

**Japan-Taiwan Relations: Opportunities and Challenges  
Report Launch Webinar**

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TRANSCRIPT

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**YUKI TATSUMI**

This is one of the mini series of the Views from the Next Generation report that the Stimson has been collaborating with Embassy of Japan for the last seven to eight years. We're going to get started in just a few minutes, but I am going to allow all the webinar attendees to get an access to this site. Give us a couple of minutes and then we'll get started.

Okay, I think people may be trickling in later but since we only have an hour, I would like to get started. Again, welcome. Good morning to those of you who are tuning in from the United States and good evening for those of you who are tuning in from Japan and other parts of Asia. My name is Yuki Tatsumi. I'm a co-director of East Asia Program and director of Japan Program here at Stimson Center in Washington, DC.

Since the Japan Program has had the pleasure of collaborating with Embassy of Japan try to promote the policy works of the rising generation of scholars, this year was no exception. We focused on Japan-Taiwan relations this year. I'm very, very happy to launch this report with the excellent lineup of the authors who contributed very wonderful pieces.

I would like to turn to each author to briefly speak about their paper. We will go in order of the chapters of this book. And then after that, we will go to a Q&A.

The book cover that you're seeing on the screen right now is actually cover of the book, which is already available at Stimson's website at HTML format, but it would also be available shortly in the PDF format as well. Please do feel free to go and browse and download.

I think I would like to quickly introduce each of the authors and the topic of the policy paper that they work on. I would first start with Dr. Madoka Fukuda who will talk about the overarching review of the history of Japan-Taiwan relations. And then I'll turn to Dr. Kayo Takuma, who will talk about the public health angle of the Japan-Taiwan. And then moving on to Mr. Takahisa Kawaguchi who will talk about the disinformation and how Japan and Taiwan can cooperate on

the disinformation campaign from the potential adversaries. We will finish off with Ms. Yuka Koshino who will talk about potential cooperation between Japan and Taiwan in the digital economy sphere. Without further ado, I would turn to Dr. Fukuda.

## **MADOKA FUKUDA**

Can you hear me? Thank you for inviting me to this program. I am Madoka Fukuda from Hosei University in Japan. Today, I'd like to share my views on... Excuse me. Today, I'd like to share my views on recent Japan-Taiwan relations and provide some policy recommendations. At first, I'd like to share a brief survey of recent Japan-Taiwan relations.

Although there was strong emotional ties between both people or political leaders, there were not many political breakthrough between Japan and Taiwan. This structure has basically not changed, even though Japanese Prime Minister Suga has succeeded Abe. Why have Japan and Taiwan made no breakthroughs, especially since the latter half of 2017? I think it is useful to analyze it from three dimensions: international relations, interactions between Japanese and Taiwanese societies and pressures from both domestic politics.

First, international relations. The progress of relationship between Japan and Taiwan has been consistent with the 1972 Sino-Japanese agreement. So, it is undeniable that their cooperation has been occasionally dependent on the reaction of the Chinese government. In this context, in 2017 Prime Minister Abe began an attempt to improve relations with China. It became risky to make a political breakthrough with Tsai because Chinese government had hostility towards her policies.

Secondly, the importance of having no official diplomatic relationship has been declining in the context of social interaction between Japan and Taiwan. In recent years, the dialogues and agreements significant to the people of Japan and Taiwan have not been on matters of power, politics, and security, but in the area of the economy, culture, and people-to-people relations.

Third, as a result of cross-economic and culture exchanges today, domestic factors have complicated the relationship. In Taiwanese politics, issues related to Japan often lead to controversy because they reflect the different political attitudes between the DPP and the KMT. In recent years, both parties have made a political issue of a ban on food imports from Fukushima, Japan and five surrounding prefectures. But many Japanese can't understand these debates well, as they purely believe the pro-Japan image of Taiwanese people. As a result, when President Tsai was elected in January 2020, it was logical to consider that the Japan-Taiwan relationship during her second term couldn't significantly improve, considering the trends within her first term. However, the COVID-19 outbreak has brought a new faith to the relationship.

First, in the international context, the COVID-19 pandemic partially changed Japan's policies towards China. Japan's attitude towards China deteriorated last spring in response to China's propaganda campaign and aggressive politico-military operations in the region under the COVID crisis. Secondly, in the context of bilateral relations, Japanese appraisal and confidence in Taiwan's epidemic prevention politics increased. Therefore, for improving Japan-Taiwan

relations, it will be critical for both governments to control their complex domestic factors such as our food ban issue.

What are possible developments of Japan-Taiwan relations for the near future? Japan and Taiwan have already signed a number of practical agreements in the last decade. It has been politically difficult to improve remaining agendas such as Taiwan's participation in the CPTPP, the conclusion of bilateral FTA or EPA, or different cooperation against China's growing military presence. These agendas are most likely under China's watchful eyes than previous practical agreements.

As policy recommendations, I'd like to try to figure out the blueprint for the two biggest agendas in the last two decades, Japan-Taiwan cooperation for economic partnership and security in the region. Looking back on discussion on the economic partnership, it is clear that the food ban issue has inhibited the discussion on it. However, it is also important to clarify Japan and Taiwan's priorities from economic or political perspectives. In the process, Taiwan needs to consider how to lift restrictions on food imports from Japan. Japan needs to consider if there are options that would not require the issue of food imports as a precondition for improving economic partnership with Taiwan.

Although Japan-Taiwan cooperation in the area of security is the most sensitive issue, Japanese debate on possible Taiwan Strait crisis is increasing, facing China's recent provocative behaviors in the region. If Japan strengthens its participation, it should be within the framework of the alliance with the United States. As another issue, Japan and Taiwan each face China's gradual change of the status quo by force in the East and South China Seas.

Finally, for improving such a cooperation, I think it is important to deepen understanding of Japan-Taiwan ties among Diet members and civil societies, especially in Japan. There are still many voices of caution in the Diet on strengthening political ties with Taiwan, considering possible oppositions from China. And, it is desirable that Japanese people have more discussions on what kind of relations they will have with Taiwan. That's all for my brief presentation. Thank you for your attention.

## **TATSUMI**

Thank you, Fukuda-san. Before I move to turn to Takuma-san, I'd like to remind everyone that once the question and answer session starts, please use the Q&A box at the bottom of the screen. If you can write specifically for which author you would like to pose a question or if you would like to pose it to everybody, please make that clear as well.

With that, I would like to turn to Takuma-san who will talk about the really important aspect of Japan-Taiwan relationship, especially given the recent evolution of COVID-19 responses. Takuma-san, go ahead.

## **KAYO TAKUMA**

Okay, thank you. Good morning or good evening, everyone. I'm Kayo Takuma from Tokyo Metropolitan University. First, I would like to express my deepest appreciation for everyone who organized and prepared for this webinar, and especially thanks to Yuki and Pamela who supported me a lot through this project. Thank you everyone for participating this webinar.

Actually, I once declined the offer for this project because I thought I was too busy to spend enough time on this project. But now, I sincerely think the project was worth effort. I sincerely appreciate this chance to join this project. Thank you very much. Let me share my PowerPoint.

I have just seven minutes, so let me start my presentation. While the world still have difficulty with coping with COVID-19, Taiwan has been a remarkable success story in fighting against COVID-19. It would be great to share Taiwan's experience and incorporate Taiwan into global cooperative framework. The reality is, however, Taiwan is excluded from any form of cooperative system. This paper examines the need for Japan's cooperation with Taiwan and explores how this cooperation can be achieved.

Let me begin with the first section, in which I explain why regional health cooperation is necessary. Pandemic preparedness should be conducted at the global level. However, as this pandemic shows, global cooperative system is far from perfect and is now being overhauled. Thus, regional cooperation is all the more important in the post-COVID-19 era.

Indeed, the EU recently moved forward to establish the European Health Union. African Union also has developed its regional cooperation regarding the supply of medical supplies or vaccines. Such a system would be useful, as a regional cooperative system would benefit countries' preparedness. In addition, this system would reinforce the shortcomings of the global cooperative system.

Since—sorry. It would be desirable to include Taiwan in such a regional cooperative system. However, Taiwan is excluded from any types of cooperative system. Since 2009, Taiwan has attended as an observer under the name Chinese Taipei, based on an agreement between the government of the then-president Ma Ying-jeou, the government in Beijing and the WHO, which was led at that time by Margaret Chan, a Hong Kong national. In 2016, when Tsai Ing-wen was elected the new president, the Tsai administration announced that it did not accept the condition proposed by the WHO. Since then, Taiwan has been excluded from the global cooperative structure. At the World Health Assembly held in November of last year, member countries agreed to set aside the contentious issue of restoring Taiwan's observer status to focus on the immediate challenges posed by COVID-19 and the WHO reform.

Given the existing circumstances, support from other countries is crucial for breaking the deadlock. Among many, the United States and Japan would be the most reliable partners for Taiwan. In August of last year, the then-Health and Human Services secretary Alex Azar met with Tsai Ing-wen. They reiterated the longstanding cooperation between the U.S. and Taiwan and their shared democratic values. U.S. backing represent a solid step forward for the

realization of Taiwan's participation in global health framework. However, the U.S.-Taiwan approach may be understood in the context of the U.S.-China confrontation.

Since 1972, the U.S. government has refrained from contact with Taiwanese government officials in deference to the Chinese Communist Party. However, the Trump administration broke this rule. Thus, the U.S.-Taiwan cooperation does not necessarily offer a model for Japan-Taiwan cooperation.

However, Japan would unquestionably be another key player in ensuring Taiwan's inclusion in health cooperative scheme. First, Taiwan and Japan share fundamental values such as freedom, democracy and basic human rights, and enjoy cross-economic relations and people-to-people exchanges. The Japan-Taiwan relationship has been maintained at the nongovernmental level in accordance with the 1972 Joint Communiqué between Japan and China. The sentiment of Japanese and Taiwanese citizens toward—each other generally favorable. This chart shows about 37% of Taiwanese say as a country, Taiwan should stay friendly from now on with Japan.

In addition to Japan's consistent support to ensure Taiwan's participation as an observer in the World Health Assembly, Japan and Taiwan have developed cooperation in the field of health. Japan's National Institute of Infectious Diseases has hosted Japan-Taiwan Symposium, a symposium on infectious diseases, every year since 2004.

Thus, Japan and Taiwan can force their cooperation in aspects such as exchange of researchers and establishment of information-sharing or early-alert system through Japan's National Institute and Taiwan's CDC. Furthermore, they can collaborate in developing medicines or vaccines for future possible diseases. Such effort would not only benefit Japan's preparedness, but also reinforce the global cooperative system. That's all from my part. Thank you for your attention.

## **TATSUMI**

Thank you, Takuma-san. Next up, moving on to Kawaguchi-san who will focus on the response to a disinformation campaign.

## **TAKAHISA KAWAGUCHI**

Can you see my PowerPoint? Okay. Good morning and good evening, everyone. Thank you for inviting me, Tatsumi-san, Pamela-san. Once again, my name is Taka Kawaguchi for Tokio Marine Risk Consulting. My chapter focuses on disinformation or unreliable information in digital space. As everyone knows, disinformation has devastating effects through cyber space, putting open societies and democracies at stake. Today, I'd like to talk about the Japan-Taiwan cooperation against disinformation in digital age.

First, my paper defines disinformation as a usage of unreliable information by foreign governments to influence another country politically. This means that disinformation is not necessarily false information or fake news. Our adversaries often use entirely accurate information, but twist the context intentionally.

So far, Taiwan has been exposed to a large amount of disinformation from Beijing during the Taiwanese presidential election of 2020, the local general elections of 2018, and also during the COVID-19 crisis and their difficult relationship with the head of the WHO since January of 2020. As a result, fortunately or unfortunately Taipei has made remarkable strides in responding to disinformation. Specifically, Taipei had revised provisions of relevant laws and strengthened fact-checking posture in the communication app LINE, in particular.

LINE, instead of WhatsApp, is the most famous messaging app in Taiwan. Over 95% of Taiwanese use LINE to communicate with others. The elderly, in particular, use LINE to get news. Coincidentally, LINE's also the most famous app in Japan. This means that the main battlefield of disinformation is not only on open social media including Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram, but also across private communication apps. According to Taiwanese cybersecurity company TeamT5, they can find disinformation on LINE during the presidential election in Taiwan.

Next, how about Japan? Unfortunately, Tokyo does not seem to consider disinformation as a major threat to national security. Indeed, the Japanese government has begun to take action. In October of 2018, Japan's Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications established an expert panel on digital platforms. The panel had examined how to deal with fake news and issued their final report in February of 2020. The report concluded that Japanese government should encourage voluntary efforts by digital platform to combat fake news. However, the report overlooked or underestimated the disinformation by foreign governments and its impact on Japan's national security.

Along with these two countries, the United States has weathered a number of widespread conspiracy theories or terrible amounts of disinformation about the 2020 presidential election. I think the most devastating one was a story of election fraud. Of course, the story was created or inspired domestically, but from my research, I can confirm that Russian media outlet spread this story on U.S. social media. This shows that it's very difficult to make a clear distinction between unreliable information spreading spontaneously and disinformation disseminated by foreign governments intentionally. In order to clarify the differences, we have to attribute specific disinformation to a specific adversary or responsible government. Anyway, however, democracies including Taiwan, Japan, and the U.S. have to combat disinformation without violating the freedom of speech and expression.

We have to remember about China's influence operation in cyberspace. There's a lot of accumulation about Russia's active measures mainly in the U.S. and European countries, but not about China's. With regards to disinformation, Moscow and Beijing are quite different. Moreover, Beijing adapts different goals and tactics towards Taipei, Tokyo, and Washington.

Finally, I'd like to propose two points. First, these three democracies should create a coalition with other democratic nations to promote cross-cooperation, specifically in the field of threat

intelligence, cyber attribution, and coordinated countermeasures, including financial sanctions and criminal prosecution. Second, these three governments should encourage the private sector's efforts to control disinformation, including digital platforms and fact-checking bodies. Cross-national digital platforms are particularly important. Their best practices adapted in one specific country should be implemented in other democratic country. That's all for my presentation. Thank you.

## **TATSUMI**

Thank you, Kawaguchi-san. Finally, I would like to turn to Koshino-san who will talk about the digital economy in Japan and Taiwan.

## **YUKA KOSHINO**

Thank you very much, Tatsumi-san, for a kind introduction. Thank you very much also for Pam and the Stimson Center for support throughout the project. It was my honor to contribute to this project.

I wrote a piece with a title called "The Japan-Taiwan Cooperation Towards an Open, Interoperable, Reliable and Secure Digital Economy." Some of you may have noticed that this is a phrase that has been used by the United States and Japan under its Policy Cooperation Dialogue on the Internet Economy. Thus, the goal of the paper was first, to contextualize Taiwan in the ongoing U.S.-Japan cooperation under the Digital Connectivity pillar of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, and also, but secondly, and most importantly, to address the need for a closer government-level policy coordination and cooperation between Tokyo and Taipei, given the importance of the two players in the global ICT supply chain, and the importance to enhance the security of the technological and manufacturing capabilities of critical technologies such as semiconductor. I also wanted to note when I say digital economy, the paper I wrote focuses on the key digital infrastructure such as 5G and technologies and services and roles that are likely to shape the foundations of the digital economy in the coming decades.

In these opening remarks, I'm sorry I don't have PowerPoint slides but I will provide a high-level summary of the three sections of my chapter, which is the drivers of cooperation and four identified areas of cooperation. We'll end with several policy recommendations.

There are three major trends that are driving cooperation between Tokyo and Taipei. First is the geopolitical challenges from China's rise in digital space. To begin with, China's increasing use and exploitations of networks beyond the military space to civil and commercial space to gain competitive advantage over information and technology is really driving the two governments. Also, the rapid deployment and spread of Chinese network systems like 5G or ecommerce and surveillance systems under the state-led Digital Silk Road, which is the digital dimension of the Belt and Road Initiative which... It's undermining the security of the world's largest digital economy in the Indo-Pacific region, and also raising concerns about promoting data protectionism along with the promotion of its digital infrastructure.

Second is the economic security challenges that are driving the cooperation. The economic security challenges are also increasing the roles of governments to enhance economic security, especially under the U.S.-China strategic competition that has been intensifying especially under the Xi Jinping and Trump era and also the COVID-19 pandemic. At the time I was writing the piece, the Trump administration was intensifying the so-called digital decoupling from China through taking pretty much unilateral policies to strengthen export controls or adding Huawei to the Commerce Department's Entity List or launching the Clean Network Initiatives to exclude Chinese vendors, oftentimes without the consultations of Tokyo or Taipei. COVID-19 was also challenging the global supply chain of semiconductor productions. And now most recently, Admiral Davidson has warned that China could, for instance, invade Taiwan in the next six years, suggesting that there's a severe economic security risk of the concentration of semiconductor, which is a critical technology in Taiwan.

These are all driving the government-led responses. And quite an aggressive industrial policy, especially by the western governments in Europe and United States, such as the massive subsidies to bring back and restore manufacturing capabilities of semiconductors. These create context for a government-led strategy, especially on the Japanese side, and need for cooperation beyond the industry levels. Third is the diplomatic context to prevent Taiwan's isolation from key multilateral and plurilateral groups, as like-minded democracies that many of the previous panelists has mentioned. I would like to expand that in the recommendation section.

Against this backdrop, there were four major identified areas where Taipei and Tokyo have potential to step up cooperation in. The first area is in the network security and resiliency, especially on the 5G front. Both Taiwan and Tokyo were early to exclude Huawei and Chinese vendors from its own 5G networks due to security concerns, but their approaches to promote network resiliency were quite different. Japan has been leading globally on the multi-vendor solution of the network called the promotion of open architecture, especially in the RAN system, to increase vendor diversity, while Taiwan is still relying heavily on two vendors such as Ericsson and Nokia.

Second area is that both governments are boosting domestic technological and industrial capabilities. On Japan, under the Abe administration in 2020 launched a new deal and secured a series of R&D funding of more than two trillion yen from the end of fiscal year 2019 to 2021 on areas such as 5G, AI, and, most importantly, on semiconductors. In Taiwan, on the other hand, goes back in 2016, launched a 5+2 industrial strategy to shift Taiwan's information and communications industrial model to focus more and higher up in the digital ecosystem, such as the software side or the digital platform sides. An example is the Asia Silicon Valley project, for instance, is a good example on Taiwan's effort in that front.

The third is the rules and norms building dimension that some other panelists have also mentioned as well. But on the digital side, the CPTPP, which Japan championed, in the conclusion of the agreement included the ecommerce chapter for the first time. Japan also championed the cross-border data flow rules under the Data Free Flow with Trust principles, which was agreed by many countries in the G20 Osaka summit, which is now continued under

the Joint Statement Initiative on ecommerce under the WTO which both Taiwan and Taipei supports. As the chair of CPTPP this year, Japan has an opportunity. There's a growing momentum to include Taiwan to join the CPTPP.

The final area is the bilateral, trilateral and plurilateral cooperation with the United States. One of the major challenges that some other panelists has mentioned for Japan really was the political element. Since 1972, Japan has maintained a nongovernmental cooperation with Taiwan. Discussions on security, including cyberspace, has been very sensitive, yet new venues and forums are creating opportunities for further engagement. In particular, the Japan's formal participation in 2019 in the Global Cooperation and Training Framework, GCTF, established between the United States and Taiwan in 2015, has been facilitating Tokyo's engagement with Taiwan on digital issues around 5G or IP theft or digital economy. The three governments are also hosted most recently the Trilateral Indo-Pacific Security Dialogue, for instance, in October 2020.

I would like to raise five broad policy recommendations for further cooperation, especially in these identified areas. First is on the network security resiliency. As I mentioned, because Taiwan has been relying heavily on very specific... I mean, two vendors, I think that there's an opportunity for Tokyo and Taipei to jointly pursue the 5G open architecture through R&D to ensure the interoperability between different vendors.

Second is to use legislative members groups, for instance, to overcome the political barriers that I mentioned to promote discussions on some of the sensitive areas such as information exchange or training on cybersecurity. Third is to pursue joint R&Ds in advanced semiconductor on the design side and the manufacturing side, which Japan and Taipei both have interest in, to enhance the security and resiliency of the semiconductor manufacturing production lines for the two sides, but also part of their effort under their respective technology and industrial policies. The fourth is to protect, related to that, is the protection of technology and talent outflow to China, which has been gaining increasing attention, to protect and boost its industrial capabilities that I mentioned.

And finally, is assisting Taiwan's participation in the various plurilateral or multilateral venues, especially to prevent the spread of data protectionism which has been spreading with the Chinese digital infrastructure expansion such as, as I mentioned, as a chair starting the discussions with including Taiwan in the CPTPP. Now, I will stop there for now. I look forward to further discussions in the Q&A section.

## **TATSUMI**

Thank you, Koshino-san. I will get right into the Q&A. There are already several question flowing in. Fukuda-san is getting a head start by typing back her answer to some of those. I know Fukuda-san had already replied to couple of these, but I think other people may want to chime in, too.

The very first question that came up was, what's the greatest opportunity for investment/economic activity in the future between Japan and Taiwan? I know Fukuda-san had already identified maybe medium-size enterprises especially in third countries in Southeast Asia and then maybe tourism, but I wonder if Koshino-san had any additional thoughts on this?

**KOSHINO**

Sure. I think I also touched on my presentation, but I think one area especially with growing interest on Japan's side is investment from Taiwan's semiconductor companies in Japan and maybe a focus more on the... Japan has a strategy called the post-5G semiconductor, but more on the advanced side of the semiconductor and cooperation with the design side. As I mentioned, this has not happened yet, but the growing possibility of maybe Japanese telecommunications vendors' investments in Taiwan to help the network resilience and security of 5G in Taiwan.

**TATSUMI**

Thank you. Kawaguchi-san, there was another question about perhaps Japan's relationship between Japanese two bureaucracies when it comes to Taiwanese digital security bureaucracies. I know Fukuda-san had already answered that partially, but I wonder if you had additional thoughts on this one. Kawaguchi-san, we cannot hear you for some reason.

**KAWAGUCHI**

Very sorry. Thank you for asking. Based on publicly available information, I'm not sure there is official cooperation between security, law enforcement organization, and so on. But I confirmed that the U.S., Taiwan, and Japan conducted multilateral tabletop exercise in the field of cybersecurity, disinformation, and so on. This indicated that there might be a bit of cooperation between such organization. This is my answer.

**TATSUMI**

Thank you. Takuma-san, there was one question coming in from actually my colleague at Stimson who's listening in. How could the United States better engage with Japan and Taiwan to support Japan-Taiwan cooperation on cross-border issues like global health?

**TAKUMA**

Excuse me, could you repeat the question?

**TATSUMI**

Yes. What can United States do to facilitate or better engage with Japan and Taiwan to support Japan-Taiwan cooperation in the area of public health?

**TAKUMA**

Yes. I think that the United States is a special country for Taiwan, especially in terms of security. The United States is the most involved, most influential actor in the field of health, so I think that the U.S. backing and U.S. support would be facilitating any kind of relationship and activity.

**TATSUMI**

Thank you. Next one is a question maybe Fukuda-san may be in the middle of answering this. But there was a question for Fukuda-san and Koshino-san on the update on the CPTPP, so the timetable and plan for engagement with Taiwan in this framework. And also, if either of you have any thoughts of prospect of United States almost returning, so to speak, coming back into CPTPP. But then finally, if either of you have any thoughts on a roadmap or strategy for Taiwan's potential joining into CPTPP. I think I would start with Fukuda-san and then ask Koshino-san for her additional thought.

## **FUKUDA**

I just send my answer on chat, but in my understanding there is... For the first question, in my understanding, there is no concrete timetable. But if Taiwanese government is ready for application, it will be possible for other countries to enrich CPTPP. I think there are many problems to solve before application in Taiwan. For the second question, I think it is—the United States join in the CPTPP, and I personally think it would be difficult under the current situation, especially considering domestic situation in the United States. For the third question about a roadmap or strategy for Taiwan's entry, I think it depends on Taiwanese government. But I personally think it is better for Taiwan to apply earlier than mainland China. Thank you.

## **TATSUMI**

Thank you. Koshino-san, any additional thought?

## **KOSHINO**

I don't have much to add to Fukuda-sensei's comments, but I think I just wanted to emphasize the fact that this year, Japan is chair and that there's opportunity for Japan. I think Japan's representation in Taiwan has expressed interest on engaging with Taiwan on this issue. And also, just some second point that there's kind of a regional momentum to expand memberships. UK has applied for the membership, for instance, so there is already a discussions about expanding memberships. I've seen that in the Australian Parliament there is a inquiry, for instance, right now about the discussions of expanding and which countries that needs to be expanded. This year, I just wanted to highlight that. There's probably going to be increased discussions about which member that these countries in CPTPP should expand, and probably Taiwan, because of the growing importance in the global technology supply chain, I'm sure there will be more increased discussions about Taiwan's inclusion as well.

## **TATSUMI**

Thank you. Next question, I think this is for anyone who would like to answer. So authors, you have to wave your hands or something if you want to take first tackle to it. Simple, but very difficult one to answer. What would Japan do if China invades Taiwan? Will we see a Japanese destroyer in Taiwan Strait? Anyone who's brave enough to tackle that one?

I think I would then ask maybe initial thoughts on this to maybe Fukuda-san, maybe? And then if Kawaguchi-san or Koshino-san wants to add their thoughts on it, please feel free. I'll start with you, Fukuda-san.

## **FUKUDA**

Okay. Thank you for the question. For me, this is the most difficult to talk about the Japan-Taiwan relationship. But as I presented, I think Japan will cooperate through the alliance with the United States. It is really difficult for Japan to independently do something in the Taiwan Strait about the security issue. For this question, I can only answer it depends on the situation. Thank you.

**TATSUMI**

Koshino-san, any thoughts? Or Kawaguchi-san, go ahead.

**KAWAGUCHI**

I think it's very difficult question for me, too. But the Taiwan Strait crisis will definitely affect the security circumstances in Japan, so I think the Japanese government should determine the crisis as the situation. It's very crisis to Japan, and Japan should consider to exercise collective security rights. Thank you.

**TATSUMI**

Thanks. Let me actually move on to next question. There's so many questions. I think this might be more of a Koshino-san question. It's from Michael Fonte, who asked, How much room is there for Japan, Taiwan, and the U.S. Development Finance Corporation to development joint sustainable development program, particularly in the areas like Pacific islands?

**KOSHINO**

I think that's a very important question. I think it's more about probably the U.S.-Japan cooperation and the use of the financing tools to support maybe the countries and Pacific islands that are more friendly and has diplomatic relations with Taiwan. I saw an opportunity when there was a case I actually included in my paper, but there was a financing by the U.S. DCF, I think, on the undersea cables in Palau. That is a sign that there's a way and there's a tool for U.S. and Japan to indirectly support Taiwan, to prevent Taiwan from isolating, to the like-minded countries. I would say that not necessarily with the Japan-U.S.-Taiwan financing cooperation, but the U.S. and Japan has tools to support the countries that have relationships with Taiwan. I think I'll stop there.

**TATSUMI**

Thank you, Koshino-san. Takuma-san, there is one question for you. To the best of your knowledge, are there any projects or initiatives on cooperation of vaccines, not just for COVID-19, but maybe other potential infectious disease between Japan and Taiwan?

**TAKUMA**

As far as I know, there is no outstanding movement between Taiwan and Japan regarding vaccine, except the fact that they are both the member of COVAX Facility. Actually in Japan, the vaccine industry has not developed because of various problems. Japan mainly depends on the foreign vaccine. As far as I know, there is no outstanding movement.

**TATSUMI**

Thank you. Next question is for Fukuda-san. This is from Andrew Oros from Washington College. Good morning, Andrew. Would you please expand on your recommendation that the Japan expand security cooperation with Taiwan in the context of U.S.-Japan alliance? If you can be slightly more specific, what specific areas do you have in mind? If Koshino-san or Kawaguchi-san will also like to add their thoughts on it, I'll welcome that after Fukuda-san.

### **FUKUDA**

Maybe as you know now, the exchange between Japan and Taiwan in the area of defense and security is very low key, just exchange of the Diet or officials of Self-Defense Force. But as I mentioned in my paper, I think it is really important to share the information about Chinese behavior and military forces in the East and South China Sea. So, I think the first step should be such kinds of exchanges between... How to say? In the framework of the trilateral between Japan and United States and Taiwan. And then, they can develop their exchanges and cooperation into more high-level issues. Thank you.

### **TATSUMI**

Kawaguchi-san, Koshino-san, any additional thoughts that you have on it? If not, I can move on to other questions. This is probably more of Fukuda-sensei's question again, but... Where was it? This is from Joe Ross. Masahisa Sato, a member of the LDP, announced the creation of a Taiwan working group a few weeks ago. Does it reflect the growing sentiment, in your view, within the LDP to support Taiwan? How much does that matter compared to the cabinet-level support which you mentioned has been a little bit more politically sensitive?

### **FUKUDA**

Looking back the history between Japan and Taiwan, there are many of these kinds of small group in Diet for exchanging with Taiwanese lawmakers. But the problem I mentioned in my paper is this activity of the small groups don't develop into the mainstream of the discussions in the Diet. So I think it is the key how to enlarge these kinds of discussions in the LDP or in the Diet.

### **TATSUMI**

Thank you, Fukuda-san. So in that context, earlier this month Japanese Defense Minister Kishi during his press conference warned that balance of power in the Taiwan Strait is changing in China's favor. There's another Japanese newspaper also published an article about a Japanese lawmaker wants Japanese version of Taiwan Relations Act. This actually attracted a lot of attention after it was translated into English and got on to the English-based media.

In your view, does this suggest that maybe what you mentioned in response to the last question that all these sorts of movements by the working group really hasn't gotten into the mainstream? Does comments like Defense Minister Kishi, or couple of days ago the 2+2 statement between U.S. and Japan Taiwan was specifically mentioned as the two countries' focus, shared interest, in your view, does this kind of evolve into perhaps Japan's growing support for Taiwan is more getting into the mainstream political discourse amongst the Japanese politicians?

### **FUKUDA**

Yes. As I presented, these kinds of discussions is actually now increasing. Many politician and scholars and many people have a sense of... How to say? Have an interest in the recent situation in the Taiwan Strait and begin to think what to do against Chinese behaviors. How to say? As Tatsumi-san mentioned, I think... How do you say? These kinds of discussion will be evolving, but I personally think it is still not that mainstream in the LDP and the Diet.

## **TATSUMI**

Thank you, Fukuda-san. Koshino-san, this may be the question for you, primarily, but perhaps Kawaguchi-san as well. This is from Darrell Rico Doss. What's the best way for Taiwan or Taiwanese companies to leverage their multilateral relationship with the Japan and U.S. in areas like semiconductor manufacturing, which as you mentioned in your paper, Koshino-san, which is currently is facing a challenge when it comes to manufacturing chain?

## **KOSHINO**

Right. I think that's an important question and probably a discussion that is still ongoing. As I mentioned in my presentation and also in my paper, I do see that the GCTF which has been established by the United States and Taiwan back in 2015 is now becoming more of a venue to include other countries, key partners like Japan or many other countries globally to work together and to prevent Taiwan from isolation on these important topics.

I think there's also separately, more generally, probably initiative led by the United States to think of good groupings between the like-minded partners, including European countries like United Kingdom or EU, to think about how to think about supply chain resiliency, for instance, and semiconductor in general. We haven't really—there's a lot of different venues. The Johnson administration in the United Kingdom, for instance, initially last year proposed the idea of the democracy of 10 countries. There's, I think, a 12 grouping or something like that, but we haven't really set on any of these key venues. I think they are potentials for Taiwan, for instance, to maybe start as an observer and engage in these discussions. But I think in general, even the United States hasn't really discussed that, decided on which course it wants to go forward. I would also just end by saying that there are ongoing discussions and a lot of different venues that Taiwan could engage in.

## **TATSUMI**

Thank you. End of the hour is quickly approaching, so this will have to be the last question. This is actually for everyone. I think you can probably speak from your own personal views. Is there any space for basically not just politicians or policymakers or bureaucracies, but what can ordinary Japanese citizens do to contribute, to promote, Japan-Taiwan relationship? What kind of area do you see that has a potential? I would start in the reverse order of your papers' orders, so I will start with you, Koshino-san, and then Kawaguchi-san, Takuma-san, and then I will ask Fukuda-san to finish.

## **KOSHINO**

That's a very broad, interesting but important, actually, question, I think. I'm usually based in London, but I'm currently in Tokyo. I saw that on TV today, especially after the 2+2 meeting for instance, lot of the major TV networks throughout the daytime were talking about the mention of

Taiwan. I was quite encouraged that Taiwan has become increasingly important even in the public space on discussions around how to engage Taiwan or how to think about security in Taiwan. I think that itself is a really significant change, probably, over the past several years.

Maybe on the students' level, I would highly encourage maybe students-based exchanges to really understand each other. I know that it's difficult because of COVID-19, but maybe because of COVID-19 it might be easy to really host virtual meetings and forums. I really encourage that if there's any students watching this webinar.

**TATSUMI**

Thank you. Kawaguchi-san, douzo.

**KAWAGUCHI**

Thank you for your interesting question. Of course, I'm an ordinary Japanese so my answer is that we should communicate with each other on social media because Taiwan and Japan share a communication app, LINE. Of course, Taiwanese LINE and Japanese LINE is different company, but we can share and communicate with each other. We should discuss what fake news is, what disinformation is on social media. We should keep to—discuss on social media. Thank you.

**TATSUMI**

Thank you, Kawaguchi-san. Takuma-san?

**TAKUMA**

Thank you. For the experience this pandemic, even ordinary citizens realize that—even ordinary Japanese citizens were very impressed by Taiwan's response to the COVID-19 and realized how important that cooperation with Taiwan is. So I think that there is a potential to foster some cooperation in the field of health by exchange of researchers or that research cooperation. Thank you.

**TATSUMI**

Thank you, Takuma-san. Fukuda-san, you have the last word.

**FUKUDA**

I mentioned this problem in my part so if you're interested in, please read my paper. But I think it is really important for Japanese ordinary people to know about Taiwanese modern history and international status and have more discussions about what kind of, especially political, relationship we should have with Taiwan. I think as a scholar of Taiwan and China studies, for me it is very important to explain about these kinds of things in plain language to students and ordinary people. Thank you.

**TATSUMI**

Thank you, Fukuda-san. That concludes this seminar. Again, I would like to thank Embassy of Japan for the years of collaboration on this really important project. I thank all the authors again for your wonderful policy papers.

If you can look at the chat box for the moment, there is a link to this actual report. Please feel free to browse. Right now, it's only available in HTML format, but the PDF version will be available very shortly. If any of you would like a hard copy, please do contact my colleague Pam Kennedy, and she can make an arrangement to mail that out to you as well.

With that, thank you everyone for channeling in. This concludes the seminar. Thank you very much.

[END]