

Integrated Implementation of Strategic Trade Control Regimes: A Guide to Good Practices

Strengthening Arms
and Dual-Use Trade
Controls

Conventional Defense
Program

Partnerships in
Proliferation Prevention
Program

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INTRODUCTION

The United Nations (UN) system has a number of conventions, resolutions, and other regimes in place that seek to prevent criminal trafficking and control cross-border movement of conventional arms and other goods, technologies and services with both legitimate and potentially illegitimate end uses. Three key instruments in these categories are:

- ▶ Firearms Protocol to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC)
- ▶ Arms Trade Treaty
- ▶ UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 (2004) and associated resolutions

Important and widely subscribed to as these international legal instruments are, state-level and frontline implementation remains uneven at best. For example, the UN 1540 Committee's **2016 Comprehensive Review** of the implementation status of UNSCR 1540 found that, "Although some progress has also been made in relation to accounting, security and export control measures, it is clear that for many states significant efforts remain to be made to address gaps in those areas." A **2017 Stimson Center report** also found that the Arms Trade Treaty and UNSCR 1540 shared implementation challenges at the state level, such as limited state capacity, stove-piping of responsibilities, lack of political will, and a narrowly compliance-focused understanding of implementation.

The Stimson Center undertook a cross-disciplinary study of these three key counter-trafficking measures and trade controls for arms and "dual-use" items to identify options and approaches to facilitate and strengthen implementation of trade control obligations in

practice. This study encompassed not just the three main legal instruments, but a wide range of implementing guidance and good practice documents on strategic trade controls and related topics from organizations as disparate as the World Customs Organization (WCO), the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the World Health Organization (WHO).

This "Guide to Good Practices" compiles the results of this year-long study, organizing the findings into eight good practices common to effective national implementation of all three international legal instruments. In some cases, the recommended good practices were found directly within the legal instrument itself. In most cases, however, the research team found the good practices by combing through the families of supporting resolutions, guidance documents, and implementation best practices that the UN and other international and multi-lateral institutions have developed over the years.

The Guide is intended as a guide for state-level policy makers on how to enable and empower frontline officers with the tools and resources they need to implement these instruments in a holistic and integrated manner, making most efficient use of limited resources while ensuring more effective implementation of international obligations and requirements.

BLUEPRINTS FOR CONTROL

A brief overview of each of the three main international legal instruments considered in this study follows:

UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols: entered into force in September 2003. Ratifying states commit to: making certain activities domestic criminal offences, e.g. participation in an organized criminal group, money laundering, corruption and obstruction of justice; adopting comprehensive frameworks for extradition, mutual legal assistance and law enforcement cooperation; and promoting training and technical assistance for building or upgrading the necessary capacity of national authorities. It has three associated Protocols, the third of which is relevant for this study:

- ▶ **Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children:** entered into force in December 2003 as the first global legally binding instrument with an agreed definition on trafficking in persons.
- ▶ **Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air:** entered into force in January 2004, and for the first time defines smuggling of migrants in a global international instrument.
- ▶ **Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition:** entered into force in July 2005 as the first legally binding instrument on small arms adopted at the global level.

Arms Trade Treaty: the first legally binding treaty to regulate the global trade in conventional weapons. Adopted by the UN General Assembly in April 2013, the treaty aims to establish international standards to combat the illicit arms trade, mitigate the adverse consequences of irresponsible arms transfers, and advance responsible transfer controls among UN member states. The ATT contains criteria for states to use when making arms transfer decisions and prohibits the transfer of conventional arms under certain circumstances. To monitor implementation and shed greater light on the global flow of weapons, the treaty requires states parties to submit an initial report on implementation one year after the treaty enters into force for a given state, as well as provide reports on arms exports and imports annually to the treaty Secretariat. The ATT entered into force in December 2014 and currently has 112 states parties, as well as an additional 30 Signatories.

UNSCR 1540 (2004): UN Security Council Resolution 1540 establishes binding obligations for all states to implement preventative measures to mitigate the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), particularly to non-state actors. Specifically, UNSCR 1540 mandates that states refrain from providing support to non-state actors that would allow them to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer, or use WMDs and their delivery systems, and take a range of domestic measures to prohibit or control proliferation-related activities. The resolution was adopted in April 2004 and is intended to support existing nonproliferation frameworks and treaties to help prevent WMDs from falling into the wrong hands. UNSCR 1540 calls upon states to submit a report on steps taken – or that a state intends to take – to implement the resolution. These national reports are part of the information the 1540 Committee uses to prepare matrices on implementation efforts for each state, which the 1540 Committee uses to engage states in implementation planning and to facilitate matching available resources with assistance needs to support implementation.





IMPLEMENTATION GOOD PRACTICES

There is no one-size-fits-all approach to securing the trade in arms and dual-use items, and what works for one state may not work for another. While it may be the case that, for many states, customs plays a leading role in enforcing these measures, there is often a range of government actors and private entities involved, and areas of responsibility will vary by jurisdiction. These recommendations should therefore be understood as overall good practices that states should employ and adapt based on what makes sense for their particular situation.

In comparing these three instruments and associated guidance on effective and efficient implementation of each of them, the research team identified eight recommended good practices common to all three instruments: 1) physical security; 2) border controls; 3) multi-stakeholder partnerships; 4) interagency cooperation; 5) international cooperation; 6) record-keeping and use of information and communication technologies; 7) risk management; and 8) training. Each of these good practice areas is examined in greater detail and with language pulled from the relevant support or guidance documents, in the sections that follow.

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Physical Security

- 1.1. Good Security Practices.** Preventing proliferation of weapons and illicit materials starts with good security practices for storage of the items.
- 1.1.1.** The **WCO recommends** states “implement, using risk assessment principles, appropriate security measures on the import, export and transit movement of firearms, such as conducting security checks on the temporary storage, warehouses and means of transport carrying firearms, and requiring persons involved in these operations to undergo security vetting.”
- 1.1.2.** The UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) **technical guide** to implementing the Firearms Protocol recommends that:
 - 1.1.2.1.** “States parties should consider requiring law enforcement authorities and other state bodies to create and implement standards for safe storage of firearms and ammunition that are in their possession;”
 - 1.1.2.2.** Seized firearms be stored, at a minimum in an appropriate safe;
 - 1.1.2.3.** Firearms held in bond pending their clearance by Customs be securely stored like other valuable or dangerous cargo;
 - 1.1.2.4.** Containers with firearms as part of their contents be sealed upon export, and that the seal only be broken upon import by the appropriate law enforcement officials;

- 1.1.2.5.** States implement the recommendations contained in the report of the Group of Governmental Experts with respect to managing stockpiles of ammunition; and
- 1.1.2.6.** The primary method of disposing of firearms, their parts and components, or ammunition be destruction, and that other methods of disposal (such as deactivation, sales, or donations) be used only in exceptional circumstances. The UN's Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium (**MOSAIC**) **5.50** provides substantial guidance on practices surrounding and during destruction of firearms, including the sequencing of events, and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) provides detailed guidance on destruction techniques in **A Destruction Handbook: Small Arms, Light Weapons, Ammunition and Explosives**.
- 1.1.3.** The International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code identifies security aspects of the ship, seafarers, ports, and port workers and outlines several physical security-related requirements, including:
- 1.1.3.1** Preventing any unauthorized entry in port facilities or on a ship and other related restricted areas, even if the unauthorized entry is not a threat (but always considered as a potential threat);
- 1.1.3.2** Preventing the passage of unauthorized weapons, incendiary devices or explosives to ships and port facilities;
- 1.1.3.3** Planning and implementing training, drills and exercises for ship and port crew so that they are familiar with the security plans and there is no delay in implementing the same in case of a real threat .
- 1.1.4.** Likewise, an Annex on the 1540 Committee's website, a resource identified as having a direct relationship with the obligations of UNSCR 1540, includes the **Storage of Hazardous Materials: A Technical Guide for Safe Warehouse of Hazardous Materials**. This guide outlines that site and buildings should be adequately protected from trespassers by secure fencing, gates, watchman, perimeter lighting, and minimum access gates. This guide notes that the security aspects should be maintained in a good state of repair.
- 1.1.4.1.** When temporarily storing hazardous materials at the border, frontline officers should have a responsibility to report any physical security measures that are not in a good state of repair. Senior frontline officers must ensure poor security measures are fixed.
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- 1.2. Security Assessments.** Senior frontline officers should conduct security assessments, defined as exercises by competent authorities to test security preparedness involving movement of goods in the international supply chain and to ensure plans and procedures are in place to react to changing security levels.
- 1.2.1** Assessments should be conducted by government agencies and industry.



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- 1.3. Leveraging International Assistance.** Governments that lack the capacity to adequately assess or enhance their physical security measures themselves can leverage the resources and assistance provided by regional or international organizations.
- 1.3.1.** The **OSCE**, for example, has developed handbooks and best practices around the management of small arms, light weapons, and conventional ammunition. Upon request, the OSCE also conducts security assessments and provides other forms of financial and technical assistance to enhance national SALW and ammunition management.
- 1.3.2.** The IAEA has developed both its **Nuclear Security Series** and **The Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources** to help states identify key practices and guidelines for the physical protection of nuclear materials and radiological sources and challenges for by local actors and frontline officers responsible for the physical security of dual-use goods.
- 1.3.3.** The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) also produced the **Indicative Guidelines for Chemical Safety and Security in Small and Medium-sized Enterprises to Foster the Peaceful Uses of Chemistry**. This guidance document aims to identify best practices for chemical safety and security for non-government stakeholders, especially those based in developing economies, without a strong existing chemical security regulatory framework.

Border Controls

- 2.1. Enable Frontline Officers.** States should ensure they have adequate measures in place to enable customs and other frontline officers to secure their borders against the illicit trade in arms and dual-use items.
- 2.1.1.** Article 11 of the UNTOC’s Firearms Protocol, for example, calls on states to increase the effectiveness of import, export, and transit controls, including border controls, while Article 7 of UNTOC itself calls on states parties to “consider implementing feasible measures to detect and monitor the movement of cash and appropriate negotiable instruments across their borders, subject to safeguards to ensure proper use of information and without impeding in any way the movement of legitimate capital.”
- 2.1.1.1** **MOSAIC 5.60** offers recommendations on a phased approach to implementing relevant border controls for states with limited resources and access to international assistance, starting with coordinating border control agencies to sensitize them to requirements for preventing illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. Over time, states should adopt an Integrated Border Management approach.
- 2.1.2.** UNSCR 1540 likewise calls on states to “[d]evelop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in” nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery.
- 2.2. Role of Customs.** As part of those measures, states should give careful consideration to expanding and strengthening the enforcement powers of Customs Administrations to prevent the illicit trade or trafficking in weapons and dual use materials of concern. The enforcement power held by Customs varies between countries. In some countries, Customs agencies have the power to search premises, while in others they have to rely on border agencies to undertake searches.
- 2.2.1.** The WCO, in particular, has recognized the important role that Customs can play in enforcement operations in addressing border security issues, as highlighted in the **Punta Cana Resolution**.
- 2.2.2.** Customs officials should determine that exporters and importers have a valid license and all other required documentation and that the goods, their quantity, and any relevant documentation is consistent with the license to ensure that CBRN materials and dual-use goods are being transported under legitimate means, rather than being trafficked for nefarious purposes.
- 2.2.3.** These determinations may require frontline officers to request information from licensing agencies, for example to determine whether goods in trade require a license. Customs managers should therefore develop “**strong working relationships, information sharing channels, and standard operating procedures with licensing agencies.**”

- 2.3. Strengthen Customs Enforcement.** Where customs administrations have a limited enforcement scope, consideration should be given to efforts to strengthen customs enforcement efforts, to include:
- 2.3.1.** Establishing ‘Customs Offences’ such as seizure of goods and interdiction of consignments
- 2.3.2.** Providing evidence related to a violation to prosecution.
- 2.3.2.1** As a result, it is important for Customs to understand procedures by identifying, recording, and preserving evidence and establishing a chain of custody.

Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships

- 3.1. Wide Array of Stakeholders.** Given that key logistical assets, infrastructure, and expertise surrounding international trade are spread across a wide array of public and private sector entities, it is important for states to foster cooperation among all supply chain stakeholders. This cooperation should not only include private sector entities that physically move the goods (e.g., manufacturers, importers, exporters, brokers, carriers, consolidators, intermediaries, ports, airports, terminal operators, integrated operators, warehouses, distributors, and freight forwarders) but also ancillary service providers (e.g., financial operators and insurers), civil society organizations, and academics.
- 3.1.1.** Notably, **UNSCR 1540** does set a precedent by mandating governments to engage with industry. Operative paragraph 8(d) calls upon states “to develop appropriate ways to work with and inform industry and the public regarding their obligations” under nonproliferation-related laws. National legislation should be enhanced, if necessary, to allow for appropriate controls on the trade in arms and dual-use items, including through engagement in industry.



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- 3.1.2.** International organizations that deal with CBRN materials also focus on partnerships with a wide variety of stakeholders in order to improve treaty implementation or enhance the use of guidance to prevent the trafficking of dual-use goods
- 3.1.2.1.** UNODA is responsible for providing support for activities of the 1540 Committee and in the implementation of the resolution. UNODA specifically focuses on effective partnerships with key stakeholders including civil society, the private sector, and academia to support **national implementation of UNSCR 1540**. This lays the groundwork for partnerships that are appropriate for the context in which counter-proliferation of dual-use goods is taking place.
- 3.1.2.2.** A **report** summarizing the work of WHO working groups developing a framework for responsible use of the life sciences emphasizes the range of stakeholders involved in mitigating risk associated with biological samples and dual-use research. Placing risk management on “academic institutions, public health and medical microbiology research institutions, commercial research companies, standard-setters, funders of research, editors, publishers[,] ... scientific societies... [, and] governments” serves to create a more effective and pervasive biosecurity culture. With governance and subsequent oversight of dual-use research often being restricted to publicly funded research, creating effective partnerships with stakeholders, especially in the private sector, can serve to fill legislative gaps for biosecurity until regulations are amended.
- 3.1.2.3.** Similarly, **the OPCW** partners with a range of stakeholders to assess stakeholder needs and develop capacity building frameworks and engagement opportunities to improve training, legislation drafting, emergency preparedness, and other areas. The OPCW has worked with Industry representatives to discuss national implementation challenges of the CWC, academics to develop guidelines for the road transportation of hazardous chemicals, and civil society partners to support victims of chemical weapons use.
- 3.1.2.4.** The **IAEA also encourages partnerships** to secure radioactive sources and nuclear materials. Multilateral partnerships are critical to safe and secure transport, given that states often partner with commercial carriers to transport dual-use goods, and the presence of radioactive sources for scientific and technical uses in the private sector. These partners, in addition to civil society stakeholders, also provide support to states and the Agency in identifying challenges and emerging threats related to nuclear and radiological material security. Ensuring that industry partners are aware of the risks associated with radiological and nuclear material transfers and providing them with the resources to implement best practices is an essential component of radiological and nuclear security.

- 3.2. Benefits of Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships.** These multi-stakeholder partnerships have a **number of benefits** for frontline officers and their managers. Communicating and collaborating with non-governmental experts and practitioners can:
- 3.2.1.** Foster a **shared understanding** that strategic trade controls help facilitate rather than undermine trade;
- 3.2.2.** Generate insights on trade patterns and supply chain issues;



- 3.2.3.** Provide feedback on the impact of new or existing regulations;
- 3.2.4.** Help promote minimum security standards and supply chain security good practices;
- 3.2.5.** Assist in identifying opportunities to delegate certain regulatory functions to compliant traders, thereby easing investigatory and oversight burdens. Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) programs are an example of this. AEOs are supply chain stakeholders involved in the international movement of goods that have been approved by a national Customs Administration as complying with the World Customs Organization’s (WCO) supply chain security standards.
- 3.2.6.** In addition, if traders invest in good security systems to comply with supply chain security (and gain expedited release/clearance of their goods) in legitimate trade, then Customs Administrations can more effectively allocate their resources to do documentary examinations and physical inspections towards serious security and safety risks.

- 3.3. Building Cooperative Partnerships.** The WCO lays out a step-by-step approach for developing cooperative partnerships between Customs and industry in its **Customs-Business Partnership Guidance**, including by developing broad-based support throughout government agencies, developing an engagement strategy and action plan, engaging and consulting with industry, and monitoring and institutionalizing the partnership.
- 3.3.1.** One example of this **as noted by the European Union** is to strengthen cooperation between national law enforcement agencies (such as customs and police) and postal service providers/operators to maintain strict oversight of any shipments that may contain firearms and their components. As part of this cooperation, the European Commission proposes the creation of “an EU-level memorandum of understanding between parcel operators and police and customs authorities” to improve information and data sharing, based on established national good practices.

- 3.3.2.** Relatedly, the **WCO recommends** states establish “Memoranda of Understanding between Customs and legitimate traders, such as manufacturers, dealers, importers, exporters, brokers and commercial carriers of firearms to strengthen controls and to increase accountability.”
- 3.3.3.** The UNTOC **Working Group on Firearms** has similarly recommended that, “with a view to preventing and combating trafficking in firearms and their parts and components through postal and courier services, states should establish permanent communication channels with relevant service providers to raise awareness of this increasing phenomenon and enhance detection of trafficked items by exchanging information on known trafficking routes.”
- 3.3.4.** The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime has, however, **noted limitations with public-private cooperation** in addressing and combatting the risks of firearms trafficking and other activities undertaken by organized criminal groups. They recommend improving upon sector-specific cooperation to first identify certain areas for further co-operation and then engaging in cross-sector discussions to learn additional approaches to addressing the challenge.

- 3.4. Corruption.** States should consider corruption (UNODC) or integrity awareness (WCO) concerns that can quickly undermine the best laws, regulations, cooperation.
- 3.4.1.** Annex 4 of the WCO **STCE Implementation Guide** provides good practice concerning industry outreach by customs departments. The Annex defines industry outreach as, “activities directed toward the trade community to promote future compliance.”

- 3.5. Good practices and practical actions** by Customs include:
- 3.5.1. Assigning a manager** for the awareness program.
- 3.5.2. Determining outreach strategies** and communications protocols.
- 3.5.3. Conducting research** to determine on which industries, companies, and national associations to focus.
- 3.5.4. Coordinating with other agencies.**
- 3.5.5. Enlisting assistance** from national and international industry associations.
- 3.5.6.** Emphasize the ways in which industry can **benefit** from strategic trade controls, including by earning the trust of trading partners, promoting foreign investment, and minimizing risks.
- 3.5.7. Developing suspicious indicator (“red flag”) lists.**
- 3.5.8. Providing a voluntary disclosure mechanism.**
- 3.5.9. Reward efforts to combat illicit trafficking** and other misconduct and apply penalties and fines only as a last resort.

- 3.5.10. Developing outreach materials** such as brochures, pamphlets, web pages, newsletters, call-in numbers, posters, etc.
- 3.5.11.** Taking care to provide **appropriate outreach** to small- and medium-sized businesses, which may be relatively unfamiliar with strategic trade controls or lack the resources necessary to apply them, and to brokers, which may not be aware they are subject to trade regulations.
- 3.5.12.** Encourage industry representatives to share **information** not only with government officials but with one another.

- 3.6. Tailoring to National Circumstances.** The **WCO STCE Annex III** also has case studies to help implementers identify ways in which to apply the good practices to specific countries and Customs mandate scope.



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Interagency Cooperation

- 4.1. National Cooperation.** Interagency cooperation at the national level is critical to effective implementation of each of the legal instruments under consideration in this study and to integrated and efficient implementation of all three.
- 4.1.1.** Of note, the UNTOC’s Article 7 specifically calls on states parties to “ensure that administrative, regulatory, law enforcement and other authorities dedicated to combating money-laundering (including, where appropriate under domestic law, judicial authorities) have the ability to cooperate and exchange information at the national and international levels within the conditions prescribed by its domestic law and, to that end, shall consider the establishment of a financial intelligence unit to serve as a national centre for the collection, analysis and dissemination of information regarding potential money laundering.”

4.1.2. UNTOC’s Article 10 further states that “Law enforcement, immigration or other relevant authorities of states parties shall, as appropriate, cooperate with one another by exchanging information, in accordance with their domestic law...”

4.2. Border Agency Cooperation. The range of instrument-specific implementation guides variously note that coordination between the different responsible national border agencies (e.g., Customs, Port Authority, Civil Aviation Authority, Police, Licensing Agency, etc.) and agencies entrusted with regulatory authority over controlled goods (e.g., weapons, hazardous and dual-use materials) allows for:

- 4.2.1.** Systematic internal coordination efforts, including:
 - 4.2.1.1.** Identifying respective roles/responsibilities in the event of a disruptive incident
 - 4.2.1.2.** Conducting joint border checks and/or investigations;
 - 4.2.1.3.** Establishing mechanisms that fulfill internal coordination such as memorandums of understandings, exchange of letters, etc.
- 4.2.2.** Efficient information-sharing to:
 - 4.2.2.1.** Facilitate seamless submission, transfer, and reuse of international trade data related to the clearance of goods;
 - 4.2.2.2.** Contribute to the development of comprehensive Risk Profiles and the sharing of those Profiles with other agencies. For example, customs would benefit from information provided by the licensing agency on the nature of common strategic goods they deal with, known traders related to those goods, suspicious parties, and information related to permits/licenses issued and denied.
- 4.2.3.** **Single Window Processing.** The UN’s **MOSAIC 5.60** notes that establishing its recommended Integrated Border Management framework at the national level can require the highest level of political mandate but notes the benefit in establishing “single window processing” at congested borders
- 4.2.4.** Ultimately, sharing data between border agencies is central to trade and transport facilitation and permits a whole-of-government approach to preventing transnational organized crime.
- 4.2.5.** The UNTOC **Working Group on Firearms** has recommended that states “combine investigations of firearms-related crimes with investigations of illicit assets and of money-laundering tackling illicit enrichment,” which requires interagency cooperation, “in order to dismantle the trafficking networks behind illicit arms transfers and gather intelligence on suspicious transactions.”



4.3. Whole-of-Government Coordination. Interagency cooperation should also incorporate the broader spectrum of national institutions that are involved in implementing international legal instruments, e.g. national public health labs, veterinary services, and agricultural services that may be responsible for analyzing material confiscated or held by customs, or agencies responsible for regulating commercial and financial institutions. This range of agencies involved in domestic enforcement creates the potential for gaps in cooperation that should be specifically addressed by practitioners.

- 4.3.1.** The UN’s MOSAIC 3.40, for example, calls for states to coordinate a long list and broad array of representatives of government departments as well as industry and civil society. The WHO report, “***Towards a global guidance framework for the responsible use of life sciences: summary report of consultations on the principles, gaps and challenges of biorisk management***,” also emphasizes the need for broad interagency cooperation. Case studies highlight the benefit of interagency oversight in determining the authorizations of research into dual-use biological methods or materials in order to mitigate biorisk.
- 4.3.2.** In addition, the IAEA’s **Code of Conduct** for radiological security specifically highlights broad interagency cooperation and communication as a cornerstone of effective national implementation of radiological security.

4.4. Formal Interagency Coordination. Guidance also stresses that states should establish a formal mechanism for interagency cooperation, whether it be interagency information sharing agreements or a regular standing coordinating committee. Breaking silos between different agencies and creating a platform for them to engage with each other on a regular basis to review cases can support coordination for more effective national implementation.

- 4.4.1.** MOSAIC’s 3.40 calls on states to establish a national authority to “take the lead in providing overall political coordination and policy direction for national small arms and light weapons control efforts” and to coordinate national institutions and programs and ensure funding. The guidance envisions a “national coordinating mechanism” even beyond the national authority, however, saying that the mechanism should include the national authority, the national point of contact, and other relevant stakeholders.

- 4.4.2. States that don't have this kind of coordination mechanism often have licensing coordination mechanisms, but these information sharing agreements are often sustained at the licensing level and don't necessarily trickle down to customs enforcers or border guards. Communication from the licensing level down to the practical implementers should be encouraged to promote information sharing.
- 4.4.3. *The **Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations*** state that, "Countries should ensure that policy-makers, the financial intelligence unit (FIU), law enforcement authorities, supervisors and other relevant competent authorities, at the policymaking and operational levels, have effective mechanisms in place which enable them to cooperate, and, where appropriate, coordinate and exchange information domestically with each other concerning the development and implementation of policies and activities to combat money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction."

5

International Cooperation

- 5.1. **Foundational International Cooperation.** Each of the international legal instruments for controlling illicit trafficking and trade in restricted and dual use goods under consideration in this study envision multilateral cooperation as foundational to successful national and global implementation. National governments are encouraged – and in some cases, legally required – to cooperate with one another on issues related to strategic trade controls.
- 5.1.1. Article 2 of the Firearms Protocol to the UNTOC identifies the promotion, facilitation, and strengthening of “cooperation among states parties” as its central purpose of countering illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms and related materials, while Article 11 calls on states to take measures to increase the effectiveness of police and customs “transborder cooperation.” More broadly, the UNTOC Conferences of states parties have **adopted resolutions** recognizing the importance of international cooperation and identifying examples of good practice, which include undertaking joint financial investigations, cooperating on the provision of legal assistance and the establishment and use of extradition mechanisms, making use of international and regional law enforcement networks, establishing and maintaining direct contacts among central authorities, and establishing working groups among practitioners to exchange views and experiences.
- 5.1.2. The ATT’s Article 15(1) also calls on states to “cooperate with each other, consistent with their respective security interests and national laws, to effectively implement this Treaty.”
- 5.1.3. UNSCR 1540 calls upon states to “renew and fulfill their commitment to multilateral cooperation,” “promote dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation,” and “take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials.”




- 5.2. **Cooperation through Communication:** The importance of communication as a form of international cooperation is a prevalent theme in guidance documents for all three instruments, as highlighted in the examples above and below:
- 5.2.1. UNTOC’s **Working Group on Firearms** encourages states to “periodically exchange information at the regional and subregional levels on emerging threats related to illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, with a view to detecting and identifying those threats at an early stage, adopting timely necessary legislative amendments and raising awareness in other countries that might, owing to their geographic proximity, face similar issues.”
- 5.2.2. **MOSAIC’s 5.60** also calls for states to designate official point of contact for cross-border security issues, direct lines of communication, joint contingency exercises, advance authorization for cross-border hot pursuit, and related measures.
- 5.2.3. The IAEA guidance for the transport of nuclear materials highlights the need for clear and timely communication with other states when it comes to the transport of nuclear materials across borders, in order to ensure that regulatory requirements are being met and that security needs are being adequately fulfilled.

- 5.3. **Communication and Information Exchange Platforms.** Several specific platforms to facilitate communication and information exchange exist:
- 5.3.1. **INTERPOL Databases.** Interpol maintains 19 databases with millions of records “on individuals such as names and fingerprints; stolen property such as passports and vehicles; and weapons and threats such as firearms.” Databases are accessible via [I-24/7](#), a technical network maintained by INTERPOL that allows enforcement agencies to share information with their counterparts around the world.
- 5.3.2. **INTERPOL Firearms Tracing System.** The UNODC [technical guide](#) to implementing the Firearms Protocol also offers another information sharing system example: “On the international front, structures such as the INTERPOL Firearms Tracing System, to which over 180 countries, as members, have access, is a good example of international cooperation.”
- 5.3.3. **WCO Compliance and Enforcement System Toolkit:** The WCO, which In the Punta Cana Resolution endorses mutual cooperation, particularly in information exchange and investigations between states, has also developed an extensive library of instruments, tools, guidance materials, and operational co-ordination that can facilitate sustainable and effective international cooperation. Collectively, these are referred to as the [Compliance and Enforcement Package \(CEP\) Toolkit](#). **Key elements of the CEP toolkit** for international cooperation include the Customs Enforcement Network (CEN) – a system for customs to share alerts with one another and add to a database of seizures and offences as well as pictures required for the analysis of illicit trafficking in the various areas under Customs’ competence. The CEN Website and the CEN Communication System (CENComm) can be used to notify the transit, transshipment, or recipient countries of the high-risk shipment so that it can be controlled in transit, during transshipment, or upon import or re-export. CEN includes a communication component that facilitates international cooperation between users, while the linked Enforcement Website gives them the option of consulting various enforcement-related publications such as alerts, analytical reports and information bulletins.
- 5.3.4. **IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database.** The IAEA has also established the [Incident and Trafficking Database](#) which helps participating states and selected international organizations to combat illicit nuclear trafficking and other unauthorized activities and incidents involving nuclear and other radioactive material outside of regulatory control, to strengthen nuclear security.

- 5.4. **National Points of Contact.** Many guidance documents related to the three legal instruments at issue in this study recommend that states establish focal points within their governments (and respective agencies) that can serve as resource for industry partners and other governments on UNTOC implementation as well as participation in other relevant multilateral regimes.
- 5.4.1. For example, in its [2020-2025 action plan on firearms trafficking](#), the European Union “urges member states and south-east Europe partners to complete the establishment of fully staffed and trained Firearms Focal Points in each jurisdiction” and to ensure that these focal points are “systematically associated to the implementation of the

UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and of the International Tracing Instrument.”

- 5.4.2. Additionally, a 2014 Council of Europe [White Paper on Transnational Organized Crime](#) suggests encouraging states to build, maintain, and use “efficient communication channels, including liaison officers and contact points” to support sharing relevant information between the public and private sector on organized criminal activity – through both existing and new databases.
- 5.4.3. Efforts to support regional coordination, especially in terms of licensing authorities sharing information with their counterparts in bordering countries should also be encouraged, where national interests and confidentiality concerns do not obstruct information sharing.
- 5.4.4. Similarly, international organizations, including the IAEA and OPCW designate formal points of contact and National Authorities to serve as domestic regulators for managing issues related to the trade and transport of dual-use goods.



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5.5. Other Forms of Cooperation. Guidance suggests a number of other ways that states can work together on enhanced implementation of the three overlapping strategic trade legal instrument.

5.5.1. TOC **Working Group on Firearms** recommends that states should consider establishing “joint investigative teams ... as standing bodies in border regions that share information and intelligence on an ongoing basis and are working jointly in the border corridor.”

5.5.2. **MOSAIC 3.20** reinforces that recommendation and also calls on states to work to harmonize laws and policies bilaterally, multilaterally, and regionally.

5.6. Cooperation through Capacity Building. While “international cooperation” is left undefined in the instruments, many of the implementation guidance documents interpret the term broadly to include not only different forms of communication and information exchange but also training and other forms of capacity building.

5.6.1. For example, the UNODC **technical guide** to implementing the UNTOC Firearms Protocol offers many examples of steps that can be taken on a national, bilateral, regional, and international level to promote effective international cooperation:

5.6.1.1. “Effective cooperation begins at the national level. Such cooperation may take many forms, ranging from exchanging information with another state party to responding to a tracing request or providing mutual legal assistance. For effective cooperation, states parties must have an effective internal means of gathering information.”

5.6.1.2. “At the bilateral level, cooperation usually involves a bilateral agreement dealing with issues of crime, more specifically firearms. Cooperation here can take the form of sharing of information, skills, training, technology and financial support,” as well as cooperating to validate documents and verify that shipments reached their intended destination.

5.6.1.3. Regional committees can be established (e.g., the Regional Centre on Small Arms in Nairobi) to coordinate national efforts, facilitate joint trainings for customs and other law enforcement officials, and standardize regional approaches (e.g., by offering standardized trainings and standardized documentation for agencies to use)

5.6.1.4. “On the international front, structures such as the INTERPOL Firearms Tracing System, to which over 180 countries, as members, have access, is a good example of international cooperation.”

5.6.2. As another example of international cooperation as capacity building, **the 1540 Committee** is tasked to “engage with relevant international, regional and subregional organizations to share experiences and lessons learned in the areas covered by the resolution.” In an Annex on 1540 Committee website, a lesson learned highlighted is the effectiveness of assistance requests made jointly by states that are in customs unions or free-trade zones.

5.6.3. UNODA, as part of its efforts to support the 1540 Committee, **actively promotes the cooperation** between Member states, relevant international organizations, and regional entities such as “the International Atomic Energy Agency, Organization of American States, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, World Customs Organization and the World Health Organization” in support of the practical implementation of the resolution by member states of these international and regional organizations.

5.6.3.1. UNODA also **assists member states** in their efforts to fully implement the key requirements of UNSCR 1540 as part of its mandate to support the 1540 Committee. This includes the preparation of voluntary national implementation and capacity building plans, through the use of regional approaches for implementation and assistance provision.

5.6.4. In addition, the **Chemical Weapons Convention** envisions part of international cooperation as building capacity and communicating good practices to states that are seeking to improve elements of their national implementation legislation, enhancing peaceful uses of chemistry for economic development, and emergency-readiness against the use or threat of chemical weapons.

5.6.5. The IAEA also supports international cooperation between its member states through the **Programme Development and International Cooperation Section**. This section works to coordinate the work and trainings developed by the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Security and supports the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) and the International Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres (NSSC Network) as platforms for states to cooperate in strengthening domestic and international nuclear security regimes through formal trainings and resource sharing.

5.7. **Cooperation through Multilateral Arrangements.** The WCO **STCE Implementation Guide** also acknowledges the important role of multilateral arrangements, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Wassenaar Arrangement, in preventing the proliferation of CBRN and dual-use materials and provides guidance on international cooperation. Key recommendations include:

- 5.7.1. Notifying recipient countries of high-risk shipments.
- 5.7.2. Negotiating mutual administrative assistance agreements.
- 5.7.3. Establishing mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) to facilitate information sharing.
- 5.7.4. Similarly, The WHO **biorisk mitigation framework development report** also highlights WHO and state-level coordination with “international and United Nations entities that have jurisdiction over any aspect of biorisk management, including the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the World Organization for Animal Health, to create a holistic international strategy across sectors” as a key recommendation for more effective risk-adverse approaches to regulating and protecting dual-use research and biological compounds.



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6

Record Keeping and Use of Information and Communication Technology

6.1. **Consistent record-keeping** is critical to track shipments of restricted materials or dual-use goods under the UNTOC, UNSCR 1540 and the ATT and to identify trends and patterns.

- 6.1.1. For example, the ATT’s Article 12 requires states parties to maintain records for a minimum of 10 years of export authorizations or actual exports of covered conventional arms as well as those transferred to its territory.
- 6.1.2. States parties to the Firearms Protocol to the UNTOC are similarly required to “ensure the maintenance, for not less than ten years, of information in relation to firearms and, where appropriate and feasible, their parts and components and ammunition.”
 - 6.1.2.1. The UNODC technical guide to implementing the Firearms Protocol recommends that: “In the case of international transfers, each state should keep all information available to it regarding the transfer of firearms.” Non-state actors involved in firearms transactions (e.g., manufacturers, brokers, gunsmiths, etc.) should also be required to maintain records that relate to their activities with firearms.
- 6.1.3. Various international organizations provide guidance on record keeping that supports implementation of UNSCR 1540 with respect to transport of dual-use and restricted CBRN materials.
 - 6.1.3.1. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has a Code of Conduct for the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources that provides guidance for record keeping to prevent the diversion or theft of radiological materials. The guidance advises that the “maintenance of records” be part of the legislative and regulatory framework for states. It further advises that regulatory authorities should “[maintain] appropriate records of persons with authorizations in respect of radioactive sources, with a clear indication of the type(s) of radioactive sources that they are authorized to use, and appropriate records of the transfer and disposal of the radioactive sources on termination of the authorizations.”
 - 6.1.3.2. The IAEA guidance for the Security of Nuclear Materials in Transport specifies that “records should be maintained of all nuclear material that has been transported through the state.”
 - 6.1.3.3. The OPCW requires that states maintain records of transfers and exports as part of the Declarations requirements for Schedule I, II, and III chemicals under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Good record keeping supports verification activities and can support states parties in their efforts to identify transfer discrepancies and the possibility of dual-use chemicals being diverted for unauthorized purposes.



6.2. Record Types. Record types recommended by the World Customs Organization (WCO) in its **Strategic Trade Control Enforcement (STCE) Implementation Guide** include: purchase orders, end-user statements, quote requests, quotations, sales contracts (including Incoterms), pro-forma and/or commercial invoices, payment receipts, export license applications, export licenses, export declarations, packing lists, bills of lading, airway bills, technical data sheets, safety data sheets, and certificates of origin.

6.21. The IAEA **guidance for the secure transport of nuclear materials** specifies that “records” include “details of the packages used and the nuclear material they contained, and information on the personnel involved in the shipment.” Records associated with the preparation and actual undertaking of a shipment, including the training and qualification of personnel, should be retained.

6.2.2. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) Infectious Substances Shipping Regulations, which provide a framework for safe and secure transport of biological dual-use materials, require proper documentation of shipments, the use of checklists to ensure handling compliance, and packaging examples which infectious substance shipments should adhere to.

6.3. Record keeping should include reference numbers and names to facilitate shipment tracking and record retrieval and to expedite customs audit checks, according to the WCO’s STCE Implementation Guide.

6.3.1. States parties to the Firearms Protocol, for example, should keep records of the appropriate markings that must be applied to each firearm and, in the case of international transactions, records of “the issuance and expiration dates of the appropriate licenses or authorizations, the country of export, the country of import, the transit countries, where appropriate, and the final recipient and the description and quantity of the articles.”

6.4. Information Security. Many implementation guidance documents stress the importance of information security in association with record keeping.

6.4.1. The UNODC technical guide to implementing the Firearms Protocol recommends that records should be securely stored and personnel should be trained on how to properly handle any records kept so as to ensure confidentiality. To avoid tampering with or leaking information, access to records should be limited and records should be kept of who has access.

6.4.2. **MOSAIC 5.60**, in addition, highlights the need for customs officials to document in as much detail as possible actual contents of arms shipments to allow for comparison with stated contents.

6.4.3. IAEA guidance documents on the secure transport of nuclear and radiological material also stress the importance of developing a transportation security plan to define the measures to protect the security of sensitive information.

6.5. ICT Facilitates Record Keeping. Modern information and communication technologies can greatly facilitate record keeping and also allow for accessing, aggregating, storing, sharing, and analyzing data at an unprecedented scale.

6.5.1. For example, IATA encourages the use of communication technologies between shippers, freight forwarders, and airlines dealing with dangerous or hazardous goods by providing the IATA Dangerous Goods Community as a platform for accessing up-to-date regulation and posing questions about transportation challenges.

6.5.2. The UNODC technical guide to implementing the Firearms Protocol recommends that records kept by states should be contained within a single, access controlled, searchable electronic database.

6.6. Other Benefits of ICT. A range of implementation guidance documents note that ICT is beneficial in other ways on the frontlines because it can:


6.6.1. Increase efficiency in controlling and facilitating trade at the border;

6.6.2. Increase time for adequate risk assessment to take place (if/when electronic information is provided in advance);

6.6.3. Provide advance identification of high-risk shipments;

6.6.4. Facilitate greater interagency cooperation by capturing data (including security-related data) in a streamlined, automated, and integrated way;

- 6.7. **Potential ICT Applications.** Implementation guides also note that while the use of ICT by frontline officers is subject to a number of constraints, including national technical capacity and expertise, it could include:
- 6.7.1. Electronic manifests (aligned with international standards) [reviewed/utilized by Customs];
- 6.7.2. Electronic records of all importers and exporters, freight forwarders, customs brokers, transport companies, and other intermediaries [maintained by Customs/and other law enforcement entities at the border];
- 6.7.3. The establishment of export manifests in timely manner. Outward manifests are often finalized days after a vessel has already departed. To facilitate the timely establishment of export manifests, states can make use of the booking information carriers use to prepare loading and stowage plans;
- 6.7.4. The use of artificial intelligence or other emerging technologies, to the extent practicable, to improve and standardize the contents and analysis of large databases.



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7 Risk Management

- 7.1. **Risk Management Approach.** States should ensure broad and consistent implementation of a risk management system in implementing obligations under the conventional weapons, anti-trafficking, and dual use trade control regime. Given that frontline officers must manage a wide range and variety of risks (including the smuggling of arms, nuclear materials, toxic waste, or WMD), risk management enables frontline officers to exercise adequate controls with minimum hindrance to legitimate trade.
- 7.1.1. **MOSAIC 5.60**, in particular, highlights the need for a risk based approach to trade control implementation given the high volume and fast pace of today's global trade landscape and directs states to WCO resources for implementing this approach.
- 7.1.2. The WCO considers development and implementation of an intelligence-based risk management framework essential to establish a solid culture of risk management both at the corporate level and on the front line.
- 7.1.2.1. **The WCO Customs Risk Management Compendium** outlines a common approach that enables Customs administrations across the globe to speak the same language about the methodology they use to both identify and address potential risks. The compendium is sufficiently flexible in its application to meet the unique operating environment and conditions of individual WCO Members.
- 7.1.2.1.1. Volume 1 sets out the organizational framework for risk management and outlines the risk management process.
- 7.1.2.1.2. Volume 2 deals with risk assessment, profiling, and targeting tools that inform selection criteria for identifying high-risk consignments, passengers, and conveyances for Customs intervention.
- 7.1.3. Risk management was also identified as a key component of chemical safety and security for non-government stakeholders seeking to use chemicals for peaceful and scientific purposes. The OPCW, with input from a panel of experts, developed **risk management guidelines and frameworks** to support the development of sustainable and complimentary risk management frameworks for chemical security.
- 7.1.4. The FATF also highlights the importance of risk assessment, management, and mitigation for institutions to avoid the potential of funds being diverted for terrorism or proliferation financing. Recommendations included:
- 7.1.4.1. Graded approaches for implementing measures and allocating resources for different levels of risk;
- 7.1.4.2. Identifying roles in risk management systems;
- 7.1.4.3. Consistent measures and methods for assessing risk; and

- 7.1.4.4.** Information sharing between states to ensure timely and effective mitigation measures for preventing the financing of terrorism or WMD proliferation.
- 7.1.5.** For its part, the private sector has published some internal guidance to address risks in the supply chain posed by organized criminal activity.
- 7.1.5.1.** For example, **Safeway-Albertsons documented** procedures to conduct risk analysis and auditing to trace labor in its supply chain as a means to combat human trafficking. It stated that the company requires suppliers to complete a human trafficking and forced labor risk assessment and conducts a review of financial and social risk. “Suppliers that are assessed to have higher risk in terms of forced labor, social risk and/or financial risk may be audited before business is awarded, or may not be selected for business.”

7.2. Risk Management and Security Culture. Strategic trade control regime implementation guidance documents note that effective risk management can be facilitated by establishing a strong security culture among frontline officers. Dual-use goods and materials restricted under UNSCR 1540 can be difficult to identify, especially when being trafficked. These materials can be sold and purchased in a broad variety of names, and tracking them is a challenge. A Customs and Border protection workplace that embraces security, and in which every employee contributes to a secure border can help spread awareness and excess caution through which dual use materials can be identified and investigated.

- 7.2.1.** As a best practice, the elements of a risk management system should include:
- 7.2.1.1.** Timely, reliable, accurate, and actionable information
- 7.2.1.2.** Defined context for managing risks via mission statements, long-term visions, and priorities
- 7.2.1.3.** Consistent methods for weighing risks (e.g., *High, Medium, Low* & accompanying criteria for each)
- 7.2.2.** Key roles in a risk management system include:
- 7.2.2.1.** Senior officials who establish the system
- 7.2.2.2.** Mid-level officers who review, refine, maintain, and adapt the system
- 7.2.2.3.** Frontline officers who implement the system

7.3. Risk Management and Information Sharing. Risk management should also include information sharing between states to better secure firearms transfers.

7.3.1. For example, the European Union encourages customs authorities from different member states to exchange risk information, using the established “customs risk management system” (CRMS) mentioned in **Article 36 of Implementing Regulation**

(EU) 2015/2447. Doing so, according to the EU, allows member states to target the same risk at the same time and share their expertise to thereby increasing the effectiveness of the control systems. Systematic use of CRMS can also advance harmonization of customs controls to better address procedural differences/gaps that may arise in states’ practice that can increase the opportunity for and risk of diversion.

- 7.3.2.** Another example of information sharing is **WCO’s recent access to INTERPOL’s iARMS database**, which will grant WCO “real-time access” to INTERPOL’s records of illicit firearms and firearms identification reference material, thereby advancing cooperation between the two organizations and efforts to combat illicit arms trafficking and transnational organized crime. As part of this access, WCO will “be able to submit international trace requests for suspicious firearms recovered during its customs activities and operations,” which may exemplify one measure that operators and state officials can establish/incorporate/use/reference in strengthening their own implementation of UNTOC and efforts to prevent and address weapons diversion more broadly.
- 7.3.3.** The WHO also outlines the need for more cohesive and communication-oriented biorisk mitigation in its report, ***Towards a global guidance framework for the responsible use of life sciences: summary report of consultations on the principles, gaps and challenges of biorisk management***.



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- 7.4. Risk Profiles.** Several guidance documents identify the development of risk profiles as another good practice in risk management.
- 7.4.1.** The OSCE’s *Handbook of Best Practices at Border Crossings – A Trade and Transport Facilitation Perspective* defines a risk profile as an item of paper or electronic documentation that is tailored to regional and/or local traffic and used by frontline officers for risk analysis. It identifies known risk areas, actual incidents, and corresponding risk indicators (i.e., red flags). It includes information on the description of risk, period of validity, data range, and additional comments.
- 7.4.2.** The **WCO also recommends** developing and utilizing risk profiles to help determine which shipments are targeted for examination, defining a risk profile in its STCE Implementation Guide as “a set of characteristics which tend to correspond to shipments of interest, often representing a picture of a smuggling pattern, a commodity of interest, an entity of concern, or a combination of these.”
- 7.4.2.1** In addition, the WCO’s Customs Risk Management Compendium defines a risk profile as a “description of any set of risks, including a predetermined combination of risk indicators, based on information which has been gathered, analyzed and categorized.”
- 7.4.3.** The WCO’s STCE Implementation Guide lists information that contributes to the development of risk profiles may **include**:

- 7.4.3.1.** “Information arising from previous transactions, seizures, investigations, and audits”
- 7.4.3.2** “Information from the licensing or permitting agency, such as the nature of common strategic goods with which they deal, known traders related to those goods, suspicious parties,” and “information related to permits/licenses issued and denied”
- 7.4.3.3** Sanctions lists (such as the **consolidated list** maintained by the UN Security Council)
- 7.4.4.** Risk profiles can help frontline officers identify transactions/shipments that call for greater compliance checks or verification.
- 7.4.5.** **Risk profiles should be tested regularly**, including through random checks, and updated as necessary. This helps avoid blind spots and makes it more difficult for non-compliant traders to anticipate and evade border controls.

- 7.5. Release Profiles.** Similarly, frontline officers may benefit from developing and utilizing release profiles to facilitate the flow of low-risk shipments.
- 7.5.1.** As described in the OSCE’s *Handbook of Best Practices at Border Crossings* and WCO’s *STCE Implementation Guide*, a release profile is an item of paper or electronic documentation that is tailored to regional and/or local traffic and used by Customs that outlines patterns that correspond to low-risk shipments by compliant traders to efficiently facilitate trade. Examples include:
- 7.5.1.1.** “Approved economic operators conducting routine transactions with known trading partners,”
- 7.5.1.2.** “High-volume exporters with good records of compliance,” or
- 7.5.1.3.** **“Shipments which have already been authorized by the licensing/permitting agency.”**

8 Training

- 8.1. Consistent Frontline Officer Training.** States should consistently provide a variety of training to frontline officers and, when possible, other relevant stakeholders on facilitating supply chain security, enabling verification, and identifying illicit, dual-use, and other controlled items of concern. Frontline officers should be forthcoming with trainers about any challenges they may face or uncertainties they may have in the course of their work and their supervisors should create an enabling environment for them to share this information. While officers may be reluctant to expose potential weaknesses, open and honest communication allows trainers to better identify and meet training needs.

- 8.1.1. Trainings should be provided and updated on a regular basis to ensure sustainability and continuity. At the same time, trainings should be well coordinated to avoid over-burdening frontline officers.
- 8.1.2. Training should also be provided by (or in coordination with) frontline officers to parties involved in the supply chain, including ship/port crews and industry, to improve understanding of the objectives and scope of trade controls and supply chain security. Ultimately, training by and for frontline officers is integral to implementing national compliance with international regimes on the prevention of trafficking and the control of conventional weapons and dual use goods.

8.2. **Training Approaches.** Training can take several forms:

- 8.2.1. The UNTOC **Working Group on Firearms** invites states to “increase the capacities of national authorities in beneficiary countries to collect, register and analyse data on seized firearms and illicit firearms trafficking, building on the methodology of the UNODC illicit arms flows questionnaire.”
- 8.2.2. States should consider utilizing photos and other visual aids in their training to facilitate commodity identification and inspection, and should consider sharing these resources with other governments in their information exchange and technical assistance.
- 8.2.3. The UNODC **technical guide** to implementing the Firearms Protocol recommends that training be coordinated by regional mechanisms, if possible, to ensure a standardized approach across countries.

8.3. **International Organization-Offered Training.** In addition to trainings organized by national governments, frontline officers can also take advantage of trainings organized by international organizations.

- 8.3.1. Interpol’s **Project Chase** provides training to senior law enforcement officials as part of its effort to counter the illegal movement of chemical warfare agents, toxic industrial chemicals, and explosive precursors.
- 8.3.2. The WCO’s STCE Programme also offers training and capacity building for operational Customs officers, while the European Union (EU) also offers trainings to help identify and restrict the proliferation of CBRN materials and dual-use goods and support effective ATT implementation as part of the EU P2P **programme**.
- 8.3.3. Related to UNSCR 1540 concerns, the IAEA provides a variety of trainings for Customs and Border protection officers relating to radioactive and nuclear materials. These include courses on categorizing radioactive materials, as well as courses on safety and threats and risks posed by different **dual-use materials**.
- 8.3.4. Also in the UNSCR 1540 category, the OPCW has jointly organized trainings with the WCO for customs and border security officials.

- 8.3.4.1. These include trainings for **good practices in securing chemical trade at the border**. Customs officials learned about identification tools that facilitate OPCW member states’ monitoring responsibilities under the Convention. They also discussed various aspects of cross-border trade control, including licensing, risk management and physical inspection of chemicals, as well as causes for discrepancies in reporting imports and exports of scheduled chemicals.
- 8.3.4.2. Another ongoing joint course is a **“train the trainer” courses** to improve the capacity of member states to enforce the CWC’s transfer regime in national customs training programs.
- 8.3.5. The **WHO** “helps member states build their national biosafety and biosecurity capacity through guidance documents, tools, technical assistance, and resource mobilization. This includes supporting trainings on biological risk management; sharing best practices through workshops and meetings; providing regulatory frameworks; and ensuring biological agents are transported safely.”
- 8.3.6. Along the same lines, organizations like **IATA** provide **competency-based training and assessments** which tailor trainings to the roles, knowledge, skills, and abilities of the target audience as part of the *Dangerous Goods Regulations* released annually. IATA’s **Infectious Substances Shipping Regulations** also provides resources for national requirement trainings, as well as training schools for individuals involved in the transportation of biological samples and broader security of dangerous goods.



- 8.4. In addition to existing training programs, a number of resources are available as references for frontline officers on the job or for states to develop training programs:
- 8.4.1. The IAEA hosts the Nuclear Security Support Centers (NSSC) Network, and is also developing the **Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre**, where specialists and experts charged with implementing nuclear security projects will be able to receive advanced training to help tackle nuclear terrorism and prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material.
- 8.4.2. The WCO's STCE Programme offers training development frameworks for senior Customs managers and policy officials, tailored to different levels of hierarchy within Customs organizations. Good practices for a sustainable and effective Customs STCE Training Programme include:
- 8.4.2.1. Conducting and participating in **bilateral and regional training** initiatives and exercises;
- 8.4.2.2. **Developing a training plan;**
- 8.4.2.3. **Establishing a working group** responsible for developing and implementing the training plan; and
- 8.4.2.4. **Integrating STCE training** into an established training regimen.
- 8.4.3. In addition, the WCO STCE Implementation Guide Annex III provides guidance resources for frontline officers to use as a resource to identify, handle, and secure select strategic commodities, such as dual use goods and CBRN materials. The Annex also provides Customs and Border agencies with reference resources to prevent, detect, and deal with cross-border trafficking of dual use goods and CBRN materials.
- 8.4.4. The WCO also maintains a database of hundreds of accredited **experts** that may be called upon to assist the organization's capacity building activities. WCO Members can access the Accredited Customs Experts Database (ACE) database on the WCO Members website.
- 8.4.5. The WCO also hosts the Customs Learning & Knowledge Community (CLiKC!).CLiKC! gathers all training-related tools in a single portal, offering the worldwide Customs community a single entry point for WCO training activities and a collaborative portal to share and foster customs knowledge.

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