

STIMSON

Arms
Trade
Treaty

Baseline Assessment Project



2020 ATT Annual Reports: Examining Trends and Enduring Challenges

OCTOBER 2021

The Stimson Center's Arms Trade Treaty-Baseline Assessment Project (ATT-BAP)

aims to assist States in understanding the obligations of the ATT and to promote effective implementation. ATT-BAP supports efforts to assist States in implementing the treaty and to ensure that reporting on the ATT is comprehensive and robust. ATT-BAP has developed tools to help provide a baseline for assessing State progress in implementing the ATT and to enable measurement of the treaty's impact and long-term effectiveness. These tools are also utilized for identifying State capacity and resource needs, including the identification of critical gaps and available resources to implement the ATT. The tools include a Ratification Checklist, the ATT-BAP Baseline Assessment Survey, and the ATT-BAP website, which includes country profiles, a national transfer control database, guidance for completing initial and annual reports, and numerous analytical reports.



STIMSON

INTRODUCTION

The ATT requires States Parties to submit a report to the ATT Secretariat each year on authorized or actual exports and imports of conventional arms that occurred during the previous calendar year. These reports, referred to as the ATT annual reports, are due by 31 May of each year. However, the ATT Secretariat extends a seven-day grace period to States Parties, creating a de facto reporting deadline of 7 June.

Since 2016, when States Parties were first required to submit annual reports on arms exports and imports, the number of States Parties that have fulfilled their ATT annual reporting requirements each year has fluctuated. Overall, ATT annual reporting compliance has averaged around 69 percent over the last six years, demonstrating some gaps in and challenges to global arms trade transparency as well as good practice in reporting on annual arms transfers.

This year's analysis aims to assess States Parties' commitments to and advancement of transparency, as exemplified by their patterns of reporting on annual arms exports and imports. The analysis highlights trends in reporting compliance, private reporting – in which States Parties only make their reports available to other States Parties and not for public analysis – and reporting behaviors, focusing specifically on the 2020 ATT annual reports and comparing current data to trends over the previous five years.

The report is organized into five sections. Section one examines the current status of reporting for the 2020 ATT annual reports and reflects on the ways in which the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic may be affecting States Parties' reporting efforts. Section two highlights practices and trends in how States Parties have reported on their annual arms exports and imports – and includes insights on private versus public reporting behaviors, an examination of the different formats States Parties have used to submit their ATT annual reports, an overview of nil reporting, and comparisons of States Parties that chose to withhold commercially sensitive and/or national security-related information from their reports. Section three provides an in-depth look at what States Parties reported in their 2020 annual reports and compares this information to previous years. Section four offers a comparison of ATT reporting patterns to those of the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) and spotlights transparency trends and inconsistencies. Section five concludes the report with commentary on challenges in ATT annual reporting that have emerged over the last six years and contains insights on assistance available for addressing these challenges and strengthening ATT reporting and transparency in the arms trade overall.



METHODOLOGY

This report contains information about the 59 ATT annual reports on 2020 arms transfers that appeared on the ATT Secretariat's website as of 17 September 2021. Analysis of detailed arms transfer data is drawn from the reports of the 42 States Parties that elected to report publicly on their 2020 arms transfers and does not reflect information on the 17 States Parties that submitted private reports. Percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number. To facilitate a comparative analysis between ATT annual reports and other national reports, this report also draws from reports submitted to the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA), which cover international arms transfers undertaken in calendar year 2020. Finally, this report contains information provided by the ATT Secretariat, which offers insight on ATT reporting obligations and compliance and helps clarify State Parties' submissions.

PHOTO: FLICKR/CPL DANIEL WIEPEN



STATUS OF REPORTING

Of the 110 States Parties to the ATT as of 17 September 2021, 105 were required to submit a report to the ATT Secretariat on their arms exports and imports that occurred during the 2020 calendar year.¹ Fifty-Nine States Parties had done so as of 17 September 2021, representing a reporting compliance rate of approximately 56 percent. At the time of writing, this represents the lowest compliance rate in the six years of ATT annual reporting. However, it represents a modest increase from the roughly 54 percent of States Parties that had complied with their obligation to submit their 2019 annual reports at the same time last year.² If current practice holds, it is likely that more States Parties will submit their 2020 annual reports over the coming months, which may ultimately result in a higher compliance rate. This is particularly likely given the challenges many States Parties continue to face as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and as evidenced by reporting behaviors over the course of the pandemic. The 2019 reports represented an all-time low in on-time reporting compliance, as well as in overall reporting compliance by October 2020. However, the reporting compliance rate for 2019 ATT annual reports increased from 54 to 64 percent between 5 October 2020 and 17 September 2021, with ten additional reports submitted in that time. Such an increase may serve as a positive indicator for increased compliance in 2020 annual reporting in the months ahead despite pandemic-related challenges.

Forty-Six of the 59 reporting States Parties submitted their 2020 ATT annual reports by the Secretariat's 7 June 2021 de facto deadline, representing an on-time compliance rate of approximately 44 percent.³ This represents an increase in on-time reporting compared to the previous year, in which 38 percent of States Parties required to submit a 2019 annual report did so by the deadline, according to figures provided by the ATT Secretariat. Over the last six years of ATT annual reporting, on-time compliance rates have remained consistently low, with an average of 44 percent from 2015 - 2020.

Figure 1: On-Time Annual Reporting Rates⁴

Report Year	States Parties Due to Submit an Annual Report	Reports Submitted by De Facto Deadline	Rate of On-Time Submissions
2015	61	30	49%
2016	75	31	41%
2017	89	37	42%
2018	92	46	50%
2019	97	37	38%
2020	105	46	44%

¹ States Parties are only required to submit their first ATT annual report following the first full year of treaty implementation for that State Party.

² As of 5 October 2020, 52 of the 97 States Parties that were required to submit their 2019 annual reports had done so, representing a compliance rate of approximately 54 percent. An additional State Party - Maldives - also submitted a 2019 annual report, bringing the total number of reports submitted to 53 and the overall reporting rate to approximately 55 percent. However, Maldives was not required to submit a 2019 annual report, and as such does not factor into this report's calculation of last year's compliance rate.

³ The 46 States Parties that submitted their 2020 annual reports on time are: Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Maldives, Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Palau, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, State of Palestine, Sweden and Switzerland.

⁴ Sarah Parker, "Arms Trade Treaty: Status of Reporting," (presentation at the Seventh Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty, Geneva, Switzerland, 1 September 2021), [https://www.thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/210901%20-%20ATT%20Secretariat%20-%20Status%20of%20Reporting%20\(01.09.2021\)/210901%20-%20ATT%20Secretariat%20-%20Status%20of%20Reporting%20\(01.09.2021\).pdf](https://www.thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/210901%20-%20ATT%20Secretariat%20-%20Status%20of%20Reporting%20(01.09.2021)/210901%20-%20ATT%20Secretariat%20-%20Status%20of%20Reporting%20(01.09.2021).pdf).

Eight States Parties were required to submit their first ATT annual reports in 2021, capturing information on their arms exports and imports that occurred in calendar year 2020: Botswana, Canada, Guinea Bissau, Lebanon, Maldives, Mozambique, Palau, and Suriname. Of these, three States Parties (Canada, Maldives, and Palau) had complied with their obligation as of 17 September 2021. Notably, Maldives had previously submitted an annual report covering 2019 arms exports and imports, though it was not required to do so at the time.

Additionally, three States Parties reported for the first time in 2021 after failing to meet their reporting obligations for one or more years. After not submitting an annual report since it was first required to do so by 31 May 2016, Antigua and Barbuda submitted private reports to the ATT Secretariat covering five years of its arms exports and imports between 2015 and 2019. Subsequently, Antigua and Barbuda submitted its 2020 annual report within the Secretariat's 31 May 2021 deadline. Barbados and Cameroon also reported for the first time this year with the submission of their 2020 annual reports. Barbados and Cameroon had not previously reported to the ATT Secretariat on their arms exports and imports despite first being required to do so in 2017 and 2020, respectively. For Antigua and Barbuda and Barbados, compliance could be related to the St. John's Declaration of Commitment from an August 2019 meeting of Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Members, which included a pledge to submit their annual reports by 15 October 2019.⁵

Forty-Six States Parties have yet to submit their required 2020 annual reports. While they may do so in the coming months, 25 of these 46 States Parties have never submitted an annual report, despite being required to do so for one or more years (not including those States Parties required to report for the first time in 2021).⁶ Of these 25 States Parties, 48 percent are from Africa, 44 percent are from the Americas, and eight percent are from Europe.⁷ Furthermore, 32 percent of these 25 States Parties are among the least developed countries, and 44 percent are small island developing States.⁸

⁵ The St. John's Declaration of Commitment (on file with the authors) was adopted by CARICOM Members States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty at a workshop on the theme of "Implementing the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty - The CARICOM Way" held in Antigua and Barbuda during 13 - 15 August, 2019. The workshop was organized by the Government of Antigua and Barbuda in collaboration with the Caribbean Coalition for Development and the Reduction of Armed Violence, with financial support from the ATT Voluntary Trust Fund.

⁶ The 25 States Parties that have yet to submit an annual report, despite being required to do so for one or more years (not including those required to report for the first time in 2021) are: Bahamas, Belize, Brazil, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominica, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Iceland, Lesotho, Mauritania, Niger, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Seychelles, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, and Zambia.

⁷ Of the 25 States Parties that have yet to submit an annual report, despite being required to do so for one or more years (not including those required to report for the first time in 2021), twelve (or 48 percent) are from Africa: Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte D'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Lesotho, Mauritania, Niger, Seychelles, Togo, and Zambia. Eleven (or 44 percent) are from the Americas: Bahamas, Belize, Brazil, Dominica, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. Two (or eight percent) are from Europe: Iceland and San Marino.

⁸ Of the 25 States Parties that have yet to submit an annual report, despite being required to do so for one or more years (not including those required to report for the first time in 2021), eight (or 32 percent) are among the least developed countries: Central African Republic, Chad, Guinea, Lesotho, Mauritania, Niger, Togo, and Zambia. Eleven (or 44 percent) are small island developing States: Bahamas, Belize, Cabo Verde, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Seychelles, and Trinidad and Tobago. For more information on country groupings, see: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistics Division, "Methodology," <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/>.

REPORTING PRACTICES AND TRENDS

PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE REPORTS

Of the 59 States Parties that submitted 2020 annual reports as of 17 September 2021, 17 elected to submit their reports privately, thereby making them available only to other ATT States Parties. The 17 States Parties that submitted private 2020 annual reports are:


- ▶ Albania
- ▶ Antigua and Barbuda
- ▶ Barbados
- ▶ Benin
- ▶ Bulgaria
- ▶ Cameroon
- ▶ Cyprus
- ▶ El Salvador
- ▶ Georgia
- ▶ Greece
- ▶ Kazakhstan
- ▶ Lithuania
- ▶ Maldives
- ▶ Mauritius
- ▶ Panama
- ▶ Republic of North Macedonia
- ▶ State of Palestine

Of note, three States Parties (Benin, Bulgaria, and El Salvador) reported privately for the first time this year, after having submitted public annual reports in previous years. Together, these reports constitute approximately 29 percent of all 2020 annual reports submitted to date, which represents the highest private reporting rate of any year thus far. For comparison, approximately 4 percent of 2015 annual reports are private. Ten States Parties (Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Cameroon, Cyprus, Honduras, Kazakhstan, Madagascar, Maldives, Nigeria, and State of Palestine) have only ever submitted private reports – representing 13 percent of all States Parties that have submitted ATT annual reports over the last six years.

The percentage of privately submitted annual reports has steadily increased each year, with 22 percent of all 2019 annual reports having been submitted privately. While this year's private reporting rate is likely to fluctuate as States Parties continue to submit their 2020 annual reports, it indicates a continued – and unfortunate – trend towards increased private reporting under the ATT and an enduring challenge to transparency in the global arms trade.



Figure 2: Rates of Public vs. Private ATT Annual Reporting



USE OF THE REPORTING TEMPLATE

Regarding the formats States Parties used to submit their 2020 ATT annual reports, of the 42 publicly available reports, 27 States Parties used the ATT reporting template, 11 States Parties used the Secretariat’s online tool, and four States Parties used versions of their UNROCA reports.⁹ This was the third year that States Parties had the option of using the ATT Secretariat’s online reporting tool. Approximately 26 percent of the 42 States Parties that reported publicly utilized the online tool for their 2020 annual reports, representing an increase in the proportion of States Parties using the online tool compared to previous years. Of the publicly available 2018 and 2019 annual reports, 21 and 20 percent, respectively, used the online tool. Seven States Parties used the online tool in all three of their most recent ATT annual reports and two States Parties used it in their two most recent reports.¹⁰ Meanwhile, three States Parties oscillated between using the online tool and other reporting formats in their three most recent ATT annual reports, while an additional two States Parties used the online tool when it was first available (for their 2018 annual reports) but have not done so since.¹¹ While there may be several reasons why States Parties have not used the online tool – or have not done so consistently – the lack of online tool usage requires further examination as efforts are undertaken to try and simplify reporting practices and synergize them with other online formats.

⁹ Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom used their UNROCA reports – or adaptations of their UNROCA reports – for the 2020 annual reports. Canada’s report appears to incorporate elements from both the ATT reporting template and the UNROCA reporting form, though its report structure aligns more closely with UNROCA reporting format.

¹⁰ Chile, Czech Republic, Italy, Japan, Romania, Sweden, and Switzerland used the online tool to submit their 2018, 2019, and 2020 reports. Finland and Hungary used the template to submit their 2018 reports but used the online tool for both their 2019 and 2020 reports.

¹¹ Argentina and Norway used the online tool for their 2018 and 2020 reports but used the template to submit their 2019 reports. Belgium used the online tool for its 2019 report but used the reporting template for its 2018 and 2020 reports. Luxembourg and the Netherlands used the online tool for their 2018 report but used alternate reporting formats in their subsequent two reports. Luxembourg used the reporting template for its 2019 and 2020 reports, while the Netherlands used the template for its 2019 report and its 2020 UNROCA report for its 2020 ATT annual report.


NIL REPORTS

Three States Parties (Monaco, Palau, and Sierra Leone) submitted nil reports for arms exports and imports, indicating that they did not import or export any weapons covered by the ATT during the 2020 calendar year. Two States Parties submitted nil reports for exports only (Costa Rica and Peru) while one State Party (Sweden) submitted a nil report for imports only. Over the last six years, the total number of submitted nil reports has declined, as illustrated by Figure 3. The reasonings behind this trend could be varied, including the potential that some States Parties may be choosing not to submit their annual reports after determining they have nothing to report, rather than submitting nil reports for arms exports or imports, or variations in reporting practices resulting from changes in personnel. Additionally, over the past six years, some States Parties indicated they were submitting nil reports for imports and/or exports despite including information on arms imports or exports in their annual reports (see Figure 3). A related challenge – and one not captured in Figure 3 – arises from those States Parties that do not indicate they are submitting nil reports but also do not provide information on any arms exports or imports in a given year.

Reporting Irregularities

States Parties that indicate they are submitting nil reports despite reporting on transfers could be confused by the reporting template and/or about nil reporting. Similarly, the fact that some States Parties fail to indicate that they are submitting nil reports despite not reporting certain transfers may suggest that some States Parties are not submitting “full” or “complete” annual reports. However, an encouraging trend is that the number of States Parties that have indicated they were submitting nil reports but that provided information on exports or imports has decreased over time, perhaps indicating an increased understanding of nil reporting.

Figure 3: Nil Reports Over Time



As they have done every year since submitting their first ATT annual reports on 2015 arms transfers, two States Parties – Austria and the United Kingdom – continue only to report on arms exports and did not submit full annual reports containing information on their 2020 arms imports. Neither State Party indicated they were submitting nil reports for arms imports nor provided an explanation as to why they did not report on arms imports, despite the obligation to do so.


NATIONAL SECURITY AND COMMERCIAL SENSITIVE INFORMATION

Nine States Parties (Argentina, Chile, Finland, Hungary, Mexico, Montenegro, Norway, Republic of Korea, and Sweden) indicated that they withheld some commercially sensitive and/or national security-related information from their 2020 annual reports in accordance with Article 13.3 of the ATT. With the exception of Montenegro, all of these States Parties also indicated that this information was withheld from their 2019 annual reports. By comparison, 12 States Parties indicated they withheld some commercially sensitive and/or national security-related information from their 2019 annual reports. For an annual breakdown of the number of States Parties indicating that they withheld commercially sensitive and/or national security-related information, including those that may have done so by mistake, see Figure 4.

Reporting Irregularities

In past years, some States Parties answered “yes” to every question on the reporting template’s cover page. Ticking every box, however, results in reporting discrepancies and can prompt confusion about what those States Parties actually reported or intended to report – including whether information was withheld from their reports. This confusing practice may illustrate a challenge of the reporting template, in which some States Parties are unsure how to complete their annual reports. The absence of these reporting irregularities in the 2019 and 2020 annual reports, however, may represent another positive indication that States Parties are beginning to develop a better understanding of how to complete their annual reports.


Figure 4: Withholding Commercially Sensitive and/or National Security-Related Information Over Time



NATIONAL DEFINITIONS

Five States Parties (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Germany, New Zealand, and Switzerland) indicated that they provided information on national definitions of arms covered by the annual reports. However, only one of these States Parties (New Zealand) provided details in Annex 2 of the reporting template on “specific national definitions” of arms covered by the ATT annual report. The number of States Parties that indicated they provided national definitions of conventional arms included in their annual reports has fluctuated over the last six years, with eight States Parties indicating as much in their 2019 annual reports and nine States Parties doing so in their 2018 annual reports. Figure 5 provides an annual breakdown of the number of States Parties that indicated that they provided information on national definitions, including those that did so despite not including any such information in Annex 2 of their annual reports.

Figure 5: Provision of National Definitions Over Time



ANNUAL ARMS EXPORTS AND IMPORTS

EXPORTS

► Actual and/or Authorizations for Exports

Seventeen States Parties indicated that they had reported on major conventional weapons exports. Of these States Parties, four reported authorized exports, 12 reported actual exports, and one (Bosnia and Herzegovina) did not indicate whether it reported actuals or authorizations.¹²

Thirty-Six States Parties indicated that they had reported on small arms and light weapons (SALW) exports. Of these States Parties, 11 reported authorized exports and 20 reported actual SALW exports.¹³ Three States Parties reported both authorized and actual SALW exports.¹⁴ Two States

¹² The four States Parties that reported authorized major weapons exports are: Australia, Italy, Belgium, and the United Kingdom. The twelve States Parties that reported actual major weapons exports are: Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.

¹³ The 11 States Parties that reported authorized SALW exports are: Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Jamaica, New Zealand, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The 20 States Parties that reported actual SALW exports are: Argentina, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Sweden.

¹⁴ The three States Parties that reported both authorized and actual SALW exports are: Estonia, Ireland, and Spain.

Parties did not indicate whether they reported actuals or authorizations, as one State Party (Bosnia and Herzegovina) left the relevant boxes blank in its report and one State Party (Montenegro) marked both boxes for a given transfer.

As in previous years, some States Parties exhibited varied reporting patterns when reporting on exports of major conventional weapons systems compared to exports of SALW. For example, two States Parties (Germany and Switzerland) reported on SALW export authorizations and actual exports of major conventional weapons. One State Party (Spain), reported actual exports of major conventional weapons and both authorizations and actual exports for SALW.¹⁵

▶ Number of Items Exported and/or Value of Exports

Twenty-Seven States Parties reported the number of items exported.¹⁶ One State Party (Sweden) indicated that the number of exports for the eight categories of conventional weapons contained in Article 2.1 of the ATT was classified, though it reported the value of weapons exports for voluntary national categories. Sweden was the only State Party to report only the value of its exports.

Seven States Parties reported both the number and value of items exported.¹⁷ One State Party (Bosnia and Herzegovina) reported both the number and value for all of its reported exports. By contrast, another State Party (Australia) reported only the number of items exported for one category of major conventional weapons exports while reporting the number and value for all other categories of exports. Other States Parties varied in reporting number and/or value based on the types of transfers they reported. For example, one State Party (Belgium) reported the number of major conventional weapons exports and the value of SALW exports, while another State Party (Ireland) reported both the number and value of authorized SALW exports and only the number for actual SALW exports.

In an example of good practice, one State Party (Norway) reported ammunition exports under voluntary national categories. However, it is unclear which States were involved in the transfer, as Norway did not indicate the final importing State or State of origin.

Figure 6: Norway reported ammunition exports under voluntary national categories

C. Voluntary National Categories (please define in Annex 2)					
		Authorised or actual exports [5]		<input type="checkbox"/> authorised	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> actual
Extent of exports [6] (choose one or both)		Final importing State [9]	State of origin (if not exporter) [10]	Remarks [11]	
Number of items [7]	Value[8]			Description of Item	Comments on the transfer
	NOK - Norwegian Krone				
Ammunition	561,683,000		Various		See statistics in annual white paper to parliament for 2020 under kategori ML3 – planned to be submitted in June of 2021.

¹⁵ For two of Spain’s reported SALW exports, it is unclear if those transfers are actual exports or authorizations, as Spain selected both boxes in its 2020 annual report.

¹⁶ The 27 States Parties that reported the number of items exported are: Argentina, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Jamaica, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

¹⁷ The seven States Parties that reported both the number and value of items exported are: Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, and Slovenia.

Information on Importing State

All 17 States Parties that reported on major conventional weapons exports provided information on the importing State(s). Notably this includes Italy, which had not reported final importing States for major conventional exports since submitting its 2015 annual report and had aggregated such information in previous annual reports relating to SALW exports.

Figure 7: Italy did not report the final importing State for major conventional weapons exports in its 2019 annual report

II. Armoured combat vehicles		Authorised or actual exports [5]		Remarks [11]	
Extent of exports [6] (choose one or both)		Final importing State [9]	State of origin (if not exporter) [10]	Description of Item	Comments on the transfer
Number of items [7]	Value[8]				
193					

Figure 8: Italy did report the final importing State for major conventional weapons exports in its 2020 annual report

II. Armoured combat vehicles		Authorised or actual exports [5]		Remarks [11]	
Extent of exports [6] (choose one or both)		Final importing State [9]	State of origin (if not exporter) [10]	Description of Item	Comments on the transfer
Number of items [7]	Value[8]				
	EUR - Euro				
31		Brazil			
37		Czech Republic			
7667		United States			
17		Tunisia			

All 36 States Parties that reported on SALW exports provided information on the importing State(s) – though Denmark simply wrote “multiple states” for some exports. Of note, Australia reported not only on international transfers but also on transfers within its own territory, indicating two of its external territories (Christmas Island and Norfolk Island) as final importing States. In an example of good practice, Australia also reported on SALW exports to the French territory of New Caledonia, thereby offering greater specificity on the final importer for that transfer.

► Origin of Conventional Arms, If Not Exporting State

The Netherlands was the only State Party that provided information on the State of origin other than the exporting State for its major conventional weapons exports.

Nine of the 36 States Parties that reported on SALW exports provided information on the State of origin other than the exporting State.¹⁸ However, Norway listed “USA, Canada, and various EU countries” as the States of origin for exports of revolvers and self-loading pistols to Denmark, without specifying which “various EU countries” it was referring to.

► Description of Conventional Arms

Eleven of the 17 States Parties that reported on major conventional weapons exports provided descriptions of the items exported, offering details on the types/models of arms exported.¹⁹ Eighteen of the 36 States Parties that reported on SALW exports provided descriptions of the items exported.²⁰

Figure 9: The Republic of Korea provided descriptions of its SALW exports

Category of arms ⁴ [I-VIII]	Authorised or actual exports ⁵		Extent of exports ⁶ (choose one or both)		Final importing State ⁹	State of origin (if not exporter) ¹⁰	Remarks ¹¹	
	Auth.	Act.	Number of items ⁷	Value ⁸			Description of Item	Comments on the transfer
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
B. VIII. Small Arms and Light Weapons^{14, 15}								
Small Arms (aggregated)¹⁶	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	318					
1. Revolvers and self-loading pistols	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Nil					
2. Rifles and carbines	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	307 11		Indonesia Indonesia		DSAR15P DSSR762	
3. Sub-machine guns	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Nil					
4. Assault rifles	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Nil					
5. Light machine guns	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Nil					
6. Others	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Nil					
Light Weapons (aggregated)¹⁷	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	40					
1. Heavy machine guns	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	32		Togo		K-6(12.7mm)	
			8		Philippines		K-6(12.7mm)	

► Comments on Transfer

Eight of the 17 States Parties that reported on major conventional weapons exports provided comments on at least some of the items being exported, offering insights on the nature of certain transfers (e.g., donation of equipment, return after testing, or for collection purposes, among others) and the intended end user.²¹ Thirteen of the 17 States Parties that reported on SALW exports provided comments on at least some transfers, and provided similar information on the nature of certain transfers and the intended end user.²²

¹⁸ The nine States Parties that provided information on the State of origin other than the exporting State for SALW exports are: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia, and Slovenia.

¹⁹ The 11 States Parties that provided descriptions of the items exported for major weapons exports are: Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Finland, France, Netherlands, Poland, Serbia, Slovakia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

²⁰ The 18 States Parties that provided descriptions of the items exported for SALW exports are: Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Mexico, Montenegro, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

²¹ The eight States Parties that provided comments on the transfer for major weapons exports are: Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Netherlands, Slovakia, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

²² The 13 States Parties that provided comments on the transfer for SALW exports are: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Montenegro, Norway, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom.

Figure 10: Canada provided comments for one category of major conventional weapons exports

A	B	C	D ^b	E ^b	REMARKS ^c	
Category (I-VII)	Final importer State(s)	Number of items	State of origin (if not exporter)	Intermediate location (if any)	Description of item	Comments on the transfer
VII. Missiles and missile launchers ^d	a)	United States	44		RIM-66 Standard Missile 2	Donation of surplus missiles to the United States Navy. 44 Missiles were physically transferred in 2020.
	b)					

IMPORTS

▶ Actual and/or Authorizations for Imports

Twenty-Two States Parties reported major conventional weapons imports. Of these, two States Parties reported authorized imports and 17 reported actual imports.²³ Three States Parties did not clearly indicate whether they reported authorized or actual imports, as two States Parties left the relevant boxes blank while one State Party checked both boxes.²⁴

Thirty-Five States Parties reported on SALW imports. Of these, seven States Parties reported on authorized imports, 19 States Parties reported on actual imports, and four States Parties reported on both authorized and actual imports.²⁵ Five States Parties did not clearly indicate whether they reported authorized or actual imports, as three States Parties left the relevant boxes blank and two States Parties checked both boxes, leaving it unclear as to whether they reported on authorized or actual imports.²⁶

▶ Number of Items Imported and/or Value of Imports

Thirty States Parties reported the number of items imported.²⁷ Two States Parties (Australia and Hungary) noted that in some cases, the number of items imported was withheld/classified. Specifically, Hungary indicated that the number of assault rifles and recoilless rifles it imported from the Czech Republic and Sweden, respectively, was classified. Australia indicated that it withheld the number of missiles it imported from the United States. Additionally, while Australia reported the number of SALW imported under the SALW sub-categories provided in the reporting template, it reported “volumes” in the supplementary table it included in its annual report that contains aggregated data on firearms commercially imported into the country.

²³ Two States Parties (Italy and Peru) reported authorized major conventional weapons imports. In one instance, Peru checked the boxes for both authorized and actual imports, making it unclear whether that particular transfer represented authorizations or actuals. The 17 States Parties that reported actual major conventional weapons imports are: Chile, Canada, Hungary, Argentina, Estonia, Japan, Latvia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Mexico, Romania, Poland, Serbia, Slovakia, Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland. Hungary indicated it reported actual imports for all but one category of major imports (armoured combat vehicles), for which it didn't indicate which it was reporting.

²⁴ Two States Parties (Australia and Portugal) did not check either box to indicate whether it reported authorized or actual imports. One State Party (Montenegro) checked both boxes.

²⁵ The seven States Parties that reported authorized SALW imports are: Germany, Italy, Jamaica, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Spain, and Switzerland. The 19 States Parties that reported actual SALW imports are: Argentina, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The four States Parties that reported on both authorized and actual SALW imports are: Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, and Liechtenstein. Belgium, Estonia, and Liechtenstein reported authorizations for most, but not all, of their reported imports. In some cases, these States Parties reported actual imports.

²⁶ Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Portugal left the relevant boxes blank. Peru and Montenegro checked both boxes.

²⁷ The 30 States Parties that reported the number of items imported are: Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, and Jamaica, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, and Switzerland.

Figure 11: Hungary indicated that the number of assault rifles it imported from the Czech Republic was classified

4. Assault rifles		Authorised or actual imports [5]		Remarks [11]	
Extent of imports [6] (choose one or both)		Exporting State [9]	State of origin (if not exporter) [10]	Description of Item	Comments on the transfer
Number of items [7]	Value[8]				
	EUR - Euro				
classified		Czech Republic		CZ BREN2 assault rifles	for the Hungarian Defence Forces

One State Party reported the value of items imported while five States Parties reported both the number and value.²⁸ States Parties took varying approaches when reporting the number and value of imports, and not all States Parties that did so reported the number and value for both major conventional weapons imports and SALW imports. For example, Japan reported the number of major conventional weapons imports and the value of SALW imports, while Latvia reported the number of major conventional weapons imports and both the number and value of SALW imports.

Information on Exporting State

All 22 States Parties that reported on major conventional weapons imports provided information on the exporting State(s). Similarly, all 35 States Parties that reported on SALW imports provided information on the exporting State(s), though some did not do so for all transfers. For example, Australia did not provide exporting State information in the supplementary table that provided aggregated data on commercial firearms imports. Norway similarly did not include exporting State information for one of the two categories of SALW imports it reported. Additionally, Denmark wrote “multiple exporting States” for some transfers without listing the specific exporters. And while Jamaica did report the exporting States, it did so in aggregate, without indicating the number of items imported from each State. Such approaches result in omitted or aggregated information that hinders comprehensive understandings of arms trade dynamics, impedes evaluations of States Parties’ compliance with Articles 6 and 7 of the ATT, and limits meaningful transparency in the global arms trade.

Figure 12: Jamaica aggregated exporting States for its SALW exports

Category of arms ⁴ [I-VIII]	Authorised or actual imports ⁵		Extent of imports ⁶ (choose one or both)		Exporting State ⁹	State of origin (if not exporter) ¹⁰	Remarks ¹¹	
	Auth.	Act.	Number of items ⁷	Value ⁸			Description of Item	Comments on the transfer
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
B. VIII. Small Arms and Light Weapons^{14, 15}								
Small Arms (aggregated)¹⁶								
1.	Revolvers and self-loading pistols	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	8,331	Canada, USA, Panama, Czech Republic, Uruguay			
2.	Rifles and carbines	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	3,233	Canada, USA			
3.	Sub-machine guns	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	4	Canada			
4.	Assault rifles	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>					
5.	Light machine guns	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>					
6.	Others	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	930 (shotguns)	Canada, USA			

²⁸ Belgium reported the value of items imported. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Japan, Latvia, Peru, and Slovenia reported both the number and value.

► Origin of Conventional Arms, If Not Exporting State

Three of the 22 States Parties that reported on major conventional weapons imports provided information on the State of origin other than the exporting State.²⁹ Eight of the 35 States Parties that reported SALW imports provided information on the State of origin other than the exporting State.³⁰

► Description of Conventional Arms

Fifteen of the 22 States Parties that reported on major conventional weapons imports provided descriptions of the items imported.³¹ Twenty-one of the 35 States Parties that reported on SALW imports provided descriptions of the items imported.³²

Figure 13: Slovakia provided descriptions of the major conventional weapons it imported

Category of arms ⁴ [I-VIII]		Authorised or actual imports ⁵		Extent of imports ⁶ (choose one or both)		Exporting State ⁹	State of origin (if not exporter) ¹⁰	Remarks ¹¹	
		Auth.	Act.	Number of items ⁷	Value ⁸			Description of Item	Comments on the transfer
1		2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
III.	Large-calibre artillery systems	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	3		Czech Republic		155 mm 52 cal. ShKH ZUZANA 2	Return after testing
III.	Large-calibre artillery systems	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	2		Poland		155 mm KRAB ShKH	For testing
IV.	Combat aircraft	a) manned	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
		b) unmanned	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	1		Israel		AGLO I Mini UAV – 2 pcs in a set
V.	Attack helicopters	a) manned	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	3		United States		UH-60M BlackHawk
		b) unmanned	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		

► Comments on Transfer

Eleven of the 22 States Parties that reported on major conventional weapons imports provided comments on the transfer, while sixteen of the 35 States Parties that reported on SALW imports did so.³³ There are several examples of good practice in the comments provided in 2020 annual reports. For example, Australia used comments to explain how some of its reported imports relate to past or future imports, which supports greater understanding of how each transfer fits into broader or longer-term acquisition processes. Additionally, the Netherlands explained discrepancies in information provided in different national reports as a result of varying reporting deadlines, which could help eliminate confusion when analyzing their annual arms transfers based on information captured in multiple reports.

²⁹ The three States Parties that provided information on the State of origin other than the exporting State for major weapons imports are: Canada, Hungary, and Mexico.

³⁰ The eight States Parties that provided information on the State of origin other than the exporting State for SALW imports are: Argentina, Denmark, France, Hungary, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia.

³¹ The 15 States Parties that provided descriptions of the items imported for major weapons imports are: Australia, Chile, Canada, Hungary, Peru, Argentina, Estonia, Japan, Denmark, Mexico, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and the Netherlands.

³² The 21 States Parties that provided descriptions of the items imported for SALW imports are: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Montenegro, Netherlands, Peru, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

³³ The 11 States Parties that provided comments on the transfer for major weapons imports are: Australia, Chile, Canada, Hungary, Peru, Argentina, Estonia, Mexico, Slovakia, Netherlands, and Switzerland. The 16 that did so for SALW imports are: Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Montenegro, Norway, Peru, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

Figure 14: Australia provided comments on transfers for some of its major conventional weapons imports

Category of arms ⁴ [I-VIII]		Authorised or actual imports ⁵		Extent of imports ⁶ (choose one or both)		Exporting State ⁹	State of origin (if not exporter) ¹⁰	Remarks ¹¹	
		Auth.	Act.	Number of items ⁷	Value ⁸			Description of Item	Comments on the transfer
1		2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
II.	Armoured combat vehicles	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	10		Germany		Boxer 8x8 Combat Reconnaissance Vehicles	Initial vehicles part of LAND 400 Phase 2 Block I
III.	Large-calibre artillery systems	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	126		United States		M252A1 81mm Mortar	A total of 176 were procured, with the first 50 imported in 2019. The remaining 126 were imported in 2020.



PHOTO: FLICKR/IGNACIO FERRE PÉREZ

COMPARISON WITH 2020 UNROCA REPORTING

Article 13.3 of the ATT allows States Parties to submit their UNROCA report as their ATT annual report. This year, four States Parties (Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) have done so in varying ways for their 2020 ATT annual reports, providing information as captured in their 2020 UNROCA submissions. France used a format that closely resembles the UNROCA reporting form when submitting its 2020 ATT annual report, as it has done every year for the last six years. By comparison, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom submitted their UNROCA reports directly as their 2020 ATT annual reports – and the United Kingdom did so for arms exports that occurred in calendar years 2018 and 2019 as well. Canada incorporated elements of both the ATT annual reporting template and the UNROCA reporting form into its 2020 ATT annual report.

ATT States Parties continue to engage with UNROCA and ATT reporting in various ways. As of 17 September 2021, 30 ATT States Parties had submitted reports on their 2020 arms exports and imports to UNROCA, representing approximately 87 percent of all UNROCA reports submitted thus far.³⁴ A total of 35 UN Member States submitted 2020 UNROCA reports on arms exports, imports, and military holdings at the time of writing, compared to 33 UN Member States that had submitted 2019 UNROCA reports by this point last year.³⁵ As Figure 15 shows, the number of States Parties that have reported on their annual arms exports and imports under the ATT exceeds the number of UN Member States that have done so under UNROCA for each of the past six years.

Figure 15: UNROCA and ATT Annual Report Submissions


Report Year	Number of UNROCA Report Submissions	Number of ATT Annual Report Submissions
2015	42	54
2016	39	56
2017	47	60
2018	44	64
2019	38	63
2020	35	59

All but two of the 30 ATT States Parties that submitted 2020 UNROCA reports also submitted their 2020 ATT annual reports. The Republic of Moldova and Uruguay both submitted 2020 UNROCA reports but had yet to submit their 2020 ATT annual reports at the time of writing. In total, 28 ATT States Parties submitted both their 2020 ATT annual reports and their 2020 UNROCA annual reports as of 17 September 2021. Trends in reporting to ATT and/or UNROCA resemble those in previous years, in which ATT States Parties have often taken the opportunity to submit information on their annual arms exports and imports to both the ATT Secretariat and UNROCA. For more details on these reporting patterns, see Figure 16.

³⁴ The 30 ATT States Parties that submitted 2020 UNROCA reports by 17 September 2021 are: Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and Uruguay.

³⁵ The data on 2020 UNROCA reports included in this section are based on information provided in the UNROCA database, last accessed 17 September 2021, available at www.unroca.org. The authors recognize that some UNROCA reports are missing from the database.

Figure 16: ATT and UNROCA Reports Submitted by States Parties Required to Submit an ATT Annual Report



Four of the 28 States Parties that submitted 2020 reports under both the ATT and UNROCA (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, and Lithuania) submitted private 2020 ATT annual reports despite submitting 2020 UNROCA reports, which are publicly available. Cyprus, Greece, and Lithuania have repeatedly reported privately to the ATT and publicly to UNROCA in recent years. Indeed, as Figure 17 demonstrates, some States Parties have submitted private ATT annual reports despite reporting publicly under UNROCA for all but one of the past six years.

One State Party (Slovakia) submitted a private ATT annual report for 2015 arms exports and imports despite reporting publicly to UNROCA for that year and three States Parties did so for their 2017 (Argentina, Cyprus, and Greece), 2018 (Cyprus, Greece, and Lithuania), and 2019 reports (Greece, Kazakhstan, and Lithuania). This is a confusing trend, perhaps demonstrating a misunderstanding of the ATT’s reporting requirement. It may also be the case that States Parties that report to UNROCA but do not regularly include SALW transfers in these reports do not want to report publicly on SALW transfers in their ATT annual reports, and so submit private ATT reports instead. Cyprus, for example, only reported to UNROCA on its SALW transfers once, in its 2006 UNROCA report. It would be helpful to identify why these three States Parties make this choice repeatedly and see what measures could be taken to advance greater transparency in their reporting practices.

PHOTO: ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCES

Figure 17: Submissions of Private ATT Reports but Public UNROCA Reports in a Given Year

Reporting Year	Number of ATT States Parties
2015	1
2016	0
2017	3
2018	3
2019	3
2020	4

Overall, there is little difference between the information provided in the 2020 UNROCA and ATT annual reports for the 26 States Parties that reported publicly under both frameworks this year. However, as in years past, several States Parties that reported on SALW exports and imports in their ATT annual reports did not do so in their UNROCA reports. Specifically, two States Parties (Montenegro and Spain) reported on SALW exports and imports in their ATT annual reports but did not report on either in their UNROCA reports. Additionally, two States Parties (Japan and Latvia) reported on SALW exports and imports in their ATT annual reports but reported only on SALW imports in their UNROCA reports. There were also slight differences in the types of information States Parties provided in their reports. For example, Australia reported the value of its authorized exports in its ATT annual report and reported only the number in its UNROCA report. Additionally, Switzerland provided descriptions of items imported and exported in its UNROCA report but did not do so in its ATT annual report. It is worth noting that States are requested to provide information on actual exports and imports in their UNROCA reports – and to clearly indicate if they are reporting authorizations (though not all do so) – whereas they may report on actual or authorized exports and imports in their ATT annual reports. This may result in States Parties reporting on actual exports and imports in their UNROCA reports and authorizations in their ATT annual reports, which may account for some of the differences in reporting under the two frameworks.³⁶



³⁶ For additional insights on UNROCA requests for States to provide information on actual exports and imports – and indicate clearly if they are reporting authorizations – see: UN General Assembly, Report on the continuing operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and its further development, A/71/259 (29 July 2016), available from <https://undocs.org/A/71/259>; UN General Assembly, Report on the continuing operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and its further development, A/74/211 (22 July 2019), available from <https://undocs.org/A/74/211>.

CONCLUSION

After six years of ATT annual reporting, some enduring challenges can be observed.

First, compliance with the ATT's annual reporting requirement remains subpar, with the on-time compliance rate never exceeding 50 percent and with an average compliance rate of only approximately two-thirds of obliged States Parties reporting since 2016. There simultaneously is an increasing trend towards private reporting, with more States Parties than ever before – and the highest share of reports to date, at 29 percent – opting to submit their reports privately. Taken together, declining reporting compliance and increased private reporting risk undermining the treaty's objective of transparency and confidence building in the global arms trade.

There also seems to be continued confusion among some States Parties on how to report, which may reflect challenges wrought by the reporting templates themselves as well as institutional challenges within national governments.³⁷ For several States Parties, it remains difficult to discern whether they reported authorizations or actual exports/imports in instances where they checked both boxes for a single transfer or, alternatively, left the relevant boxes blank. For other States Parties, it seems as though information may have mistakenly been entered into the wrong column or tick boxes, creating uncertainty as to how to interpret the information provided.³⁸ These uncertainties and discrepancies can compound existing challenges in analyzing and comparing export and import data across States Parties and dilute understandings of arms trade trends.

Finally, the aggregation of key datapoints poses an ongoing challenge. Nine States Parties aggregated information in their 2020 annual reports in ways that significantly limit understandings of their arms exports and imports (Australia, Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Jamaica, Latvia, Luxembourg, and Norway). For example, Austria provided aggregated information on its SALW exports without utilizing the SALW sub-categories to indicate the specific types of SALW it exported. Denmark aggregated importing and exporting State information for certain SALW transfers, making it unclear how many SALW were imported to or exported from each State. And as noted above, Norway listed “various EU countries” as the States of origin for one of its categories of SALW exports without specifying which countries it was referring to. Data aggregation is a continuing trend in ATT annual reporting. Every year, some States Parties aggregate information on importing and/or exporting States as well as, at times, details on the number or value of a given export or import – making it impossible to discern how many or how much of a given item went to a given State. Such aggregation further complicates analysis of the global arms trade and transfers of concern with regard to the overall purpose and objective of the treaty, which include reducing human suffering and contributing to international and regional peace, security, and stability.

³⁷ For a more detailed examination of the challenges posed by the ATT reporting templates, see: Arms Trade Treaty Baseline Assessment Project, *The ATT Reporting Templates: Challenges and Recommendations*, January 2020, http://www.armstrade.info/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Reporting-Templates-Challenges-and-Recommendations_Web-Version.pdf. For an overview of reporting challenges identified by States Parties, see: Arms Trade Treaty Baseline Assessment Project, *Factsheet on ATT Reporting Challenges*, August 2021, http://www.armstrade.info/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/ATT-Factsheets_Reporting-Challenges.pdf.

³⁸ For example, in Germany's 2020 annual report, importing States seem to have been mistakenly entered under the “value” column for two categories of major conventional weapons exports. And in Norway's 2020 report, where the State Party reported on ammunition exports under voluntary national categories, it appears as though the word “ammunition” may have been mistakenly entered into the wrong column, which may cause the other information provided to appear in the wrong column.

Although the trends surrounding ATT annual reporting are on a downward trajectory, there is some hope that circumstances may improve. Ongoing responses to, and positive resolutions of, disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic provides an opportunity for States Parties to resume and refresh their reporting practices. Moreover, the Seventh Conference of States Parties to the ATT adopted revised reporting templates for States Parties to use in subsequent years.³⁹ The changes to the annual reporting template may spur States Parties to provide more comprehensive information in their reports and to avoid misunderstandings in their provision of data. Lastly, there are numerous mechanisms for States Parties to acquire assistance to support their reporting efforts. States Parties can utilize the reporting FAQ developed by the Working Group on Transparency and Reporting, apply for a grant from the Voluntary Trust Fund to support reporting, or take advantage of numerous civil society reporting resources. Additionally, following a decision adopted by the Council of the European Union in April 2021, the EU will provide new funding to train local and regional ATT experts to deliver implementation assistance, create a database to match implementation needs and resources, and build IT and communications mechanisms to enhance cooperation between States Parties and the ATT Secretariat.⁴⁰ In short, more than ever, States Parties committed to reporting can get the help they need to do so effectively. The first six years of ATT annual reporting have provided many lessons about reporting practices and inclinations. Looking to the future, States Parties and ATT bodies – including the Secretariat and relevant working groups – should be well positioned to address the challenges and obstacles that have been identified and ensure that momentum towards reporting advances.



³⁹ For the revised reporting templates that were adopted at CSP7, see: Arms Trade Treaty, Seventh Conference of States Parties, Final Report, 2 September 2021, [https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/CSP7%20Final%20Report%20\(ATT.CSP7.2021.SEC.681.Con.FinRep.Rev1\)%20-%2002%20September%202021/CSP7%20Final%20Report%20\(ATT.CSP7.2021.SEC.681.Con.FinRep.Rev1\)%20-%2002%20September%202021.pdf](https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/CSP7%20Final%20Report%20(ATT.CSP7.2021.SEC.681.Con.FinRep.Rev1)%20-%2002%20September%202021/CSP7%20Final%20Report%20(ATT.CSP7.2021.SEC.681.Con.FinRep.Rev1)%20-%2002%20September%202021.pdf).

⁴⁰ Council of the European Union, “Arms Trade Treaty: EU steps up support in fight against illicit arms trade,” 16 April 2021, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/04/16/arms-trade-treaty-eu-steps-up-support-in-fight-against-illicit-arms-trade/>.



ARMSTRADE.INFO

STIMSON

Since its inception, the Stimson Center's Arms Trade Treaty-Baseline Assessment Project has been generously funded by the Governments of Australia, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, as well as UNSCAR (the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation). In addition, the project has engaged in partnerships with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs and its regional centers, regional organizations (including CARICOM and the European Union), and civil society organizations, including the Center for Armed Violence Reduction (CAVR), Control Arms, and the ATT Monitor. For more information, visit the Arms Trade Treaty-Baseline Assessment Project Portal at www.armstrade.info or contact us at ATT@stimson.org.

Rachel Stohl: rstohl@stimson.org

©2021 ATT-Baseline Assessment Project.

All rights reserved.

Produced by Masters Group Design



PHOTO: U.S. AIR FORCE