

UN 2.0: Ten Innovations for Global Governance

75 Years beyond San Francisco



About this report

UN 2.0 considers the kinds of enlightened global leadership and vision, norms, tools, institutions, and ethic of civic engagement required to better deal with pressing global challenges, from avoiding runaway climate change to preventing atrocities and reducing the disruptive potential of novel technologies. Drawing parallels to the 1944 Dumbarton Oaks conference that, in the midst of World War II and on the heels of the Great Depression, laid the groundwork for the successful 1945 San Francisco conference that founded the United Nations, the report argues for this September's UN75 Summit and Declaration to lay the foundations for further innovating and strengthening global governance in the coming two-to-three critical years. In presenting a bold yet practical roadmap for global renewal, *UN 2.0* stresses the need for international organizations, starting with the United Nations, to harness creatively the ideas, networks, and capabilities of governments, civil society, and the private sector for effective global problem-solving.

About Stimson

The Stimson Center promotes international security, shared prosperity & justice through applied research and independent analysis, deep engagement, and policy innovation. For three decades, Stimson has been a leading voice on urgent global issues. Founded in the twilight years of the Cold War, the Stimson Center pioneered practical new steps toward stability and security in an uncertain world. Today, as changes in power and technology usher in a challenging new era, Stimson is at the forefront: Engaging new voices, generating innovative ideas and analysis, and building solutions to promote international security, prosperity, and justice.

Stimson's Just Security 2020 Program supports efforts to build more capable global governance institutions to better cope with existing and new global challenges, in the face of growing mass violence in fragile states, the threat of runaway climate change, and fears of devastating cross-border economic shocks and cyber-attacks. Effective problem-solving requires both global collaboration and attention to serious deficits of justice as well as security, to create what we call "just security." The program gives particular attention to initiating and influencing preparations for a Leaders Summit, in September 2020 in New York, and its follow-through on United Nations renewal and innovation.

Visit our knowledge Platform on Global Security, Justice & Governance Innovation:
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Foreword

We are honored to introduce this new Stimson Center report, *UN 2.0: Ten Innovations for Global Governance-75 Years beyond San Francisco*, timed to coincide with the seventy-fifth anniversary of Charter Day (June 26). It considers the need for—and seeks to provoke thoughtful debate on—new tools, ideas, and innovative kinds of public-private, multinational initiatives and networks for more effective common action against common threats and challenges faced by “We The Peoples” and the world organization’s 193 member countries.

These challenges include a rapidly changing global climate, violence and large-scale displacement in fragile states, sophisticated cyber-security threats, and the COVID-19 pandemic and its devastating social and economic consequences. But the most dangerous threat we see is the rise of narrow, exclusionary nationalism, corroding the wider sense of community essential to meeting all these other challenges— threatening the very structure of the international order that has been built since the Second World War. It raises a too-real risk that this structure and its institutions, essential but in need of repair and renewal, may instead be left to decline and decay. We know, from our respective experiences leading global institutions, that such an outcome would be tragic, not just for those institutions but for humanity at large. *UN 2.0* offers a path to renewal and a more inclusive and invigorated system of global governance, complementing and building on the UN75 Declaration to be endorsed by UN Member States.

Individuals and organizations from across global civil society have an opportunity, during this year’s commemoration of the UN’s founding, to help create “The future we want, the United Nations we need.” Sparking a global conversation on the future of the UN system and wider global governance is also a fundamental goal of The Elders’ new Policy Paper on Multilateralism, also released on Charter Day, as is our commitment to promoting diverse thinking and action on sustainable development, human rights, and peace.

We wish to express our appreciation to the authors of *UN 2.0* and look forward to discussing, at the virtual UN75 Global Forum this September (16-17), how its proposals, and the insights and suggestions anticipated from civil society worldwide, can help to ensure that “the future we want,” for today’s younger generation and all future generations, becomes the future we get.

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Related Publications

- *Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance, The Report of the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance* (2015)
- *Just Security in an Undergoverned World* (2018)
- *An Innovation Agenda for UN75: The Albright-Gambari Commission Report and the Road to 2020* (2019)
- *Reimagining Governance in a Multipolar World* (2019, co-published with the Doha Forum)
- *Global Governance Innovation Perspectives & UN75 Policy Briefs* (2019 and 2020, co-published)

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List of Abbreviations

ACLED	The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project
AI	Artificial Intelligence
AU	African Union
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CERTs	Computer Emergency Response Teams
CIVCAP	Civilian Capacities
CGPCS	The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
COP	Conference of the Parties
COVID-19	2019 Novel Coronavirus
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
DESA	(UN) Department of Economic and Social Affairs
DPO	(UN) Department of Peace Operations
DPPA	(UN) Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
EST	Environmentally Sound Technology
EU	European Union
G20	Group of 20
GCYPS	Global Coalition on Youth, Peace and Security
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GPEI	Global Polio Eradication Initiative
GPI	Global Peace Index
The IGG	Group Expert Advisory Group on Inclusive Global Governance
H.E.	His/Her Excellency
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IGO	InterGovernmental Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IOM	(UN) International Organization for Migration
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPR	Intellectual Property Rights
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
KPCS	Kimberley Process Certification Scheme

LAWS	Legal Autonomous Weapons Systems
MERCOSUR	The Southern Common Market (English), El Mercado Común del Sur (Spanish)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCS	National Cybersecurity Strategies
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA	(UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR	Office of the (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights
P5	Permanent Five (members of the UN Security Council)
PASO	Colombia Sustainable Peace for Colombia (English), Paz Sostenible para Colombia (Spanish)
PBC	(UN) Peacebuilding Commission
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
ROI	Return on Investment
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
U.S.	United States
UN60	United Nations' 60 th anniversary
UN75	United Nations' 75 th anniversary
UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UN	United Nations
UNPN	United Nations Parliamentary Network
UPR	Universal Periodic Review (UN Human Rights Council)
WHO	World Health Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization
WPS	Women, Peace and Security
WTO	World Trade Organization

Executive Summary

“The UN75 Declaration represents the start of a worldwide conversation and process, rather than an endpoint, for global governance innovation and renewal.” — *UN75 Declaration Co-Facilitators, H.E. Ambassador Alya Al-Thani, Permanent Representative of The State of Qatar to the United Nations, and H.E. Ambassador Anna Karin Eneström, Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations (correspondence with the authors, June 17, 2020)*

With the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the United Nations and its Member States are facing one of the biggest challenges to confront the world organization since its founding in 1945. Accompanying nearly half a million deaths and more than nine million people infected worldwide (at the time of writing) are the calamitous socioeconomic consequences felt by billions, with the heads of the International Monetary Fund and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development predicting that the world is headed toward a recession at least as bad as that of 2008–9.

In the midst of a past period of global turmoil—the Second World War, on the heels of the 1930s Great Depression—leaders from the Republic of China, the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom gathered, in 1944, at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington, D.C., to consider a new postwar international architecture to succeed the failed League of Nations. Six months later, a gathering of delegates from fifty nations convened in San Francisco to negotiate over two months and then sign, on June 26, the Charter of the United Nations.

This September, world leaders will mark the UN’s seventy-fifth anniversary. On this occasion, they will endorse, through the adoption of a Declaration, a renewed vision for collective global action and a set of commitments to respond to the pandemic, climate change, extreme poverty, armed conflict, disruptive technologies, and other global challenges. Can UN75 be an inflexion point like Dumbarton Oaks, and catalyze a broader global conversation toward a new “San Francisco Moment” for a more inclusive, just, and effective global governance system?

Informed by research and policy dialogues undertaken since 2014, initially for the Albright-Gambari Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance, this report’s ten main recommendations offer an approach to realizing the UN75 Declaration’s principal commitments for organizational renewal and are intended to encourage more ambitious, forward-looking thinking and deliberation on global governance renewal and innovation:

1. Expand and ensure more coherent, inclusive, and collaborative participation of civil society and socially responsible businesses in shaping decision-making and supporting programming across the United Nations system through the establishment of a **UN Global Partnership**.
2. Define one or more **global climate adaptation goals** and gauge their achievement in terms of measurable improvements for local human security; finance support for adaptation from revenues formerly directed to fossil fuel subsidies.
3. Create a strong **UN Peacebuilding Council** to replace the current Peacebuilding Commission. Similar to the transformation of the Human Rights Commission in 2006, upgrading the Peacebuilding Commission to a Council—a subsidiary body to the Security Council and General Assembly—would give it enhanced powers, responsibilities, and a mandate to lead on conflict prevention and peacebuilding policy development, coordination, and resource mobilization, for situations not addressed directly by the Security Council.

Humanity today has, in many ways, reached the proverbial “fork in the road.”

4. Create a **G20+** to accelerate socioeconomic recovery from COVID-19 through enhanced coordination by G20 members with the UN system, Bretton Woods institutions, and related bodies, supported by a new, small, full-time secretariat. The global economic governance system should be strengthened to limit the socioeconomic dislocations produced by the current global pandemic, to generate an equitable and broad-based recovery, and to reduce, at large, the volatility of our hyperconnected global economy.
5. Seek **universal acceptance of international justice institutions**, in particular the **International Court of Justice** and the **International Criminal Court**, while increasing their enforcement powers, preserving their independence, and enhancing their resilience against political pressures.
6. Establish a **Green Technology Licensing Facility** within the Green Climate Fund. This facility would encourage licensing and transfer of technology to developing countries, while protecting intellectual property rights to incentivize the development of green technology and increase its availability in developing countries.
7. Give the UN’s recently consolidated Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs a central role in coordinating and compiling **UN knowledge and analysis in conflict prevention**, with special attention to averting mass atrocities, focusing on the **Responsibility to Prevent** principle.
8. Strengthen cybersecurity through **international cybercrime centers, international cybercrime expert rosters**, and a global campaign to promote end-user **cyber hygiene**.
9. Establish **standing and reserve capacities** to meet United Nations needs for rapidly deployable civilian specialist skills in **conflict prevention and peacebuilding** efforts worldwide. Such a new civilian capability, emphasizing gender parity, could be central to the early efficacy of future integrated UN peace operations and special political missions.
10. Address the United Nations’ democracy and legitimacy deficits by establishing a **United Nations Parliamentary Network** as an advisory body to the UN General Assembly. Composed of individual members of national and regional parliaments—as well as representatives of existing parliamentary networks, institutions, and possibly local authorities—the UN Parliamentary Network would act as a platform for direct participation, input, and accountability claims by the peoples of the world on governance matters pertaining to the UN.

Harnessing the ideas, networks, and capabilities of businesses and civil society groups can help to advance these recommendations, in service to the Declaration’s twelve principal commitments. By using technology in new, inventive ways, adopting creative financing models, and developing a shared language among partners for strategy, communications, and project management, partnerships would seek to overcome obstacles to impactful public-private collaboration, including “forum-shopping,” competing preferences and goals, and absence of accountability for follow-through.

Humanity today has, in many ways, reached the proverbial “fork in the road.” Exclusionary-nationalistic undercurrents driven by populist, anti-multilateralist politicians are amplifying public anxieties to turn their societies inward and away from a sense of global solidarity and responsibility. We can either recognize that the economic, social, and even environmental impacts of COVID-19 and other transnational challenges require broadened and deepened

forms of multilateral cooperation or fall back on narrowly focused solutions that fail to address these risks, learn little from others' ideas, and instead erect short-sighted barriers to the cooperation that is essential to further human progress. That is the clear and stark choice of our times.

Today, our collective task is to rekindle the original spirit of the founding of the United Nations and to build the smart coalitions needed to overcome the growing bottlenecks (whether institutional, political, financial, or psychological) to solving humanity's inextricably global problems. In support of like-minded countries and civil society networks, such as those affiliated with the intergovernmental Alliance for Multilateralism and the civil society-led networks UN2020 and Together First, this report offers a roadmap for strengthening global cooperation in the form of practical guidelines:

- Orient near-term global governance innovation and strengthening agendas to the COVID-19 public health emergency and the broader socioeconomic recovery response.
- Prioritize the adoption of and, if possible, augment the UN75 Declaration commitments made during the 75th Session of the UN General Assembly (September 2020–September 2021).
- Support actively a new Expert Advisory Group on Inclusive Global Governance.
- Design and advocate a World Summit on Inclusive Global Governance, to be held no later than September 2023.

The world's governance institutions at all levels need to keep pace with growing global economic, social, political, technological, and environmental challenges and opportunities. If present crises and conflicts have created both the imperative and the conditions for a new "San Francisco Moment," seizing this moment will depend, in large part, on enlightened leaders who give equal weight to and pursue, simultaneously, both global security and justice goals—or "just security"—when rethinking how humanity may best tackle 21st century global problems.

Fortunately, our leaders are not alone on this pivotal journey. Underpinned by a global civic ethic for a more just and peaceful world, civil society groups worldwide—from religious communities and volunteer associations to social movements, journalists, and business leaders—are poised to mobilize public pressure for progressive global change. Joining the ideas, partnerships, and legitimacy of both traditional national and increasingly powerful transnational actors in common cause to address common goals will usher in a new, more inclusive era of global governance. The present breakdown in global governance can, in effect, be turned on its head. Inspired by our forebears in San Francisco, we can continue to pull through adversity and chart a more hopeful course for all humanity.

I. Introduction

“The principle of justice is the foundation stone of this charter. That principle is the guiding spirit by which it must be carried out—not by words alone but by continued concrete acts of good will.” — U.S. President Harry S. Truman (in his address, on June 26, 1945, to the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco)¹

“Establish a mandated post-2020 follow-up mechanism ... to usher in a new compact for more equitable and effective global governance and to rebuild confidence in global institutions.” — Lysa John, Secretary-General of CIVICUS (in her presentation of the UN75 People’s Declaration on May 13, 2020, to the UN75 Dialogue with UN Ambassadors, Civil Society Representatives, and Independent Experts)

In the waning months of the Second World War, the founding architects of the United Nations met in San Francisco to put the UN Charter into final form. The document, signed on June 26, 1945, established the principles and the institutions of post-war global governance and multilateral cooperation intended to avoid a repetition of the sorts of bloody conflicts that had, in the previous quarter century, killed upwards of eighty million people. The political headwinds of the Cold War and the post-colonial aspirations of the UN’s many new members recontextualized those principles and buffeted those institutions. However, three quarters of a century after San Francisco they still stand, at increasing risk of obsolescence but not of irrelevance: humanity increasingly faces problems of regional and global scope that can only be effectively addressed by solutions of equal scope. Its ability to find the will and wisdom to craft those solutions is, however, seemingly in doubt.

At this writing, the COVID-19 pandemic, its impacts on life and health, and the socioeconomic wreckage it has left in its wake have reinforced already rising tendencies, in many states and societies, to curtail global engagement, block out external actors, and regard the world from a defensive crouch. Even prior to the spread of the coronavirus, major global commissions and

a large body of scholarship had decried a growing “crisis of multilateralism.”² In response to that sense of crisis, and as a first step toward new solutions to global problems, some nations are acting. Germany and France, for example, initiated an Alliance for Multilateralism in 2019, which grew to include some sixty-five countries within a year.³

In these uncertain times, countries and their citizens will need to make a conscious choice about coming together with their global neighbors to deepen cooperation for tackling today’s most pressing challenges and looming threats. But without a bold yet practical roadmap for “getting-from-here-to-there,” combined with the leadership and coalition-building skills necessary to realize its vision, sensible and carefully crafted ideas may never be put to the test of improving collective action through a modernized global governance system. This report addresses both these dimensions needed to achieve major change and renewal.

Such change has been realized before, and in the wake of proportionately greater damage to the human prospect. On at least four major occasions over the past two hundred years, major transnational struggles entailing large-scale loss of lives and material damage concluded with enhanced and often novel approaches to global cooperation (table 1).

Table 1: Four historic moments for global cooperation, and the present one

DISRUPTION	YEAR ENDED	COST IN LIVES	SUBSEQUENT INNOVATION
Napoleonic Wars	1815	About 3 million	Concert of Europe
First World War	1919	About 15 million	League of Nations
Second World War	1945	About 66 million	United Nations, UN specialized agencies, Bretton Woods Institutions
Cold War (East-West Standoff)	1989	About 12 million (in regional proxy wars)	NATO, arms control treaties, UN complex peace operations, European Union, African Union, World Trade Organization
COVID-19, rampant cyber-insecurity and disinformation, identity politics, climate crisis	Ongoing	COVID-19 related, about 480,000 (through mid-2020)	To be determined

Sources: White, Matthew. "Source List and Detailed Death Tolls for the Primary Megadeaths of the Twentieth Century"; Ikenberry and Kupchan. "Global Distancing"; and Johns Hopkins University & Medicine. "Coronavirus Resource Center."

Some "Highs and Lows" from the UN's First 75 Years

The United Nations' chief purpose, in its earlier years, was—as the first preambular clause of its Charter proclaims—"to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our life-time has brought untold sorrow to mankind"⁴ The changing composition of the world body's membership in the 1960s and 1970s, accelerated by decolonization, produced a noticeable shift away from the West's preoccupation with mainly peace and security ("freedom from fear") issues toward a more balanced appreciation for the social and economic ("freedom from want") issues that continue to dominate daily life in many developing countries.

With a growing range of programs, funds, agencies, and departments and their respective, growing staff and budgets, the contemporary United Nations looks far different from the world body of the late 1940s. Its achievements are distributed across its main "pillars" of peace and security and economic and human development (table 2). In recent decades, human rights have also moved to the fore as a third pillar of the UN's work, and "sustainable"

development has integrated environmental priorities with traditional socioeconomic concerns in developing and advanced industrialized nations alike.

Alongside the UN's many high points in its first seven and one-half decades are many low points, including, for instance, the continuation of large-scale intrastate conflicts and associated famines across much of its history; the limited results to date of nearly three decades of implementation talks under the 1992 the Framework Convention on Climate Change and 1993 Convention on Biological Diversity; the failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda and the Balkans in the mid-1990s; mixed results in promoting democracy; the ongoing proliferation of nuclear weapons and small arms; and the association of some of its peacekeepers with the spread of cholera in Haiti (2010) and with continued acts of sexual exploitation and abuse decades after it was first recognized as a serious, ongoing problem.⁵ The UN is, arguably, now facing the greatest test since its creation: helping countries and their citizens respond to a global pandemic on a scale not seen for more than a hundred years, at a time when political support in some capitals has been waning.

Table 2: The United Nations @ 75: Twelve areas of historic achievement

<i>Saving Lives</i> (1946* UNICEF: vaccinations against childhood diseases; 1950 UNHCR: vital assistance to millions of refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced, and stateless people; 1961 World Food Programme: addressing hunger and food insecurity for millions)
<i>Human Rights and Humanitarian Law</i> (1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 1949 Geneva Conventions; 1951 Refugee Convention; 1976 International Covenants on Civil & Political Rights and Economic, Social, & Cultural Rights; 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child; 1993 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights)
<i>Impartial Peacekeeping Forces</i> (1956 Suez Crisis: buffering against great power conflict in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia during the Cold War; helping to build peace after civil wars thereafter)
<i>Decolonization</i> (1961 UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples; UN Charter Chapters XI, XII, and XIII)
<i>Preventing Great Power War</i> (1962 Cuban Missile Crisis; helping to keep proxy wars from escalating into great power conflict during the Cold War)
<i>Limitations on Nuclear Weapons</i> (1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty; 1967 Outer Space Treaty; 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty; 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty—UN General Assembly adoption; awaiting ratification by key nuclear states)
<i>Global Environmental Leadership</i> (1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment and creation of UNEP; 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change; 1993 Convention on Biological Diversity; 1997 Kyoto Protocol; 2016 Paris Agreement)
<i>Banning Biological and Chemical Weapons</i> (1975 Biological Weapons Convention; 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention)
<i>Fighting Poverty and Promoting Human Security</i> (1990 UNDP <i>Human Development Report</i> ; 2000 Millennium Development Goals; 2000 United Nations Global Compact; 2015 Adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development; UN Charter Article 71 affording non-governmental organizations consultative status with the Economic and Social Council)
<i>Framing an Agenda for Peace</i> (1992 An Agenda for Peace; 2005 Responsibility to Protect principle; 2018 High-Level Meeting on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace)
<i>Women's Equality</i> (1995 Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing; 2000 UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security; 2010 creation of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, known as UN Women)
<i>Global Governance and International Law Innovation</i> (2005 UN Peacebuilding Architecture; 2006 Human Rights Council; 2013 High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development; International Law Commission)

Note: *All dates in this table denote the starting date of an institution or international instrument.

UN Anniversaries and Change in Global Governance

Anniversaries of the United Nations offer moments for reflection on past achievements, stocktaking of progress in meeting current challenges, opportunities to renew commitments to longstanding principles of multilateral cooperation, and sometimes opportunities to reimagine and renovate the global governance architecture, though results have varied. In 1995 (UN50), Member States gave merely rhetorical support to the need to “strengthen,” “resource,” and “reform” the UN system,⁶ whereas in 2005 (UN60) the World Summit Outcome adopted several notable ideas, including a new UN Peacebuilding Architecture, the upgrade of the Human Rights Commission into an empowered Council with new tools for safeguarding human rights, and endorsement of the Responsibility to Protect principle—each with the active support of civil society organizations.⁷

In this study and elsewhere, robust and independent civil society groups are credited in recent decades with offering timely “outside-the-box” thinking and timely political pressure for consideration of and follow-through on their global governance innovation ideas. It was therefore discouraging to observe, between April and June 2019, a few powerful countries’ unsuccessful attempt to curtail (in language proposed for the UN75 “modalities

resolution,” A/RES/73/299) the active participation of global civil society in negotiations that commenced in February 2020 on the UN75 Declaration.

Fear of a potential “shrinking space for global civil society,” some thirty years after the Cold War, is all the more surprising when one considers how non-governmental organization observers, at the 1945 San Francisco Conference, successfully lobbied for consultative status with the world body, enshrined in the Charter’s Article 71.⁸ As detailed in section 5 of this report, however, civil society—most notably through the UN2020 and Together First coalitions—exerted influence over the 2020 negotiations through regular, substantive interactions with the UN75 Declaration’s Co-Facilitators (the UN Permanent Representatives of Qatar and Sweden to the United Nations in New York); engagement with UN Ambassadors and the President of the General Assembly; informal consultations; the UN75 People’s Forum; and other means of influence, despite not being welcome to participate or observe the official deliberations among Member States.

Besides the seventy-fifth anniversary of the United Nations Charter, 2020 will mark important anniversaries for several other major agreements and institutions (box 1) associated with the UN system that reinforce the centrality of the world body for the conduct of global affairs and the evolution of social, environmental, and security norms. The case for investing political

BOX 1: Selection of major agreement and institutional review anniversaries in 2020

- ➔ Fifteenth anniversary Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture
- ➔ Twentieth anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace and Security
- ➔ Twenty-fifth anniversary of the adoption of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action on women’s rights, roles, and empowerment
- ➔ Fiftieth anniversary Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
- ➔ 2020 Human Rights Treaty Body Review
- ➔ Post-2020 Biodiversity Framework Conference

capital and financial and technical resources in modernizing the UN system cannot be made on the basis of longevity alone, or because it is the most universal of global institutions. Rather, as detailed in the following pages, the world body is worth strengthening and innovating because it is well-placed for addressing many global problem-sets, especially by harnessing and guiding the application of capabilities of all major transnational actors—including states, international organizations, regional organizations, and diverse business and civil society groups—toward common aims.

Objectives and Underlying Themes of this Report

Building upon the 2015 report of the Albright-Gambari Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance, *Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance*, the 2018 book *Just Security in an Undergoverned World*, and the 2019 Stimson Center report, *An Innovation Agenda for UN75*, this report addresses the following objectives:

- *First*, to help elaborate upon and provide concrete ideas for implementing several of the UN75 Declaration’s twelve major commitments (section 3; see annex 1 for the text of the draft Declaration).
- *Second*, to encourage UN75 to serve as a launch-pad for a broader conversation on global governance renewal and innovation, giving consideration to more far-reaching

“unaddressed business” proposals (sections 3 and 4).

- *Third*, to harness the ideas, networks, and capabilities of businesses and civil society groups to address the UN75 Declaration’s twelve commitments through innovative public-private partnerships with the UN system (section 4).
- *Fourth*, to provide a bold yet practical roadmap for “getting-from-here-to-there,” combined with skillful global leadership and coalition-building, to realize a more inclusive, just, and effective global governance system (section 5).

The recommendations introduced in this report drew upon the outcomes of a two-year series of global and regional policy dialogues (see figure 1 and annex 2). Those dialogues sought to inform and focus on the ideas needed for upcoming, virtual discussions at the UN75 Global Governance Forum (September 16–17, 2020) and the UN75 Leaders Summit (September 21, 2020).

In terms of the underlying themes addressed, the report begins (in section 2) by drawing lessons, from the 1944 Dumbarton Oaks and 1945 San Francisco conferences that gave birth to the United Nations Charter, for addressing today’s many global challenges and the attendant strain they have placed on multilateral cooperation. Using the lens of “just security” (which places a premium on balancing security and justice objectives in global governance),

Figure 1: Global and regional dialogues on the road to the UN75 summit



The seventy-fifth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations offers a unique opportunity to rethink how global affairs are managed

subsequent sections analyze issues and propose institutional, policy, and normative changes for global governance in the areas of civic and parliamentary engagement in global institutions, conflict and state fragility, climate governance, and the hyper-connected global economy.

A critical takeaway from these still early days of this new age of pandemic-driven uncertainty is that, rather than erecting futile barriers to somehow protect nations against increasingly transnational problem-sets, countries need new tools, ideas, and innovative kinds of public-private, multinational, and multilevel networks for more effective, unified action against common threats and challenges. The seventy-fifth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations offers a unique opportunity to rethink how global affairs are managed, as the world recovers from the pandemic and its attendant financial, economic, and social consequences. As world leaders and global civil society together pursue the inextricably linked issues of “reform and recovery,” their interplay can generate political momentum for overhauling global governance on, heretofore, difficult and contested issues and renew a greater sense of shared global responsibility. This report, and this September’s UN75 Global Governance Forum, both aspire to inform and shape this important conversation.

II. A Start Out of the Woods: No new “San Francisco Moment” without a new “Dumbarton Oaks”

“In the years after 2021, I think we’ll learn from the years after 1945. With the end of the second world war, leaders built international institutions like the UN to prevent more conflicts. After COVID-19, leaders will prepare institutions to prevent the next pandemic.”

—Bill Gates, Co-Founder of Microsoft and Co-Chair of The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation⁹

2020 marks the 75th anniversary of the signing of the UN Charter at the San Francisco Conference. The process leading up to San Francisco had already started while the Second World War was still raging, ultimately resulting in a document that was intended to achieve nothing less than saving “succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” This mindset is needed in 2020, but without a “Dumbarton Oaks process” to pave the way, there cannot be another “San Francisco moment” to mark the next stage in the evolution of the UN to tackle the world’s many global challenges.

António Guterres described the COVID-19 pandemic as “the most challenging crisis we have faced since the Second World War.”¹⁰ In its April 20, 2020 resolution, the UN General

Assembly noted with concern “the unprecedented and multifaceted effects of the pandemic, including the severe disruption to societies, economies, global trade, and travel and the devastating impact on the livelihoods of people.”¹¹ COVID-19’s global spread has further stressed a world already challenged by what the UN Secretary-General dubbed the “four horsemen:” geostrategic tensions, the climate crisis, growing global mistrust, and the “dark side of the digital world.”¹² Besting this range of crises—COVID-19 being now added, but not most damaging in the longer term—requires unprecedented efforts and feats of solidarity on the part of the international community. It also requires the intellectual and political feat of refashioning the architecture of global



Representatives of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States meeting in the opening session of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference.

Photo: UN Photo/
Historical Photo

governance. While 2020 marks the commemoration of the San Francisco Conference, this is also a “Dumbarton Oaks” moment, not just of threat but of singular opportunity.

In October 1943, the governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China issued a declaration in which they pledged to continue the war until the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers. However, looking beyond victory in the war, they also recognized “the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization ... for the maintenance of international peace and security”¹³ to succeed the League of Nations, which had failed in its mission to prevent an even deadlier conflict than “the Great War” of 1914–18. To flesh out this pledge, the “Washington Conversations on International Peace and Security Organization,” better known as the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, took place from August to October 1944.

The conference resulted in a set of “Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization.”¹⁴ These proposals included revolutionary ideas for their time, above all the establishment of a Security Council, which could decide by majority rather than by unanimity to take measures—including the use of force—to preserve international peace and security (requiring the concurrence of the five permanent members). Moreover, the proposals suggested widening the global agenda by introducing an Economic and Social Council. The “United Nations Conference on International Organization” at San Francisco, from April to June 1945, consolidated the buy-in from the international community. Although it was unrepresentative at the time, the Conference elaborated the details of the new world organization, including the UN Charter, the formulation of the novel ideas it embodied, and the amassing of political will to bring it to life. Indeed, in preparing for San Francisco, then U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, learning from the ill-fated League of Nations, considered it was essential to undertake negotiations while wartime political cohesion was at its peak.

The unprecedented scale and severity of the current coronavirus pandemic has thrown into

BOX 2: The world coming together to fight the pandemic



Photo: Haeferl, via Wikimedia Commons

- ➔ Through mid-May 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) supplied more than 1.5 million testing kits to 126 countries and coordinated the shipment of personal protective equipment to seventy-five countries.
- ➔ World leaders, scientists, humanitarians, and private sector partners launched a landmark collaboration—the “ACT Accelerator”—to make new tools and medicines to diagnose and treat COVID-19 accessible to people everywhere.
- ➔ A fundraising conference organized by the European Union brought in pledges from government and philanthropists amounting to U.S. \$8 billion for the development of a vaccine.
- ➔ Several countries heeded the UN Secretary General’s call for a ceasefire during the pandemic.
- ➔ High-end fashion brands switched their production to manufacture facemasks.
- ➔ Musicians around the world livestreamed concerts and operas for free.

Source: Better World Campaign, “Fact Check: The World Health Organization and COVID-19.” United Nations, “Landmark collaboration.” Stevis-Gridneff and Jakes, “World Leaders Join to Pledge \$8 Billion for Vaccine.” Wintour, “Coronavirus: UN says warring countries have responded to ceasefire call.” Bennhold, “A German Exception?” Bramley, “Prada the latest fashion brand to make medical face masks.” and Tilden, “Lockdown listening.”

Box 3: Joint Declaration of the Alliance for Multilateralism, April 16, 2020



and enhanced international cooperation and worldwide solidarity. ... At the same time, in a situation of emergency, it is of utmost importance to maintain principles of democracy and the rule of law. ... The COVID-19 crisis has demonstrated just how crucial multilateral institutions are to our collective health, prosperity, and security. We fully support the World Health Organization in leading the global public health response, as well as the efforts of the wider United Nations, the World Bank Group, and other international and regional organizations as they come together in a coordinated, coherent whole to respond to the wider socioeconomic impacts of the crisis.

Source: Alliance for Multilateralism. *COVID-19 - Joint Declaration of the Alliance for Multilateralism*. April 16, 2020.
Photo: UN2020/Jocelyn Jayasooria

sharp relief the moral imperatives and practical necessities of our time, following several years of noise, distortion, and digression in many countries. Like no other global challenge in recent history—though there are many others—it has revealed more clearly, more globally, and more personally, the need for effective institutions that can tackle “problems without passports.”¹⁵ It has brought out both the best and the worst in terms of responses and approaches (box 2).

Exclusionary nationalist, nativist, and populist policies, having fueled an “anti-multilateralist turn”¹⁶ in recent years, have revealed their futility and moral bankruptcy when it comes to tackling global challenges. Stark examples include continuing attempts to downplay the crisis, assign a foreign nationality to a virus, bidding wars for and even diversions of medical equipment, and cutting funding to the WHO.¹⁷ The pandemic has also shown that crises can be abused to curtail democratic accountability.¹⁸ Moreover, technologies for fighting the pandemic, such as population surveillance, can result in violations of privacy and other human rights,¹⁹ and offer a stark reminder of the need

The COVID-19 pandemic is a wake-up call for multilateralism. Trying to cope with the immediate devastating effects of the virus, nations have turned toward imposing unprecedented executive measures, including closing borders. However, a virus knows no borders. All countries are affected. We must remain united in our shared humanity. The fight against this global pandemic, which is taking so many lives and challenging our societies, requires more

and enhanced international cooperation and worldwide solidarity. ... At the same time, in a situation of emergency, it is of utmost importance to maintain principles of democracy and the rule of law. ... The COVID-19 crisis has demonstrated just how crucial multilateral institutions are to our collective health, prosperity, and security. We fully support the World Health Organization in leading the global public health response, as well as the efforts of the wider United Nations, the World Bank Group, and other international and regional organizations as they come together in a coordinated, coherent whole to respond to the wider socioeconomic impacts of the crisis.

for balance between the effective struggle against the virus and the preservation of justice, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.²⁰ Balancing the pursuit of security and justice in a manner “that does not privilege one major concept over the other” but instead builds, “a mutually supportive system of accountable, fair, and effective governance and sustainable peace globally” rests at the heart of the notion of “just security,” as emphasized in the 2015 Albright-Gambari Commission Report.²¹

The lack of early, effective responses to the pandemic and its knock-on effects in large parts of the world are likely to worsen existing injustices and widen the gulf between “haves” and “have-nots” worldwide. The UN’s March 2020 report on the socioeconomic impacts of COVID-19 warns that the crisis “risks reversing decades of progress in the fight against poverty and exacerbating already high levels of inequality within and between countries.”²² In its Call to Action at the end of its report, the UN stresses that COVID-19 is a challenge “that requires all actors—governments, academia, businesses, employers and workers’ organizations, civil society organizations, communities

and individuals—to act in solidarity in new, creative, and deliberate ways for the common good and based on the core United Nations values that we uphold for humanity.”²³

These values and such solidarity cannot and should not only concern the global response to this particular public health crisis. As the UN report observes at its start, “had we been further advanced in meeting the Sustainable

Development Goals and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, we could better face this challenge—with stronger health systems, fewer people living in extreme poverty, less gender inequality, a healthier natural environment, and more resilient societies.”²⁴ The “rebirthing of society” that the report hopes will follow from the pandemic needs to find expression in a refashioning of our global governance

Box 4: Selection of current initiatives to reform and strengthen global governance



Alliance for Multilateralism

A global initiative launched by France and Germany as a network of countries “united in their conviction that a rules-based multilateral order is the only reliable guarantee for international stability and peace and that our common challenges can only be solved through cooperation.”ⁱ



UN2020

A citizens’ organization movement, initiated in September 2017, to ensure an effective and inclusive preparatory process for the September 2020 UN75 Summit, which in turn is to catalyze the renewal and strengthening of the United Nations system.ⁱⁱ



Together First

A “movement of global citizens, experts, practitioners, civil society activists and business leaders from all regions of the world,” launched at the 2018 Paris Peace Forum, that campaigns for the September 2020 world leaders’ summit to initiate urgent reforms for making global governance more democratic, transparent, and accountable.ⁱⁱⁱ



Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group (ACT)

An initiative of more than 110 countries that support the adoption of a “Code of conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes.”^{iv}



Fridays for Future

A global movement launched by Greta Thunberg and other young activists, starting with school strikes, to demand implementation of the Paris Climate Agreement and climate justice and equity more broadly.^v

i. Alliance for Multilateralism. *What is the “Alliance for Multilateralism?”* Accessed April 25, 2020. <https://multilateralism.org/the-alliance/>.

ii. UN2020. *Call to Action*. Accessed April 26, 2020. <http://un2020.org/call-to-action-for-reform/>.

iii. Together First. *About us*. Accessed April 25, 2020. <https://together1st.org/about-us>.

iv. United Nations. General Assembly. *Letter dated 14 December 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Liechtenstein to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. A/70/621-S/2015/978*. December 14, 2015.

v. Fridays for Future. *Our demands*. Accessed April 26, 2020. <https://fridaysforfuture.org/what-we-do/our-demands/>.

architecture as a whole to save succeeding generations not just from “the scourge of war,” but from global pandemics, the “four horsemen,” and other global systemic risks that confront humankind now and will surely do so in the future.²⁵ Practical yet-far-reaching solutions that balance the fundamental principles of justice and security need to be formulated and implemented—as elaborated in the following sections—to increase civic participation in the development of global policies, better assist fragile and conflict-affected states, improve climate governance, and increase stability and reduce inequalities in our hyperconnected global economy.

Human activity has a growing and increasingly lethal impact on the planet’s environment and ecosystems. Heavily pressed ecosystems respond in an increasingly virulent manner. Therefore, a global governance architecture with the authority and resources commensurate to the momentous task of preserving life and facilitating human dignity and well-being is needed more than ever. Unlike 1945, a new “general international organization” need not be invented. It exists in the form of the United Nations, but it must be adapted to better meet the emerging challenge. It should remain at the heart of an adaptive architecture to assume effective stewardship of the Anthropocene on behalf of its Member States, as the most effective alternative to ad hoc flailing at global problems that lack national, or even regional, solutions.

At the same time, as the COVID-19 pandemic and other contemporary crises have demonstrated, global challenges also require what can be called “whole-of-humanity” approaches. They can only be tackled by marshalling the capacities and contributions from states,

intergovernmental organizations—including regional and sub-regional organizations—civil society organizations, and the business community.²⁶ As explored in this report, the UN will need to foster closer partnerships to bring together these diverse actors to deepen and focus their various contributions, and to connect better with other international forums and bodies, such as the G20 or the International Criminal Court. Ultimately, to maintain the balanced and mutually supportive relationship between security and justice, or “just security,” that is essential for the functioning of global governance, any action to make the UN more effective as a global steward needs to be accompanied by steps to ensure it remains accountable to “We the peoples” and beholden to the rule of law.

Supporters, initiatives, coalitions, and political will to stand up for more inclusive and rules-based global governance and to make real progress towards “the United Nations we need” were already in acute demand before the pandemic, but now even more so. Their lessons, proposals, and calls for action were not drowned out by the current crisis; they were vindicated. The world is ripe for another “San Francisco Moment” for the next stage in the evolution of global governance with the United Nations at its heart. We now have in front of us “a rare and short window of opportunity” to rectify past failures and current shortcomings “by rebuilding a better world, not reverting to one that is good for only a minority of its citizens.”²⁷ However, to reach a new “San Francisco Moment” there must first be another “Dumbarton Oaks” process to pave the way, which is what UN75, the focus of this report, can in many ways be.


III. Ten Innovations to Renew the UN System

Building on recommendations introduced in the 2015 report of the Albright-Gambari Commission, updated in the 2018 book *Just Security in an Undergoverned World*, and refined in last year’s follow-on report, *An Innovation Agenda for UN75*, this section offers ten far-reaching reform innovations to make the UN system more inclusive, agile, and effective. Moreover, it offers up-to-date analysis and tailored strategies for reform to marshal change in the areas of conflict and state fragility, climate governance, and the hyperconnected global economy (see figure 2).

In selecting these ten recommendations, the study’s authors sought to: *first*, help elaborate upon and provide concrete ideas for implementing several of the UN75 Declaration’s twelve major commitments (to be adopted,

on September 21, 2020, by world leaders) and, *second*, encourage UN75 to serve as a launchpad for a broader conversation on global governance renewal and innovation, giving consideration to more far-reaching “unaddressed business” proposals. They further drew upon the outcomes of a series, since 2018, of global and regional policy dialogues (see figure 1 in section 1). Unlike prior year reports, we present these recommendations—all of which we deem important to effective future global governance—organized not by substantive focus but by a rough and ready sense of complexity or ease of implementation, with those needing perhaps the most “runway” trailing those that might be launched with relatively less political and/or budgetary effort.

Figure 2: International law, institutions, and issues: Overlapping solutions



Source: Adapted with permission from Durch, Larik, and Ponzio, *Just Security in an Undergoverned World*. Ch. 19, 492.

1. Bring New Voices into Policy-Making through a UN Global Partnership

Recommendation

Expand and ensure more coherent, inclusive, and collaborative participation of civil society and socially responsible businesses in shaping decision-making and supporting programming across the United Nations system through the establishment of a UN Global Partnership.

Global Challenge Update

Global civil society continues to make its mark in building more just, inclusive, and accountable forms of global governance. In recent years, civil society organizations (CSOs) worldwide have enhanced international negotiations and facilitated the adoption of key international instruments such as the Escazú Agreement, a binding treaty that aims to protect environmental rights defenders and provide space for citizen participation in environmental decision-making in Latin America and the Caribbean. The contributions of global civil society were further recognized when the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded, in 2017, to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons for its work on a treaty-based prohibition of nuclear weapons and, in 2018, to human rights advocates Denis Mukwege and Nadia Murad for their work safeguarding human rights.

Despite their many contributions to global governance, civil society groups face repeated challenges to secure space at the global decision-making table. In November 2019, CIVICUS, for example, warned that civil society space was “under attack in 111 countries,” and that more than six billion people live in countries where civic space was “closed, repressed or obstructed” (see figure 3). CIVICUS also observed that sixteen of nineteen UN Member States on the UN Economic and Social Council’s Non-Governmental Organization Committee, which grants civil society consultative status, imposed “serious civic space restrictions” within their borders.²⁸

Even those non-governmental organizations that receive UN consultative status face difficulty participating in policy-making. Resourceful and

large CSOs from the Global North have disproportionate access to policy-making in global institutions compared to their counterparts from the Global South. In addition, while multi-stakeholder partnerships have widely complemented the work of multilateral institutions (see section 4), civil society collaboration with the private sector (including through the UN Global Compact) on shaping and implementing global policy agendas has yet to reach its full potential.

Innovation Proposal

Ensuring greater and more collaborative participation of civil society and socially responsible businesses in global policy-making could be achieved through a UN Global Partnership, as proposed by the Albright-Gambari Commission. With the backing of leadership from civil society organizations, the private sector, the United Nations, and the World Bank, the Global Partnership would, first and foremost, seek to expand the quantity and quality of progressive non-state actor engagement in shaping global policy-making and better coordinating responses to transnational challenges. It could also oversee UN accreditation for CSOs and the business community and further enhance the principles of collaboration between civil society, the private sector, and the UN while advancing corporate social responsibility in global governance.²⁹ To accommodate broader representation, including from the Global South, the UN Global Partnership would function primarily as an online hub. But, in order to ensure equal opportunity of participation, the North-South digital divide needs to be addressed. The partnership could facilitate swift and open collaboration to develop updated mechanisms for global digital cooperation precisely by using the capabilities,


expertise, and resources of its members worldwide, including the private sector.

This recommendation aims to complement similar recent proposals to encourage enhanced civil society space at the UN. For example, the UN75 People’s Declaration and Plan for Global Action recommends the appointment of a “civil society focal point at the UN Under-Secretary level, a system wide review of stakeholder participation in UN processes, increased use of communications technology ... for greater transparency, inclusivity, accountability, and participation and the creation of a global petition mechanism.”³⁰ Combined with the UN Global Partnership idea, the proposed Under-Secretary-General for Civil Society would bolster more effective civil society participation at different levels across the UN system, serving as a potential check on those Member States seeking to curb or deny civil society access to global policy-making.

Strategy for Reform on the Road to 2020 (UN75)

The UN’s 75th anniversary has been in the spotlight, in part due to the strong and continuous advocacy efforts by the civil society-led coalitions UN2020 and Together First, who have sought to use the anniversary to amplify their call for global governance innovation and strengthening. Naturally, both campaigns have lobbied forcefully during the UN75 Declaration negotiations to widen civic space in future United Nations policy-making. In addition to garnering support from civil society, a sustained reform process for enhancing civic space at the United Nations would benefit from continued leadership from the UN Secretary-General. In his 2020 human rights report on the occasion of the world body’s 75th anniversary, Secretary-General Guterres recommended utilizing UN75 as an opportunity to “launch a dialogue on more systematic participation of civil society in UN bodies and agencies ... and to design a system-wide strategy on civic space and adequate guidance to UN leaders in the field.”³¹ In addition, the draft UN75 Declaration calls for the Secretary-General to “report back before the end of the

Figure 3: Civic space: Percentage of the world’s population per ratings category



Source: CIVICUS Global Alliance. “People Power Under Attack. A Report Based on Data from the CIVICUS Monitor.” December 2019. 5.

seventy-fifth session of the General Assembly with recommendations to advance our common agenda and to respond to current and future challenges.”³²

Seizing this opportunity, UN2020 and Together First, alongside global civil society more generally, should seek to refine major elements of the abovementioned UN Global Partnership concept at the UN75 Global Governance Forum planned for September 16-17, 2020. Planning discussions in the weeks preceding the forum and the UN75 Summit on September 21st should actively engage substantive inputs and support from influential CSOs, the UN Departments of Global Communications and Economic and Social Affairs, the World Bank, and representatives of supportive private sector networks. These initial strategy discussions could subsequently lead to dialogues with the Secretary-General and Member States to formally stand-up a UN Global Partnership and its associated new Under-Secretary-General for Civil Society to champion under-represented voices and sorely needed new perspectives and expertise in UN system policy-making.



Photo: Masud Ananda

2. Define Climate Adaptation Goals and Gauge Their Achievement

Recommendation

Define one or more global climate adaptation goals and gauge their achievement in terms of measurable improvements in local human security; finance support for adaptation from revenues formerly directed to fossil fuel subsidies.

Global Challenge Update


The world is on the precipice of a climate catastrophe that requires leadership, creativity, and significant resources in support not only of mitigation—cutting greenhouse gas emissions to bend the curve on global warming (figure 4)—but also adaptation to the consequences of change already underway.³³ As the Global Commission on Adaptation has warned, “Failing to lead and act on adaptation will result in a huge economic and human toll, causing widespread increases in poverty and severely undermining long-term global economic prospects.”³⁴

Take, for example, Bangladesh, where large population centers face threats of extreme flooding that are projected to worsen in the coming years, even as climate change forces more people into the country’s already crowded cities.³⁵ Salinization of major rivers, such as the Nile and Mekong, has also resulted as rising sea levels push saltwater into freshwater environments, damaging fisheries and farmland.³⁶ Droughts and attendant loss of arable land and, thus, food production are also affected by unchecked climate change. Wildfires

in the United States, since 2000, have consumed on average more than double the number of acres per year than in the last two decades of the 20th century.³⁷ Climate change is also estimated to have made southeastern Australia’s devastating 2019–20 wildfires 30 percent more likely.³⁸

Innovation Proposal

In response to this fast-emerging threat potentially affecting millions in the near future, the Albright-Gambari Commission recommended that countries identify and commit to one or more climate adaptation goals and periodically assess progress toward achieving them, with emphasis on measurable improvements in human security. Measurable progress could highlight, for instance, more people surviving severe weather events, increased access to water and food in drought-affected regions, or improved response times to disasters. Adaptation initiatives should assess baseline vulnerabilities (recognizing that vulnerability has multiple dimensions) in order to measure improvements in human security arising from adaptation efforts using a small number of context-specific indicators.³⁹

Figure 4: IPCC projections for global warming

Source: IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 °C – Technical Annex 1.A, Fig. 12

Diverse international actors from across the UN system, regional development banks, the business community, and international non-governmental organizations will prove integral to equipping national governments and local civil society groups with the latest approaches, tools, and resources for effective adaptation. Making lessons and experience more readily shareable—through recently launched UN climate action clearinghouses, for example—could accelerate, deepen, and improve the effectiveness of adaptation efforts worldwide.

Significant funding for this effort could derive from ending fossil fuel subsidies and redirecting those budget savings to climate adaptation. Globally, countries spent roughly U.S. \$310 billion in 2016 on fossil fuel subsidies, over 80 percent of it to support fossil fuel consumption. Fortunately, the movement to end fossil fuel subsidies is gaining support, as evidenced in parts of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.⁴⁰

Strategy for Reform on the Road to 2020 (UN75)

Over the coming months, there are multiple high-level conferences and initiatives that can strike a better balance between international mitigation and adaptation efforts. Momentum can be generated by building, first and foremost, on September 2019's UN Climate Action

Summit, which included a track, led by the U.K. and Egypt, on “Resiliency and Adaptation.” Adaptation also remains a priority within Goal 13 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and H.E. Ban Ki-moon’s Global Commission on Adaptation recently found that investing U.S. \$1.8 trillion globally in five areas from 2020 to 2030 could generate U.S. \$7.1 trillion in total net benefits.⁴¹

Moving forward, adaptation goals and specific political and technical recommendations should move to the center of the agenda at the upcoming UN75 Leaders Summit this September and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change COP 26 (provisionally postponed until November 2021, due to the coronavirus pandemic) that will review progress on the Paris Climate Agreement’s implementation. Climate action, including an emphasis on nationally defined climate adaptation goals as proposed above, must feature prominently in the UN75 Declaration. Fortunately, its present draft proclaims, “Without more determined action we will continue to impoverish our planet with less biodiversity and fewer natural resources. We will see more environmental threats and more climate related crises, including drought, desertification, food shortages, water scarcity, widespread wildfires, sea-level rise and depletion of the oceans. The time to act is now.”⁴²

3. Strengthen the UN’s Ability to Sustain Peace: Upgrade the UN Peacebuilding Commission

Recommendation

Create a strong UN Peacebuilding Council to replace the current Peacebuilding Commission. Similar to the transformation of the Human Rights Commission in 2006, upgrading the Peacebuilding Commission to a Council—a subsidiary body to the Security Council and General Assembly—would give it enhanced powers, responsibilities, and a mandate to lead on conflict prevention and peacebuilding policy development, coordination, and resource mobilization, for situations not addressed directly by the Security Council.

Global Challenge Update

Despite a general decline in violence internationally over the past months (see figure 5) and despite some of that decline being attributable to COVID-19, violent conflict remains the main driver of humanitarian needs, with projections by OCHA showing that, in 2020 alone, more than 167 million people could require humanitarian aid and protection.⁴³ Conflict also has a detrimental impact on the global economy. The Global Peace Index estimates that, in 2019, violent conflict cost the global economy roughly U.S. \$523 billion in purchasing power.⁴⁴

Since 2011, for example, Russia and China, as permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) have cast thirteen vetoes to block action to support humanitarian access and peace agreements to address the Syrian conflict. In contrast, the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC, an advisory body to the UNSC and General Assembly created in 2005) has made some important strides by “bridging” the UN’s peace and security, development, and human rights pillars, and convening Member States, the UN system, international financial institutions, regional organizations, and civil society to develop best practices and strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery. But the past two reviews of the peacebuilding architecture (in 2010 and 2015) found that the PBC had not lived up to expectations set in 2005 and had struggled to make itself relevant in relation to the UNSC.⁴⁵ As relations between the two bodies have improved since the 2016 UNSC and General Assembly resolutions (S/RES/2282 and A/RES/70/262) that promised


greater collaboration, the Commission now has the potential to complement the UNSC in a more effective way to strengthen global peace and security.

Innovation Proposal

Acknowledging this potential, the Albright Gambari Commission recommended that the PBC be upgraded to a Council. A Peacebuilding Council should have new authorities to lead on policy development, coordination, resource mobilization, and prevention for conflict-affected states not hosting a UN Security Council–mandated peace operation, and function as a subsidiary body to both the UNSC and the General Assembly. The UNSC would maintain its current role and focus on hard security issues, while issues of “soft security”—such as climate change, human rights, and conflict prevention—would fall under the purview of the new PBC. Given that the UNSC has for a long time faced difficulties improving its representativeness and effectiveness, an empowered Peacebuilding Council would allow a larger number of capable UN Member States to contribute directly to the UN’s primary purpose of maintaining international peace.

As part of any enhancement, the new Peacebuilding Council should be able to operationalize its conflict prevention mandate through a new “Peacebuilding Audit” tool, modeled on the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) instrument for appraising the human rights records of all UN Member States. As with the UPR, countries would participate periodically in such audits of early warning indicators. This

Figure 5: Violent events and fatalities, May 30, 2019 to May 30, 2020



Source: The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). *ACLED Dashboard*. May 30, 2020. Accessed June 5, 2020. <https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard>.

approach could, for example, complement current efforts to track national commitments to Sustainable Development Goal 16. At the same time, the new PBC would invest most of its time and resources on countries and regions in non- (and especially “post-”) peacekeeping environments, monitoring as well as marshaling collective action to avert the outbreak or recurrence of deadly conflict and tracking closely the UN’s system-wide efforts at sustaining peace.

In the long-term, a successful Peacebuilding Council could become a candidate to replace the Trusteeship Council as one of the six principal organs of the United Nations. Such a move would put sustaining peace on the same footing, in UN circles, as managing conflict. Proposals to establish the Peacebuilding Council as a principal UN organ would face undoubtedly initial resistance in some quarters, especially among permanent members of the Security Council, who might see a challenge to their authority, but such resistance could fade once the Peacebuilding Council has had a chance to demonstrate its worth in its newly assigned roles.

Strategy for Reform on the Road to 2020 (UN75)

In the near term, the 2020 review of the peacebuilding architecture could serve as an opportunity to push forward the proposed Peacebuilding Council concept and to garner further political support in the run-up to UN75 Leaders Summit. Member States and the UN Secretariat are organizing consultations with relevant non-governmental entities to review progress on the implementation of past peacebuilding architecture resolutions. The Security Council is further planning to review the findings and recommendations of the Secretary-General’s forthcoming comprehensive report (on the “continued implementation of resolution 70/262, and progress in the implementation of the recommendations and options contained in his report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace”) and of related stakeholder consultations.⁴⁶ These consultations, along with the call, in the draft UN75 Declaration, for the Secretary-General to enhance the diplomatic toolbox of the Charter to “prevent the outbreak, escalation and recurrence of hostilities on land, at sea, in space and in cyberspace,” could generate interest and consideration for the recommendation by UN leadership and Member States.⁴⁷

4. Create a “G20+” for Accelerated, Equitable, and Broad-Based Recovery from COVID-19

Recommendation

Create a G20+ to accelerate socioeconomic recovery from COVID-19 through enhanced coordination by G20 members with the UN system, Bretton Woods institutions, and related bodies, supported by a new, small, full-time secretariat. The global economic governance system should be strengthened to limit the socioeconomic dislocations produced by the current global pandemic, to generate an equitable and broad-based recovery, and to reduce, at large, the volatility of our hyperconnected global economy.

Global Challenge Update

The remarkable transmissibility of COVID-19 alongside the speed and extent of its global spread in the first half of 2020 sent stock markets and bond yields tumbling worldwide, leading the heads of the IMF and OECD to predict that the world was headed toward a recession at least as bad as, if not worse, than that of 2008–9 (figure 6).⁴⁸

Although markets rebounded somewhat, this wholesale volatility, coupled with drops in consumer confidence and severe knock-on economic and social effects from government-ordered business closures and population lockdowns, resulted in swift contractions in both domestic and international finance, trade, air travel, and most other sectors of our closely intertwined global economy, as well as millions of job losses.⁴⁹

In response to the 2008–9 global financial crisis, the Pittsburgh G20 Summit in September 2009 vowed to make the G20 the “premier forum” overseeing international economic and financial cooperation and, thereafter, established the Financial Stability Board to implement reform of international financial regulation and supervision.⁵⁰ In the intervening decade, however (and prior to the COVID pandemic), economic inequality increased sharply in many quarters of the globe, further concentrating income and wealth.⁵¹ There is, not surprisingly, a spreading and deep sense of resentment against economic globalization among those who, in contrast to its greatest beneficiaries, see themselves as “left behind by globalization and automation,” particularly in industrialized countries.⁵² The current global economic governance system


urgently needs upgrading in the face of such challenges, to help all countries better deal with—indeed, reverse—growing inequality both globally and domestically, as well as the catastrophic socioeconomic effects of the coronavirus pandemic and related threats to the well-being of nations and peoples.

Innovation Proposal

G20 Member States’ economies generate about 74 percent of global GDP with roughly two-thirds of the world’s population.⁵³ However, the G20 does not give representation to another 174 other countries, many in the Global South. They too are concerned with sustaining global economic growth while maintaining economic stability, reducing global inequality, and addressing the economic, social, and political threats posed by pandemics like COVID-19 and the accelerating challenge of climate change.

For the G20 to truly become the “premier forum” of global economic and financial governance, it needs an upgrade to what the 2015 Albright-Gambari Commission called the “G20+.”⁵⁴ While the main policy focus of the G20+ should remain priority setting on critical issues for the world economy (including economic crisis response), it should also establish formal links with intergovernmental organizations for implementation and follow-through. Operationally, this proposal would entail assembling the G20 at the Heads of State level every two years at UN Headquarters, timed to coincide with the gathering of all world leaders at the start of the UN General Assembly in September in New York.

Figure 6: World growth in GDP per capita and recessions (percent)



Source: International Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook, April 20. The Great Lockdown,” 6.

To overcome current fragmentation of roles among international economic policy institutions, the G20 will also require more institutional presence. Currently, it has no collective institutional memory and no familiar face to the world—not even a permanent website. A modest secretariat should be created for the G20+ to give it such presence and promote greater policy continuity, more accountability, and better-integrated economic, social, and environmental approaches to international problems by G20 governments, international organizations, and even civil society organizations and the business community.

Well into 2021, the G20+ would need to focus, in particular, on mitigating the impact of and then promoting recovery from COVID-19. Specific measures could include integrated fiscal, monetary, central bank, and anti-protectionist initiatives to “prevent a liquidity crisis turning into a solvency crisis, and a global recession becoming a global depression.”⁵⁵

Strategy for Reform on the Road to 2020 (UN75)

Multilateral diplomacy has been put to the test in recent years. Nevertheless, severe socioeconomic fallout worldwide from the COVID-19

pandemic reinforces the case for expanded multilateral coordination to foster a globally coherent approach to recovery, both to prevent and to respond effectively to this and other economic shocks, and to work towards greater economic equity. At the same time, without leadership, countries—large and small—could opt to turn inward, blame foreign adversaries for their troubles, and erect shortsighted barriers to international exchange.

On April 16, 2020, twenty-five Foreign Ministers from the recently formed Alliance for Multilateralism issued a statement arguing “for a co-operative, transparent, science-based and coordinated global response” against COVID-19 and to “work to minimize disruptions to cross border trade and global supply chains.”⁵⁶ Enthusiastic members of the Alliance for Multilateralism that are concurrently G20 members—including Argentina, Canada, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, and South Africa—should be looked to for leadership on the G20+ reform initiative, just as Canada’s Finance Minister and later Prime Minister Paul Martin long advocated for the need to upgrade the G20 Finance Ministers forum to the level of Heads of State. Strong support is also expected from the 174 UN Member States not represented on the current G20.



Photo: UN Photo / Wendy van Bree

5. Boost the Reach and Resilience of International Justice Institutions

Recommendation

Seek universal acceptance of international justice institutions, in particular the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC), while increasing their enforcement powers, preserving their independence, and enhancing their resilience against political pressures.

Global Challenge Update

International courts and dispute settlement institutions are an integral part of rules-based global governance. Even as they enjoy international standing and support for seeking justice and accountability, these mechanisms have often lacked universal reach, enforcement mechanisms, and resilience to effectively carry out their mandates. In today's environment, characterized in many places by an "anti-multilateralist turn,"⁵⁷ they are also subject to severe political pressures and criticisms. The fate of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which was shut down in December 2019 by persistent U.S. refusal to agree to the appointment of new members, is a cautionary tale for other international courts and tribunals. Harsh criticism of the ICC by the United States and some non-Western countries has not led to a mass exodus from the Court, however, although the Philippines and Burundi have formally withdrawn from it and Asian countries in general remain underrepresented. Major countries, such as China, Russia, India, and the U.S., as well as Indonesia,


Pakistan, Nepal, Vietnam, and Myanmar are not parties to the Rome Statute. Moreover, only seventy-four of the world's nations accept the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction in general terms, among which the United Kingdom is the only permanent member of the UN Security Council (see figure 7).

At the same time, the continued demand for justice demonstrates that international courts are needed. This is evident from high-profile cases, such as the *Gambia v. Myanmar* case concerning the latter's obligations under the Genocide Convention, and the thirteen active ICC investigations (five of which were referred to the ICC by the countries in questions and two by the Security Council).⁵⁸

Innovation Proposal

International judicial institutions need nations to support them to increase their effectiveness. This includes bolstering their reach (acceptance of their jurisdiction and decisions across the global community) and their resilience (the ability to avail themselves of mechanisms to enforce their decisions and to resist political pressure).

Figure 7: Map highlighting countries that accept the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction under the "Optional Clause"



Source: Jacob Mukand and Joris Larik, using <https://mapchart.net/> and data from the website of the International Court of Justice. "Declarations recognizing the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory."

For the ICJ, this requires increased acceptance of its compulsory jurisdiction through so-called "optional clause" declarations under Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute. This would help to ensure that international disputes are addressed in courts of law rather than through direct and possibly violent confrontation.⁵⁹ In addition, more active use of the ICJ's advisory opinions—non-binding, but authoritative—could extend its reach with respect to pressing global challenges. The UN General Assembly and UN specialized agencies should make greater use of their powers to request such opinions. Since ICJ judgments are enforced by the Security Council,⁶⁰ ongoing campaigns to restrain the use of the veto—including the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group and the French-Mexican initiative—should include a commitment by Council members not to obstruct resolutions that enforce ICJ judgments.

The ICC—though not formally part of the UN system—should establish enhanced working methods with the Security Council. These should include a protocol to guide Council decisions to support the ICC investigations and prosecutions it has recognized, such as targeted sanctions to enforce ICC arrest warrants, as appropriate. Moreover, the vulnerability of international courts and tribunals to being rendered non-operational should be urgently assessed.

The ICJ and ICC should also be "stress-tested" and reformed to strengthen their resilience—not only regarding the appointment of judges, but also the need for appropriate funding, premises, and freedom to operate without political pressure and interference.

Strategy for Reform on the Road to 2020 (UN75)

Increasing the number of states that accept the ICJ's and the ICC's jurisdiction is essential to crafting a coalition to boost international justice institutions as an integral part of the rules-based multilateral order. This will lay the groundwork for more ambitious goals, such as ensuring that a majority of the world's nations issue "optional clause" declarations under the ICJ or support a much-needed protocol on ICC-UNSC cooperation. These proposals can be achieved without having to pass large political and legal thresholds such as UN Charter amendment. Additional studies to underpin campaigns for international justice could be launched prior to the September 2020 Leaders Summit in New York and continued during the General Assembly's 75th Session, while existing government-led initiatives, such as the Alliance for Multilateralism and the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group, can champion a drive to extend the courts' reach and resilience.



Photo: Daniel Lee / Unsplash

6. Make Green Technology to Combat Climate Change More Accessible to Developing Countries

Recommendation

Establish a Green Technology Licensing Facility within the United Nations Green Climate Fund. This facility would encourage licensing and transfer of technology to developing countries, while protecting intellectual property rights (IPRs) to incentivize the development of green technology and increase its availability in developing countries.

Global Challenge Update

Some current programs do promote technology transfer and climate adaptation in the Global South, but licensing and IPR laws often hinder the process. To meet Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris Climate Agreement, most countries will need large investments in green technology. Solar and wind power, in particular, will be needed to help countries turn away from fossil fuels. But green tech is often mired in a complex web of patent and IPR laws, which can make it hard, if not impossible, for many states to acquire the needed technology. Despite advances in funding (e.g., the UN's Green Climate Fund) and technical assistance (e.g., the Climate Technology Centre and Network of the UN Environment Programme and UN Industrial Development Organization), there are still financial barriers to licensing green technology applications.

Innovation Proposal

To ease the transfer and implementation of green technology, the Albright-Gambari Commission recommended the establishment of a Green Technology Licensing Facility within the UN Green Climate Fund. This facility would eliminate current barriers to the proliferation of environmentally sound technology (EST) by issuing licenses that are internationally binding and applicable in any country. This would prevent one country's patent laws from impeding green tech applications in another country. The facility would incentivize the use of such technologies by developing tailor-made programs to promote recipients' absorptive capacities for ESTs. The facility could also promote public awareness of green tech needs in order to encourage innovative technology firms to transfer ESTs as an integral element of corporate social responsibility.

The transfer of technology creates frictions between nations, with developing and developed

countries disagreeing on how to proceed and what kinds of results these transfers should encourage, as summarized in table 3.

Strategy for Reform on the Road to 2020 (UN75)

The international community is currently pursuing a series of initiatives to combat climate change. In September 2019, the United Nations hosted the Climate Action Summit in New York at the start of the 74th General Assembly, with participation from governments, the private sector, civil society, local authorities, and other international organizations. The summit considered, among other priorities, the importance of green energy and of further assisting least developed countries in the green economy. This, in effect, created an opening for the idea of a Green Technology Licensing Facility.

In December 2019, in Madrid, Spain, the UNFCCC’s 25th Conference of Parties (COP25), presented another opportunity to advance this idea, leaning on commitments made in 2018’s “Katowice Rulebook” and the Paris Climate Agreement national progress reports first introduced in Madrid. Similarly, the UN75 Leaders Summit in New York (September 21, 2020) and the re-scheduled COP26 in Glasgow (now provisionally considered for November 2021, due to the coronavirus pandemic) provide two more opportunities to adopt the Green Technology Licensing Facility idea within the

This facility would eliminate current barriers to the proliferation of environmentally sound technology ... by issuing licenses that are internationally binding and applicable in any country.

UN Green Climate Fund. The ability of millions to meet the escalating dangers of climate change could well depend on it. Fortunately, the draft UN75 Declaration declares that “We need to immediately curb greenhouse gas emissions and achieve sustainable production and consumption patterns in line with the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda. This cannot wait.”⁶¹

Table 3: The purposes of technology transfer for developing countries

Developed Countries Goal	Developing Countries Goal	
X	X	Getting the right technologies to the places where they are needed to combat climate change
X	X	Finding ways to modify these technologies to local circumstances
	X	Enabling and/or installing local knowledge centers to improve or adjust technologies
	X	Ensuring that developing countries do not depend on the goodwill of industrialized countries to give or sell them specific products to combat climate change, but enable them to produce these means themselves
	X	Enabling developing countries to grow their economies

Source: van der Veen, Menno. “Enhancing Technological Responses to Climate Change.” *Just Security in an Undergoverned World*, 220.

7. Enhance UN Capacity to Support the Responsibility to Prevent

Recommendation

Give the UN's recently consolidated Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs a central role in coordinating and compiling UN knowledge and analysis in conflict prevention, with special attention to averting mass atrocities, focusing on the Responsibility to Prevent principle.

Global Challenges Update

Since 2014, conflict and fragility have been on the rise. Fifty-two active state-based armed conflicts were recorded in 2018—the highest number since 1991 (see figure 8)—driven by eighteen “internationalized intrastate” conflicts, those with “troops from external states supporting one or both sides in the conflict.”⁶²

While the fast-spreading COVID-19 pandemic has ravaged big and small, rich and poor countries alike, fragile and conflict-affected countries have come under particularly acute strain. On March 23, 2020, UN Secretary-General António Guterres called for an immediate global ceasefire in all corners of the world to better focus on “the true fight of our lives.”⁶³ Despite weeks of negotiations, the Security Council failed to adopt a resolution in support of the Secretary-General’s call.⁶⁴ The pandemic has further burdened the lives of people in countries such as Syria, Yemen, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where ongoing political violence already inhibits the delivery of life-saving assistance and rises to the level of mass atrocities with numbing regularity.⁶⁵

Fifteen years ago, Member States collectively endorsed the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, when those populations’ governments manifestly fail to do so, and committed to “assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.”⁶⁶


Preventing violent conflict saves lives and creates space for building effective and equitable service delivery capacity and the accompanying inclusive governance culture that fragile states tend to sorely lack.⁶⁷ The United Nations’ current toolkit for conflict prevention

and response has proved effective at times, but many challenges persist. Current prevention efforts, though a high priority for UN Secretary-General António Guterres, are modest in scale relative to need and insufficient to address the complex, asymmetric nature of contemporary conflicts.⁶⁸ Building the capacity of states to prevent atrocities requires far closer attention to the political, social, and institutional factors known to generate political extremism and violence. And to do that, the UN system needs greater capacity for integrated conflict preventive action, underpinned by greater institutional “situational awareness.”⁶⁹

Innovation Proposal

The UN needs to better link up its widely distributed conflict analysis and crisis warning capabilities. There are UN elements to build on, such as the 2014 *Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes*,⁷⁰ to help assess and to avert future mass atrocity events. A responsibility center—logically located within the UN’s recently consolidated Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA)—could both strengthen DPPA’s efforts at prevention and support the Office of the Special Advisers for Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect by coordinating information and analysis to enable quicker decision-making and early action. Using as a point of departure the Responsibility to Prevent dimension of R2P—as envisaged by the 2001 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty—all major UN agencies and programs with the interest and ability to support conflict prevention efforts within their particular purviews should, in turn, contribute to a coordinated plan of action, led by the new responsibility center, for UN

Figure 8: Armed conflict by type from 1946 to 2018



Source: Pettersson, Therése, Stina Högladh, and Magnus Öberg. “Organized violence, 1989–2018 and peace agreements.” 590.

system-wide sharing of prevention-relevant data and analysis.

The UN’s prevention toolbox should draw lessons from the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review process to facilitate national reflection on the risks of atrocity crimes. It should build an assessment of risk factors for atrocity crimes into the basic structure of those reviews, as recommended by the Secretary-General.⁷¹ Regional organizations—given that many conflicts have regional implications—as well as governments, local peacebuilders, and civil society representatives should also be regularly consulted by the conflict prevention responsibility center. Similarly, UN Country Teams should be equipped to play a key role in collecting and communicating data to the headquarters.

Strategy for Reform on the Road to 2020 (UN75)

The UNSC cannot be the only organ relevant

to R2P if preventing conflicts and atrocities is to be undertaken seriously. We now have fifteen years of experience and a growing body of serious work to draw upon in developing a coordinated knowledge-building initiative on the part of the UN system, in consultation with regional organizations and a growing number of non-governmental networks.⁷²

Fortunately, the draft UN75 Declaration lends high-level political support to the Secretary-General’s call for a global cease-fire and requests him, in turn, to enhance “the diplomatic toolbox of the Charter” so as to better “prevent the outbreak, escalation and recurrence of hostilities.”⁷³ This, along with the Secretary-General’s emphasis on prevention and sustaining peace, and the progressive shift in the UN’s operationalization of conflict prevention, present opportune moments to steer political attention and resources toward developing an integrated UN platform to align system-wide efforts for early assessment, analysis, and action to prevent future atrocity crimes.⁷⁴

8. Strengthen Cybersecurity to Safeguard Positive Global Connectivity

Recommendation

Strengthen cybersecurity through international cybercrime centers, international cybercrime expert rosters, and a global campaign to promote end-user cyber hygiene.

Global Challenge Update

In 2019, the number of internet users in the world passed the four billion mark (see figure 9). With more than half of the world's population connected to the internet, the potential for cybercrime has also increased.

Cybercrime has been estimated to cost the world almost U.S. \$600 billion per year, “or 0.8 percent of global GDP.”⁷⁵ The rapid adoption of new technologies by criminals, rising numbers of new internet users, the emergence of “cybercrime-as-a-service,” and easier monetization through enhanced financial sophistication among cybercriminals are some of the main reasons for this staggering amount and its continual rise.⁷⁶

A range of organizations and initiatives have been working towards securing global connectivity. The UN is pursuing international cooperation through its Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security.⁷⁷ This group examines potential cooperative measures to avoid inter-state tensions in cyberspace.

In addition, since 2015, the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise has brought together stakeholders to share know-how and best practices on countering cybercrime. It now has eighty-six partners, including the United States, inter-governmental organizations, and large private companies.⁷⁸ Its work contributes to building a healthy foundation for global governance in cybersecurity, including a campaign to raise cybersecurity awareness and a project to assess and develop cybersecurity capabilities. Furthermore, in 2017, the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace was initiated by two independent think tanks, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and the EastWest

Institute. In November 2019, it launched its final report in which it put forward a set of norms and principles to enhance international security and stability, as well as guide responsible state and non-state behavior in cyberspace.⁷⁹


However, despite the wealth of expertise and technical resources in the international community, cybersecurity still lacks effective international coordination. According to the ITU, in 2018, there was “still a visible gap between many countries in terms of knowledge for the implementation of cybercrime legislation, national cybersecurity strategies (NCS), computer emergency response teams (CERTs), awareness and capacity to spread out the strategies, and capabilities and programmes in the field of cybersecurity.”⁸⁰ A year later, the UN Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation confirmed that, “as technological change has accelerated, the mechanisms for cooperation and governance of this landscape have failed to keep pace.”⁸¹ And, in December 2019, the UN General Assembly stressed “the need for enhanced coordination and cooperation among States in combating the criminal misuse of information technologies.”⁸²

Innovation Proposal

The Albright-Gambari Commission recommended several steps to better tackle cybersecurity as a matter of global governance.⁸³ Progress has been made on some of them, especially with regards to the global harmonization of cybersecurity frameworks and standards under the aegis of the UN in the form of principles for responsible state behavior and Member State capacity-building thanks to, among others, the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise.

To close the capacity gap highlighted by the ITU, a standby roster of cybercrime experts should be created to assist countries for the development

Figure 9: Individuals using the internet, 2005-19*



Source: International Telecommunication Union. “Measuring digital development: Facts and figures 2019.” 1.

of critical cybersecurity capabilities. These rosters should be managed by a UN-affiliated global network of regional cybercrime centers that could draw on the experience and best practices of, for instance, Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre. Moreover, regional centers would allow countries with limited budgets and capabilities to share resources and technology as well as exchange information. The centers and their staff could promote best practices and due diligence in cybersecurity among millions of new internet users each year. In addition, a global UN campaign promoting “cyber hygiene”⁸⁴ could help new users protect themselves, their data, and their assets from cybercrime. The benefits of prevention would easily outweigh the limited costs of such a campaign.

Strategy for Reform on the Road to 2020 (UN75)

UN Secretary-General Guterres has made addressing “the dark side of digital world” one of his priorities for 2020 and announced “a Roadmap for Digital Cooperation covering internet connectivity, human rights, trust and security in the age of digital interdependence,” which is being finalized

by his team with input from outside advisers.⁸⁵

However, if the goal is to “usher in order to the Wild West of cyberspace,”⁸⁶ the abovementioned innovation proposals are essential for ensuring that emerging global norms are enforced and frameworks of cooperation become effective. Crucially, in this quintessentially transnational domain, weak links among both state and non-state actors contribute to insecurity on a global scale. Therefore, countries that already have stringent cybercrime regulations and state-of-the-art enforcement capacities have an interest in sharing their expertise with others that do not. Such sharing is not only a form of development cooperation but an essential contribution to the human security of more than half of the world’s population.

The draft UN75 Declaration gives priority to the promotion of “a shared vision on digital cooperation and a digital future that show the full potential for beneficial technology usage, and addressing digital trust and security.”⁸⁷ Such trust and security can only be achieved with the requisite expertise and capacities, without which both the Secretary-General’s Roadmap and the UN75 Declaration cannot be implemented.

9. Improve UN Civilian Capacity to Help Build Back Swiftly in the Aftermath of Conflict

Recommendation

Establish standing and reserve capacities to meet UN needs for rapidly deployable civilian specialist skills in conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts worldwide. Such a new civilian capability, with an emphasis on gender parity, could be central to the early efficacy of future integrated UN peace operations and special political missions.

Global Challenge Update

Violent conflicts are never static. Rapid emergency response post-conflict—and similarly energetic efforts to prevent new or recurrent conflicts—can reduce prospects of violence and increase chances for sustainable peace.⁸⁸ But, in many instances, the international community’s capacity to quickly mobilize critical technical expertise for effective early action has proven to be less than satisfactory. The COVID-19 pandemic has further tested global institutional capacity to coordinate quick and effective responses to crises. The global outbreak has the potential to erode international crisis management systems and further destabilize fragile countries by exacerbating both domestic and regional tensions.⁸⁹

Building and sustaining peace requires greater international civilian capacity to support the objectives of post-conflict reconstruction and governance.⁹⁰ Despite this urgent identified need to complement and strengthen national and local-level governing functions in fragile and conflict-affected situations, the UN faces significant challenges in deploying civilian capabilities to missions and settings with mandates that vary widely.⁹¹

Matching growing demand with supply in an innovative, systematic way was the goal of the UN’s Civilian Capacity initiative (CIVCAP, 2009–14) and “CAPMATCH”—the UN’s former online civilian capacity sourcing platform. CAPMATCH

was used, for instance, to provide country-level support to institution-building efforts in Liberia and Côte D’Ivoire.⁹² Despite CIVCAP’s disbandment and the closure of the CAPMATCH platform, the initiative drew attention to the many shortcomings related to the UN’s ability to deploy needed civilian capacities in conflict-affected states.⁹³

Innovation Proposal

Building on these efforts, the Albright-Gambari Commission proposed a new UN Civilian Response Capability to meet three distinct goals: (a) improving support for post-conflict institution-building grounded in national ownership; (b) broadening and deepening the pool of civilian expertise for peacebuilding; and (c) enhancing regional, South-South, and triangular cooperation in building and sustaining peace.⁹⁴ Such an initiative would include a rapidly deployable cadre of 500 international staff possessing technical and managerial skills, and fifty senior mediators and Special Envoys/Representatives of the Secretary-General with special attention paid to the recruitment of women mediators and mission leaders in line with UNSCR 1325 (2000) and the UN’s Gender Parity Strategy. Ideally, this group would be complemented by a two-thousand-strong standby component of highly skilled and periodically trained international civil servants drawn voluntarily from across the UN system—including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund—and beyond, to

“Invest in systems to attract the best and brightest mission leadership and civilian expertise for field service. There is no substitute for getting the right people, into the right jobs, at the right time and only for the time that is necessary.” — Lakhdar Brahimi addressing the General Assembly on June 22, 2010

Source: United Nations. Secretary-General. *Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict*. 2011, para. 64.

Table 4: Civilian positions in UN peacekeeping and special political missions, 2011–19

		2011	2015	2019
UN peacekeeping operations	International staff	5,734	5,315	4,539
	UN Volunteers	2,248	1,710	1,221
	National staff	13,715	11,476	8,393
UN special political missions	International staff	1,707	1,456	1,733
	UN Volunteers	106	92	220
	National staff	3,023	2,102	2,052
Totals:	International	7,441	6,771	6,272
	Volunteer	2,354	1,802	1,441
	National	16,738	13,578	10,445
	All	26,533	22,151	18,158

Sources: UN Department of Peace Operations. *Peacekeeping Operations Fact Sheet*. April 30, 2011; August 31, 2015; August 31, 2019. (For factsheets older than December 2018, contact authors.) UN General Assembly documents A/66/354, November 2, 2011, 19; A/70/348, October 16, 2015, 47; and A/74/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.1, June 19, 2019, 41.

tap specialized skillsets (including judges, municipal-level administrators, engineers, and technical specialists—particularly those with newly needed skills in areas such as cybersecurity).⁹⁵

Advancing Secretary-General António Guterres' renewed focus on prevention requires a nimble global approach to identifying, sharing, and rapidly deploying civilian expertise to prevent and de-escalate violent conflict. The new Civilian Response Capability would ensure that the UN could better respond to the urgent needs of conflict prevention and recurrence worldwide. It should be coordinated with other similar initiatives led by, among others, the African Union, European Union, and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. It can draw lessons from the EU's Civilian Capabilities Development Plan launched in November 2018, which aimed to make the Civilian Common Security and Defence Policy "more capable, more effective, flexible and responsive."⁹⁶ Investing in a system that provides immediate civilian leadership and expertise has the potential to reduce the outbreak and recurrence of violent conflict, thereby diminishing the need for costly, large-scale, and more politically intrusive interventions from the international community.⁹⁷

Strategy for Reform on the Road to 2020 (UN75)

With thirty-seven political missions and thirteen peacekeeping operations that include

thousands of civilian personnel worldwide, the UN's need for technical expertise is ongoing and substantial (see table 4). The dramatic global economic slowdown poses great potential for unrest and renewed violence in fragile and conflict-affected states and regions. Non-state, illegal armed groups may use the health crisis and knock-on socioeconomic effects, including the growing specter of famine, to gain political and social influence. Directly addressing this heightened threat to vulnerable populations requires preventive action and experts who are readily available for deployment. A new UN Civilian Response Capability could not be timelier.

The present pandemic serves as a reminder that preparedness is essential to prevent and mitigate crises. In 2020, the UN's 75th anniversary and the review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture provide two complementary tracks where Member States, with support from the Secretary-General and external experts, can choose to invest in new standing and reserve capacities to meet rapid deployment needs for civilian specialist skills. Fortunately, the draft UN75 Declaration opens the door to consideration of such innovations.⁹⁸ If adopted by world leaders this September at the UN75 Summit, this commitment can pave the way for serious consideration of a new UN Civilian Response Capability and other innovative conflict prevention and response measures.



Photo: Roberto Stuckert Filho/PR

10. Create a UN Parliamentary Network to Enhance Democratic Legitimacy and Effectiveness

Recommendation:

Address the UN's democracy and legitimacy deficits by establishing a UN Parliamentary Network (UNPN) as an advisory body to the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Composed of individual members of national and regional parliaments—as well as representatives of existing parliamentary networks, institutions, and possibly local authorities—the UNPN would act as a platform for direct participation, input, and accountability claims by elected representatives of the peoples of the world on governance matters pertaining to the UN.


Global Challenge Update

The increasing transnational nature of global challenges requires a shared commitment to cooperation and collective action based on multilateral principles. Such action, however, requires both representative and legitimate decision-making, two elements that are insufficiently embedded in the UN system. At present, all 193 UN Member States are represented solely by the executive branches of national governments with no formal direct channels for legislative branch involvement.⁹⁹ Since 1945 (first arrow in figure 10), but especially since the end of the Cold War (second arrow), a “period of ‘parliamentarisation’ of international relations” has seen at least sixty-eight transnational parliamentary institutions created.¹⁰⁰ Following the example of regional and sub-regional governance institutions with parliamentary structures such as the European Union, the African Union, ECOWAS, and Mercosur, the UN General Assembly—the world’s most

representative body of states—is long overdue to incorporate a formal structure to allow for direct input and oversight from parliamentarians irrespective of their political affiliation.

Innovation Proposal

With the long-term objective of creating a UN Parliamentary Assembly that affords greater citizen participation in global governance, the Albright-Gambari Commission recommended as an initial step introducing a parliamentary dimension to the General Assembly, by establishing a UNPN as a subsidiary consultative body to the UNGA.¹⁰¹ This can be achieved under Article 22 of the UN Charter and does not require Charter amendment. The UN Parliamentary Network would consist of individual parliamentarians who decide to opt-in and would have diverse political backgrounds beyond that of their home country’s ruling-party. The UNPN could focus on promoting transparency, oversight, and accountability within

Figure 10: The creation of international parliamentary institutions, 1889–2006

Source: Šabič, Zlatko. “Building Democratic and Responsible Global Governance: The Role of International Parliamentary Institutions,” 261. (Note: this is a redesign of the original chart.)

the UN system, as well as providing substantive inputs to the work of the General Assembly.¹⁰² The UNPN could further help to address concerns at the grassroots level about the benefits of multilateralism and provide a platform for input from domestic populations (i.e., through public hearings with local constituents), local civil society groups, and the private sector—a key feature to facilitate more accountable and inclusive decision-making at the global level.

Initially, the UNPN could meet every September and contribute ideas to the work of the UN General Assembly at the start of its new session and maintain an online platform for engagement throughout the year. In its composition, the UNPN could consist of several hundred standing members, and its operations could be supported by the UN Secretariat.¹⁰³ It could serve as a precursor to a more ambitious UN Parliamentary Assembly idea spearheaded by a more than decade-old campaign to establish such an assembly as a formal UN body that allows for optional direct elections of delegates.¹⁰⁴ That campaign has received support from 1,600 current and former members of parliament, and thousands of individuals and civil society groups from more than 150 countries.¹⁰⁵ The European (2018) and Pan-African Parliaments (2016) adopted resolutions supporting the proposal as well.

Strategy for Reform on the Road to 2020 (UN75)

While the UN Parliamentary Assembly campaign has made important strides to expand the broad reach of supporting parliamentarians and civil society organizations, formalizing a full-fledged parliamentary body at the United Nations will require more time to garner sufficient political support. The UN Parliamentary Network idea, by contrast, is more realistic in nature and requires fewer political obstacles to be overcome. In the lead-up to the UN75 Leaders Summit, on September 21, 2020, advocates of a UNPN and a UNPA could work to establish a “UNPN Group of Friends” consisting of Member States and influential civil society organizations interested in championing these initiatives. Referencing the UN75 Declaration’s support for enhancing “democratic governance and the rule of law,”¹⁰⁶ the Group of Friends could go public during September’s UNGA high-level segment. By including supportive parliamentarians worldwide, the group would be poised to generate further momentum for the UN Parliamentary Network and United Nations Parliamentary Assembly ideas post-2020.

IV. Pioneering Partnerships in Global Governance

“The United Nations system has long entered into multi-stakeholder partnerships with civil society organizations, academia, businesses, among others. In fact, civil society has become an integral part of the United Nations ensuring good governance, and promoting human rights, but also for advancing the implementation of the priorities of the UN.”

— H.E. Tijjani Muhammad-Bande, President of the 74th Session of the UN General Assembly¹⁰⁷

Public-private (or multi-stakeholder) partnerships are enhancing global governance in many spheres, from combating climate change to fighting piracy, enhancing public health, and supporting internet access. In this section, we consider the evolution of different kinds of public/private, state/non-state partnerships that seek to advance major UN goals since the turn of the millennium, drawing lessons from their achievements and shortcomings alike. We also offer some ideas on ways to generate innovative partnerships and scale-up their impact in global governance by encouraging businesses and civil society groups to work with governments and UN agencies to deliver on forthcoming UN75 Declaration commitments, including a specific commitment to boosting partnerships with regional organizations, scholars, and parliamentarians.

Learning from the Past Two Decades

Multi-stakeholder partnerships are powerful and relatively recent occurrences in global governance that increased fourfold between 2000 and 2015.¹⁰⁸ Their contribution to strengthening cooperation and addressing some of the biggest challenges of the century was recognized in 2015, when the Sustainable Development Goal 17 on partnerships was adopted as one of the seventeen goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Goal 17 “recognizes multi-stakeholder partnerships as important vehicles for mobilizing and sharing knowledge, expertise, technologies and financial resources to support the achievement of the sustainable development goals.”¹⁰⁹ In some instances, these flexible and multi-faceted entities are joining up with more

traditional multilateral mechanisms to advance complex intergovernmental policies that require cross-cutting approaches.¹¹⁰ These often innovative, problem-solving joint ventures are not just consistent with present definitions of global governance but may be essential to its future effectiveness. As used in this section, global governance involves bilateral, informal multilateral, and treaty-based relations among state and non-state actors.¹¹¹

The progression of multi-stakeholder partnerships with the UN over the past two decades reflects an increasingly interconnected and interdependent style of global governance. Especially noteworthy are: the establishment of the UN Global Compact (2000), the adoption of Millennium Development Goal 8 on Developing a Global Partnership for Development (2000), the creation of the UN Office for Partnerships (2006), the first annual UN Partnership Forum within ECOSOC (2008), and several General Assembly resolutions and Secretary-General reports on enhancing partnerships between the UN and other stakeholders.¹¹² Partnerships that once used predominantly intergovernmental frameworks have evolved into models that increasingly engage groups and entities once excluded from formal participation in governance, now including non-state actors such as private corporations and civil society organizations.

Recognizing the value of multilateral agreements and the need for their effective implementation, growing numbers of state and non-state actors have begun to move beyond “contested multilateralism” toward greater collaboration on both policy development and operational matters.¹¹³ Especially given growing political difficulties of the negotiation, let

alone accession or ratification of new international treaties (e.g., the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court¹¹⁴ or the Kyoto Protocol¹¹⁵), new kinds of public-private partnerships in global governance are increasingly shaping modern behavioral norms in international politics.¹¹⁶

Successes to Build On

The new multi-stakeholder multilateralism contributes to global governance in at least three important ways. *First*, multi-stakeholder partnerships characteristically take a targeted, issue-oriented approach to international collaboration, avoiding comprehensive agendas, which tend to be politically fraught and bureaucratically complex. Reaching consensus among the United Nations' 193 Member States can be a daunting process, not least because many are "wedded to bloc identities and entrenched regional positions,"¹¹⁷ making it difficult to address broad global challenges such as the elimination of poverty or of nuclear weapons.

Agreement is less difficult on specific, narrowly defined issues. Consider, for example, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI). Coled by the World Health Organization, Rotary International, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the UN Children's Fund, GPEI engages effectively with national governments and international public and private partners. By supporting a unique transnational health network, this partnership is credited, in just over thirty years, with eradicating type 2 polio,¹¹⁸ and reducing the number of type 1 and type 3 polio cases from 350,000 per year to just 407 by 2013.¹¹⁹ Another concrete, issue-focused multi-stakeholder endeavor from the past decade has been the fight against piracy off the coast of East Africa (box 5).

Second, multi-stakeholder partnerships practice "network governance,"¹²⁰ coordinating key policies and actions to fill gaps and foster synergies among distinct state and non-state actors to make political implementation more effective. Disparate partners can leverage their unique skills and pool resources—such as funding, expertise, legitimacy, or long-established international relationships—towards

Box 5: Partnership lessons from fighting piracy in Somalia

The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) was established to collectively address maritime piracy in 2009. It focuses on filling gaps in maritime governance by providing practical guidance on fighting piracy to all relevant stakeholders. More than sixty governments are joined by more than twenty intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), non-profit organizations, and private associations.¹ Between 2010 and 2019, the CGPCS helped reduce reports of acts of piracy and armed robbery as well as attempted attacks off the coast of Somalia from 218 to zero. With five working groups, open membership, and a commitment to counter-piracy, the CGPCS is a highly effective multi-stakeholder partnership representing a model for future partnerships involving many diverse actors.

The CGPCS helps fill regional knowledge gaps and improve information-sharing between civilians and military officials, creating an effective information- and idea-exchange forum. As a result, national governments began to implement legislation on prosecuting pirates, and the UN Security Council has worked to close loopholes in existing international legal frameworks. The contact group fills an institutional gap, and its voluntary, burden-sharing mechanisms promote an effective cycle of prosecution, resulting in a stark decrease of maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia.

The CGPCS is a specific program that focuses on a single issue with regional boundaries, in this case limited to the Somali Basin, Gulf of Aden, and, increasingly, the Indian Ocean. A specific geographic focus encourages collective action tailored to focused issues. Unity of purpose is critical to a partnership's success, as well as having a like-minded coalition of capable non-state, state, and intergovernmental actors, including the Security Council, International Maritime Organization, and UN Office on Drugs and Crime.

Source: Zach, Seyle, and Madsen, "Burden-sharing Multi-level Governance: A Study of the Contact Group off the Coast of Somalia." UNODC, "In-depth Evaluation of the Counter Piracy Programme." IMO, "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Annual Report — 2019."

a particular transnational solution. Exploiting the leverage that accompanies membership in a network can also help non-state actors or traditionally weaker states punch above their weight in global governance.¹²¹

The Kimberley Process is an important example of a partnership that utilized its many stakeholders to contribute resources and expertise, and to enforce compliance. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) unites governments, civil society, and the diamond industry to define and identify conflict diamonds (rough diamonds often used to finance wars), then remove them from the economy. Created in 2003, the partnership consists of fifty-five participants representing eighty-one countries¹²² (the EU and its twenty-seven member states all count as a single participant that is represented by the European Commission), the Civil Society Coalition, and diamond industry working groups.¹²³ It is intended to guide states in implementing regulations on the trade of rough diamonds and to certify them as “conflict-free.” While states implement and agree to shared standards for diamond mining, civil society organizations (CSOs) such as the Center for Natural Resource Governance actively monitor the effectiveness of the KPCS, promote good governance and global sustainability (with special attention to diamond mining in Africa), and guide policy.

Third, public-private partnerships benefit from informality, characterized as “a preference for voluntary commitments over binding conventions,”¹²⁴ which lends itself to speed and adaptability of response. In informal partnerships, stakeholders can organize quickly and nimbly to address specific issues as they arise. Such flexibility enhances freedom of action and policy autonomy from complex bureaucratic structures. These informal networks also increase communication, reduce uncertainty through greater transparency and an enhanced knowledge base, and improve coordination of relevant policies.

Thus, the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change endorsed a flexible “pledge and review” framework, in December 2014, which afforded each state the ability to decide individually its contribution to global carbon emission

reductions.¹²⁵ A year later, the Paris Climate Agreement endorsed “nationally determined contributions” to facilitate agreement among nations and encourage their participation.¹²⁶ With more than 10,000 representatives from non-governmental organizations participating in the annual COPs, many observers attribute the Paris Climate Agreement’s successful completion, in part, to the external pressure placed on political leaders by global civil society.¹²⁷ The growing multi-stakeholder character of the COPs is further amplified by the concurrent, informal commitments to contribute to the agreement’s implementation by thousands of multinational corporations, mayors, and non-governmental organizations.

Obstacles to Impactful Partnerships

Although multi-stakeholder partnerships offer pragmatic tools to help generate solutions to global problems, the process of collaboration and the production of tangible results may be undermined in a number of ways. For starters, some of the basic characteristics of partnerships and networks, including their voluntary nature, member autonomy, informality, and lack of enforceable accountability for members’ behavior or results, can hamper transnational action. If tasks and contributions are always voluntary and not defined clearly (and sometimes even when defined properly), for example, partnerships can suffer from a lack of resources and engagement.

Competition between private sector companies, CSOs, or states may also prevent stakeholders from contributing to important norms creation. If one stakeholder feels that it is losing money, power, or prestige because of the partnership in relation to its competitors, this partner may not be willing to engage unless equal compliance can be ensured.¹²⁸ Member autonomy may also prevent a partnership from progressing. If all partners do not develop a shared interpretation of the problem, differing perspectives on tasks and pathways to action could cause the partnership to stall.¹²⁹

In addition, resistance from groups inside the process that do not want to implement innovative solutions may hinder goal achievement.¹³⁰ If there is lack of continuity, adequate

follow-up, or a clear leader, many partners may fall back into old patterns and practices, rendering the partnership ineffective.¹³¹ Tensions between partners' preference for top-down versus bottom-up approaches may fracture a partnership. As more actors become involved in separate multi-stakeholder partnerships, competing perspectives and goals could prevent progress in solving the problem that originally drew partners together. Consequently, international coordination can be increasingly fragmented into smaller, competing blocs.¹³²

Informality in multi-stakeholder partnerships can also lead to forum-shopping. Powerful and interested partners can cherry-pick their partners,¹³³ and tend to pick older, more established institutions with more resources, information, experience, and networks. IGOs tend to be more interested in CSOs for their ability to deliver programmatic activities that support policy implementation than for their substantive input to policy development. This preference indicates a bias towards Northern-based CSOs that often have a greater capacity to deliver programmatic results, due to better access to knowledge, capital, and other resources. This results in a potential bias in partnership-building that can, in effect, prevent the most disadvantaged voices from being able to participate in global governance.¹³⁴

Finally, if the original partnership holds together, its ability to produce results may be undermined by a corresponding inability to hold members accountable for upholding agreed rules, norms, or processes for attaining the partnership's objectives. Since multi-stakeholder engagements are increasingly defined by voluntary codes of conduct and informality, and lack enforcement mechanisms, only strong internal incentives may influence partners' full compliance. In the absence of such incentives, and with few repercussions for non-compliance, partnerships can be excuses for inaction.

The Future of Partnerships in Global Governance

Although great strides have been made over the past two decades in realizing the full potential

of multi-stakeholder partnerships to effect positive change in global affairs, considerable room for improvement remains, especially as these increasingly influential initiatives attract a healthy level of outside scrutiny. In some instances, these flexible and multi-faceted actors are joining up with more traditional multilateral mechanisms to advance complex intergovernmental policies that require cross-cutting approaches.¹³⁵ Learning from the strengths and shortcomings exhibited by public-private partnerships in global governance, three ways in which their impact can be further elevated are:

1. Develop a measurement and evaluation (M&E) system and tools for information flow about partnership progress and collective impact

Before a multi-stakeholder partnership is stood-up, it is critical that all partners have a clear, common understanding of the initiative's goals, intended deliverables, and desired outcomes as well as how they are to be sequenced over short-, medium-, and longer-term timeframes. To this end, an M&E system and associated tools can be utilized to develop and track various metrics to assess progress in goal attainment over the lifecycle of the partnership, including progress toward achieving a durable impact. Incorporating the latest techniques from robust log-frame methodologies, the M&E system can be used, for instance, to: a) develop "network maps" (detailing the capabilities of current and prospective network partners) and other visualization/presentation tools; b) assess partnership development to ensure greater efficiency and monitoring; c) track adherence to commitments made in the partnership; and d) reduce the transaction costs associated with an initiative's basic administrative, financial management, and communications needs.

2. Innovative financing in public-private collaboration for better development results

Complementing traditional international resource flows (such as overseas development assistance, foreign direct investment, and remittance), innovative financing instruments, including "blended finance" models, are proving effective at mobilizing additional development resources and overcoming institutional barriers

Box 6: The draft UN75 Declaration underscores significance of partnerships

We will boost partnerships. Today’s challenges require cooperation not only across borders but also across the whole of society. We have to make the United Nations more inclusive and engage with all relevant stakeholders, including regional and sub-regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, civil society, the private sector, academia and parliamentarians to ensure an effective response to our common challenges.

Source: United Nations. “Declaration of the Commemoration of the Seventy-Fifth Anniversary of the United Nations.” Draft, July 3, 2020, 4.

that can contribute to market failure.¹³⁶ Such innovative financing can support enhanced public-private partnerships and increase focus on development programs that deliver results, from eliminating poverty to protecting the environment.¹³⁷ One notable example of innovative public-private financing is the U.S. \$8 million Nordic Horn of Africa Opportunities Fund that targets Somali small- and medium-sized-enterprises.¹³⁸ With a focus on job creation and empowering female entrepreneurs, the fund deploys risk capital (creatively leveraged from multiple development partners) to finance such enterprises with Sharia compliant loans and other self-liquidating structures.

3. *Develop a shared language for strategy, communications, and project management among partners*

The need to develop common approaches within a partnership—including a shared language for strategy, communications, and project management among those involved in a new partnership—cannot be overemphasized. The UN Secretary-General, Global Compact Secretariat, Presidents of the General Assembly and Economic and Social Council, World Bank President, and other parts of the global governance system all stress the importance of multi-stakeholder partnerships. It is often *lower-level* bureaucratic challenges that create the implementation bottlenecks, as many international civil servants simply do not have the time required or the professional incentive to exert greater leadership and initiative on behalf of a novel, voluntary enterprise. Yet businesses and CSOs have much to offer the UN and other IGOs in terms of logistical and technical support,

project management skills, IT support, and sometimes strategic leadership. Partners must, therefore, work to develop a shared understanding of what each can actually contribute to a new initiative, and here a common approach to strategy, communications, and project management can be valuable.

Looking ahead—and like the old saying “Think Globally, Act Locally”—researchers should allocate more time and resources to examining the impact of globally-oriented public-private partnerships at the most local levels of governance. Scholars and policy analysts could further analyze the influence partnerships have on developing countries, by “uncovering in greater detail the diversity of partnership effects across issues and jurisdictions.”¹³⁹ Both areas of inquiry will help to ensure that these new kinds of joint-ventures are both engendering the expected effects and mitigating any unintended consequences.

Multi-stakeholder multilateralism represents, in many ways, a significant step forward for building more effective and inclusive types of global cooperation. Its pioneering and results-driven spirit is instilled in a new generation of joint-ventures with UN system entities, initiated or further developed in connection with the seventy-fifth anniversary commemoration of the world body in 2020 (see table 5). Public-private partnerships in global governance have the potential to guide and equip civil society and private sector actors seeking to help deliver on the twelve action point commitments made in the intergovernmental UN75 Declaration, including one directly in support of partnerships (see box 6), a subject to which we now turn.

Table 5: UN75 Global Governance Forum partnerships

The Stimson Center, One Earth Future Foundation, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung New York Office, Global Challenges Foundation, and Global Governance Philanthropy Network are convening, on September 16 and 17 2020, a UN75 Global Governance Forum. Held immediately prior to the September 21 gathering of world leaders to commemorate the seventy-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, the forum will bring together leaders worldwide from governments, global civil society, and the technology, business, and philanthropic communities to foster new kinds of innovative partnerships with the United Nations system to better address global peace and security, sustainable development, human rights and humanitarian action, and climate governance challenges. Below is a selection of the partnerships to be showcased at the Forum:

Peace and Security

Partnership	Partnership Description
Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace (Lead: <i>Alliance for Multilateralism</i>)	Gathers a multi-stakeholder, international community of supporters who unite around, promote, and implement a common set of values and principles to increase trust and security in cyberspace.
New Alliances to Curb Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (Lead: <i>Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung New York Office</i>)	Foster a coalition between UN Member States, civil society organizations, and private businesses to better address technological challenges on the security landscape.
The Promise of Youth as Peacebuilders: Making the Case for Investment (Lead: <i>Search for Common Ground</i>)	Analyze return on investment (ROI) for donors and national governments to make a compelling case for higher prioritization for youth in government budgeting (and potentially investing in all aspects of youth empowerment, including education) and more coordinated efforts in the donor community for youth-led peacebuilding.
Building a Network of Peace (Lead: <i>PASO Colombia, One Earth Future Foundation</i>)	Build a coalition of funders to scale-up a new system of Governance for Peace, Agricultural, and Inclusive Development in rural Colombia.
Women, Peace & Conflict (Lead: <i>Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies, Doha Institute</i>)	Innovate strategies and advocate for a fair and active representation of women in peace negotiations and post-conflict reconstruction.

Sustainable Development

Partnership	Partnership Goal
Wealth and Tax Transparency for a Fair Post-COVID Global Economy (Lead: <i>Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung New York Office</i>)	Investigate whether a global campaign to tackle two critical drivers of inequality—hidden wealth and tax evasion and avoidance—should be pursued as a necessary step to lay the groundwork for a fairer global economy in the post-COVID recovery.
Cold Catch - Developing Cold Chain Infrastructure for the Somali Fishing Industry (Lead: <i>Secure Fisheries, One Earth Future Foundation</i>)	Bring about an innovative, multi-disciplinary solution in partnership with the Global Cold Chain Alliance, to develop cold chain infrastructure that can be piloted in Somalia and expanded to other lesser developed countries.
The Purpose First Economy (Lead: <i>Leaders on Purpose</i>)	Leadership coalition of business and cross-sectoral organizations at the frontier advancing the purpose first economy. Leaders on Purpose CEOs and cross-sectoral allies will advance the co-creation of a set of blueprints in support of a Purpose First Economy.

UNDP Accelerator Labs: Radical Innovation for Sustainable Development (Lead: <i>United Nations Development Programme</i>)	Respond to the devastating impact of COVID-19 by strengthening the infrastructure necessary to withstand the emergency and forge a more equitable, sustainable, and inclusive future.
Leaving No One Behind: Financial Models that Reach the Last Mile (Lead: <i>United Nations Capital Development Fund</i>)	UNCDF will showcase examples of partnerships that fill a key gap in the international financial architecture and enable more public and private resources to reach the “last mile”: the most vulnerable and underserved groups in the Least Developed Countries.

Human Rights and Humanitarian Action

Partnership	Partnership Goal
The Digital Identity Project (Lead: <i>Association for Computing Machinery’s Future of Computing Academy</i>)	Engage students and early-career practitioners in dialogue on issues of digital identity.
System Development of UN Data Strategy (Leads: <i>Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, UN University, Global Information Management Working Group</i>)	Create and fund a global multi-stakeholder mechanism for information governance and implementation of the UN Data strategy in support of the Sustainable Development Goals.
Mental Wellness for the World’s Growing Refugees, Migrants, and Disenfranchised Peoples (Lead: <i>Pythia International</i>)	Bring together stakeholders from global public relations, financing, and activist communities to bring proven and successful mental wellness programs, education, and awareness to people worldwide, with a primary focus on the world’s refugee population.
Enhancing Civil Society Space at the United Nations (Leads: <i>UN2020 and The Stimson Center</i>)	Expand and ensure more coherent, inclusive, and collaborative participation of civil society in shaping decision-making and supporting programming across the United Nations system.

Climate Governance

Partnership	Partnership Goal
Climate Governance Commission: 21st Century Governance Driving Exponential Climate Action (Leads: <i>Climate Governance Commission and Global Challenges Foundation</i>)	Confront the global climate emergency by innovating and proposing feasible high impact global governance solutions for urgent, exponential climate action, to limit global temperature rise to or below 1.5°C.
Amazon Rainforest Investor Coalition (Lead: <i>Global Governance Philanthropy Network</i>)	Report about Amazon conservation impact investing, educate global investor networks, and investigate rule-of-law grantmaking in the region to inform donors, innovate carbon markets, and improve market opportunities.
Countering Future Ecological Threats: A multi-stakeholder partnership built around the Ecological Threat Register (Lead: <i>Institute for Economics and Peace</i>)	Inform innovative, comprehensive, and evidenced-based policy recommendations, especially for countries with high levels of environmental vulnerability.
Building the pathway for boosting an “Earth System Caring Economy” (Lead: <i>Common Home of Humanity</i>)	Work towards the establishment of the Common Home of Humanity initiative as the Operational Design of the United Nations’ proposed Global Pact for the Environment.
Shifting Power: Transitioning to Renewable Energy in United Nations Field Missions (Leads: <i>The Stimson Center and Energy Peace Partners</i>)	Leverage greater use of economic and climate solutions to support peace in the world’s most fragile regions through clean energy options, focusing on crisis regions that host international peace and humanitarian field operations.

V. Smart Coalitions, The UN75 Declaration and Beyond

“This charter, like our own Constitution, will be expanded and improved as time goes on. No one claims that it is now a final or perfect instrument. It has not been poured into a fixed mold. Changing world conditions will require readjustments—but they will be readjustments of peace and not of war.”— U.S. President Harry S. Truman, (June 26, 1945, at the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco)¹⁴⁰

“In light of the pandemic, climate change, and other global challenges, we may just need another San Francisco Moment.”— H.E. Ambassador Cho Hyun, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations (May 15, 2020)¹⁴¹

The 2015 Albright-Gambari Commission report defined smart coalitions as “the creative collaboration of traditional (state) and nontraditional (nongovernmental) actors ... to engender progressive global systemic change. [They represent] a new form of diplomacy for a new era of international relations.”¹⁴² In this concluding section, we survey the landscape on forging such smart coalitions to remake global governance; derive initial insights and lessons about the potential for such change from the UN75 Declaration negotiations in New York; and offer guidance to governments, UN leadership, and business and civil society groups for mobilizing additional political support to advance this report’s ten innovation proposals and other ideas during the 75th General Assembly Session (September 2020–September 2021) and beyond.

Smart Coalitions and the Future of Global Governance

Since the end of the Cold War, civil society coalitions have been increasingly prominent in influencing and negotiating global governance reforms at the policy, programmatic, and normative level. These coalitions are diverse, non-governmental, non-profit entities that coordinate, often internationally, in seeking change in governance practices, norms, policies, and institutions. They are also known as transnational advocacy networks or, more loosely, “global civil society.” Civil society organizations (CSOs) have proliferated worldwide to become

a growing presence in national and international policy and negotiating forums. The United Nations alone saw an increase from 41 in 1946, to over 5000 such organizations in 2020, granted consultative status by the Economic and Social Council (Charter Article 71).¹⁴³

From peace and security to sustainable development, and human rights to climate change, transnational advocacy networks have helped shape recent global accords such as the Paris Climate Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and influenced the adoption of key legal frameworks such as the Mine Ban Treaty (1997), the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), and the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (2003).¹⁴⁴ These major milestones suggest the transformational global change that can be achieved when civil society leaders, government champions, and multilateral institutions’ officials unite under a common vision and a strategy for reform.¹⁴⁵

In an increasingly multipolar world, smart coalitions have been one of the main driving forces of progressive global systemic change. The success of past coalitions (see box 7) attests to the possibility of creating change at the global level, although the process has been uneven. While “history demonstrates that smart coalitions, working discreetly with supportive member state foreign ministries and UN Secretariat champions, can ‘move the dial’ of political will at key moments,”¹⁴⁶ achieving global governance reform requires credible and realistic

Box 7: Lessons learned from the Global Coalition on Youth, Peace and Security

Established in 2012 as a Working Group on Youth and Peacebuilding, the Global Coalition on Youth, Peace and Security (GCYPS) is the leading platform on advancing and promoting global policy and practice on youth, peace, and security. Following nearly five years of knowledge production, advocacy, and coalition-building, the UN Security Council adopted, in 2015, its landmark resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security, which acknowledges the importance of youth as agents of change in the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.

This, and the follow-on resolution 2419, in 2018, recognized young people's essential role in peace and security and highlighted the need to build partnerships with and include youth in peace processes, including prevention. Major elements contributing to GCYPS' success, to date, were:

1. It has primarily been led by youth alongside other key civil society groups and UN entities.
2. It produced several knowledge products including the *Guiding Principles for Young People's Participation in Peacebuilding* that helped establish a foundation for the normative frameworks.
3. The Coalition partners focused, first, on building trust and common understanding which laid a firm foundation for the Coalition's success and longevity.
4. Many UN Member States have become champions of the Youth, Peace and Security agenda including the Kingdom of Jordan who sponsored the first historic resolution 2250.
5. Two youth events in Amman and New York (both in 2015) led to the adoption of the Amman Youth Declaration, reflecting the voices of over 11,000 young people, and the Youth Action Agenda to Prevent Violent Extremism & Promote Peace. Both events created momentum for the UNSCR 2250 and for the mandated study, *The Missing Peace: Independent Progress Study on Youth, Peace & Security*.
6. The Secretary-General's Report on Youth, Peace and Security, released in March 2020, identified structural barriers that limit young people's capacity to influence decision-making, violations of their human rights, and insufficient investment in facilitating their inclusion.

Source: The Global Coalition on Youth, Peace and Security. *The Global Coalition on Youth, Peace and Security flyer*; and interview with Saji Prelis, Co-chair of the Global Coalition on Youth, Peace and Security, May 2020.

theories of change, sustained by international leadership and substantial public support. Pertinent and well-intended reform ideas can be quickly swept aside without sufficient follow-through. The 1995 Commission on Global Governance, for example, offered major UN reform proposals but few of them were considered for implementation, partly owing to insufficient follow-through by Member States and the UN at large, and partly because its proposals amounted to political "wishful thinking."¹⁴⁷

The global governance system marks a number of anniversaries in 2020 (see table 3 in section 1), each reminding us that norms, institutions, practices, and policies need constant nurturing and revalidation. Institutional anniversaries offer opportunities for reflecting on past achievements, stocktaking of progress in meeting current challenges and looming threats, renewing commitments to the principles of multilateral

cooperation, and strengthening and renewing the global governance architecture.

Despite the hostile political context and challenges posed by resurgent exclusionary nationalism and populism (section 2), the preliminary results of the UN75 "global conversation," undertaken by the UN75 Office, show an optimistic result: the majority of over 155,000 (as of June 3, 2020) survey respondents agreed that "it is either 'essential' or 'very important' for countries to work together to manage global trends."¹⁴⁸ UN75 is an opportunity to advance a dialogue that builds on such sentiments to revitalize and strengthen the global governance architecture. Two civil society coalitions, UN2020 and Together First, and the inter-governmental initiative, the Alliance for Multilateralism, aim to make headway for a sustained post-UN75 global governance reform effort. These players are

presently the loudest champions of multilateralism and the strongest advocates for a meaningful UN anniversary that prompts the rejuvenation of global institutions.

UN2020 and Together First have focused on leveraging the UN's 75th anniversary to create more inclusive, effective, and responsive governance to meet major global challenges.¹⁴⁹ The two campaigns have common goals but differ in approach: while UN2020 has centered its advocacy on the UN75 intergovernmental negotiations at the UN Headquarters in New York, Together First has a global risk lens and focuses on collecting and promoting concrete global governance reform ideas. The UN2020 secretariat is based within the World Federalist Movement in Ottawa and New York, while the United Nations Association-UK provides the secretariat for Together First. Among their most important achievements are:

- Mobilizing support for the official UN75 Declaration from thousands of individuals, civil society organizations, and Member States;
- Developing the UN75 People's Declaration and Plan for Global Action;
- Producing research and conducting online and in-person experts dialogues to build consensus on priority global governance reform innovations;
- Establishing close relationships with the Office of the Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General on the Preparations for the Commemoration of the United Nations' 75th Anniversary and with the UN75 co-facilitators (UN Permanent Representatives of Qatar and Sweden);
- Disseminating knowledge-based and advocacy materials and lobbying Member States through various communication channels; and

Box 8: Selection of global governance innovation recommendations for the UN and Member States advocated by UN2020 and Together First

Dedicate a civil society focal point at the UN Secretariat. A UN focal point for civil society at the Under-Secretary-General level would bring deeper partnerships with civil society into the work of the UN. (UN2020 and Together First)

Adopt a whole-of-ecosystem approach by linking climate governance to other environmental agreements, protocols, conventions, and innovations. An ecosystem wide approach will harmonize myriad international environmental agreements with state and non-state parties and their regulatory and technology development actions. (UN2020 and Together First)

Create a more coordinated, comprehensive, and resilient global health system. There is a need for pandemics-related, collaborative global guidelines and norms; advanced independent research and development into vaccines and treatment; outbreak monitoring and early warning systems; and the management of transmission across borders. (UN2020 and Together First)

Ensure good leadership and accountability. The full program of reform of selections suggested by the 1 for 7 Billion campaign need to be implemented and institutionalized for future Secretary-General elections and—with variations as appropriate—for senior appointments in all international institutions. (Together First)

Create a UN Youth Council as an advisory body to the UN General Assembly. The advisory body would support the application of the UN Youth Strategy, and ensure meaningful youth participation in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and all other strategic operations of the UN. (Together First)

Source: UN2020 and Together First, UN75 People's Declaration and Global Plan for Action, 7–9; Together First. Stepping Stones for a Better Future. 10 Ideas for World Leaders Who Are Serious About Building Back Better. May 2020, 12, 24–25.

- Organizing a major virtual UN75 People’s Forum to endorse the UN75 People’s Declaration and present it, along with the Together First “Stepping Stones” Report recommendations (see box 8), to the President of the General Assembly.

Launched on September 26, 2019, by the French and German Foreign Ministers, the now sixty-five nation strong Alliance for Multilateralism (“the Alliance”) is “an informal network of countries united in their conviction that a rules-based multilateral order is the only reliable guarantee for international stability and peace and that our common challenges can only be solved through cooperation.”¹⁵⁰ In addition to offering countries a platform to affirm their commitment to “stabilize the rules-based international order,” the Alliance intends to advance reforms that make multilateral institutions more effective in delivering results.¹⁵¹ A smart coalition composed of the Alliance for Multilateralism, UN2020, and Together First would create the right balance between decision-making authority, innovative ideas, and advocacy that could subsequently translate into greater influence, credibility, and chances for shepherding reform proposals to adoption during and beyond UN75.¹⁵²

Some initial steps for advancing a smart coalition of UN2020, Together First, and the Alliance for Multilateralism to strengthen multilateral action beyond UN75 may include:

- Developing an advocacy, outreach, and communication strategy with targeted, concise, and simple messages that speak to diverse audiences (governments, individuals, civil society, youth, bureaucrats, etc.) and create a unifying approach for the campaign, using digital spaces (social media) and technology to disseminate key messages.
- Partnering with youth leaders and organizations, as they are creative, nimble, able to mobilize quickly, and should be encouraged to decide and act for their future. Youth have not only participated in some of the most progressive social campaigns of the past decades, but they have also been in the vanguard of these movements (e.g., the Arab Spring¹⁵³ and its recent follow-on movements, the youth-led global movements on climate action,¹⁵⁴ or youth mobilization in former communist countries¹⁵⁵).
- Expanding the membership of UN2020 and Together First by mobilizing support from more diverse civil society organizations and individuals, particularly across the Global South.
- The Alliance for Multilateralism could benefit from strengthening its collaboration with UN2020 and Together First, including by officially and publicly recognizing and promoting their efforts to revitalize the UN and broader global governance system. The Alliance could also help keep UN2020 and Together First informed about key political positions and tensions, which would help the two civil society-led campaigns better navigate political bottlenecks. The two civil society-led coalitions could, in turn, keep the Alliance up-to-date on transnational and grassroots trends in support of multilateral action and building more inclusive and effective global institutions. Finally, the Alliance’s member countries could contribute modest funding to the secretariat functions and programmatic activities of both civil society campaigns, which would enhance both their global outreach and impact.

Insights and Lessons from Building the UN75 Declaration

General Assembly resolution 73/299 (June 14, 2019) called for a “concise, substantive, forward-looking, and unifying” declaration to be adopted at an anticipated high-level meeting, on September 21, 2020, commemorating the seventy-fifth anniversary of the United Nations. Since then, the co-facilitators of the intergovernmental negotiations for the declaration, the Permanent Representative of Qatar, Ambassador Alya Ahmed bin Saif Al-Thani, and the Permanent Representative of Sweden, Ambassador Anna-Karin Eneström, have consulted extensively with Member States, civil society, scholars, policy researchers, and youth representatives. During the first informal consultation meeting, held on February 21, 2020, nearly all Member States expressed a desire for the declaration to be concise, readable, substantive, unifying, actionable, and to reaffirm existing commitments while also being future-oriented. Consultations also highlighted strengthening multilateralism and mobilizing financial resources as key issues for consideration.

The Elements Paper and Member State Expectations

Despite moving to remote work in mid-March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the co-facilitators continued to push ahead with drafting preparations. Drawing on the interim report of the UN75 Office (box 9), the co-facilitators shared the “elements paper”—an initial sketch of the main themes and issues that could be covered in the declaration, on April 9, 2020, for Member State feedback.

The elements paper included three sections intended to capture the inputs received in the February consultation: (1) Acknowledging achievements and looking ahead; (2) Delivering on commitments and responding to global challenges; and (3) Building consensus and mobilizing for change. Section one took a somber tone, noting that “the 75th anniversary is not a time



Photo: Maensard Vokser

Box 9: Preliminary assessment of the UN75 Survey and Dialogues

In early January 2020, the UN75 Office (The Office of the Under-Secretary-General and Special Adviser on Preparations for the Commemoration of the UN’s 75th Anniversary) launched an initiative to gather public perspectives on global challenges and the role of the UN in addressing them. A preliminary report of the study, made publicly available on April 20, 2020, indicated “overwhelming public support for international cooperation.” The report is based on data from 186 countries, including 40,000 survey responses and more than 330 dialogues. According to the data collected, 95 percent of respondents agreed that “countries must work together to manage global trends,” and “climate and environment” was the most frequent response regarding issues that most affect the future (chosen by nearly three times as many respondents as the second and third most popular issues cited—armed conflict and violence, and health risks—though prior to the rise of COVID-19). Other priority issues cited were new technology, forced migration and displacement, and nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. The report’s press release noted that “the UN’s 75th anniversary initiative is markedly different from previous commemorations, with less emphasis on communicating the UN’s successes and a strong focus on listening to the global public, especially young people.”

Source: UN75 Office, “Public Support for International Cooperation Surges Amid Global Upheaval.” UN75 Office, “Resolved to Combine Our Efforts: Preliminary Assessment of the UN75 Survey and Dialogues,” April 2020.

for celebration,” especially given the “devastating effects” of COVID-19. Focused on looking ahead, the text proposed a reaffirmation of UN Charter and broader multilateral cooperation principles. The elements paper also proposed highlighting the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development, the impact of COVID-19, and the “four horsemen”—global challenges outlined earlier this year by the Secretary-General.¹⁵⁶ Other challenges, collated from Member State remarks, included those related to peace and security, development, human rights, humanitarian action, gender equality, climate change, UN reform, sustainable financing, and stakeholder inclusivity. The paper’s final section proposed specific follow-up action items.

Pointing to social-distancing constraints, some Member States argued that in order to reach consensus, nothing contentious or new should be included in the declaration. The emphasis on concision and implementation of a new silence procedure further limited the likelihood of new language and concepts being included, which led some interviewed for this study to conclude that the declaration—and UN75 process as a whole—would be largely commemorative.

On the other hand, many expressed great trust in the co-facilitators’ ability to produce a solid *quasi-final* text, noting the elements paper as a good basis for future negotiations. Issues flagged as potential obstacles to a successful declaration included failure to adhere to the Secretary-General’s call for a global ceasefire, strains placed on cooperation between the U.S. and China and on global cooperation to address COVID-19, and fear of losing ground on development and human rights gains. Additionally, while UN reform issues are very important to many Member States, there was concern that certain countries may want to leverage the declaration for national political gain or to increase economic austerity measures.

The gap between civil society’s aspirations and Member State expectations caused some tension in itself. Some Member States agreed that partnerships with civil society are beneficial, and that non-governmental organizations can be an effective force in mobilizing support for multilateralism. Some also supported enlarging ownership

of the UN75 Declaration to encompass civil society—as did the co-facilitators, who conducted consultations with select civil society actors. However, other delegations saw civil society as somewhere between disruptive and too idealistic for the present declaration, and they pushed back against civil society’s emphasis on showcasing progressive reforms in the declaration, arguing that the “timing is not right” to advance ambitious reform agendas. Initiatives promoted by civil society may be largely welcomed, they argued, but are more likely to be accepted further down the road, post-2020.

The Zero Draft

On May 15, 2020, the “zero draft” of the UN75 declaration was released, along with the announcement of a second informal consultation to take place virtually on May 22.¹⁵⁷ The draft, just under four pages of text, exceeded early expectations in terms of both length and level of ambition. Unsurprisingly, the COVID-19 pandemic figured prominently throughout, and was particularly emphasized in the first section as “the largest global challenge in the history of the United Nations.” The widespread impacts of COVID-19, such as economic recession and increasing poverty, were added to the “four horsemen” list of global challenges (see box 10). The second section of the draft listed twelve areas for action¹⁵⁸ and made brief reference to many areas of potential contention—such as, Security Council reform, climate action, women’s rights, partnerships with civil society, international law, and decolonization—and to key issues which were missing from the elements paper, such as respect for democracy and enhancing the rule of law. Although strengthening multilateralism was the initial primary subject of the declaration, this language took a back seat to the urgency of *building back better* from the COVID-19 pandemic.

The zero draft invited comparison to the fiftieth anniversary declaration where Member States gave merely rhetorical support to the need to “strengthen,” “resource,” and “reform” the UN system. On the other hand, the inclusion of some ambitious (albeit still vague) language may, in effect, open the door and lend support for future

Box 10: COVID-19 and the UN75 Declaration: An interview-based assessment

In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, some Member States noted how the context of UN75 significantly changed, and as a result, significantly impacted both the UN75 Declaration and the forthcoming Summit. There is now a perception that the future of the UN is closely linked to its response to the pandemic and how the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development will be adapted to account for such a far-reaching global crisis. In a sense, the pandemic serves as a tool for its membership to re-evaluate the working processes and substantive priorities of the United Nations. COVID-19 not only raises health and broader socio-economic development concerns, but it has led to a profound shift in both how the UN75 Declaration was prepared and what it underscored in terms of action commitments.

COVID-19 creates an unprecedented challenge for the operations of the UN system. At the most basic level in UN centers, such as New York and Geneva, there are still concerns around the technological capacity to convene meetings with the full membership (including questions of cybersecurity, transparency, interpretation, and overall efficacy). Uncertainty about the pandemic's progression over coming months also affects the planning and convening of the UN75 Summit gathering in New York, which at this writing will involve limited UN Mission presence combined with pre-recorded video statements by world leaders.

In an effort to continue business as usual, the General Assembly decided to utilize the “silence procedure” as a temporary method for decision-making, while in-person meetings at UN Headquarters are not possible. According to the *Procedure for taking decisions* (of March 27, 2020), “The President of the General Assembly will, by a letter, circulate the draft decision/resolution to all Member States under a silence procedure of at least 72 hours.” If there are no objections within the given timeframe, the decision or resolution will be adopted. If the silence is “broken,” and a Member State voices an objection, additional consultations, revised drafts, and rounds of the silence procedure may take place as needed.

The silence procedure has been criticized by some as a sort of “veto,” and in danger of misuse. Without in-person negotiations, the elements of informal relationships, body language, and vigorous debate normally associated with multilateral diplomacy may be stifled. Conversely, some Member States—citing successful work taking place remotely with the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee—have found some benefit to virtual negotiation. Notably, given strong facilitation by the Fifth Committee’s chairperson, the stripping away of some formalities has increased the speed at which work can be done.

Source: Interviews conducted April-May 2020 with various permanent mission representatives to the UN. General Assembly. *Decision No. 74/544--Procedure for taking decisions of the General Assembly during the Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic*. March 27, 2020.

substantive action, including during the General Assembly’s upcoming seventy-fifth session from September 2020 to September 2021.

Finalizing the UN75 Declaration

The second informal consultation with Member States, held on May 22, 2020, took place virtually. During the meeting, many applauded the co-facilitators on their success in drafting a concise and accessible declaration. Substance, on the other hand, had not satisfied some expectations. With little surprise, language around climate action, women’s rights, Security Council

reform, and the role of civil society were topics of contention. Neither was full consensus achieved on how and to what degree Member States would be held accountable to their commitments, as well as specifics concerning the Secretary-General’s follow-on process.

Many Member States also expressed the view that the Declaration’s language on multilateralism should be strengthened, with some noting the focus on COVID-19 was unbalanced relative to other important issues. Additionally, further strengthening of language on human rights appeared to garner broad support.

When the penultimate draft of the Declaration was released, on June 5, 2020, and subsequently presented by the co-facilitators on June 8, 2020, Member States expressed appreciation for their taking on board several amendments, including a stronger emphasis on preventing violent conflicts, abiding by international law, ensuring justice, increasing transparency and effectiveness, and underscoring the global response to COVID-19. With forty-five countries making interventions, the feedback shared with the co-facilitators was overwhelmingly positive, with strong, broad-based support for strengthening multilateralism expressed by more than the usual western countries. The draft UN75 Declaration circulated on July 3 was put under the silence procedure; the Declaration will be presented to the September 21, 2020 UN75 Summit for formal adoption.

Key Takeaways

Negotiations on the UN75 Declaration came at an unprecedented time in UN history. The normal rhythm of multilateral diplomatic debate was disrupted, replaced with closed-door bilateral meetings and limited virtual consultations. A careful balance had to be crafted between advocating for the *future we want, the UN we need* (the official over-arching theme for UN75), and the necessary precautions of working in the midst of a global health crisis. Crafting a declaration that could meaningfully address ambitious plans for the future while meeting the urgent demands of the present took both skillful leadership and some sacrifice of earlier expectations.

Looking beyond the UN75 Declaration negotiations, there is a growing sense of an impending inflection point, which may force change on the UN and the broader system of global governance. Although logistical complications stemming from COVID-19 and other factors⁵⁹ may be pumping the brakes on current plans for strengthening the UN system, awareness of the need for international cooperation is only intensifying.

The COVID-19 pandemic has shifted the UN's attention to proving its leadership capacity for coordinating an adequate global response, and

these developments may, in turn, prove to be a positive force for mobilizing substantive structural changes post-2020. Some Member States acknowledged this, and, consequently, strove to include aspirational language in the Declaration that could pave the way for more ambitious measures in the coming years. The COVID-19 pandemic and the UN's seventy-fifth anniversary may both be only momentary turning points in world history, but if Member States truly act on their commitment to "building back better," the United Nations has the opportunity to accelerate global recovery *and* garner political momentum for improving the global governance architecture.

Beyond 75: A Stronger UN for the Next Quarter Century

This report has offered ten global governance reform innovations for 2020 and beyond. But these and other carefully researched and articulated ideas for global change could be swept away by exclusionary, nationalistic undercurrents driven by populist, anti-multilateralist politicians, who amplify public anxieties (over immigration, job loss, or COVID-19) to turn their societies even more inward and away from a sense of global solidarity, let alone responsibility. Worse yet, some also undermine the institutions and rules of global cooperation by falsely passing blame for their countries' troubles, or restricting the movement of people, goods, services, and capital in violation of agreed international laws and norms. Meanwhile, the global climate crisis, though momentarily overshadowed, has not gone away.

In this time of acute uncertainty and rising challenge, humanity seems to have reached the proverbial "fork in the road." We can recognize that the economic, social, and even environmental impacts of COVID-19, and other pressing challenges, require broadened and deepened forms of multilateral cooperation. Or we can fall back on narrowly focused solutions that do not mirror these risks, learn little from others' ideas, and instead erect short-sighted barriers to the cooperation essential to further

human progress. That is the clear and stark choice of our times.

Seventy-five years ago, after record levels of bloodshed and stupefying crimes against humanity, the world faced a similar choice, and actually started down the right path, building institutions and partnerships designed to stave off a recurrence. It was reasonably successful, despite the political gulfs that soon opened up, first between East and West, then between North and South. Today, our collective task is to recover that original spirit and build the smart coalitions needed to overcome the growing bottlenecks (whether institutional, political, financial, or psychological) to solving humanity's inextricably global problems.¹⁶⁰

With high hopes for the leadership and skill of an emerging new broad-based coalition of governments and civil society-led networks to drive change, we offer here eight practical guidelines for actors committed to embracing and pursuing vigorously a more advanced approach to global cooperation in the “post-COVID, but still warming” era, building on the momentum—and the novel and forward-looking thinking—generated by UN75.

Orient near-term global governance innovation and strengthening agendas to the COVID-19 public health emergency and the broader socio-economic recovery response:

In addition to its death toll,¹⁶¹ COVID-19 has caused a sharp contraction of the global economy, with millions of job losses, overnight bankruptcies, and a severe slow-down in cross-border finance, trade, air travel, and most other economic sectors.¹⁶² While climate change, international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and other global risks remain serious problems, world leaders will likely be preoccupied, for the coming one to two years, with the pandemic and its devastating social and economic knock-on effects. Any specific global governance reform ideas, as well as strategies for their realization, must take into account this overriding new reality and, as necessary, “reframe the pitch” to ensure perceived relevance, let alone basic consideration, in the new era.

Commend the UN75 Declaration's strengths and unique contributions, while critiquing constructively its shortcomings:

Especially given the opportunities for civil society engagement in the UN75 Declaration negotiations and now its follow-through, states and non-state partners seeking to build upon the progress of recent months together should strike a skillful balance between highlighting the Declaration's merits and where it fell flat and failed to confront today's monumental challenges. For example, the draft UN75 Declaration demonstrates an unequivocal commitment to “build back better from the COVID-19 pandemic” and to the Secretary-General's initiative for a global ceasefire.¹⁶³ Building on momentum generated by the declaration, further political attention and commensurate financial resources are needed to ensure a growing—rather than shrinking—space for civil society in global decision-making and to safeguard against any backsliding in support of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law—as championed over the past two decades at major UN anniversaries. In this regard, and learning from the climate change COPs and other multi-stakeholder UN forums, UN75 follow-on efforts should encourage civil society participation in Member State delegations, holding future negotiations in public settings and encouraging regular statements on behalf of diverse civil society organizations, and encouraging governments and their legislatures to hold public hearings to better inform and engage the general public about deliberations on the future of the UN system.

Prioritize the adoption of, and, if possible, augment the UN75 Declaration commitments made during the 75th Session of the UN General Assembly (September 2020–September 2021):

The historic adoption of the UN60 (2005) Outcome Document demonstrated that at least several months are needed to flesh out a declaration's commitments—often through operational UNGA and UNSC resolutions. In 2005, these included establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture and the upgrade of the Human Rights Commission to a more capable Council with new tools for safeguarding human rights, such as the Universal Periodic

Review. This year, the commitment to enhance the Secretary-General's diplomatic toolbox “to prevent the outbreak, escalation and recurrence of hostilities”¹⁶⁴ will need further elaboration after its political endorsement this September. The same applies to any commitment to curb greenhouse gas emissions or to achieve sustainable production and consumption patterns “in line with the Paris agreement and the 2030 Agenda.”¹⁶⁵ Through such measures, the 75th UNGA session could leave a lasting legacy by beginning to realize the full potential of the UN75 Declaration.

Initiate a new generation of public-private partnerships with the UN system to advance specific UN75 Declaration commitments:

Current trends in multilateral cooperation tend to favor innovative kinds of transnational public-private partnerships and more informal mini-lateral forums that traditional, decades-old international organizations, such as the United Nations, will need to engage and leverage, in order to mobilize sufficient talents and tangible resources to create new opportunities and cope effectively with today's crises. Section 4 of this report illustrates partnership initiatives (see table 5 for specific examples) that wield the potential of diverse non-state actors to help implement specific UN75 Declaration commitments, particularly by using technology in creative new ways, adopting innovative financing models, and developing a shared language among partners for strategy, communications, and project management.

Pressure and engage governments and senior UN leaders to consider the “unfinished business” of the UN75 Declaration and Leaders Summit:

To be sure, the UN75 Declaration leaves considerable space for a much-needed and far more ambitious follow-on agenda to modernize and build the kind of global governance system needed to deal better with current global tensions and over-the-horizon risks. For example, as noted in this report, a new Peacebuilding Council would equip the United Nations to better prevent the outbreak of deadly conflict and to sustain peace in its aftermath. The proposed “G20+” could ensure more inclusive

and effective global economic governance for socioeconomic recovery, once the COVID-19 health emergency begins to abate. As Sweden's UN Ambassador Anna-Karin Eneström emphasized when marking the International Day of Multilateralism and Diplomacy for Peace (April 24, 2020), “The UN75 Declaration should not represent the end-point. Rather, it should set into motion a broader conversation.”¹⁶⁶ When the political conditions ripen, states and non-state actors committed to more ambitious kinds of global institutional, policy, and normative change should stand ready to champion the “unfinished business” from 2020. An expert advisory group, assembled to collect and synthesize the latest thinking on strengthening and innovating the UN system, could serve as a pivotal focal point for this effort.

Support actively a new Expert Advisory Group on Inclusive Global Governance (IGG Group):

Since effective and durable change cannot be achieved in a single high-level meeting or single year of UNGA deliberations, the draft UN75 Declaration calls upon “the Secretary-General to report back before the end of the seventy-fifth session of the General Assembly with recommendations to advance our common agenda and to respond to current and future challenges.” Such a process could benefit substantially from a new Expert Advisory Group on Inclusive Global Governance. The Expert Advisory Group could examine how the entire global governance system (not just the United Nations) can be better organized and equipped to address major current and emerging challenges and opportunities facing the international community, giving special attention to how the international system can best foster a durable and just economic, social, and environmental recovery from the coronavirus pandemic. To advance a post-2020 agenda and alongside single institution and issue-focused reform efforts,¹⁶⁷ it should propose a World Summit on Inclusive Global Governance to usher in a compact for renewed global governance and to rebuild confidence in global institutions. Calling it the Expert Advisory Group on “Inclusive Global Governance” would help to ensure that the research and consultations undertaken—and

Box 11: Can humanity better govern itself? Looking for answers.

The proposed Expert Advisory Group on Inclusive Global Governance, with the support of Member States and reporting directly to the Secretary-General, has the potential to make a timely contribution to creative thinking and action on strengthening and innovating global governance, but its mandate must be carefully defined, its diverse members and secretariat carefully selected, and its distinct insights and proposals respected. It should further:

1. Deal with the international system of governance as a whole (not simply the United Nations) and encourage pioneering joint ventures between global, regional, and sub-regional organizations.
2. Organize broad-based discussions and consultations on global governance system renewal and innovation and the central role of global civil society and the business community in it.
3. Ensure that global governance reform initiatives are carefully researched and vetted.
4. Reframe issues and employ positive, forward-looking narratives when engaging potential spoilers in order to find common ground in addressing specific global policy challenges.
5. Utilize April 24, the International Day of Multilateralism and Diplomacy for Peace, June 26, Charter Day, and October 24, United Nations Day, to focus global attention on the UN's achievements and ways to build on success.
6. Most importantly, design and advocate for an inclusive, multi-stakeholder, two-year negotiation process toward a culminating World Summit on Inclusive Global Governance in 2023.

the policy and institutional reform proposals arrived at—tap the ideas, networks, and capabilities of all actors, state and non-state, with something to contribute to tackling new and emerging transnational problem-sets (see box 11 for further ideas). Members of the Expert Advisory Group should include representatives of civil society, parliamentarians, scholars and policy researchers, and even former leaders of global institutions.


Design and Advocate a World Summit on Inclusive Global Governance, held no later than September 2023:

The proposed World Summit on Inclusive Global Governance would serve as the culmination of a two-year, multi-continent preparatory process (see figure 11), with the chief aim of re-designing and better equipping the global governance system—including but not limited to the UN system—to better address major current and emerging challenges and opportunities facing the international community. Viewed as a direct extension and fulfillment of the UN75

Declaration's vision and commitments, the 2023 Summit's Plan of Action should strive to increase participation in global decision-making, enhance the legitimacy, effectiveness, and accountability of global institutions, and to strengthen the rules-based global order.

The preparations could be organized around the four thematic pillars of peace and security, sustainable development, human rights and humanitarian action, and climate crisis abatement (as well as a fifth on overarching topics to promote integrated, system-wide reforms), each led by a manageably sized working group co-chaired by a developing and developed country UN Permanent Representative. The working groups would commence activity shortly after the presentation, in September 2021, of the Expert Advisory Group-inspired "Roadmap of the Secretary-General in Fulfillment of the UN75 Declaration" to world leaders at the UN General Assembly High-level Week, and would engage myriad state and non-state actors with contributions to make to the

Figure 11: Roadmap to 2023
(recommended)



* Only select activities listed.

** IGG Group is the Expert Advisory Group on Inclusive Global Governance

future of global governance. They should be supported by a UN Director-General and a well-resourced secretariat team (including secondments from the international financial institutions, World Trade Organization, and regional organizations), who should report directly to the Secretary-General.

Drawing inspiration from the 1987 World Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland Commission), the multi-stakeholder preparatory process leading up to the September 2023 World Summit in New York could consist of four two-week global Prep Coms (in, for example, Brussels, Seoul, Bogota, and Addis Ababa), and one two-week preparatory committee meeting with a special focus on “blended finance for global governance” (in Doha). Each would be complemented by a series of regional, youth-led, and global people’s forums and parliamentary dialogues, as

well as the direct participation of civil society, business, and parliamentary representatives in government delegations, to ensure diverse (under-represented) perspectives are heard and that the most timely and innovative proposals are deliberated and acted upon. Learning from creative new ways to effectively facilitate online transnational conversations since the onset of the COVID-19 crisis, consultative technologies will be employed extensively throughout the preparatory process and during the September 2023 World Summit.

Redouble efforts to scale-up and extend the reach of the Alliance for Multilateralism, UN2020 Initiative, and Together First Campaign, with an emphasis on skillful communications and advocacy:

Political will is never constant, and as underscored earlier, smart coalitions of civil society

organizations, Member States, business leaders, and international civil servants have demonstrated, time and again, an ability to “move the dial” and create the political and institutional incentives for implementing solutions and increasing ambition.¹⁶⁸ The degree to which, and the manner in which, like-minded governments and global civil society organizations are mobilized will, in large part, determine the level of success of the proposed 2023 World Summit on Inclusive Governance and its preparatory process. In particular, the Alliance for Multilateralism, UN2020 Initiative, and Together First Campaign are needed to work together to ensure that good ideas from the anticipated new Expert Advisory Group (and elsewhere) are put into action through skillful political maneuvering, buttressed by a robust communications and advocacy strategy that maximizes technology for meaningful public outreach. Further scaling-up their size and global reach will also help to expand their collective credibility and influence over future negotiations.

Creating a new “San Francisco Moment”

In Stephen Schlesinger’s seminal study, *Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations*, he details how even during the height of Second World War, the major allied powers—the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and China—were able, at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference (August 21–October 7, 1944), to chart a new way forward for world order. Their enlightened collaboration culminated, near the war’s end, in the more inclusive and definitive United Nations Conference on International Organization (April 25–June 26, 1945) in San Francisco.¹⁶⁹ The UN75 Declaration to be adopted this September by world leaders, prepared in the midst of a global health crisis whose scale and socioeconomic consequences are serious and growing, could lay the groundwork for a more definitive World Summit on Inclusive Global Governance in 2023 and more participatory and effective management of humanity’s global affairs.

The world’s governance institutions at all levels need to keep pace with growing global economic, social, political, technological, and environmental challenges and opportunities. Just as past crises and conflicts ushered in new arrangements for global governance, the coronavirus pandemic and its knock-on effects, the imminent threat of runaway climate change, and the recent rise of exclusionary nationalism have created both the imperative and the conditions for a new “San Francisco Moment.” As underscored by the Albright-Gambari Commission, seizing this moment will depend, in large part, on enlightened leaders who give equal weight to and pursue, simultaneously, both global security and justice goals when rethinking how humanity may best tackle 21st century global problems.¹⁷⁰

Our leaders cannot be alone in embarking on this pivotal journey. Global civil society, underpinned by a powerful, ethical vision for a more just and peaceful world, is poised to mobilize a range of dynamic actors—from religious communities and volunteer associations to social movements, journalists, and business leaders—to bring constructive public pressure to bear for progressive global change. The great majority of respondents to the United Nations’ global survey and dialogue series, marking this seventy-fifth year of the world body, view global cooperation as critical to managing global trends, while offering creative ideas for enhanced cross-border collaboration, including more effective global partnerships and platforms for knowledge-sharing.¹⁷¹

When the ideas, networks, capabilities, and legitimacy of both traditional national and emerging transnational actors are joined in common cause to address common goals, a new, more inclusive era of global governance can emerge, and the present breakdown in global governance can, in effect, be turned on its head. Time and again, history teaches us that humanity can pull through adversity when it pulls together. As we strive to achieve a more just and secure world, we can draw inspiration from our forebears in San Francisco and turn to renewing the architecture of global governance for a new century and a new generation.

Annex 1

Declaration on the Commemoration of the Seventy-Fifth Anniversary of the United Nations

Draft, July 3, 2020

We, the Heads of State and Government representing the peoples of the world, have gathered on September 21, 2020, to commemorate the seventy-fifth anniversary of the United Nations. We do so with a sense of awe and deep respect for the founders who created this Organization. There is no other global organization with the legitimacy, convening power and normative impact as the United Nations. No other global organization gives hope to so many people for a better world and can deliver the future we want. The urgency for all countries to come together, to fulfill the promise of the nations united, has rarely been greater.

Born out of the horrors of World War II, the United Nations, as a common endeavor for humanity, was established to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. Even in times of great global challenges and tension, our Organization has catalyzed decolonization, promoted freedom, shaped norms for international development, and worked to eradicate disease. The United Nations has helped mitigate dozens of conflicts, saved hundreds of thousands of lives through humanitarian action and provided millions of children with the education that every child deserves. It has worked to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, including the equal rights of women and men. The Charter of the United Nations, which is the cornerstone of international law, has declared the principle of sovereign equality of all States, respect of their territorial integrity, political independence and the right to self-determination of peoples. It has affirmed the principles of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States and the resolution of international disputes by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law. It has determined that all states shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

The achievements are many, and we owe the United Nations and its personnel much gratitude and respect, not least to those who have paid the ultimate price in the line of duty. Over the years, more than one million women and men have served under the UN flag in more than 70 peacekeeping operations. Every day, countries, citizens, private sector and civil society representatives use the platform provided by the United Nations to make life better for all of humanity.

However, the United Nations has had its moments of disappointment. Our world is not yet the world our founders envisaged 75 years ago. It is plagued by growing inequality, poverty, hunger, armed conflicts, terrorism, insecurity, climate change, and pandemics. People in different corners of the world are forced to make dangerous journeys in search of refuge and safety. The least developed countries are falling behind, and we still have not achieved complete decolonization. All this calls for greater action, not less. When Member States lend their will and resources to the collective efforts of the Organization, powerful results have been seen. Through the Global Conversation launched by the Secretary-General this year, we have listened to the concerns and aspirations of the people. We are here to respond.

Our challenges are interconnected and can only be addressed through reinvigorated multilateralism. As we meet, the COVID-19 pandemic continues to reverberate around our world. In a matter of weeks, the pandemic manifested itself as the largest global challenge in the history of

the United Nations. It has not only caused death and serious illness, but also global economic recession, increased poverty, anxiety, and fear. It has put enormous pressure on our societies, economies, and health systems. While none of us have been left untouched, people in vulnerable situations and the most vulnerable countries have been the hardest hit. The COVID-19 pandemic has reminded us in the most powerful way that we are closely interconnected and only as strong as our weakest link. Only by working together and in solidarity can we end the pandemic and effectively tackle its consequences. Only together can we build resilience against future pandemics and other global challenges. Multilateralism is not an option but a necessity as we build back better for a more equal, more resilient, and more sustainable world. The United Nations must be at the center of our efforts.

Strengthening international cooperation is in the interest of both nations and peoples. The three pillars of the United Nations – peace and security, development, and human rights – are equally important, interrelated, and interdependent. We have come far in 75 years but much more remains to be done. We have the tools and now we need to use them. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is our roadmap and its implementation a necessity for our survival. Urgent efforts are required. Therefore, we are not here to celebrate. We are here to take action. Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter, we are here to ensure the future we want, and the United Nations we need.

* * *

We will leave no one behind. The next ten years, which have been designated as the Decade of Action, will be the most critical of our generation. It is even more important as we build back better from the COVID-19 pandemic. We need a strong UN development system and effective collaboration between the United Nations and the international financial institutions. We support the Secretary-General's efforts and measures in this regard. We are determined to implement the 2030 Agenda in full and on time. There is no alternative. The peoples have to be at the center of all our efforts. Particular attention must be given to people in vulnerable situations. Humanitarian access to those in need of assistance must be granted without obstacle or delay and in line with the humanitarian principles. We are guided by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international human right treaties and instruments and will ensure everyone's human rights and fundamental freedoms.

We will protect our planet. Without more determined action we will continue to impoverish our planet with less biodiversity and fewer natural resources. We will see more environmental threats and climate related challenges, including natural disasters, drought, desertification, food shortages, water scarcity, wildfires, sea-level rise, and depletion of the oceans. The time to act is now. Many countries, not least small island developing states, least developed countries and landlocked developing countries, are already among the most affected. We need to adapt to the circumstances and take transformative measures. We have a historic opportunity to build back better and greener. We need to immediately curb greenhouse gas emissions and achieve sustainable consumption and production patterns in line with applicable State commitments to the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda. This cannot wait.

We will promote peace and prevent conflicts. The ongoing armed conflicts and threats against international peace and security must be urgently resolved through peaceful means. We reiterate the importance of abiding by the Charter, principles of international law, and relevant resolutions of the Security Council. International arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament agreements and their architectures need to be upheld. The United Nations must better address all forms and domains of threats. Terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism are serious threats to international peace and security. The diplomatic toolbox of the Charter needs to be used to its full potential, including preventive diplomacy and mediation. We call on the Secretary-General to

enhance this toolbox to prevent the outbreak, escalation and recurrence of hostilities on land, at sea, in space and in cyberspace. We fully support and promote the Secretary-General's initiative for a global ceasefire. International humanitarian law must be fully respected. To build, keep and sustain peace is now one of the main responsibilities of the United Nations.

We will abide by international law and ensure justice. The purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law remain timeless, universal and an indispensable foundation for a more peaceful, prosperous and just world. We will abide by the international agreements we have entered into and the commitments we have made. We will continue to promote respect for democracy and human rights, to enhance democratic governance and the rule of law by strengthening transparent and accountable governance and independent judicial institutions.

We will place women and girls at the center. Conflicts will not be resolved, and sustainable development not occur, without the equal and active participation of women at all levels. Human rights can never be fully upheld unless they are also enjoyed by all women and girls. Persistent gender inequalities and abuse, including sexual- and gender-based violence, have deprived us of a more just and better world. We will accelerate action to achieve gender equality, women's participation, and the empowerment of women and girls in all domains.

We will build trust. Growing inequality within and among countries is jeopardizing our efforts to ensure the future we want. Inequality leads to mistrust between countries, and to people's mistrust in institutions of governance. It also contributes to acts of xenophobia, racism, intolerance, hate speech and disinformation. We condemn all such acts. We will address the root causes of inequalities, including violence, human rights abuses, corruption, marginalization, discrimination in all its forms, poverty and exclusion, as well as lack of education and employment. It is our responsibility.

We will improve digital cooperation. Digital technologies have profoundly transformed society. They offer unprecedented opportunities and new challenges. When improperly or maliciously used, they can fuel divisions within and between countries, increase insecurity, undermine human rights, and exacerbate inequality. Shaping a shared vision on digital cooperation and a digital future that show the full potential for beneficial technology usage, and addressing digital trust and security, must continue to be a priority as our world is now more than ever relying on digital tools for connectivity and social-economic prosperity. Digital technologies have a potential to accelerate the realization of the 2030 Agenda. We must ensure safe and affordable digital access for all. The United Nations can provide a platform for all stakeholders to participate in such deliberations.

We will upgrade the United Nations. The world of today is very different from what it was when the United Nations was created 75 years ago. There are more countries, more people, more challenges but also more solutions. Our working methods need to keep pace and adapt. We support the ongoing reforms by the Secretary-General. They are creating a more agile, effective, and accountable organization that can deliver better in the field and adapt to global challenges. We reiterate our call for reforms of three of the principal organs of the United Nations. We commit to instil new life in the discussions on the reform of the Security Council and continue the work to revitalize the General Assembly and strengthen the Economic and Social Council. The review of the peacebuilding architecture has our full support.

We will ensure sustainable financing. Realizing our aspirations will require sustainable and predictable funding of the Organization. We will pay our assessed contribution in full and on time. Measures to better ensure this should be explored. We will further enhance transparency, accountability and efficient use of resources. The full and timely implementation of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development is key for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. Joint public-private financing plays a central role in our efforts to make the United Nations deliver better on its purposes.

We will boost partnerships. Today's challenges require cooperation not only across borders but also across the whole of society. We have to make the United Nations more inclusive and engage with all relevant stakeholders, including regional and sub-regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, civil society, the private sector, academia, and parliamentarians to ensure an effective response to our common challenges.

We will listen to and work with youth. Youth is the missing piece for peace and development. As we benefitted from the foresight of the founders of the United Nations, young people today will have to live with the consequences of our action and inaction. For too long, the voices of youth have been sidelined in discussions about their future. This has to change now through meaningful engagement with youth.

We will be prepared. The COVID-19 pandemic caught us off-guard. It has served as a wake-up call for improving our preparedness for not only health related crises but also other challenges and crises. We need to strengthen international cooperation, coordination, and solidarity. It is important to learn, share experiences and information to reduce risks and make our systems more resilient. While improving our global crisis prevention and response systems, there is an urgent need to accelerate development, production as well as equitable and affordable global access to new vaccines, medicines, and medical equipment. We applaud all healthcare and other frontline workers who put their own safety at risk when saving others, and pledge to put the people at the center of our response.

* * *

What we agree today, will affect the sustainability of our planet as well as the welfare of generations for decades to come. Through reinvigorated global action and by building on the progress achieved in the last 75 years, we are determined to ensure the future we want. To achieve this, we will mobilize resources, strengthen our efforts and show unprecedented political will and leadership. We will work together with partners to strengthen coordination and global governance for the common future of present and coming generations.

We request the Secretary-General to report back before the end of the seventy-fifth session of the General Assembly with recommendations to advance our common agenda and to respond to current and future challenges.

We commit to take this declaration to our citizens, in the true spirit of We the Peoples.

Annex 2

List of resources on global governance innovation and UN75 from the Stimson Center and its partners

Reports and Books:

- *Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance* (June 2015)
- *Just Security in an Undergoverned World* (Oxford University Press, 2018)
- *An Innovation Agenda for UN75: The Albright-Gambari Commission Report and the Road to 2020* (June 2019)
- *Reimagining Governance in a Multipolar World* (co-published by the Doha Forum and Stimson Center, September 2019)

Action Plans from the UN75 Global Policy Dialogues series on:

- *Preventive Action, Sustaining Peace & Global Governance* (Doha: Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, December 2018)
- *Global Security, Justice & Economic Institutions* (Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center, June 2019)
- *Climate Governance: Innovating the Paris Agreement and Beyond* (Seoul: Global Green Growth Institute, October 2019)
- *Global Economic Institutions* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, November 2019)

UN75 Regional Dialogues summaries:

- *UN75 Regional Dialogue for Africa: Toward Innovation and Renewal of Global and Regional Governance* (online, March 30–May 10, 2020)
- *UN75 Regional Dialogue for the Americas: Toward Innovation and Renewal of Regional and Global Governance* (online, March 20–April 26, 2020)

Background Briefs from the UN75 Global Policy Dialogues series on:

- *Preventive Action, Sustaining Peace & Global Governance*
- *Global Security, Justice & Economic Institutions*
- *Climate Governance: Innovating the Paris Agreement and Beyond*

UN2020 and Together First publications:

- *The UN75 People's Declaration and Plan for Global Action* (UN2020 & Together First, May 14, 2020)
- *Stepping Stones for a Better Future* (Together First, May 14, 2020)
- *Summary of the Working Group on Global Governance Innovation and Renewal* (December 15, 2019)
- *Global Governance Innovations Perspectives and UN75 Policy Brief* series (2019 and 2020, co-published with partner institutions)

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UN 2.0: Ten Innovations for Global Governance

75 Years beyond San Francisco



“UN 2.0 offers a path to renewal and a more inclusive and invigorated system of global governance, complementing and building on the UN75 Declaration to be endorsed by UN Member States.”

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In these uncertain times, countries and their citizens will need to make a conscious choice about coming together with their global neighbors to deepen cooperation for tackling today’s most pressing challenges and looming threats. But without a bold yet practical roadmap for “getting-from-here-to-there,” combined with the leadership and coalition-building skills necessary to realize its vision, sensible and carefully crafted ideas may never be put to the test of improving collective action through a modernized global governance system. This report addresses both these dimensions needed to achieve major systemic change and renewal.