Sunshine Heats Up Taiwan Politics, Affects PRC Tactics

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In Taiwan this spring, domestic political developments attracted more attention than those on foreign fronts. The “Sunflower” student-led occupation of the Legislative Yuan (LY), continuing interparty stalemate over the cross-Strait trade in services agreement (TiSA) and LY supervision of cross-Strait negotiations, revision of the referendum law, and the fate of the 4th Nuclear Power Plant (4NPP) sparked bitter political conflict. At the same time, both major parties have begun the process of choosing new leaders. Although we do not delve into the details of all of those developments here, they are all of some consequence and are sure to have an impact not only on domestic politics but also on cross-Strait relations.

On the PRC side, Xi Jinping’s policy toward Taiwan continued to attract attention, with the unification-related messaging of late 2013 giving way to an approach more appealing to Taiwan.

We simply mention here but do not discuss in this essay that there have been several developments in U.S.-Taiwan relations. Most notably, a number of senior American officials visited Taiwan this spring, most important among them the Cabinet-level Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administrator. Her visit, and action by the House of Representatives to approve the sale of guided-missile frigates to Taiwan, were warmly welcomed on the island but, as expected, sharply criticized by Beijing.

Protests Reshape Taiwan Politics

For three weeks, from mid-March through early April, Taiwan political circles were consumed with the so-called Sunflower student-led movement. The demonstrations that began on March 18 were initially triggered by anger at a KMT parliamentary maneuver to overcome DPP tactics to stall LY consideration of the TiSA. The Ma administration and the KMT LY caucus argued that, while an item-by-item review and vote had been agreed to, the DPP was impeding deliberations and insisting on what would likely be devastating modifications. It was believed that if these efforts succeeded, they would either kill the TiSA or, at the very least, require renegotiation with Beijing, which the Mainland had broadly hinted would be unacceptable.

There was also concern that should the LY demand TiSA modifications, no other trading partner would want to negotiate with Taiwan, as they would fear that any agreed terms could be subject to tinkering by the legislature, an untenable approach to trade talks. The fact that the New Zealand and Singapore economic cooperation agreements were approved without amendment was not reassuring, since they were of relatively small
economic significance compared with other agreements that might be negotiated in the future.

Although President Ma Ying-jeou strongly defended both the procedural and substantive aspects of the TiSA agreement, the DPP—as well as the demonstrators—insisted that the Ma administration’s “black box” approach to negotiations had yielded results damaging to the Taiwan economy in general and to job opportunities in particular. Moreover, concerns were also raised about the implications for national security of greater Mainland participation in the Taiwan economy. The only remedy, the opponents argued, was detailed LY review of TiSA combined with active LY supervision and involvement in negotiation of any future cross-Strait agreements.

The student-led demonstrations—which quickly involved physical occupation of the LY and even an attempt to occupy Cabinet offices—grew out of long-simmering dissatisfaction among various student and other civic groups with the Ma administration that paralleled DPP concerns. The demonstrators demanded that the administration withdraw the TiSA and defer LY consideration of it until a law had been passed to provide for LY oversight.

Implications for Cross-Strait Relations

The demonstrations carried with them a number of important implications for cross-Strait relations. First, as several public opinion polls showed, and as Beijing learned, they reflected anxiety not just among the students and their fellow demonstrators but more broadly in Taiwan society about possible repercussions from greater economic interaction with—and dependence on—the Mainland. And while some of this concern centered around fear about the economic fallout, some also was related to worry that a certain inevitability regarding eventual unification was being created, an inevitability that was quite disturbing to a populace that did not want unification.4

Second, although the DPP has vigorously denied that it instigated the demonstrations and occupation of the LY despite the fact that several of the leaders had worked for Tsai Ing-wen in one capacity or another in the past, DPP leaders gave significant public support to the demonstrators once they got under way. Then-DPP Chair Su Tseng-chang said the protestors occupying the LY were “a shield to our democracy”6 and praised them as “great” and “doing the right thing,” while his predecessor (and now successor) as party leader, Tsai Ing-wen, said she was “moved” by the young people, and urged that they be protected.7 Prominent DPP legislator Hsiao Bi-khim made an open appeal to the international community to support the students and, as she put it, “express concern for the status [of] Taiwan’s democracy and survival.”8 Senior DPP leader and former premier Frank Hsieh noted that DPP lawmakers took turns guarding the doors of the LY to shield the students after the occupation began and even joined them in their sit-in of the Executive Yuan compound and in a massive protest rally in front of the Presidential Office.9

Particular focus is now on Tsai as the new party chair and likely DPP presidential candidate in 2016. Tsai had been arguing for some time, and not simply since the
Sunflower movement emerged in March, that the party needs to connect better with Taiwan “society” and mainstream opinion, creating a framework that she had previously called the “Taiwan consensus.”\textsuperscript{10} But after the events of the spring, Tsai contended that the Sunflower movement had, as one paper reported it, “changed everything,”\textsuperscript{11} and that the next generation had “come of age.” She observed that the student protest changed both the way people in Taiwan looked at domestic politics as well as how the PRC should understand Taiwan public opinion and what it must do to engage with it.\textsuperscript{12}

In light of all of this, it was not surprising that when Tsai announced her candidacy for party chair, she emphasized the need for greater inclusiveness as well as for forging greater connections with civil society and groups that share a similar vision of Taiwan. She said, “The DPP must open its doors to civil society, and allow it to become part of the party.” Having made a clarion call that “It is our responsibility and our mission to rebuild public confidence in politics, trust in political parties [i.e., the DPP], and usher in the next era for politics in Taiwan,” she went on: “My decision to run for chairperson is also a call for everybody that shares this vision, to come together and become the change we want for this party.”\textsuperscript{13}

Nonetheless, perhaps reflecting a concern that the DPP agenda might be “captured” by the social movements, Tsai commented a few days later that, while the DPP and many civil society institutions shared the same goals, political parties and social movements were not the same; each had its own role in society.\textsuperscript{14}

Separate or not, the student movement’s wariness about cross-Strait relations fits nicely with positions Tsai has taken over time. Although she has generally emphasized pragmatism in cross-Strait ties during recent years—and we will discuss this further in future essays—to the extent that she is successful in bringing younger people into the party as well as cooperating with civil society organizations in forging a “Taiwan consensus,” their skeptical views about ties to the Mainland are likely to carry some weight, including in the presidential campaign. In this context, it is important to note that Tsai believes that forging a consensus on the concept of sovereignty is the most important issue for the Taiwan people at the moment,\textsuperscript{15} and as DPP chair she intends to establish dialogue with civic groups on a number of topics, including “a cross-Strait policy in line with Taiwan’s strategic interests.”\textsuperscript{16}

In terms of the impact of recent events on the DPP’s prospects in the upcoming elections, especially in the presidential contest in 2016, at the same time that the DPP has been criticized by some people for being too involved with the students as well as too tolerant and even supportive of their conduct, the party has been chastised by others for offering support to the protestors that was both too little and too late. As the party’s U.S. representative explained to Washington-based media, while the Sunflower movement has apparently hurt the KMT, it has not had a positive impact on the DPP’s standing.\textsuperscript{17} One DPP gadfly, former DPP legislator Julian Kuo Cheng-liang, said this was due to the fact that the DPP had been unable to assume a decisive leadership role during recent protests,\textsuperscript{18} a judgment echoed by other DPP members as well.\textsuperscript{19} Whatever one’s analysis
of the causes, the lack of a boost for the DPP appeared to be substantiated by polling results.\textsuperscript{20}

The third point about the demonstrations is that they brought to the fore the issue of the TiSA process and revealed widespread public dissatisfaction with it, to the point that, while the administration did not withdraw the agreement as opponents demanded, nonetheless the KMT not only had to agree to return the agreement to committees for a section-by-section review and vote, but as a matter of practicality, and in accordance with a surprise decision by LY Speaker Wang Jin-pyng,\textsuperscript{21} the TiSA will not be taken up until after an LY oversight bill has been adopted. This sequence will not only strengthen the LY’s role regarding TiSA (as well as any future cross-Strait agreements) but, despite efforts to speed things up in the meantime, including by convening a special LY session in June,\textsuperscript{22} it may well also delay the process such that TiSA will not be considered until sometime in 2015. The prospect of considerable delay was obvious before the Sunflower movement broke out, but the protests contributed significantly to the dynamic that now virtually ensures slow movement.

Three final points about the implications of Taiwan’s current domestic situation for cross-Strait relations.

First, although it now seems certain that the LY supervisory legislation will precede any consideration of the TiSA, it is not a foregone conclusion that the supervisory legislation itself will easily be agreed to. Almost a dozen versions have been submitted, some of which are worded in ways that carry a strong sense of “Taiwan independence.” None of those highly provocative versions is likely to be adopted. But a confrontation in the LY over establishing procedures is inevitable, and even at this early stage there has been filibustering and other legislative maneuvering.\textsuperscript{23} These delays, as well as the number of proposals and the tone of some of them, have created some anxiety on the Mainland about the implications for the future.

Second, if the LY insists on amending TiSA rather than approving it and then fixing it with a supplementary agreement later on, the Mainland’s willingness to renegotiate the text is not certain. Some people say that Beijing has already closed the door to renegotiation. At this point that would seem to be an over-reading of the situation. But the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) has gone to some lengths to discourage LY revisions and to make clear that, whatever its ultimate position, the Mainland has not said the door is open to renegotiation, as some press reports had suggested.\textsuperscript{24}

Third, Taiwan’s domestic situation could well affect other cross-Strait developments. Although at various points officials on both sides of the Strait have struggled to deny that the LY controversy over ratification of the TiSA has affected other ECFA-related agreements,\textsuperscript{25} the fact is that meetings on the commodities trade agreement have been postponed\textsuperscript{26} and concerns have been expressed about the linkage among these agreements. Moreover, no doubt chastened by criticism for not protecting Taiwan businesses and workers adequately in the services sector, Taiwan officials have warned their commodities trade agreement negotiating counterparts that if certain problems in
sensitive industrial sectors such as petrochemicals, panels, automobiles, and machines tools were not resolved, there was no chance that Taiwan would sign a commodities agreement.  

Other cross-Strait exchanges have also been affected. TAO head Zhang Zhijun’s return visit to Taiwan, which had been anticipated during April, was postponed, as were other planned visits. Not only had Zhang been expected to announce agreement on the long-negotiated reciprocal establishment of SEF and ARATS offices during his visit (and this may still happen if he comes later), but Mainland commentators are also beginning to talk of other significant consequences. In mid-May, for example, a well-known Taiwan scholar from Shanghai, Yan Anlin, suggested that the anti-TiSA activity in Taiwan and the student movement not only could have an impact on Taiwan’s economic development and cross-Strait economic cooperation, but it could also affect SEF-ARATS dealings referring specifically to the reciprocal establishment of SEF and ARATS offices. Moreover, Yan raised the specter of longer-term complications after 2016 when he speculated that all of this could well hamper any adjustment of the DPP’s Mainland policy.

On a hopeful note, Xiamen University Taiwan expert Liu Guoshen observed that Tsai Ing-wen had spoken of maintaining cross-Strait peaceful development and said that, in assessing its policy toward Taiwan, Beijing would “seek truth from facts” and would pay attention to any changes in the DPP’s policy. But at the same time he also expressed the view that if the DPP returned to power the Mainland would inevitably be very concerned, since the political foundation between the DPP and the Mainland is weak. Nonetheless, Liu said, even though the anti-TiSA student movement would have some impact on Beijing’s Taiwan policy—“It must have an impact, because this is quite a big event”—based on Xi Jinping’s conversation with James Soong, the Mainland’s original policy framework would not change and the impact of the protests would likely be that Beijing would be more meticulous, perhaps allowing people in the lower middle class to enjoy more of the benefits from cross-Strait relations.

There are also questions about the degree to which all of this, in turn, will affect Taiwan’s ability to participate in regional economic activity, where PRC cooperation is essential. As we pointed out in our last essay, as Zhang Zhijun reportedly said to Wang Yu-chi when they met in February, Beijing insists that finishing the post-ECFA agenda takes precedence over Taiwan’s interest in participating in regional organizations such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) or the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).

To the extent that Beijing continues to insist on this sequencing, the prospects for Taiwan’s larger trade agenda could be significantly affected. While American officials have stated they see no “direct” connection between the fate of TiSA or other cross-Strait ties and U.S. attitudes toward Taiwan’s interest in TPP and have sought to downplay the PRC’s role, it is widely believed that as a practical matter Beijing has sufficient leverage among the current 12 TPP negotiating parties to block Taiwan’s application if it chooses to do so.
Beyond this, many people now believe that the entire cross-Strait agenda faces dim prospects for the duration of the Ma administration. Even if TiSA passes unscathed, or if the PRC cooperates in renegotiating portions of it, and even if the remaining ECFA follow-on agreements on commodities trade and dispute resolution are then completed, there is clearly no enthusiasm in the Taiwan body politic for a robust program of further agreements at this point, and President Ma is not well placed to force things through. Perhaps there could be more cultural and educational exchanges, but probably not any formal umbrella agreements.\textsuperscript{37} And if there is any life left in the idea of political talks (beyond Track II), it is clearly on life support.

In line with this, as we have discussed in a number of recent essays, the issue of a potential Ma-Xi meeting is still pending. Although the Mainland continues to say that it is “positive and open” to a meeting\textsuperscript{38} and to suggest ideas that could promote a conclave between the two leaders, such as a “third venue” in addition to Taiwan or the Mainland,\textsuperscript{39} we have seen how difficult it has been to create mutually agreeable conditions for that even without the recent complications.

However, if the net result of the recent domestic turmoil in Taiwan is to downgrade even further any interest on the island in cross-Strait political dealings, or tolerance for making concessions to the Mainland, the prospects for such a “summit,” while not totally destroyed, would seem to be dimmer than ever. Moreover, even though a “Green” poll taken during the demonstrations showed that over half of respondents supported the notion of a Ma-Xi meeting,\textsuperscript{40} after she assumed office as DPP chair, Tsai Ing-wen again skeptically questioned the purpose of such a meeting and insisted that the administration spell out the costs and benefits.\textsuperscript{41}

All of this being said, while acknowledging the Mainland’s disinclination to convene a Xi-Ma summit at any international event, including the Beijing APEC leaders meeting in November, and while recognizing the need for caution due to the Taiwan domestic requirements, Ma Ying-jeou has spoken more than once recently in favor of a meeting at APEC, calling it the “best opportunity.”\textsuperscript{42} And though Ma has said that, due to Beijing’s reluctance about that venue, Taiwan has no other proposal to resolve the problem,\textsuperscript{43} he obviously hopes the idea is not dead. (In response to Ma’s renewed references to APEC, Beijing once again rebutted the notion of a summit there or in any other international setting.\textsuperscript{44})

Viewed in longer-term perspective, it also would seem that much of the energy may have gone out of the entire cross-Strait agenda not only for the duration of Ma’s term but possibly at least for a while beyond 2016. Certainly no DPP leader is going to promote a robust cross-Strait agenda even if the PRC is flexible enough to engage with a leader in Taipei who at the most will have done no better than express indirect “tolerance” for and “non-denial” of “one China.” Moreover, on the KMT side, it is noteworthy that the person widely seen as the leading candidate for the party’s presidential nomination, New Taipei Mayor Chu Li-luan, has suggested that too much attention may be being paid to the Mainland. While the services trade agreement was stalled in the LY in April, Chu commented that by being over-focused on the Mainland market Taiwan might have
missed opportunities elsewhere. “When you only see China, and can’t see Indonesia, with its 300 million population, what kind of world perspective is that?”

So the driving force for vigorous cross-Strait progress that Ma has provided may have passed its peak for some time to come.

**On the Other Side of the Strait**

We closed the last essay with an “afterword,” noting that Xi Jinping’s tone with Lien Chan in February seemed somewhat different not only from that during his own meeting with Vincent Siew in October, but especially from some of the speeches given by senior officials following the Siew meeting. In his more recent statements, including in his meeting with People First Party (PFP) president James Soong in early May, Xi reinforced the approach he took with Lien Chan. In the wake of the Sunflower movement, Xi indicated that he wanted to reach out to broader segments of Taiwan society so as to better understand their concerns based on Taiwan’s unique experiences and aspirations.

However, Xi also reiterated his views on the concept of a cross-Strait “family” and the mutual benefit to be achieved in realization of rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, labeling the “China dream” as the common dream of people on both sides of the Strait. And in the wake of the domestic controversy in Taiwan over ratification of the services trade agreement, Xi stressed that economic integration between Taiwan and the Mainland would bring positive results for both sides and should not be disturbed.

Based on the concept that both sides of the Taiwan Strait are of one family, there is no difficulty that cannot be overcome as long as each side feels for the other and treats the other with sincerity . . . We’d like to know more about the practical needs of the Taiwan people, especially those of the grassroots, and take proactive and effective steps to take care of vulnerable groups.

Xi denied that the Mainland had any intention to “take advantage of Taiwan” or that there was any risk of one side “compelling or swallowing” the other.

At the same time, in articulating “four noes” for Soong, Xi stated unequivocally that “the staunch will” to check Taiwan independence splittist plots “will not waver.” Opposition to “Taiwan independence” is, of course, a hardy perennial of PRC statements on cross-Strait relations. But the strength of this particular statement, and its inclusion in what was otherwise a positive formulation, apparently stemmed from concern that the Sunflower movement was grounded in hostility toward the Mainland and aimed at Taiwan independence. It probably also reflected Beijing’s understanding (right or wrong) that the DPP’s approach to TiSA and to LY supervision of cross-Strait negotiations also reflected a Taiwan independence agenda.

Xi’s reference to “one family” was, of course, not new. He had used it with Lien Chan in February and Li Keqiang had done so with Vincent Siew at Boao in April. In fact Xi had used it with Siew at Boao a year earlier, in April 2013,
hsiuang in June.\textsuperscript{53} Xi’s reference to it in his meeting with Lien in February had been explained by TAO head Zhang Zhijun as both showing “sincerity” to take care of Taiwan compatriots and reflecting Xi’s true understanding of Taiwan people and his good intention to develop a good future with Taiwan compatriots.\textsuperscript{54}

But it was not imagery that warmed the hearts of all people in Taiwan. Following Xi’s meeting with Soong, one Taiwan paper editorially pointed to recent polls that revealed people on the island saw the Mainland getting a greater benefit from the relationship than Taiwan did. The editorial also reported that those polls showed strong support for independence and against unification, concluding: “The idea that more exchanges will help promote closer ties and ‘family feeling’ is too simplistic.”\textsuperscript{55} Similarly, DDP Chair Su Tseng-chang reacted by stating that Taiwan doesn’t want to be part of the PRC’s family; it is already a sovereign, independent country.\textsuperscript{56}

Although Xi sought to focus on the fact that the three positive aspects of his “four noes” were consistent elements in China’s cross-Strait policy,\textsuperscript{57} his emphasis on “family” nonetheless conveyed an implicit negative message like that in Wen Jiabao’s imagery of people on the two sides being “brothers.” As we discussed last year, Wen’s message that “we are doing Taiwan favors because we are brothers” suggested that if they were not brothers, then the Mainland would not do those favors for Taiwan.\textsuperscript{58} The “family” imagery contained a similar implied conditionality.

In early May, China Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) Taiwan Research Institute head Zhou Zhihuai sought to reassure his interlocutors during a visit to Taipei that that Xi’s “generation-to-generation” comment to Vincent Siew in October\textsuperscript{59} did not indicate a sense of urgency. Rather, Zhou said, Xi envisaged a slow process like “simmering stew.”\textsuperscript{60} This policy, he explained, was basically a continuation of Hu Jintao’s dictum, “Unification is a long process; we must still engage in a long-term struggle with Taiwan independence forces.” It is not important, Zhou asserted, which generation solves the issue; what matters is how the people on both sides of the Strait can live happily.\textsuperscript{61}

A somewhat different theme was struck by a senior official of the CCP Central Committee’s Central Policy Research Office, Qiu Dunhong. Qiu published an article in late April that was perhaps aimed at a domestic PRC audience rather than a cross-Strait readership, but that nonetheless attracted a lot of attention in Taiwan.\textsuperscript{62} He agreed with Zhou’s general theme of patience, and laid out a three-stage timetable for unification, with the first stage an extended period of peaceful development. But what was particularly striking—and different from the line that appeared in official statements and articles after the turn of the year—was Qiu’s bold connection of peaceful development to peaceful reunification. The first subheading of his article read: “The only goal of peaceful development is peaceful unification” (和平发展的唯一目标是和平统一). Moreover, he made explicit a linkage that had generally been phrased only indirectly before: “By national rejuvenation we mean not only making the country strong and the people affluent and enhancing our cultural soft power but also achieving the motherland's complete reunification and the nation's great unity” (我们说民族复兴，不仅要强国富民和增强文化软实力，而且要实现祖国的完全统一和民族大团结).
It does not seem likely that Qiu’s themes will replace the kinder, gentler approach that Xi and others have been taking in direct conversation with Taiwan representatives since January. And, indeed, an article penned by Zhang Zhijun in late April focused on self-confidence (自信), mutual trust (互信), and faith (信心) as key elements undergirding cross-Strait economic cooperation and peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, which, in turn, will create conditions more beneficial to Taiwan’s participation in regional economic cooperation. And he and Chen Deming provided similar messages of reassurance to Taiwan visitors throughout the recent period without mentioning reunification or rejuvenation.

But Qiu’s article is important as a frank statement reminding everyone that goals have not changed, and that there is a purposefulness in Beijing’s approach that is not always stated. Qiu’s timetable for reunification was not urgent, and there is nothing inconsistent between his article and what others are saying. But it spelled out connections in unvarnished terms that usually are framed more indirectly.

In any case, in the current situation, Beijing has struggled to cope not only with the short-term implications of the Sunflower student movement in Taiwan but with the increasingly evident long-term anxiety throughout Taiwan society about becoming overly tied to—and dependent upon—the Mainland.

As to the short term, the PRC has more or less rolled with the punches. It has taken some rhetorical shots at the student movement and the chaos it created (ironically occasionally lecturing Taiwan about the requirements of democracy). But mainly it has sought in relatively low-key fashion to tout the benefits to Taiwan of economic ties, including the services trade agreement, and to echo Xi’s statements to Lien Chan and James Soong that the Mainland wants to listen more carefully to all voices in Taiwan, especially those at the grass roots. In light of the prominent role of students in the protests, Beijing also moved to woo Taiwan students through more youth exchanges.

Although TAO Director Zhang Zhijun, in the course of discussing the work program for 2014 in March, had spoken about plans to announce a “new policy” toward Taiwan to benefit as many “grassroots masses” as possible, both he and ARATS President Chen Deming acknowledged in May, in the wake of the developments we have been discussing, that “some new conditions and new problems” had emerged and that negotiations were facing “an even more complicated situation” (更复杂的形势). But they emphasized the themes sounded by Xi. Despite the earlier postponement of Zhang Zhijun’s return visit to Taiwan and delay in establishing the regular dialogue mechanism between TAO and MAC agreed to in February, they pledged to continue to press forward for ratification of agreements already signed as well as for negotiation of the remaining ECFA agenda, the reciprocal exchange of SEF and ARATS offices, the signing of agreements on avoiding double taxation and strengthening taxation cooperation and environmental cooperation, and the launching of preliminary studies on cross-Strait cooperation in education, science and technology, culture, agriculture, and other areas.
Longer term, however, Mainland observers could not avoid considering the problematic attitudes that had been revealed in the broad public support for the issues the students had raised, if not necessarily their tactics. Recognizing that it was “inevitable” that there would be “some estrangement due to the historical and realistic situations,” the TAO concentrated its fire on Taiwan independence activities. The door was open for exchanges with “any political party, group or person who adheres to the one-China principle and opposes the ‘Taiwan independence’ stance in Taiwan,” one statement contended, but there would be no compromise regarding opposition to Taiwan independence activities. Perhaps referring to the fact that the Sunflower leaders had outspokenly supported Taiwan independence in other contexts but only focused their LY occupation protest on domestic economic and political issues, spokesmen cautioned that compatriots on both sides of the Strait should be wary of “Taiwan independence” forces that always “play tricks” to undermine cross-Strait peace and development.

Looking Ahead to Taiwan Elections

This then gives rise to the question of how the Mainland currently views the DPP and is likely to treat it both in the presidential campaign and, should it win the 2016 election, once it takes office. Things may change, of course, and various responsible DPP officials caution that one should wait to see how Tsai Ing-wen approaches cross-Strait issues once she settles into the position of party chair—and if she becomes the DPP presidential nominee. They note that she was largely responsible for putting off for future consideration any changes in the party’s position at the January 2014 China Affairs Commission meeting, purposely leaving a “blank” in the box notionally labeled “cross-Strait policy.”

That said, as we have noted before, at the same time Beijing has welcomed a wide variety of DPP members and officials to the Mainland, and has engaged with them when visiting Taiwan, the level of suspicion about the party’s ultimate intentions remains high, as does the bar for dealing on a party-to-party basis.

The DPP has sought to persuade the Mainland—and others—that despite its support of the student protests it is not opposed to free trade but is merely concerned with due process and principles of fairness and reciprocity. And it has sought to disabuse them of the idea that the party harbors any intention either to actively promote an independence agenda or to use legislation in any way. Perhaps these arguments have registered, but as discussed above, so far they appear not to have been persuasive.

During his recent trip to Taipei, Zhou Zhihai argued that most people in Taiwan prefer maintenance of the status quo, and that the most significant factor in maintaining the status quo is opposition to Taiwan independence. Indeed, he said, a key factor in the CCP-KMT cooperative relations is their common position on this, including their common support of the “1992 Consensus.” But as for the DPP, Zhou said, despite some promising signs in 2012 when Frank Hsieh Ch’ang-ting and Chen Chu visited the Mainland, after the Sunflower student movement the DPP threw all of that to the wind. As a result, DPP cross-Strait policies still lack this essential foundation, he observed, and the party should ponder why the DPP and KMT can cooperate reasonably well, whereas
there is no party-to-party contact between the CCP and DPP. His downbeat conclusion was that, taking all the factors into account, for the DPP “there still is a very, very long road to travel and much to do” (還有一段很長很長的路要走，還需要付出努力) before the party can reconcile with the Communist Party.75

As stated earlier, it is too soon to tell what this will mean for the Mainland’s position in the run-up to the 2016 presidential election. Zhou referred favorably to the notion of “abandoning independence [or] freezing independence” (棄獨, 冷獨),76 saying that if the DPP could take this first step, then perhaps reconciliation would be possible. (Readers may recall the Mainland had commented favorably on the idea of freezing the 1991 DPP charter provision promoting a Republic of Taiwan when such a freeze was proposed for consideration by the January DPP China Affairs Commission meeting, and then had criticized the commission’s failure to adopt the proposal.77) While skeptical of her “deep Green” history, Mainland scholars have adopted something of a wait-and-see attitude toward how Tsai will move on cross-Strait relations.78 If she and her colleagues can, for example, resuscitate the idea of a freeze, one suspects that this could go some way toward facilitating not only direct DPP-CCP interaction, but perhaps a smooth cross-Strait relationship if the DPP takes power again in 2016. However, all that clearly lies in the realm of speculation at this point.

Notes
2 In the wake of the weeks of protest and the uncertain prospects of the TiSA, Taiwan’s economics minister said that many countries had grown hesitant and indefinitely postponed scheduled trade talks with Taipei. (Huang Chiao-wen and Maia Huang, “‘Countries’ shelve FTA talks over China pact row: Minister,” CNA, April 21, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201404210025.aspx.)
4 A Taiwan Indicators Survey Research (TISR) poll in February reinforced results from similar polls in the past that a large majority of respondents oppose unification. TISR found that 64 percent of respondents did not approve of ultimate reunification as against 19.4 percent who did. Perhaps of some importance for the future, 82.7 percent of 20- to 29-year-olds opposed ultimate unification. The same poll also found that 47.8 percent of respondents supported ultimate independence, as against 34.1 percent who did not. Among 20- to 29-year-olds, 68.5 percent supported ultimate independence. (“Taiwan Mood Barometer Survey,” TISR, February 21, 2014, http://www.taiwansecurity.org/files/archive/185_7548d355.pdf.)

A TISR poll in late May revealed a similar breakdown of opinion regarding the nature of the current relationship. 59.7 percent of respondents believed cross-Strait relations were “state-to-state” relations, and 61.7 percent did not agree that the two sides belonged
to “one China” (up from 48.1 percent in April 2013). (Those who believed Taiwan and
the Mainland belong to “one China” slipped from 39.1 percent in the April 2013 poll to
26.8 percent now. “Taiwan Mood Barometer Survey,” TISR, May 29, 2014,

5 Tsai did not deny that the students had had previous connections with her, but her
spokesman insisted that their participation in the protest movement was based on their
own ideals and was undertaken as a matter of their own volition. (Justin Su and Y.F.
Low, “Ex-DPP chairwoman plays down connection with student protestors, ” CNA,

6 “DPP ultimatum to Ma: demand substantial review, restart negotiations with China,”
DPP Department of Foreign Affairs, March 20, 2014,

7 Sophia Wu Justin Su, and Lilian Wu, “DPP mobilizes to support student protestors at

8 “Open letter by DPP legislator Hsiao Bi-khim,” March 25, 2014,

9 Justine Su and Lilian Wu, “Ex-premier calls for party conference after student protest,”

10 She did so at the beginning of January (Justin Su and Jay Chen, “Opposition party
needs to reconnect with society: former chief,” CNA, January 1, 2014,
http://focus taiwan.tw/news/aip1/201401010019.aspx), in the middle of the month in the
context of the China Affairs Commission’s report (“Tsai emphasize Taiwan Consensus,”
_content.php?id=2387159), and again in February (Chris Wang, “DPP must work with
social forces: Tsai,” Taipei Times, February 11, 2014,

http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/05/06/2003589690.

12 Ibid.

13 “To reestablish trust, to regenerate Taiwan—announcement on becoming a candidate
for the chair of the DPP” (重建信任、台灣再生—參選民主進步黨主席聲明), March 15, 2014,

14 “Tsai Ing-wen: Goals of better cross-Strait relations, more youth in DPP,” Taiwan
News Online, May 18, 2014,

15 Justin Su and Evelyn Kao, “DPP head calls for consensus on sovereignty concept,”

16 Tsai Ing-wen, “Rebuilding a contract of trust between the party and society—the party
chair candidate’s political views and live questions and answers with the media”
(重建黨與社會的信任契約—參選黨主席政見及現場媒體問答), April 17, 2014,

17 Yu Donghui, “Wu Jaushieh: No sign of positive impact on the DPP from the Sunflower
student movement” (吳嘉衝：未見太陽花學運對民進黨正面影響), China Review News, May
0&docid=103176522&mdate=0509084102.

19 One DPP legislator said the party could not pretend that the protest had nothing to do with what she described as the DPP’s incapacity to fulfill its role; another said the party was unable to find its role in the student movement and that the DPP was in a dilemma because it could involve itself neither too deeply nor too lightly in the movement. (Justine Su and Lilian Wu, “Ex-premier calls for party conference after student protest,” CNA, April 8, 2014, http://focusntaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201404080026.aspx.)

20 In a poll in early May, Taiwan Indicators Survey Research found that while the KMT had a higher negative rating than the DPP (51.8 percent vs. 44.1 percent), the KMT was nonetheless supported by 27.9 percent of respondents as against only 27.6 percent for the DPP. Independents soared to 41.5 percent. (“Taiwan Mood Barometer Survey, May 1-10, 2014,” TISR, May 13, 2014, http://www.tisr.com.tw/?p=4145.) This was consistent with a pro-Green poll (Taiwan Thinktank) some weeks earlier, during the demonstrations, which showed that while the KMT had a very high dissatisfaction rate among respondents (78.3 percent), with an extremely low support rate (11 percent), the opposition party also did not fare well. The DPP garnered a support rate of only 29.6 percent as against a dissatisfaction level of 52.9 percent. (Zou Liyong, “Green camp public opinion poll shows more than half support Ma-Xi meeting, more than half identify themselves as Taiwanese” [綠營民調過半支持馬習會 過半自認台灣人], *China Review News*, April 2, 2014, http://hk.crntt.com/doc/1031/0/6/8/103106860.html?coluid=93&kindid=2931&docid=103106860&mdate=0402155957.)

Moreover, a TISR polling series that tracks party identification showed that a lead of 5.4 percentage points that the DPP enjoyed over the KMT as of March (27.4 percent vs. 22.0 percent) had become a KMT 3.1 percent advantage by May (24.8 percent vs. 21.7 percent). And if all “Blue” vs. all “Green” parties were taken into account, the Blue parties enjoyed an identification rate 4.8 percent higher than the Green parties (32.2 percent vs. 27.4 percent). This is the first time since fall 2013 that the KMT/Blue parties have enjoyed an advantage over the DPP/Green parties in this poll. (“Party Identification Tracking Analysis in Taiwan as of May 2014,” TISR, http://www.tisr.com.tw/?p=4213.)


24 The TAO spokesperson took note in mid-April of reports coming out of Taiwan that the TiSA could be renegotiated. She said there is no precedent for that. Moreover, SEF and ARATS had been authorized to conduct negotiations and had engaged in talks in a “responsible” way bringing bona fide benefits to people on both sides. (“TAO: There is no precedent for renegotiating cross-Strait agreements” (國台辦：兩岸協議沒有重談的先例), Taiwan Affairs Office, April 11, 2014, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/
Although Taiwan media interpreted this as saying Beijing would not renegotiate agreements (Lawrence Chiu and Lilian Wu, “China nixes reports of agreeing to renegotiate grade pact,” CNA, April 11, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201404110038.aspx), at this point that seems not to be true. Indeed, that same day in commenting on the issue of renegotiation at Boao, the head of the TAO’s economy department, Xu Mang, while denying press reports that Zhang Zhijun had said the TiSA could be renegotiated, nonetheless said: “First, Taiwan has to think it through, and if it requests that the pact be renegotiated, we’ll study it.” (Eva Feng and Lilian Wu, “China open to studying pact renegotiation: official,” CNA, April 11, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201404110032.aspx.)

The situation was further confused when MAC Minister Wang Yu-chi said that, if there is even a single change in TiSA, Taiwan would “have no choice but to renegotiate.” (Shih Hsiu-chuan, “Renegotiating pact possible: MAC head,” Taipei Times, April 12, 2014, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/04/12/2003587832.) This led various media to report Wang’s remarks had been over-read, that he was only “analyzing” the situation, not saying that the MAC was planning to renegotiate. The MAC press release pointed out that while Wang had noted that the Mainland had never said the two sides could not renegotiate, it also had not said that they could do so. (Hsieh Ai-chu, “Did Wang Yu-chi show flexibility on renegotiation? MAC: Over-interpretation” [王郁琦對重談鬆口？陸委會：過度解讀], Commercial Times, April 12, 2014, http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20140412000127-260203.)


26 “Because of concern over the services trade agreement, consultations on commodities trade have suffered a setback” (服貿卡關 貨貿谘商進度受挫), Commercial Times, May 6, 2014, http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20140506001107-260202. However, MAC head Wang Yu-chi told the LY that the commodities agreement talks had not been “suspended” and that the two sides were looking for “another time” to convene. That said, he also cautioned that changing a single provision of the TiSA during legislative review would invalidate the entire agreement, which could impact negotiations of future cross-Strait trade agreements. (Wen Kuei-hsiang and Frances Huang, “Talks on trade-in-goods pact with China postponed,” CNA, May 8, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aeco/201405080011.aspx.)


29 Some people have suggested that although the final stumbling block about “humanitarian visits” to detained citizens has largely been resolved (“Humanitarian
visitation rights to be included in cross-Strait agreement,” KMT News Network [from Taipei papers], May 6, 2014, http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=14488), and the reciprocal exchange of SEF and ARATS offices is apparently on the brink of realization, even that could be delayed.

In our judgment, any extended delay by Beijing would be self-defeating and is unlikely. While it probably will be held off until Zhang Zhijun visits Taiwan (now hoped for by the end of June), failure to announce agreement at that time would convey an extremely negative signal about PRC intentions that runs counter to what Xi and others have been saying.


36 An economics official in Taiwan pointed out that the PRC is the largest trading partner of six of the twelve countries currently negotiating TPP and the second largest partner of five others. Given that TPP operates by consensus, Beijing’s attitude is obviously of great significance. (Elaine Hou, “Ties with China linked to Taiwan’s TPP bid: official,” CNA, April 24, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201404240015.aspx.)

37 The cultural affairs ministers were having a hard time even getting together. Consistent with what we discussed in the last essay, forms of address beyond the MAC and TAO were not resolved, and this issue reportedly led to the cancellation of a planned meeting between Taiwan’s minister of cultural affairs, Lung Ying-tai, and her PRC counterpart, Cai Wu. (Sabine Chen and Y.F. Low, “Planned cross-Strait culture ministers’ meeting canceled,” CNA, April 10, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201404100016.aspx.) As we had indicated previously (Romberg, “From Generation to Generation,” endnote 28), Lung had conditioned her visit to the Mainland on being received in an “appropriate status.” That obviously did not work out.

As to a cross-Strait agreement on cultural affairs, which we have previously pointed out is something on Beijing’s agenda but not Taipei’s, the Taiwan ministry of culture once again said it was not promoting—and had never promoted—such an agreement. (Cheng Ching-wen, “Ministry of Culture: Never promoted cross-Strait culture


On the meeting site, a Taiwan National Security Council official said a meeting in a “third place” is not impossible. But he reiterated Taiwan’s basic principle that Ma should meet Xi in his capacity of president and that the meeting must have a positive effect. Interestingly, the official also revealed that there is an NSC task force that convenes regularly to assess the possibility of a Ma-Xi meeting. (Ho Meng-k’uei, “NSC: If there is no positive result, Ma and Xi need not meet” [國安會：若無正面效應 馬習不必會], Storm Media, March 4, 2014, http://www.stormmediagroup.com/opencms/news/detail/e131c922-a359-11e3-9f4a-ef2804cb5a1/?uuid=e131c922-a359-11e3-9f4a-ef2804cb5a1.)

40 Zou Liyong, “Green camp public opinion poll,” see endnote 20. While 53.3 percent of respondents supported a Ma-Xi meeting, the poll also showed, however, that a near majority (49 percent) worried that such a meeting would lead to reunification (43.8 percent disagreed). Consistent with this result, and with another poll discussed earlier (endnote 4), this poll showed that if the status quo could not be maintained, over two-thirds (67.2 percent) supported founding a new state (as against 20.4 percent who favored unification). Over two-thirds (68.7 percent) also favored moving to independence if the Mainland used force. When respondents were asked about identity, if given the option to choose dual Chinese and Taiwanese identity, 37 percent took that option while 58.2 percent chose Taiwanese only and 2.3 percent opted for Chinese only. But if not given the option of dual identity, 88.4 percent identified themselves as Taiwanese as against 7.7 percent who said they were Chinese.


Xi’s “four noes” were that the policy of promoting peaceful development of cross-Strait relations will not change; pragmatic measures to boost cross-Strait exchanges, cooperation mutual benefit will not be abandoned; sincere enthusiasm to unite with Taiwan compatriots in common endeavors will not wane; and the firm will to curb Taiwan independence is unshakable. (“Cross-Strait economic integration win-win: Xi,” Xinhua, May 7, 2014, http://english.cri.cn/6909/2014/05/07/2821s825265.htm.) In Chinese they read:

“我们推动两岸关系和平发展的方针政策不会改变，两岸交流合作、互利共赢的务实举措不会放弃，团结台湾同胞共同奋斗的真诚热情不会减弱，制止‘台独’分裂图谋的坚强意志不会动摇。” (“TAO: General Secretary Xi Jinping’s speech clearly expresses the fundamental orientation and policies of the Mainland’s Taiwan work” [国台办: 习近平总书记讲话表明了大陆对台工作的基本方针政策], Taiwan Affairs Office, May 14, 2014, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201405/t20140514_6159895.htm.)

In commenting on a poll in Taiwan in the midst of the protest showing that 40 percent of respondents were dissatisfied with the DPP’s alleged indiscriminate hostility against the Mainland, the TAO spokesman equated this attitude to a toxin, saying “Only by eliminating this toxin will the DPP find a way out for future development.” (“Mainland tells DPP to drop hostility,” Xinhua, March 26, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-03/26/c_133215138.htm). (In Chinese, “只有去除‘逢大陆必反’的毒素，民进党才能找到自身发展的出路,” Transcript of TAO press briefing, March 26, 2014, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/xwfbh/201403/t20140327_5912763.htm.)


Chen Jianxing, “With feelings of sincerity, with rich meaning, inspired by popular sentiment—TAO Director Zhang Zhijun talks about how to understand General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important speech about Taiwan” (感情真挚、内涵丰富、感召人心——中台办主任张志军谈对习近平总书记对台重要讲话的理解), Xinhua, February 21, 2013, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201402/t20140221_5713228.htm.


Zou Liyong, “Su Tseng-chang declares Taiwan independence is a fact, doesn’t want to become one family with China” (蘇貞昌聲稱台獨是事實 不願與中國做一家人), China Review
57 Ibid.
59 Romberg, “From Generation to Generation.”
61 An article in a PRC-owned Hong Kong newspaper by Mainland analysts similarly sought to explain Xi’s “four noes” statement and the interpretation offered by the TAO as designed to reassure people in Taiwan about the consistency of Mainland policy and to “dispel misgivings of some people on the island” [打消島內某些人的疑慮] over any readjustment. (“Adhere to the trend of the healthy development of cross-Strait relations” [順應潮流讓兩岸關係健康發展], Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao, http://news.takungpao.com.hk/paper/q/2014/0517/2481050.html.)
63 What attracted some people’s attention at first was that Qiu used a term for talks “on an equal footing” (对等) preferred by Taiwan and that suggests equal status of the interlocutors rather than the term Beijing usually uses (平等), which has a more restricted meaning regarding not the status of the interlocutors but the manner in which those particular talks would be conducted. Some people wondered if this was a precursor to an important conceptual shift in the PRC position on dealing with Taiwan. After consideration, this appeared unlikely, at least in terms of any near-term significance.

Readers may recall that this emphasis on the grass roots was a theme from about the time of the 18th Party Congress. (Romberg, “Following the 18th Party Congress: Moving Forward Step-by-Step,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 40, January 2013, p. 11,
At some point that theme seemed to have faded, but it clearly is now back in vogue.


“Zhang Zhijun: ARATS should conscientiously plan for cross-Strait consultations and negotiations” (張志軍：要仔細規劃兩岸協商談判), Zhong Xin She, May 8, 2014, http://taiwan.huanqiu.com/article/2014-05/4990566.html. The agreement on tax issues had been scheduled to be signed at the 10th SEF-ARATS meeting in late February, but was put off. At that meeting, however, agreements were signed on meteorological and seismic monitoring cooperation. (“SEF, ARATS hold cross-Strait talks in Taipei,” Taiwan Today, February 27, 2014, http://taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xitem=214854&CtNode=414.)


Tsai also opposed debating all aspects of the policy (as advocated at the time by then-DPP Chair Su Tseng-chang) on the grounds that some aspects were suitable for debate but debate on others could harm flexibility. She said any debate would need to be carefully devised and well planned, striking a balance between DPP core values and political realities, and this would take time. Meanwhile, Tsai advocated that, in the process of finding that balance, there was need to communicate with the Taiwan public and interact with Beijing. (“DPP to hold intraparty debate on Mainland China policy,” KMT News Network [from Taipei papers], January 13, 2014, http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=13981.)


76 Ibid.
