
A central tenant of the gathering was focused around featuring Poland's positive example over the last 20 years, having achieved significant economic progress through various security capacity building initiatives, many of which are mandated under UNSCR 1540. As such, Poland is a positive example of how security and development objectives can be achieved in tandem.

Throughout the two-day conference, participants from the EU Eastern Partnership countries, Caucasus, and Central Asia engaged in conversation on their national plans to implement UNSCR 1540, and global and regional efforts to comply with the UN measure. The meeting heard presentations from Nikita Smidovich of the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs on the current state of UNSCR 1540 as well as efforts undertaken vis-à-vis UNSCR 1540 implementation under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The latter two speakers, Ambassador Jacek Bylica and Mr. Mathew Geertsen, respectively, honed in on their organizations’ current activities and opportunities available for partnership in the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) nonproliferation area. Ambassador Bylica particularly highlighted NATO’s outreach to and cooperation with the United Nations, the European Union, and other regional organizations and multilateral initiatives that address WMD proliferation. In turn, Mr. Geertsen reviewed the work and accomplishments of the OSCE with regard to UNSCR 1540, including mechanisms for information exchange, capacity building training courses, and the promotion of legislative improvements. Participants noted that more donor coordination is needed to maximize impact and prevent capacity building overlap.
An important facet of the workshop was to highlight the interconnectedness between the capacity building necessary to combat the WMD proliferation threat and the required measures to fight a broader range of security concerns: organized crime and terrorism; the trafficking of illicit drugs; small arms and humans; irregular labor migration; and the trafficking in nuclear, biological, and chemical materials or dual-use technologies. To that end, participants heard presentations from Mr. Patryk Pawlak, the European Union Institute for Security Studies; Mr. Karl Lallerstedt, Strategy & Communications Director, Anti-Illlicit Trade Strategy, JT International SA; Ms. Maria Lorenzo Sobrado, Terrorism Prevention Branch, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; and Ms. Karin Burmester, Office of Nuclear Security, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Mr. Lallerstedt spoke about the connection between the illicit trade in legal goods, organized crime, and terrorist activities more broadly. He also highlighted that when an illicit trade route has been established, the same adjoining routes are used to move drugs, arms, people, cigarettes, counterfeit goods, antiques, and the like. To that end, Ms. Burmester briefed the conference on the nuclear smuggling threat and the wide range of activities the IAEA engages in to counter this challenge, including mapping nuclear smuggling incidents in its I illicit Trafficking Database.

Following this panel, the workshop turned to public and private sector partnerships and assistance opportunities available to states in need of UNSCR 1540 implementation support. Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, Coordinator for Threat Reduction Programs, advised the conference that the United States has a wide range of capacity building programs available to states in need throughout its bureaucracy, for example, its Export Control and Related Border Security program hosted in the Department of State. Mr. Nico Frandi, EU External Action Service, provided a similar analysis of his organization’s capacities to assist. He also lauded the broader focus of the conference saying that:

the perspective of the 1540 resolution and its implementation should not be limited to the prevention of terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction…measures taken to fulfill [UNSCR 1540] bring numerous advantages in a more holistic and cross-cutting sense. Capacities built with regard to border control, serve well beyond the purpose of detecting one or the other sensitive material. They significantly enhance and improve [a] particular country’s security, but also collective security in a broad sense.

In turn, Mr. Anders Berntsson, Managing Director at Saab Technologies, Poland discussed the wide range of technological solutions that industry has to contribute as partners in fighting global security and development.
challenges—from energy production and distribution security, maritime and port security, infrastructure protection, police and rescue solutions, and border security capacity building technology. Mr. Berntsson also noted the opportunities and challenges today in bringing industry in to fruitful cooperative partnerships noting innovative financing methods, government support and development of new business models, including leasing agreements of expensive equipment.

Finally, the Governments of Poland, Croatia, and France offered best practices models for UNSCR 1540 and other nonproliferation efforts. Among other things, Sanja Bujas Juraga from the Head of Department for International Security, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs in the Government of Croatia, outlined Zagreb's export control system and enforcement mechanism associated with it.

**Poland's Diverse and Ongoing Commitment to Nonproliferation**

Poland supports UN efforts in the sphere of disarmament and nonproliferation and believes that they mutually reinforce each other. Both in Geneva and in New York, Poland strongly advocates for a progressive approach to nonproliferation and disarmament. Warsaw's activities aimed at reinforcing the role and methods of the international disarmament machinery are the best proof of that. Poland is convinced that the UN should serve as the platform to discuss and upgrade the implementation of international norms against WMD terrorism and CBRN proliferation.

Most recently, by organizing the Warsaw Workshop, Poland confirmed its will to underline the importance of undertaking measures necessary to stop proliferation of WMD to the non-state actors. Poland is determined to continuously support all UN efforts in this regard, including innovative approaches to UNSCR 1540 implementation.

The Workshop was also aimed at demonstrating a very important aspect of the implementation of global nonproliferation obligations. In an era of globalisation it is of utmost importance to apply a holistic approach to counterproliferation efforts. This means that the international community must engage with both the public and private sector to minimize the risk of nuclear CBRN smuggling and the illicit trafficking of dual-use goods. The 1540 Committee has stated that this is an important aspect of its work. A holistic approach is also necessary to understand that the implementation of nonproliferation commitments can support and supplement efforts in many other spheres related both to social and economic development of states and their national security. The workshop was an attempt at featuring the implementation of UNSCR 1540 in this dual-benefit manner.

Subsequently, a regional approach to 1540 implementation is of utmost importance in bringing together countries with similar experiences but also with similar security challenges. Poland will continue to support this cooperation, especially through the European Union and its Eastern Partnership, as well as through the efforts undertaken by the OSCE. Together with the UNODA and Stimson, the Government of Poland stands ready to promote the ideas from the Warsaw conference in a more global context, including at the United Nations headquarters.

The meeting in Warsaw represented Poland's ongoing commitment to bringing together a wide range of WMD nonproliferation stakeholders. Yet, its nonproliferation efforts go well beyond organizing meetings. Other than the Government of Poland, few countries have shown a willingness to innovate their response to the changing proliferation environment. Warsaw's efforts to organize, engage, and act provide a unique case study in the willingness to adapt effectively to the changing proliferation threat.
1. Addressing an interdisciplinary threat

With few exceptions, the first few decades of the atomic era were dominated by state control over the means of production of nuclear weapons. During these years it was difficult to imagine a pathway to crossing the nuclear threshold that did not involve the complicity of a technologically advanced government. As North Korea, Iran, and even non-state terrorist actors have shown, we now know that today's potential WMD proliferators rely increasingly upon a network of dual-use producers and private actors who knowingly or not produce, ship, or underwrite proliferation activities.

Guarding against this potentiality therefore requires the engagement of a much broader subset of government and private know-how and capacity. In recognition of this new reality, the government in Warsaw launched one of the more sweeping efforts to bring together all arms of government to address this threat. A committee bringing together the Office of the Prime Minister, Ministry of the Finance and the Economy, National Defense, the intelligence community, the National Atomic Energy Agency, Police and Border agencies, and the Office of the General Prosecutor to analyze trends, share information, and act in a coordinated manner against the burgeoning threat. Remarkably, each of these agencies views the proliferation challenge not as a sideline favor to the central policy apparatus at the Foreign Ministry or the President's Office, but as a central component of their own mission. This has yielded a unique and lasting collaboration between the relevant agencies, and dramatically rising capacity to manage the proliferation threat at home and abroad. Indeed, other countries in Europe are lauding the Polish example.

2. Pragmatic efforts to address the challenge

Building a responsive modern nonproliferation infrastructure is ultimately a failed exercise without pragmatic action. In joining the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Proliferation Security Initiative, and welcoming the repatriation of highly enriched uranium from Poland back to Russia, the Polish Government has become both an active recipient of foreign assistance to backfill capacity shortfalls at home, as well as a new provider of nonproliferation assistance through joint training and direct financial assistance to, among other things, construct the Gorny chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia.

The model of nonproliferation engagement developed by the Government of Poland should be instructive: by recognizing national capacity shortfalls, the Government has requested the necessary assistance. Yet this recipient dynamic has not excused the Government from proffering its own capacity building assistance around the globe wherever their strengths dictate a useful application. In short, in an increasingly complex global environment, every government should view itself as a net assistance provider as well as a recipient of nonproliferation assistance. Poland has typified this approach.

3. Engaging the private sector

As noted, the private sector has inevitably become a central player in both proliferation and proliferation prevention. Yet governments around the world have systematically failed to come to terms with how best to engage industry. Here, the Government of Poland is also quietly working on innovative approaches to this challenge. This year, Warsaw announced the launch of the International Centre for Chemical Safety and Security (ICCSS). The goal of the ICCSS will be to share the principles of safety and security; promote prevention and preparedness against the misuse of toxic chemicals; enhance security at chemical facilities and transportation of chemicals; and promote national capacity building for research development, storage, production, and safe use of chemicals. The initiative will operate as a public-private partnership and attempt to build a bridge between the security objectives of the former, and the profit-making motive of the latter.

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