the highest number of non-reporters, the Americas have the highest average number of years of non-compliance (at 5.6 and 8.8 average years for Africa and the Americas, respectively). At the sub-regional level, States in West Africa and the Caribbean make up half of ATT non-reporters, at 24 and 28 percent, respectively.¹⁸

Figure 4: Regional Breakdown of Non-Reporting States Parties and Their (Past-due Reports)

Africa	Americas	Asia	Europe	Oceania
Guinea (9)	Bahamas (9) ¹⁹	Lebanon (4)	San Marino (8)	Niue (3)
Chad (8)	Grenada (9)	Afghanistan (3)		
Mauritania (8)	Guyana (9)	Philippines (1)		
Cabo Verde (7)	Saint Kitts and Nevis (9)			
Central African Republic (7)	Saint Lucia (9)			
Ghana (7)	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (9)			
Togo (7)	Dominica (8)			
Guinea Bissau (4)	Belize (8)			
Mozambique (4)				
Namibia (3)				
São Tomé and Príncipe (3)				
Gabon (1)				

Least developed and small island developing States also make up an outsized proportion of States Parties yet to submit a required report (accounting for 19, or 76 percent, of the 25 non-reporters). Specifically, 7 are least developed countries, 10 are small island developing States, and 2 (Guinea Bissau and São Tomé and Príncipe) are both.²⁰

¹⁷ Fletcher and Stohl, “2022 Arms Trade Treaty Annual Reporting: In the Shadow of Ukraine.” *The Stimson Center*, 31 October 2023, <https://www.stimson.org/2023/2022-arms-trade-treaty-annual-reporting/>.

¹⁸ Of the non-reporting States Parties, 6 States (Guinea, Mauritania, Cabo Verde, Ghana, Togo, and Guinea Bissau) are in West Africa, and 7 (the Bahamas, Grenada, Guyana, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Dominica) are in the Caribbean.

¹⁹ The Bahamas submitted its overdue initial report this year (2024), which may indicate movement towards submission of a first annual report.

²⁰ The 7 non-reporting States Parties that are least developed countries are: Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Chad, Guinea, Mauritania, Mozambique, and Togo. The 10 non-reporting States Parties that are small island developing States are: the Bahamas, Belize, Cabo Verde, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Niue, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

SECTION 2: REPORTING PRACTICES AND TRENDS

Section 2 analyzes five main trends of ATT annual reporting: the submission of private reports, the formats by which States provide reports, the submission of “nil” reports for exports and imports, the withholding of commercially sensitive and national security-related information, and the use of national arms definitions and categories.

PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE REPORTS

Although Article 13(3) of the ATT requires annual reports to “be made available, and distributed to States Parties by the Secretariat,” some States Parties elect to make their reports available only to the Secretariat and States Parties. The submission of “private” or “restricted” annual reports poses several challenges to the ATT’s overall object and purpose, including by limiting public insight into global arms flows and compromising efforts to assess States’ compliance with ATT obligations.


Of the 65 States Parties that submitted 2023 annual reports as of 8 October 2024, 15 (23 percent) elected to submit their reports privately, and one State (Finland) submitted a “hybrid” report:

- ▶ Albania
- ▶ Barbados
- ▶ Brazil
- ▶ China
- ▶ Côte D’Ivoire
- ▶ Croatia
- ▶ Cyprus
- ▶ Finland*
- ▶ Georgia
- ▶ Latvia
- ▶ Lithuania
- ▶ Maldives
- ▶ Mauritius
- ▶ Nigeria
- ▶ Senegal
- ▶ State of Palestine

Finland submitted a “hybrid” 2023 report, in which they submitted a public report on exports while restricting import information only for access by the ATT Secretariat and States Parties. Finland had previously submitted a fully private report (after seven years of public reporting) for the 2022 reporting period. Finland’s report marks the first occurrence of a State Party bifurcating an annual report. Methodologically, this analysis does not consider Finland an entirely public nor an entirely private 2023 reporter.

The first six years of annual reporting were characterized by significant and steady increases in private reporting. Between the 2015 and 2020 reporting periods, the share of private reports grew from 7 to 32 percent of total report submissions. While the 15 States Parties that submitted private 2023 reports represent nearly a quarter of total submitted 2023 reports, the current level of private reporting seems to continue a recent and encouraging trend towards public reporting (see Figure 5).

**Figure 5: Private Report Submissions
(as of 8 October 2024)**



Further, the list of States reporting privately seems to be growing relatively consistent. Each State Party that submitted a private 2023 report has a history of restricting access to their annual reports. Six have only ever submitted private annual reports (Barbados, Brazil, China, Côte D'Ivoire, Nigeria, and the State of Palestine), and nine (Albania, Croatia, Cyprus, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Maldives, Mauritius, and Senegal) have each reported privately at least three times in prior years.

This year only one State Party has switched from public to private reporting – Cyprus submitted a private 2023 report after submitting publicly for the first time (after five years of private reports) in 2022. Two States Parties (Botswana and Madagascar) submitted public 2023 reports after only having submitted privately in the past.²¹ Another two States Parties, Panama and Slovenia, returned to public reporting this year after submitting their previous annual report privately.²²

REPORT FORMATS

The ATT does not require States Parties to employ any particular format when preparing their annual reports. However, recognizing that informational consistency would (1) enable more uniform analyses of reporting data, (2) assist States in understanding the information required for comprehensive reporting, and (3) facilitate identification of implementation gaps and good practices, States Parties are encouraged to utilize a standardized reporting template. The Second Conference of States Parties (CSP2) in 2016 introduced an annual reporting template for States to use to submit their reports.²³ This CSP2 template was revised and again recommended for use in 2021 at the Seventh Conference of States Parties (CSP7).²⁴ The ATT Secretariat also provides States the option of submitting their annual reports online in a format that mirrors the content of the CSP7 template.

The CSP7 template was the most widely used format for submissions of 2023 reports. Of the 50 States Parties that submitted public reports on their 2023 exports to the ATT Secretariat by 8 October 2024, 40

²¹ Before submitting public 2023 reports, Botswana reported privately in 2021 and 2022, and Madagascar reported privately from 2017 to 2022.

²² Panama submitted its 2020 report privately following three years of public reporting and had not submitted an annual report until their public 2023 submission. Slovenia returned to public reporting after submitting its first private report last year (on 2022 transfers).

²³ ATT Secretariat, "Final Report – Second Conference of States Parties to the ATT," 26 August 2016, <https://bit.ly/4dNEIOZ>. A blank version of the CSP2 template may be found at: ATT Secretariat, "Annex 2 – Reporting Template," in *Report of the ATT Working Group on Reporting Templates to the Second Conference of States Parties*, 17 July 2016, <https://bit.ly/4dPbdwq>.

²⁴ A blank version of the currently recommended CSP7 template may be found at: ATT Secretariat, "Annual Reporting Template," <https://bit.ly/3BLdVW9>. For a more in-depth analysis of the utility of the currently recommended report format, please see: Stohl, "Taking Stock of the Use and Impact of the Revised ATT Reporting Templates," 12 August 2024, <https://www.stimson.org/2024/taking-stock-of-the-use-and-impact-of-the-revised-att-reporting-templates/>.



(or 80 percent) used either the currently recommended template or a prior version. Specifically, 34 (or 68 percent) used the CSP7 template and 6 (or 12 percent) used an earlier iteration of the template.²⁵ A further 6 (12 percent) used the online tool,²⁶ 3 (6 percent) used a version of their UNROCA report or the UNROCA reporting form,²⁷ and one (Chile) used a national format. Montenegro continues to report using a template that merges the CSP7 recommended template with the earlier version by including the first page of the CSP7 template while completing the rest of the report using the CSP2 format.

Compared to the 2022 reporting period, use of the CSP7 template has slightly increased (from 63 to 68 percent of public reports). The use of the online reporting tool and the UNROCA report format has slightly decreased from 2022 report numbers.²⁸

Of the nine States Parties that changed the format of their submissions between the 2022 and 2023 reporting periods, five (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Estonia, Serbia, and Switzerland) switched from another format to the CSP7 template. Hungary and Romania switched to the CSP2 version of the recommended template (Hungary had used the CSP7 recommended template last year and Romania had used the online reporting tool). Spain submitted with the online tool for the first time after using the CSP7 template for its 2021 and 2022 report submissions. Chile's 2023 annual report is the first time it has reported using a national format — in previous years Chile used the CSP7 template and the online reporting tool.

NIL REPORTS

Under the ATT, State Parties have an obligation to report on arms transfers even if none are undertaken. States Parties that have not transferred arms during a given reporting period may fulfill their reporting

²⁵ The 34 States Parties that used the CSP7 recommended version of the template (introduced in 2021) for their 2023 report submissions are: Australia, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Estonia, Germany, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mexico, Monaco, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Moldova, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, and Uruguay.

²⁶ The 6 States Parties that used the online tool to submit 2023 reports are: Argentina, the Czech Republic, Finland, Italy, Poland, and Spain.

²⁷ The 3 States Parties that used a version of the UNROCA report or reporting form for their 2023 ATT report submissions are: Canada, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

²⁸ Use of the online reporting tool decreased from 13 to 12 percent between the 2022 and 2023 reports available as of 8 October 2024. Use of the UNROCA format decreased from 10 to 6 percent, or 5 to 3 States Parties in hard numbers.

obligation through the submission of a “nil” report, which may be completed solely for exports, solely for imports, or for both exports and imports. To assist States Parties in submitting nil reports, the CSP7 recommended reporting template includes checkboxes that States may use to indicate whether they are submitting a nil report for exports and/or imports.

Of the public reports submitted by 8 October 2024, 7 States Parties indicated that they submitted a nil report for exports only, one State Party (Sweden) indicated a nil report for imports only, and 7 States Parties indicated a nil report for both exports and imports.²⁹

State Party understanding of nil reporting may be improving. Of the public 2023 reports, only one State Party, Panama, indicated that they submitted a nil report for both exports and imports but reported small arms imports under national categories.

COMMERCIALLY SENSITIVE AND NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Article 13(3) of the ATT explicitly allows annual reports to “exclude commercially sensitive or national security information.” The CSP7 report template includes a “Yes” or “No” checkbox to indicate whether States withheld information, and if so, asks States to “please consider providing more information on a voluntary basis.”

Sixteen States Parties, or 32 percent of the fifty 2023 public reports, indicated that they had withheld some commercially sensitive and/or national security-related information.³⁰ Fifteen States Parties checked the corresponding box in their annual reports to indicate such information was withheld.³¹ Canada submitted its 2023 report with a UNROCA template (which does not ask about information withholding) but noted that the number of missiles it imported was “classified.”

Two States Parties, Botswana and Spain, used the CSP7 template and online tool respectively to submit their 2023 reports but neglected to check either “Yes” or “No,” and thus it is unknown whether information in their reports was withheld.

In comparison, 39 percent of States Parties that submitted public 2022 reports by 5 October 2023 reported withholding information.³² This year’s level of withholding still remains higher than pre-2022 levels — before the war in Ukraine — when only 12 States Parties, or 27 percent, of those that submitted public 2021 reports by 8 October 2022 indicated that they had withheld information.³³

Of the 16 States Parties that marked or stated that they had withheld information, only four (Belgium, Canada, Poland, and Sweden) provided an explanation of the information they had withheld and/or the reasons for withholding. Canada indicated that the number of AIM-9X Sidewinder Missiles imported from the United States was “classified,” noting that a “multi-year procurement of AIM-9X missiles is underway to upgrade and recapitalize a portion of the existing AIM-9 missile inventory.” Sweden marked that the number of exports of recoilless rifles (specifically, the number of 84 mm Carl Gustaf Recoilless Multi Role Weapons) and portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems (specifically, the number of

²⁹ The 7 States Parties that indicated they submitted nil reports for exports only are: Benin, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, Lesotho, Peru, the Republic of Moldova, and Sierra Leone. The 7 States Parties that indicated they submitted nil reports for both imports and exports are: Botswana, the Dominican Republic, Madagascar, Monaco, Panama, Suriname, and Uruguay. (Note: Panama did report small arms imports under national categories).

³⁰ Each of these States has withheld information in at least one prior report.

³¹ The 15 States Parties that checked “yes” on the withholding of commercially sensitive or national security-related information are: Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Montenegro, Norway, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, South Africa, and Sweden.

³² Between 5 October 2023 and 8 October 2024, one State Party (Denmark) submitted an overdue 2022 report that indicated the withholding of information. The total number of reports with information withheld increased to 20, although alongside new submissions of non-withholding reports the percent out of the total number of public 2022 reports has slightly decreased from 39 to 38 percent.

³³ Between 5 October 2022 and 8 October 2024, only one State Party (Mexico) submitted a new 2021 report that indicated the withholding of information. The percent out of the total number of 2021 public reports has decreased to 25 percent.

AT4 Anti-Armour weapons) to Hungary, the United States, Brazil, France, and Lithuania was “classified.” Regarding the impact of regional conflict on State Party reporting, both Belgium and Poland noted that they withheld information concerning their arms exports to Ukraine. Although in 2022 and 2023 reports States explicitly noted that they had withheld information regarding exports to Ukraine, there has not been a similar trend with regards to arms exports to Israel despite ongoing international attention to the subject.

Reporting Update: The War in Ukraine

The war in Ukraine, now in its third year, has continued to impact ATT States Parties’ transparency in annual reporting. Stimson’s 2023 report on annual reports, “2022 Arms Trade Treaty Annual Reporting: In the Shadow of Ukraine,” highlighted that several States Parties withheld information from their 2022 annual reports on their exports to Ukraine, either by partially withholding specific information and noting the lack of data, or by simply removing their transfers to Ukraine altogether.³⁴

Among the States Parties that submitted public 2022 reports after the publication of our previous analysis (between 5 October 2023 and 8 October 2024), Denmark and the Republic of Moldova reported exports of conventional weapons to Ukraine. In a departure from Denmark’s seven years of transparent reporting to the ATT, Denmark’s 2022 report indicated that it had withheld information (Denmark’s 2023 report submission continued this trend). Denmark noted multiple transfers of major arms and SALW to Ukraine but in several instances did not provide the quantity of items exported. In its 2022 report, the Republic of Moldova indicated that it had not withheld information, and only reported one export to Ukraine — a transfer of small arms to multiple aggregated countries, Ukraine included.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) arms transfers database provides another source of information on arms transfers that occurred during the 2023 year.³⁵ The database indicates that of the 50 States Parties that submitted public 2023 reports by 8 October 2024, at least fourteen transferred arms covered under ATT Article 2(1) to Ukraine in 2023.³⁶

Of those fourteen, five States Parties (Belgium, Finland, Norway, Poland, and Sweden) reported that they had withheld information from their 2023 reports by marking “Yes” to the corresponding question in their report submissions. Two of these States Parties, Finland and Sweden, did not indicate Ukraine as the final importing State for any of their exports. Another two States, Belgium and Poland, indicated explicitly that they partially withheld information on their transfers to Ukraine. As Norway did not provide information on the importing State for any of its exports, it is difficult to tell whether Norway’s reporting includes exports to Ukraine in its 2023 report.

³⁴ At least three States Parties (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Poland) partially withheld information on transfers to Ukraine from their 2022 reports. At least four States Parties (Estonia, the Republic of North Macedonia, Slovakia, and Sweden) did not report transferring weapons to Ukraine in their 2022 reports, but the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) estimates suggest that each exported ATT Article 2(1) major arms to Ukraine during the 2022 ATT reporting period. Slovakia and Sweden indicated that some information was withheld from their reports, Estonia and the Republic of North Macedonia did not. For more, see: Fletcher and Stohl, “2022 Arms Trade Treaty Annual Reporting: In the Shadow of Ukraine.” *The Stimson Center*, 31 October 2023, <https://www.stimson.org/2023/2022-arms-trade-treaty-annual-reporting/>.

³⁵ Discrepancies between SIPRI data and the information contained in ATT annual reports may be the result of differing operational definitions rather than efforts by States Parties to mislead or misinform. How States define authorized transfers, for example, may not be analogous to SIPRI’s orders and licensing terminology. Accordingly, 2023 transfers in SIPRI’s database may not align with a State Party’s understanding of what transfers were “authorized” in 2023.

³⁶ The 14 States Parties that submitted 2023 reports by 8 October 2024 and transferred arms covered under ATT Article 2(1) to Ukraine in 2023, according to SIPRI, are: Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. For more, see: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Arms transfer database.” <https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/TransferData/transferResults?logic=on>.

Belgium and Poland “partially” withheld information but provided details on data that was withheld. Belgium, which indicated that it had “omitted in its [2022] report the description of the equipment transferred to Ukraine,” in its 2023 report provided descriptions of the missiles and missile launchers it sent to Ukraine but withheld the number of such transfers “for security reasons.” In 2023 categories of small arms and light weapons exports, Belgium did report disaggregated numbers of assault rifles, light and heavy machine guns, grenade launchers, and anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems exported to Ukraine as well as the aggregated value of “smooth-bore weapons.” In its 2022 report, Poland did not specify the information it withheld, but provided additional information in its 2023 report, noting that the data in the annual report did “not include donations from the Ministry of National Defence of Poland to Ukraine — in accordance with Article 13.3 of the Arms Trade Treaty.” Poland did report other transfers to Ukraine, including a number of armored combat vehicles and large-caliber artillery systems, that presumably did not fall within the above parameters. It is also possible that States may have withheld information beyond what was specified in their 2023 reports.

Four of the fourteen States Parties identified by SIPRI as providing arms exports to Ukraine (Canada, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom), did not indicate whether they had withheld information from their 2023 reports. Canada, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom submitted their 2023 ATT reports using a UNROCA template, which does not ask whether the reporting State has withheld information, while Spain, which submitted its report using the online tool, neglected to provide an answer. While it is difficult to know whether these States reported comprehensively on their transfers, all four States reported on several categories of export to Ukraine.³⁷ In particular, the Netherlands, which in its 2022 report omitted the number of items in many categories of export to Ukraine for “national security interests,” in its 2023 report only withheld number values from its light weapons exports.

Five States Parties (the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Slovenia) indicated that they had not withheld information from their 2023 reports. With regard to Ukraine, the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, and Portugal all provided disaggregated quantities in multiple categories of exports. Germany and Portugal also gave specific descriptions labeling weapon type, although Germany did neglect to report the number of M31 GLMRS missiles shipped to Ukraine when it did so for all other transfers. Notably, while Slovenia marked that they had not withheld information from their 2023 reports and did not note any exports to Ukraine, SIPRI estimates that Slovenia may have delivered 20 Pandur armored vehicles to Ukraine in 2023.

NATIONAL CATEGORIES AND DEFINITIONS

The ATT allows States Parties to report using national definitions of arms categories, provided that such national definitions do not “cover less than the descriptions used” in the UN Register of Conventional Arms (for major arms) and do not cover less than the “descriptions used in relevant United Nations instruments at the time of entry into force of this Treaty” (for small arms and light weapons).³⁸ The CSP7 recommended template provides a checkbox for States to indicate whether they used national definitions when reporting, gives space for States to define and report exports or imports under their own categories, and further includes an “Annex 2” in which States Parties may provide “specific (diverging or more detailed) national

³⁷ The United Kingdom and Canada reported the number of items and further detail on each category of arms it exported to Ukraine. Spain provided the number of items exported to Ukraine under each general UN Register category. However, it is difficult to know whether each State withheld additional information.

³⁸ ATT Secretariat, Article 5(3), “Treaty Text.” <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/treaty-text.html?templateId=209884>.



definitions” of the categories of conventional arms covered by the ATT as well as “definitions of additional national categories.” This information provides useful insight into how States Parties categorize the items they transfer and operationalize the ATT within their national control systems.

Of the 50 public annual reports on the Secretariat website as of 8 October 2024, seven States Parties indicated that their reports used national definitions of arms, and eight States Parties explicitly reported some or all of their transfers under self-defined national categories.³⁹

Three States Parties (South Africa, Switzerland, and Uruguay) indicated they had reported using national definitions of conventional arms but did not provide further information on those definitions, whether in Annex 2 or elsewhere in their reports.

Four States Parties (Belgium, Japan, New Zealand, and Panama) reported some of their transfers under national categories and provided information on national definitions. Belgium defined the national category it used, “European Common Military List ML1,” within the main body of its report. Japan reported its small arms and light weapons imports and exports in a separate table under the World Customs Organization’s Harmonized System (HS) categories (and provided the definitions of each HS sub-category). New Zealand provided information in Annex 2 on how their national laws categorize arms. Panama used Annex 2 to define the national categories under which they reported.

Four States Parties (Australia, Chile, Costa Rica, and Romania) reported their transfers under national categories but did not provide information fully explaining the scope and content of the categories. Australia reported all small arms and light weapons (SALW) exports in a separate table; while the number of permits granted, number of items, their value in AUD, and end destination were included, there was no indication of what sub-categories the figures refer to. Under imports, Australia coded some small arms under UN Register categories, but added another table in which SALW imports were reported under national categories. Chile, which used a national format for its 2023 ATT report, did not provide any additional information on the categories under which it reported. Costa Rica reported under several national categories (including “pistolas semi automáticas,” “pistolas y revólveres,” and “municiones”) and indicated that they had provided information on these categories in Annex 2 but did not do so. Romania reported transfers under national categories, though the categories they listed were the same as provided in the UN Register Definitions of Categories I-VII.

³⁹ The 7 States Parties that indicated they reported using national definitions are: Belgium, Costa Rica, New Zealand, Panama, South Africa, Switzerland, and Uruguay. The 8 States Parties that reported at least some of their transfers under national categories are: Australia, Belgium, Chile, Costa Rica, Japan, New Zealand, Panama, and Romania.

SECTION 3: REPORTING PRACTICES AND TRENDS OF ARMS EXPORTS AND IMPORTS

Section 3 reviews the content of 2023 annual reports, including actual or authorized transfers, the number or value of transfers, information on the importing or exporting State, the origin of reported transfers, and the descriptions or comments provided on transfers.

Exports

Of the 50 States Parties that reported publicly on their exports as of 8 October 2024, 36 (or 72 percent) reported exports of conventional arms.⁴⁰ All 36 of these States Parties reported small arms and light weapons (SALW) exports, and 25 of these States Parties reported major arms exports.⁴¹

► Actual and/or Authorizations for Exports

Article 13(3) of the Arms Trade Treaty allows States Parties to report either “authorized or actual” arms transfers, allowing for a measure of flexibility given that one type of data may be more readily available than the other. Although States have the option of reporting authorized or actual transfers, in order to assist with comparability and to better understand global arms transfers, it is helpful for States to indicate which kind of transfers they are describing.

Of the 25 States Parties that reported major arms exports in public 2023 reports, 15 (or 60 percent) reported actual exports of major arms, four States (16 percent) reported authorized, and two (Belgium and South Africa) reported a combination of the two.⁴² While Belgium alternated between authorized and actual exports depending on the category, in multiple instances South Africa marked that the aggregated data provided within a category represented both authorized and actual. Four States Parties (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Poland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) did not indicate whether the major arms exports they reported were comprised of authorized or actual exports.

Of the 36 States that reported SALW exports in public 2023 reports, 13 (or 36 percent) indicated that their SALW exports represented actual transfers, 10 (28 percent) reported authorized transfers, and five States Parties (Belgium, Costa Rica, Luxembourg, Montenegro, and Romania) reported both.⁴³ In one or more categories of SALW exports, Costa Rica, Luxembourg, Montenegro, and Romania noted that the data represented both actual and authorized transfers without further specification. Belgium reported authorized transfers for SALW exports under national categories and actual transfers for SALW exports under ATT categories (never both types in one category). Nine States Parties (Bosnia and Herzegovina,

⁴⁰ The 36 States Parties that reported exports in their 2023 annual reports are: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, Montenegro, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

⁴¹ The 25 States Parties that reported exports of major arms in their 2023 annual reports are: Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

⁴² The 15 States Parties that reported *actual* major weapons exports are: Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, and Switzerland. The four States Parties that reported *authorized* major weapons exports are: Australia, Denmark, Italy, and the Republic of Korea.

⁴³ The 13 States Parties that indicated their 2023 SALW exports represented *actual* transfers are: Argentina, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Japan, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Portugal, Serbia, Slovenia, and Spain. The 10 States Parties that reported *authorized* SALW exports are Australia, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Jamaica, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, South Africa, and Switzerland.

Chile, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) failed to indicate whether their SALW exports reflected authorized or actual transfers in one or more categories.

At least five States Parties provided different types of transfer data on exports of major arms compared to exports of SALW. Three States (Germany, New Zealand, and Switzerland) reported actual transfers for major exports and authorized transfers for SALW exports, Romania reported actual exports of major arms and a combination of actual and authorized SALW exports, and South Africa reported authorized SALW exports and a mix of authorized and actual for major exports.

► **Number of Items Exported and/or Value of Exports**

Of the 36 2023 annual reports that publicly reported exporting conventional arms, 30 States Parties (83 percent) provided the number of items exported, and 6 States Parties (16 percent) reported some combination of the number and value of their exports.⁴⁴

In some cases, States Parties did not provide either a number or a value for certain categories of export. South Africa, for example, did not provide a number or value for any of their SALW exports. And as discussed above, at least two States Parties (Belgium and Germany) withheld the quantity of some of its exports to Ukraine.

► **Information on Importing State**

Of the States Parties that reported major arms and/or SALW exports, only Norway did not provide information on the final importing State for any of its exports. Multiple States Parties, including Denmark, Ireland, and Jamaica, aggregated the information they provided on importing States by either indicating that a category of weapons was delivered to “multiple States” or by listing several importing States within one category without indicating the quantity of items exported to each importing State. At least one State Party (Australia) went beyond the information required by the ATT and named the specific sub-regions of the States to which it exported.

► **Origin of Conventional Arms, If Not Exporting State**

Of the 36 States Parties that reported publicly on their conventional arms exports in 2023, six (or 16 percent) reported the State of origin of their exported major arms in at least one category and 9 (or 25 percent) reported the State of origin of their exported SALW in at least one category.⁴⁵

However, some of this information was provided in ways that do not facilitate meaningful analysis. For example, two States Parties (Costa Rica and Luxembourg) aggregated the origin State in several categories of arms exports, obscuring the quantity of arms that came from each State. At least two other State Parties (Montenegro and Hungary) wrote in multiple categories that there were “various” States of origin per the respective category of arms exports.

Other States Parties reported this information with higher levels of transparency. In a mark of good practice, Canada indicated that there was no other State of origin in its listed exports as opposed to leaving the field blank. Romania formatted its 2023 report such that many exports were disaggregated by both the importing State and the origin State (see Figure 6).

⁴⁴ The 30 States Parties that provided the number of arms exported are: Argentina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Costa Rica, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, Montenegro, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The 6 States Parties that reported with a combination of the number and value of exports are: Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Japan, Portugal, and Slovenia.

⁴⁵ The six States Parties that reported publicly on the State of origin of the major arms exported in 2023 are: Canada, Hungary, the Netherlands, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia. The nine that did so with respect to their SALW exports are: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Costa Rica, Hungary, Luxembourg, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia.

Figure 6: Romania disaggregated its exports by both importing State and the State of origin.

Category of arms ⁴ [I-VIII]		Authorised or actual exports ⁵		Extent of exports ⁶ (choose one or both)		Final importing State ⁹	State of origin (if not exporter) ¹⁰	Remarks ¹¹		
		Auth.	Act.	Number of items ⁷	Value ⁸			Description of Item	Comments on the transfer	
2.	Rifles and carbines = 10827	☒	☒	10301		United States		Various types and calibers	For civil use	
				472		Bulgaria		Semiautomatic rifle with scope	-	
				25		Poland		Various types and calibers	For civil use	
				14		Italy		Sweden - 1 pcs. United Kingdom - 1 pcs.	Various types and calibers	For civil use
				12		Germany		Belgium - 4 pcs. United States - 2 pcs.	Various types and calibers	For civil use

► Description of Conventional Arms

Twenty of the 25 States Parties (80 percent) that publicly reported major arms exports in their 2023 reports provided descriptions of transfers in at least one category of exports.⁴⁶ Twenty-two (61 percent) of the 36 States Parties that publicly reported SALW exports in their 2023 reports provided at least one description of the exported items.⁴⁷

States Parties used these descriptions to provide useful insight into the items they exported. In many cases, these descriptions included the make, model, type, caliber, and number of items exported per sub-category of an exported item (see Figure 7). Several States Parties provided additional details. Examples of information given include the operational level of the export (Hungary), the intended end use of the item (Romania), or that the export had been “broken down into spare parts” (the Czech Republic).

Figure 7: The United Kingdom (using the UNROCA template) provided information on the model of the combat vehicle and the specific number of items exported of each model.

Category	Trading partner	Number of items	State of origin (if not exporter)	Intermediate location(s)	Description of items	Comments on the transfer
II. Armoured combat vehicles	Ukraine	171			5 x Alvis Saracen 2 x CEN B6 TITAN D/S APC BUILT ON FORD F-550 145 CHASSIS 1 x FV104 Samaritan Armoured Ambulance 51 x FV432 Armoured Personal Carrier 5 x FV434 1 x Mercedes Vario Armoured Vehicle 5 x Pinzgauer Vector Amoured Vehicle 6 x Samaritan CVRT Armoured Personnel Carrier 3 x Samson CVRT Armoured Personnel Carrier 6 x Shielder CVRT 41 x Spartan CVRT 13 x Stormer CVRT 22 x Sultan CVRT Armoured Personnel Carrier 10 x Warthog Armoured All-Terrain Ambulance	

⁴⁶ The 20 States Parties that provided descriptions for at least one category of major arms exports in their 2023 reports are: Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

⁴⁷ The 22 States Parties that provided descriptions for at least one category of SALW exports in their 2023 reports are: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Mexico, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

► Comments on Transfer

Thirteen (52 percent) of the 25 States Parties that reported publicly on their 2023 major arms exports provided comments on one or more of these transfers, as did 15 (42 percent) of the 36 States that reported publicly on SALW exports.⁴⁸

In general, States Parties use comments to offer additional information on their reported transfers. These comments may clarify the purpose of the transfer (e.g., for testing, repair, or reexport) or the item's intended end-user (e.g., military, police, or civilians). The comments can also include information on the nature of the transfer (e.g., the ministries or companies involved, whether the items were sourced from government stockpiles, or whether the transfer was commercial or non-commercial in nature). However, some States Parties included other types of information in their comments, including details of the arms manufacturer (South Africa), if items were to be resold once imported (Hungary), the rationale for withholding certain transfer data (Belgium, Canada, and the United Kingdom), or the time period in which the transfers were expected to occur (Denmark).

Imports

Of the 49 States Parties that reported publicly on their 2023 imports, 41 (84 percent) reported imports of conventional arms.⁴⁹ Twenty-three of these States Parties reported major arms imports and 40 reported imports of small arms and light weapons (SALW).⁵⁰

Only one State Party (the United Kingdom) reported major arms imports but did not report imports of SALW in 2023. In previous ATT reports (covering the 2015 through 2021 calendar years), the United Kingdom provided no information on arms imports, but began to report on major arms imports under the ATT last year. However, as it did in its 2022 report, the United Kingdom did not include information on SALW imports in its 2023 report submission, despite ranking among the top ten SALW importers in recent years.⁵¹

► Actual and/or Authorizations for Imports

As with exports of major arms, most States Parties that reported major arms imports in their public 2023 reports indicated that the data given represents actual, not authorized, arms transfers. Sixteen (70 percent) of the 23 States that publicly reported major arms imports indicated that the transfers represented actual data, and two States Parties (Italy and the Republic of Korea) reported authorized

⁴⁸ The 13 States Parties that provided comments on major arms exports in their public 2023 reports are: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The 15 that did so with respect to SALW exports are: Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Germany, Hungary, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, and the United Kingdom.

⁴⁹ The 41 States Parties that publicly reported imports of conventional arms in 2023 are: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, Montenegro, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

⁵⁰ The 23 States Parties that reported imports of major arms in their 2023 annual reports are: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

⁵¹ According to a December 2020 analysis by the Small Arms Survey, the United Kingdom was the world's tenth leading importer of SALW based on the value of its SALW imports. Nicolas Florquin, Elodie Hainard, and Benjamin Jongleux, *Trade Update 2020: An Eye on Ammunition Transfers to Africa*, Small Arms Survey, December 2020, p. 26, <https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resource/trade-update-2020-eye-ammunition-transfers-africa>.



transfers.⁵² Two States Parties (Norway and Romania) reported both authorized and actual imports of major arms. Norway reported a mix of authorized and actual major arms imports depending upon the category, and Romania reported actual imports for all but the category of armored combat vehicles, in which Romania indicated that the named transfers were both authorized and actual. Three States Parties (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Poland, and the United Kingdom) failed to indicate whether their major arms imports reflected authorized or actual transfers in one or more categories.

Of the 40 States Parties that publicly reported SALW imports in their 2023 reports, 19 (48 percent) reported actual imports of SALW, 8 (20 percent) indicated they had reported authorized imports, and another 8 (20 percent) reported with both authorized and actual transfer data.⁵³ Of those that used both authorized and actual transfer data to report 2023 SALW imports, four States Parties (Costa Rica, Denmark, Peru, and Luxembourg) reported within one or more categories that the data provided represented both authorized and actual transfers. The other four (Belgium, Estonia, Sierra Leone, and Switzerland) reported actual SALW imports in some categories and authorized in others, but never reported both within a single category. Five States Parties (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ireland, Mexico, Panama, and Poland) did not indicate whether their SALW imports reflected authorized or actual transfers in one or more categories.

Of the parties that reported on both major arms and SALW imports, at least eight States Parties provided different types of transfer data on their imports of major arms compared to imports of SALW.⁵⁴ Four States Parties (Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, and Switzerland) reported actual major imports and some form of both authorized and actual for SALW imports, two (Germany and New Zealand) reported actual major imports and authorized SALW imports, and two (Norway and Romania) reported some form of both authorized and actual for major imports and actual SALW imports.

► Number of Items Imported and/or Value of Imports

Of the 41 States Parties that publicly reported importing conventional arms, 33 States Parties (80 percent) reported the number of items imported, and 7 States Parties (17 percent) reported with some combination

⁵² The 16 States Parties that indicated their 2023 major arms imports represented actual transfers are: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Serbia, and Switzerland.

⁵³ The 19 States Parties that indicated their 2023 SALW imports represented *actual* transfers are: Argentina, Australia, Benin, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Japan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, and Spain. The 8 States Parties that indicated their 2023 SALW imports represented *authorized* transfers are: El Salvador, Germany, Italy, Jamaica, Montenegro, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, and South Africa. The 8 States Parties that reported their 2023 SALW imports with both *authorized and actual* transfer data are Belgium, Costa Rica, Denmark, Estonia, Luxembourg, Peru, Sierra Leone, and Switzerland.

⁵⁴ The 9 States Parties that reported different types of transfer data between major arms and SALW imports are: Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Romania, and Switzerland.

of the number and value of their imports.⁵⁵ One State Party, South Africa, did not provide a number or value for any of its SALW imports.

In some reports, States Parties did not provide either a number or value for discrete categories of imports. For example, Argentina did not provide a number or value for the quantity of revolvers and self-loading pistols it imported from Finland and Turkey but did provide the numbers imported from other countries under the same category.

Information on Exporting State

As was the case with exports, of the States Parties that publicly reported imports of conventional weapons only Norway did not provide information on the exporting State for any of its imports. At least six States Parties (Burkina Faso, El Salvador, Ireland, Jamaica, Panama, and the Republic of Moldova) aggregated the information they provided on exporting States by either indicating that a category of weapons was delivered to “various countries” or by listing multiple exporting States within a category without indicating the quantity of items imported from each.

Origin of Conventional Arms, If Not Exporting State

Of the 41 States Parties that publicly reported conventional arms imports in 2023, four provided information on the States of origin for their major arms imports and nine did so with respect to their SALW imports.⁵⁶

Several States Parties were not transparent in how they reported States of origin. At least one State Party (Costa Rica) provided aggregated import data that obscured the number and type of arms that originated in each State. Additionally, at least two States Parties (Hungary and Montenegro) wrote “various” in the States of origin column for some of their reported imports.

Other States Parties provide examples of good reporting practice. The Netherlands wrote “none” in the States of origin column instead of leaving the section blank, and three States Parties (Australia, Mexico, and Peru) listed the same States under the exporting States and States of origin columns. Estonia formatted its 2023 report such that many imports were disaggregated by the exporting State, the State of origin, and the description of each import type (see Figure 8).

Figure 8: Estonia disaggregated its imports by exporting State, the State of origin, and the description of each import type.

Category of arms ⁶ [I-VIII]			Authorised or actual imports ⁷		Extent of imports ⁸ (choose one or both)		Exporting State ¹¹	State of origin (if not exporter) ¹²	Remarks ¹³	
			Auth.	Act.	Number of items ⁹	Value ¹⁰			Description of Item	Comments on the transfer
VII.	Missiles & missile launchers	a) Missiles etc	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	17 504 4800 650	n/a	PL DE ZA ZA	DE DE	PIORUN, missile Vulcano, artillery 155mm HE 155mm HE ER	
		b) MANPADS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	0					

⁵⁵ The 33 States Parties that provided the number of arms imported are: Argentina, Australia, Benin, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Costa Rica, the Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, Montenegro, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The 7 States Parties that reported with a combination of the number and value of imports are: Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Japan, Peru, Portugal, the Republic of Moldova, and Slovenia.

⁵⁶ The four States Parties that reported publicly on their 2023 major arms imports and gave information on the State of origin are: Estonia, the Netherlands, Romania, and Serbia. The 9 States Parties that did so with respect to their SALW imports are: Australia, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Hungary, Mexico, Montenegro, Peru, Romania, and Serbia.

► Description of Conventional Arms

As with exports, a larger share of States Parties provided descriptions of their major imports than their SALW imports. Of the 23 States Parties that publicly reported major arms imports, 19 (83 percent) provided descriptions.⁵⁷ Of the 40 States Parties that publicly reported SALW imports, only 26 (65 percent) provided descriptions.⁵⁸

States Parties provided several different types of information in these descriptions. Many used these descriptions to provide information concerning an item’s make, model, type, or caliber. Some States Parties provided additional information, such as the manufacturer of the imported weapons (Costa Rica, Mexico, the Netherlands, and Peru).

► Comments on Transfer

Just under half of the 41 publicly reporting importers (20 States Parties, or 49 percent) provided comments on some, or all, of their conventional arms imports. Ten (43 percent) of the 23 States Parties that reported publicly on 2023 major arms imports provided comments on at least some of these transfers, as did 14 (35 percent) of the 40 States Parties that reported publicly on SALW imports.⁵⁹

The information included in these comments helps to contextualize 2023 arms imports. Many of these comments describe the purpose of the transfer (e.g., for storage, export, military training, repair, or reclamation) or the item’s intended end-user (e.g., police, hunters, Search and Rescue, or the National Guard). These comments were also commonly used to describe the nature of the transfer (e.g., the parties involved, the procurement programs used, the status of an authorized import, or whether the import was temporary in nature). Several States Parties provided additional information on their imports, such as the rationale for withholding certain transfer data (Canada), the domestic private purchaser of the imported weapons (Peru), or the time period over which the transfers were expected to occur (Canada, Germany, and Luxembourg) (see Figure 9).

Figure 9: Mexico provided comments for each sub-category of its “revolver and self-loading pistol” imports.

Categoría de armas ⁶ [I-VIII]	Importaciones autorizadas o reales ⁷		Alcance de las importaciones ⁸ (elijá una o ambas opciones)		Estado exportador ¹¹	Estado de origen (si no es el exportador) ¹²	Observaciones ¹³	
	Aut.	Reales	Número de artículos ⁹	Valor ¹⁰			Descripción del artículo	Comentarios sobre la transferencia
I	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Revólveres y pistolas semiautomáticas	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	22		México	Israel	Pistolas Cz Cal. 9 x 19 mm.	Uso militar
	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	138		Estados Unidos	Estados Unidos	Pistola Sig Sauer Mod. P320 Tamaño XCARRY, Cal. 9 mm	Uso Militar y Seguridad Pública
	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	72		Israel	Israel	Pistola Marca IWI Modelo JERICO II Cal. 9 mm.	Uso Militar y Seguridad Pública
	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	22		Coskaca Zbrojovka	Republica Checa	Pistola Cz Cal. 9 mm.	Uso Militar y Seguridad Pública

⁵⁷ The 19 States Parties that provided descriptions of imported major arms in their public 2023 reports are: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

⁵⁸ The 26 States Parties that provided descriptions of imported SALW in their public 2023 reports are: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Peru, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, and Switzerland.

⁵⁹ The 10 States Parties that provided comments on major arms imports in their public 2023 reports are: Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The 14 States Parties that did so with respect to SALW imports are: Argentina, Burkina Faso, Canada, Costa Rica, Germany, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, Montenegro, Panama, Peru, Romania, and Slovenia.


SECTION 4: ATT REPORTING IN THE CONTEXT OF UNROCA

The ATT is one among several international mechanisms that seek to improve transparency and reporting on the conventional arms trade. The UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA), established by the UN General Assembly in 1991, encourages UN Member States to voluntarily report each year on their transfers of major conventional arms and small arms and light weapons (as well as other data, such as military holdings and procurement through national production). This section compares ATT and UNROCA reporting for the 2023 calendar year, in terms of the number of reports submitted and the types of information given, and provides an update on how efforts to leverage synergies between these two transparency frameworks have impacted reporting levels.

COMPARING ATT AND UNROCA REPORTING LEVELS

Until recently, the number of annual reports submitted to the ATT Secretariat has consistently outpaced the number of submissions to UNROCA (see Figure 10). At this time last year, according to the ATT Secretariat and the UNROCA websites, 67 States Parties had submitted ATT annual reports covering the 2022 calendar year and only 55 States had submitted 2022 UNROCA reports.⁶⁰ However, this long-standing trend appears to be reversing: submissions of past-due reports to UNROCA have skyrocketed in the past year. As of 8 October 2024, only 72 States have submitted 2022 annual reports to the ATT while 74 States have submitted 2022 annual reports to UNROCA. Regarding reports covering the 2023 calendar year, UNROCA and ATT reporting levels are almost equal, with a count of 65 reports submitted to the ATT compared to the 62 reports submitted under UNROCA.⁶¹

Figure 10: ATT vs. UNROCA Reporting Levels



This encouraging increase is likely attributable, in part, to renewed efforts by the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) to encourage and support UNROCA reporting, which, in 2023 and 2024, included holding virtual training workshops for government representatives in partnership with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), publishing updated reporting guidance, and engaging in government

⁶⁰ Fletcher and Stohl, "2022 Arms Trade Treaty Annual Reporting: In the Shadow of Ukraine." *The Stimson Center*, 31 October 2023, pp. 21, <https://www.stimson.org/2023/2022-arms-trade-treaty-annual-reporting/>.

⁶¹ According to correspondence with UNODA, as of 8 October 2024, 62 States had submitted 2023 annual reports under UNROCA.



outreach.⁶² At the same time, this increase may also have been driven by recent efforts to leverage synergies between ATT and UNROCA reporting, as discussed in more detail in the next section.

States Parties that reported to either the ATT or UNROCA generally submit reports under both frameworks. Of the 68 ATT States Parties that submitted either an ATT or UNROCA report covering the 2023 calendar year as of 8 October 2024, 54 States Parties submitted under both mechanisms,⁶³ 11 States Parties reported under the ATT but not UNROCA,⁶⁴ and three ATT States Parties (Greece, Honduras, and San Marino) reported under UNROCA but not the ATT (see Figure 11). Four UN Member States that are not ATT States Parties submitted 2023 UNROCA reports (Belarus, Israel, Thailand, and Ukraine).

The three States Parties that submitted 2023 UNROCA reports but had yet to submit their required 2023 ATT annual reports as of 8 October 2024 include Greece, Honduras, and San Marino. Greece has submitted UNROCA reports for each calendar year since ATT reporting began (2015-2023) and has submitted every one of its required ATT reports until this year (including a 2016 report it was not required to complete). Honduras has not submitted its required 2021-2023 ATT reports but has submitted UNROCA reports for the 2022 and 2023 calendar years. San Marino has never submitted any of its required ATT reports but has submitted “nil” reports to UNROCA for the 2022 and 2023 calendar years.

⁶² United Nations, General Assembly, United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: Report of the Secretary-General, A/78/165, 12 July 2023, paras. 5-8.; United Nations, General Assembly, United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: Report of the Secretary-General, A/79/216, 22 July 2024, paras. 4-9.

⁶³ The 54 States that submitted 2023 reports under both the ATT and UNROCA are: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, the Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Maldives, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Uruguay.

⁶⁴ The 11 States Parties that submitted 2023 reports to the ATT but not UNROCA are: Albania, Barbados, Côte D'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, the Dominican Republic, Georgia, Hungary, Mauritius, Nigeria, and the State of Palestine.

Figure 11: States Parties That Submitted Either to UNROCA or ATT

ATT State Party	2023 ATT Annual Report	2023 UNROCA Annual Report
Albania	X	
Barbados	X	
Côte D'Ivoire	X	
Croatia	X	
Cyprus	X	
Dominican Republic	X	
Georgia	X	
Greece		X
Honduras		X
Hungary	X	
Mauritius	X	
Nigeria	X	
San Marino		X
State of Palestine	X	

LEVERAGING REPORTING SYNERGIES

In an effort to leverage reporting synergies and lessen the burden of reporting between the two mechanisms, the ATT CSP7 revised reporting template includes a checkbox option for States Parties to indicate whether the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) may use the information provided as a basis for their UNROCA report (see Figure 12).

Figure 12: The CSP7 recommended reporting template checkbox to authorize use of information by UNODA.

The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) may use the relevant information in this Annual Report as a basis for the reporting State's report to the United Register on Conventional Arms (UNROCA)	<input type="checkbox"/>
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The number of States Parties that use this option has increased since its 2021 introduction. Of the 50 States Parties that submitted 2023 public (and hybrid, in the case of Finland) annual reports as of 8 October 2024, 32 States Parties (or 64 percent) authorized their reports for use by UNODA.⁶⁵

⁶⁵ The 32 ATT States Parties that authorized their 2023 ATT annual reports for use by UNODA are: Argentina, Australia, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Germany, Jamaica, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, and Uruguay.

According to UNODA, out of the 62 UNROCA reports submitted as of 8 October 2024, 33 reports were submitted through this ATT-UNROCA information-sharing arrangement (this includes both public and private 2023 ATT reports), making the percentage out of total 2023 ATT submissions 51 percent.⁶⁶ Comparatively, 30 (or 58 percent) of public 2022 reports and 27 (or 52 percent) of public 2021 reports available on the Secretariat website as of 8 October 2024 authorized their reports for UNODA use.⁶⁷ This option is likely facilitating more frequent UNROCA report submissions from States Parties that report under the ATT but do not regularly report to UNROCA.

DIFFERENCES IN INFORMATION PROVIDED IN ATT AND UNROCA 2023 REPORTS

There were several notable variations in the information States Parties provided in their 2023 ATT annual reports as compared to their 2023 UNROCA reports. For example, seven States Parties (Brazil, China, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Maldives, and Senegal) elected to restrict public access to their 2023 ATT annual reports but opted to report publicly on their arms transfers in their 2023 UNROCA reports. Specifically, Brazil (using the CSP7 ATT template) reported publicly on major arms and SALW imports and exports under UNROCA, China reported publicly on major arms exports, Finland reported one transfer of major arms imports under UNROCA while making their 2023 imports section private under the ATT, Latvia publicly reported major arms and SALW imports to UNROCA, Lithuania publicly reported SALW imports and small arms exports to UNROCA, the Maldives submitted a “nil” report for exports and imports, and Senegal reported SALW imports. Interestingly, both Brazil and the Maldives utilized the ATT information sharing mechanism to submit public UNROCA reports.

At least three States Parties reported on a wider range of arms transfers in their 2023 ATT annual reports as compared to their UNROCA reports. This includes Estonia and Japan, which both reported SALW exports in their 2023 ATT annual report submissions but not in their UNROCA reports, and the Czech Republic, which reported major arms exports and imports in its ATT report but not its UNROCA report. Additionally, at least two States Parties did the reverse, reporting on a wider range of arms transfers in their 2023 annual UNROCA reports as compared to their ATT reports. El Salvador reported SALW exports to UNROCA but not to the ATT, and the Republic of Moldova reported major arms imports to UNROCA but did not include them in their ATT report submission.

⁶⁶ As of 8 October 2024, the 33 States that submitted UNROCA 2023 annual reports through the ATT-UNROCA information sharing arrangement are: Argentina, Australia, Benin, Bosnia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Denmark, Germany, Jamaica, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Maldives, Madagascar, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, and Uruguay. As of this date UNODA was still in the process of uploading a number of reports to the UNROCA online reporting tool due to the need for clarification or additional information from submitting States. (Correspondence with UNODA, 8 October 2024)

⁶⁷ According to UNODA, out of the 74 2022 UNROCA reports submitted as of 8 October 2024, 31 reports were submitted through the ATT-UNROCA information-sharing arrangement (this includes both public and private 2022 ATT reports).

CONCLUSION

The ATT commemorates the tenth anniversary of its entry into force on 24 December 2024. Next year, report submissions for the 2024 calendar year will mark ten total years of ATT reporting. These important anniversaries provide an opportunity to measure significant trends and identify measures to improve and enhance ATT reporting.

In the last year, we have seen several positive trends in ATT reporting, including the continued decline in submissions of private reports, a decrease in the percentage of States indicating the withholding of commercially sensitive and national security-related information, and an increase in use of the ATT-UNROCA information sharing mechanism. However, annual reporting compliance continues to decrease and 52 ATT States Parties (46 percent of the 112 currently mandated to report) either have outstanding reports or have never submitted a required report.

While there are good practices coming out of ATT reporting efforts, we know that States are not fully living up to their reporting obligations. What is clear is that there is significant work needed to improve reporting in the ATT context. These improvements are the responsibilities of States, but there is work that civil society and the ATT Secretariat can undertake in order to strengthen ATT reporting.

- ▶ Strengthen outreach to those States Parties that have not complied with their reporting obligations. Link those States with States Parties that have prior experience reporting (through avenues such as the new initiative of regional champions) to share good practices.
- ▶ Undertake outreach to ATT States Parties to better understand their reporting challenges and identify the barriers leading to cessation of — or sporadic — reporting. Utilize outreach findings to provide targeted and specific support to overcome reporting challenges.
- ▶ Provide guidance and support to the newest States Parties Andorra, Gambia, and Malawi in the completion of their first annual reports. Provide similar assistance to any subsequent new States Parties.
- ▶ For those States that are reporting, continue to encourage public reporting. Provide all States reminders of the benefits that public reporting provides, such as identifying good practice and troubling arms trade trends.
- ▶ Focus on leveraging synergies in reporting. Further study should examine if and how the synergies between the ATT and UNROCA have been and continue to be beneficial. In the meantime, synergies with UNROCA and other multilateral instruments should be strengthened in order to encourage greater arms trade transparency.

Transparency is a cornerstone of the ATT. As the treaty's tenth anniversary approaches, States, the ATT Secretariat, civil society, and other stakeholders can work together to ensure that the ATT lives up to its obligations and fulfills its object and purpose.

Arms Trade Treaty

Baseline Assessment Project

STIMSON

PHOTO: SGT. JARRED WOODS/ U.S. ARMY

