William J. Durch
Tobias C. Berkman

Who Should Keep the Peace?

Providing Security for Twenty-First-Century
Peace Operations

THE HENRY L.
STIMSON CENTER

WHO SHOULD KEEP THE PEACE? PROVIDING SECURITY FOR TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY PEACE OPERATIONS

William J. Durch and
Tobias C. Berkman

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PREFACE

I am pleased to present the latest product from the Stimson Center's Future of Peace Operations program. This work, by Senior Associate William Durch and Research Associate Tobias Berkman, addresses the *supply* of peacekeeping forces, in a world where the *demand* appears to be growing. As we go to print in the summer of 2006, the international community is seized with the question of how to bring stability and peace to the border area between Israel and Lebanon. All the enduring issues are in play there: What are the political prerequisites for a workable stabilization force? Should it be run by the UN or by a group of strong countries willing to use more robust rules of engagement if need be? Which countries, regional organizations, alliances, or international institutions can muster the right forces and the political will to engage? How long will they stay engaged? When they want to leave, to whom will they hand over their tasks? The new Stimson Center study provides important context, history and analysis to address these questions.

Bill Durch and Toby Berkman have produced a useful and thoughtful assessment of current trends in peacekeeping with a focus on the capacity of the international community to provide forces for diverse requirements. They explain the new complexities of peace operations, when responsibility passes from immediate post-conflict stabilization to longer challenges of peacebuilding, and highlight the development of new institutional collaborations and divisions of labor. They also discuss how the private sector is changing the dynamics of peace and stability operations and lay out the risks and the benefits that these changes entail.

The Stimson Center is deeply committed to examining issues of international security with an eye to identifying practical and achievable steps to enhance prospects for success. This new book is an important contribution to our work on peace operations and post-conflict issues. We hope it will be useful to policymakers, experts and concerned citizens as they work to find solutions to the enduring challenges of conflict in the twenty-first century.

Sincerely,

Ellen Laipson

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

— 1 —
INTRODUCTION

In an ideal world, peace would be self-validating, self-enforcing, just, and indivisible. While some countries have approached this ideal for some periods of time, in much of the world discord trumps tranquility, enforcement of peace has been neither reflexive nor necessarily just, and both peace and the responsibility to maintain it have been viewed as divisible nationally. But as populations grow and distances shrink, borders leak, and belief systems clash, the divisibility of peace becomes increasingly difficult to sustain, either conceptually or operationally; peace and stability with justice become growing imperatives; and peace, stability, and justice are validated in turn by the ability of political and economic systems to generate decent lives and livelihoods for those living within them. Implicit political recognition of these emergent facts can be found in international peacekeeping and peace support operations (PSOs) now scattered all through the world's least-well-governed, most-conflict-ridden regions.

Midway through the first decade of the twenty-first century, about 150,000 troops, police, and civilian mission personnel are deployed in these operations.[1] An average of 135,000 have been deployed annually since the turn of the century, at an estimated real cost of US $11–12 billion per year.[2] They provide critical security, political, and other support that helps war-torn parts of the world regain a firmer peacetime footing. About half of these people serve in operations led by the United Nations and half serve under other arrangements. These numbers do not include coalition forces committed at this writing to combat and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Depending on how one defines it, peacekeeping has been around quite awhile.[3] After World War Two, however, it became a tool by which the United Nations, in particular, could help keep conflict-prone parts of the international system from shaking the stability of the Cold War standoff. This process began with quiet, neutral, unarmed monitoring groups placed on disputed post-colonial frontiers, later adding armed contingents but also a self-preserving reflex against the use of force except in self defense. PSOs, more complex efforts managing decolonization or the settlement of intrastate conflicts, got their start in the early 1960s when Belgium suddenly relinquished its hold on the Congo. A series of difficult encounters there with internal politics and Cold War gamesmanship

soon put such operations largely on hold until the Cold War ended. In the new era, however, PSOs have once again been assigned intensely political tasks of internal security, peacebuilding, and state-building in some of the world's weakest, poorest, and most war-ravaged places. These may involve whole states but sometimes just parts of states, including parts that want to be states in their own right.

Such PSOs bring international military, policing, and other governmental resources to bear, under international mandate, to promote peace and, increasingly, political and economic transformation in the wake of war. As distinct from most outside interventions affecting state governance throughout history, the bodies that authorize such operations and the organizations and people who participate in them usually have less interest in who rules, per se, than in how they rule. But getting the how right is not easy, because acceptable rule is increasingly seen in terms of internationally-recognized principles of democracy and respect for human rights. These high standards make successful operational outcomes very gratifying but also very hard to achieve.

As demand for complex PSOs increased in the new century, the number of implementing institutions grew as well. Added to the United Nations were the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), European Union (EU), African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The Organization of American States (OAS) sponsored several military observer missions in Central America in prior decades, and one armed operation in the Dominican Republic in 1965, but has more recently favored civilian peacebuilding missions. NATO, the AU, and ECOWAS have focused primarily on security elements. The EU has been adding security and justice to its operational repertoire without losing its traditional focus on economic and humanitarian aid. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)—the organization of successor states to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics— authorizes operations in the former Soviet space that are nominally multilateral but also reflect the political and military preponderance of the Russian Federation. Other sub-regional organizations have also periodically sponsored missions on a relatively modest scale.

States set all of these organizations' policies and provide all of the troops and police that go into the field. Yet few states can sustain, without help, the forces and people they contribute to such operations and few organizations have the logistical and financial mechanisms in place to provide that help or to otherwise defray the continuing costs of a lengthy deployment. It is in this area—the ability to sustain troops, police, and civilian personnel at long distances for long periods in marginal and potentially dangerous circumstances—that most would-

be sponsors of peace operations currently fall short. The fundamental reason may be money, equipment (lift capacity, in particular), or politics (weak or waning domestic support), or it may be some combination of these. The one international organization capable of providing long-term and global logistical and financial support—the United Nations—does not have the ability to execute high-end or intensive military operations.

The operational environments and mandates for PSOs vary almost as much as the abilities of the organizations that would carry them out. Therefore no one operational model and no single security provider can address every circumstance and meet every operational need with equal aplomb. Over the past decade, various combinations of providers and divisions of labor have been tried: integrated operations that combined all mission components under one line of authority; sequenced operations where NATO, for example, replaced the UN or the UN replaced a regional organization; or simultaneous operations featuring NATO or coalition military forces and UN plus other civilian components.[4] The prevalence of such "hybrid" operations points to the need for harmony in doctrine, training, procedure, and communications, if not basic equipment, across institutional providers.[5]

Presently, institutional decisions to co-operate and the forms of co-operation that emerge rest on largely ad hoc processes and temporary convergences of interests. Promoting convergence is one task of the secretariats who staff each institution but most need better guidance from their member states and better tools to work with. Most of all, they need better understanding of what different potential partners and their members can bring to the table for contemplated PSOs. They need to know what others can or cannot, will or will not, do in the field; what available capabilities complement one another; and what new capabilities should be developed and maintained to remedy present operational deficiencies.[6]

What constitutes a deficiency depends, of course, on what one intends to do under what circumstances, and how much of it. Keeping a small place stable is relatively easy if everyone wants peace and the basic problem is mistrust; but keeping even a small place stable is hard if the outsiders face one or more groups that have not renounced violence, or splinter factions that have taken it up. An organization capable of doing the first job may be utterly incapable of doing the second. An organization capable of effectively containing violence, on the other hand, may be incapable of shepherding the political and institutional changes needed to keep itself from being locked into its job of containment forever.

For both analytical and operational purposes, therefore, it is key to distinguish between PSOs imposed by international initiative and those invited to deploy by the local parties themselves, usually to implement a peace agreement. Politically imposed peace includes instances where international actors demand a halt to hostilities and, together with diplomatic or other pressure, bring an end to fighting. Examples include the 1956 Suez Crisis and the 1973 Middle East war. PSOs deployed in the wake of such pressures to induce a cease-fire can last for a long time while the local parties decide whether and how to end their dispute.

PSOs can also be considered politically imposed if outsiders assume control after pressuring the ruling group to relinquish control (Indonesia and East Timor, 1999); threaten but do not actually use violence to achieve a political goal (the United States and Haiti, 1994); or implement an accord signed by some but not all local belligerents. The latter type operation runs the risk of decaying into militarily imposed peace: the use of coercive military power to overcome armed resistance by at least one local belligerent. In 1987, for example, an Indian Peacekeeping Force deployed to Sri Lanka under an agreement with the government that left out its principal adversary, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Within a few months, the Indian force found itself at war with the LTTE and ultimately failed in its mission.[7]

Internationally-sanctioned military intervention may also aim to end genocide or other grave crimes against humanity (the goal of the NATO air campaign against Serbia in 1999); to remove from power a regime that supports or shelters a group responsible for terrorist violence (as, the US-led campaign against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, from late 2001); or to rescue a peace process under threat from violent spoilers (British forces in Sierra Leone, 2000).

PSOs that either follow or function in parallel with such military interventions tend to require more resources and time than other operations. Change will be harder to create and sustain on the ground because the demand for change either did not arise locally or arose from groups out of power who must learn how to govern. Some or all local parties may be as hostile to the follow-on PSO as they were to the initial intervention. Much greater military capacity per head of local population may therefore be needed to maintain political stability and public security. (NATO's Kosovo Force, KFOR, for example, initially deployed one soldier for every ten Kosovar males of fighting age). The larger the area of operation, the more resources spoilers have available to them, and the thinner the international presence, the more elusive stability may prove to be. Where those associated with the old regime have been excluded from the new one, as in Afghanistan, constant vigilance and periodic resort to force by the outsiders

may be needed for several years, to protect the new regime's basis for governing until it can protect itself.

Invited PSOs generally derive from peace agreements, the negotiation of which may have entailed international mediation or other support. They are easier to implement, point-for-point, than imposed settlements for a given-sized territory and population, but the places where they deploy are still settings of unfinished political struggles, the military elements of which have ended in stalemate. Therefore even invitational PSOs deploy into situations of frustrated ambition or, perhaps, frustrated criminal enterprise, where one or more belligerent factions may function primarily as extortion and extraction rackets. Countries with relatively abundant and readily accessible sources of mineral wealth, such as Sierra Leone, have fallen prey to such gangs.[8] Therefore, while invitational PSOs may not require the concerted fighting power of forces that seek to implement an imposed peace, they still must be able to maintain peace against potential spoilers who may look for opportunities to renege on promises made in peace accords and may just shift gears from overt, military-style operations to those of organized crime.[9]

This volume examines the operational capabilities of present providers of security for PSOs in all of the above sorts of situations. We start with an historical review of security support to peace operations—what kind, how much, by whom—and then turn to likely future demand for that support based on current trends in conflict, conflict resolution, and estimates of state vulnerability to violent internal conflict. We then examine how major security providers' doctrine for and thinking about PSOs have evolved over a decade of experience with increasingly complex and dangerous operations. That discussion prefaces a detailed discussion of the strengths, weaknesses, and accomplishments of the United Nations, NATO and other alliances, regional and sub-regional organizations, states and coalitions, and private firms as security providers for PSOs. The final section compares providers on multiple dimensions, traces patterns of institutional cross-support in the field, and stresses peace as a public enterprise that is outsourced at great peril, as well as the critical importance to PSOs of civilian peacebuilding efforts and the risks that arise when the military takes on, by design or default, substantial peacebuilding tasks.

— 2 —
PEACE OPERATIONS
SUPPLY AND DEMAND

Scholars of global conflict report that the incidence and magnitude of warfare, especially "societal" warfare—that which is primarily internal to states—have both declined steadily since reaching a peak in the early 1990s, coincident with the end of the Cold War. Measured conflict has continued downward into the new century, to apparent levels of relative peace not enjoyed by humankind for forty years.[10] A rising proportion of these conflicts ended in stalemates that produced requests for help to implement peace, or they ended in outside military intervention followed by peace support operations.

WHO SENDS PEACEKEEPERS WHERE, ON WHOSE AUTHORITY?

The United Nations manages by far the largest number of PSOs globally (eighteen) and about half of the troops and police presently deployed in peace operations. Regional organizations are increasingly involved, however, and coalitions of the willing have become the first responders in situations that require the rapid deployment of international security forces. In a 2004 study for the UN DPKO Best Practices Unit, Bruce Jones and Feryal Cherif stressed the degree to which PSOs have become largely "hybrid" operations of various kinds. In only a few cases have all aspects of complex operations been run by a single entity from start to finish.[11] Responsibilities may be shared over time, or different organizations may function in parallel, coordinating their work in different substantive areas. **Table 1** shows how operations map onto a matrix that compares the standard categories of integrated, coordinated, parallel, and sequential operations with Jones' helpful functional categories that unpack the coordinated and parallel operations into civilian-military divisions of labor, linked peacekeeping and observer missions, and short-term military support to ongoing operations. Understood as affiliated with essentially all operations in all categories are commercial sector support firms whose specialties vary from long-range air transport to VIP close protection.

During the Cold War, peacekeeping was a fairly steady-state enterprise to monitor and maintain cease-fires between long-term adversaries. As regional

**Table 1: Categorizing Hybrid Peace Support Operations,
with Select Examples**

Standard Categories: ⟍ Jones' Categories:	Integrated Operations	Civilian-Military Division of Labor	Linked Peacekeeping-Observer Missions	Short-term Military Support	Hand-Over Operations
Integrated Operations (all elements answering to a common structure of authority in the field)	**Somalia (93–95) Haiti (95–96) Haiti (04–)** *E. Timor (99–02) Liberia (03–)*				
Coordinated Operations (civil-military; UN-other; armed-unarmed military; or PSOs with common goals but own space)		**Bosnia (95–) Kosovo (99–) Afghanistan (02–)**	*Liberia (93–97) Sierra Leone (98–99)* **Georgia (93–) Tajikistan (94–00)**	**S. Leone (00) UK >UN DRC (03, 06) EU >UN**	
Parallel Operations (short-term military support; or securing separate space without coordination)		**Afghanistan (02–) Iraq (03–)**		*Rwanda (94) France ~ UN*	
Sequential Operations (trail-breaking operations or handoffs from one established mission to another)					**Somalia (93) US >UN Haiti (95, 04) US >UN** *Burundi (04) AU >**UN***

Notes: **Bold** indicates operations with Chapter VII or equivalent peace enforcement authority. *Italics* indicates missions added by the authors of this study to those listed by Jones and Cherif.

Source: Bruce Jones with Feryal Cherif, "Evolving Models of Peacekeeping, Policy Implications and Responses," paper prepared for UNDPKO Best Practices Unit (New York: New York University Center on International Cooperation, 2004).

organizations in Africa and Europe engaged as well, in the 1990s, the UN Security Council remained the authorizing agent of choice for their operations. **Figure 1** parses peace operations according to such mission authority. It distinguishes two categories of UN-led operations ("Chapter six and half" peacekeeping and "Chapter seven" operations given broader license to use force or to exert powers of governance).[12] Operations in a third category have been authorized ("mandated") by the Security Council but led by other entities, like the NATO-led Kosovo Force. A fourth category includes operations recognized or endorsed by the Security Council but not formally mandated by it, which would include operations undertaken by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, and the

Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands (2003–), whose mandate derives from an agreement between the operation's sponsors and the host government. A fifth category includes all PSO's undertaken without reference to or recognition from the UN Security Council.

Figure 1: Peace Support Operations by Source of Deployment Authority, 1948–2005

Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance* (annual), London; Birger Heldt, "List of Non-UN Peacekeeping Operations 1948–2004 and Related United Nations Security Council Resolutions," Stockholm: Folke Bernadotte Academy, draft of January 31, 2006 (provided by the author); UN mission reporting documents; and UN Security Council resolutions and presidential statements. For a complete list of missions included in the chart, see annex.

Most Cold War operations were UN-led, deployed on international frontiers, and lacked Chapter VII peace enforcement authority. One large UN operation, sent to the former Belgian Congo (the present DRC) immediately after independence at the request of the state's fledgling leadership, became deeply enmeshed in its crisis of governance (1960–64) and found itself sandwiched between rival factions whose patrons came from different sides in the Cold War. Eventually authorized to use all necessary means to halt the country's slide into civil war, the operation shepherded a new national government into brief existence and halted the secession of the mineral-rich, mercenary-supported province of Katanga. The operation suffered substantial casualties over four years, however, and the country remained unsettled long after the peacekeepers left.

Other Cold War-era operations included the U.S.-led occupation of the Dominican Republic (1965–66), under the aegis of the OAS; the Syrian-led

Arab Deterrent Force in Lebanon (1977–83), sponsored by the Arab League; and the Indian Peacekeeping Force in Sri Lanka (1987–1990), under a bilateral agreement with that government. The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) that has patrolled the Sinai Peninsula since 1982 is a small, traditional-type peacekeeping force authorized by the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, managed by its own international organization based in Rome, and funded by the United States and the two treaty signatories. It replaced a UN peacekeeping force whose continuation had been vetoed by the Soviet Union, and a US-led, largely civilian-contractor-staffed Sinai Field Mission that filled the gap between the UN's departure and the MFO's arrival.[13]

Toward the end of the Cold War, UN operations grew modestly, by subsequent standards, with new, small missions in Central America, Angola, Afghanistan, and Namibia. After the Cold War, a second operational surge doubled UN peace operations to about 38,000 troops and police in 1992. UN forces doubled again the following year to 80,000, deployed mostly in the Balkans and Somalia. In this same two-year period, the size of non-UN operations exploded as well. The largest UN-authorized mission, led by the United States, put 35,000 troops in Somalia from December 1992 to May 1993. Another 37,000 troops were deployed at about the same time in UN-recognized operations, including the Nigerian-led ECOWAS operation in Liberia and the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) operation in Tajikistan. Total numbers continued to climb in 1994, and about 150,000 troops and police were deployed by mid-year.

The 1994 peak was not exceeded for a decade. PSOs did not go away in the interim, however. On the contrary, they became a major, ongoing international enterprise occupying an average of 125,000 troops and police per year. The UN's share dropped substantially from 1994 to 1998, to just 8 percent of forces deployed. Meanwhile, NATO kept the peace in Bosnia, Russian operations continued in Tajikistan, and Nigeria, with help from other West African troops, wrestled with conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

UN missions rebounded unexpectedly in mid-1999, however, as the Security Council mandated major new operations in Kosovo and East Timor and followed up with three more operations over the next twelve months, in Sierra Leone, the DRC, and on the Ethiopian–Eritrean border. In Kosovo, the United Nations formed a temporary government and deployed police and civil administrators, while NATO provided 45,000 military peacekeepers. In East Timor, the UN took over from an Australian-led coalition and governed the territory until elections and independence in May 2002. The UN's operation in

the DRC started life as an observer force with fewer than 3,000 military personnel, most of them designated to protect the operation and its premises.

In December 2001, ISAF began deploying to Kabul, Afghanistan, as a coalition of the willing with a Security Council mandate, led by the UK and comprising roughly 5,000 troops. The U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom continued to fight Taliban and al Qaeda forces elsewhere in the country. ISAF was taken over by NATO in August 2003 and soon began to expand its operational reach beyond Kabul, as discussed later in some detail.

A fourth surge of demand for UN PSOs occurred between July 2003 and April 2005. Over that period, the Security Council doubled the size of the UN Mission in the DRC to 10,800 troops then increased it by a further 5,900 troops in the fall of 2004. The Council established a new, 15,000-troop UN operation in Liberia in September 2003; directed the UN to take over peacekeeping in Côte d'Ivoire from ECOWAS and to triple the size of the operation to 6,000 troops (April 2004); took over peacekeeping in Burundi from a financially-strapped African Union mission of 5,000 (June); established an 8,000-person force to replace a 90-day coalition operation in rapidly-decaying Haiti (also June); and, in spring 2005, authorized deployment of 10,000 troops and 700 police for the UN Mission in Sudan, to implement a peace accord ending two decades of war in the country's south. By the end of 2005, UN operations involved 70,000 troops, military observers, and police, with 4,500 international civilian personnel, 8,300 local staff, and more than 1,800 UN Volunteers (the UN's Peace Corps-equivalent).[14]

This latest sharp growth in demand for UN forces occurred shortly after the United States mounted Operation Iraqi Freedom. During this period the United States was also canvassing the globe for coalition partners to contribute forces to the stability operations phase in Iraq that it believed would follow the end of major combat operations. The allied portion eventually comprised 24,000 to 25,000 troops, of which about one-third were British (the UK had roughly 41,000 troops in Iraq for the initial attack but drew down rapidly to 9,000). The most significant other national contributions came from Poland, Ukraine, Spain, and the Netherlands, followed later by South Korea, Italy, Romania, and the Netherlands.[15] Because forces in Iraq were mired in counterinsurgency warfare by mid-2004, Iraq is not counted here as a PSO after 2003.

We have noted in passing where operations have deployed, but before turning to the supplier survey it is useful to look at geographic distribution more specifically. **Figure 2** charts deployment levels over time by region. The Middle East is traditionally associated with peacekeeping but, except for a few

significant spikes, historically it has not seen the sort of large operations deployed in Europe and Africa. Nor, with the exception of operations focused on Iraq, has there been much in the way of Chapter VII enforcement authority.

Figure 2: Peace Support Operations by Region, 1948–2005

Sources: See figure 3.

Post-Cold War, PSOs expanded in striking fashion in Europe (to cope with the breakup of Yugoslavia) and in Africa (to cope with anarchy in Somalia and, later, civil wars in western and central Africa). Central Asian PSOs reflected the adaptation of Russia and the newly-independent, former Soviet republics of that region to post-Soviet realities and the use of the regional PSO model by Russia as a way to reassert political-military influence. As operations in southeastern Europe have phased down, operations in Central Asia and Africa have grown. Apart from Cambodia and East Timor/Timor-Leste, few UN peacekeepers have deployed in Southeast Asia. Neither have regionally-mandated forces, reflecting both Southeast Asia's lack of a formal regional organization and rigorous support of national sovereignty among Southeast Asian states. The situation in Oceania has been a little different, as Australia has provided operational leadership for missions arranged bilaterally and with the endorsement of the Pacific Islands Forum. Apart from a few troops to monitor the disarmament of Nicaragua's "contras" in 1990 and the two deployments in Haiti, armed UN peacekeepers have not deployed in Latin America, a region whose sovereign

immune response has been periodically reinforced over the last century or so by US military interventions.

Over the past decade, the various organizations able to conduct PSOs have worked out, or perhaps defaulted to, a rough geographic and task-oriented division of labor. The United States and its close allies specialize in forced entry. NATO is presently focused on peacekeeping in southeastern Europe and Afghanistan. The European Union is slowly testing its abilities to do PSOs in Europe and short-term reinforcement operations in Africa. The African Union has the greatest regional need for PSOs but the least regional capacity to provide for them. The United Nations has become, by default of other options, the principal manager of complex PSOs in sub-Saharan Africa.

FUTURE DEMAND FOR PSOs

Are current levels of demand for PSOs likely to be sustained into the foreseeable future? Charts of recent conflict trends produced by a consortium of the Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO) and the Conflict Data Program at Sweden's Uppsala University suggest that while war may be down, it is far from out. Virtually all of the 30 ongoing conflicts that they track are internal/societal wars (**figure 3**). Of those, seven count as major wars with over 1,000 battle-related deaths per year; ten are intermediate conflicts with more than 25 but fewer than 1,000 such fatalities annually; and thirteen are minor conflicts that cause up to 25 fatalities per year but, over time, have racked up at least 1,000 battle-related deaths (**figure 4**).[16] If most of the intermediate-to-major conflicts follow recent trends and end in stalemate (or intervention) over the next few years, then we could expect at least half of them—say, ten out of twenty—to generate demand for new peace operations, based on trends of the past decade.

A separate effort by Monty Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr at the University of Maryland Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) has, since 2001, generated roughly biannual reports on the magnitude, causes, and consequences of war, together with an assessment of countries' capacities to build and sustain internal peace. These reports build on Gurr's longstanding "minorities at risk" work and Marshall's efforts to measure the societal impact of war.[17] In their estimation, "major societal wars" escalated steadily in total magnitude—or total impact on the affected society—from the late 1950s through the early 1990s, also showing significant decline in magnitude after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.[18] Long-running and newer wars alike came to an end in unprecedented numbers during the 1990s.

**Figure 3: Interstate and Intrastate Armed Conflict,
1989-2004**

Source: Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, "Armed Conflict and Its International Dimensions, 1946–2004," Journal of Peace Research 42(5) 2005: 623–635, tables I and II, www.prio.no/cscw/armedconflict.

**Figure 4: Armed Conflicts of Minor, Intermediate, and Major Intensity,
1989-2004**

Source: Harbom and Wallensteen, 2005.

Roughly half of the sixty societal wars that ended in the 1990s benefited from the presence of some sort of PSO in starting their transition back to peace.

As of spring 2005, Marshall and Gurr counted sixteen ongoing wars, which they catalogued both as to magnitude and intensity of fighting (sporadic to high intensity). **Table 2** maps these sixteen wars according to these two parameters. None of the conflicts exceeds magnitude five on their ten-point scale of peace-to-apocalypse but magnitude five is bad enough, involving up to a half-million deaths.[19] The countries listed in *italics* in table 2 already host peace support or stability operations: In Darfur's high-intensity conflict, African Union peacekeepers are largely observers. The conflict in the DRC is rated as medium intensity, while Burundi and Côte d'Ivoire are considered low intensity. Three conflicts (Afghanistan, Algeria, and Somalia) were rated as "sporadic" fighting as of late 2004–early 2005. That the authors' consider four states to have ongoing conflicts despite the presence of PSOs underlines the fact that war has not always ended completely before a PSO deploys; or may re-erupt for any number of reasons.

Table 2: Ongoing Major Armed Conflicts in Early 2005

		Intensity		
	Sporadic	**Low**	**Medium**	**High**
5	Somalia		*DR Congo*	
4	Algeria	*Burundi*	Colombia Myanmar Russia	*Sudan [Darfur]*
3	*Afghanistan*	Philippines [Moros] Nigeria [Communal]	India [Kashmir]	
2		*Cote d'Ivoire*	Nepal	
1		Indonesia [Aceh]		

(Magnitude labels the vertical axis; Intensity labels the horizontal axis.)

Source: Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, (eds.), *Peace and Conflict 2005* (College Park, Maryland: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, July 2005). Based on appendix table 11.1.

Note: *Italics* indicate countries that Marshall and Gurr count as ongoing conflicts, which also host peace support operations.

Looking ahead, Marshall and Gurr viewed sixteen states *not* already at war as dangerously deficient in domestic peacebuilding capacity, a deficit that places these countries "at the greatest risk of neglecting or mismanaging emerging societal crises such that these conflicts escalate to serious violence and/or instability." Most of these states at risk are either in Africa or in the southern tier of Asia, regions where most PSOs are already concentrated.[20] Fifteen other low-capacity states were already engulfed in some level of armed conflict, by their accounting, when Marshall and Gurr published (see **table 3**).

Table 3: Comparing Conflict Risk in *Peace and Conflict 2005* and *The Security Demographic*

Country	Marshall & Gurr: "Low Peace-building Capacity"	Cincotta, et al: "Very High Demo-Risk"	Marshall & Gurr: "States in Armed Conflict"	Uppsala-PRIO Dataset, 2004: Ongoing Wars	Low PB Capacity with Ongoing War	Hi Demo-Risk States at War	High Risk Factors But No Wars	Wars without Highest Risk Factors
Afghanistan	X		1	2	x			
Algeria	X		3	2	x			
Angola	X			1	x			
Armenia	X						x	
Azerbaijan	X						x	
Bangladesh		X					x	
Bhutan		X					x	
Burkina Faso	X	X					x	
Burundi	X	X	3	2	x	x		
Cambodia	X						x	
Cent. Afr. Rep.	X		1		x			
Colombia			3	3				x
Comoros		X					x	
Congo-Braz.	X		1		x			
Congo-Kinshasa	X	X	3		x	x		
Cote d'Ivoire	X		1	1	x			
East Timor		X				2006		
Eritrea		X						
Ethiopia	X	X	1	1	x	x		
Gambia		X					x	
Georgia				1				x
Guinea	X						x	
Guinea-Bissau	X						x	
Haiti	X		2	1	x			
India			3	3				x
Indonesia			3	2				x
Iran	X						x	
Iraq	X		3	3	x			
Israel-Palestine		X	3	2		x		

Note: Shading indicates both sources consider the state to be at high risk of future violent conflict. 1 = minor conflict with 25 or fewer battle deaths/year; 2 = intermediate conflict with more than 25 but fewer than 1,000 battle-related deaths/year; 3 = major conflict with more than 1,000 battle-related deaths per year.

Table 3: Continued

Country	Marshall & Gurr: "Low Peace-building Capacity"	Cincotta, et al: "Very High Demo-Risk"	Marshall & Gurr: "States in Armed Conflict"	Uppsala-PRIO Dataset, 2004: Ongoing Wars	Low PB Capacity with Ongoing War	Hi Demo-Risk States at War	High Risk Factors But No War	War Without Highest Risk Factors
Kenya		X					x	
Laos		X					x	
Lebanon	X				2006			
Liberia	X	X	1				2005	
Madagascar		X					x	
Malawi		X					x	
Maldives		X					x	
Mauritania		X					x	
Myanmar	X		1					
Nepal	X	X		3	x	x		
Nigeria	X			1	x			
Pakistan	X		2		x			
Philippines			1	2				x
Russia			3	3				x
Rwanda	X	X	1		x	x		
Saudi Arabia			2					x
Sierra Leone	X	X	1				2006	
Solomon Is.	X	X	1		x	x		
Somalia	X	X	1		x	x		
Sri Lanka			1					x
Sudan	X			3	x			
Tajikistan	X						x	
Tanzania		X					x	
Thailand			2					x
Turkey			2	2				x
Uganda	X			3	x			x
USA (GWOT)			3	2				x
Uzbekistan				1				x
Yemen		X	2			x		x
Totals:	31	25	29	22	21	10	22	13

Sources: Marshall and Gurr, 2005, 8-10. Richard Cincotta, et al, *The Security Demographic* (Washington, DC: Population Action Internation, 2003). 74. Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, "Armed Conflict and Its International Dimensions, 1946-2004," *Journal of Peace Research* 42(5): 623-635, tables I and II.

Richard Cincotta and his colleagues at Population Action International took a different cut at predicting war, emphasizing demographic "stress factors" that have historically been associated with higher risks of civil conflict. These include a large "youth bulge" (males aged 15–29), rapid urban growth, and low availability of cropland or fresh water. The authors consider countries with all three risk factors to be at "very high" risk of future violent conflict; countries at "high risk" of conflict have two risk factors: a youth bulge and either high urbanization rates or land or water shortages.[21] Among the 25 countries at very high risk during the 1990s, the likelihood of civil conflict breaking out during the decade was 40 percent; among the 40 countries at high risk, the likelihood was 33 percent. Among other countries the likelihood of conflict was 12–24 percent.[22]

Marshall and Gurr list thirty-one countries as having critically low peacebuilding capacity. Cincotta, et al, list twenty-five countries at "very high risk" of conflict in the decade 2000 to 2010. Ten states are rated as high risk by both studies, that is, face high demographic pressures with low peacebuilding capacity. Of these ten, nine were already judged to be involved in violent conflict in 2004 (six minor conflicts, three major). Of Marshall and Gurr's states at risk, twenty of thirty-one were engaged in some level of violent conflict in 2004 as judged by them and by PRIO/Uppsala. Lebanon joined them in the summer of 2006 as battlefield if not as belligerent. Of Cincotta, et al's twenty-five states at highest demographic risk, ten were in conflict in 2006. Twenty-two states had one or the other class of risk factors but were not at war, while thirteen states presently at war fit none of the highest risk categories in either study.

The reader is invited to study table 3 at leisure but it is immediately clear that those who study conflict risk closely can disagree not only about what risk is but about where risk is most acute. Both studies may be right, at different times and places, and there may be a chance to head war off at the pass if some major player is willing to mount a peace posse and the risk factors assumed to be at play really are the crucial ones.

The thirteen wars whose host states meet neither study's set of risk factors give particular pause. There are, by definition, conflict-promoting variables in parts of Colombia, Georgia, India, the Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, among other places, that neither study seems to be picking up—perhaps the lure of drug money, perhaps ethnic or religious fanaticism. Other studies have attempted to divine those factors, with equally mixed results.[23]

The range of current and potential conflict, and the minor likelihood of outright victory in modern civil wars,[24] together suggest that international peace operations have a busy if not bright future ahead of them. The record to date suggests the difficulty of leaving behind a fully-formed democracy in the amount of time that the international community has generally been willing to devote to post-conflict peacebuilding, but the same record also suggests that half-formed democracies are politically unstable. Because the focus in this volume is the security that is prerequisite to successful peacebuilding, and not peacebuilding itself, we do not pursue this issue of ultimate objectives in any depth here. Nonetheless, poorly-governed countries with unresponsive and non-transparent governments are the ones that tend to generate civil wars, mass population displacements, and genocidal outbursts with regrettable regularity.[25] If the well-governed parts of the world are not to face an increasingly unpleasant choice of either of paying for rehabilitation or dealing with the migrating human detritus of failed or failing states, it will behoove them to attempt to avoid that choice either by preventing the failure, or by building high walls to seal out the problem. The former will be difficult but the latter is morally bankrupt as well as impossible.

The case for prevention is buttressed by calling attention to the fact that peace operations have enjoyed relative success in relatively small places and then only after considerable investment of time and resources. Larger zones of potentially violent conflict pose daunting obstacles to effective peacekeeping. Nigeria, for example, has 132 million people—five times the population of Iraq.[26] Colombia is twice the size of Iraq and is not only mountainous and forested but home to thriving drug cultivation and distribution networks and to the gangs that operate them to feed the developed world's cocaine habits—like Afghanistan but with shade. Myanmar has equally difficult terrain, multiple ethnic conflicts, and a history of involvement in the heroin trade. Any of these places would pose severe operational challenges to a peace operation. Indeed, the international community would be hard pressed to field peacekeepers in anything like the density achieved by NATO in the Balkans. The United States has found it difficult to maintain even one-third that troop density in Iraq, yet to achieve even Iraq-type troop densities in countries the size of Nigeria or Pakistan would require on the order of one million troops in each. The UN operation in the DRC has been able to gain leverage against rogue militias and other foes only because it has been able to focus on a small fraction of the DRC's vast territory. Were it necessary for the United Nations to keep the peace on its own in all parts of the DRC simultaneously, at a tempo equivalent to that now maintained in the eastern 15 percent of the country, it would find the task impossible, as would NATO or, for that matter, the United States. This matter of scale and

perspective is vital to keep in mind as we contemplate the world's capacity to meet the demand for peace support that is likely to arise in the decade to come.

— 3 —
PEACE OPERATIONS AND
ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING

Peacekeeping has always occupied a hard-to-define niche within a large body of military principles and practice that varies by country and changes over time. For a long time peacekeeping was the preserve of neutral and non-aligned states whose forces could competently monitor a buffer zone but not actually defend it, and for whom the mantra of "consent, neutrality, and non-use of force" embodied both political principle and force protection strategy. Most of these operations were UN-led, although the United Nations promulgated no formal concept of peace operations until UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992.[27]

The traditional model of peacekeeping was strongly associated with the Nordic states. The third edition of *Nordic UN Stand-by Forces*, published in 1986 and intended as a handbook for officers preparing to deploy on UN missions, devoted no space to the use of force or the rules of engagement (ROE) under which force might be used.[28] Indeed, even today, not many states have specific doctrines for peace operations that encompass the more complex and risky missions of recent years.[29]

This section traces the evolution of thinking about complex PSOs at the United Nations, at NATO, and in three states that do have doctrines for complex operations (France, the United States, and the United Kingdom), wield vetoes as permanent members of the UN Security Council, belong to NATO, and possess most of the world's expeditionary military capabilities.[30] How their doctrines have changed over the past decade (and shaped institutional doctrines in turn) reflects what their armed forces have learned from recent operations and suggests the shape of future international response to demand for support of peace.

EARLY TO MID-1990S

In his book, *Peacekeeping in the Abyss,* Robert Cassidy discussed U.S. and British peacekeeping doctrine in the early 1990s. The former emerged from U.S. Army doctrine for low intensity conflict and the latter from a long British tradition of "imperial policing." U.S. doctrine distinguished peacekeeping (local

consent, neutrality, use of force in self-defense) from peace enforcement (operations "to restore peace between hostile factions" or otherwise restore order). Both, however, were subcategories of low intensity conflict. British doctrine circa 1989 built on that country's experience with traditional buffer-zone operations like Cyprus and placed peacekeeping outside the "spectrum of conflict." Neither doctrine, Cassidy argued, prepared either country for the complex and chaotic environments that their forces faced in Somalia and Bosnia, respectively.[31]

The United Nations was the first multinational institution to define an approach to peacekeeping, which international politics required that UN leaders call something other than "doctrine." *An Agenda for Peace,* commissioned in January 1992 by the first meeting of the Security Council at the level of heads of state, offered an oddly loose and incomplete definition of peacekeeping as "the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well."[32] In January 1995, a revised version, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace,* addressed the dramatic increase in number and complexity of peacekeeping operations since the first version was published, the shift in focus to the aftermath of internal conflict, and what this shift entailed in terms of "building up…national institutions, the promotion of human rights, the creation of civilian police forces and other actions in the political field." *Supplement* affirmed that "consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defense" defined peacekeeping's niche in international security affairs and stressed that "peace-keeping and the use of force (other than in self-defense) should be seen as alternative techniques and not as adjacent points on a continuum, permitting easy transition from one to the other."[33] *Supplement* side-stepped the question of what to do when consent decays or violence against civilians casts doubt on the value of "impartiality" de-linked from the security of the local population.

In its strict separation of peacekeeping from all use of force beyond self-defense, however, *Supplement* was consistent with then-prevailing US and British peace operations doctrine. The US Army defined peacekeeping ("PK") in terms of consent and defined peace enforcement ("PE") in terms of coercion, with no conceptual overlap. Army Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations,* warned that "PK and PE...are not part of a continuum," that the existence of consent and strict impartiality divided the former from the latter. A contingent doing peace enforcement might well be capable of peacekeeping, but it should be swapped out because "the impartiality and consent divides have been crossed."[34]

British doctrine circa 1994–95 also used local consent to differentiate peacekeeping from other military practice but expanded the concept of peacekeeping to entertain the use of force in volatile tactical situations, provided consent was maintained at the national or "strategic" level (for example, amongst national leaders of a political faction, as opposed to their provincial or lower-level commanders). British doctrine distinguished such "wider peacekeeping" from peace enforcement in terms of the loss of such strategic-level consent.[35] Strategic consent was lost by crossing the "Mogadishu Line," a reference to UN and US actions in Somalia in 1993; unfortunately, there was no real way to draw that line in advance.

In March 1995, reflecting in part French experience in Bosnia, the chief of staff of France's armed forces, General Jacques Lanxade, issued a directive that described three primary types of peace support operations:[36]

- *Opérations de maintien de la paix*—authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter and based on the consent of the parties to the conflict, with a mission to monitor and facilitate the implementation of a ceasefire once hostilities have ceased. (Translated in NATO doctrine, below, as "peacekeeping.")

- *Opérations de restauration de la paix*—authorized under Chapter VII, attempt to reconstitute peace in a country where hostilities continue and the security of populations is not assured, but without designating an enemy or an aggressor. (Translates as "peace restoration," a term not incorporated into NATO doctrine.)

- O*pérations d'imposition de la paix*—limited war, authorized under Chapter VII to impose peace through the use of force against an identified enemy. (Translated in NATO doctrine as "peace enforcement" but there involving more restrained and impartial use of force.)

A January 1996 aide-memoire issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs further elaborated on these concepts, describing a middle ground between war and peace in which French troops should embrace the concept of "active impartiality," or the proactive, aggressive use force against a particular party if that party's actions contradicted the mission's mandate or prevented the mission from performing its duties. French troops in peace restoration operations should therefore project a "credible coercive capacity," and "enjoy, to the extent possible, undisputed military superiority," on the assumption that a strong deterrent capacity would decrease the likelihood that force would actually be needed.[37] Finally, French doctrine argued that peace maintenance, peace restoration and peace imposition should *not* be understood as strictly separated

categories but instead as key points along a spectrum of operations between peace and war, "a continuum of possibilities" in which "the principle of war fighting" remained "the foundation of action."[38] The principles that French PSO doctrine applied to peacekeeping were very similar to the go-in-strong-and-sort-it-out-later Powell Doctrine for the wartime use of force by US military forces, named for then-Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, later Secretary of State, Colin Powell.[39]

LATE 1990S TO 2001

In 1998, British doctrine adopted an approach to impartiality comparable to that of France, anchored in "international humanitarian law and/or the mandate, against which the actions of the belligerent parties can be judged and acted upon." The new British doctrine offered a definition of what it called "peace support operations" that encompassed both peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The latter was distinguished from war not by the loss of local consent but by a shift from the impartial application of force to the designation of an enemy. Because peacekeeping and peace enforcement were now a conceptual and operational continuum, every "peace support force" should be capable of enforcing peace even if its immediate, mandated tasks were less daunting and its initial operating environment was relatively benign. By adopting both the concept of an operational continuum within peace operations and the need to be ready at all times to enforce the peace, British doctrine converged toward the French.[40]

The UN's August 2000 Brahimi Report reflected this convergence, which in turn reflected the realities of implementing agreements intended to settle sometimes-long-running conflicts within states. The report acknowledged peacekeeping's roots in consent, neutrality, and the use of force only in self-defense but, grappling with many of the same issues as British doctrine writers, it also argued that UN peacekeepers should be prepared to contest local parties' efforts to manipulate consent in ways that undermined the peace (by failing to carry out obligations under an accord, for example, by rebuilding their forces or by holding consent hostage to political payoffs). Impartiality for UN operations, it argued, must therefore mean adherence to the principles of the Charter "and to the objectives of a mandate that is rooted in those Charter principles. Such impartiality is not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time, which can amount to a policy of appeasement." Once deployed, peacekeepers may find that "local parties consist not of moral equals but of obvious aggressors and victims, and peacekeepers may not only be operationally justified in using force but morally compelled to do so. Genocide in Rwanda went as far as it did in part because the international community

failed to use or to reinforce the operation then on the ground in that country to oppose obvious evil."[41]

The Brahimi Report was careful to note that "the United Nations does not wage war. Where enforcement action is required, it has consistently been entrusted to coalitions of willing States, with the authorization of the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter." But because the United Nations was often asked to accept responsibility for continuing a mission that a coalition had initiated—as in Somalia, Haiti, and East Timor in the 1990s and, in 2004, Haiti once again—it was important that UN forces be able to shoulder the burden of security that such missions entailed. If they could not do that, then it was better not to undertake the mission at all. To deploy a force "incapable of solidifying a fragile peace would first raise and then dash the hopes of a population engulfed in conflict or recovering from war, and damage the credibility of the United Nations as a whole."[42]

The report drew what was to some a fairly fine line between the ability to sustain peace by force if necessary and the ability to create it in the first place. The distinction is crucial, however, as the UN itself will never have access either to the standing forces or the command and control authority needed to undertake "enforcement actions," even though such actions were envisioned by the drafters of the UN Charter in 1945.[43]

Five months after the Brahimi Report was released, George W. Bush was sworn in as the 43rd president of the United States. Disentangling US forces from peacekeeping and "nation-building" obligations abroad had been a theme of the new president's campaign for the office but the politics of disentanglement proved more tangled than expected. Washington's NATO allies objected to unilateral US force reductions in Bosnia and Kosovo, while Israel and Egypt resisted the notion of US forces leaving the Multinational Force and Observers, which monitors the Sinai under the two countries' 1979 peace treaty.

NATO, meanwhile, had been developing its own peace support operations doctrine and procedures over a period of years, with results that bear family resemblance to both US and UK doctrine at the turn of the century. Adopting the British terminology of "peace support operations," Allied Joint Publication 3.4.1 of July 2001 situated PSOs within the "non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations" of its new Strategic Concept, adopted at the April 1999 NATO Summit in Washington, at the height of the organization's Kosovo bombing campaign.[44] AJP 3.4.1 stressed that PSO are normally conducted "in support of an internationally recognized organization, such as the UN or Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe," and are "characteristically

multifunctional" activities in which the military role "is normally to create the necessary conditions for other organizations to do their work and so create a stable, self-sustaining secure environment for the longer term."[45] PSOs are distinguished from other military operations by their "impartial approach" and lack of designated enemy or by "specifying a desired political end state rather than the achievement of military victory."[46] Impartiality, consent, and "restraint" in the use of force are the guiding operational principals for NATO PSOs, but impartiality is defined in the British manner as anchored in the mandate and as implementation "without favour or prejudice to any party," meaning that a given level of non-compliance will generate a requisite level of enforcement regardless of who is being non-compliant. The NATO doctrine also incorporates the British sensibility about consent, cautioning that while it may hold at the strategic level, "there may be local groups who disagree violently with their leaders and who may be hostile to the PSO," and that these conditions will vary over time, in different parts of the Area of Operation, and at different levels of the local political hierarchy.[47]

2002 FORWARD

The new US administration continued for a while to regard peacekeeping and "nation building" as obstacles to the prosecution of the war on terrorism, rather than as building blocks in winning it. The new US *National Security Strategy,* published in September 2002, laid out a pro-active approach to countering terrorism and curtailing its spread by spreading American values. It declared that there was but "a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise;" that "[t]he United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere;" and that "[n]o nation owns these aspirations and no nation is exempt from them."[48]

The Bush administration endorsed "stability operations" as the preferred umbrella term for a range of military operations other than war that included peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The US Army issued Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations,* five months after the release of the new national security strategy. It retained peacekeeping and peace enforcement as distinct activities under stability operations. Peacekeeping was still defined in traditional terms as "undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement...and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement," with force used "only in self-defense." Peace enforcement was "the application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore

peace and order."[49] International authorization was still a normal constituent element of peace enforcement operations.

The US Army remained uneasy about shifting or "transitioning" a force from peacekeeping to peace enforcement or vice versa (NATO doctrine reflects similar concerns). Unavoidable transitions were to be preceded by changes in mandate or political guidance and by "appropriate adjustments to force structure, ROE, and other aspects of the mission."[50] In other words, commanders were not to drift into role transitions and decision makers should not require that they make such transitions without first changing the formal instructions and the tools for doing the mission. The doctrine devoted several paragraphs to warning against these two forms of "mission creep."[51]

A year later, the UK released a revised version of its doctrine for PSOs. The revised edition of Joint Warfare Publication 3-50 was a radical rethink that embraced the notion of an unsegmented spectrum of tension that requires the equally agile adaptation of deployed forces to changing field circumstances. The new document argued that previous doctrine had unduly "compart-mentalized" reality and misrepresented the nature of the situations in which peace support forces find themselves. Going further, it argued that since military force "complements diplomacy across the spectrum of tension," a PSO ought to be able to occur "at any point on that spectrum." Thus it advanced what it called the "one doctrine concept." Instead of defining boundaries between different kinds of missions, the new approach portrayed a fluid mission space in which any given force must be capable of taking any of three "stances"—enforcement, stabilization, or transition—as circumstances require. An enforcement stance would emphasize the coercive and deterrent use of force to uphold a mandate in an environment that may entail high risk of conflict escalation. A stabilization stance would "normally warrant the use of force in self-defence alone," while a transition stance would emphasize the reform, training, and reconstitution of indigenous forces and planning for mission handover or exit. Selection of stance would depend on operational requirements and on what JWP 3-50 calls "campaign authority," which "defines the capacity of a PSO to act in the collective interest of all parties, and thereby achieve a sustainable peace." Campaign authority is a composite of several interdependent variables: local perceptions of the legitimacy of an operation's mandate and of the freedom of action that operation has been given; the extent to which the operation's activities meet local expectations; and the degree of local consent to its presence.[52]

These factors can be difficult to sort out and appear to loop back upon themselves to some degree. Consent, for example, clearly can be affected by

whether the operation meets expectations and those, in turn, by how it uses its freedom of action. So sometimes campaign authority defines a PSO's capacity to act, sometimes its actions alter campaign authority, and sometimes that authority is affected by circumstances outside the PSO's immediate control.

The revised British doctrine argues that, in defining a PSO, "effects" (ends, objectives) matter more than the means employed to achieve them:

> [T]he distinction between tasks that fall within the definition of Peace Support Operations and other tasks lies, not in doctrine or the range of military capabilities that may be employed but in the effects that the military instrument will be required to achieve. In PSOs, the desired strategic effect, or intent, is to uphold international peace and security by resolving conflicts by means of prevention, conciliation, deterrence, containment or stabilization. Generally, in other contingent overseas operational tasks, the intention is to prosecute the conflict or dispute until the enemies are disrupted, defeated, destroyed or surrender.[53]

Despite the emphasis on effects-based definitions for PSOs, they are distinguished in the preceding paragraph by *means* used (prevention, etc.) and by effects "avoided" (including "enemies…disrupted, defeated, destroyed or surrender[ed]").

US doctrine also evolved further by 2004, informed mostly by military experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, two very difficult theaters with ongoing counter-insurgency operations in significant portions of both countries and terror campaigns mounted against foreign workers and host country nationals working either with the international community or with the respective transitional governments. Thus, Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05, defined stability operations as, "Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions."[54] The Directive (at paragraph 4.1) makes it DoD policy that "stability operations are a core US military mission and US military forces should be prepared to undertake them," with priority "comparable to combat operations." It defines (in paragraph 4.2) immediate operational goals as security, essential services, and humanitarian needs. Long-term goals are "to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society."[55] With this directive, DoD embraced state-building, albeit on its terms.

US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), meanwhile, was developing a family of operational concepts, headed by a *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations,* that looked ahead to the requirements of the next decade. The capstone document

anticipated three principal future threats to US interests: transnational security threats, "including threats from networked ideologues, criminals, or other hostile elements. . . employing terrorism or other methods"; regional, near-peer and emerging global competitors (that is, other powerful states); and failing or failed states "that afford potential safe haven for terrorist or other criminal elements and . . . may be ripe for humanitarian or political crises that threaten stability and security in surrounding regions." US military forces would address these threats as part of the full spectrum of US power, working with other US agencies and with "private, non-governmental, regional, and international organizations" in a "continuum" of military operations ranging from the maintenance of peace and stability "through conflict to reconstruction."[56]

Although a chart depicting the range of military operations in the capstone document includes both "peacekeeping" and "peace enforcement," these terms did not appear in the *Joint Operating Concept* ("JOpsC")*: Stability Operations*, that JFCOM released for comment in September 2004. That document defined "stability operations" as,

> multi-agency operations that involve all instruments of national and multinational action, including the international humanitarian and reconstruction community to support major conventional combat operations if necessary; establish security; facilitate reconstruction among local or regional adversaries; establish the political, social, and economic architecture; and facilitate the transition to legitimate local governance.[57]

"Multi-agency" refers to other US federal agencies. The tasks listed above include many that one would normally associate with complex peace operations. The major exception, of course, is support for "major combat operations." Indeed, the draft JOpsC made clear that stability operations were to be conducted "in support of civilian agencies and organizations to *complete the achievement of wartime political objectives*." [Emphasis added.] The notion that US forces might be invited to help implement a negotiated end to someone else's war was not contemplated, although it might be considered a lesser-included case in addition to the four "core" cases listed: foreign internal defense (or counter-insurgency); regime change; mounting international receiverships in failed states; and counter-terrorism. Of these four, only number three approaches the objectives and ethos of peace support operations as addressed by NATO or the UN. The document itself focused on case two, the analog to Iraq**.**

Although this document remained in draft form at the time of writing and would likely change, it reflected the political *zeitgeist* that propelled the US invasion of Iraq, which put military action at the cutting edge of a strategy intended not just

to restore political order but to promote a better one, a "new normal," in failing or dangerous states.[58]   The authority to promote new political order in such circumstances was implicitly national, with no mention of the United Nations, NATO, the African Union, or the Organization of American States, and no discussion of the relative costs and benefits of international authorization. Multinational operations were implicitly U.S.-led coalitions. Although the draft noted that commanders have "obligations under international law," the laws themselves, such as the Geneva Conventions, were not referenced, despite the JOpsC's heavy emphasis on combat and what amounted to a strategy for post-war occupation. DoD Directive 3000.05 was similarly silent on international law or higher authority, even as operational conveniences.

Contrasts with British doctrine in this regard were rather stark: The revised JWP 3-50 stressed that the source of a PSO's operating authority affects its international legitimacy, and that legitimacy helps determine campaign authority. It noted that the "most widely respected authority for a PSO" is a UN mandate.   Although regional mandates "can provide for more timely, preventative, or responsive action, than might be possible through the UN," non-UN mandates are also "vulnerable to perceptions of bias and may prove sensitive to variations in international will. Similarly, the legitimacy of unilateral or small coalition action is frequently challenged, and can act to compound the underlying causes of a conflict when the PSO is thought to reflect a disregard for international law…."   Finally, JWP 3-50 warned that acting without UN approval "has invariably attracted international opprobrium and accusations of acting above international law."[59]

IMPLICATIONS

Looking back at the recent evolution of these doctrines for undertaking PSOs and stability operations, the old walls that initially segregated peace operations from war-fighting clearly have been crumbling. Not only are peacekeeping and peace enforcement now seen as endpoints of a peace operations continuum of decreasing consent and increasing use of force, but peace operations and war-fighting are increasingly viewed, in the doctrines of the three permanent members of the Security Council evaluated here, as differing in degree more than in kind. Rather than buy into the relatively humble, if risky, world of the PSO as confidence building measure, temporary security presence, and support agent for the voluntary dismantling of belligerent factions and the restructuring of host state security forces, these powers have reconceptualized peace operations as low-intensity conflict with a hefty hearts-and-minds annex. Rather than rely, going in, on local consent as a source of operational legitimacy, these doctrines posit that firm and fair implementation of post-conflict reconstruction

in an atmosphere of growing public security and tranquility will *generate* local consent. Experience of the past five years with efforts to impose political change has not, however, demonstrated the validity of this notion that power-makes-order-makes-consent. There is life yet in the notion of consent in some form as prerequisite to peace operations, as distinct from other military action, however well-intentioned, and in the notion, explored below, that international authorization not only reinforces the legitimacy of PSOs but, in some circumstances, provides substitute consent.

Although a UN-led PSO may follow military action that has imposed peace (as in Kosovo and post-Dayton Bosnia) and in theory might follow action to oust a government (for example, a genocidal regime that the international community has decided to stop), the UN has yet to take responsibility for military security in such circumstances. In virtually every other instance in which UN-led military forces have deployed, they have done so on the basis of local consent, either at the request of a government (for example, Haiti in 2004) or on the basis of an invitation embedded in a peace accord that in turn triggers a Security Council mandate. The same has been true of NATO and European Union peace operations.

The peace agreements that embody consent for a PSO also embody limits on what the invited force may do. The mandates that authorize the PSO in turn are keyed to those limits because sovereignty, however limited in practical terms in many failed-state and similar scenarios, can be ignored only at the outsiders' eventual peril. Invitational operations are, in short, constrained by the sources of consent to their presence.

Although the Brahimi Report emphasized the value of consent to UN operations, it also argued that, once deployed, UN forces must be willing and able to defend themselves, their mandate, and those whom they are assigned to protect, against violent challenge. It argued, further, that UN PSOs should not be limited to reactive and tit-for-tat uses of force that "cede the initiative to their attackers."[60] Regardless of whether use of force is reactive or proactive, however, the UN sees it as a tool for *maintaining* rather than creating consent for its operations. In principle, the use of force by any PSO should be calibrated and proportionate to the political-military objective sought and should entail the minimum force needed to achieve that objective.[61] A fragile peace process can be destroyed by too much firepower used with too little finesse, just as it can be undermined by too little force used too cautiously.

In the spirit of the Brahimi report, and consistent with the British notion that PSOs do not use force to destroy adversaries, UN troops operating in the eastern

provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) from mid-2005 onward took the initiative against remnants of the perpetrators of Rwanda's genocide, in order to enforce compliance with recent promises made by their leaders regarding repatriation. Consistent with a concept of appropriate force and containment rather than defeat or destruction of an enemy, these operations destroyed the groups' base camps—*after* warnings designed to allow fighters to flee—pushing fighters either away from populated areas or toward demobilization camps for repatriation.[62]

The British military's intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000 was undertaken in parallel with and in direct support of a then-trouble UN peace operation there, and in direct support of the Sierra Leone government against a number of armed gangs British forces killed a number of armed gang members in the process of freeing several of their own number held hostage, and the demonstration effect of that encounter, rather than a concerted military campaign, led to the disintegration of the gang in question and to the disarmament of others. The British then stayed on, in reduced numbers, for some years to train and advise government forces. The initial British intervention bought time for the UN to reorient and restructure its own operation, which recovered its footing and ultimately went on to contribute significantly to the implementation of peace in the country. The UK operations thus helped to reinforce the power and legitimacy not only of the government but of the United Nations. They also enjoyed considerable legitimacy of their own: locally, owing to their support of an elected government against the armed gangs opposing it, and internationally, owing to a Security Council statement calling upon UN member states to provide such support.[63]

Carefully calibrated use of force and the international legitimacy conferred by due process of the UN Security Council or other established regional security organizations seem, as suggested earlier, to set peace operations apart from other military activities, whether unilateral or multi-party. In the case of interventions to impose peace, such authorization substitutes for the consent of the "host" government, makes the action taken more acceptable, politically, at least to the broader international community, and may complement and reinforce consent emerging from civil society within the state against which action is to be taken.

But even invitational PSOs benefit from international endorsements and the legitimacy they confer, especially where an operation involves a security provider and a recipient of grossly disparate military and economic power. A regional or UN mandate defining the responsibilities and limiting the authority of that provider can be reassuring both to the recipient (as a political barrier to unlimited outside interference) and to the provider (as a tool to prevent mission

creep or the growth of unrealistic local expectations regarding outside aid). If and when the going gets rough, an international mandate is also a license to canvass for international help.

To the extent that the great powers define their own military activities in terms of limited warfare or low intensity conflict that does not entail the calibrated use of force or a perceived need for international legitimacy, they are describing something other than peace support operations. The US government is therefore correct to define the adjuvant functions of forces in combat zones as "stability operations" rather than PSOs.

Complexity creeps in, of course, in conflict zones that are only partly pacified, that fall back into conflict as a peace process stalls, that harbor parties who resist constraints on their illicit income, or that generate splinter groups who try to muscle their way into a share of political power. Part of a PSO may need to adopt a combat "stance" in which defeat or destruction of an enemy force is indeed temporarily required. Such has been the case for UN forces deployed in Ituri district, northeastern DRC, where a combination of die-hard militias, illicit business interests, and oblivious Ugandan authorities continued to fuel lucrative instability. A lethal ambush of UN peacekeepers in February 2005 resulted in a deliberate and even more lethal UN riposte, when forces again came under fire from the militia that set the ambush. The resulting battle killed 50–60 militia fighters.[64] Beyond Ituri and the Kivus, however, UN operations in the DRC involve little or no proactive use of force and the whole operation is broadly invitational, deriving its welcome from a series of national-level peace accords as well as Security Council mandates.

It should be noted, however, that in the DRC, the forces brought into Ituri in mid-2003 and into the Kivus in late 2004 were specifically intended to help pacify their respective areas and were prepared to fight, if necessary. Although other UN troops already in the DRC were also redeployed to these more volatile areas, for various political and operational reasons they proved not as adaptable to the demands of peace enforcement.

In short, although great power military doctrines have been absorbing peace operations into a broader concept of military operations, PSOs still can and probably should be distinctly conceptualized, if only to differentiate—and protect—invitational operations. A PSO operates with international legitimacy derived from an international mandate, and with local legitimacy derived either from invitational language in a peace agreement or from the actions that it takes to curb deadly violence and protect a population. Its legitimacy is further enhanced to the extent that it trains and mentors local security forces to do the

same. Ideally, it enjoys the consent of all local parties initially but can work with partial absence of consent and should be prepared to deal with decayed consent. Legitimacy and consent are, to a PSO, what bolt-on armor is to an infantry fighting vehicle: both reduce the probability of catastrophic system failure. A PSO also uses the minimum force needed to protect and advance its mission objectives but may use it proactively, if necessary. Although it may need to act as a combat force in certain places and at certain times, combat is not its baseline "stance." Should combat become a routine preoccupation, then the operation has transitioned from a PSO to something else, regardless of who mandated it or what that initial mandate said.

— 4 —
SUPPLYING PEACE SUPPORT: AN INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW

The supply of security for PSOs has remained rather constrained. Military forces are expensive institutions and most of the world's wealthier states cut military spending substantially when the Cold War ended, while most of the world's less wealthy states do not have the resources to finance the training or deployment of military or police a long way from home for long periods of time. Neither do their respective regional organizations, if they are in the PSO business at all.

Availability of competent and experienced police personnel has been, if anything, more problematic than availability of troops, as few states maintain more police than they need for daily maintenance of public security and police forces do not routinely prepare for operations abroad. Police are trained to local law and custom, local criminal procedures, and local equipment. States with national-level police forces may have an easier time finding volunteers for international service. Moreover, states with gendarme-type paramilitary police, who function in formed units, have been able to spare some of them for PSOs. NATO and the United Nations have both used such units to good effect, playing a role in support of public order that otherwise falls upon a most reluctant military. Indeed, as will be seen below, demand for these "special" or "stability" police units (SPUs) or, as the United Nations calls them, "formed" police units (FPU), has grown dramatically in the new millennium, as their particular utility has increasingly been recognized by peacekeeping mission planners and leaders. Some states and organizations, notably in Europe, have developed mechanisms through which both regular police personnel and SPUs can be made available for PSOs. Still, supplies worldwide remain tight.

THE UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations is more than the Security Council or the General Assembly, especially in war-torn environments, where, in addition to managing peacekeepers, it is also a loosely structured system of operating agencies that protect refugees, distribute emergency food, immunize children, promote human

rights, and provide political and electoral advisers for states in distress or in transition from war to peace. UN humanitarian agencies such as the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or the World Food Program (WFP) have substantial operational infrastructures. At any given time, WFP operates 20 transport aircraft and 40 cargo ships; in 2004, the agency shipped over 5 million tons of food to support 89 million recipients, repairing ports, airstrips, roads and railways as needed to achieve physical access.[65] A spin-off concept, the UN Joint Logistics Center (UNJLC), was developed in the 1990s to coordinate the logistics of humanitarian agencies during complex emergencies. UNJLCs track commodity shipments and the status of fuel assets, aid corridors, border crossings, and aid-supportive infrastructure. As each is a temporary expedient, "no UNJLC is activated without a clearly defined exit strategy."[66]

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) sets up and supports Humanitarian Information Centers (HIC) in complex emergencies to serve as information hubs for agencies and non-governmental organizations alike. The first HIC was set up to manage information about "who was doing what where" in Kosovo, and promoted the use of geo-coding and geographic information systems that combine data bases with maps to better match needs with service providers and to de-conflict the operations of a sprawling NGO community. At present, HICs are operational in Niger (famine relief), Sri Lanka and Sumatra (tsunami-related relief and reconstruction), Darfur, and Liberia.[67]

These elements of the UN system have standing mandates to help in humanitarian emergencies. With the acquiescence of local governing authorities and a sufficiently permissive security environment, they can act quickly during a crisis. Several have emergency procedures designed to dispatch small rapid response teams on 24–48 hours notice. More than 90 percent of UN humanitarian agencies' funding takes the form of voluntary contributions from governments, however, so while these agencies have the authority to act, they may only have the immediate reserves to act briefly unless donors send money quickly.[68]

UN political and security entities, on the other hand, cannot mount major field operations without Security Council authorization.[69] In the case of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), that means either a Council resolution with a mission mandate, or written approval from the President of the Council to begin mission planning. Development entities like the World Bank and UN Development Program also will not move into a post-conflict setting without some signal (such as a statement by the President of the Council) that gives them political cover to engage.

By contrast with the humanitarian agencies, funding for UN PSOs comes from the "assessed" contributions of UN member states, which they are obligated to pay under the terms of their membership in the UN. The funding structure for peace operations was set up informally as UN forces went into the Sinai and onto the Golan Heights after the October 1973 Middle East War. It was repeated for every UN mission launched between then and mid-2000. Under the "peacekeeping scale of assessments" (**table 4**, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the "P5") paid a larger share of PSO costs than they paid to the regular UN budget; in turn, developing states paid substantially less. Developed states other than the P5 paid the same rates for both. This system was finally formalized and rationalized in late 2000, with peacekeeping payments for wealthier developing states keyed for the first time to their per capita gross national income. The additional funds collected due to this shift in the funding scale allowed the peacekeeping premium paid by the P5 to be reduced proportionately. Developed states and the P5 still pay about 96 percent of the UN's peacekeeping budget, however, even under the adjusted formula.[70]

Table 4: Old and New UN Peacekeeping Scales of Assessment

As of January 1999   *As of January 2005*

Old Groups	Payment Relative to Regular Scale	Group Criteria	Number of Members	Percentage Funded by Each Group	New Groups	Payment Relative to Regular Scale	Group Criteria (per capita income)	Number of Members	Percentage Funded by Each Group
A	121.1%	P5 [a]	5	46.89%	A	122.5%	P5	5	45.25%
B	100.0%	Developed	26	51.09%	B	100.0%	Developed	32	50.13%
					C	92.5%	N/A	5	0.82%
					D	80.0%	<$10,188	1	1.51%
					E	60.0%	<$9,169	3	0.01%
C	20.0%	Developing	60	2.01%	F	40.0%	<$8,150	2	0.29%
					G	30.0%	<$7,131	4	0.34%
					H	30.0%	<$6,112	9	0.28%
					I	20.0%	<$5,094	81	1.38%
D	10.0%	Least developed	97	0.02%	J	10.0%	Least developed	49	0.01%

[a] P5 are China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States.

Sources: United Nations, *Financing of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group,* A/RES/43/232, March 3, 1989. United Nations, *Scale of Assessments for Apportioning the Expenses of the United Nations,* A/RES/52/215, January 20, 1998. United Nations, *Implementation of General Assembly Resolutions 55/235 and 55/236, Report of the Secretary-General,* A/58/157/Add.1, December 17, 2003.

The mandates and rules of engagement of UN operations have changed since the 1990s. More than three quarters of troops deployed in UN-led operations in 2005 functioned under Chapter VII mandates, generally with authority to "use all necessary means" to do their jobs. The change indicates that the Secretariat and the Security Council alike recognize that, while the United Nations does not

lead combat operations per se, the environments in which contemporary PSOs function entail a high risk of violence and that troop contributors and other participants in such operations must come prepared to deal with it.

Expanding and Reforming UN Peacekeeping Support

In early 2000, the UN faced yet another crisis of confidence in its ability to manage complex PSOs, driven in part by the rapid ramp-up of operations in the second half of 1999 and in part by the release, in late 1999, of UN reports on the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the 1995 Srebrenica massacre that were very critical of the organization's role in those crises. In response, S-G Annan commissioned the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, chaired by UN Undersecretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi, to assess and make recommendations on the full range of UN conflict-related activities, from conflict prevention through peacebuilding. Given limited time, however, the Panel chose to focus on peacekeeping in the context of stalemated civil wars and the invited deployment of peacekeepers to implement them. Its report, released as noted in August 2000, emphasized measures needed to create an effective international security presence. The Panel was writing as UN peacekeepers had begun once again to deploy in large numbers into sub-Saharan Africa. Condemning countries that treated UN operations like military soup kitchens—as places where ill-equipped troops could find uniforms, food, housing, and UN reimbursements—the Panel stressed states' responsibility to contribute well-equipped, well-trained, and well-disciplined troops to UN operations. The Panel also stressed the need to increase the ability of UN Headquarters—primarily but not only DPKO—to plan, recruit for, deploy and manage complex operations. It also emphasized the UN's need to have much greater ability to process analytically all of the open-source information about current and potential conflicts and crises that flowed through the organization daily but tended to settle in its quietest pools, unnoticed.[71]

In the years following the Brahimi Report, DPKO grew to the point where its 600 staff would be able to manage well many of the tasks assigned to it by the Security Council during the mission surge of June-October 1999, as would its counterpart offices in the Department of Management, which submit DPKO's budgets, recruit its Headquarters staff, and sign the procurement contracts for most of the non-military goods and services that the UN buys for the field. Even so, Headquarters support was just 4 percent of the $2.6 billion that the United Nations spent on peacekeeping in 2002-2003, with one person at Headquarters notionally supporting 50–55 people in the field. By 2006–2007, despite substantial additional growth in DPKO, that ratio of Headquarters support to field costs remained at 4 percent, due to the significant growth in field

operations over the same period.[72] As "overhead" costs go, this is low for any large organization.

The Office of Mission Support

About two-thirds of DPKO personnel work in the Office of Mission Support (OMS), which recruits civilian mission personnel and arranges for transport, other logistics, and communications support for both military and civilian elements of UN operations. Since 2003, the Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS) at the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy, have been established to support the deployment of one nominal complex operation of 10,000 persons each year.[73] Of course, since fall 2003, the Department has been asked to set up an average of two new operations per year and to expand others, and despite efforts to keep up in New York, the expansion of UN Headquarters support for PSOs has been outstripped by the growth in operations such that for 2005–2006 one person at Headquarters was supporting about 110 people in the field, even after 75 new hires approved by the General Assembly were brought aboard.[74] UN Headquarters, despite growth, is carrying as great a per capita peace operations support burden in 2005–2006 as it was carrying before the Brahimi reforms were instituted.

The Military Division and UN Troop Deployment Capacity

DPKO's Military Division, which scours the globe for military units and devises mission strategy for the military components of UN operations, consists of just 46 officers and 14 support staff, of whom less than half shoulder all of the initial military planning for each UN operation.[75]

The larger emerging economies of Africa and Asia supply most of the UN's peacekeepers at present. They can provide competently-trained foot soldiers and the basic tactical field transport for them. UN requirements that contributors also provide their own supplies, spare parts, and maintenance (so-called "wet lease" arrangements) can be difficult for many emerging economies to meet, however.[76] Specialist units (such as engineering, communications, intelligence, logistics and medical) are also less abundant in such countries' armed forces than among the armies of wealthier states. Thus the United Nations has turned increasingly to civilian contractors to support its operations, sometimes subsidized by voluntary contributions from wealthier states. In fact, DPKO has well over 100 standing systems contracts for support of its operations, not least for rapid supply of the ubiquitous four-wheel-drive vehicles that form most of its mission motor pools. DPKO also plays matchmaker between developed and developing states to find the needed funds, training, or equipment for some of its troop contributors, on a voluntary basis.[77]

The 2003–2005 mission surge is instructive for what is seems to say about the UN's ability to deploy troops. Over that period, DPKO deployed a maximum of 3,000 new troops per month, or three to four battalions. Since US and other developed states' military airlift was by and large fully-committed to support of forces in Afghanistan and Iraq during this period, the 2003–2005 surge is indicative of the maximum rates of new deployment that the UN can sustain on its own, using contract carriers. Note that over the same period the organization also continued to supply and to rotate troops, police, and civilian personnel into and out of a dozen other PSOs in addition to the ones just being set up.

At the start of the surge period, DPKO deployed just under half of a brigade-size force to Ituri, northeastern DRC, within four months of initial planning and just five weeks after receiving the mandate to do so. A mechanized battalion from Bangladesh and a mechanized company from Pakistan arrived in time to relieve a French-led European force. Another 25 percent of the UN brigade (the remaining two companies of the Pakistani battalion, plus an Indonesian engineer company) arrived the following month and the force was 90 percent complete within 90 days of mandate—the Brahimi Report benchmark for complex operations. The peak flow rate was nearly 1,600 troops per month, with an average rate of 950 over deployment distances of 3,000–4,500 miles for most of the troop contributors.[78]

As the Ituri Brigade was deploying, DPKO began planning for its large operation in Liberia, which had lapsed into a terminal political-military crisis in the summer of 2003. With approval to start planning given by Security Council Resolution 1497 (August 1, 2003) and with $48 million in advance spending authority, DPKO got a head start on the mandate, which passed the Council on September 19th. As part of that mandate, the UN operation in Liberia (UNMIL) would "re-hat" 3,500 regional peacekeepers who were sent to Liberia in August by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Although supported in part by a private company (Pacific Architects and Engineers) paid by the United States, the ECOWAS forces needed substantial additional support to be brought closer to UN operational standards (the UN procured 92 trucks for the rehatted battalions, for example).[79] DPKO also set out to find another 11,500 troops beyond those transferred from ECOWAS. The need for them was critical as Liberia lacked reliable security forces and ECOWAS troops patrolled just the capital, Monrovia.

By the end of October 2003, its first month in operation, UNMIL had one additional battalion, from Bangladesh, in the field. By then, at the 90-day mark post-mandate, the operation had 55 percent of its authorized force, including 40 percent of its add-on forces. Another 5,550 troops arrived by the end of March,

raising the force to 91 percent of authorized troops. About 88 percent of the add-on forces had arrived by six months post-mandate. Troops arrived at maximum rate of 2,900 per month and an average rate of 1,600.

In April, May, and June 2004, DPKO turned its efforts toward other operations. In April, it assumed responsibility for peacekeeping in Liberia's neighbor, Côte d'Ivoire and, in June, in Burundi and Haiti. All summer, it continued to build up these operations and found the last troops that it needed for Liberia, deploying on average nearly 2,400 new troops per month in July, August, and September. In October, the Council agreed to add 5,900 troops and police to MONUC and the cycle shifted back to the DRC: about 700 new troops arrived in November, 1,100 in December, 1,300 in January, and 2,500 in March. In December 2004, DPKO pleaded with the Council and member states not to send any more business its way.[80]

Sources of 21st Century UN Forces

The national composition of UN forces was quite different in the new millennium from what it had been previously. Until the late-1990s, developed states (defined here as the members of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development)[81] were reliable participants in UN peace operations. The world's smaller developed states had always formed the backbone of traditional UN peacekeeping operations and, initially, they contributed a substantial fraction of the troops in complex PSOs as well. The high water mark for those states' troop contributions to UN-led PSOs was 1993 for operations outside Europe and 1995 for Europe itself when, on average, developed states provided 41 percent of the troops and police in the largest UN operations. Experiences in Bosnia and Somalia convinced many of them to reduce their material contributions to UN operations, an oft-heard reason being deficiencies in UN command and control.[82]

The growing requirements of UN PSOs were therefore met by armies from the world's emerging economies. **Table 5** lists the top fifteen contributors of troops, military observers, and police to UN PSOs at the end of 2005. These states accounted for three quarters of the total number. About two-thirds of the developed state personnel remaining in UN operations are police. Exceptions include a joint Irish-Swedish mechanized battalion in Liberia with about 660 troops and a French unit of about 200 troops with the United Nations in Côte d'Ivoire. Together, however, these were just 2 percent of the armed UN peacekeepers in sub-Saharan Africa at the end of 2005.

Table 5: Top Contributors of Uniformed Personnel to UN PSOs, End of 2005

Bangladesh	9,529	Ethiopia	3,410	Senegal	1,845
Pakistan	8,999	Ghana	2,520	Morocco	1,706
India	7,284	Uruguay	2,428	Kenya	1,482
Jordan	3,703	Nigeria	2,412	Brazil	1,270
Nepal	3,466	South Africa	2,010	China	1,059
		Top Fifteen Contributors:	53,123		
		All Contributors:	69,838		

Source: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

Among the UN's present principal troop contributors, India and Pakistan bring considerable technical capacity to the field as a byproduct of their long-standing preparations to deter and/or do battle with each other. Most developing states willing to contribute forces to UN operations lack that primary stimulus, however, and require assistance in both equipment and training. These issues can be addressed to some extent by programs like the Global Peace Operations Initiative (see discussion under African Union) but equipment and tactical training are easier to provide than are the leadership skills and experience required to deal constructively with dangerous urban centers or militia-ridden rural districts. The urgent need to support such skills has sometimes collided with Washington politics as US aid and training programs have been linked to states signing "Article 98 waivers" regarding the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over American citizens.[83]

In a somewhat related vein, is the United Nations now promoting democracy and human rights with troops from countries with poor rights records themselves? In the mid-1990s, 46 percent of UN troops came from "free countries," according to Freedom House surveys of political rights and civil liberties. Of these troops, nine out of ten came from developed states. In 2005, 39 percent of UN troops still came from free countries but nearly nine out of ten of these troops came from *developing* countries. This is a testament both to the advance, over time, of political liberty in the developing world and to these states' willingness to contribute materially to the peace and freedom of others. About as many UN troops came from countries such as Bangladesh, Jordan, Ethiopia, and Nigeria that Freedom House judges to support only partial political rights and civil liberties (see **table 6**).[84]

**Table 6: UN Troop/Police Contributions Grouped by Freedom House
Country Ratings for Political Rights and Civil Liberties, mid-1990s and 2005**

	Mid-1990s*		December 2005	
Total Personnel from:				
"Free" countries	29,941	46%	27,014	39%
"Partly Free" countries	29,748	45%	26,807	38%
"Not Free" countries	5,732	9%	16,017	23%
TOTAL	65,421		69,838	
UN Troop Contributor Ratings:				
"Free"	41	52%	54	50%
"Partly Free"	27	34%	38	35%
"Not Free"	11	14%	16	15%
TOTAL	79		108	
DAC Country Contributions:				
Total DAC country personnel and as percent of total	26,912	41%	3,963	6%
DAC personnel as percent of "Free"		90%		15%

*Includes uniformed personnel totals for UN operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (March 1995), Somalia (November 1993), and Cambodia (Spring 1993). All but Cambodia include civilian police personnel.

Sources: Freedom House, *Freedom in the World, 2006* (report) and "Freedom in the World Comparative Rankings: 1973–2005," http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15. UN DPKO, troop contributor listings, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/. William J. Durch, ed. *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s* (New York: St. Martin's, 1996), tables 5.3, 6.1, and 8.1.

Although more UN troops in 2005 came from states judged "not free," two countries' altered status account for two-thirds of the increase in that category: Pakistan (9,000 troops) was down-rated by Freedom House after the 1999 Musharraf coup and Nepal (3,500 troops) after the king declared a state of emergency in February 2005. The UN's acceptance of states with poor rights records but competent troops is indicative of the trade-offs that the world body must make in filling out troop totals in difficult missions, absent the availability of more good troops from less repressive states.

The Police Division and the Availability of Police for UN Operations

The Police Division has had 21 officers and 5 support staff to recruit, test, and manage the deployment and rotation of more than 6,000 UN police. Although its headquarters-field ratio looks a little better than the Military Division's, most of the UN's police are recruited and deployed in penny-packets and the UN provides their field gear, whereas most of its military forces come in battalion-

size bundles (roughly 800 troops), most with their own equipment or equipment supplied by third countries. This is, however, the largest office that the United Nations has ever managed to maintain for the purpose of recruiting and deploying police officers in peace operations.

Historically, the availability of police for peacekeeping has been constrained. Police forces are the quintessential domestic government agency, except for those parts of police agencies that follow, say, international organized crime or the laundering of funds destined for terrorist groups. Countries tend not to recruit, train, or hold in reserve personnel destined for international police missions. Hence both the timeliness of police deployments and the competence (in terms of training, experience, and even native ability) of individuals offered by governments to the UN for police billets have historically been relatively limited. One notable exception is the International Deployment Group created in 2003 by the Australian Federal Police.[85]

Serious lags in police deployments have been chronic.[86] The police contingent for the mission in El Salvador (1992–1993) never exceeded half of its authorized 631 officers; the mission in Cambodia (1992–1993) took four months to deploy half of its police and ten months to approach full deployment—with well-known problems in the quality of its personnel. Three years later, the UN police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1996–2002) did somewhat better, fielding nearly half of its people within three months and 90 percent within six months. Although the operation in Bosnia developed significant leverage over local police toward the end of its mission, none of these operations had direct responsibility for law enforcement.

When the United Nations did receive such responsibility, time was of the essence. UN police were to be the sole public security force in Kosovo and East Timor, which were blanketed by military peacekeepers who dislike intensely, and try to avoid, law enforcement roles. Police availability and timeliness for these two executive missions were little improved over previous missions, however. UNMIK, in Kosovo, took six months to get most of its originally-mandated 2,400 police officers on the beat, at which point the component's authorized strength was increased by half, to just over 3,600, because of deteriorating public security. UNMIK took another year to fill out the larger force. In East Timor, meanwhile, the UN transitional administration (UNTAET) took nine months to build up to three quarters of authorized strength, where it reached a plateau.

UNMIK and UNTAET recruited not only individual police but paramilitary FPUs of 110–125 persons each. Trained in crowd control, VIP protection,

and/or border security functions, the members of FPUs deploy and function as units, much as military forces do. They tend to use military-pattern vehicles such as armored cars, and to have heavier armament than regular police. A number of countries maintain substantial national forces with such capabilities, among them Italy, France, Spain, Romania, India, Pakistan, and Argentina.

Deployments of FPUs have lagged about as badly as deployments of regular police until very recently. UNMIK's ten units were only halfway deployed one year into the mission (mid-2000) and were not fully deployed for another year, while UNTAET needed six to nine months to acquire its two units. The UN operation in Liberia had two of its FPUs operational after nine months, and four at the one-year mark. The new operation in Haiti, looking for six FPUs at about the same time, had three on hand after six months and all six in ten months. Allocated a seventh FPU in early 2005 and an eighth at mid-year as Haiti approached elections, the operation remained nearly 500 officers short of its goal of 1,897 (regular police and FPUs combined) at the end of August. In the DRC, MONUC's initial effort to field an FPU ran aground when the Nigerian police unit, deployed in August 2005, was withdrawn less than two months later under a cloud of sexual abuse charges.[87] MONUC was given new authority to field six FPUs in September, however, and all of these units—from India, Bangladesh, and Senegal—were deployed within 90 days of authorization, a much better than average performance. By the end of the year, 26 FPUs were authorized for UN operations, and accounted for nearly half of the police personnel deployed in UN PSOs.

The most recent efforts to improve the availability and pre-training of FPUs for international operations are Europe-based and include the creation of a European Gendarme Force (not new capacity but a new umbrella under which capacity can be organized and deployed) and the opening of a new Center of Excellence for Security Police Units in Vicenza, Italy. The latter's programs are open to participation by non-European police organizations and personnel.[88]

In addition, DPKO has campaigned for and finally won member state approval of a Standing Police Capacity (SPC) initially consisting of twenty-seven persons (a director, twenty-four officers, and two support staff) whose jobs would be to "provide coherent, effective and responsive start-up capability for the policing component of United Nations peacekeeping missions and to assist existing missions through the provision of advice and expertise." The intent of the SPC is to have initial police presence on the ground in a new mission area within seven days of Security Council authorization, thereupon to plan for, coordinate and manage the rest of the new mission's police component until the new operation is fully operational.[89] The SPC doubles the Police Division in size and

radically alters its ability to field well-trained police personnel rapidly, assuming that the creation of new missions is reasonably paced.

Civilian Mission Planning

DPKO has no dedicated planning capacity for the civilian-run political, economic, or other substantive peacebuilding elements of its missions. Neither does the Department of Political Affairs, which has been the UN's nominal "focal point" for peacebuilding but without the budget to support that role. While DPKO/OMS is good at providing logistics support, transport, and communications—the things needed to enable a mission—the department has no civilian planning office for the things a mission actually tries to accomplish.[90] This helps to explain the recommendation in the December 2004 report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change for a new Peacebuilding Commission and peacebuilding support office (PBSO) in the UN Secretariat, which would focus on such things. That recommendation was subsequently taken up and adopted at the 2005 World Summit. The PBSO, to be located within the executive office of the Secretary-General, may provide some degree of focus within the UN system but, with no operational support role and just four staff members allocated to planning UN peacebuilding efforts globally, the new office is likely to have only modest initial impact.[91]

Relative Success

The UN has enjoyed a notable degree of success in some of its recent operations, whether success is defined in terms of meeting a Security Council mandate or in terms of leaving a reasonably stable polity behind when its troops finally depart.[92] Having found that abrupt departures serve neither political nor economic stability, the United Nations has made a greater effort in the present decade to phase down its presence and to reduce or extend the draw-down if it appears that local authorities will have difficulty maintaining stability on their own. On occasion, the preferences of the secretary-general and DPKO on such matters have been over-ruled by the Security Council.

Thus East Timor (Timor-Leste) has its own government, to which authority was returned in May 2002 after less than two years of UN civil administration. The follow-on UN support mission closed its doors three years later, but sooner than UN staff would have preferred. Serious political unrest with ethnic overtones roiled the capital, Dili, in May-June 2006, validating those earlier concerns and showing how even an apparently successful transition can be fraught with risk. An Australian-led international task force deployed to provide temporary additional security.

The UN operation in Sierra Leone recovered from a near-disastrous start in 2000 with critical short-term assistance from British paratroopers and sustained British training and advice to the Sierra Leone army. Success for the UN mission also followed key changes in its military leadership, troop contingents, and operational strategy. The PSO phased out at the end of 2005, replaced by the all-civilian, multi-agency, UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone.

MONUC, in the DRC, began as a protected observer mission overseeing separation of forces in a land as large as Western Europe but has evolved into a much more complex operation directly involved in the maintenance of public security in the country's volatile northeast and eastern provinces, bordering Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. MONUC's Ituri Brigade, composed primarily of troops from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal, has been credited with taking a more forceful approach toward containing and disarming that region's violent tribal militias.[93] Members of the temporary French-led coalition force that the Ituri Brigade replaced in August-September 2003 were favorably impressed by the training and professionalism of the UN forces that were to replace them, in fairly stark contrast to hand-off experiences in other operations ten years prior.[94] A comparable brigade force established in the wake of a very weak UN response to Congolese army mutinies in the eastern DRC one year later was similarly robust in its operations by early 2005, although these focused on rogue Congolese or Rwandan expatriate militias that refused to disarm or return home, respectively.

The UN operation in Liberia (UNMIL) was credited with re-establishing stability in that country sufficient to promote free and fair national elections in late 2005. The election of former World Bank official Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf as president, and Nigeria's subsequent agreement to return Liberia's ex-president, Charles Taylor, for trial on war crimes charges, heralded for many a new and more hopeful chapter in Liberian history.

Discipline Problems and Remedies

On the other hand, UN disciplinary problems have tended to peak as demand for peace operations has peaked. At the last operational peak, in the mid-1990s, operations in Bosnia were beset by shady dealings in fuel and other commodities on the part of some troop contingents. Later, in Kosovo, where UNMIK is responsible for enforcing the law, business establishments involved with human trafficking—and hence, with organized crime—began to grow right along with the international military and civilian presence. Eventually UNMIK created a Trafficking Prevention and Investigation Unit (TPIU) that drew up an 'off limits list' for international personnel that included 200 establishments by January

2004.[95] Similar problems occurred in Bosnia, post-Dayton.[96] The users of such establishments, the traffickers, and law enforcement investigators are overwhelmingly male and tend to be well-connected locally or with the international community. The victims are overwhelmingly female, foreign to the locale, and have few, if any, local family or community ties. In the cases that Human Rights Watch and Amnesty reviewed, law enforcement tended to fall more heavily on the trafficked than the traffickers, and punishments meted out to traffickers tended to be light for the character and the quantity of the crimes.[97]

Abuse and exploitation can also arise from the proximity of troops to destitute, displaced populations. Of the world's principal international organizations, only the UN presently deploys military forces—overwhelmingly young and male—in such close and continuing proximity to large numbers of displaced persons—disproportionately women and children who live in societies where the social status and life opportunities of women are heavily unequal to begin with. Displaced persons seek out proximity to peacekeepers for greater security from local violence but, unless properly managed and monitored, proximity increases opportunities for abuse, especially where troop discipline and leadership are not what they need to be, as in the UN's sprawling Congo mission.[98] UN investigators uncovered relatively widespread instances of abuse in MONUC and in some other operations, triggering a series of remedial actions, from the appointment of personnel conduct advisors in missions to the institution of a 20-person conduct and discipline unit working directly for the Undersecretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.[99]

A March 2005 report by Jordan's permanent representative to the United Nations, Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid al Hussein, serving concurrently as the Secretary-General's special adviser on sexual exploitation and abuse, offered detailed recommendations on how to apply UN rules against exploitation and abuse more effectively, on how to deter future violations, and on how to more effectively investigate and punish violations that do occur.[100]

UN management could have done more sooner but the UN's limited ability to enforce such policy with regard to troops and police seconded from governments is a preference of member states that is unlikely to change. What should change, however, is the way in which the UN deals with accusations of criminal behavior on the part of its own personnel. Although the S-G can waive the functional immunity accorded UN personnel in the performance of their official duties, a failed or war-torn state may have no capacity to prosecute and the laws of an alleged offender's state of nationality may not cover crimes committed by its citizens on other countries' soil (unlike national military law,

which routinely reaches wherever national military forces deploy). This is a serious gap in law and enforcement.

REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

An international organization whose membership is drawn from one, geographically coherent region would seem to offer several advantages as a security provider for PSOs within that region. Its members' national interests, being directly affected by events in the region, should make those states easier to engage as peacekeepers than more remote states. The organization, to the extent that its members reach consensus on the need for military action, can confer at least regional legitimacy upon that action. Finally, to the extent that the organization plans to take such action, it may also serve as a ready forum through which members work out measures promoting the ability of their respective militaries to work together operationally, as well as joint operational planning capacity, procedures for appointing mission leadership, and structures for the operational command and control of multilateral forces.

Each of these potential advantages has a counterpart, however. As Paul Diehl notes, "Unity from homogeneity comes in response to threats to security external to the organization, such as Arab unity against Israel or African support for the decolonization of Angola. The most common threats to regional peace—internal threats—are exactly those least likely to generate consensus."[101] Indeed, the members of regional organizations vary in size, internal politics, military power, and economic clout. The greater that variation, the more the organization moves as its largest members desire that it move. The largest members may or may not have interests or policy objectives consonant with the goals of the rest of the region for any number of reasons, not least because, being largest, they don't have to. Their politics may be autocratic, their human rights records dismal, or their economies corrupt or unstable. Other states in the region may consider democracy a generally good idea but may not be willing to promote or safeguard it outside their own borders (consider the rest of Southern Africa viz a viz Zimbabwe), or states in the region may not consider democracy a good idea at all (for example, most of the former Soviet states of Central Asia). Some regional leaders and associated elites may even benefit from the black market flows of gems, gold, guns, and drugs that have fuelled many internal conflicts.[102]

To the extent that regional organizations are seen as dominated by their most powerful members, the actions that they take can be seen as serving primarily those states' interests. Thus, while ECOWAS nominally sponsored the deployment of West African forces in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s,

their operations were heavily dependent on Nigerian resources and seen as primarily responsive to Nigerian national interests, much as CIS operations are dependent on and responsive to Russia.[103]

Whether military interoperability is better amongst members of a regional organization will depend on the arms acquisition habits and patron-client histories of the organization's members and on the organization's objectives regarding political-military integration. States generally prefer to produce at home as much of their defense capacity as they can, even if the resulting unit cost is higher. Thus, for example, despite a half-century of interoperability efforts under the aegis of NATO, Europe's defense-related production has remained, with the exception of a few high-profile projects, highly state-centric.

What states cannot produce at home they will buy on the arms market from preferred suppliers, the choice of which may be as much a matter of politics as of cost-effectiveness or weapon performance. Once made, it will be hard to change except at great expense. Thus, nearly fifteen years after the end of the Cold War, many former Warsaw Pact countries that are now members of NATO still operate the Soviet-pattern weapon systems they acquired in their former lives, albeit with upgrades to Western electronics and perhaps ordnance. Reflecting a different associational history, Francophone states in western and central Africa operate mostly French equipment. Anglophone African states' inventories are, by and large, more eclectic. Both groups of states also operate former Soviet equipment, much of which Moscow provided cheaply during the Cold War's final decade.[104]

Equipment interoperability notwithstanding, there are prior issues of political willingness to engage difficult post-conflict situations with sufficient staying power to do an effective job of peace implementation. Here the record is mixed as between regional organizations and, say, the United Nations. In a comparative study of UN and regional operations, Birger Heldt concluded that regionally-led operations enjoyed no greater success rate than UN missions.[105]

Organization of American States

The Organization of American States (OAS) is configured as a regional organization recognized as such by the United Nations. In an earlier era when Latin American states were dominated by non-democratic governments, the OAS sanctioned the U.S.-led intervention in the Dominican Republic and several unarmed military observer missions in Central America. Since then it has focused more on protecting sovereignty and promoting democracy and human rights within the hemisphere. Indeed, as Paul Diehl observes, "the OAS

has played an increasingly central role in conflict management efforts in the Western Hemisphere" but "more involved with diplomatic [efforts] at conflict management than with more coercive mechanisms."[106] Civilian OAS peacebuilding missions in the 1990s in El Salvador and Haiti were well-received and could be repeated but the organization has no procedures for planning or fielding armed regional PSOs, either in the hemisphere or outside it.[107] Central and South American OAS members have instead tended to participate mostly in UN peacekeeping operations, although some have contributed forces to the U.S.-led Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai, and to some U.S.-led coalitions. The Military Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru (1995–99)—the first international military observer mission in South America since World War Two—was not an OAS operation.[108]

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum

Not a military alliance but a venue for periodic discussion of regional security issues, the ASEAN Regional Forum is chaired on a rotating basis by one of the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. With that forum, however, eastern Asia is doing better than South Asia, where comparable disparities of power and deeper international antagonisms have hobbled regional political-military cooperation. Indeed, both India and Pakistan are members of the ASEAN Regional Forum, as are Japan, China, Russia, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Canada, and the European Union.

For peace operations within the region, one preferred option has been UN-led missions to which regional states contribute forces and senior leadership (as in Cambodia (1992–93) and Timor). Regional powers can thereby exercise influence within such operations but in a context where political direction has been kicked up one level to where major regional powers' preferences are balanced by those of other powers outside the immediate region. Another option, used for the Pacific Islands more than the mainland or Indonesia, has involved regional coalitions growing out of peace talks (a sequence of observer groups for Bougainville, part of Papua New Guinea) or a governmental request for help (leading, for example, to the Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands, led by Australia and ultimately welcomed by resolution of the UN General Assembly).[109] Finally, with respect to East Timor, the UN secretary-general requested, and the Security Council authorized, a regional force led by Australia to restore order in East Timor until the UN itself could mount an operation to manage the territory's passage to independence after an

historic plebiscite and equally unprecedented violence orchestrated by the departing Indonesian military.[110]

European Union

Western Europe started its long trek toward greater economic and political integration more than fifty years ago, when World War Two was a fresh memory and Europe's economies were barely on the road to recovery from it. The European Community slowly coalesced economically through four decades of Cold War and, when the East-West confrontation ended, deepened and broadened its integrative objectives to become the European Union (EU). Until 1997, however, when the EU added security and foreign policy issues to its portfolio, the only European entity intended to facilitate regional military operations, including peacekeeping, was the Western European Union (WEU). Founded in 1954 to offer West Germany and Italy their first formal path toward security cooperation with the Western Allies of World War Two, the WEU enjoyed a ten-year revival from the mid-1980s, managing mostly maritime operations, before being effectively subsumed under the EU.[111]

The 1992 Maastricht Treaty, aiming at the eventual monetary and political unity of EU member states, launched the Common Foreign and Security Policy and its labored set of interlocking institutions and authorities. The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam "envisaged the use of military resources" by the WEU on behalf of the European Union.[112] The political structures of the WEU have since adjourned *sine die.* Two of its affiliate institutions transferred directly to the European Union, however: The EU Institute for Security Studies tracks, analyzes, and critiques the implementation of defense-related projects and policies, producing thoughtful and authoritative research work. The EU Satellite Center receives downloads from *Helios* medium-resolution surveillance satellites and uses imagery analysis to support EU operations, among other missions.[113]

Crises in the Balkans, from the wars of ethnic cleansing in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (1991–95) to the mass expulsions of ethnic Albanians and others from Kosovo in 1999, helped propel greater European military integration and military capacity.[114] As Alyson Bailes has observed,

> The Kosovo crisis crystallized the frustration of the EU's largest military spenders, France and the United Kingdom, with Europe's poor capabilities performance overall: but it also created European-US tension over questions of *method* and *control* in Western crisis management, leading even the UK to express the view that Europe

must have at least the option of operating under its own flag in the future.[115]

The EU's quest for a military identity distinct from NATO caused disquiet in Washington, which had long enjoyed a substantial degree of control over European allies' military policies and actions via NATO and its sundry policy committees. Launched in 1999, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) promised to dilute that control.

At a December 1999 meeting in Helsinki, the European Council set a "Headline Goal" for troops and police to be made available for peace operations and other crisis management tasks. Some 60,000 troops were to form a European Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) for deployment on 60 days notice and were to be sustainable in the field for a year.[116] According to a number of analysts, a 60,000-strong RRF would require the participation of every combat soldier in Europe, where there are an estimated 75,000 to 175,000 deployable combat troops to be found among 1.4–1.9 million personnel in uniform. Non-deployable conscripts are still a substantial proportion of some European armies (Germany and Poland, for example).[117] For all practical purposes, however, the RRF may have been superseded by a French, German, and British proposal that was approved by EU defense ministers in April 2004 to form smaller "battlegroups" of 1,500 troops each, with integrated support elements. These are to be ready for deployment within 15 days and sustainable for 30 days (extendable up to 120 days with troop rotations). In November 2004, the Brussels Military Capability Commitment Conference raised the total number of battlegroups to thirteen, to be operational by 2007. Three states (France, Italy, and the UK) pledged to field their own battlegroups in 2005, Spain would provide a fourth national battlegroup, and nine others would be multinational in nature.[118] When completed, the battlegroups program could allow the EU to field up to 20,000 troops quickly for several months, once air and sea lift are available, or 6-7000 troops on a longer-term basis, with periodic troop rotation, assuming sustainability measures and supply lines are in place.

Washington (and London) resisted the proposed creation of an EU military planning staff wholly separate from NATO's, so there is instead an EU planning cell within the NATO military structure. The EU also has a 125-officer Military Staff within the Council Secretariat that generates strategic concepts and military options for carrying them out, provides military advice when new operations are contemplated, and writes the initial military directives for EU force commanders.[119] More detailed operational and logistical planning support are, however, expected to come from NATO. The Alliance has agreed to make military planning and other assets available to the EU on an as-needed basis for

EU operations, under the "Berlin-plus" arrangement.[120] The EU has no comparable access to established planning and deployment support resources for the civilian elements of its operations, however, nor are logistics stocks set aside for rapid supply of new operations.

European defense budgets remain rather anemic and analysts argue that they need to rise to around two percent of European GDP if the continent is to have anything like a robust capability to project power into anything approaching a hostile environment (such as suppressing genocide 2-3,000 kilometers beyond Europe's borders). The European Defense Agency was established in July 2004 and helps coordinate EU member states' defense transformation to meet ESDP capabilities targets. It has fewer than 80 staff and a budget of roughly €25 million.[121] Although much emphasis is placed on "rationalizing" (divvying up) defense responsibilities and perhaps redirecting smaller members' militaries to "niche" capabilities, few countries would willingly forego all but one or two of the many basic elements of military power as to do so would be to place their trust and sovereignty in some other entity's hands. But that is what the evolving Europe is all about, and the question for the long term is whether the big players in the EU will go along with the required subordination to the whole and the eventual submergence of national power and identity that this implies. Popular concerns about loss of national identity and/or control over regional events— evident in the negative votes on the EU Constitution in France and the Netherlands—suggest that concerns about such submergence are real and capable of generating a popular backlash against further expansion and deepening of European-level political authority.

Even if it had the people lined up, trained, and equipped tomorrow, the EU would not be able to transport them any distance quickly, because European powers presently have very little heavy military airlift capacity. The UK has leased several American C-17 heavy lifters and eight NATO/EU member states have committed to take delivery of a total of 200 Airbus A400M medium airlifters beginning in 2009.[122] Each A400M will have double the lift capability of a C-130 Hercules, the mainstay military cargo aircraft in European NATO and EU inventory today. With a maximum cargo capacity of 37 metric tonnes, the new aircraft will not be able to carry a main battle tank but it will be able to transport a pair of wheeled, light armored vehicles or up to 116 paratroopers. It is designed to be capable of quick (2-3 hour) reconfiguration as a probe-and-drogue tanker for air refueling operations vital to forward-based fighter-bomber operations.[123]

Meanwhile, the EU has been learning peace operations by doing, beginning with relatively stable venues: in FYROM (Macedonia), the EU replaced a NATO

mission with a small (300-strong), lightly-armed monitoring force, then a 200-strong police observer-mentor mission; in Bosnia, the EU took over international police tasks from the United Nations and then replaced NATO's Stabilization Force with a slightly smaller, 7,000-strong peacekeeping presence. Both of these locales retain just enough uncertainty and tension to be good learning environments. Both may also be contrasted with Ituri, in DRC, where the EU-flagged, French-led Operation Artemis deployed over the summer of 2003. France and its coalition partners, not the EU, made Artemis work; even NATO was consulted only minimally in advance.[124]

Given the heavily bureaucratic, heavily political and consensus-based multilateral decision making in which it is enmeshed, the EU can be expected to move cautiously into more complex and/or hostile peace operations environments in the future. The possible exception may be more Artemis-like, short-term, battlegroup-level excursions. These may be EU-authorized but would likely function as de facto coalitions of the willing. Indeed, the second battlegroup-level operation was approved by the EU Council in March 2006, a 1,250-strong force to supplement security for the June 2006 national elections in the DRC. One third of the force was to deploy in Kinshasa and two thirds were to serve as a quick reaction force on standby outside the DRC. Germany assumed overall command, France operational command, and the two each pledged 500 troops to the four-month operation. Ten other EU members pledged smaller units.[125] The issue of follow-on forces did not arise since the EU force deployed for a specific event and the need for such backup was expected to dissipate thereafter. In recent experience in war-recovering and other semi-functional states, however, elections and their results have been known to generate extreme violence, and plans for withdrawing such guard forces should be flexible enough to address that violence, if necessary.

Along with military capacity, the EU planned to develop a roster of 5,000 civilian police to be available for peace operations duties, of whom 1,000 were to be deployable on 30 days notice. By mid-2004, it appeared to have developed the requisite roster and more than 1,000 rapidly-deployable police (including some in FPUs). A companion "rule of law" roster (for judges, prosecutors, and corrections officers) also had been filled out, a small rule of law support mission had been sent to Georgia, and member states had committed over 240 civil administrators to a pool of personnel available to deploy to a mission area on short notice. These ready capabilities had not been integrated, however, and planning and administrative capacities in some areas remained rather weak (the Police Unit responsible for the roster and rapid deployment capacity, for example, had just ten staff).[126]

Authority and responsibility for civilian crisis management are, moreover, divided between the European Council (the highest decision-making body of EU member states) and the European Commission (the 25 individuals who, as Commissioners, represent the 'Community' as a whole). The Commission has certain responsibilities under the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy and disburses most of the budget. The Council, however, has primary responsibility for policies and activities under the ESDP and all 25 members must agree to the launch of an ESDP-related operation (so-called "active unanimity"), unless some choose to recuse their countries from the decision and from participation in the operation. The Council Secretariat has a limited share of the Community budget to apply to its crisis management activities. Of a meager €60–65 million for 2005, all but €4 million were committed by the second quarter of the year.[127]

EU mission operations costs are borne primarily by contributing countries, who continue to pay the salaries of the personnel whom they send to EU operations or second to EU billets, much as UN member states do for police officers seconded to UN operations. In March 2004, however, the EU launched a mechanism called "Athena" for handling mission common costs. Athena is managed by a Special Committee of mission-participating states that must unanimously approve operations' common cost budgets. "Participating and contributing states" pay into a common costs fund "in accordance with a GNP scale."[128] Common costs under Athena include:

- incremental costs for deployable or fixed headquarters for EU-led operations;
- all transport costs to and from theaters of operation and some within theater;
- administrative costs, including communications, locally hired personnel, maintenance costs, public information, representation and hospitality;
- accommodation and infrastructure costs;
- incremental costs incurred to support the forces as a whole;
- incremental costs associated with the use of NATO common assets and capabilities.[129]

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

The original Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) produced the 1975 Helsinki Final Act on military confidence building measures, human rights, and cultural communications. The Act is best known for its injection of human rights considerations into the East-West dialog and for

helping to inspire such anti-totalitarian movements as Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia and Solidarity in Poland, as well as for stimulating greater East-West exchange at the levels of culture and entertainment, which, along with poor eastern bloc economic performance, helped to weaken the grip of Communist regimes. CSCE also negotiated military confidence-building measures designed to reduce the risk of surprise attack by requiring, for example, advance notice of military exercises. In 1986, CSCE members agreed to verify such measures by on-site inspections—a first for the Soviet Union.

Institutionalized after the Cold War as the *Organization* for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), it has the largest membership of any Europe-focused security organization (55 states). Because the EU and NATO are unlikely ever to encompass all of the OSCE's members, it will likely continue to have a niche role in European security and that role—providing expert technical advice to governments—may have as much value outside peace operations as within.

OSCE prides itself on being a bureaucratically "light" organization. As of 2004, its headquarters and 'institution' staff totaled 465, distributed amongst the Secretariat and the offices of the Representative on Freedom of the Media, both located in Vienna; the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, in Warsaw; and the High Commissioner for National Minorities in the Hague. Secretariat appointments are time-limited, a system that is designed to bring in "new blood" but that may also limit the growth and depth of institutional memory. A further 750 international staff and 2,400 national staff work for OSCE field missions and offices. Most of the international field staff are provided by governments on relatively short-term (2–3 year) secondments.
OSCE member states share the costs of its annual Unified Budget according to a multi-tiered scale of contributions. The six OSCE members of the "Group of Eight" industrial economies—France, Britain, Germany, Italy, the United States, and Russia—each contribute 9.0 or 9.1 percent of the budget for the organization's central institutions. Except for Russia, they fund larger shares of OSCE field operations. Russia's dues for operation are less than half of its headquarters budget share, a significant break since field operations accounted for 73 percent of the OSCE's total 2005 budget of €169 million. Wrangling over budget priorities in 2005 delayed passage of the budget by the OSCE Permanent Council for five months.

OSCE has become increasingly field-and-service-oriented over time. Since it has yet to sponsor armed peacekeeping operations (a would-be OSCE operation for Nagorno-Karabakh has never gotten off the ground), its principal contributions to human security have been in the areas of human rights promotion and conflict

prevention; conduct and observation of elections and democratic institution-building; and security sector reform, including police training and advising. In late 1995, OSCE was given responsibility—although not full authority—under the Dayton Accord for the conduct of elections in Bosnia. It has since evolved considerable capacity for electoral advice and supervision within its large membership region. In Kosovo, OSCE created a well-regarded Police Academy for training a new, multi-ethnic and gender-balanced Kosovo Police Service, and has managed the "pillar" of UNMIK charged with democratic institution building. In Georgia and Central Asia, OSCE police advisory missions were invited to introduce modern police practices and sensibilities—community policing and respect for human rights—and have done so on shoestring budgets.

The OSCE has a civilian rapid-response system called REACT (Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams). REACT is not a roster, however, but a system for issuing "vacancy notices to which its 55 participating states are obliged to respond rapidly—possibly within a matter of days." It typically receives between four and thirty nominations per vacancy. Six recruitment officers in its Secretariat screen nominations for qualifications, "experts" rate those who pass the initial screen, and the head of mission makes the final selections in cooperation with the Secretariat. In her recent report for DPKO Best Practices, Catriona Gourlay noted that, overall, 60 percent of those nominated by states in 2004 "met the requirements of the vacancy notice" but that the rate dropped to 30 percent for police positions, reflecting the limited supply of qualified police but also "the importance of fully briefing participating states on changing needs and requirements."[130] Since the EU has been developing rapid response capabilities for police and other rule of law personnel, it is not clear where REACT's future value-added lies in this particular area, except that it can draw from double the number of states.

Given OSCE's broad-based legitimacy, from the shores of the Atlantic to the western borders of China, it would seem more valuable for the organization to concentrate on capacities that complement those of the European Union and that focus on the long haul, that is, technical advice on transparent governance, assistance to and observation of elections, and advice and training to promote more effective and professional police and judicial personnel, not after states have collapsed into war, but before. Such advice and training cannot by themselves forestall the collapse of a corrupt or malignant government but together with other international aid and pressure working in coordinated fashion, they can be a force for positive change.

African Union

Until 2002, Africa had no continental organization interested in or capable of threatening forceful action to induce governments to treat their peoples right. The capabilities are still fairly weak but the interest seems to be growing and has been embodied in the African Union (AU). It succeeded the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which was set up in 1963 to promote the principles of sovereign equality and the inviolability of Africa's post-colonial national borders. These two principles were critical at the time to the survival of governments that otherwise possessed few of the trappings of sovereignty, were largely unable to protect their borders against military threats, and could not assume that they enjoyed the political loyalty of citizens whose main kinship groups may have been split by those same arbitrary colonial-era borders. The OAU, therefore, was not at all focused on the quality of governance within African states, let alone on capacity for collective military intervention. With the advent of the AU that has changed, at least on paper.

A United States of Africa, proposed in 1999 by Moammar Qaddafi, revived old notions of Pan-African unity. Over several years, the concept evolved into the African Union, which was formally established at the Durban Summit in July 2002. The AU Charter gives the Union the right to intervene in the internal affairs of member states under "grave circumstances," and includes a provision to "suspend governments coming to power unconstitutionally." The "supreme organ" is the Assembly of the Union, comprising Heads of State and Government. The Executive Council meets at the level of foreign ministers and has a Permanent Representatives Committee for day-to-day work. Like the EU, it has a Commission whose members are supposed to "defend the Union and defend its interests." Commissioners were first elected to 4-year terms at the Maputo Summit in July 2003. Finally, and key for our purposes here, the AU has a Peace and Security Council (PSC) whose tasks are conflict prevention, peace restoration, disaster management, and humanitarian affairs. The PSC's enabling protocol entered into force in late December 2003. When it contemplates authorizing military intervention, the PSC "may consult a Panel of the Wise," a five-person panel of distinguished Africans, and a Military Staff Committee. Eventually it will be able to call upon an African Standby Force (ASF).[131]

The functions and structure of the ASF were laid out in a two-part report by African Chiefs of Defense in May 2003.[132] The report called for standby brigades of roughly 5,000 persons—each with some civilian as well as military components—to be formed in each of the continent's five principal regions. The ASF was to be capable of meeting the requirements of six, successively

more challenging, missions: giving military advice to a political mission (such as conflict mediators or negotiators); deploying military observers alongside a UN mission; deploying a stand-alone military observer mission; undertaking traditional-type peacekeeping operations such as monitoring a cease-fire; providing peacekeepers in support of a complex PSO with some risk of low-level spoiler activity; and forceful intervention (for example, to prevent or halt genocide). Phase one of the ASF—comprising the ability to fulfill tasks one or two—was to be complete in 2005 and phase two—managing independent observer missions and undertaking complex operations with contributions from the regional standby brigades—by 2010. The sub-regional organizations were to function as the continent's military first responders, while the AU appoints mission heads and force commanders and handles liaison with the United Nations.[133]

So far, the AU has no common operating doctrine or training guidelines for sub-regional institutions to follow in developing their standby brigades, and has few staff to create them. Only ECOWAS has field experience with regional peace operations and is taking steps to build a region-level military staff. The first effort to deploy an AU peacekeeping force, in Burundi in 2003, is perhaps more appropriately thought of as an AU-authorized coalition of the willing. The force rapidly ran short of resources despite financial and training support from Washington and London and, within a year, was transferred to UN command. To be fair, the ASF timeline did not contemplate undertaking such a large, complex and costly operation until 2010 or later, but events have had a way of pressing against that timeline.

This was certainly true of the Darfur region of Sudan, where discriminatory Sudanese government policies ignited a rebellion in February 2003.   The government used the rebellion as excuse and cover for a proxy war of ethnic cleansing and genocide, using air force raids followed up by Arab militia cavalry who were used to terrorize black African farmer/villagers with a campaign of murder, rape, pillage, and arson. The toll from that campaign had reached an estimated 180,000 dead and 2.45 million displaced by late spring 2005, according to the United Nations.[134]

The AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) deployed in 2004 to monitor a putative cease-fire agreement between the government-backed raiders and the rebel groups. That deployment grew to 450 military observers, 1,960 security troops, and 244 civilian police by May 2005, and to 700 military observers, 4,879 troops, and 1,211 civilian police by the end of the year.[135]   Having at first rejected non-African technical advice at AU headquarters, AU leaders eventually were convinced of the need for outside help by the growing

complexity of the support tasks involved in Darfur. Indeed, in December 2005, a joint AU, UN, EU, and US assessment team visited Darfur "to study whether the United Nations should take over" operations in Darfur. The AU summit meeting in Nairobi in March 2006 voted to extend AMIS through September, but the UN Security Council voted later that month to ask the Secretary-General to expedite plans for UN operations in Darfur.[136]

Essentially all of the logistical support for the deployment of AMIS came from third party sources, especially US State Department support contracts with Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE), a firm that had prior experience supporting ECOWAS and UN operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and DRC. PAE provided the staff for a Civilian Protection Monitoring Team and built a series of eight forward operating camps for AMIS. The EU contributed $100 million of AMIS' $220 million 2005 operating budget, while the United States contributed $45 million. Canada and the Netherlands contracted for transport helicopters, Canada provided 105 armored personnel carriers, and the UK supplied 650 other vehicles. The operation, with 7,800 personnel by late 2005, was estimated to cost $17 million per month or about $204 million per year.[137]

Almost none of the financial support for the operation and little of the equipment was coming from AU members themselves, who were behind on their basic dues for the AU itself. The ASF plan was estimated to cost $600 million to implement initially, with one-third coming from the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), one-third from AU member states, and one-third from outside donors. The AU regular budget is also growing rapidly. In December 2004, its Executive Council voted a $158 million budget for 2005, nearly four times the size of the 2004 budget. Of that amount, AU members were expected to pay $63 million to cover AU administrative costs, a goal whose actual attainment was in doubt given that AU members had contributed just $26 million toward the 2004 budget by December 2004. The other $95 million in the 2005 budget was expected to come from "discretionary payments by member states and from Western partners."[138] Since those Western partners were spending an increasing amount of money on the Darfur deployments, it was not clear whether the anticipated outside budgetary support would be forthcoming.

Apart from support for specific missions such as AMIS, the Group of Eight (G-8) major industrial democracies has endorsed significant aspects of the U.S.-proposed Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a five-year program of training and financial support for regional peace operations capacity, particularly in Africa, that would serve as an umbrella concept for G-8 members' bilateral assistance programs in this area. As proposed by the US administration in 2004,

GPOI would train 75,000 troops over five years, support the establishment of the Vicenza "special" police unit (SPU) training center, and "foster an international deployment and logistics support system to transport peacekeepers to the field and maintain them there." The US Congress appropriated a bit more than $100 million for fiscal year 2005 and the Bush administration asked for another $114 million for 2006. [139]

Economic Community of West African States

Africa has more than continental organizations. Some of its Regional Economic Communities have taken on security-related responsibilities.[140] Of these, the most action-oriented has been the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). With large but relatively unstable Nigeria as its principal engine and a mix of Anglophone and Francophone members, ECOWAS' record of response to sub-regional conflict has been mixed.

Founded in 1975 as an institution to promote West African economic integration and headquartered in Abuja, Nigeria, ECOWAS has taken on a growing regional security role since the outbreak of civil war in Liberia in 1989. The organization deployed a Nigerian-dominated ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to Liberia in 1990 that soon became embroiled in the ongoing war. Military units were left in place for years and became rooted in Liberia. As Ero and Temin observe, "While ECOMOG intervention in Liberia was an innovative enterprise by what was essentially an economic and political organization, it actually served to perpetuate the war as participating states—most notably Nigeria— undermined the Liberian peace process while pursuing their own economic and political interests."[141]

ECOWAS deployments in neighboring Sierra Leone were similarly troubled. Military training provided by US Special Forces units to five Nigerian battalions and one each from Senegal and Ghana under the rubric of Operation Focus Relief (OFR) starting in October 2000 improved field operations considerably.

> Battalion-level training occurred over a ten-week period, beginning with small-unit tactics and culminating in a battalion-level capstone exercise. As part of the OFR initiative, the United States included a common equipment package that enabled the battalions to "shoot, move, and communicate." Specifically, the West African battalions received a US light infantry battalion's equivalent of individual and crew-served weapons, mortars, trucks, and radios. From start to finish, Operation Focus Relief lasted 16 months, trained and equipped seven battalions, and cost approximately $87.3 million. [142]

Nigerian battalions trained under this program, using the equipment supplied by the program, deployed to support the UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 2001 and 2002, demonstrating much greater professionalism than had their predecessors in ECOMOG.[143]

The ECOWAS Treaty was revised to include peace and security objectives three years after ECOMOG deployed. Nearly a decade elapsed, however, between initial ECOMOG deployments and the adoption by ECOWAS of an organizational framework for peace operations. That 1999 framework established grounds for military intervention that included humanitarian disasters, regional threats to peace and security, or disorders stemming from threats to a democratically-elected government. A few more years passed before the organization developed any internal planning or management capacity for such operations. Until then, lead nations such as Nigeria provided most of the thought behind the military muscle—which they also provided.

ECOWAS has set up a Mediation and Security Council (the regional counterpart to the AU Peace and Security Council), which is supported by a Defense and Security Commission that backstops peacekeeping operations; by a Council of Elders who function as mediators and negotiators; and by an Executive Secretariat. The Secretariat includes a Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Defense, and Security (DES-PADS), who oversees departments for political affairs, humanitarian affairs, defense and security, and observation and monitoring. In 2000, this bureaucracy existed only on paper, with the exception of the DES himself. By 2004, each department had just one or two people in it, except for defense and security, which had several seconded Nigerian military officers.[144]

The lack of human resources to fill these kinds of planning and operational backstopping posts may be ECOWAS' and Africa's most critical shortcoming, even more than money, because the needed skills cannot be bought or developed overnight.[145] Some analysts, emphasizing that African talent must be what drives these new regional and continental initiatives over the medium to long term, nonetheless argue that if the program is to be effectively jumpstarted, some short-term recourse to seconded foreign talent may be the only way to do it.[146] ECOWAS recognized, much earlier than the AU, that such temporary outside assistance was needed.

ECOMOG is now the Mediation and Security Council's operational arm. A June 2004 plan called for the formation of a task force of 1,500 troops for rapid (30-day) deployment, for a reinforcing brigade of 3,500 troops deployable in 90 days, and for a reserve force of 1,500. Like the AU, ECOWAS had trouble

getting financial support from its member states for these structures. A *Peace Fund* remained largely unfunded in 2005.[147]

ECOMOG deployments in the 1990s were supported logistically by U.S.-paid contractors such as PAE. That was also true of later deployments in Liberia (July–September 2003) and Côte d'Ivoire (2003–04). In both instances, however, the West African forces were either replaced by or absorbed into a follow-on UN peace operation, making the United Nations, in effect, ECOWAS' exit strategy. This seeming assurance of UN rescue or replacement may give the regional organization little incentive to build much more than forces capable of holding the line in a crisis for a month or two. If, however, more robust ECOWAS forces become operational, the same tendency to look toward the UN as the operational sustainer and conflict closer could prove dangerous if it encouraged ECOWAS military actions whose longer-term costs and consequences were left to the global body to sort out. This has happened more than once with coalitions of the willing, for example, in Somalia (1993) and twice in Haiti (1995 and 2004).

ALLIANCES

America's military alliances were created over a half-century ago for the purpose of containing Stalin's Soviet Union, Mao's China, and the communist philosophies of governance that they championed. Three bilateral defense pacts—with the Philippines, South Korea, and Japan—remain in force and one three-way alliance—with Australia and New Zealand (the ANZUS treaty)—has been a de facto bilateral pact since the United States suspended its obligations viz à viz New Zealand over nuclear issues in 1986.[148] Two major multilateral treaties—the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (or Rio Treaty, 1948) and the North Atlantic Treaty (1949)—generated formal international organizations. We look briefly at each of these before focusing on the major player among them in peace support operations, namely, NATO.

Asia-Pacific Bilateral Pacts

America's alliance structure in the Pacific reflects both continuing US security interests and regional states' reluctance to link up in a formal multilateral security organization. That reluctance has deep roots in the region's history and patterns of political dominance, especially those deriving from imperial ambitions. Indeed, the United States signed most of its Asian defense pacts less than a decade after defeating the Japanese empire and relinquishing its own Philippine colony, during or shortly following its bloody engagement with the Chinese Red Army in Korea, and during the Vietnam War. Created, like NATO, for higher strategic purpose, these defense pacts are still propelled in

most cases by variants of their original purposes: North Korea remains a Communist gulag. China is a rising if ideologically ambiguous rival. The Philippines remain threatened internally by armed groups with external links, albeit Muslim rather than Maoist, The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is still seen as a governor on Japanese military behavior and the ANZUS pact gives Australia a direct military tie to the United States, which it has reinforced over time with military support to US engagements in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The United States has repaid that support with, for example, substantial logistical help for Australia's 1999 deployments to East Timor.

Other allies have similarly demonstrated operational support for Washington's policies. South Korea sent a large number of combat troops to South Vietnam in the 1960s, and 600 engineering and medical troops to Iraq in May 2003, followed by a brigade of combat troops 15 months later. Japan sent naval forces to support Operation Enduring Freedom and a battalion of engineering troops to Iraq. These latter were protected first by Dutch and then by Australian troops, preserving the government's assertion that, since service in Iraq did not require Japanese combat forces, it could be construed as politically and constitutionally permissible peace support.[149] Japan and Australia have also contributed forces to UN operations—Japan to Cambodia and East Timor, Australia to Somalia and East Timor.

Together, these bilateral treaty relations, the coalition partnerships that draw upon those relations, and UN operations that play to global images and interests, give the states of eastern Asia the means to both promote stability within their region and to reach out beyond it in operational terms. They can do so without having to face many of the deeper differences, including territorial issues, that divide them or the huge regional size and power disparities that also make a formal political-military organization for eastern Asia difficult to contemplate.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, America's partners in the North Atlantic Alliance looked for a mission of sufficient heft and institutional warrant to replace the Cold War threat. What they found was a combination of rapid response, counter-terrorism, capacity building, and PSOs. Since 1999, NATO has undertaken a serious and sustained effort to reorganize its international staff structure, its military planning and command structures, and its higher-readiness formations to reflect what the Alliance is actually doing in the field and what it can look forward to more of in the future. That includes primarily peace support operations and political-military crisis responses that may be 200 or 2000 miles "out of area."

NATO Decision-Making and Command Structure

NATO strategic direction is set at periodic summits of NATO heads of state and government. Otherwise, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) is the Alliance's highest standing body and the only one that "draws its authority from the North Atlantic Treaty."[150] It meets twice yearly at the level of foreign ministers, and weekly at the level of Permanent Representatives (Permreps). It can and has authorized NATO to use military force, deciding to back UNPROFOR in Bosnia with air power (September-October 1995) and to use air power against Serbian forces and other targets to halt ethnic cleansing in Kosovo (March-June 1999). The NAC is supported by an international staff of 1,200 civilians; NATO members' headquarters delegations comprise another 1,400 staff.[151]

The Defense Planning Committee (DPC) provides policy guidance to NATO's military authorities and advice to the NAC, and it can take operational military decisions. It receives advice and recommendations from the Military Committee, the Alliance's highest collective military body, which meets three times a year at the level of Chiefs of Defense and weekly at the level of Military Representatives (Milreps), whose meetings follow sessions of the NAC. The Military Committee is supported by an International Military Staff of about 295 military and 85 civilian personnel who provide strategic intelligence and long-range policy planning support.[152]

NATO consensus decision processes can be time-consuming, although, as Paul Gallis notes in his study of these processes, what NATO means by consensus is not unanimity but consent-by-acquiescence (the "silence procedure"). A formal vote is not taken; rather, states objecting to a decision must, in effect, cast a veto by means of a letter to the Secretary General of NATO. Although much is made of the vetoes accorded the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the North Atlantic Council involves, in effect, 26 vetoes.[153]

None of the above councils, committees, or staffs either plans or executes military operations. That is the job of NATO's military command structure and the forces voluntarily contributed to NATO's operational control by its member states. Since the end of the Cold War, that command structure has been successively reduced "from 78 headquarters to 20" (1997-2003) and then from 20 to 10 (2003-04).[154] Much of that consolidation comes from the end of the requirement to fight across the Atlantic in the event of an East-West war. The latest command transformation eliminated the post of Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, substituting a new head of Allied Command, Transformation, still headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia. The new office is in

charge of restructuring Alliance forces to meet current and future operational requirements.

In the latest changes, NATO's Allied Command Europe (in Mons, Belgium) was re-branded Allied Command Operations. Two operational NATO commands, Allied Forces North (at Brunssum, the Netherlands) and Allied Forces South (Naples, Italy) each became Joint Forces Commands (JFCs) with associated land, air, and naval headquarters. Part of the former Allied Forces Center (Heidelberg, Germany) lives on as the land forces component of JFC-Brunssum. Both JFCs are required to generate, on short notice, deployable headquarters units for NATO Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs—"combined" because they comprise forces from two or more states; "joint" because they draw from two or more branches of the armed forces). CJTFs were conceived in 1994 to allow a subset of the Alliance, with the approval of the NAC, to use NATO resources in operations that not all members saw as meeting their national interests. The CJTF concept allows them to let a decision to use force go forward without incurring obligations to provide forces in support of that decision.

As NATO's military staffs have adapted to new times and tasks, however, the military muscle of most west European members of NATO has atrophied. The same low military spending that limits EU efforts to rebuild or restructure European defense also limits European NATO. Eight separate strands of defense "transformation" aimed to boost and/or rationalize European countries' defense production but whether budgets will expand to match the demands of transformation remained to be seen. The Alliance has nearly doubled its membership in the past decade, reaching 26 members in March 2004, and at its most recent summit, in Istanbul, NATO affirmed that "the door to membership remains open."[155] With more members, a less-focused threat, budget problems, technology gaps, and a deep need to rationalize European defense production, NATO will need to work hard to build and sustain political consensus on the kinds of operations it should focus on in the future, and their locations, their scope, size, and duration.

Since December 1995, NATO's largest operations have been PSOs, starting with 60,000 troops to implement the military elements of the Dayton Accord in Bosnia-Herzegovina, followed in mid-1999 by the deployment of nearly 50,000 troops into Kosovo. Since August 2003, NATO has been running ISAF, in Kabul. NATO's new rapid-reaction capability, the NATO Response Force, reached initial operational capability in late 2004, offering a reminder that contemporary NATO is supposed to be about more than PSOs.

NATO in Bosnia: IFOR and SFOR

NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) was initially billed as a twelve-month operation, consistent with an election-year promise made by US President Bill Clinton. Following Clinton's re-election in November 1996, IFOR did indeed come to an end but many of its forces segued into a follow-on Stabilization Force (SFOR).   Through mid-1997, SFOR stuck to a strict and narrow interpretation of its mandate under the Dayton Accords, that is, separating the respective forces of Republika Srpska and of the Muslim-Croat Bosnian Federation, cantoning heavy weapons, patrolling the Zone of Separation, and otherwise functioning as a very heavily-armed but otherwise cautious peacekeeping operation.   However, NATO's early concerns about "mission creep" into duties not considered proper for military forces allowed Serb authorities and their local thugs to drive the ethnic Serb population out of Federation-held parts of Sarajevo, Bosnia's capital city, under NATO's very nose.[156]   NATO could have used its initial, overwhelming military superiority as cover for immediate special forces action to apprehend "persons indicted for war crimes," and the Bosnia Serb leadership, in particular.   It could have anticipated the need for early and capable policing; determined, with its superior planning and intelligence capabilities (and a cursory review of recent UN missions) that the United Nations would not be able to assemble a forceful police presence in short order, even if Dayton permitted the United Nations to do so, which it did not. NATO would then have deployed substantial numbers of military police in key contested areas such as Sarajevo, Mostar, and Brcko. To the detriment of both immediate stability and longer-term peacebuilding in Bosnia, NATO chose not to do so.

After Clinton's election in November 1996, Tony Blair's assumption of the duties of UK Prime Minister in May 1997, and Gen. Wesley Clark's appointment as NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, that July, the alliance's view of its mandate in Bosnia became a little more expansive. SFOR began to search for and seize "persons indicted for war crimes," to actively support the civilian elements of peacebuilding in Bosnia—for example, seizing Serb broadcast facilities that incited to violence—and to provide secure environments for elections.

The military situation in Bosnia proved sufficiently stable that NATO could progressively reduce its forces from the initial 60,000 troops in late 1995 to just 8,000 by mid-2004. In December of that year, NATO turned over peacekeeping duties to a 7,000-strong European Union force.   NATO maintained a headquarters unit of about 150 personnel in Sarajevo, however, to focus on

"defense reform in the country, counter-terrorism, apprehending war-crimes suspects, and intelligence gathering."[157]

The cost of IFOR and SFOR is difficult to measure, as troop contributors were largely self-funded, but the bill from late 1995 through 2004 seems to be in the range of $15 to $30 billion.[158]

NATO in Kosovo: KFOR

In Kosovo, NATO reprised its role as principal security provider after long-simmering tensions and a guerilla war by Kosovar-Albanian militants against Serb authorities produced a Serb campaign to drive out Kosovo's 90 percent ethnic-Albanian population. A 78-day NATO bombing campaign against Serbia (the largest remaining part of former Yugoslavia) was as unsettling to America's NATO allies as it was damaging to Serb infrastructure. The allies saw in action what they had known for some time: that European NATO was, for the most part, far behind the United States in its ability to suppress air defenses and deliver precision-guided weaponry from the air; that it lacked the ability to communicate securely and effectively with ground forces; and that if its forces could not be moved by road or rail to an area of operations, then they could not be moved.

Although NATO used force against Serbia without prior authorization from the UN Security Council (a Russian veto being anticipated), it returned to the UN to authorize deployment in Kosovo of NATO peacekeepers and to provide a temporary government for Kosovo, while leaving it, nominally, a province of Serbia and Montenegro. Resolution 1244 remains the authority for all international security- and governance-related activities within Kosovo. Unlike the mandates for most UN peace operations, 1244 has no expiration date; rather than invite veto fights over renewal, this approach allows the veto to halt any effort to shut the operation down.

As in Bosnia, NATO forces in Kosovo stand apart from the rest of the international effort. Unlike in Bosnia, they coordinate with a more integrated hierarchy of civilian institutions. The United Nations leads the multi-institutional UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), a collaborative effort with OSCE and the European Union. The head of UNMIK holds ultimate executive and legislative authority. UNMIK police enforce the law and carry arms. Several states have contributed special police (gendarmerie) units with heavier arms, equipment, and crowd control training.

NATO forces peaked in September 1999 at nearly 49,000 troops in Kosovo and 8,000 more nearby in supporting roles. By February 2004, their numbers had shrunk to about 18,600. The following month, coordinated violence erupted against remaining Kosovar Serbs and their property. KFOR and UNMIK police did a relatively poor job of handling the disturbances, testament both to the reluctance of military forces to get involved in "policing" tasks, and to the fact that even having modern militaries from developed democratic states—which would include most of the forces in KFOR—will not guarantee good performance in the face of a poorly-anticipated threat or disdain for the measures required to meet it.[159]

NATO in Afghanistan: ISAF

Begun as a UN-authorized coalition of the willing, ISAF always derived most of its troops from NATO member states. Having the Alliance doing its planning and backstopping gave ISAF much more solid grounding as well as access to political-military deliberative bodies other than the UN Security Council. Having NATO formally at the helm of the operation since August 2003 facilitated ISAF's progressive expansion outside Kabul. Such expansion was opposed by Washington for the first year of US operations in Afghanistan on grounds that peacekeepers deployed in the provinces could be a liability to US forces, presenting targets for the Taliban or local warlords and generating requirements for distracting rescue operations. Washington's comfort level with NATO management had risen, by early 2005, to such an extent that there were discussions about greater command synergy and possible merger of ISAF and the U.S.-led coalition.

Having begun with about 5,000 troops patrolling Kabul and its environs, ISAF has since branched out and grown, by the end of 2005, to about 9,000 troops, with higher numbers added to help provide security during the October 2004 presidential elections and the September 2005 legislative elections.[160] It has also established or assumed control over several Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)—civil-military elements varying in size from 50 to 500 personnel deployed originally by the US coalition—in key cities the northeast, north, central, and western parts of Afghanistan where the Taliban and al Qaeda have been least active. (But where opium poppy production has increasingly been taking hold.[161]) In "stage two" of its expansion, NATO established a PRT in the western Afghan city of Herat and one in Farah, to the south of Herat, as well as in two other northwestern towns.[162] Stage three was to set up a PRT in the key southern city of Kandahar, while stage four would involve taking over PRTs run by the US coalition in the volatile southeast and east, bordering Pakistan. Those outposts were larger and more heavily-armed than PRTs in calmer parts of the

country and more appropriately thought of as garrisons, but that term implies too much staying power to be used by either NATO or Afghan authorities.

In an unusual first for NATO, the military alliance appointed a Senior Civilian Representative to the Afghan government who "carries forward political-military aspects of the Alliance's assistance," and "works closely with ISAF, the United Nations, and other coordinating bodies." Functioning much like a personal envoy of the UN Secretary-General, the civilian rep gives the North Atlantic Council political eyes and ears in Kabul. His appointment symbolizes NATO's recognition that its military role in Afghanistan has primarily political objectives: "NATO's aim is to assist in the emergence of a secure and stable Afghanistan, with a broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government, integrated into the international community and cooperating with its neighbors."[163] Which sounds much more like that other organization based in Brussels than it does a military alliance, suggesting further convergence in the two organizations' operating styles, even if decision-making structures remain quite separate.

NATO Response Force

As a signal, perhaps, that NATO will remain ready to do more than peace support operations, it has been standing up the NATO Response Force (NRF). Declared to have reached initial operational capability with 17,000 affiliated personnel in October 2004, the NRF is anticipated to grow to 24,000 by the time it reaches planned full operational capability in October 2006. The NRF is a light, mobile force with ground, air and maritime components, and is intended to be able to deploy on five days' notice with the ability to sustain itself for 30 days.[164] National forces committed to the NRF train for six months and then remain on-call for another six months before rotating out to other duties.

The land component of the NRF is to be roughly brigade-sized, meaning that most of the NRF's personnel will be airborne and afloat. The maritime component is planned to include an aircraft carrier battle group, amphibious task group, and naval surface action group. A typical U.S.-style carrier battle group might deploy 5,000 sailors and 2,500 additional personnel associated with its air wing, which maintains and flies about 70 aircraft. A US Marine Amphibious Ready Group, with escorts, deploys about 2,800 sailors and 3,200 Marines. A typical US surface action group involves two missile destroyers and a frigate and about 950 sailors.[165] Added up, the floating portion of the NRF is likely to comprise around 8,800 ships' personnel, 2,500 air component personnel, and 3,200 combat troops (Marines). The Marines might be augmented by one or two land forces units comparable to the EU's 1,500-soldier battle groups. The

land component is intended to be first-in and first-out, replaced by follow-on NATO forces kept routinely at lower rates of readiness than the NRF.

This maritime component will allow NATO to project force about 300 to 400 nautical miles inland from the ocean's edge (approximately the operating radius of the US Navy's principal fighter/bomber, the F/A-18, and of its heaviest-lift helicopter, the CH-53E).[166] For missions deeper inland (say, Darfur), all naval aircraft would require multiple in-flight refuelings and NATO would confront the same strategic airlift problem as the European Union. As a partial solution, beyond the UK's lease of American C-17 cargo aircraft, a German-led NATO airlift consortium of 15 nations has chartered two An-124-100 Ruslan heavy airlifters full time from the German subsidiary of a Russian firm, with options to use four more on six to nine days notice.[167] The United Nations uses these and other ex-Soviet heavy cargo aircraft on commercial charters to carry its peacekeepers and their equipment around the world and aid agencies use them for responses to far-flung disasters like the December 26, 2004, Indian Ocean tsunami. The use of Russian aircraft by the NATO alliance potentially to ferry troops to a crisis within spitting distance of Russia's borders is, depending on one's perspective, either deeply ironic or symbolic not only of the evaporation of East-West differences but of the power (and utility) of the private sector in 21st century military operations, which we treat at length below. It may also prove frustrating, should NATO needs and Russian interests not line up some time in the next six years, which is the term of the initial airlift contract.

NATO is comparably dependent for its sealift on either the United States or commercial charters. The post-Istanbul Summit "reader's guide" noted that NATO sealift commitments involved (as of December 2003) "assured access to three ships, one or two Danish ships, and the residual capacity of four British ships."[168] The US military, through the Military Sealift Command, has access, by contrast, to eight active   roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) fast cargo ships; 36 maritime pre-positioning ships; 35 ships of the Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force; and 78 ships in the Ready Reserve Force, including 31 RO/RO vessels technically able to be activated in one to three weeks.[169] While European NATO may be able to move its NRF land component by sea, reinforcing it in a timely fashion would be extremely difficult without use of American sealift or emergency charters.

The timely availability of NATO follow-on forces is a potentially serious issue for the NRF, especially if its initial use is for "opposed entry," for example, against a campaign of genocide or ethnic cleansing. NATO estimates that only 10–15 percent, on average, of its members' current active duty forces are "deployable." Its current plans are to reach a point where 40 percent of its

members' forces are deployable and eight percent can be sustained in the field at any one time. (Sustaining eight percent would require that 24 percent of NATO forces be committed to the deployment cycle, with one force element deployed, another training to take its place, and a third recuperating and refitting after deployment. The difference between the 24 percent needed and 40 percent available would mean that troops just back from the field could recuperate and then sit out two rotations before facing further deployment, which would reduce political as well as operational stress, or they could be available for other contingencies.)

Over the past decade, NATO has deployed large peacekeeping forces with the capacity, if not the will, for peace enforcement. Although Bosnian Serb forces resembled to some extent the kinds of challengers for which NATO mechanized forces were initially designed, organized and armored foes are not the kinds of challengers that NATO has faced recently. Civil unrest, ethnic cleansing, public security and public order issues, and fervent groups with improvised explosives are the kinds of opponents that NATO has been facing in the field. The Alliance still seems to have more in the way of planning and command structures than it has forces to command, and certainly so if US forces are abstracted from the picture. Without the United States, NATO has neither substantial deployable forces nor the capacity to deploy the forces it does have quickly, at a distance. Nor is it clear that its members are willing to substantially remedy either condition, given alternative demands on national budgets.

Indeed, owing to its command overhead and cumbersome decision making apparatus, NATO may not be able to launch and sustain a rapid, brigade-level deployment unless that deployment were entrusted to a lead (or "framework") nation. That appears to be the approach that the EU has adopted in shifting emphasis from the original corps-sized Rapid Reaction Force to the battle groups concept. The EU's battle groups and NATO's planning and intelligence capabilities may turn out to be a good match for the conduct of regional expeditions assuming that the lift issue is resolved in some fashion.

STATES AND COALITIONS

Like other organizational forms, coalitions can be conceived of in more than one way. As Canadian scholar Andrew Cooper notes, in the dominant concept, a coalition of the willing is:
- generated from the top down;
- designed to further the foreign policy objectives of the coalition leader, if only by raising the political legitimacy of the effort;
- focused on the application of hard military power; and
- open only to states (and their supporting contractors).

In a kind of mirror image of this concept, however, a coalition can be:

- generated from the bottom up (or laterally, among relative equals);
- designed primarily to further instrumental goals (i.e., achieving a joint objective of the participants that none can achieve singly);
- configured to emphasize soft power (often directed toward international institution-building); and
- open to (and perhaps instigated by) civil society organizations as well as states.[170]

This latter sort is like the coalition that produced the Ottawa Treaty to ban antipersonnel land mines and the coalition that eventually created broad agreement on the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court.

Cooper observes that both types of coalitions tend to arise out of "frustration" or "impatience with established institutional structures" and that both are results-oriented, subordinating traditional diplomacy to "mobilization campaigns conducted via modified forms of public diplomacy." The strengths of both "stem from an ability to ramp up 'just in time' initiatives.[171]

Like other organizational forms, coalitions have key strengths as well as serious weaknesses. The advantages of a coalition of the willing, from the standpoint of the lead nation, at least, include:

- responsiveness to direction (my party, my rules);
- flexibility (coalitions can be task-built, as needed);
- lower long-term cost (no standing institutions to impose overhead costs whether or not they are being used); and
- unity of effort by definition (since only willing partners join).

Disadvantages of coalitions, on the other hand, include:

- reduced partner responsiveness to lead state direction, over time (responding to the call to join may not harm a government that answers it once, but may do so if it agrees to join up several times without clear public support, and/or incurs serious casualties);
- interoperability issues (in doctrine, communications and information technologies and protocols, unless the members of a potential future coalition work them out in some detail in between fights, or smaller members of the coalition conduct only limited operations);
- potentially high start-up costs (unless a "virtual coalition" is maintained in between operations, with mobilization, deployment, and tasking plans drawn up and well-practiced, which starts to look a lot like an alliance);
- no standing mechanism for cost-sharing or reimbursement (contributing states cover their own costs unless special

> arrangements can be made with the lead state or some third party for financial support);
>
> - political fragility (without binding political-legal commitments, a coalition can come apart as easily as it is brought together); and, related to it,
> - a tendency to search for a quick exit (as emergency operations, coalitions seek to hand over their responsibilities to other actors relatively quickly, which implies a need for well-prepared "other actors").

The operational form of a coalition has often been combined with endorsement or authorization from a global or regional body (the UN Security Council, NATO's NAC, the AU's PSC), to give the operation political cover and enhance its regional and international legitimacy. Moreover, coalition actions not multilaterally authorized in advance have tended eventually to seek such support for follow-on operations. Thus, while NATO did not seek UN authorization for its air campaigns in Bosnia or Serbia, the alliance's subsequent PSOs in both places functioned under UN mandates.

Post-Cold War Coalition Operations

The strengths and weaknesses of coalitions can best be seen in operational context. The following paragraphs offer thumbnail sketches of prominent coalition operations for peace support or stabilization since the end of the Cold War. Operations summarized here include the Unified Task Force for Somalia (1992–93); the Multinational Force (1994) and Multilateral Interim Force (2004) for Haiti; the Australian-led International Force for East Timor (1999–2000); and the first two years of ISAF in Afghanistan (2001–03).

Somalia

On November 25, 1992, Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger told UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali that the United States would be willing to lead a coalition of states to "ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies to the people of Somalia," if the Security Council would authorize it.[172] Eight days later, Security Council Resolution 794 did so. Lead elements of the U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) deployed on December 9th. Up to 28,000 US Marines and Army troops ultimately deployed into the southern third of Somalia, together with roughly 10,000 troops from 21 other countries, the largest contingents being brigades with about 2,800 troops from France and 2,200 from Italy.[173] The United States crafted the objectives and the command and control arrangements for UNITAF and, with three-fourths of the ground troops, dominated operations, at least in Mogadishu, the Somali capital. UNITAF created nine Humanitarian Relief Sectors in the central and southern

parts of the country, parceled out primary military responsibility in those sectors amongst the major troop contributors, enforced a cease-fire, and delivered relief goods. UNITAF did not involve itself in implementing the political settlement crafted in March 1993 by the principal Somali political factions, leaving that task to a UN follow-on force in May 1993. The UN force, initially less than one-third UNITAF's strength, soon found itself at war with the most powerful Somali faction in Mogadishu and struggling with some national contingents' non-compliance with mission orders and rules of engagement.[174] US Special Forces sent to capture the faction's leaders were ambushed by their quarry, with serious casualties on both sides. Congress demanded that US forces leave Somalia within six months, and the UN mission left a year after that, its political and peacebuilding tasks unfinished. As of this writing, Somalia remains without a functioning national government.[175] Operations in Somalia demonstrated the value of a powerful coalition force for imposing initial public order, but also the great difficulty of trying to build peace when one or more powerful local political factions are determined to oppose the peacebuilding enterprise.

Haiti

Haiti held its first democratic elections in 1990 but its first elected president was ousted by the army in late 1991. Its people suffered under three years of international sanctions to reverse that coup, sanctions that hurt its ruling elites not much at all but caused a large efflux of would-be refugees. US forces turned away Haitian boat people by the thousands, housing some at Guantanamo Bay and returning others to Haiti. US military intervention in September 1994 was as much motivated by a desire to keep these waves of emigrés from reaching US shores as it was by any interest in restoring Haiti's elected government, much less transforming its economy or social structure. American forces shifted from combat intervention to peacekeeping mode at the eleventh hour, when the military government agreed to resign. The Multinational Force (MNF) that deployed in Haiti acted with Chapter VII authority from the UN Security Council and was about ninety percent American in makeup.[176] Non-US coalition elements were of largely symbolic value. US forces drew down rapidly through the fall of 1994 and a UN peace operation took over from the MNF the following March. The UN operation had a US force commander and retained 2,400 US troops out of 7,000 total. In 1996, US forces left the UN operation, which was substantially reduced in size. Neither the coalition force nor the follow-on UN operations in Haiti touched the country's political, economic, or judicial structures. Interest in Haiti faded away by the turn of the century as outsiders grew frustrated with the country's growing political gridlock.[177] By early 2004, Haiti once again exhibited visible symptoms of state failure, with militias brandishing arms against an incapacitated government. A coalition

intervention force led by the United States and again authorized by the Security Council deployed for 90 days in the spring of 2004. It was replaced by a Brazilian-led UN operation, MINUSTAH. Twenty months later, Haiti remained a very troubled country but had passed a significant milestone by conducting a presidential election generally considered free and fair.[178]

East Timor/Timor-Leste

Australia's first venture in coalition leadership stemmed from the orchestrated violence inflicted upon the first-time voters of East Timor, a half-island annexed militarily by Indonesia when Portugal's scattered imperial realm collapsed abruptly in 1974. Local armed resistance and Indonesian counter-insurgency operations took a heavy toll over the next quarter-century, during which time Indonesian jurisdiction was recognized only by Australia. When several abrupt changes in Indonesian politics led to an equally abrupt offer to the UN to manage a "consultation" on Timorese association with Indonesia, the UN accepted. When East Timorese voters rejected "autonomy" within Indonesia, the Indonesian military unleashed armies of thugs to destroy anything standing above ground level. Nearly the entire population was displaced and a quarter-million were forced into Indonesian-controlled West Timor. On September 6, 1999, one week after the vote, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan asked Australia, which had already launched an emergency evacuation of international staff from the island, to create and lead an intervention force to restore order, subject to Indonesian consent.[179] This the Australian Defence Force did, despite a lack of doctrine or experience in leading or managing multinational operations with an enforcement mandate, which the UN Security Council passed on September 15.[180] Three days prior, intense international pressure had convinced Indonesian's President Habibie to accept its deployment.

Australia sent 5,700 troops to the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET).[181] In doing so, however, Australia deployed about one-third of its entire ground force to Timor and thus committed virtually the entire force to the operation. Essential operational assistance was provided by the United States, which contributed strategic lift, local heavy lift, intelligence, and communications assets. US Navy assault carriers cycled through the harbor at Dili, East Timor's major town, to give INTERFET critical heavy-lift helicopter support as its forces deployed away from the capital.[182] (The UN force that followed INTERFET in February 2000 used private-sector contractors using Russian helicopters to acquire comparable capabilities.) Essential financial support was provided by Japan through a trust fund established by the United Nations to reimburse the costs of developing state members of the coalition. Australia, however, paid out of pocket operational costs equivalent to its entire

defense budget for the previous year.[183] INTERFET maintained stability and took on some aspects of governance in East Timor until a United Nations follow-on mission could be stood up in February 2000. That mission had temporary governing authority and managed the territory until presidential elections in May 2002, whereupon the newly-independent nation of Timor-Leste became self-governing, with three more years of help from a UN advisory mission.

Afghanistan

International operations in Afghanistan started as a U.S.-led effort to oust the ruling Taliban and destroy al Qaeda training bases in the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. Special Forces units and concentrated air support helped the "Northern Alliance" of opposition forces regain the offensive and win control of the northern and central parts of the country, including the capital, Kabul, in a matter of weeks. The US coalition enlisted the aid of other regional warlords ("local commanders") to fight Taliban and al Qaeda forces in the rugged southern and eastern parts of the country, near the largely lawless Pakistan border. Focused closely on the counter-terrorist campaign, the United States looked up after two years to find much of the country overgrown with opium poppy. It began to pay closer attention to public security and police training, having initially left those tasks in the hands of Germany under a division of labor agreed to by the Group of Seven industrial powers.[184]

For most of its existence, the coalition operated in parallel with the politics-and-aid-focused UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).   UNAMA helped implement the December 5, 2001, Bonn Agreement, signed by most of the country's major political actors, which laid out a multi-year process for restoring legitimate governance to the country. UNAMA also helped coordinate international aid supplies and to build up the capacities of central government ministries.

Annex I of the Bonn Agreement called for deployment of an international security presence in Kabul and, eventually, beyond it, which became ISAF.[185] The force was further authorized by Security Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001). Pulled together under British leadership, it comprised 4,500 troops, primarily from European states. Unlike the US coalition, ISAF was, in structure and makeup, a more collective enterprise. At no time in its first four years did the lead nation or entity (which changes every six months, even under NATO management) provide more than 40 percent of the total force.[186]

Coalition Lessons Learned

Most of the coalition operations reviewed here were set up on an emergency basis and shared an impulse to leave just as quickly. Their ad hoc nature and the uncertain nature of their domestic political support mean that sustainability issues begin rapidly to overtake them if they cannot find a quick exit.

Most of the coalition peace operations discussed above were top-down organized and lead-nation-dominant. The United States supplied about 75 percent of the force in Somalia; the next-largest troop contributor (France) contributed 9 percent. The United States supplied 90 percent of the 1994 Haiti MNF; the next-largest contributor (Bangladesh) sent 6 percent. U.S.-led fighting coalitions have been similarly weighted: 60 to 90 percent of the fighting forces in Afghanistan have been American, as were 75 percent of the troops in the first Gulf War and 75 to 85 percent of the troops in Operation Iraqi Freedom.[187]

In dominating its coalitions, the United States is not unique. Operation Artemis, although technically an EU operation, was in essence a coalition planned and led by France, with 81 percent French participation overall and a slightly higher French percentage in the actual operational presence on the ground in Bunia.[188] Such top-down coalitions led by great powers have the trappings of international collaboration and some smaller contributors may bring niche capabilities but these are largely national undertakings.

INTERFET was a little different. Australia provided the planning and organizational impetus and 55 percent of its troops but INTERFET was closer to a lateral coalition in that its operational objectives served a regional as well as lead nation goal of furthering Timorese independence. Some funding issues were assuaged by the UN-managed trust fund but Australia was no less eager than the United States or France to place the longer-term problem of Timor's transition on the UN's plate.

In its first two years, ISAF resembled a bottom-up coalition as its lead nations supplied only 27 to 38 percent of its troops. Although built on hard power, it used that power rather softly. It lasted as a coalition for twenty-one months, much longer than is typical, for several reasons: Its members were mostly wealthy and the United States was willing to subsidize the participation of some other troop contributors. Its contributors all had clear national interests in seeing Afghanistan stabilized under non-Taliban rule. Finally, it was an operation essential to the "war on terrorism" and let participants render active support to US foreign policy without committing troops to the unpopular struggle in Iraq.

ISAF's longevity was only assured, however, when it graduated from an ad hoc coalition to a NATO-run enterprise.

Coalitions of the willing may be more nimble and capable of wind sprints than either UN or regional PSOs but they remain governmental efforts with all the accoutrements of the public sector. Supporting those efforts, much as they support UN operations, are many private firms. What began as supplemental logistical support has grown in recent years into a much more complex, public-private relationship with potentially troubling implications.

THE PRIVATE SECURITY SECTOR

Few issues in this field inspire as much impassioned debate as that of the role of military support and service companies, which have become much more visible in PSOs since the mid-1990s. The industry as a whole may generate annual revenues of $100 billion, a major proportion of which derive from contracts with governments, whose military expenditures topped $1.1 trillion worldwide in 2005.[189] While the front-line war-fighting of firms such as Executive Outcomes (EO) and Sandline International (both now out of business) brought notoriety to the industry during the 1990s (and while firms specializing in such activities still exist), most companies provide less dramatic services, from base construction and logistical support to weapon system maintenance, military training, site security, and close protection. But certain types of activities—from executive policing to the aggressive site and convoy protection provided by Blackwater Security in Iraq or the interrogation and/or translation services offered by CACI and Titan—have raised concerns that private firms are taking on roles best left to the public sector.

This section looks at the sources and consequences of reliance on the private sector by PSO security providers. In engaging this question, we review some of the current literature on private security firms, look at current and potential frameworks for making the industry more accountable in the field, and discuss the implications of growing private involvement for both the efficacy and the legitimacy of PSOs.

Origins

Security contractors' prominent roles in Iraq since 2003 have raised the industry's profile but its rapid growth began in the early 1990s as the combined result of several trends related to the end of the Cold War, the most direct of which involved regimes losing Cold War-related support from both East and West, which helped terminate some conflicts and generate others. But globalization, defense downsizing, the changing nature of warfare, and trends in

outsourcing of heretofore governmental functions contributed to the growing presence of private firms in what had previously been considered the public sphere.

In the 1990s, non-state actors—from multinational corporations to humanitarian NGOs—began to increase their activities in potentially dangerous conflict zones. In places rich in natural resources but lacking effective public security, corporations hired their own security forces rather than abandon potentially lucrative capital investments. The booming global market in small arms and the ease of stashing profits in the darker corners of international financial markets made it easier to finance and sustain rebel movements. Where public institutions lacked capacity to maintain order, private companies were sometimes hired to fill the security void. Meanwhile, international NGOs faced an unenviable choice: either hire their own security or abandon activities in unstable regions where they were needed the most.[190] In the 1990s, a growing number of NGOs chose the former option.

Post-Cold War cuts in many developed states' defense budgets meanwhile created a growing pool of former soldiers. US active duty ground forces decreased 33 percent from their Reagan-era peak in 1986 to just 652,000 in 1999, before rebounding some. Other militaries worldwide employed 7 million fewer soldiers in 2002 than they did in 1989. Some of these demobilized soldiers naturally turned to companies able to use their primary areas of expertise and training. Up to 70 percent of the former KGB in the Soviet Union, for example, is estimated to have turned up in the private security industry.[191]

Since the typical internal conflict in the 1990s featured poorly equipped and badly paid government forces fighting poorly-trained and ill-disciplined militias, small, well-organized entities such as Executive Outcomes could have a significant and immediate impact on the battlefield. Demand for their services therefore increased. In countries such as Colombia, the DRC, Angola, and Sierra Leone, residual ideological motives were eventually superseded by the allure of profits from drugs, gold, or diamonds and conflicts became both criminalized and market-driven. Hiring market-driven actors to fight such market-driven fighting forces entailed a certain symmetry.[192]

In the 1990s, US politicians, in particular, concluded that many heretofore governmental functions could be performed better and more efficiently by the private sector. Although "inherently Governmental functions," which were "so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance by Government employees" were not to be outsourced,[193] everything from prisons

to garbage collection was privatized under the Clinton administration's "Reinventing Government" initiative and "National Performance Review."

The military was not immune to the outsourcing wave of the 1990s. Public-sector jobs in such supposedly non-"core" military functions as logistics, transport, foreign military training, weapons maintenance, civilian policing and, more controversially, some intelligence collection were contracted out to private businesses. The US military today could not launch or sustain a large-scale operation without the services provided by military contractors.

Is Private Security "Mercenary"?

Peter Singer has offered a set of five "distinguishing characteristics" to separate what he calls "Private Military Firms" from mercenaries. These characteristics include a corporate structure; pursuit of business profit rather than individual gain; participation in the market as public, legal entities; public recruitment of employees with specialized skills; and ties to financial markets.[194]

Still, firms that appear to have a transparent corporate structure may in reality have few concerns about long-term legitimacy and little regard for market constraints beyond immediate profits. Some are "virtual companies" consisting of little more than a database of contacts and former employees to call up when a new contract is signed, as Singer notes.[195] If a mission goes awry, both the employees and the firm itself can disappear with little trace. EO, for example, disbanded in 1999, two years after the introduction of a regulatory framework in South Africa, where it was based. Most industry observers believe that it splintered into a number of smaller firms based in neighboring countries that lack similar regulations and that many of these firms' current activities likely go undocumented. The boundary separating such firms from mercenaries is inherently blurry and less reputable firms may cross it.

The complex realities in conflict zones make it difficult to categorize definitively the activities of different firms, as a UK government Green Paper noted:

> The distinction between combat and non-combat operation is often artificial. The people who fly soldiers and equipment to the battlefield are as much a part of the military operation as those who do the shooting. At one remove the same applies to those who help with maintenance, training, intelligence, planning and organization—each of these can make a vital contribution to war fighting capability. . . . The fact is that there are a range of operators in this field who provide a spectrum of military services abroad. It is possible to devise labels

according to the activities concerned, the intention behind them and the effect they may have; but in practice the categories will often merge into one another.[196]

Private Firms and Peace Operations

The more exotic and potentially combat-related roles of private firms notwithstanding, every UN peacekeeping mission since 1990 has benefited from the presence of at least some private contractor support.[197]   And while Kofi Annan declared in 1994, after the Security Council declined to hire a private firm to address the refugee crisis in Goma, DRC, that "The world may not be ready to privatize peace," by 2006 it had come much closer to doing so.[198]

The UN has relied on private companies for logistics support, transportation, and some of its civilian policing work. It also frequently uses private security firms to protect its field offices, convoys, warehouses, and personnel.[199]   Los Angeles-based PAE, for example, developed airfields for MONUC and assisted with air traffic control in the country.[200]   Given the massive land area of the DRC and its paltry road network, MONUC is probably more reliant on air transport than any previous UN mission. PAE also provided fuel, rations, and medical and communications support to the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI).[201]

Other companies provide similarly critical support to UN missions.   ICI frequently has provided heavy airlift support, transporting peacekeepers even in potentially unstable environments. The British company Defense Systems Ltd. (DSL) provided local security guards to UN peacekeeping operations in Angola and security and logistics personnel to operations in the former Yugoslavia. (DSL counts De Beers, Shell, Mobile, Amoco, Chevron, CARE and GOAL among its other clients.) DynCorp, PAE, and MPRI have all supplied civilian police to UN missions under contract to the US State Department. The South African firms KZN Security and Empower Loss Control Services provided local intelligence to UNTAET in East Timor, while DynCorp provided transport, logistics, and communication services. A number of private firms conduct most of the UN's de-mining efforts, as RONCO does in the Sudan. In February 2005, the US government awarded DynCorp a $35 million contract to recruit and train a new 4,000-man Liberian army, while UN forces keep the peace. A firm from Canada, Black Bear Consulting, even provides private training in peacekeeping.[202]

In addition to DPKO, at least seven UN agencies have reportedly hired private firms to perform various security roles. DSL, for example, provides personnel and property security for both the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

and the World Food Program.   The ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), a West African peacekeeping force, benefited from US State Department logistics contracts with ICI and PAE.   When the United States needed to send an unarmed verification team as part of the OSCE's mission to monitor promised Serb withdrawal from Kosovo, it outsourced the job of observation to employees of DynCorp.[203]

More recently, private firms have supported West African forces in Liberia (2003) and the AU Mission in Darfur, which likely would have been impossible to sustain had not companies such as PAE and Medical Support Solutions (MSS) prepared bases, set up logistics systems, and provided housing, office equipment, transport, and communications gear.[204]   West African troops in Liberia benefited from private transportation and logistical support and many had earlier received peacekeeping training from companies such as MPRI.[205]

The UN and other multinational organizations have not yet outsourced the most critical of peacekeeping duties—actual foot soldiering—although private firms have done nearly everything but that. It is in this area that advocates of privatized peacekeeping see the greatest potential and detractors harbor their greatest fears.

Private firms could be further used in other ways to supplement UN forces, however. Without replacing UN boots on the ground, companies could be used to provide certain high-tech services, making current troop numbers more effective and efficient. For the UN operation in the DRC, for example, the private firm AirScan offered aerial surveillance capacity that could help the UN operation track multiple militia forces and better target its patrols.[206]

Similarly, in Darfur, monitors from the African Union have compiled invaluable information on attacks against civilians and even deterred some attacks but the reach of the AU's force is extremely limited compared to the 256,000 square kilometers of territory it is expected to cover. The use of surveillance drones has usefully augmented ground capacity in other conflict zones, and a number of private firms could provide such services to the AU in Darfur. The main issue would be cost.

Concerns with Outsourcing to the Private Sector

Decisions and capabilities regarding the use of deadly force by PSOs should be kept in public hands—at least until more transparent international regulatory and legal mechanisms are devised and implemented (about which more, below). But private use of deadly force is not the only issue raised by critics and advocates

of the PSP industry alike. There are also concerns involving accountability of the companies and their employees, the accountability of governments who employ them, their impact on the coherence of military action, and their contributions to the erosion of public sector capacity in the security sphere.

Criminal Accountability

It is often difficult to hold personnel of private firms accountable for their behavior in the field. In many cases, rule of law has broken down in a given area of operations, which makes *in situ* prosecution of misbehavior by the host state unlikely or impossible. The domestic criminal law of a contractor's home state may lack extraterritorial reach, that is, jurisdiction over crimes committed by its nationals on foreign soil. Issues of accountability already plague UN and other peace operations, the scandal in MONUC discussed earlier being only the most prominent of these. It is unclear whether companies' concerns for corporate image and future contract prospects would make them less tolerant of illegal behavior in their ranks than are publicly-provided forces, since market forces can both create incentives for professionalism and drive firms to cover up rather than correct institutional flaws. Under US laws, at least, a federal agency can issue directives only to its prime contractors, not to those firms' subcontractors, meaning that public contractual oversight and the possibility of contract-based disciplinary measures reaches only the first of potentially many layers of contract personnel. Nor is it clear whether subcontractors can be held accountable under new US laws designed to extend criminal liability to contractors working for DoD (discussed below).[207]

Political Accountability

As noted earlier, use of private firms can increase the power and flexibility of the executive and decrease the checks and balances of legislative and judicial oversight. They can help a government implement a more flexible, activist, and independent foreign policy, mitigating the constraints imposed by military end-strength limitations as well as pesky opposition politicians and public opinion, because security firms' activities—and their costs—could be defined as proprietary information under the terms of their contracts.

If UN DPKO were given the authority to hire more of its security service personnel from the market, would it remain as accountable to UN member states? Since all of its funding comes directly from member states, the answer is, ultimately, yes, providing contracts were subject to scrutiny by UN legal advisors and performance was scrutinized by the requisite bodies of auditors, including resident auditors now deployed with most large UN PSOs. The innately risk-averse nature of the organization and its lack of independent

resources would tend to serve as natural brakes on risky contractor behavior in the field, though on occasion those brakes have failed.

Impacts on military coherence

Some observers worry that contracts, no matter how well-written and all-encompassing, cannot ensure that contractor personnel react appropriately to military contingencies or even appropriately anticipate such contingencies, and this applies not only to warfighting situations but to some of the more dangerous types of PSOs. Firms unable to protect themselves in a dangerous environment can be a drain on regular military capacity, and contractors unwilling to maintain their support if the going gets tough could leave an operation in jeopardy.[208] Yet many courageously uphold their end of the bargain if given appropriate equipment, protection, and incentives. Nonetheless, in a security contractor-saturated environment, the public-private blurring of roles can be serious and may be correctable only if armed contractors withdraw or adopt a common livery.[209]

Proliferating security providers can also cause problems with intelligence sharing, something that has been clearest in Iraq but that could easily apply to PSOs like MONUC, as well, were they to employ armed civilians who operated in the field. In Iraq, because the US Army initially gave companies access to delayed and edited versions of military intelligence, many firms found it necessary to gather intelligence of their own. Some were in turn less-than-generous in sharing the information they collected with their competitors. Singer suggests that insufficient intelligence led four Blackwater employees to be captured in Falluja in March 2004, which led in turn to the first, abortive Marine siege of the city and to a major increase in anti-Coalition violence. This problem may have eased once a Reconstruction Operations Center became operational in October 2004. The Center was designed to facilitate DoD/other agency/contractor information sharing, to serve as a central emergency contact number for contractor and non-DoD US agency personnel, and to transmit requests for assistance to the US military unit closest to the incident.[210] This model has to some extent already been adopted in UN operations in the form of Humanitarian Information Centers, which, together with Civil-Military Information Centers, or CIMICs, serve to coordinate field activities and collate security-relevant information.

Because the UN already leases its logistics capabilities from the private sector and borrows its military capacity from dozens of troop contributing countries, it is accustomed to outsourcing as a way of life. The Memorandum of Understanding that a contributing country signs with the United Nations is the

public-sector equivalent of a company contract (though without much chance of redress in case of material breach). It may specify what the country is willing to let its forces do and whether they may collaborate with other contingents in tactical operations. Thinking in terms of possible private-sector substitutes for some of the security provided to UN peace operations, one can conceive of contracts tailored specifically to the goals of an operation's mandate, but many current UN operations call for more than the private sector is presently capable of providing, namely, brigade-sized mechanized forces. Private firms do not, at present, have remotely the sorts of ground capabilities needed to carry out such mandates, no matter how efficient they may be. As a matter of public policy, moreover, it is not clear that one would want them to have such capabilities. There may be other areas such as close-in protection for VIPs or site security, however, where private security firms would be well-suited to the task, if the accountability problem can be solved.

Erosion of public capacity

Critics contend that military outsourcing erodes as well as supplements governmental military capabilities. The US military, for example, has found itself competing with private firms for a limited supply of military labor. Veteran special forces personnel are in particularly high demand and can earn far more working for private companies than they can by staying in the military. At the start of the Iraq invasion, the most highly-trained, experienced special forces personnel could earn up to $1,000 or $2,000 a day working for private firms, although the figure two years later was closer to $700 a day.[211] Each Navy SEAL or Army Green Beret who joins a private security firm is highly-skilled human capital, the cost of whose training has been borne over many years by the public sector, that is, US taxpayers. Security firms in effect lease back to the military the people that it has trained, to perform less complex and demanding tasks than the special forces soldier likely would have performed while on active duty, at much higher per capita cost.

National militaries have begun to respond to this challenge by increasing the incentives offered to special forces and other personnel to forgo retirement and stay in the armed services. Both the US Army and the US Air Force offered a $150,000 bonus to their most experienced, best trained personnel who opt to stay in the armed forces for a minimum of six years.[212] The British government was reportedly considering similar incentives to stem the loss of Special Air Services personnel.[213]

The availability of private security providers tends to reduce pressure on governments to adapt their militaries to changing security threats and to fill

capacity gaps. In the United States, such firms have enabled the government to contribute civilian police to UN operations without having a federal police force or a police reserve system drawing on state and local officers. Although developing such capacity for use abroad may well be in the country's long-term interests, and although competent civilian police are both in short supply globally and vital to the present and the future success of international peace operations, Washington shows no inclination to create such a force, perhaps believing that DynCorp and other contractors provide all the capability that is needed.[214]

There is a danger in such creeping privatization. Much of the cost-saving attributed to outsourcing rests on the adaptable nature of the private sector and the option that it gives the military to discard standing capacity for infrequently-utilized services. It is quickly becoming apparent, however, that many military tasks once deemed "non-mission essential" are in fact crucial to long-term security in the post-9/11 world, and that requirements to perform these tasks show no signs of disappearing. Peace and stability operations, only recently considered peripheral to US national security, are now the subject of a DoD Directive that, as noted earlier, establishes stability operations as a core US military function. Yet there are few to no core capabilities within the active components of the US military to perform many critical sub-functions within peace and stability operations. The military's options are to grow them, buy them, or get the civilian side of government to grow or buy them. Like many a commercial firm looking to expand its core competence, the temptation on the part of military and civilian agencies alike is to buy. But like many a corporate merger that fails to last, the purchase may generate higher than expected costs downstream.

Regulating the Private Security Sector

The upsurge in private security activities in the 1990s led to a number of efforts at regulation, the most successful of which have been at the national level. Thus far, however, only South Africa and the United States have comprehensive regulatory frameworks. The UK published a "Green Paper" that outlined various legislative options in 2002, but as of spring 2005 had not yet translated any of these options into law, although Parliament appeared ready to revisit the issue.[215]

South Africa's Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act required domestically-based security firms to obtain government authorization for every contract.[216] While the Act significantly restricted the activities of firms based in South Africa, it has been largely unsuccessful at curbing the activities of

individual South Africans. An abortive coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea in 2004 involved South African mercenaries, and South Africans were among the most common nationalities of private security employees in post-intervention Iraq.[217] Strict new legislation recently introduced in South Africa would criminalize working for private security companies anywhere in the world without special permission of the government.[218]

The United States licenses private security firms in much the same way that it licenses arms exports, through the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which does not always keep companies from signing contracts contrary to US interests. MPRI, for example, signed a contract to upgrade the naval security capacity of Equatorial Guinea, one of the world's most oppressive dictatorships, despite the objections of the US State Department. The firm succeeded in obtaining a license by arguing that if it did not conduct the training, Equatorial Guinea would simply hire another firm—from France.[219]

The United States has also enacted legislation aimed at ending private contractor impunity abroad, but with limited success. Employees of private firms are exempt from the Uniform Code of Military Justice and thus cannot be prosecuted by military courts or be forced to deploy against their will. However, the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 extended the jurisdiction of domestic US courts to civilians "employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States."[220] A 2004 amendment extended the law's jurisdiction to employees of any Federal agency supporting DoD missions overseas, but the Act still does not cover civilians providing security where DoD is not involved.[221]

Despite the existence of such laws and the probability that someone among the more than 20,000 private security personnel employed by the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq from March 2003 to January 2005 might have engaged in felonious behavior during that time period, not one was prosecuted for criminal behavior.[222] There are no established institutional mechanisms analogous to the US military's Judge Advocate General corps assigned to investigate and prosecute civilian contractors (or, for that matter, US civil servants on overseas assignment). Extending the reach of the law will not ensure accountability if forensic investigations and prosecutions both remain difficult. Moreover, if more states were to do a better job extending their domestic laws, not all states will do so, leaving opportunities to change a corporation's state of registry.

Some attempts have been made at international regulation but these have been largely ineffective, even irrelevant to the firms and activities considered here, as

they have focused on outlawing mercenaries, whose line of work is defined in a way that allows modern security companies to easily set themselves apart.[223] Another suggestion is to create a UN regulatory body that could register and monitor security firms and/or specific contracts.[224]   But such an arrangement would require an internationally agreed-upon definition for both mercenaries and security companies and guidelines for regulation, neither of which appear likely in the foreseeable future.

The industry has made some strides towards voluntary self-regulation.   The International Peace Operations Association (IPOA), for example, has adopted a Code of Conduct written by human rights organizations and other NGOs, most recently updated in March 2005. The Code of Conduct includes guidelines on human rights, transparency, accountability, choice of clients, safety, insurance, clients' control over firm activities, ethics, and use of partner companies and subcontractors.[225]   Adherence to such codes demonstrates a firm's interest in upholding standards of professionalism and accountability, and contributes to a responsible company image.   Penalties for non-adherence are fairly mild, however. Loss of IPOA membership is not quite the same as being hauled into court and threatened with jail time, however, and a number of firms have called publicly for more effective government regulation.[226]

— 5 —
SECURING PEACE

T he first requirement of peace support is security. Security and stability help make life livable, open doors for economic growth, and contribute to peoples' willingness to stay and make a go of it rather than risk their lives on the next smuggler's truck or boat outbound for Oz.[227]

In these and other ways, effective peace operations serve the interests of rich and poor alike. Indeed, as the international system and the powers within it wheel about to face the security challenges of the twenty-first century, PSOs find themselves elevated to a far more central role in "strategic affairs" than has been the case heretofore.[228] This includes the blending of peace and stability support into US and other major power doctrine as a core military function. With this evolution comes a risk, however, as major powers naturally tend to emphasize their own needs and interests, at potential risk to the needs and interests of local parties, populations, and cultures, which may leave a legacy of diminished legitimacy and increased resentment, if not resistance, for follow-on institutions and operations to manage.

SPEED AND FIREPOWER VERSUS LEGITIMACY AND STAYING POWER

Security for peace operations comes in many institutional packages but at base derives from states, which loan their forces to the United Nations and to alliances, regional organizations, and coalitions. States redistribute security resources through aid and training programs. They and international organizations at all levels hire private security and support contractors, but many of these are led by, and virtually all of them hire, personnel who received extensive and expensive training in the militaries or police forces of their respective home states. The security packages for PSOs thus to a large degree simply represent reconfigured state assets. Yet these packages take on very different legal, political, and operational characteristics once reconfigured. Common origins notwithstanding, who manages what configuration of capabilities in the field makes a difference to the execution of PSO mandates.

Characteristics—from legitimacy through operational capacity to accountability—of six major security support providers are compared in **table 7**.

Table 7: Summarizing Capabilities of Major Security Providers

Capability	United Nations	European Union	African Union
Legitimacy	UN Charter, global writ.	Treaty of Maastricht+; UN Charter Ch. VIII; in/around Europe; else-where with local or regional invite, UN mandate.	AU Constitutive Act; UN Charter Ch. VIII; in Africa; potentially elsewhere.
Decision Structure	UN Security Council, 15 states, 5 vetoes	Council of EU, 25 states, active consensus, with opt-out	Peace and Security Council, 15 states, consensus preferred, can revert to 2/3 vote of voting members.
Military planning capacity	Limited; HQ Military Planning Service of ~ 20 staff, plus some operations planners in each mission.	Intrinsic capacity limited; small cell embedded with NATO; access to NATO capacity as needed.	Limited; to date, mostly seconded officers from other institutions.
Military force availability	Avg. 3–6 mos., brigade to division-size mission (3,000 troops/mo. max.).	Goal: 2–4 weeks, 1–4 "battlegroups" of 1,250 each. To date: 1 btlgrp equivalent, 3 wks (Ituri)	African Standby Force to be formed. To date: 6 mos., 3,000 troops, 900 milobs (Darfur)
Police availability	Avg. 4–9 months for 1,000 police to new mission; pilot rapidly-deployable field HQ team.	Goal: 1000 EU police, 30 days notice. To date: 6–12 mos. for 384 EU, 87 non-EU police (EUPM Bosnia).	10 mos., 815 police; 8 mos., for additional 400 police (Darfur, '04–'05).
Civilian availability (admin. and high-skills reconstruc-tion)	Rapid Deployment Roster (14 days for 90-day deployment) on hiatus after initial trials; developing civilian peacekeeper career track.	Council: No centralized civilian roster; rapid secondment of personnel by member states. Commission: 2200-strong elections monitoring roster; 6000 national secondments for two-week technical	No AU-level civilian rapid deployment as yet. Southern Africa standby roster (SAFDEM) of 160 members, deployed just 18 since 2002 due lack of funds to pay for secondments.

Table 7: Continued

NATO	Coalition	Private Sector
North Atlantic Treaty; in/around Europe; elsewhere with local or regional invite, UN mandate.	UN Charter Art. 51 (self-defense); other action with regional or UN mandate.	Derives from status of client, from specific contract, and applicable law.
North Atlantic Council, 26 states, acquiescence procedure with 26 vetoes.	Lead nation, plus bilaterally-negotiated terms of coalition membership.	Client and company directives to field team structure per contract.
Extensive. two Joint Force Commands with operations planning capacity. Plus member state capacities.	Lead nation; if U.S., thousands of planners; if others, hundreds.	Varies.
Goal: NRF brigade, 5 days; relief force, 30 days. Not yet deployed operationally.	Varies (lead nation specific); a few weeks on average for battalion-size force.	Varies with breadth, intensity of contracted tasks.
Has used para-military units to bolster peace-keeping forces but non-military police not part of NATO forces.	Varies by states participating.	Firms provide field security for many clients, from UN to NGOs. U.S. govt. sends contractors to UN operations.
NATO not geared to deploy civilian personnel in quantity.	Canada, Norway, UK, others: civilian rapid rosters. U.S. building a 100-person roster on 14-day notice, up to 6 mo. deployment and 3,000-person reserve roster, 30–90-day notice, up to 12 mo. deployment.	Varies by company.

Table 7: Continued

Capability	United Nations	European Union	African Union
Maximum demonstrated intensity of operations (example)	Division-strength peace enforcement against militia-type forces (Ituri, Kivus). Has managed up to 8 simultaneous complex operations each with brigade-level forces.	One battalion-level, stable police mission and one brigade-strength, stable PSO (both Bosnia) plus one short-term battlegroup strength peace enforcement mission (Ituri).	Brigade-strength observation mission (Darfur) with external support.
Lift assets	Contracted; use of member state assets in emergencies.	Members' medium air lift assets; limited UK heavy air lift; else contracted heavy air/sea lift.	Contracted; some assist from NATO for Darfur.
Initial Sustainability	Military/police good, civilian mixed (issue of timely replacement, RDR cadre).	Intended to be 90 days for battlegroups; 90 days demonstrated for UN support operations	Requires extra-regional funding and logistics; usually contractor-implemented.
Funding for Security Elements of Operations	Assessments from member states; supplemented by voluntary contrib.	Participant self-funding plus "Athena" system for common costs.	Donor countries and institutions outside Africa.
Accountability	Sending state disciplines military and seconded police; admin. penalties for UN civilians, functional immunity can be waived; gains criminal jurisdiction with a governance mandate.	EU through Coalition: Sending state discipline of military and seconded police personnel. Civilian legal status depends upon the laws of the sending or home state. Some egregious crimes subject to "universal" state jurisdiction and/or to jurisdiction of International Criminal Court.	

Table 7: Continued

NATO	Coalition	Private Sector
Nationally-segmented air strikes (against Serbia); corps-strength stable PSO (Bosnia); division-strength PSO with some spoiler management (Kosovo, Afghanistan).	U.S.-led: up to army-level stability ops with counterinsurgency. French/UK-led: battalion- to brigade-level PSO with active spoiler management.	Small wars in small places against militia-quality foes. Logistics support under fire, with adequate compensation.
U.S. heavy air/sea lift; limited UK heavy air lift, others medium air lift; plus contracted heavy air/sea lift.	Lead state air/sea lift (U.S. strategic/heavy; others medium range and lift), some partner lift, and contract air.	Contracted or owned (heavy lift cargo firm).
Good; primarily national-level function.	Varies by states participating; heavily dependent on lead state.	Varies by company.
Participant self-funding for operational costs; NATO assessments for common costs.	Participants are self-funded, with possible subsidies for partners.	Client.
EU through Coalition: Sending state discipline of military and seconded police personnel. Civilian legal status depends upon the laws of the sending or home state. Some egregious crimes subject to "universal" state jurisdiction and/or to jurisdiction of International Criminal Court.		Varied, weak. U.S. has extended domestic law to cover DoD contractors only.

Legitimacy is political body armor for PSOs, helping to generate and sustain local consent, without which PSOs can degenerate into counterinsurgency warfare. British doctrine still recognizes UN Security Council authorization as the "gold standard" for mission legitimacy and thus what it calls campaign authority. Washington and Paris seem much less certain of that value, yet failure to seek Security Council authority or endorsement can give pause even to regional action—such as more forceful EU or NATO action in Darfur—and deprive coalition operations not only of political cover but of states whose governments will not join without such cover. On the other hand, regional organizations may be able to act when the Security Council is politically deadlocked.

Decision making in the Security Council is subject to the vetoes of its five permanent members and several other organizations' decision structures are also vulnerable to vetoes although most have emergency work-arounds. The European Union works on the basis of active consensus but for "issues that involve only selected governments" members can form "committees of contributors" that need only "general approval from a principal EU governing body." The AU Peace and Security Council can opt to make decisions on the basis of two-thirds majority present and voting if it is unable to reach a consensus. The UN Security Council or the General Assembly can vote to shift a deadlocked security issue to the General Assembly for an advisory resolution under the 1950 "Uniting for Peace" resolution. Only NATO decisions appear always to be vulnerable to veto, but the silence procedure does allow the North Atlantic Council to act unless some member simply cannot bring itself to abstain.[229]

Once decisions are made, lead nations and NATO have much more extensive operational planning capacity and can operate at higher intensity than other PSO providers. The EU can deploy small forces relatively quickly and in theory NATO can deploy somewhat larger forces even faster, although its Response Force is as yet untested operationally. The United States can deploy a battalion-sized Marine force up to a few hundred miles from the ocean shore in the time it takes to sail an Amphibious Ready Group to the operational area. The United Nations can ship up to 3,000 troops to new missions per month, if necessary, starting about 90 days after planning begins and request letters issue. Every entity is short on police and has its own approach to police recruitment, as is the case with civilian personnel. Only the United States owns substantial amounts of long-range, outsized airlift and, for solutions to the airlift problem, all presently turn to the private sector. The United Nations and NATO both contract with international firms for Ukraine/Russia-built heavy airlifters, many operated by Russian or Ukrainian companies through contracts with international

partners. Rented strategic lift is just one dimension of contemporary PSOs' present and foreseeable reliance on the private sector for logistical support.

Although the United Nations cannot run large combat operations or marshal intervention forces quickly, it can sustain the operations that it undertakes because of its structure of financial assessments, equipment stores, systems contracts, and reimbursements to contributors. NATO's and the EU's provisions for funding "common costs" of operations do not extend to troop or police contributors' direct operational costs. In these and other non-UN operations, only the wealthiest of states can afford to participate in the absence of separate, bilateral subsidies. Because United Nations operations have global financial support, they can tap the large armies of South Asia or the forces of African states that could not otherwise afford to participate in extended field operations.

Accountability, the last item in table 7, is critical for all elements of PSOs but can be very difficult to ensure, even where nominally strong institutional and legal systems are in place to deal with malfeasance, as in the case of the US Uniform Code of Military Justice and its application to field forces. When forces are loaned to international operations of any stripe, disciplinary jurisdiction remains with the sending states and their respective systems of military justice. As noted earlier, rapidly-growing UN operations have suffered serious accountability problems and the organization has moved to deal with them, but has limited recourse beyond administrative measures even with its own civilian personnel. Every international operation suffers from similar accountability issues to some degree, however.

PATTERNS OF INSTITUTIONAL CROSS-SUPPORT

The institutions in table 7 engage in a range of military operations relevant to PSOs, consistent with their respective political and operational characteristics. At higher levels of intensity—war and/or involuntary regime change—states and coalitions take the lead, perhaps followed by a PSO in the aftermath of full-scale fighting. At mid-level intensity—repression of genocide or mass killings, or reversing the overthrow of democratic governments—either coalitions or regional organizations may come into play politically or operationally and the United Nations may play politically. Regional institutions have also undertaken peace operations in places that are too difficult for the United Nations to manage, as has NATO in Afghanistan. The United Nations tends to dominate the lower-intensity range of operations, implementing cease-fires and peace agreements in situations that nonetheless can and have flared into temporary or localized fighting.

Even where the United Nations is not putting boots on the ground, the Security Council frequently puts political gas in the tank of new peace operations, and a UN-led operation often follows either a coalition intervention or a regional mission. **Table 8** compares how various first-in forces have timed their handovers to follow-on forces. It suggests that handovers have tended to be quicker when the follow-on force was to be led by the United Nations, and this tendency seems to have grown more pronounced over time: Seven of nine transitions to UN operational control have occurred since 2000. Five of these happened within one year, from October 2003 to June 2004. In most of these transitions, the first-in force withdrew within six months of deployment and sometimes within three months. Especially when more than one operation is experiencing such a transition, the pressures on UN DPKO to find, transport, and sustain the requisite numbers of troops, police, and civilian professionals can be tremendous.

Table 8: The Timing of Mission Handovers

Time to prepare for handover: / Handover sequences:	Three Months or Less	Four to Six Months	Six to Twelve Months	More Than Twelve Months
Coalition to UN	Haiti, MIFH-UN ('04)	Somalia, UNITAF-UN ('93) Haiti, MNF-UN ('95) E. Timor, INTERFET-UN ('00)		
Regional Organization to UN	Congo, EU-UN ('03) Liberia , ECOWAS-UN ('03)	Sierra Leone, ECOWAS-UN ('00) Côte d'Ivoire, ECOWAS-UN ('04)	Burundi, AU-UN ('04)	
Coalition to Regional Organization			Burundi, South Africa-AU ('03)	Afghanistan, ISAF-NATO ('03)
Regional Organization to Regional Organization				Macedonia, NATO-EU ('03) Bosnia, NATO-EU ('04)
UN to Regional Organization		Bosnia, UN-NATO ('95)		Bosnia, UN-EU ('02)

Note: In underlined missions, the top troop contributors from the initial mission also contributed a substantial fraction of the follow-on force, or most of the original mission was "rehatted" as part of the follow-on force.

Although other institutions plan to deploy military forces rapidly, including to PSOs, only the United Nations is routinely required to meet short deadlines for operations undertaken at *other* institutions' initiative. Although Operation Artemis responded to a support request from the UN secretary-general and arrived in Ituri within weeks of that request, it functioned more as a French-led coalition than as a regional force and operated under a self-imposed and self-enforced deployment timeline of 90 days, which it refused to extend as UN

forces filled in behind it. The African Union had about six months to prepare for its mission in Burundi but a South African force already there was "rehatted" as the core of the AU presence. The South Africans also provided most of the managerial expertise.[230] Finally, while the 1996 UN-NATO handover in Bosnia was accomplished on just a few months notice, it involved an easier mission than NATO had originally anticipated (namely, extracting international personnel under Bosnian Serb fire).

Rapid deployment of UN follow-on forces would be easier if the troops of richer coalition forces did not decline to participate in the follow-on operation. Notable exceptions to that trend were Haiti in 1994 (with US forces) and East Timor in 2000 (with Australian and other forces). More often, rehatted units have needed substantial equipment upgrades to meet UN deployment standards, as in Liberia and other operations in Africa, generating costly logistics burdens.[231]

If the world wants the United Nations to be an effective purveyor of sustained security support to peace operations, then the Security Council needs to review the deployment time pressures that it routinely imposes upon DPKO and its current troop contributors. Moreover, the organization's wealthier members should resolve either to build the organization bigger deployment stocks and give it a massive training budget or to contribute forces of their own to UN operations that are now earmarked, if at all, exclusively for regional-level or coalition deployments. It is unfortunate and ironic that, in a period when the United Nations is more capable of managing PSOs and is carrying an historically high burden of operations, its richest and most capable members would offer little more than dollar diplomacy on its behalf.

PEACE AS A PUBLIC ENTERPRISE

Although the historical utility of private sector support for PSOs is undeniable, the growing reliance on private firms by major militaries, minor governments, and international organizations alike is symptomatic, we would argue, of a failure of public authorities to adapt military structures and strategies to current security requirements, and of a perhaps deeper failure to educate their publics as to how international military engagements meet their national security interests. The mere availability of private alternatives to governmental functions is not sufficient reason to adopt them: The private sector will always offer such alternatives because its firms compete to live and a good living can be had from outsourcing, which can be a practical solution to a short-term problem (a lack of recruitable police for PSOs, for example). Over the longer term, however, government's capacity to perform or even to manage the outsourced function

may atrophy unless government competes vigorously with the market to retain at least the managerial talent, and over time *experienced* talent will only be recruitable from the private security providers themselves, producing, in effect, a closed loop.

The main job of government in a democratic society is to protect the country, its people, their Constitution, and their interests abroad, using policy tools that best serve the public interest. It is a continuing struggle to ensure, even in developed states, that what elected officials represent in their decisions is indeed the public interest and not well-funded private interests. This struggle is even more intense in places where civil war is a recent memory. For that reason, peace operations work to restore not just the physical infrastructure but the rule of law—which must incorporate some notion of public interest and public service if it is to last—against efforts by dissatisfied or greedy local leaders to re-privatize governance or elements of it. The need to prevent this and to promote accountable, legitimate government is a major reason why key public security functions in PSOs should remain in public sector hands, lest capabilities and decisions for which public leaders ought to be held accountable end up parceled out to corporate persons whose accountability is at best indirect, at worst nonexistent, and whose operations abroad can elude the effective reach of criminal law.[232]

Although the rapidly-growing literature on peacebuilding (or "state-building") has not quite reached consensus on what is needed or achievable for self-sustaining peace in war-torn states, most authors agree that reconstruction and transformation take time and need protection.[233] These twin requirements demand that political decision makers exercise caution in selecting which cases to add to the international PSO inventory—especially if they do not represent the institution that will be finishing the job—because operations are likely to remain on the books in some form for five to ten years. Fifteen years ago, completion of national elections was the signal for a complex PSO to up stakes and leave after just one or two years in the field. Elections seemed to offer both a peaceful mechanism for allocating power and a step by step recipe for mission termination. They soon came to be viewed as inadequate for either purpose.

Alternative benchmarks for effective peacebuilding need not mean solving everyone's problems for all time but do require that underlying grievances be resolved or successfully shifted into non-violent channels for resolution. When that is accomplished, complex operations can end gracefully, even when many other local problems remain. In Sierra Leone, the violent opposition to peace was dealt serious military setbacks and then collapsed after its founder's death. In East Timor, the opposition fled. Manageable peacebuilding objectives in both

places focused on standing up democratic forms and institutions of governance and international advisory missions succeeded the respective peacekeeping operations to ease the shock of international drawdown. Liberia may have reached a similarly positive tipping point with the election of a new government, with the close advice to be available to that government through the novel "Governance and Economic Assistance Program," and with the arrest and arraignment of former president Charles Taylor, who had fomented so much of the country's internal strife.[234] International drawdown in Liberia will require stability in the rest of the sub-region as well, however, where it has been a scarce commodity for much of the past two decades.

PEACEBUILDING AND THE ADVISABLE LIMITS OF MILITARY ACTION

Even an invited peace operation faces the limits of outside influence when it tries to implement a flawed peace accord whose signatories still seek personal gain over public good. An example would be MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but there are others. At some point, local politics must change or the mission will simply stall, but creating that change is not and cannot be the responsibility of military peacekeepers. It is, rather, the job of change-minded local leaders supported by diplomatic pressure that ties aid to compliance with peace accords, with the risk prosecution for war crimes and/or crimes against humanity—for which too many faction leaders in too many places bear enormous but untried responsibility—hovering in the background.

Implementing an imposed peace, of which Bosnia and Kosovo are present examples, entails even deeper problems. The cost of maintaining artificial stability in order to encourage or enforce political and economic change balances against the risk that strife might once again erupt should external props be removed and the flow of dollars and euros cease. Yet Bosnia and Kosovo are at least arguably part of Europe. Attempts to Westernize governments in places well outside the ambit of Western culture and politics, that have strong alternative governance models on which to draw, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, pose even stickier problems.

Astute military leaders recognize the trap that awaits forces consigned to political, economic, and/or social reconstruction tasks. Major militaries—the US military in particular—should continue to be wary of picking up the reconstruction sack just because they are widely viewed to have the strongest grip. The system of unit rotation alone, designed to give soldiers respite from the battle front, regularly weakens that grip at the crucial local level, lending a Sisyphean quality to military-led or -coordinated development work in the

constant re-learning of basic facts and re-building of personal relationships that are key to understanding, let alone influencing, local-level behavior. And while the energetic efforts of bright, competent leaders of tactical units like Provincial Reconstruction Teams can seem a model of good governance delivered on time, they also send the inadvertent message that local people should turn to the military if they want to improve their lives. This is not what a democratic transition would hope to achieve.

The reconstruction trap is harder for the military to avoid when there are not enough civilian counterparts to take on civil-side operational tasks. The US government has moved to remedy that deficit with a new, small State Department Office for the Coordination of Reconstruction and Stabilization, but the department has had a hard time convincing Congress to fund it. Indeed, there may never be a true civilian counterpart in the US government to the well-funded Pentagon, but that may not be a bad thing. No American should want the functional equivalent of a Colonial Office. Americans should, instead, support US capacity to contribute to a competent, effective, and civilian multilateral entity dedicated to coordinating UN, regional, and national peacebuilding capabilities, policies, and operations. Fortunately, there is enough civilian governing experience out in the rest of the world—at the national, provincial, and local levels—that such an entity, with an on-call cadre of peacebuilding specialists, is not beyond the realm of possibility. The need for it is well-recognized and the first, halting steps in its direction have been taken.[235]

Such peacebuilding capacity, even when fully deployed, is likely to be dwarfed in size and cost by the security forces deployed to protect it. The military components of even relatively calm peacekeeping operations are internationally-labor-intensive by comparison to such operations' civilian components or to the development efforts that may operate in parallel with them. Support for imposed peace must be even more robust and therefore costly. The preferred solution for reducing that cost and phasing out international military presence is of course to recruit, train, and equip local military and police forces. But local forces do not automatically function professionally with two or three rounds of training, nor are they automatically prepared to risk their lives to fight for the international community's (or, worse, the occupying power's) vision of what their government and society ought to be. Without compatible local and international visions of a country's political future, it is very difficult for the outsiders to let go of an imposed peace, yet very costly to hang on. This argues for the international community taking great care about where it places its bets—and its forces—in the future, lest past commitments soak up present forces and leave the future without champions.

NOTES

[1] Any ongoing field operation requires the periodic rotation of forces for rest, refit, and retraining. Most complex PSOs last for several years and therefore require ongoing rotations. The rule of thumb is that for every unit deployed there is one unit training to replace it and one unit in rest and refit. Assuming annual rotations, 135,000 troops in the field represents a total commitment of just over 400,000 troops to peace operations, globally. Since some countries rotate troops more frequently, at six to nine month intervals, the actual commitment level may be closer to half a million. This is the same order of magnitude as total US troop commitments to Iraq, 2003–05.

[2] The United Nations will spend about US $5 billion for peacekeeping operations in 2005–2006, or about $59,000 per person deployed. Troop units cost the United Nations the least per capita ,at about $24,000 per soldier per year (though UN reimbursement rates cover just 10-15 percent of wealthier troop contributors' operating costs). Troop units are still the largest line item in the UN peacekeeping budget, because three quarters of all UN peacekeeping personnel are troops in units. Military observers and UN police are the next most costly elements, as they receive UN per diem while deployed, although salaries continue to be picked up by their national employers. International civilians are the UN's most costly full-time personnel as the organization pays both their salaries and their per diem. Civilian staff hired locally by missions cost much less but requisite skills are often scarce. The costs of non-UN peace support operations are more difficult to estimate as most costs are borne directly by troop and police contributing states, which report these costs irregularly and inconsistently. A reasonable estimate for operations drawing troops from developed countries, however, is US $125,000–$250,000 per soldier per year; and for operations with troops from developing countries, about $13,000–$40,000. (See William J. Durch, with Tobias C. Berkman, "Restoring and Maintaining Peace: What We Know So Far," in *Twenty-first Century Peace Operations,* edited by William J. Durch (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006), ch. 1, annex. See also Michael Carnahan, William Durch, and Scott Gilmore, "Economic Impact of Peacekeeping" (Ottawa, Canada: Peace Dividend Trust for the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Best Practices Section, March 2006), www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/.) The total estimated cost of non-UN peacekeeping in 2003 was just under $7 billion, and the non-UN level of effort was relatively stable in the following two years. Allowing for inflation and especially higher costs of fuel since 2003, the estimated real global cost of $11–12 billion for all peace operations 2005 is probably conservative.

[3] Alan James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics* (New York: St. Martin's, 1990) and Birger Heldt and Peter Wallensteen, "Peacekeeping Operations: Global Patterns of Intervention and Success, 1948–2004," 2nd ed., research report (Sandöverken, Sweden: Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2006), 4.

[4] See, Bruce Jones with Feryal Cherif, "Evolving Models of Peacekeeping, Policy Implications and Responses," paper prepared for the Best Practices Unit, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (New York: New York University Center on

International Cooperation, 2004). See also Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, "Who's Keeping the Peace?" *International Security* 29:4 (Spring 2005), 157–95.

[5] For a good recent study see "Meeting the Challenges of Peace Operations: Cooperation and Coordination," Challenges Project Phase II Concluding Report, 2003–2006, main ed. Annika Hilding Norberg (Stockholm: Elanders Gotab for the Challenges Project and the Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2005).

[6] The United Nations has maintained a small advisory cell at African Union Headquarters in Addis Ababa since 2004 and in mid-2006 won approval for a larger, permanent African Peacekeeping Capacity advisory team with military and police advisers, logistics and communications experts, one administrative/financial expert and two support staff. See United Nations documents A/60/727, para. 118; A/60/807para. 56; and A/C5/60/L.62, para. 6d–e.

[7] The Indian force grew rapidly from 3,000 to 50,000 troops as the security situation deteriorated, ultimately withdrawing in 1990 after suffering nearly 1,200 killed and 3,000 wounded. L. N. Subramanian and P. V. S. Jagan Mohan "The Indian Army in Sri Lanka, 1987-90," available online at www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1987/. Alan Bullion, "The Indian Peace-Keeping Force in Sri Lanka," *International Peacekeeping* 1:2 (Summer 1994), 148–59.

[8] For analysis of the role of "greed" in many civil wars, see Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers*, October 2004.

[9] For further discussion see Halvor A. Hartz and Laura Mercean, with Clint Williamson, "Safeguarding a Viable Peace: Institutionalizing the Rule of Law," in Jock Covey, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Leonard R. Hawley, eds., *The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation* (Washington: US Institute of Peace Press, 2005), 157–198.

[10] Monty G. Marshall, "Global Trends in Violent Conflict," in *Peace and Conflict 2005,* ed. Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr (College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 2005), 11.

[11] Bruce Jones with Feryal Cherif, "Evolving Models of Peacekeeping, Policy Implications and Responses," paper prepared for the Best Practices Unit, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (New York: New York University Center on International Cooperation, 2004), 17–24.

[12] Although the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was authorized to use force beyond self-defense, and is therefore grouped with Chapter VII operations in Figure 1-2, the Council did not specifically invoke Chapter VII. ONUC's mandate was embodied in Security Council resolutions 143, 145, and 146 (1960) and resolutions 161 and 169 (1961). See Rosalyn Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946–1967, Documents and Commentary: Volume III: Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).

[13] I am grateful to Birger Heldt for reminding me of the Sinai Field Mission's use of contract personnel.

[14] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 'Background Note', April 30, 2005, www.un.org/depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm.

[15] Troop contributions drawn from GlobalSecurity.org, www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat_coalition.htm.

[16] See Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, "Armed Conflict and Its International Dimensions, 1946–2004," *Journal of Peace Research* 42(5): 623–635.

[17] Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: a Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts,* with contributions by Barbara Harff, Monty G. Marshall, James R. Scarritt (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993). Monty G. Marshall, "Measuring the Societal Impact of War," in *From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System,* edited by Fen Osler Hampson and David Malone (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers for the International Peace Academy, 2002).

[18] Monty G. Marshall, "Global Trends in Violent Conflict," in Marshall and Gurr, *Peace and Conflict 2005*, 11.

[19] "Category 05 – Substantial and prolonged warfare. Technology of destruction is at a high level but goals are limited and often ill-defined. Impetus to warfare is often sustained by issue complexities that make negotiation and compromise difficult. Warfare is intense but mostly confined to particular regions. Population dislocations may exceed one million; deaths range from one hundred thousand to half-a-million." Excerpted from Marshall, "Measuring the Societal Impact of War," 71.

[20] Marshall, "Global Trends in Violent Conflict," 3.

[21] Richard Cincotta, Robert Engleman, and Daniele Anastasion, *The Security Demographic: Population and Civil Conflict after the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Population Action International, 2003), 71.

[22] Ibid., 73.

[23] See, for example, the review of the conflict and peacebuilding literature in Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006). See also Diana Cammack, et al., "Donors and the 'Fragile States' Agenda: A Survey of Current Thinking and Practice," a report submitted to the Japan International Cooperation Agency (London: Overseas Development Institute, March 2006), esp. executive summary and annex 6, which lists fragile states as defined by different donor agencies' criteria.

[24] See Virginia Page Fortna, "Where Have All the Victories Gone? War Outcomes in Historical Perspective." Draft paper, version July 10, 2005.

[25] See, *Freedom in the World, 2005* (Washington, D.C.: Freedom House), summary essay. www.freedomhouse.org/research/index.htm. Over time, the number of countries that Freedom House rates as "free" has grown from 41 in 1974 to 76 in 1994 and 89 in 2004. See also Adrian Karatnycky and Peter Ackerman, *How Freedom is Won: From Civic Resistance to Durable Democracy* (Washington: Freedom House,

2005); Jack Goldstone and Jay Ulfelder, "How to Construct Stable Democracies," *The Washington Quarterly* (Winter 2004–05), 9–20; and, Monty G. Marshall, "Global Trends in Democratization," in Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr (eds.), *Peace and Conflict 2005* (College Park, Maryland: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, July 2005), 19–20.

[26] Population Reference Bureau, "2005 World Population Data Sheet," www.prb.org.

[27] United Nations, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping, Report of the Secretary-General*, A/47/277-S/24111, June 7, 1992.

[28] Joint Nordic Committee for Military UN Matters, *Nordic UN Stand-by Forces* (Stockholm: Norstedts Tryckeri, 1986).

[29] Victoria K. Holt, "The Responsibility to Protect: Considering the Operational Capacity for Civilian Protection" (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, January 2005), 20–26.

[30] An expeditionary military is one that is able to deploy a substantial fighting force some distance beyond national borders and sustain it there for an extended period of time.

[31] Robert M. Cassidy, *Peacekeeping in the Abyss: British and American Peacekeeping Doctrine and Practice after the Cold War* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 135–143. Note that, up through this period and several years beyond, the U.S. Marine Corps used its *Small Wars Manual* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1940), to reasonably good effect.

[32] UN, *An Agenda for Peace,* para. 20.

[33] United Nations, *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations*, A/50/60-S/1995/1, January 25, 1995, 6–7, 9.

[34] US Army, *Peace Operations,* Field Manual 100-23 (December 1994), v, 4, 6, 12–15. US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peace Operations,* Joint Publication 3-07.3 (February 12, 1999), vii–xii. For a more detailed discussion of FM 100-23, see Trevor Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 2002), 391–399.

[35] Findlay, *The Use of Force*, 399–402.

[36] Thierry Tardy, "French Policy Towards Peace Support Operations," International Peacekeeping, 6:1 (Spring 1999), 73. Joseph P. Gregoire, "The Bases of French Peace Operations Doctrine," Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy Series (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, September 2002), 4, at www.carlisle.army.mil/usassi/welcome.htm. There are two principal differences between how France defines its terms and how NATO uses those terms. NATO's English-French glossary translates peacekeeping as *maintien de la paix*. Peace enforcement is translated as *imposition de la paix* but defined as the impartial use of force, which does not involve the "defeat or destruction of an enemy," in order to "...to

maintain a ceasefire or peace agreement where the level of consent and compliance is uncertain and the threat of disruption is high." This translation is closest to how French doctrine defines *restauration de la paix* but the latter does not appear in the NATO lexicon. Should French and other NATO forces participate jointly in a future PSO, one would hope that any differences of interpretation will have been sorted out before commanders make a fatal misjudgment while transitioning from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), *Peace Support Operations*, AJP 3.4.1 (Brussels: 2001), 2–4. NATO Standardization Agency, *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*, AAP-6 (2004) (Brussels: December 2003), www.nato.int/docu/standard.htm#AAP.

[37] Gregoire, "Bases of French Peace Operations Doctrine," 5, 6.

[38] Sten Rynning, *Changing Military Doctrine: Presidents and Military Power in Fifth Republic France, 1958–2000* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), ch. 5. Also Findlay, *The Use of Force*, 404–405. For an excellent review of French doctrine and practice, see also Rachel E. Utley, "A Means to Wider Ends? France, Germany and Peacekeeping," in *Major Powers and Peacekeeping – Perspectives, Priorities and the Challenges of Military Intervention*, ed. Rachel E. Utley (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2006), 65–70.

[39] For definitions, discussion, and further links, see en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Powell_doctrine.

[40] Philip Wilkinson, "Sharpening the Weapons of Peace: Peace Support Operations and Complex Emergencies," In Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham, eds., *Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution* (Portland, Or: Frank Cass, 2000), 73–74.

[41] United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,* paras. 48, 50. The report's effort to redefine impartiality may not have penetrated all quarters of the UN system, however, especially the inter-governmental bodies like the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, whose membership is dominated, like that of the General Assembly, by developing states leery of "robust" peace operations. Dominick Donald, "Neutrality, Impartiality and UN Peacekeeping at the Beginning of the 21st Century," *International Peacekeeping* 9, no. 4, Winter 2002: 21–38.

[42] Ibid., paras. 53, 60.

[43] Chapter VII was drawn up to facilitate the creation of international collective action with international forces against international aggressors but that intent, laid down at the moment of peak Allied collaboration against the Axis Powers of World War II, was always more than the post-war political market would bear. Indeed, the most that it would bear until the end of the Cold War was traditional peacekeeping. The main exception—the Congo operation—precipitated both political and financial crises within the United Nations and occurred at a time when East-West relations at large had reached their nadir, with East Germany building the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union smuggling nuclear-tipped missiles into Cuba.

[44] White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Fact Sheet: NATO's New Strategic Concept," released by NATO April 24, 1999. online at: www.fas.org/man/nato/natodocs/99042450.htm.

[45] NATO, *Peace Support Operations*, AJP 3.4.1, July 2001, preface.

[46] Ibid., chapter 2, paras. 3–4.

[47] Ibid., chapter 3, paras. 1, 6, and 9.

[48] White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 9, 2002, p, 9. www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.

[49] US Army, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, Field Manual FM 3-07 (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, February 2003), 4–3, 4–6, 4–16. www.globalsecurity.org/ military/library/policy/army/fm/index.html.

[50] US Army, FM 3-07, 4–13.

[51] Ibid., 1–17.

[52] UK Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, *The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations,* JWP 3-50, 2nd ed. (Shrivenham, UK: June 2004), 2-5, 2-6, 2-14, 2-17–2-18.

[53] JWP 3-50, 2nd ed., 2-3.

[54] US Department of Defense (DoD), Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations," DoD Directive 3000.05, November 28, 2005, para. 3.1. This definition is considerably broader than a January 2005 draft that said stability operations "establish order in *failed or failing* states and regions." [Emphasis added.] States apparently no longer need to be failing to qualify.

[55] The language in the earlier draft was to restore "a viable market economy, and *self determination* in a healthy civil society." US DoD Directive 3000.cc, January 2005, para. 4.2. Rule of law and democratic institutions are more specific—and much more directive of local politics—than is self-determination.

[56] US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, Version 2.0, August 2005, 5, 9–10. www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/approved_ccjov2.pdf.

[57] JFCOM, *Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept*, "final draft" of September 2004, 3. www.dtic.mil/jointvision/finalstab_joc.doc. Accessed January 15, 2005.

[58] Ibid., 7, 9, 16, 26, 28, 40–45.

[59] JWP 3-50, 2nd ed., 2–13 and n22.

[60] Brahimi Report, para. 49.

[61] Thus, while Security Council resolutions routinely authorize use of "all necessary means" to implement Chapter VII mandates, better language would mandate the use of "all appropriate and proportionate means" to achieve mission objectives. Since several prominent troop contributors possess nuclear weapons, the Council presumably does not *really* mean that *all* military means are to be used as needed.

[62] UN, *Eighteenth Report of the S-G on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo* (MONUC), S/2005/506, August 2, 2005, paras. 31–36.

[63] UN, *Statement by the President of the Security Council,* S/PRST/2000/14, May 4, 2000. "The Security Council commends UNAMSIL forces and the Force Commander for the courage, resolve and sacrifice they have shown in attempting to bring this situation under control. It expresses its full support for their continued efforts to this end, and for the overall fulfillment of their mandate. It calls upon all States in a position to do so to assist the Mission in this regard."

[64] Ibid., paras. 21–30 and UN, *Seventeenth Report of the S-G on MONUC*, S/2005/167, March 15, 2005, paras. 11–19.

[65] World Food Program, "Fast Food: WFP's Emergency Response," www.wfp.org/aboutwfp/introduction.

[66] UN Joint Logistics Centre, "Brief Description," www.unjlc.org/content/index.phtml/itemID/9639.

[67] "UN Humanitarian Information Centres, " www.humanitarianinfo.org/abouthics.html.

[68] William J. Durch, "Picking Up the Peaces: The UN's Evolving Post-Conflict Role," *Washington Quarterly,* Autumn 2003.

[69] The UN secretary-general can, of course, launch diplomatic initiatives under his good offices function, using modest discretionary funds at his disposal; more substantial "special political missions" can be established with authorization from the Security Council or General Assembly and funding from the General Assembly. As of late 2005, some 2,300 UN personnel were serving in ten such "political and peacebuilding missions." For further information, see the UN Department of Political Affairs, www.un.org/Depts/dpa/prev_dip/fst_prev_dip.htm.

[70] United Nations, *Implementation of General Assembly resolutions 55/235 and 55/236, Report of the Secretary-General*, A/58/157/Add.1, December 17, 2003.

[71] United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000.

[72] Durch, Holt, et al., *Brahimi Report and the Future of Peace Operations*, 53, 130. United Nations, *Budget for the support account for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006, Report of the Secretary-General,* A/59/730, March 8, 2005, table 1; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Background

Note: UN Peacekeeping Operations," October 31, 2005; and United Nations, *Draft resolution submitted by the Chairman following informal consultations, Support Account for Peace Operations*, A/c.5/60/L.62, June 28, 2006.

[73] Durch, Holt, et al., *Brahimi Report and the Future of Peace Operations*, 90–93.

[74] United Nations, *Proposed Budget for the Support Account for Peacekeeping Operations for the Period 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006, Report of the Secretary-General,* A/59730, March 8, 2005. United Nations, *Proposed Budget for the Support Account for Peacekeeping Operations for the Period 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006, Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions*, A/59/784, April 18, 2005.

[75] Sixteen officers and four support staff were transferred in 2006 from the military division to DPKO's new Integrated Training Service. United Nations, *Financial performance report for [2004–05] and proposed budget for the support account for peacekeeping for [2006–07], Report of the ACABQ*, A/60/807, April 20, 2006, para. 75.

[76] The wet-lease policy grew out of the logistical nightmares of the mid-1990s, when the UN found itself procuring parts and supplies for hundreds of different types of vehicles, communications equipment and weapons for 80,000 troops.

[77] UN General Assembly, *Practical aspects of wet-lease, dry-lease and self-sustainment arrangements, Report of the Secretary-General*, A/57/397, September 11, 2002, paras. 26–29.

[78] UN DPKO, "Troops Contributors," monthly charts at www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/.

[79] UN DPKO, Best Practices Unit, *Lessons Learned Study on the Start-up Phase of the United Nations Mission in Liberia*, April 2004, 6, 11–12. www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/.

[80] United Nations, *Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, Report of the Secretary-General*, A/59/608, December 15, 2004, para. 4.

[81] The 23 current members of the Development Assistance Committee are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US For listing and details see www.oecd.org/dac/memberswebsites.

[82] There is little on the record as to why this is the case, perhaps because the answers would be embarrassing for the United Nations, for the demurring states, for Africa, or all of the above. The usual reason cited for developed state reluctance to work under UN command and control is experience with UN leadership in the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR, Bosnia, 1992–95). There is much finger-pointing in particular at the NATO-UN dual-key arrangement for summoning NATO close air support on

behalf of UNPROFOR. But while top UN civilian leaders were "deeply reluctant" to use air power lest it disrupt humanitarian operations, military officers in the UN's Balkans chain of command who approved or denied requests for NATO close air support were largely seconded from European NATO countries, and their governments and militaries were also deeply reluctant to oppose Serb aggression in Bosnia by force of arms. They were, moreover, focused closely on protecting their forces in the field and on the domestic political repercussions of not doing so. When Srebrenica, in eastern Bosnia, was attacked in July 1995, the UN's force commander in the Balkans and UNPROFOR's deputy commander in Sarajevo were seconded French officers. The commander of UNPROFOR (out of Bosnia at the time of the Srebrenica crisis) was British. The force commander's chief of staff, UNPROFOR's chief of staff in Sarajevo, and the acting commander of UNPROFOR Sector Northeast (to whom the UN's Dutch battalion in Srebrenica reported) were Dutch. Although the UN's approval procedures for close air support were confusing and time-consuming, most of the requests for air support from the battalion never made it far enough up the chain to reach UN civilians. Owing to reporting and processing delays within UNPROFOR, a critical final request for air support made on the morning of the day Srebrenica was overrun did not reach the civilian Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) until noon. The SRSG approved the request 17 minutes later. NATO aircraft began bombing Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) targets two hours later. The BSA threatened to shell Srebrenica's civilian population and kill the Dutch troops that it held hostage, whereupon the Dutch government launched a full-court, high-level diplomatic initiative to get the UN and NATO to call off the air action, which they did. Between seven and eight thousand men and boys in and around Srbebrenica were subsequently massacred by Serb forces. European militaries' and European governments' reluctance to use force in a timely fashion appears, therefore, to have been at least as great a contributing factor to the debacle as were UN policies and decision-making.

[83] See Victoria K. Holt and Elisabeth W. Dallas, "On Trial: The US Military and the International Criminal Court," Report No. 55 (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, March 2006), 58–60.

[84] Freedom House has rated countries on political rights and civil liberties since the early 1970s. In 1974, of 152 countries, 41 were judged free, 48 partly free, and 63 not free; in 2005, of 192 countries, 89 were judged free, 58 partly free, and 45 not free. Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2006* (Arlington, VA: Freedom House, March 2006). For individual annual ratings, see Freedom House, "Freedom in the World Comparative Rankings: 1973–2005," spreadsheet, www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15.

[85] Michael J. Dziedzic, "Introduction," in Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Eliot M. Goldberg, *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1998), 8–16. Australian Federal Police, "International Deployment," website, www.afp.gov.au/international/IDG.

[86] The following summary of police deployment rates is based on data gathered from nearly 100 UN progress reports on each UN operation since 1989 that has deployed civilian police. For citations, please contact the author.

[87] United Nations, *Nineteenth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,* S/2005/603, September 26, 2005, 13. Also UN DPKO, "Mission by Country" troop contributor tables, July–October 2005. www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/95-05.htm.

[88] Training classes for international students began in November 2005. Slated to participate were officers from Cameroon, India, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Morocco, and Senegal. The United States is helping fund the training program as part of the Global Peace Operations Initiative. US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, "US Support to the New Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units," press release, Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2005.

[89] United Nations, *Budget for the support account for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, Report of the Secretary-General*, A/60/727, March 23, 2007, para. 237.

[90] William J. Durch, "Strengthening UN Secretariat Capacity for Civilian Post-Conflict Response," paper prepared for the Center on International Cooperation, New York University, for discussion at the conference on Strengthening the UN's Capacity on Civilian Crisis Management, Copenhagen, Denmark, June 8, 2004.

[91] United Nations, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change (New York: 2004), 83–85. Over time, the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) concept shrank from 21 posts to just 15 in the final configuration. The final arrangement is top-heavy, with three director-level posts (for finance, planning, and policy analysis) each directing just two or three professional staff. Since directors must be approved by the General Assembly, this structure suggests a strategy for later augmentation of the PBSO via extra-budgetary posts funded by individual donor countries. United Nations, *2005 World Summit Outcome: Peacebuilding Support Office. Report of the Secretary-General*, A/60/694, February 23, 2006.

[92] There is, of course, much more to be said about how to define peace operations' impact on their operating environments and whether or not that impact is, on balance, positive, and for whom. For a good discussion, see Heldt and Wallensteen, "Success Rates of Peacekeeping Operations," 33–37.

[93] Marc Lacey, "UN Forces Using Tougher Tactics to Secure Peace," *New York Times*, May 23, 2005, A1.

[94] Author interview, European Union Council Secretariat, Brussels, May 2005.

[95] Amnesty International, "Protecting the Human Rights of Women and Girls Trafficked for Forced Prostitution in Kosovo," May 6, 2004, ch. 6. web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR700102004.

[96] International Crisis Group, "Policing The Police In Bosnia: A Further Reform Agenda," Europe Report N°130 (Brussels: Crisis Group, May 2002), 31–32.

[97] Ibid. and Human Rights Watch, "Hopes Betrayed: Trafficking of Women and Girls to Post-Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina for Forced Prostitution," November 2002.

[98] Rasmussen, Jane, "MONUC: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, End of Assignment Report," February 25, 2005, 1. www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/. United Nations, Office of Internal Oversight Services, *Investigation by the OIOS Into Allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo*, A/59/661, January 5, 2005, paras 8–9, 44.

[99] United Nations Department of Public Information, "UN Establishes Peacekeeping Conduct and Discipline Units," press release PKO/120, August 3, 2005. www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/pko120.doc.htm.

[100] United Nations, *A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,* A/59/710, March 24, 2005, paras. 15–22, 32–35, 41.

[101] Paul F. Diehl, "New Roles for Regional Organizations," in *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*, ed. Pamela Aall, Chester Crocker, and Fen Osler Hampson (Washington: US Institute of Peace Press, forthcoming).

[102] Alex Vines, "Monitoring UN sanctions in Africa: the role of panels of experts," in *Verification Yearbook 2003,* Trevor Findlay. London: VERTIC, 2003, 247–263.

[103] Comfort Ero and Jonathan Temin, "Sources of Conflict in West Africa," in *Exploring Subregional Conflict: Opportunities for Conflict Prevention*, ed. Chandra Lekha Sriram and Zoe Nielsen (Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 112.

[104] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 2004–2005* (London: Oxford University Press for the IISS, October 2004), country tables, arms trade tables.

[105] Birger Heldt, "UN-Led or Non-UN-led Peacekeeping Operations?" Draft of August 27, 2004, Stockholm, Folke Bernadotte Academy. For further discussion of relative success and how it is affected by situational or mission difficulty, see Durch and Berkman, "Restoring and Maintaining Peace."

[106] Paul F. Diehl, "Conclusion: Patterns and Discontinuities in Regional Conflict Management," in *Regional Conflict Management*, ed. Paul F. Diehl and Joseph Lepgold (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 275.

[107] Carolyn M. Shaw, "Conflict Management in Latin America," in *Regional Conflict Management*, ed. Diehl and Lepgold, 123–149. See also Hilaire McCoubrey and Justin Morris, "The Organization of American States and the Security of the Western Hemisphere," in McCoubrey and Morris, *Regional Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), 93–124.

[108] Monica Herz and João Pontes Nogueira, *Ecuador vs. Peru: Peacemaking Amid Rivalry*, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 61–63.

[109] United Nations General Assembly, A/RES/59/20, January 27, 2005, para. 8.

[110] Michael G. Smith and Moreen Dee, "East Timor," in *Twenty-first-Century Peace Operations*, ed. William J. Durch (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2006), ch. 6.

[111] In June 1992, its Council of Ministers issued the "Petersberg Declaration," which stated that military units of WEU states could be employed under authority of the WEU for "humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; [and] tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking." Subsequently, WEU members mounted "Operation Sharp Guard" (1993–96) in the Adriatic Sea, in conjunction with NATO, to enforce the UN arms embargo on the Former Yugoslavia and set up riverine patrols on the Danube during the same period to help Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria enforce the same embargo. For the origins and a brief history of the Western European Union, consult its website, www.weu.int.

[112] Alyson J. K. Bailes, *The European Security Strategy: An Evolutionary History* (Sölna, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI], February 2005), 4.

[113] Helios 2A was launched in December 2004. Tariq Malik, "Ariane 5 Successfully Orbits France's Helios 2A Satellite," *Space.com,* December 18, 2004. www.space.com/missionlaunches/ariane5_helios_launch_041218.html.

[114] Jean-Yves Haine, "An Historical Perspective," in *EU Security and Defence Policy: The First Five Years (1999–2004)*, ed. Nicole Gnesotto (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 36.

[115] Bailes, *The European Security Strategy*, 4.

[116] Caroline R. Earle, "European Capacities for Peace Operations: Taking Stock," issue brief (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, March 2004, 4. www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=125.

[117] Elmar Brok and Norbert Gresch, untitled contribution in *EU Security and Defence Policy,* ed. Gnesotto, 184. Julian Lindley-French and Franco Algieri, *A European Defence Strategy* (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation, 2004), 10. Michele Flournoy, Julianne Smith, Guy Ben-Ari, Kathleen McInnis, and David Scruggs, "European Defense Integration: Bridging the Gap Between Strategies and Capabilities" (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 12, 2005), 19.

[118] UK Parliament, Select Committee on European Union, "EU Battlegroups, Letter from Rt Hon Geoffrey Hoon MP, Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence to the Chairman," February 19, 2005, www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldselect/ldeucom/16/16100.htm.

[119] Interview, EU Council Secretariat, Brussels, May 3, 2005.

[120] "Berlin-plus" built upon results of a 1996 WEU ministerial meeting in Berlin that arranged for NATO-WEU operational cross-support.

[121] Flournoy and others, "European Defense Integration."

[122] IISS, *Military Balance, 2004–05*, 75, 281–287. Originally to be 300 aircraft.

[123] Airbus Military, "A400M," 2004. www.airbusmilitary.com/.

[124] Haine, "An Historical Perspective," 132. In addition to its primarily military operations, the EU has supported a number of smaller policing and rule of law missions. These include EUJUST THEMIS in Georgia (to assist government of Georgia in reforming criminal justice system and improving legislative procedures), EUPOL Kinshasa in the DRC (setting up and training an integrated police unit), EU COPPS Palestine (support to Palestinian police reform), EUSEC DRC (advice and assistance for security sector reform), support to AMIS II in Darfur (planning advice, training and assistance), and EUJUST LEX in Iraq (training officials to strengthen the criminal justice system on human rights issues). For details, see Giovanni Grevi, Dov Lynch and Antonio Missirolli, "ESDP Operations," in *EU Security and Defence Policy, ed.* Gnesotto, ch. 9.

[125] AFP, "EU Approves Plan for DR Congo Election Force," Brussels, March 23, 2006. Idem, "Germany Says EU Force to Stay in DR Congo Till New Government in Place," March 31, 2006. Pan African News Agency, "EU Unveils Quick Reaction Force for DR Congo," Brussels, April 5, 2006.

[126] Peter Viggo Jacobsen, "The Emerging EU Civilian Crisis Management Capacity," paper prepared for the Center on International Cooperation, New York University, for discussion at the conference on Strengthening the UN's Capacity on Civilian Crisis Management, Copenhagen, Denmark, June 8, 2004, 4, 7.

[127] Interview, EU Council Secretariat, Brussels, May 4, 2005.

[128] Gustav Lindstrom, "On the Ground: ESDP Operations," *EU Security and Defence Policy*, ed. Gnesotto, 125–126.

[129] Ibid., 126.

[130] Catriona Gourlay, "Rosters for the Deployment of Civilian Experts in Peace Operations," a lessons learned study (New York: UN DPKO, Best Practices Section, February 2006), 22–23.

[131] Office of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, *Vision of the African Union and Missions of the African Union Commission,* Final Draft, March 2004.

[132] African Chiefs of Defence Staff, *Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee,* parts I and II, adopted 15–16 May 2003.

[133] Victoria K. Holt with Moira K. Shanahan, "African Capacity-Building for Peace Operations: UN Collaboration with the African Union and ECOWAS," report produced by the Stimson Center Future of Peace Operations program under a grant

from the United States Institute of Peace (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2005), 16–19.

[134] United Nations, *Monthly report of the Secretary-General on Darfur*, S/2005/ 305, May 10, 2005, para. 11, and "Sudan: NATO drops plan to coordinate Darfur airlift," Reuters (Brussels), June 8, 2005. www.reliefweb.int/rw/dbc.nsf/doc108?OpenForm&emid=ACOS-635PJQ&rc=1.

[135] S/2005/305, para. 29. African Union, Peace and Security Council, "Briefing Note on the Renewal of the Mandate of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS)," AU document PSC/PR/2(XLII), October 20, 2005. United Nations, *Monthly report of the Secretary-General on Darfur*, S/2005/825, December 23, 2005.

[136] UN Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs, Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), "SUDAN: SC urges quick planning for proposed UN Darfur mission ," March 29, 2006, www.irinnews.org/frontpage.asp?SelectRegion=East_Africa.

[137] Ken Bacon, "UN Peace monitors creating pockets of security in Darfur," *Sudan Tribune* online, February 26, 2005. www.sudantribune.com/article_impr.php3?id_article=8245. Otto Bakano, "Sudan Warns Against UN Involvement," *Mail and Guardian Online*, March 8, 2006. www.mg.co.za.

[138] Lea-Lisa Westerhoff, "African Union quadruples its budget," *Mail and Guardian Online*, December 7, 2004. www.mg.co.za.

[139] Nina M. Serafino, "The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress," RL32773 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, updated June 25, 2005), summary and 3.

[140] In the context of Africa, "regional" refers to the northern, western, eastern, southern, and central sections of the continent. "Sub-regional" refers to elements of those regions. Thus, West Africa is a region; the Mano River Basin (encompassing Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone) is a sub-region.

[141] Ero and Temin, "Sources of Conflict in West Africa", 112.

[142] LCOL Mike Denning, "Creating an Effective African Standby Force," *Parameters* (Winter 2004-05), 111.

[143] Eric G. Berman, "French, UK, and US Policies to Support Peacekeeping in Africa: Current Status and Future Prospects," NUPI Paper No. 622 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, February 2002), 28–29.

[144] Holt and Shanahan, "African Capacity-Building," 23–24.

[145] Funmi Olonisakin, "African Peacekeeping at the Crossroads: An Assessment of the Continent's Evolving peace and Security Architecture," External Study for the UN Dept. of Peacekeeping Operations Best Practices Unit, September 2004.

[146] Alex Ramsbotham, Alhaji M. S. Bah, and Fanny Calder, "Enhancing African peace and security capacity: a useful role for the UK and the G8?" *International Affairs* (London) 81 no. 2 (2005), 74.

[147] Holt and Shanahan, "African Capacity-Building," 19–20.

[148] US Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, "Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 2005," compiled by the Treaty Affairs Staff (Washington, DC, 2005): 165, 177, 254, 398.

[149] Japanese officials have assured their public that the engineering battalion based near Samawah in south-central Iraq is not in a "combat" environment, despite the ongoing insurgency. Anthony Faiola and Sachiko Sakamaki, "Japan Extends Its Military Presence in Iraq," *Washington Post*, December 9, 2004, www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A50633-2004Dec9?language=printer. Global Security.org, "Non-US Forces in Iraq—15 March 2005," www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat_coalition.htm.

[150] *NATO Handbook* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001),149–152. www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/index.htm.

[151] "NATO's International Staff," www.shape.nato.int/issues/international_staff/index.html.

[152] NATO, "The Role of the International Military Staff," www.nato.int/ims/docu/ims.htm.

[153] Paul Gallis, *NATO's Decision-Making Procedure* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 5, 2003), 2–3.

[154] "NATO's Command Structure: Old and New," www.nato.int/ims/docu/command-structure.htm.

[155] NATO, *Istanbul Summit Reader's Guide* (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, October 2004), 19.

[156] Elizabeth Cousens and David Harland, "Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina," chap. 2 in *Twenty-first-Century Peace Operations*, edited by William J. Durch (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, forthcoming). Also Michael J. Dziedzic and Andrew Bair, "Bosnia and the International Police Task Force," in Oakley, Dziedzic, and Goldberg, *Policing the New World Disorder*, 281–284.

[157] Plamen Pantev, et al., "Balkan Regional Profile: The Security Situation and the Region-Building Evolution of Southeastern Europe," No. 68 (Sofia: Institute for Security and International Studies, December 2004). cms.isn.ch/public/docs/-doc_10513_259_en.pdf.

[158] Cousens and Harland, "Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina," n. 93. Other relevant costs of international involvement in the Balkans since 1992 include: The UN operation, UNPROFOR (1992–95, in both Croatia and Bosnia), about $4.5 billion.

William J. Durch and James A. Schear, "Faultlines: United Nations Operations in the Former Yugoslavia," in *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s* (New York: St. Martin's, 1996), table 6A. Emergency humanitarian aid, tracked by UN OCHA from 1994 to 2002, cost about $5 billion. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Financial Tracking System, "Complex Emergencies." www.reliefweb.int/fts. Development aid from 1992 to 2002 amounted to $28–30 billion. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, "Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows, 2004 – Parts I & II," www.sourceoecd.org . The two NATO enforcement actions, "Deliberate Force" (1995) and "Allied Force" (1999) cost on the order of $3–6 billion, depending on assumptions made about the proportion of the effort undertaken by US and allied war planes. See Nina M. Serafino, and Stephen Daggett, "Costs of Major US Wars and Recent US Overseas Military Operations," CRS Report for Congress, RS21013, updated October 3, 2001.

[159] Michael J. Dziedzic, "Kosovo," chap. 5 in *Twenty-first Century Peace Operations*, ed. Durch.

[160] NATO, "NATO in Afghanistan," press factsheet, January 19, 2006. www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/050816-factsheet.htm.

[161] Suppressed during the final year of Taliban rule, poppy production has ballooned since the Taliban's ouster in late 2001. According to survey data from the UN Office of Drugs and Crime, production of opium gum in Afghanistan soared to 3,600 tons in 2003 and 4,200 tons in 2004, accounting for 87 percent of total world production. Over [500,000] Afghan families participate in growing poppy, and cultivation has been spreading rapidly despite desultory government efforts to prevent it. Poppy is a very productive and drought-resistant weed and Afghan family farmers turn to it for want of other revenue-producing crops. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Afghan Transition Government, Counter Narcotics Directorate, "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004," Kabul and Vienna: November 2004).

[162] Amin Tarzi, 'Analysis: Karzai Turns Warlord Into Potential Ally', Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, January 19, 2005. www.rferl.org/featuresarchive/country/afghanistan.html (archive).

[163] NATO, *Istanbul Reader's Guide*, 10.

[164] NATO, *Istanbul Reader's Guide*, 57.

[165] Global Security.org, "US Navy," www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/navy/index.html

[166] Global Security.org, "F/A-18 Hornet," www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-18-specs.htm.

[167] James Murphy, "An-124-100s Enter Service with NATO," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, March 29, 2006, 21. The initial three-year contract with Leipzig-based Ruslan SALIS GmbH (a German subsidiary of the Russian Volga-Dnepr Group), provides two aircraft on full-time charter, makes two available on six days notice, and a final two on

nine days notice. The cost of the initial contract in the first year was a reported €38 million, plus usage fees.

[168] NATO, *Istanbul Reader's Guide*, 51.

[169] IISS, *The Military Balance, 2004–2005* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 26. Also Federation of American Scientists, "US Ready Reserve Force," October 1998, www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/rrf.htm.

[170] Andrew F. Cooper, "Dueling labels in International Relations: The two faces of "Coalitions of the Willing," paper to be presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Winnipeg, June 3–5, 2004. Draft, 3–12.

[171] Ibid, 13–17.

[172] United Nations, *Letter Dated 29 November 1992 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,* S/24868, November 30, 1992, 5.

[173] UN Security Council, *Letter dated 19 January 1993 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the United Nations Security Council*, S/25126, January 19, 1993. Also Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Washington: DC: NDU Press, 1995), 17.

[174] United Nations, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 885 (1993) to Investigate Armed Attacks on UNOSOM II Personnel Which Led to Casualties Among Them,* S/1994/653, June 1, 1994.

[175] Terrence Lyons and Ahmed Samatar, *Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction*, Brookings Occasional Paper (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995); William J. Durch, "Introduction to Anarchy: Humanitarian Intervention and 'State-building' in Somalia," in Durch (ed.), *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 311–365; and Mark Bowden, *Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999).

[176] United Nations Security Council Resolution 940, S/RES/940 (1994), July 31, 1994, operative para. 4.

[177] See Chetan Kumar, "Peacebuilding in Haiti," in Elizabeth Cousens and Chetan Kumar, eds., Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001). See also Janice Stromsem and Joseph Trincellito, "Building the Haitian National Police," Haiti Papers No. 6 (Washington, DC: Trinity College Haiti Program, 2003), and Robert Maguire, "US Policy Toward Haiti: Engagement or Estrangement?" Haiti Papers No. 8 (Washington, DC: Trinity College Haiti Program, 2003).

[178] The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1542, creating the UN Stability Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), in April 2004, authorizing deployment of 6,700 troops and 1,622 civilian police (including six formed police units of 125 each,

primarily for crowd control). As of May 2005, battalion-strength troop contributors included Brazil (1,200), Uruguay (772), Sri Lanka (750), Jordan and Nepal (748 each), Argentina (548), and Chile (533). Police units were contributed by China, Jordan (2), Nepal, and Pakistan (2). United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti*, S/2005/313, May 13, 2005; and S/2005/313/add.1, June 23, 2005. Security Council Resolution 1608, June 22, 2005, increased troop strength by one battalion (750), plus 50 more staff officers, and increased police strength by 275, including a 7th formed police unit, anticipating the need for greater security in the run-up to elections and to ease the transition to the new government.

[179] Michael G. Smith and Moreen Dee, "East Timor, 1999–2003," in *Twenty-first-Century Peace Operations*, ed. Durch, chap 6, at notes 47–48.

[180] Australian National Audit Office, *Management of Australian Defence Force Deployments to East Timor,* Audit Report No. 38, 2001–02 (Canberra: ANAO and Department of Defence, 2002), 35.

[181] The next largest contributor, Thailand, sent 1,600 troops. Altogether, twenty-two states contributed troops to the coalition. .Smith and Dee, "East Timor," at note 61.

[182] Alan Ryan, "Australian Army Cooperation with the Land Forces of the United States: Problems of the Junior Partner," Working Paper No. 121 (Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, January 2003), 20–23. Also, "Operation Stabilise, Timor Crisis: American Forces," www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/timor-orbat.htm.

[183] Smith and Dee, "East Timor," at note 59. Budget data from IISS, *The Military Balance, 1999–2000*, 183.

[184] J Alexander Thier, "Afghanistan," in *Twenty-first-Century Peace Operations*, ed. Durch, chap. 7 at note 106.

[185] *Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions* (the "Bonn Agreement"), Annex I: International Security Force. December 5, 2001, online at: www.usip.org/library/pa/afghanistan/pa_afghan_12052001.html.

[186] For coalition composition, see IISS, *The Military Balance*, editions 2002–03 through 2004–05 (London: Oxford University Press, 2002–04). For the initial composition of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF I), see *Letter dated 14 March 2002 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General*, S/2002/274, March 15, 2002. ISAF reports quarterly to the Security Council.

[187] Stimson Center calculations based on data derived from *The Military Balance* (various years) and globalsecurity.org.

[188] Fernando Faria, *Crisis Management in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Role of the European Union*, Occasional paper no. 51 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, April 2004), 42–43.

[189] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute *SIPRI Yearbook 2006: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 2006), ch. 8: "Military Expenditure." The amount quoted is in current US dollars. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated that global military expenditures topped $1.1 trillion in 2004, using the purchasing power parity method to estimate the effective spending of China and states of the former Soviet Union. See IISS, *The Military Balance, 2006* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the IISS, June 2006), 403.

[190] See, for example, Deborah Avant, *Conserving Nature in the State of Nature: Tragic Choices for INGO Policy Implementers*, paper presented at the meeting of the Structure and Organization of Government Research Committee of the International Political Science Association, George Washington University, Washington, DC, May 22–24, 2003. www.sog-rc27.org/Paper/DC/Avant.doc

[191] US DoD, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, "DoD Active Duty Military Personnel Strength Levels Fiscal Years 1950–2002," web1.whs.osd.mil/mmid/military/ms9.pdf, accessed September 20, 2005. Idem., "DoD Civilian Strength, Fiscal Years 1950 to 2001," web1.whs.osd.mil/mmid/civilian/civtop.htm, accessed September 20, 2005. Peter W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 53. IISS, *The Military Balance, 1988–89* (London: IISS, 1989), 19, 23; idem, *The Military Balance, 1999–2000* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1999), 21, 24. SIPRI, "Military Expenditure Database," accessed September 20, 2005, www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_database1.html.

[192] Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 64.

[193] OMB, *Circular A-76*, August 4, 1983 (Revised 1999), http//www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a076/a076.html.

[194] Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 47.

[195] Ibid., 75

[196] United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation*, HC 577 (London: The Stationary Office, February 12, 2002), 8

[197] Avant, "The Privatization of Security," 153–154

[198] Lewis, Paul, "It's Not Just Governments that Make War and Peace Now," *The New York Times*, November 28, 1998, www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/issues/private.htm.

[199] Garrett Mason, "UN Peacekeeping and the Private Sector," *IPOA Quarterly*, October 5, 2004, 1.

[200] SourceWatch, a project of the Center for Media and Democracy, "Pacific Architects and Engineers, Inc." www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Pacific_Architects_and_Engineers%2C_Inc. United Nations, *Note to the Under Secretary-General for Management*, Summary of the work of the Fifth Committee during the first part of the resumed 56th session, March 4–19, 2002, www.un.org/ga/56/fifth/roundup56resumed1.htm.

[201] United Nations, *First Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire*, S/2004/443, June 2, 2004, www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/0/7d940b3a82fecc2d85256eb30059bfd9?OpenDocument.

[202] Damian Lilly, "The Privatization of Peacekeeping: Prospects and Realities," *Disarmament Forum*, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, No. 3, 2000, 5; Traci Hukill, "Firms seek to sell U.N. on privatized peacekeeping," *National Journal*, May 17, 2004; IRIN, "US hires private company to train 4,000-man army," February 15, 2005; Singer, *Corporate Warriors,* 183; and Avant, *The Market For Force,* 16, 18.

[203] Singer, *Corporate Warriors*, 184; Lilly, "The Privatization of Peacekeeping," 4–6.

[204] Doug Brooks, "Statement Before the United States House of Representatives Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on Africa" in *Proceedings of Peacekeeping in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities,* Washington, DC, October 9, 2004 , 3

[205] Deborah Avant, "Privatized Military Training," *Foreign Policy In Focus* 7, no. 6 (May 2002).

[206] International Peace Operations Association, *Supporting the MONUC Mandate with Private Services* (Alexandria, VA: IPOA, January 2003), IPOA Concept Paper. IPOA's Brooks suggested that AirScan's fees could be paid from part of the US contribution to the MONUC mission budget. This would be a wash for the United States but a net loss in funding for the UN, which would then also be working with a contractor taking its orders from Washington rather than one that the UN itself vets, hires, and directs.

[207] "DoD Report to Congressional Committees As Required by the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2005, PL 108-375, section 1206 (October 28, 2004), 12, n. 26. Online at www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/1206report.pdf.

[208] Major Christopher D. Croft, *Contractors on the Battlefield: Has the Military Accepted Too Much Risk?* (Ft. Leavenworth: Army Command and General Staff College, 2001), 26.

[209] See, for example, Lisa Myers and the NBC investigative unit, "Security contractors largely unregulated: Pentagon monitors conduct but doesn't assist with hiring," February 16, 2005.

[210] Singer, "Outsourcing the War," *Salon.com*, April 16, 2004. US Congress, Government Accountability Office (GAO), "Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve Use of Private Security Providers," report no. GAO-05-737 (Washington, DC: July 2005), 23–26.

[211] Isenberg, *A Fistful of Contractors*, 24–25

[212] GAO, "Rebuilding Iraq," 37.

[213] AFP, "British SAS mull bonus to halt exodus," February 15, 2005.

[214] See, for example, Robert Perito, *Where is the Lone Ranger When You Need Him?* (Washington, DC: USIP, 2005).

[215] Clayton Hirst, "Dogs of war to face new curbs in Foreign Office crackdown: Regulations planned for security firms amid claims that 'any Joe Public can get a Kalashnikov and work abroad,'" *The Independent*, March 13, 2005.

[216] Republic of South Africa, *Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Bill*, B54–97, 1997, www.info.gov.za/gazette/bills/1997/b54-97.pdf.

[217] Andy Clarno and Salim Vally, "Iraq: The South Africa Connection," ZNet, March 6, 2005. www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=12061. Tom Gjelten, "US Hired Mercenaries as Bodyguards in Iraq," *Morning Edition* (National Public Radio), February 15, 2005.

[218] Fred Bridgland, "South Africa to bring 'dogs of war' to heel...but let nationals join al Qaeda," *Sunday Herald*, April 9, 2006, www.sundayherald.com/print55032.

[219] Singer, *Corporate Warriors,* 132. Such arguments, while self-interested, may also reflect market realities. Thus, US economic sanctions against Sudan, for example, have not prevented Chinese energy companies from stepping in to fill the void left by the absence of American companies.

[220] The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261–3267 (2000).

[221] For example, those providing protection at US embassies. Davis Brown, "Civilians and Contractors Deployed Overseas: Who's Law Applies?" Genium Group, Washington, DC, *IPOA Quarterly*, April 2005. For extensive discussion of possible options for national regulation (including registration, licensing, and monitoring), see Scheier and Caparini, "Privatising Security," 117 ff.

[222] Singer, "Outsourcing War," *Foreign Affairs*, March 1, 2005.

[223] The 1977 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions denies mercenaries the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war, and defines them as follows:
A mercenary is any person who:
   a. Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;
   b. Does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
   c. Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party;
   d. Is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;
   e. Is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and
   f. Has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.

(Geneva Conventions Protocol 1, Article 47, 1977, www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/93.htm.)

The Organization of African Unity outlawed mercenaries in 1977 under the Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa. The Convention borrowed almost verbatim the mercenary definition in Protocol I, but added:
The crime of mercenarism is committed by the individual, group or association, representative of a State or the State itself who *with the aim of opposing by armed violence a process of self-determination, stability or the territorial integrity of another State*, practices any of the following acts:

    a. Shelters, organizes, finances, assists, equips, trains, promotes, supports or in any manner employs bands of mercenaries;

    b. Enlists, enrolls, or tries to enrol [sic] in the said bands; [or]

    c. Allows the activities mentioned in paragraph (a) to be carried out in any territory under its jurisdiction or in any place under its control or affords facilities for transit, transport or other operations of the above mentioned forces [my italics].

(Organization of African Unity, *Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa*, July 3, 1977, www.africanreview.org/docs/conflict/mercen.pdf.)

The 1989 International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, drafted after nine years of negotiations, also attempted to outlawed mercenary behavior, but suffered from the same legal shortcomings as its predecessors. Its primary definition for mercenarism borrows the overly prescriptive language of Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, while secondary definitions include references to the financial "motivation" of the actors in question, and the use of violence "aimed at...[o]verthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining the constitutional order of a State; or...undermining the territorial integrity of a State." United Nations General Assembly, *International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries*, A/RES/44/34, November 11, 1989. The Convention did not come into force until October 20, 2001, after Costa Rica became the 22nd state party. Todd S. Milliard, "Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call to Recognize and Regulate Private Military Companies," *Military Law Review* no. 176 (2003). Of 35 states parties to the Convention, none is five permanent member of the UN Security Council. United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, "Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General," untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treaty6.asp. The UK House of Commons has declared the UN definition of mercenaries "unworkable for practical purposes," while the United States has no plans sign the Convention. UK House of Commons Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Ninth Report*, HC 813 (London: The Stationary Office, August 1, 2002, www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmfaff/922/92204.htm.

[224] For discussion, see, for example, Schreier and Caparini, "Privatising Security," 116.

[225] International Peace Operations Association, "Code of Conduct," March 31, 2005. www.ipoaonline.org/code.htm.

[226] Clayton Hirst, "Dogs of War to Face New Curbs in Foreign Office Crackdown," *The Independent*, March 13, 2005.

227 In the first quarter of 2006 alone, more than 1,000 Africans died trying to make the 600-mile crossing from the mainland to the Spanish-run Canary Islands, en route to Europe. Mar Roman, "More Africans Arrive in Canary Islands," *Washington Post*, April 4, 2006, A1. During fiscal year 2005, along the southwestern US border with Mexico, a record high number of persons died trying to enter the country illegally (415 between October 1, 2004 and September 1, 2005). William Finn Bennett, "Border Death Toll Sets Record," *North County Times* (San Diego), September 1, 2005. www.nctimes.com.

228 Lawrence Freedman, *The Transformation of Strategic Affairs*, Adelphi Paper No. 379 (New York: Routledge for the IISS, 2006).

229 Gallis, *NATO's Decision-Making Procedure*, 5–6. United Nations General Assembly, "Uniting for Peace," A/RES/377 A (V), November 3, 1950.

230 Kristiana Powell, *The African Union's Emerging Peace and Security Regime,* Monograph 119 (Tshwane, South Africa: May 2005), 36–38.

231 UN DPKO, Best Practices Unit, *Lessons Learned Study on the Start-up Phase of the United Nations Mission in Liberia*, April 2004. www.un.org/depts/depts/lessons.

232 Anna Leander, "The Market for Force and Public Security: The Destabilizing Consequences of Private Military Companies," *Journal of Peace Research* 42 no. 5, 2005, 605.

233 For a survey of this literature, see William J. Durch, with Tobias C. Berkman, "Restoring and Maintaining Peace: What We Know So Far," ch. 1 in Durch, ed., *Twenty-first-Century Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2006). See also Michael Doyle, *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*: (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 2006), chapter 2.

234 For alternative views on the feasibility of democracy as a PSO's necessary leave-behind, see Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004) and Jack A. Goldstone and Jay Ulfelder, "How to Construct Stable Democracies," *The Washington Quarterly* 28, no. 1: 9–20.

235 United Nations, *2005 World Summit Outcome*, A/60/L.1, September 20, 2005, paras. 97–105.

Annex: Source Tables for Figures 1 and 2, Uniformed Personnel in Peace Operations, 1948-2005

Acronym	Region	Country	Auth'n	1948	1949	1950–4	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
UNMOGIP	CSA	India, Pakistan	UN-6		20	50	50	50	50	50	50
OAS Military Experts Commission	LAC	Costa Rica, Nicaragua	Other				27				
UNTSO	MENA	Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria	UN-6	572	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
UNEF I	MENA	Israel, Egypt	UN-6					3,000	6,000	6,000	5,300
UNOGIL	MENA	Lebanon	UN-6							590	

Acronym	Region	Country	Auth'n	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
UNMOGIP	CSA	India, Pakistan	UN-6	50	50	50	50	50	102	45	40	40	40
UNIPOM	CSA	India, Pakistan	UN-6						100	100			
UNFICYP	EUR	Cyprus	UN-6					6,400	5,800	4,600	4,700	4,700	4,700
OAS IAPF	LAC	Dominican Rep	Other						13,100	8,000			
UNTSO	MENA	Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria	UN-6	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	128	128	128
UNEF I	MENA	Israel, Egypt	UN-6	5,300	5,200	5,200	5,100	5,100	4,600	4,600	3,400		
UNYOM	MENA	Yemen	UN-6				190	190					
UNTEA/UNSF	SEA	W. New Guinea	UN-6			1,580	1,580						
ONUC	SSA	Congo, DR	UN-7	14,500	19,830	15,000	19,400	5,500					

Acronym	Region	Country	Auth'n	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
UNMOGIP	CSA	India, Pakistan	UN-6	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40
UNFICYP	EUR	Cyprus	UN-6	4,700	4,700	4,700	2,200	4,400	4,400	4,400	3,600	3,600	3,600
OAS Military Observers II	LAC	Honduras, El Salvador	Other							28	28	11	11
UNTSO	MENA	Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria	UN-6	128	128	128	225	200	200	200	200	200	200
UNEF II	MENA	Israel, Egypt	UN-6				2,600	2,500	3,900	4,200	4,300	4,200	4,000
UNDOF	MENA	Israel, Syria	UN-6					1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,250	1,250
UNIFIL	MENA	Lebanon	UN-6									6,000	6,000
ADF	MENA	Lebanon	Other								30,000	30,000	30,000
CMF	SSA	Zimbabwe	Other										1,319

Note: For key to authorization and region codes see next page.

Annex: *Continued*

Acronym	Region	Country	Auth'n	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
UNMOGIP	CSA	India, Pakistan	UN-6	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40
UNGOMAP, OSGAP	CSA	Afghanistan	UN-6									50	50
IPKF	CSA	Sri Lanka	Other								3,000	53,000	45,000
UNFICYP	EUR	Cyprus	UN-6	3,600	3,600	3,600	3,600	3,600	3,600	3,600	3,400	3,000	2,500
UNPROFOR-BH	EUR	Bosnia	UN-7										
ONUCA	LAC	Central America	UN-6										260
OAS Mil Obsvrs II	LAC	Honduras, El Salvador	Other	11	11								
UNTSO	MENA	Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria	UN-6	200	200	200	200	200	200	200	200	200	200
UNDOF	MENA	Israel, Syria	UN-6	1,300	1,300	1,300	1,300	1,300	1,330	1,300	1,300	1,300	1,300
UNIFIL	MENA	Lebanon	UN-6	6,000	6,000	7,000	7,000	7,000	7,000	5,500	5,500	5,500	5,500
UNIIMOG	MENA	Iran, Iraq	UN-6									400	400
ADF	MENA	Lebanon	Other	30,000	30,000	30,000							
MFO	MENA	Egypt (Sinai)	Other				2,600	2,600	2,600	2,600	2,600	2,600	2,600
MNF I	MENA	Lebanon	Other			2,285							
MNF II	MENA	Lebanon	Other			3,900	4,800						
UNAVEM I	SSA	Angola	UN-6									70	70
UNTAG	SSA	Namibia	UN-6										6,000
Chad II	SSA	Chad	UN-R	600									
Chad III	SSA	Chad	UN-R		3,500	3,500							
CMF	SSA	Zimbabwe	Other	1,319									

Note: UN-6 = UN-led without Chapter VII authority. UN-7=UN-led, with Chapter VII authority. UN-7-A=Security-Council-authorized, under Chapter VII. UN-R=Security-Council-recognized or endorsed. Other=no recognition from UN Security Council. CSA=Central and South Asia. EUR=Europe. LAC=Latin America and Caribbean. MENA=Middle East and North Africa. PAC=Pacific Islands. SSA=Sub-Sahara Africa. For a glossary of mission acronyms, go to www.stimson.org/newpubs.cfm.

Annex: *Continued*

Acronym	Region	Country	Auth'n	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
UNMOGIP	CSA	India, Pakistan	UN-6	35	35	35	38	40	40	40	44	45	46
UNGOMAP, OSGAP	CSA	Afghanistan	UN-6	10									
UNMOT	CSA	Tajikistan	UN-6						39	45	41	81	33
CPKF	CSA	Tajikistan	UN-R				25,000	25,000	13,000	13,000	32,000	25,000	23,000
IPKF	CSA	Sri Lanka	Other	2,000									
UNFICYP	EUR	Cyprus	UN-6	2,200	2,200	2,200	964	1,200	1,173	1,182	1,270	1,279	1,263
UNPROFOR-C, UNCRO	EUR	Croatia	UN-6			12,000	15,400	17,900	12,146				
UNPREDEP	EUR	FYR Macedonia	UN-6					938	1,150	1,167	1,043	796	
UNOMIG	EUR	Georgia	UN-6					21	135	127	109	83	100
UNMIBH	EUR	Bosnia	UN-6							1,615	1,902	1,955	1,802
UNMOP	EUR	Croatia	UN-6							28	27	24	27
UNPF	EUR	Croatia	UN-6							276			
UNPROFOR-BH	EUR	Bosnia	UN-7			1,500	9,500	21,300	19,071				
UNTAES	EUR	Croatia	UN-7							5,243	3,787		
RRF	EUR	Bosnia	UN-7-A						12,500				
IFOR	EUR	Bosnia	UN-7-A							60,000			
SFOR	EUR	Bosnia	UN-7-A								36,179	33,200	33,200
MPF-Operation Alba	EUR	Albania	UN-7-A								6,000		
KFOR	EUR	FYR Macedonia	UN-7-A										8,000
KFOR	EUR	Kosovo	UN-7-A										45,000
AFOR	EUR	Albania	UN-7-A										5,500
Russian Abkhazia PK Operation	EUR	Georgia	UN-R					3,000					
CPKF/CPFOR	EUR	Georgia	UN-R					2,500	2,500	1,700	2,100	1,500	1,500
OSCE Mission	EUR	Bosnia	UN-R						800	800	800	800	800

Annex: *Continued*

Acronym	Region	Country	Auth'n	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
OSCE Mission	EUR	Croatia	UN-R									250	280
Moldova Joint Force, JCC PKF	EUR	Moldova	Other			5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	1,500	1,500
South Ossetia Joint Force	EUR	Georgia	Other			1,400	1,400	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200
OSCE Mission	EUR	Moldova	Other				8	8	8	8	8	8	8
OSCE Mission	EUR	Georgia	Other					17	19	19	19	19	39
ONUCA	LAC	Central America	UN-6	995	164								
ONUSAL	LAC	El Salvador	UN-6			291	380	250	1,010				
MINUGUA	LAC	Guatemala	UN-6								132		
UNSMIH, UNTMIH	LAC	Haiti	UN-6								1,525		
MIPONUH	LAC	Haiti	UN-6									284	279
UNMIH	LAC	Haiti	UN-7						6,840	1,484			
Operation Uphold Democracy	LAC	Haiti	UN-7-A					21,000					
MOMEP	LAC	Peru, Ecuador	Other						100	100	100	100	100
UNTSO	MENA	Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria	UN-6	298	300	300	224	218	220	173	154	153	141
UNDOF	MENA	Israel, Syria	UN-6	1,300	1,330	1,300	1,120	1,033	1,036	1,051	1,047	1,045	1,029
UNIFIL	MENA	Lebanon	UN-6	5,500	5,900	5,900	5,300	5,200	4,963	4,491	4,470	4,473	4,496
UNIIMOG	MENA	Iran, Iraq	UN-6	400									
MINURSO	MENA	W. Sahara	UN-6		200	343	327	310	410	281	233	363	270
UNIKOM -a	MENA	Kuwait, Iraq	UN-6		300	300	320						
UNIKOM -b	MENA	Kuwait, Iraq	UN-7					1,147	1,111	1,174	1,093	1,098	1,058
MFO	MENA	Egypt (Sinai)	Other	2,600	2,600	2,600	2,600	2,600	1,950	1,900	1,900	1,896	1,872
TMG (Truce Monitoring Grp)	PAC	Papua NG (Bougainville)	UN-R									260	

Annex: *Continued*

Acronym	Region	Country	Auth'n	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
UNAMIC	SEA	Cambodia	UN-6		116	1,090							
UNTAC	SEA	Cambodia	UN-6			12,000	19,350						
UNAVEM I	SSA	Angola	UN-6	60									
UNAVEM II	SSA	Angola	UN-6		440	456	103	77					
ONUMOZ	SSA	Mozambique	UN-6					6,435	7,214				
UNOSOM I	SSA	Somalia	UN-6			300							
UNOMIL	SSA	Liberia	UN-6					370	70	14	85		
UNAMIR I	SSA	Rwanda	UN-6					525					
UNOMUR	SSA	Rwanda	UN-6					80					
UNASOG	SSA	Chad,Libya	UN-6					9					
UNAMIR II	SSA	Rwanda	UN-6						6,019				
UNAVEM III	SSA	Angola	UN-6						1,969	7,302	4,220		
MONUA	SSA	Angola	UN-6									1,156	
MINURCA	SSA	Cent. Af. Rep.	UN-6									1,365	1,312
UNOMSIL	SSA	Sierra Leone	UN-6									27	22
UNOSOM II	SSA	Somalia	UN-7				20,707	18,240					
UNITAF	SSA	Somalia	UN-7-A				35,000						
Operation Turquoise	SSA	Rwanda	UN-7-A					2,500					
MISAB	SSA	CAR	UN-7-A								800	1,100	
Operation Licorne	SSA	Ivory Coast	UN-7-A										
ECOMOG	SSA	Liberia	UN-R	12,000	7,950	7,100	11,600	12,040	10,000	8,600	10,500	5,000	
OAU NMOG II	SSA	Rwanda	UN-R				240	240					
OMIB	SSA	Burundi	UN-R					47	67	67			
ECOMOG	SSA	Sierra Leone	UN-R							1,300	6,000	12,000	14,000
ECOMOG	SSA	Guinea Bissau	UN-R									2,400	
OAU Obsrvr Mission	SSA	Congo, DR	UN-R										28
OAU NMOG I	SSA	Rwanda	Other		40	50							

Annex: *Continued*

Acronym	Region	Country	Auth'n	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
UNMOGIP	CSA	India, Pakistan	UN-6	46	45	43	43	43	44
UNMOT	CSA	Tajikistan	UN-6	18					
UNAMA	CSA	Afghanistan	UN-6			9	12	12	20
ISAF	CSA	Afghanistan	UN-7-A			4,858	4,600	6,265	8,700
CPKF	CSA	Tajikistan	UN-R	25,000	24,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	22,300
OEF	CSA	Afghanistan	Other		2,000	8,500	9,500	19,500	20,000
UNFICYP	EUR	Cyprus	UN-6	1,209	1,308	1,238	1,262	1,274	934
UNOMIG	EUR	Georgia	UN-6	100	103	107	117	130	132
UNMIBH	EUR	Bosnia	UN-6	1,700	1,687	1,458			
UNMOP	EUR	Croatia	UN-6	27	27				
UNPF	EUR	Croatia	UN-6			27			
UNMIK	EUR	Kosovo	UN-7	4,720	4,415	4,492	4,105	3,639	2,648
SFOR	EUR	Bosnia	UN-7-A	20,000	22,000	18,000	12,000	7,905	
KFOR	EUR	Macedonia, FYR	UN-7-A	5,000	5,000	4,000	320	300	260
KFOR	EUR	Kosovo	UN-7-A	39,100	38,600	34,500	23,000	19,000	16,485
EUFOR	EUR	Bosnia	UN-7-A						6500
CPKF/CPFOR	EUR	Georgia	UN-R	1,500	1,700	1,600	1,600	1,600	1,600
OSCE Mission	EUR	Bosnia	UN-R	800	800	800	800	800	800
OSCE Mission	EUR	Croatia	UN-R	225	100	90	67	67	
Moldova Joint Force/JCC PKF	EUR	Moldova	Other	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,000	1,000	1,400
South Ossetia Jnt Force	EUR	Georgia	Other	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,500	1,500
OSCE Mission	EUR	Moldova	Other	8	8	10	10	10	
OSCE Mission	EUR	Georgia	Other	42	30	42	144	175	
MINUGUA	LAC	Guatemala	UN-6		13	14			
MINUSTAH	LAC	Haiti	UN-7					2,483	7664
MIFH	LAC	Haiti	UN-7-A					3,000	
UNTSO	MENA	Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria	UN-6	143	144	154	152	153	152
UNDOF	MENA	Israel, Syria	UN-6	1,035	1,042	1,027	1,043	1,039	1,036

Annex: *Continued*

Acronym	Region	Country	Auth'n	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
UNIFIL	MENA	Lebanon	UN-6	5,619	4,448	3,426	1,990	1,997	1998
MINURSO	MENA	W. Sahara	UN-6	231	263	241	253	229	229
UNIKOM b	MENA	Kuwait, Iraq	UN-7	1,111	1,099	1,097	9		
OIF, res 1483	MENA	Iraq	UN-R				164,900		
MFO	MENA	Egypt (Sinai)	Other	1,800	1,800	1,700	1,685	1,700	1,700
IPMT	PAC	Solomon Is.	UN-R	49					
CMPAG	PAC	Solomon Is.	Other	20					
RAMSI	PAC	Solomon Is.	UN-R				2,200	360	360
UNOTIL	SEA	Timor Leste	UN-6						60
UNTAET	SEA	Timor Leste	UN-7	7,905	9,520				
UNMISET	SEA	Timor Leste	UN-7			5,527	3,848	604	0
INTERFET	SEA	Timor Leste	UN-7-A	10,000					
UNMEE	SSA	Ethiopia, Eritrea	UN-6		3,852	4,125	4,074	3,875	3,293
MINUCI	SSA	Ivory Coast	UN-6				26		
MONUC -a	SSA	Congo, DR	UN-7	264	2,400	4,278			
UNAMSIL	SSA	Sierra Leone	UN-7	12,447	14,403	17,455	12,929	9,831	3,411
MONUC -b	SSA	Congo, DR	UN-7				6,886	10,596	16047
UNMIL	SSA	Liberia	UN-7					15,174	15978
ONUB	SSA	Burundi	UN-7					2,659	5625
ONUCI	SSA	Ivory Coast	UN-7					5,016	6640
UNMIS	SSA	Sudan	UN-7					0	1926
ECOMICI	SSA	Ivory Coast	UN-7-A			1,300	1,300		
Operation Licorne	SSA	Ivory Coast	UN-7-A			3,900	3,900	3,900	3800
ECOMIL	SSA	Liberia	UN-7-A				1,500		
Operation Artemis	SSA	Congo, DR	UN-7-A				2,205		
OAU Obsrvr Mission	SSA	Congo, DR	UN-R	28					
AMIB	SSA	Burundi	UN-R				1,300		
AMIS	SSA	Sudan	UN-R					680	3048

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