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**The U.S. Arms Control  
and Disarmament Agency:  
Restructuring for the  
Post-Cold War Era**

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*Pragmatic steps toward ideal objectives*



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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The time has come to make hard choices about the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). ACDA's declining fortunes over the past decade have hurt agency morale and, more importantly, weakened the U.S. Government's ability to deal with the post-Cold War arms control agenda. Other parts of the executive branch have a spotty record in dealing with non-proliferation and treaty implementation--two of ACDA's core concerns. At a time when these and other issues will place increasing demands upon policy-makers, basic decisions are in order about the agency's future.

In the past decade, arms control expertise has been broadly diffused within the executive branch. Except in areas like multilateral diplomacy, chemical disarmament, and nuclear non-proliferation, ACDA no longer retains the comparative advantage in expertise that it once enjoyed.

In the past, ACDA could fairly claim important successes for its efforts, particularly the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). But, clearly, the agency's bureaucratic health has deteriorated over the past fourteen years, despite some recent modest increases in funding. Symptoms of the agency's problems are numerous:

- The political status and clout of the ACDA directorship has declined. The most influential advisors on arms control in the Reagan and Bush Administrations have been lodged in the State Department.
- ACDA has slowly lost its place in the negotiating chain of command. Most arms control ambassadors are now housed in the State Department, not ACDA.
- ACDA is beginning to lose its role in coordinating negotiations support activity ("backstopping") to the State Department.

- Experienced staff in many areas have left the agency, oftentimes to take posts elsewhere in the executive branch, and recruitment for top jobs in ACDA has proved more and more difficult.
- ACDA's ability to be a credible interlocutor for the United States in international fora has suffered in line with its declining status at home. When foreign governments or international organizations want to transact important business with the U.S. Government on arms control, ACDA is less and less the preferred point of contact.
- The agency's ability to fund and carry-out research on arms control has declined markedly since the 1960s and 1970s, and its wherewithal to coordinate government-wide arms control research priorities is marginal.

Despite these serious problems, ACDA has still been able to make important contributions to U.S. Government arms control efforts:

- The agency took the lead in framing U.S. options and providing staff support for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) negotiations. Without ACDA's prodding, technical expertise, and institutional memory, it is doubtful that there would be a signing ceremony for the CWC in Paris next month.
- ACDA has performed an important watchdog role in the nuclear non-proliferation field, while taking the lead in designing improved safeguards to strengthen the NPT.
- The agency's legal expertise has been indispensable in treaty drafting and has been the U.S. Government's conscience on domestic arms control compliance issues.
- ACDA has promoted the utilization of confidence-building measures in regions of tension, particularly

on the Korean peninsula, to address the demand side of proliferation problems.

Even though the agency is a shadow of its former self, there are good reasons to be concerned about its further demise. Other executive branch agencies have weak records in dealing with non-proliferation and treaty implementation issues which will be central concerns in the post-Cold War period. Other agenda items, such as export controls, multilateral negotiations, conventional arms transfer restraint, and economic conversion, have received short shrift by the departments of State, Defense, and Commerce. There is no reason to believe they will perform better in these fields with ACDA's demise or abolition.

### **Where do we go from here?**

One option for ACDA is to "stay the course"--but we liken this to the agency's further deterioration. In theory, ACDA could be transformed into an arms control "czar," but this is not possible, and it would be unwise, in any event. No agency of government can realistically dictate policies that cut across so many important portfolios held by other departments.

ACDA could be turned into a "whistleblower" agency or a friend of the Congress. While this option might help flag impending problems or misdeeds, it would effectively close the door on any effort by ACDA to advise the executive branch on policy. Moreover, the Congress has plenty of institutional support that did not exist a generation ago. On balance, we believe that the drawbacks of these options clearly outweigh the advantages.

In our view, the Clinton Administration has two basic choices for ACDA. The first is to rejuvenate the agency around the central mission of controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The ACDA director would become, in effect, the secretary of state's agent to carry out this mission, with the support of a special ambassador for nuclear non-proliferation and a

special ambassador for chemical and biological weapons non-proliferation.

A rejuvenated ACDA would also play a central role in implementation policy for existing arms control agreements as well as provide staff support for multilateral and regional arms control negotiations keyed to reducing the demand for weapons of mass destruction. In addition, ACDA's role would be to focus on a range of post-Cold War issues, such as export controls, transparency, arms transfer restraint, and economic conversion, that have traditionally suffered from bureaucratic inertia. A rejuvenated ACDA would also carry out a verification research program. This report details fourteen specific steps that should be taken as part of a rejuvenation strategy.

If, on the other hand, the new administration chooses not to rejuvenate, we recommend a second option: that key ACDA functions and staff be merged into the State Department and the On-Site Inspection Agency. Under this approach, we recommend the creation of a new under-secretary of state for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, who would draw staff support from ACDA officials and from a consolidation of existing functions from all relevant bureaus within the department.

If the new administration chooses to merge ACDA into State, we believe compensatory steps (or "safeguards") regarding personnel and organizational missions will be essential to help ensure effective executive branch policies in non-proliferation, treaty implementation, multilateral and inter-regional arms control, and verification research and development (R&D). Six specific safeguards are recommended. Most importantly, to improve the department's performance on proliferation issues, we recommend the creation of special ambassadors to deal with nuclear and chemical/biological issues who would be "dual-hatted," serving the under-secretary and also serving as assistant secretaries of state.

Also, to improve the executive branch's conduct on treaty implementation issues in ACDA's absence, we recommend the compensatory step of making the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) a semi-autonomous agency of

government instead of a defense agency. We further recommend that OSIA be given a broader charter to deal with policy issues and a verification R&D budget.

We strongly support a high profile, well-coordinated approach to arms control policy. The question is how this should be achieved under the changing conditions that characterize the international situation in the 1990s. Rejuvenation or merger with State are the best current options for ACDA. The status quo is unacceptable.





## **Preface**

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With the end of the Cold War, the time has come to take a fresh look at the U.S. Government's cumbersome apparatus to formulate arms control policies, negotiate treaties, and implement a long-term process of successful arms reductions. The organization created thirty-one years ago to assume primary responsibility in these areas--the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)--has been in steady decline; other parts of the executive branch have gradually taken over much of ACDA's mission.

ACDA's decline has not hindered the executive branch in negotiating important new arms reduction agreements for nuclear, chemical, and conventional weapons during the demise of the Soviet Union. At the same time, there have been important lapses in U.S. Government efforts to retard the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the executive branch has not proven to be very adept in handling a range of post-Cold War arms control issues like conventional arms transfers and economic conversion. With a presidential transition upon us, the time is ripe for a searching and independent review of U.S. decision-making for arms control.

For the past year, the Stimson Center has conducted a study of this issue under a grant from the Ford Foundation. The objective of this research is to help policy-makers understand what roles, if any, ACDA should have in future U.S. Government policy-making, research, negotiation, and implementation of arms control treaties.

We have been fortunate to have the help of many people throughout the course of this project. Nearly 150 individuals were interviewed for this report. Appendix A lists those who shared their time with us, with the exception, of course, of those who wished to remain anonymous.

We are particularly indebted to Betty Lall, who shared her voluminous files and unpublished manuscript on ACDA's creation with us. We wish to thank Larry Weiler, Charles Gellner, Philip Farley, and George Bunn,

all veterans of ACDA's early days, who helped us with their recollections. We also wish to acknowledge the contributions of ACDA's former directors, who were kind enough to constitute themselves as an advisory panel. Paul Warnke, Eugene Rostow, William Burns, Kenneth L. Adelman, and Fred Iklé participated in a session evaluating ACDA's performance and future role. Their thoughts can be found in a separate Stimson Center report, "Does the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Have a Future?" (Occasional Paper 8, March 1992). George Seignious and Ralph Earle II were not able to attend but provided additional views.

Most of all, we are indebted to Celes Eckerman for her research assistance and administrative support. Thanks also go to Jay Korman of the Stimson Center. Above all, we thank the Ford Foundation and Enid Schoettle for making this project possible.

# **Contents**

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<i>Executive Summary</i>	i
<i>Preface</i>	vi
<i>Table of Contents</i>	viii
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	ix
<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
ACDA's Origins	1
ACDA's Statutory Mandate	4
Purpose of this Report	5
<b>ACDA's Performance Record</b>	<b>9</b>
The Cross-fire of Criticisms	10
Problems of Evaluating ACDA's Performance	12
The Statutory Baseline	12
Alternate Means of Evaluation	16
Idea Generation	17
Policy Formulation/Management	20
Negotiation/Backstopping	23
Implementation and Follow-through	24
Public Outreach	27
Summing Up	28
<b>ACDA's Alternative Futures:</b>	
<b>Advantages and Drawbacks</b>	<b>35</b>
Stay the Course	35
Merge Into the State Department	40
Arms Control "Czar"	43
Arms Control Advocate/Whistleblower	46
Rejuvenation	49
Assessing the Models	53
<b>Two Basic Choices for ACDA</b>	<b>59</b>
Choice Number One: Rejuvenation	59
Steps to Rejuvenate ACDA	67
Choice Number Two: Merge into State	75
Safeguards Associated with a Merger	78
<i>Appendix A: Individuals Interviewed</i>	87



## **List of Abbreviations**

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
ACDA	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ACIS	Arms Control Impact Statement
AEC	Atomic Energy Commission
BWC	Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention
CD	Conference on Disarmament
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CTB	Comprehensive Test Ban
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
DNA	Defense Nuclear Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DOE	Department of Energy
ExCom	Executive Committee
FSO	Foreign Service Officer
GAC	General Advisory Committee
GAO	General Accounting Office
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IG	Inspector General
INF	Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
LTBT	Limited Test Ban Treaty
MLF	Multilateral Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSC	National Security Council
OPM	Office of Personnel Management
OSD/A	Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition
OSIA	On-Site Inspection Agency
R&D	Research and Development
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SCC	Standing Consultative Commission
START	Strategic Arms Reductions Talks
SVC	Special Verification Commission
TTBT	Threshold Test Ban Treaty
UN	United Nations
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission
VTWG	Verification Technology Working Group



# **1**

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## **Introduction**

More than thirty years after its creation, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) remains something of an enigma--dismissed by some, invisible to many, and constantly in search of a secure niche in government that it has never quite found. While some observers may dispute this perception as unfair or misleading, it is, unmistakably, a dominant view of the agency within the American foreign policy community. Ironically, this view contrasts sharply with the fortunes of arms control writ large. Indeed, just as arms control was entering the mainstream of U.S. security policy-making as the Cold War was drawing to a close, ACDA seemed to have diminished in stature, prompting one congressional observer to ask rhetorically whether arms control policy was deemed to be "too important" to be left in the hands of the agency.<sup>1</sup>

### **ACDA's Origins**

In the beginning, it looked as though ACDA would lead a charmed life. Only 65 days were needed to enact the legislation establishing the agency, an impressive feat considering that the bill passed within days of the building of the Berlin Wall and the breakout of the nuclear testing moratorium by the Soviet Union with a megaton blast. In the summer of 1961, establishing an agency devoted to the pursuit of all aspects of arms control and disarmament was the height of lunacy to some, an act of sanity to others.<sup>2</sup>

At that time, according to numerous observers and officials, the United States Government lacked a coherent national policy on arms control issues, was unprepared to participate in international negotiations on these issues, and approached the entire subject in an ad hoc manner.<sup>3</sup> Senator John F. Kennedy (D-MA) and other legislators joined Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (D-MN) in raising this issue; Kennedy promised during his presidential campaign

to correct the problem. On 29 June 1961, less than six months after his inauguration, President Kennedy sent a draft bill to establish a U.S. Disarmament Agency for World Peace and Security to the Capitol where it was introduced that day by Humphrey, the agency's champion in the upper chamber, and Representative Thomas Morgan (D-PA), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The Senate bill had 14 co-sponsors. That day, the House introduced 50 similar bills.

On September 8th, the bill passed by a vote of 73 to 14 in the Senate, while the House passed it by a 290 to 54 margin on September 19th. Differences between the Senate and House versions were ironed out in a conference committee report that passed the Senate unanimously and the House by a 250 to 50 vote on September 23rd. Kennedy signed the bill into law on September 26th.

Underneath the surface of this ostensibly smooth start lay the roots of turbulence that would characterize the agency's operation over the next three decades. The first hint of trouble occurred just prior to ACDA's creation, when Kennedy nearly backed away from his legislative initiative in the face of Senate grumbling. John J. McCloy, Kennedy's disarmament advisor, prevailed upon the president to pursue the matter.<sup>4</sup> Kennedy had astutely recruited McCloy, who had impeccable conservative credentials, to help develop his thinking on arms control issues. McCloy lined up a stellar cast of witnesses in support of the bill, including Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) General Lyman Lemnitzer, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Commissioner Leland Haworth, and former United Nations (UN) Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge. At McCloy's behest, former President Dwight D. Eisenhower supplied a written endorsement of the bill. Nonetheless, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee wanted to send the bill back to the administration for redrafting that would put the agency fully within the State Department's sphere.

The debate over the bill was influenced by the specter of nuclear weapons, which imbued each superpower confrontation with the potential for disaster. Arms control was becoming too critical and too complex an aspect of



national security to treat lightly, on an ad hoc basis. As Rusk noted:

Disarmament is a unique matter in the field of foreign affairs. I know of no other single matter in the international area that exceeds it in scope and breadth. It entails not only a complex of political issues, but involves a wealth of technical, scientific, and military problems which in many respects are outside the Department's normal concerns and, in many instances, reach beyond the operational functions the Department is designed to handle.<sup>5</sup>

Rusk's comments also forecast ACDA's dilemma within the executive branch: arms control issues cut across the jurisdictions of several cabinet departments, all of which would be more powerful than the fledgling agency. Members of Congress and witnesses expressed their concerns over the awkward compromise for the agency's chain of command: the director would report to the secretary of state and the president. However, none could find an alternative that could preserve the State Department's province in the diplomatic aspects of arms control while at the same time providing enough leverage to enable the director to counterbalance the vested interests of other agencies, particularly the Department of Defense (DOD) and the AEC.

Those who helped launch the agency fully appreciated its symbolic impact, which was intended also to counter the propaganda edge the Soviets held over the United States with their initiatives to "ban the bomb" and promote general and complete disarmament. This thinking was behind the original choice of a name for an agency of "World Peace and Security." When asked about the grandiose title, which was bound to raise hackles in conservative congressional circles, Adrian Fisher replied, "We don't want the devil to have all the good tunes."<sup>6</sup>

Not to be outdone by Soviet propaganda, the United States would dedicate an arm of its government to arms control. Policy-makers thus spent a significant amount of

time tussling over what the agency would be called, suggesting such titles as the:

- U.S. Peace Agency for World Disarmament and Security;
- U.S. Advisory Agency for Arms Control, Peace, and Security;
- U.S. Arms Control Agency for World Peace, Disarmament, and Security;
- U.S. Arms Control Agency.

During a long day of floor debate on the bill in the Senate, a compromise--U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency--was finally reached.<sup>7</sup>

To get the bill to the Senate floor, McCloy had personally twisted the arms of key opposing Senators such as William Fulbright (D-AR) and Willis Robertson (D-VA). The Foreign Relations Committee reported the bill out unanimously after McCloy's staffers worked furiously over the weekend to revise the bill to accommodate the committee's desire to subsume the agency in the State Department.<sup>8</sup> The administration's bill passed largely intact in the House, setting the scene for a final showdown between the Senate and House over how close a relationship the agency should have with the State Department. The Conference Committee threw a bone to each chamber: the Senate got to name the agency and most of the original organizational structure preferred by the House was restored. Despite Kennedy's reluctance to pursue the matter once in office, the threatening security environment of the day, the agency's awkward setting in the bureaucracy, and semantic battles over the agency's title, ACDA was created.

## **ACDA's Statutory Mandate**

Congress endowed the agency with a sweeping arms control charter composed of four major missions, as set forth in the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961 (Public Law 87-297).<sup>9</sup> ACDA's first responsibility was the "conduct, support, and coordination of research for arms control and disarmament policy." The Act listed thirteen different potential research areas, including analysis of the economic implications of arms control, the various ways to

promote a lasting peace, and the techniques and equipment that might be used to detect and monitor limits on nuclear, missile, conventional, bacteriological, chemical and radiological weapons.<sup>10</sup> Second, the agency was charged with the "preparation for and management of United States participation in international negotiations in the arms control and disarmament field," which included making recommendations on policy and serving as the institutional home for special representatives that the president could appoint for different negotiations. Third, the agency was to prepare and operate "such control systems as may become part of the United States arms control and disarmament activities." The term control systems refers to what is now called on-site and remote monitoring activities. Last, ACDA was to be responsible for the "dissemination and coordination of public information concerning arms control and disarmament."

The Act expressly designated ACDA as the "central organization charged by statute with primary responsibility for this field" under the direction of the president and the secretary of state.<sup>11</sup> It empowers the agency's director, *inter alia*, to serve as the principal adviser to the president, the secretary of state, and the National Security Council (NSC) on arms control and disarmament matters. Subsequent amendments and new legislation over time have expanded ACDA's missions, most notably to analyze U.S. weapons acquisition programs for their arms control impact and to assess the impacts of arms and related technology transfers and the adequacy of safeguards or other control mechanisms.

## **Purpose of this Report**

What has happened to the agency since its "send off" in 1961? As this report makes clear, ACDA's life has been anything but quiescent. The agency has suffered through politically inspired purges, both in the 1970s and again in the 1980s, and it has seen its role eclipsed in many respects. At present, ACDA lacks a clear sense of purpose. Many people, including President George Bush,<sup>12</sup> have suggested that the agency is a creature of the Cold War. Others are claiming that ACDA can now be safely

disbanded. These issues are among many that the Clinton Administration must face.

In this report, we address the question of whether ACDA is still worth saving and if so, what its future missions should be. In attempting to answer these questions, we have sought the counsel of many in the arms control and national security community who have participated in or watched with varying degrees of dismay, amusement, or indifference as ACDA has been buffeted about by the political currents of the day.<sup>13</sup> Though they may have disagreed on the exact nature of the problem or the prescription, almost to a person they agreed on one point: the time has come to do something about ACDA.

## ENDNOTES

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1. Remarks by Senator John Kerry (D-MA), Congressional Record, 26 July 1991, p. S11052.

2. Sometimes a single witness represented both sides of the debate. Former Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett decried the existing method for dealing with arms control within the government as "far too dispersed and fragmented to make possible orderly planning, policy-making, and supervisory procedures which, I believe, are increasingly necessary as man's ingenuity in killing himself continues to outrun his self-restraint." Though he "profoundly and sincerely" believed in the agency, Lovett noted his fears: "This would be almost an ideal place for subversives to attempt to infiltrate....a Mecca for a wide variety of screwballs....a natural magnet for those rather uninspiring groups that have slogans, 'Better Red Than Dead,' 'Surrender and Survive,'....a sort of bureau of beatniks." Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, S.2180, A Bill to Establish a United States Disarmament Agency for World Peace and Security, U.S. Senate 87th Congress, 1st session, 14-16 August 1961, pp. 83, 87.

3. See "Strengthening the Government for Arms Control," A Report by the NPA Special Project Committee on Security through Arms Control, National Planning Association, Planning pamphlet no. 109 (Washington, D.C.), July 1960.

4. McCloy felt strongly that an agency established by executive fiat would not carry the clout of one with a strongly affirmative congressional vote. He convinced Kennedy not to retreat from a potential battle with Hill conservatives. For accounts of the agency's creation, see Duncan L. Clarke, Politics of Arms Control: The Role and Effectiveness of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (New York: The Free Press, 1979), pp. 14-28 and Kai Bird, The Chairman: John J. McCloy, The Making of the American Establishment (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), pp. 512-14.

5. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, S.2180, op. cit., p. 15.

6. Interview with George Bunn, 17 October 1991.

7. Congressional Record, 87th Congress, 1st session, 8 September 1961, pp. 17567-8.

8. McCloy's skilled, determined, and wily staff included Adrian Fisher, who later became the agency's first deputy director, George Bunn, who drafted much of the bill and was ACDA's first general counsel, and Betty Goetz, a former staffer with Humphrey. The United World Federalists were also working hard behind the scenes, helping Humphrey and McCloy with print, radio, and television media access, as well as staff support for research, mailing, and lobbying on behalf of the bill. "President's Address

to the Eighteenth General Assembly," United World Federalists, Inc. by Paul W. Walter (Washington, D.C.: 12 June 1964). Telephone interview with George Bunn, 23 November 1992.

9. See Section 2, PL 87-297.

10. See Title III, Section 31 of Public Law 87-297.

11. See Section 2, Public Law 87-297.

12. Bush-Quayle '92 General Committee, Agenda for American Renewal, 1992, p. 26.

13. We gratefully acknowledge the contributions of these individuals to our research. Except for those who wished to remain anonymous, the individuals who contributed to the study are listed in Appendix A.

## 2

# ACDA's Performance Record

All government bureaucracies are imperfect instruments of the public will. In the national security domain, the State Department is frequently attacked for being weak-kneed and unduly deferential to foreign interests. The Pentagon is often faulted for inadequate contingency planning and gold-plating its acquisition process. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) comes under fire for alleged analytical bias and forecasting failures. These are the commonplace criticisms that each organization must face in its own sphere of policy. ACDA is no exception, of course, but it is different in one important sense: the agency is plagued by a fundamental confusion over what criteria to apply to its performance.

In retrospective accounts of ACDA, one finds many compliments. Testifying in 1981, former ACDA director and Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) negotiator Gerard Smith stated that ACDA's record is generally "a good one" and lamented that its achievements went "largely unrecognized."<sup>1</sup> Duncan L. Clarke, a chronicler of the agency's programs, has observed that although its effectiveness has "fluctuated," ACDA has made many "invaluable contributions."<sup>2</sup> Similarly, Fred Iklé, a Reagan Administration defense policy official and an ACDA director from 1973 to 1977, notes: "ACDA has, on an intermittent basis, handled extremely well the very complicated arena of policy planning, the combination of agreements and unilateral moves."<sup>3</sup> In a 1989 report to Congress, the Inspector General (IG) of the State Department concluded that ACDA was performing its "basic mission very well indeed."<sup>4</sup>

Yet, there are also strong tones of disappointment and criticism running through many retrospectives of ACDA's performance. In 1992, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee commented, somewhat delphically, that "many members of this committee believe ACDA's role has diminished in recent years and that the Agency has not lived up to expectations" (emphasis added).<sup>5</sup> While this complaint is typical of the kind that ACDA confronts,

the specific perceptions that underlie such criticism are shaped significantly by where one sits on the political spectrum.

## **The Cross-fire of Criticisms**

ACDA's traditional critics have come from the conservative camp. In its early years, agency officials were variously attacked as "nutball people" who wanted to surrender to the Kremlin and even curtail the Second Amendment rights of citizens to carry firearms.<sup>6</sup> In 1972, the agency drew fire as a result of unhappiness with the SALT negotiations. Upset by the SALT I Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms, a group led by Senator Henry Jackson (D-WA) applied intense pressure upon the Nixon Administration to shake up its arms negotiating team as part of a deal to gain congressional support for SALT. ACDA saw its budget slashed by one-third and its staffing reduced by 16 to 25 per cent. A few weeks earlier, Jackson had charged that "minimum deterrence is the orthodoxy of the arms control community that planned and negotiated the American side of the Moscow accords."<sup>7</sup> The cure for the problem, logically, was to change personnel.

This line of criticism provided the grist for the neo-conservative attack on the "mad momentum of arms control," a term coined by Albert Wohlstetter, which emerged full-bore in the late 1970s. Conservatives argued that American policy-making was hampered by the existence of a highly institutionalized arms control bureaucracy, which imparted a momentum to the negotiating process and impeded a clear appreciation for strategic requirements. Richard Burt, for one, argued that ACDA, in part, was responsible for this state of affairs:

Having no responsibility for either threat assessment or force planning, but possessing strong vested interests in negotiations, ACDA has little reason to get involved in the difficult trade-offs between arms control and unilateral military flexibility . . . . As arms control has moved from being a diplomatic experiment to a central fixture of U.S. foreign policy, ACDA's role has been displaced by



... the Pentagon, the State Department, and the National Security Council. In order to justify its existence, therefore, the agency has had to become ever more doctrinaire in its adherence to the primacy of arms control.<sup>8</sup>

Whatever the merits of the "mad momentum" critique, its own momentum greatly increased as a result of the general downward spiral of Soviet-American relations and growing domestic opposition to the SALT process. When the Reagan Administration took office in 1981, the agency's budget and personnel levels were slashed, and the task of reconstituting a senior management echelon in ACDA proved difficult and time consuming.<sup>9</sup> For those who remembered the famous "purge" eight years earlier, it was *deja vu* all over again.

Voices of disapproval with ACDA have also been heard from liberal groups. During the early Reagan years especially, the agency was variously cited as a "basket case," bereft of capable staff, shorn of adequate resources, a sink-hole for right-wing political appointees, and generally a shadow of its former self.<sup>10</sup> Just as liberal appointees to ACDA, such as Paul Warnke, had been attacked by the right-wing as being too eager for arms control, conservative appointees, such as Kenneth L. Adelman, who served from 1983 to 1987, were taken to task by liberals for being hostile to negotiations.

A particular problem for liberals has been ACDA's penchant for self-censorship. For example, a major assessment of the agency prepared for the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 1974 concluded that ACDA had "worked well as a line agency" in the bureaucracy and stressed its contributions to various negotiations. This same report cited discontent in Congress and elsewhere that ACDA was "too conventional and unimaginative in thinking, too timid in contesting Government policy and lobbying for its point of view."<sup>11</sup> It complained, in particular, that the agency had "scarcely functioned" as a resource for Congress and the public, and that information and ideas on arms control coming from ACDA tended to emerge from "the compromises and buffetings of interagency debate, not pure and unalloyed."<sup>12</sup> Such sentiments were echoed in the late 1980s.

In reading between the lines of such commentaries, one can detect a degree of caution and restraint. Liberals

faced a predicament of trying to reconcile criticism of the agency's day-to-day performance with their underlying support for the concept of an arms control and disarmament agency. No one wanted to be accused by a colleague as having, in effect, destroyed ACDA in order to save it. Right-wing critics were not so encumbered.

Since the Cold War's demise, the old pattern of left- and right-wing sparring over ACDA has largely disappeared. New voices of dissent have argued that arms control activities in general are too inflexible, over-bureaucratized and no longer correspond to security needs; but such sentiments fit into no particular ideological box.<sup>13</sup> In addition, in light of the recent displacement of ACDA by other executive branch departments in areas such as negotiations management, research, and on-site inspection, there is a new openness among groups traditionally loyal to ACDA to rethink the whole rationale for having an independent agency.

## **Problems of Evaluating ACDA's Performance**

As the foregoing suggests, much of the disappointment with ACDA has been a reflection of larger partisan debates over the concept of arms control itself. Clearly, some criticisms have been concerned less with the issue of performance than with ACDA's very existence. Short of self-destruction, there is probably nothing the agency could do to win the applause of these critics. As for complaints that focus on performance, the relevant issue is what are the proper standards against which to measure performance.

### **The Statutory Baseline**

The commonly used baseline for measuring performance is that contained in the agency's enabling legislation, which is reviewed in chapter 1. Briefly, ACDA's four arms control functions are research, policy management, verification and implementation, and public affairs.

Even a casual observer would acknowledge that the ACDA of today is a far cry from the agency that was

envisaged in the 1961 Act. The agency's research-related work is extremely limited compared to the arms control research and development (R&D) programs of the departments of Energy and Defense. ACDA's leadership role in negotiations has been largely eclipsed by the State Department, which since the mid-1980s has housed most U.S. arms negotiators of ambassadorial rank. The agency's public affairs program, while useful in some respects, produces far less public information on arms control than do some academic and private sector organizations. ACDA's involvement in verification and implementation activity is largely derivative of the work performed by the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA), which was established in 1988 and has been responsible to the Pentagon.

Yet, is the statutory mandate standard a realistic one? The answer, quite clearly, is no. According to Adelman, "When somebody says that ACDA never lived up to its charter, the same can be said about the Housing Department, the Treasury Department, and probably about Congress."<sup>14</sup> Moreover, ACDA's statute was crafted in a different era--in a policy vacuum, without much practical experience to guide the drafters of the legislation. In terms of assessing the performance of the agency, the statutory mandate approach is deficient in at least two respects.

First, inherent tensions within and between ACDA's core functions have become much clearer with the passage of time. The effort to have ACDA engaged in both policy formulation and management provides an apt illustration. By its very nature, policy management involves decision-making not only in regard to the technical substance of negotiations but also to the more politically-sensitive questions of timing and linkage. While ACDA obviously should be expected to articulate a position on all such questions, it was never realistic to think that the agency could simultaneously advocate an "arms control perspective" and manage a policy process in which that perspective is balanced along with other factors.

Tensions also persist between the policy management and public affairs functions. There are inherent tensions between the idea that ACDA could serve as a forceful public advocate for arms control or be a resource to Congress, and yet at the same time perform effectively as policy manager brokering compromises in the

executive branch in the interests of achieving viable negotiating positions. At some level, the two jobs are incompatible; one cannot optimize for one role without doing damage to the other. The same can also be said of the negotiating and verification roles, where a persuasive case can be made that an agency with an institutional interest in negotiating agreements should not also be charged with the task of overseeing the verification of those agreements.

Second, the statutorily mandated approach to assessment runs afoul of unrealistic assumptions regarding ACDA's ability to operate effectively within the interagency environment. It was never very practical to give ACDA a broad mandate for intra-governmental coordination of arms control research programs, as if the agency could somehow harmonize priorities across bureaucracies without a weighty budget of its own. Accordingly, ACDA's success in the area of verification R&D was short-lived.

ACDA's last major foray into the R&D arena was the Cloud Gap program. From September 1962 to September 1968, ACDA and the DOD jointly sponsored a far-sighted and elaborate field testing program in several areas, including aerial inspections, on-site inspections of conventional forces and for the identification of underground nuclear tests, and the monitoring of nuclear weapons destruction. Cloud Gap had a permanent staff of about 25 civilians and its contingent of temporary-duty military officers at times numbered up to 200. DOD assigned soldiers to ACDA for the length of the test in question, which could last as little as a month or more than a year. ACDA and DOD both contributed \$3 million to the project, until Congress cut DOD's funding for Cloud Gap in September 1967.

Minus half of Cloud Gap's funding, ACDA scaled back the follow-on Field Operations Program using smaller tests. According to two officials who worked in these programs, not long after the Field Operations Program began, the agency's leadership began to feel that the possibility of negotiating an agreement with on-site inspections was slim at that time. ACDA's money, they decided, would be better spent on more immediate research tasks.<sup>15</sup> When ACDA abolished the Field Operations Division in 1972, the agency essentially withdrew itself from the "hardware" business and became a sponsor of

research papers on various subjects. Thus, ACDA is partly responsible for putting its own R&D budget in an endangered category. Despite the increased demands for monitoring technologies that have accompanied recent arms control accords, the agency has not seen its R&D budget restored.

In practice, government agencies rarely earmark resources for research mainly to pursue some objectively defined "common good." Rather, they spend money on research in large part to sustain their own bargaining positions in interagency deliberations. In the intervening years since the collapse of the Cloud Gap program, Congress could have appropriated funds or reallocated them from other R&D agencies to ACDA, with the aim of having the agency act as a kind of "cash cow" for a government-wide research program. Short of this step, however, it is naive to think that ACDA, with no research budget to speak of or interagency R&D coordinating groups, could force a restructuring of research priorities among or within departments or agencies.

To use another example, it was also unnatural to expect that a semi-autonomous agency could operate as an executive agent for the secretary of state in the negotiating arena. U.S. ambassadors gain authority in large part through being the direct emissary of the secretary or the president. They can be expected to resist any effort by bureaucratic intermediaries to obtrude into that relationship.<sup>16</sup> In the past, this fact was obscured because the ACDA director also served as the lead representative for Soviet-American strategic negotiations. When this "dual-hatting" practice ended in the early 1980s, the State Department became a magnet for arms control ambassadors, to the detriment of ACDA.

The bottom line is clear: if the yardstick for measuring performance is to be found in its legislative mandate, ACDA will always come up short. One simply cannot draw fairminded conclusions about the agency's overall performance, however, based solely on whether it has fulfilled the intent of Congress. As the IG correctly put it: ". . . the provisions of the (ACDA) Act, literally interpreted, simply could not be implemented today."<sup>17</sup>

## Alternate Means of Evaluation

Bureaucratic state of health is notoriously hard to measure. Standard "input" indicators--trends in budgets and staffing--are not necessarily indicative of performance "output." An alternative approach might focus on evaluating the agency's participation in various phases that define the arms control policy process. This process includes:

- Idea generation. This task entails the provision of analytical support for policy development, and it can be aimed at several objectives: developing new initiatives, fleshing out existing ones, or deflecting or modifying defective ones.
- Policy formulation/management. This task entails participation in decisions on the overall direction and content of policy, on which areas to emphasize, and on the human and material resources to allocate across various priorities.
- Negotiation/backstopping/representation. These inter-connected functions involve leading and staffing delegations, coordinating support for delegations in the field (e.g., responding to requests for guidance), and the receipt and transmittal of demarches and diplomatic communication in national capitals.
- Implementation and follow-through. This task mainly involves the marshalling of assets to carry out the provisions of agreements (e.g., data exchange, weapons disposal, cooperative verification), to assess the performance of parties in the process, and to determine the need for modifications or adjustments, if need be, to remedy problems or to deal with compliance problems.
- Public outreach. This entails explaining and defending official policy to a broader audience, including Congress and the general public.

Although these activities cannot always be neatly put into separate conceptual boxes, they do provide a rudimentary framework for evaluating ACDA's strengths and weaknesses at different points in its history.

## **Idea Generation**

A retrospective look at ACDA through interviews and other assessments suggests that the agency has at times contributed significantly to policy innovations. During the 1960s, ACDA was instrumental in pressing for more aggressive U.S. efforts to curb nuclear proliferation. At the time, the government was focused mainly on curtailing independent nuclear programs in Europe through the Multilateral Force (MLF) proposal, a State Department-led initiative that would have given non-nuclear North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies a coordinated role in nuclear use though not possession of weapons. ACDA, however, took the lead in promoting the idea of a global non-proliferation pact, and after the MLF's demise in 1964, high-ranking ACDA officials convinced the State Department and White House to pick up the initiative.<sup>18</sup> In subsequent years, ACDA personnel were instrumental in developing the design of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards system, which monitors peaceful nuclear activities for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatories. The agency also sought creation of a nuclear suppliers group and the expansion of nuclear safeguards to cover the production of sensitive materials.<sup>19</sup>

As for nuclear arms control, ACDA's role was less overt. The agency provided timely analysis to the White House to support the shift in U.S. nuclear testing policy that paved the way for the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT).<sup>20</sup> Given the adamant opposition of the JCS to force structure limitations during the 1960s, ACDA did not seek out the mantle of chief advocate for strategic arms control; it was primarily civilian staff work in the Pentagon that succeeded in prompting a serious examination within the government of how security goals could be advanced through strategic limits.<sup>21</sup> ACDA did, however, provide useful analytical support from behind the scenes, especially on verification issues, including at times surreptitiously drafting papers for the NSC in the early Nixon Administration.<sup>22</sup>

In its early years ACDA enjoyed a clear comparative advantage in technical arms control expertise. Policy task forces set up by William Foster, the agency's first director, generated options for executive-level consideration, and ACDA officials had ties to senior levels at the State

Department and the White House that were vital for promoting new ideas at critical moments.<sup>23</sup>

During the 1970s and 1980s, ACDA's contributions to policy innovation were less conspicuous. Under Iklé, the agency was vociferous in calling attention to the adverse implications of the spread of nuclear power technology. During the Warnke years, the agency gained respect for its operations analysis work on the limitations of passive defenses and its efforts in assessing the security implications of proposed arms transfers.<sup>24</sup> Subsequently, the agency contributed a great deal to the comprehensive ban on chemical weapons by coordinating backstopping for interagency reviews and by providing technical expertise for treaty drafting over the long course of negotiations. In addition, agency personnel played important roles in developing on-site inspection procedures for East-West accords such as the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.<sup>25</sup>

On occasion, ACDA's mission to focus on the nitty-gritty of arms control has helped in concentrating human resources for specific technical tasks. The agency's lawyers, for example, represent a talent pool that is not found elsewhere in government. This has given ACDA a major, though often unappreciated, role in treaty drafting and in implementation questions. Critical analysis by the agency on the legal basis for reinterpreting the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty found its way to high levels in the Reagan Administration, even as similar views within other agencies were not ventilated.<sup>26</sup>

In general, though, these examples represent exceptions to a very perceptible slackening off of ACDA's "value-added" to arms control. Arguably, the 1970s were simply not a period of major intellectual innovation for arms control theory or practice. Most of the energy and resources in government were directed toward fleshing out and strengthening regimes (e.g., the NPT) that had been conceived earlier. During this period, ACDA officials enjoyed comparatively less access to high levels. Moreover, one began to see at this time a siphoning-off of ACDA's institutional memory and expertise in key areas such as strategic arms control and nuclear safeguards technologies. To the extent that this talent went elsewhere in the executive branch, as much of it did, the result was not necessarily a net diminishment of governmental expertise



in arms control, but it clearly cut into ACDA's comparative advantage. What is more, burdened with an awkward "junior-varsity" image, ACDA found it harder to recruit and retain high-caliber staff from outside of government.

In the past several years, ACDA has been more of a follower than a leader in generating proposals and policies. Most recent initiatives, such as Bush's September 1991 path-breaking announcements on large scale withdrawals of tactical nuclear weapons and a more relaxed strategic force posture, were developed completely outside the agency. Nor was ACDA involved in the creation of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), established to oversee the disarmament of Iraq, although as UNSCOM's work has become more routinized, ACDA personnel have played increasingly important roles.<sup>27</sup>

Though difficult to measure, ACDA's handling of research also may have contributed to a flattening of the upward curve for new ideas and innovations for negotiation. During its early years, in-house and external research was an important component of ACDA's mission, in line with its statutory mandate, and a major management task for ACDA's leadership.<sup>28</sup> The external research budget represented a high percentage of the agency's overall budget.

Beginning in the 1970s, however, ACDA found itself increasingly pressed to strike balances between its research work and greater involvement in negotiations. It adopted the controversial practice of raiding its modest research funds to underwrite personnel and negotiations expenses, and it began to pay less attention to research needs.<sup>29</sup> This trend, combined with widespread disinterest in arms control research by other agencies on nuclear test constraints and chemical arms control during the 1980s led to gaps between U.S. negotiating policies and agency spending for external research. Subsequently, as the negotiations began to generate greater demands for research in the late 1980s, the departments of Energy and Defense, with sizeable laboratory infrastructures and consulting arrangements in place, became the agencies of choice for the funding of technology-intensive arms control research needs.

A congressionally-mandated 1989 assessment of ACDA undertaken by the State IG was highly critical of the agency's inability to conduct and support research in a

timely manner.<sup>30</sup> One consequence of ACDA's dwindling effort in research, the report concluded, was its clear inability to perform the coordination and management roles conferred upon the agency through its congressional mandate: "Given ACDA's small size and research budget . . . there is no way that ACDA can influence to any significant degree the way other government agencies spend Federal research dollars."<sup>31</sup>

### **Policy Formulation/Management**

Historically, ACDA's most certain path to influence policy has been through a close, mutually supportive relationship between the director and the secretary of state.<sup>32</sup> Yet, secretaries of state are extremely wary of arms control directors with political clout. The pivotal issue in the State-ACDA relationship thus becomes whether the agency's director will be a close confidant "in the pocket" of the secretary.<sup>33</sup> ACDA directors have always had to weigh carefully where and how they should plug into the senior echelon. With few exceptions, directors have sought influence through building alliances with larger departments rather than acting in opposition to them.<sup>34</sup>

Under its first director, Foster, ACDA was infused with a sense of purpose. Foster and his immediate successors headed negotiating delegations that produced the NPT and the SALT I accords. Unfortunately for the agency, instances of solid working relationships between the ACDA director and the secretary of state have been quite rare since the late 1960s, with the exception of the Carter years.

In contrast, efforts by ACDA to align itself with the NSC or DOD, usually against State, such as in the mid-1970s and again in the early 1980s, generally did not redound to ACDA's benefit. In such cases, the agency became marginalized. ACDA's senior non-career positions were purged after the SALT I accords were signed in 1972, and with the appointment of Iklé to become the new ACDA director, Fulbright, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, was sorely tempted to pull the plug on the

agency.<sup>35</sup> In a letter to the agency's chief sponsor, Humphrey, he wrote:

If the Agency is to have an inferior kind of relationship to State, Defense, and to the SALT negotiators, it might be better to abandon the Agency.<sup>36</sup>

Humphrey dissuaded Fulbright, but the chairman's jaundiced view was reinforced by the subsequent appointment of two arms control skeptics to be assistant directors and a one-third budget cut imposed by the Nixon team.<sup>37</sup> ACDA limped along until the Carter Administration, when Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and ACDA Director Warnke worked extremely well together. In the day-to-day tugging matches over policy, Vance protected Warnke from Pentagon and NSC criticism and, in return, Warnke enabled Vance to broker bureaucratic compromises by staking out policy positions generally to the left of the State Department.<sup>38</sup> After Warnke's turbulent tenure and the shelving of the SALT II Treaty, some influential voices, like that of William Hyland, raised the option of merging ACDA into the State Department or abolishing it entirely.<sup>39</sup> This view gained more adherents during the Reagan transition, when the agency was provisionally run by a group distinguished by their strong opposition to SALT and their ability to detect Soviet arms control violations undeclared by the Nixon, Ford, and Carter Administrations.<sup>40</sup> One close observer of ACDA likened this period to "a Fellini movie recut by Laurel and Hardy."<sup>41</sup>

The belated appointment of Eugene Rostow did little to change the agency's fortunes, a period characterized as "malign neglect" of ACDA by one observer.<sup>42</sup> Despite his previous years of government experience and neo-conservative credentials as chairman of the executive committee of the Committee on the Present Danger, Rostow was unable to enter the Reagan Administration's inner policy-making circles, and his preferred appointments encountered stiff opposition among hard-line senators.<sup>43</sup> After eighteen fractious months at ACDA's helm, he exited, leaving the agency no better positioned than before he arrived.

The selection of Rostow's replacement, Adelman, an aide to UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, signalled a

continued downgrading of ACDA's role in policy formulation. Adelman's modest background in the field and articles deprecating the utility of arms control provided critics with an opening to focus attention on Reagan Administration views hostile to existing agreements or the negotiation of new accords with the Soviet Union. His nomination was questioned openly in the Senate. The Foreign Relations Committee sent his nomination to the floor "unfavorably," where it was approved by a 57 to 42 margin.<sup>44</sup>

Once again, senior non-career officials, including non-political appointees, were jettisoned. In all, the agency suffered a sixteen percent cut in personnel during what became known as the "second purge." The agency's budget was cut by twenty percent and its meager research budget by more than two-thirds.<sup>45</sup> None of the agency's four assistant directors was confirmed until mid-1983.

Leery of ACDA's quasi-independence and its inherent susceptibility to outside political pressure, Secretaries of State Alexander Haig, George Shultz, and James Baker, adopted the pattern of relying upon their own arms control expertise and looked to ACDA only for technical assistance. Leading arms control advisors in the past decade, such as Paul Nitze, Max Kampelman, John Tower, or Reginald Bartholomew, have been negotiators or have occupied positions close to the secretary of state, eclipsing the role of the ACDA director.

Interviews suggest that the incoming Bush Administration flirted with the idea of abolishing the agency. Bush opted not to do so, presumably to avoid unnecessary political flak on Capitol Hill. Again there was an extended delay in the appointment of a new director, making it impossible for the appointee to engage in early policy formulation and extremely difficult to become a first-string member of the new team. Secretary of State Baker's close involvement with the selection of Ronald F. Lehman II did not compel Baker to delegate responsibility for arms control matters to the new ACDA chief.

Lehman was as well if not better prepared for the job of ACDA director than any of his predecessors, having served previously in key roles on Capitol Hill, the Pentagon, the NSC staff, and in nuclear arms control negotiations. However, Lehman lacked access to Baker's inner circle and had no political base of his own from

which to command attention. Time and again, he found himself in the frustrating position of having less of an input on key decisions than political appointees and civil servants of lower rank.

Ultimately, ACDA's ability to influence policy at senior levels has been necessarily very dependent upon the stature of its director, and upon the director's rapport with the secretary of state and the president. No ACDA director has ever enjoyed direct access to the Oval Office that would fully correspond with his statutory role as the president's principal advisor on arms control and disarmament.<sup>46</sup> Past directors have had some influence but generally have lacked the kind of clout that comes with cabinet status. This has been especially true since the early 1980s, when the job has been held either by technically proficient experts, like Lehman, or by political lightning rods, like Adelman. As the political status of ACDA's directorship has slipped, there has been a cascading effect: it has proved more difficult to fill the agency's assistant director slots with distinguished appointees, and the individuals chosen have had increased difficulty in weighing in on policy debates. ACDA also lost its chain-of-command authority over arms control negotiations to the State Department.

The General Advisory Committee (GAC) on Arms Control and Disarmament has also undergone a precipitous decline in stature. Originally, the GAC was established as a committee of notables to advise the director, as well as the president and the secretary of state. In recent years, it has become highly politicized and practically invisible, no longer playing any apparent role.

### **Negotiation/Backstopping/Representation**

Traditionally, the agency's presence has been most visible not in the high councils of government but in the trenches of diplomacy. Early on, ACDA acquired substantial authority in the staffing and management of delegations. The 1960s-era negotiations on the NPT, the Outer Space Treaty, the Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), and other agreements were in a sense the halcyon days for the agency. U.S. negotiators were based in ACDA. Moreover, ACDA's influence was heightened by a process of instructing delegations that seems amazingly uncomplicated by

contemporary standards. Cables were prepared in ACDA and circulated via interagency backstopping groups to other agencies. Yet, the clearance process itself was rather informal and few offices in other agencies were involved. Generally, negotiators were given wide latitude in implementing their instructions. Moreover, dissenting views were noted for the information to the negotiators. Except in rare cases, dissents did not hold up the process, and the requirement for consensus was not as apparent.<sup>47</sup>

With the expanded size of negotiating teams drawing on expertise more broadly from the interagency community, ACDA's role began to contract in the late 1970s. While this trend helped to "export" interagency disagreements to negotiating forums and constrain ambassadorial flexibility, the merits of inclusion were compelling, given the need to maintain bureaucratic consensus on the home front.<sup>48</sup> As this shift occurred, ACDA retained a useful though less visible role in providing technical input to the backstopping process.<sup>49</sup> ACDA's staffing and expertise is especially important in the delegation work at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and for the backstopping of multilateral treaty review conferences.

Balanced against these positive aspects are two significant problems which have hampered ACDA's effectiveness in recent years. First, ACDA suffered disproportionately from attrition of key career staff as the agency's political echelon shifted sharply to the right in the 1980s. Second, as noted earlier, ACDA suffered from the migration of ambassadorial-level arms negotiators to the State Department, not only in the nuclear area but also in areas such as conventional forces, Open Skies, and other negotiations. This has tended to exclude ACDA's leadership from the chain of command, to lower the number of interagency groups that it chairs, and to remove it on occasion from high-level communications on matters in which it has a substantive interest. Furthermore, ACDA's staff level expertise in some areas, such as non-proliferation, has not been effectively utilized through lack of access.<sup>50</sup>

### **Implementation and Follow-through**

Arms control implementation activity--both in the procedures to be followed and in the verification of

obligations generally--has become more of a focal point for policy, unlike the case when ACDA was created. Yet, perhaps in a way which was forecast by ACDA's expressly qualified mandate--to "inter alia" direct, "as appropriate," U.S. participation in "control systems"--the agency's involvement has been selective.

In the early 1970s, ACDA took the lead in staffing the U.S. component of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), which was set-up to be the diplomatic channel for dealing with implementation and compliance issues under the ABM Treaty and (at the time) the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Subsequently, new consultative bodies, such as the Special Verification Commission (SVC) for the INF Treaty, which were created in the late 1980s, have been headed by officials from ACDA. The informational basis for verification assessment is provided partly by the intelligence community, which operates technical collection systems, and also by the OSIA, which reports on cooperative inspections; ACDA is a user, not a producer of intelligence and other raw monitoring data.

Although ACDA has had an important input into the design of treaty verification procedures, its track record on the implementation and compliance side has raised concerns. First, ACDA's relations with the intelligence community have generally been poor. During the mid-1970s and again in the 1980s, the agency adopted the role of devil's advocate, taking issue with what it perceived to be the CIA's lax approach to verification and its chronic underestimation of Soviet deception and concealment activity. To some observers, this stance was salutary in the sense of keeping the intelligence agencies vigilant; to others, ACDA's preoccupations were extreme. Whichever perception is accurate, the situation amplified disputes within ACDA, hampering the agency's ability to present internally unified positions to the interagency community.<sup>51</sup> ACDA's all-important relationship with State also suffered as a result.

Curiously, in handling compliance matters ACDA has been whipsawed by criticism from precisely the opposite direction. In the early Reagan years, the SCC and, more particularly, the ACDA personnel assigned to it, were the targets of right-wing criticism for allegedly being insufficiently tough on the Soviets for treaty compliance

problems and even for sweeping violations under the rug. Hard-liners in the Pentagon and Congress effectively paralyzed SCC operations and cast a dark shadow over ACDA's general involvement.<sup>52</sup> Attacks against the SCC by arms control opponents reinforced counter-offensives by liberal groups that viewed Reagan Administration objectives as designed to subvert existing agreements or to use exaggerated claims of Soviet cheating as a pretext for stonewalling new negotiations and killing existing agreements. The advent of Mikhail Gorbachev and the signing of the INF Treaty defused this situation but left some lasting scars in the bureaucracy.

With respect to treaty implementation, ACDA's net contributions are difficult to evaluate. The placement of OSIA in DOD was symbolically damaging to the agency. As one DOD official put it, "For ACDA, OSIA would have been legitimacy personified."<sup>53</sup> In retrospect, there were good reasons to place OSIA in the Pentagon's orbit, given the politicized nature of ACDA's work on compliance and the need to insulate OSIA officials (most of them military officers) from political controversies. Moreover, the Pentagon had the managerial, logistical, and other skills necessary to undertake inspection activity; ACDA did not. In light of these practical realities, then-ACDA director Adelman did not fight for the OSIA mission.<sup>54</sup> Nonetheless, many saw OSIA's placement as a clear encroachment on ACDA's statutory turf by the Pentagon, and it raised the question once again of why ACDA was needed. Meanwhile, OSIA has grown enormously: it is now roughly two and a half times the size of ACDA in terms of both personnel and budget.<sup>55</sup>

On the whole, ACDA has had a very difficult time in attempting to gain a clear role in verification, compliance, and implementation activities. With a mandate to negotiate agreements, the agency's leadership has been timid about getting embroiled in sensitive implementation issues, given the presumptive conflict of interest that arises when negotiation and verification duties are mixed together. Generally, its involvement has been selective and highly politicized, and it has suffered from the appearance of being erratic.



## **Public Outreach**

Few areas of ACDA's performance have come in for more criticism than its efforts in public affairs. Throughout much of its history, ACDA has been distinctly uncomfortable with the role of public arms control "salesman," fearing that this would complicate its interagency dealings and incur the wrath of the right-wing in Congress.<sup>56</sup> Thus, the agency has been cautious in its public or promotional utterances, and it has not placed a high priority on outreach activities. Indeed, during periods when ACDA's leadership was politically conservative, the agency evinced a "with friends like these, who needs enemies" type of attitude toward the public interest sector and towards the agency's traditional friends on Capitol Hill.

Given the highly politicized character of arms control policy during the Cold War, ACDA's instinctive caution in the public affairs domain was understandable. Quite obviously, ACDA could not promote ideas that went against the grain of administration policy, then or now. More troubling, however, was the fact that even on "motherhood and apple pie" issues, like nuclear non-proliferation, the agency has not taken much of a public profile.

Nor has ACDA invested much in being the "agency of record" for arms control. Its three major publications--the Documents on Disarmament series, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, and World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers--are of substantial research and documentary value, though they are sometimes not produced in a timely fashion. ACDA produces briefing pamphlets and issue briefs, but these do not appear to be widely circulated or cited. According to the 1989 IG report, the agency's publications were "not necessarily being sent to the right audiences or providing the data that the targeted audiences most require."<sup>57</sup> In general, the report indicated, the public affairs function had suffered from "poor management and a misalignment of staff."<sup>58</sup> ACDA's relations with Congress have also been problematic. Some in Congress have complained that ACDA should be more forthright in articulating publicly the "arms control perspective" on major security policy issues in the same way that DOD presents the case for military planning and budgets. As argued previously, this

is not a fair criticism: the idea that ACDA could somehow be unleashed from the constraining influence of other executive branch agencies--to, in effect, "let ACDA be ACDA"--is both impractical and self-defeating. Compounding this problem, Congress has levied reporting and analytical requirements on ACDA, such as the Arms Control Impact Statement (ACIS), which have embroiled interagency relations while not helping the agency's image in Congress. Not surprisingly, when Congress has sought reports on how ACDA views its own agenda, the agency has generally disappointed its sponsors on Capitol Hill.

## Summing Up

In general, the foregoing discussion reveals a troubling picture of ACDA. Although in some areas of performance the agency exhibited underlying strength, in most areas one finds evidence of progressive decline. Specifically:

- **ACDA's ability to operate effectively at senior political levels in the executive branch has declined substantially since the early 1970s, with the exception of the Warnke era.** ACDA no longer serves as a focal point for managing arms control efforts; the stature of its directorship has diminished; and in the past decade, the agency's relations with the State Department have been seriously out of sync. Although it might be tempting to invoke some Darwinian law of bureaucratic natural selection to explain this phenomenon, there was nothing preordained about this decline. Reducing ACDA's role has been a conscious choice of administrations, in part perhaps because of the agency's unhappy tendency to serve as a political lightning rod.
- **There is no inherent reason why better coordination between the ACDA director and the secretary of state could not result in restoring a political mandate for the agency and thereby fundamentally dispelling the sense of drift that has plagued ACDA in the past decade.** But the agency's decline has made it difficult to recruit a strong person for the job of ACDA director, and a new director will need considerable help at senior levels to regain lost

ground. Much depends on the personalities and perspectives of the individuals chosen for these jobs.

- **ACDA's strongest efforts clearly have been in the areas of negotiations support and analysis, regardless of the administration in power.** This is especially true in the areas of non-proliferation and multilateral affairs. If current trends continue, ACDA's role will be limited to that of a bureaucratic backstopper with a focus on the near-term operational needs of negotiations
- **Unfortunately, however, the agency's human resources have been stretched very thin.** Over time, the scope of arms control activities has broadened to the point where the agency can no longer maintain a "critical mass" of expertise in many areas. The agency, at best, has become a jack of many trades but the master of only a few. This trend has made it difficult for observers to understand what ACDA's special role is in the interagency process.
- **ACDA's most notable weaknesses--external research and public affairs management--result both from its own choice of priorities and from constraints in its design.** ACDA does not have a laboratory infrastructure that would make it the agency of choice for systems R&D in various fields of arms control; nor can it truly be a source of ideas for public consumption outside the mainstream of administration policies. ACDA could, however, optimize performance to realistic standards by adopting a more systematic approach to defining and pursuing research needs and by asking Congress to build budget "firewalls" between its research and operational accounts. In a similar vein, it could augment its public affairs efforts to more clearly serve as a spokesman for administration policy than it does today.

To a significant degree, as has been stressed here, deficits in ACDA's performance are not mainly self-inflicted; the agency is truly not a master of its own destiny. That, however, does not diminish the need for corrective action. The next chapter details alternative approaches to correcting ACDA's problems.

## ENDNOTES

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1. U.S. Congress, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Authorization for Fiscal Years 1982-83, 97th Congress, 1st session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1981), p. 2.
2. Duncan L. Clarke, "The Role (and Nonrole) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the Coordination and Integration of National Security Policy," in Duncan L. Clarke, ed., Public Policy and Political Institutions (Greenwich: JAI Press, Inc, 1985), p. 230.
3. Does the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Have A Future?: Thoughts of the Agency's Former Directors, Occasional Paper 8 (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, March 1992), p. 18.
4. Transmittal memorandum from Sherman M. Funk to George Murphy, Acting Director of ACDA, 28 April 1989, contained in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Office of the Inspector General, Semiannual Report to the Congress, 1 October 1988 to 31 March 1989.
5. U.S. Congress, Report (102-99) of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Arms Control and Disarmament Amendments Act of 1991, 102nd Congress, 1st sess., (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1991), p. 3. As part of its review, the Committee adopted a proposal, sponsored by Sen. Paul Simon, to require an assessment on the "current ability and performance" of the agency in carrying out its legislatively-mandated functions.
6. The Politics of Arms Control, op. cit., pp. 31-33.
7. Cited in The Politics of Arms Control, op. cit., p. 51.
8. Richard Burt, "Defense Policy and Arms Control: Defining the Problem," in Richard Burt, ed., Arms Control and Defense Postures in the 1980s (Boulder Colo.: Westview, 1982), p. 11.
9. For figures on the post-1981 cuts, see Lawrence Weiler, "The ACDA Scandal: A Critical Agency Becomes a Basket Case," Arms Control Today, (July 1983), p. 3. Perversely, the long delay in assembling a new management team also subjected the agency to criticism that it was acting as a haven for liberal hold-overs from the Carter administration. See "Arms Control and the Permanent Government," National Security Record, No. 42, February 1892, (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation), p. 4.

10. For an apt illustration of these criticisms, see "The ACDA Scandal," op. cit., pp. 3, 7-8. A response to the Weiler piece was made by Kenneth L. Adelman, in "The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: Alive and Well," Arms Control Today, (October 1983), pp. 1,4. For a more dispassionate recounting of the period, "The Role (and Nonrole) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency," op. cit., pp. 211-212. The highly ideological character of the ACDA transition team prior to the arrival of Reagan's first director, Eugene Rostow, contributed to controversy surrounding the agency. See Michael Getler, "Two Arms Control Officials Abruptly Relieved of Jobs," The Washington Post, 30 April 1981, p. A3.
11. U.S. Congress, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, Report: Review of Arms Control Legislation and Organization, 93rd Congress, 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1974), p. 13.
12. Ibid., pp. 19, 17.
13. See, for example, Lawrence Freedman, "The Politics of Conventional Arms Control," Survival, (September/October 1989), p. 395. Also John Mueller, "A New Concert for Europe," Foreign Policy, (Winter 1989-90), p. 6.
14. Does the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Have a Future?, op. cit., p. 11.
15. Confidential interviews.
16. A celebrated example of this was Gen. Edward Rowny's reported opposition to the idea of taking guidance from in-coming ACDA director Kenneth L. Adelman, see Walter Pincus, "Memo says Negotiator Won't Take Adelman's Orders," The Washington Post, 15 March 1983, p. A15.
17. Transmittal memo, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Office of the Inspector General, Semiannual Report to the Congress.
18. Confidential interview, 3 September 1991; for further background, see Glenn T. Seaborg, with Benjamin S. Loeb, Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 131-5.
19. Confidential interviews.
20. Interview with James Goodby, 25 October 1991.
21. Interview with Morton Halperin, 10 January 1992. For the definitive account, see John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), Chapter 2.
22. Confidential interview. In evaluating ACDA's analytical track record, some observers point out ACDA's role in promoting policy ideas which in retrospect looked sound even though they were not pursued at the time.

The classic case is a suggestion for a ban on MIRV testing in the late 1960s. See Gerard C. Smith, "The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: an Unfinished History," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (April 1984), p. 13.

23. Interview with Lawrence Weiler, 2 July 1991.

24. For examples, see Robert B. Cullen, "Arms Control after Afghanistan: 'Like a brewery after Prohibition,'" Defense Policy Report, 23 May 1980.

25. Interview with Edward Lacey, 20 August 1991 and other confidential interviews.

26. Interview with Thomas Graham, 20 September 1991.

27. ACDA provided key personnel as consultants to the Commission and currently provide the top U.S. official, who serves as the deputy executive chairman of UNSCOM.

28. Prepared statement of Philip Farley before the Subcommittee on National Security and Scientific Affairs, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Prospects for Arms Control and ACDA," in U.S. Congress, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Authorization for Fiscal Years 1982-83, pp. 9-10.

29. Cited in a Report by the Comptroller General to the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Efforts to Improve Management Practices and Increase Resources at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 11 April 1984), p. 18. This report cited a range of problems in the research area, including the lack of formal criteria for project selection, lack of interagency coordination and inadequate preparation and use of contractor evaluations.

30. R. Jeffrey Smith, "ACDA Research Lags, Report Says," The Washington Post, 5 May 1989, p. A25.

31. Quotation cited in U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Verification Technologies: Managing Research and Development for Cooperative Arms Control Monitoring Measures OTA-ISC-488 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, May 1991), p. 6.

32. For an incisive analysis of this question, see "The Role (and Nonrole) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency," op. cit., pp. 199-200.

33. Remarks of George Seignious in Does the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Have a Future?, op. cit., p. 27.

34. James A. Schear, "The Political Aspects of Arms Control and Disarmament," in Richard Dean Burns, ed., Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, forthcoming).

35. The message to release senior ACDA officials after the SALT I negotiations was conveyed to then-Deputy Director Philip Farley by Nixon White House personnel officials Stanton Anderson and Robert Reisner on 16 February 1973. ("Eyes Only Memorandum For File; Subject: ACDA Senior Non-Career Appointments," 20 February 1973.)
36. Letter dated 10 May 1973, reprinted in part in Alan Platt, The U.S. Senate and Strategic Arms Policy, 1969-1977 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), 41.
37. Amrom Katz and Robert Behr were the appointments in question. Iklé was not confirmed by the Senate until mid-June, 1973. The lengthy delay in having a new director in place reinforced the message that ACDA would not be a weighty participant in policy deliberations during the Nixon second term.
38. Does the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Have a Future?, op. cit., p. 10.
39. Richard Burt, "Its Arms Pact on Shelf, U.S. Agency Suffers Ennui," New York Times, 11 June 1980, A2.
40. ACDA's temporary leadership was composed of James Malone, Michael Pillsbury, David Sullivan, and James Hackett.
41. Duncan L. Clarke, "Arms control and Foreign Policy Under Reagan," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November 1981), p. 12.
42. William Kincade, then-director of the Arms Control Association, quoted in Charles Gellner and Lynn F. Rusten, "The United States: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: Data on Management, Personnel, Budget, Status and Related Matters 1981-83," Arms Control (September 1984), p. 133.
43. See Patrick E. Tyler, "Arms Talks Chief Assails GOP Critics," Washington Post, (5 January 1983), p. A1, and Charles R. Gellner and Lynn F. Rusten, "The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: Data on Management, Personnel, Budget, Status and Related Matters 1981-83," Arms Control (September 1984), pp. 128-147.
44. Senator Paul E. Tsongas (D-MA) called Adelman's confirmation "a major propaganda victory for the Soviets in Europe." "Senate Confirms Adelman to Head Arms Control Unit," New York Times, 15 April 1983, p. A1. See also, Walter Pincus, "Adelman Nomination Sent To Floor, With Reservation," The Washington Post, 25 February 1983, p. A3.
45. See Charles R. Gellner and Lynn F. Rusten, "The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: Data on Management, Personnel, Budget, Status and Related Matters 1981-83," Arms Control (September 1984) pp. 128-147; See also Weiler, "The ACDA Scandal," p. 1. For Kenneth Adelman's rebuttal, see "The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: Alive and Well," p. 1.

46. This is the perception of Ralph Earle II, see remarks in Does the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Have a Future?, op. cit., p. 30.

47. On clearances, see Cold Dawn, op. cit., p. 228.

48. See Strobe Talbott, Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1979); Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984); and The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988).

49. Thus, for example, the ACDA IG stated in a March 1989 report: "ACDA handles the task of providing technical support to arms control negotiations very well, and the Agency receives high marks from other elements of the U.S. Government . . . in some cases, such as the U.S. interaction with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, ACDA's technical expertise is rated as invaluable." U.S. ACDA, Office of the Inspector General, Semiannual Report to the Congress, (31 March 1989), p. 4.

50. Confidential interviews.

51. This may explain a rather oblique reference in the State IG's report to Congress which states that the agency's efforts in this area "lack focus" and that the agency is transmitting "mixed signals" on implementation and compliance matters. See Semiannual Report to Congress, op. cit., p. 4.

52. Michael Krepon, "How Reagan is Killing a Quiet Forum for Arms Talks," Washington Post, 31 August 1986, p. D1.

53. Confidential interview.

54. Confidential interviews.

55. ACDA plays an oversight role by holding claim on the principal deputy director's position at OSIA and by sitting on the interagency group that sends guidance to OSIA via a Pentagon committee, the Executive Committee.

56. For example, the agency was heavily criticized during the SALT II ratification debate.

57. See Semiannual Report to Congress, op. cit., p. 4.

58. Ibid.



### **3**

## **ACDA'S Alternative Futures: Advantages and Drawbacks**

Any number of options are available for how the executive branch might be structured more effectively to handle arms control affairs. This chapter reviews the benefits and liabilities of five of the most salient choices. Each of these models gained a constituency during the period since ACDA's creation. The purpose of this chapter is to collect and present most of the arguments--good, bad, and indifferent--supporting the major options about the agency's future.

### **Stay the Course**

- **Definition.** Taking the path of least resistance by filling ACDA's top six political slots with competent and committed individuals, without making changes in interagency arrangements bearing on arms control policy-making, research, and implementation.

### **Advantages**

Since ACDA was established in 1961, the United States has entered into over 74 arms control agreements. Even in the past five years, when seven Government Accounting Office (GAO) and State Department IG reports critical of the agency have been issued, arms control accords and initiatives have been concluded that effect conventional forces, chemical weapons, nuclear testing, confidence-building measures, and short-range, intermediate, and strategic nuclear weapons. In chronological order, these achievements include:

- The December 1987 INF Treaty, which banned ballistic and ground-launched cruise missiles between the ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometers and ushered in the era of on-site inspections.
- The June 1990 bilateral chemical weapons destruction agreement, which committed the United States and Russia to reduce their stockpiles,

regardless of the status of a Chemical Weapons Convention.

- The November 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which established ceilings for conventional armament and equipment of the NATO and the member states of the former Warsaw Pact.
- The 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), which the Senate at last consented to ratify on 12 December 1990 after its verification protocol was renegotiated.
- The July 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which reduced the number of strategic delivery vehicles allowed each side to 1,600 and set a ceiling of 6,000 on accountable warheads.
- Additional nuclear cuts resulted from unilateral pledges by Bush and Gorbachev to take nuclear weapons off of naval surface ships, withdraw all ground-based, short-range nuclear forces, and take some strategic forces off alert status.<sup>1</sup> In June 1992 Bush and the new Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed to cut nuclear arsenals to between 3,000 and 3,500 warheads by the year 2003, or sooner, depending on the level of U.S. assistance to Russia.
- The March 1992 Open Skies Treaty, signed by 25 countries under the auspices of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, will initiate short-notice cooperative aerial overflights that cover territory from Vladivostok to Vancouver.
- The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), concluded in August 1992 and slated for signature on 13 January 1993, which bans the research, development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons.

ACDA played a diminished role in the interagency policy deliberations that guided U.S. nuclear and conventional negotiators, but the agency was the stalwart of most backstopping operations. As these significant accomplishments indicate, problems within and between agencies have not been disabling.

The creation of OSIA to conduct the INF Treaty's on-site and perimeter-portal inspections in January 1988 within DOD, rather than ACDA, proved to be a success

story. OSIA's achievements with the INF assignment earned the new agency other responsibilities, including conducting the inspections associated with the TTBT, START, CFE, CWC, Open Skies, and other accords.

While staying the course probably means that ACDA will continue to be a peripheral player, enhancing ACDA's role or abolishing the agency would not guarantee more or better arms control. In fact, the personnel changes associated with a new administration might be enough to increase ACDA's role in the future. Arms control policy-making is notoriously dependent on personalities and styles of operation, the interest in arms control or lack thereof by the president and his senior advisors, and the priorities of the administration. A "strong" ACDA on paper with weak leadership and working relationships with senior officials will play a marginal role; a "weak" ACDA on paper with strong leadership and good connections will have policy-making clout. Fiddling with organizational charts cannot alter these facts of life. If the standard for judging an arms control policy-making system is the agreements produced by it, then this one may not be broken, much less in need of fixing.

### **Drawbacks**

The credit for recent successes may well lie in historical circumstances and personalities rather than sound executive branch organization and management. The current structure may not serve U.S. national security interests in the post-Soviet era, when concerns shift from the negotiation of new agreements to proper implementation. Moreover, the preeminent arms control issue for the 1990s will be the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, an area where the executive branch can point to some successes, but can hardly claim a record of great distinction.

The failure to recognize the ambitions behind Saddam Hussein's purchasing habits rests at the high end of policy-making failures. At a more mundane, but still important level, there have been numerous disconnects in U.S. arms control policy-making behind the recent record of negotiating successes. At the Reykjavik summit, President Ronald Reagan offered to negotiate away at least two legs of the U.S. strategic deterrent without the benefit of detailed analysis from the executive branch. Similarly,

six years passed before the executive branch could "elaborate" on then-Vice President George Bush's 1984 proposal to have CWC challenge inspections conducted on an anywhere, anytime, no-right-of-refusal basis. In the verification research and development area, an awkward interagency process presented INF inspectors at Votkinsk with a \$10 million Cargoscan x-ray imaging system, which OSIA's inspectors regarded as an extravagant behemoth. None of these decisions proved to be fatal, and all could be explained by the difficulties of coordinating arms control policy and adjusting verification R&D to operational needs, as well as the oddities of decision-making at the highest levels.

A stronger ACDA might not have been able to prevent these disconnects, but a weak ACDA certainly contributes to them. When ACDA has little clout, it is unable to push important arms control issues higher up the national security agenda, to prevent waste or add coherence to a vast verification R&D program, or to improve the staffing and content of U.S. arms control policies. These telltale signs suggest that at times progress has been made in arms control despite executive branch organization, not because of it. Surely, the interagency system is not disabled, but it is not functioning in optimal ways.

In its early years ACDA was a magnet for skilled and motivated personnel, but the agency has suffered progressive deterioration for more than a decade. This slump can be measured in the traditional terms of dollars and cents, but equally important has been the migration of talented ACDA personnel to other departments. Access to more resources, greater bureaucratic clout, and opportunity for advancement have turned ACDA into a "farm system" for the rest of the executive branch. As a current U.S. official has noted, "Why stay for years to get a seat along the wall while your colleagues from other agencies are sitting at the table?"<sup>2</sup> While the U.S. Government does not lose when ACDA officials move elsewhere within the executive branch, the agency has been notably weakened by this "brain drain," which also makes it difficult to recruit talented replacements.

Few are eager to board a small, leaky ship. For example, the position of chief scientist, which was created to improve the agency's entree into the verification

research community and prepare ACDA for a more aggressive role in R&D management, remained vacant for over two years. Almost one-third of the agency's professional staff of 153 consists of detailees from other agencies who no longer see an ACDA assignment as desirable. High vacancy rates have plagued the agency for several years. As of November 1992, ACDA had a total of 48 vacant slots for 252 full-time and "other equivalent" employees, including 20 for in-house professionals.

Other telltale signs of decline, as noted in chapter 2, include the loss of interagency committee chairmanships and the movement of almost all negotiating ambassadors to the State Department.<sup>3</sup> ACDA has also lost the backstopping assignments for CFE and Open Skies. Some have pointed out that the level at which the ACDA director has interacted with others in interagency deliberations reflects and accentuates the agency's downgrading. One former high-ranking ACDA official observed that the director has either been relegated to or has settled for interchanges at the assistant secretarial level, when he really needs to be working at the cabinet level.<sup>4</sup>

This gradual decline would not matter if other agencies of government could effectively take over ACDA's mission, but this will be difficult for bureaucratic and structural reasons, as discussed in chapter 4. The most pressing arms control issues for the 1990s will be proliferation and implementation. In both areas, U.S. governmental efforts are likely to be weaker with the further deterioration of ACDA.

Nor is the federal government's verification R&D effort likely to improve by staying the current course. ACDA's research budget is minuscule in comparison to the funds given to other agencies. The Department of Energy's (DOE's) 1992 budget for verification and control technology was \$140 million, the Defense Nuclear Agency's (DNA's) was almost \$75 million, while ACDA's external research budget reached \$1.9 million.<sup>5</sup>

Despite the criticisms the agency has received for not living up to its statutory responsibilities, these comparisons can be misleading, as Adelman and others contend.<sup>6</sup> At present, the agency's research consists mainly of conceptual evaluations of arms control and verification ideas, while DOE and DNA are involved in much more costly activities such as fundamental research,

development, testing, and deployment of verification technologies. Ever since the agency's Field Operations Division was abolished in 1972, it has been virtually shut-out of the verification R&D arena.<sup>7</sup>

With such a small budget, ACDA has had little say in the design and execution of the program. As one veteran of ACDA's research programming acknowledged, "Research is controlled by the people who do the funding. Period."<sup>8</sup> The problem is not that there is insufficient government funding for verification R&D, but that programming is influenced as much by bureaucratic imperatives as by real needs. Institutionally-driven constraints on R&D are impervious to changes in the international negotiating environments and reduce the technical options available to policy-makers during the final stages of a negotiation.

Congress' lack of interest and confidence in ACDA accentuates all of the agency's woes. When asked for his thoughts about ACDA, an influential Senate staffer responded, "Nothing. ACDA is not really a presence on the Hill."<sup>9</sup> As a result, when Congress mandated funds to assist the former Soviet republics in safely dismantling their nuclear and chemical stockpiles in 1991 and 1992, the legislation also bypassed ACDA to put the State and Defense departments in charge of the operation.<sup>10</sup>

If ACDA's fortunes continue to decline, the agency will become a hollow shell and a dumping ground for unqualified or poorly motivated individuals. Resembling comments made about the widely ridiculed Federal Emergency Management Agency, one Defense official described ACDA's status in rather graphic terms: "I'm afraid we've created a eunuch."<sup>11</sup> Keeping the agency on its current downward glide path would be a mistake because ACDA's missions continue to be of pressing importance. Furthermore, the executive branch and the American taxpayers do not need another agency of government largely incapable of carrying out its assigned missions.

## **Merge into the State Department**

- Definition. Integrating arms control into the other facets of foreign policy by disbanding the agency and

moving its critical functions and personnel into the State Department, under an under-secretary of state for arms control.

### **Advantages**

During the debate over ACDA's creation, some legislators were clearly convinced that arms control would disarm the country in the face of foreign aggression, while others felt that arms control was the only road to a safer, more secure world. ACDA has always been buffeted by these cross-currents. Only toward the end of the Cold War did arms control become increasingly accepted as an integral part of U.S. national security policy. By the time the Berlin Wall collapsed, only a few holdouts continued to argue against the value of arms control as a method of security enhancement.

With this consensus, the need for a separate agency devoted to arms control advocacy has come into doubt. ACDA was created because this subject was not receiving sufficient priority elsewhere. Arms control expertise now exists in all the national security bureaucracies, in part because ACDA has served as a farm team, developing talent for other agencies of government.

Arms control is now big business. DOD estimates that it has some 65 professionals working in 13 offices in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.<sup>12</sup> Two focal points for DOD's implementation activities are OSIA and the Air Force's XOXI office, which has just under 300 employees worldwide working on research and implementation for 22 treaties.<sup>13</sup> OSIA currently houses 723 professionals. To accommodate the upcoming demands of the CWC and the bilateral chemical weapons destruction agreement, OSIA expects its staff size to increase to 1071.<sup>14</sup> The intelligence community has an Arms Control Intelligence Staff of about 100 and a new Non-proliferation Center, which has a staff of approximately 100, as well.<sup>15</sup> DOE has scientists at over half a dozen national laboratories working on verification technologies, and DNA also has more than twenty people managing verification R&D programs in private industry and the laboratories. One could readily question the need for a specialized agency when so much attention and expertise is being devoted to arms control elsewhere in the executive branch.

ACDA's semi-autonomy has always been more fictional than real. The agency's directors have rarely taken disputes directly to the president. ACDA is physically located within the State Department, and the success of ACDA directors has always depended on their relationship with the secretary of state. While secretaries like Rusk and Vance were willing to rely heavily on the ACDA director's advice, most have quickly pigeonholed ACDA in the backstage role of "technical resource."<sup>16</sup> Regardless of ACDA's charter, there is little doubt about who comes out on top in any bureaucratic struggle between the ACDA director and the secretary of state.

Merging ACDA into State would not downgrade arms control; quite the contrary, it would integrate arms control more effectively into the other facets of foreign policy. This approach, which was preferred by the Senate during the debate over ACDA's creation, was part of the motivation behind the creation of the Disarmament Administration within the State Department back in 1960.<sup>17</sup> Civil service protection provisions similar to those used in the Office of the Secretary of Defense could be employed at State so that arms control experts do not become second class citizens under a Foreign Service Officer-dominated bureaucratic culture. An under-secretary of state for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation could be created to head an enhanced staff to help ensure that arms control initiatives do not get buried at Foggy Bottom. This arrangement could give arms control issues a stronger voice within decision-making circles, and make the State Department's arms control experts more effective advocates. As Kampelman has concluded, "ACDA does not belong as an independent agency anymore. They just do not have the policy clout."<sup>18</sup>

### **Drawbacks**

One of the primary reasons for creating a separate arms control agency was the concern that if these responsibilities resided in the State Department's Disarmament Administration, they would be dominated by higher priority concerns or displaced by regional and bilateral foreign policy initiatives. As one current ACDA official put it, merging ACDA into State would be "a recipe for subordinating arms control issues."<sup>19</sup> Arms control



could, over time or perhaps immediately, slip into a policy netherworld, a victim of the State Department's achilles heel--"clientitis," which is the impulse to improve bilateral relations above all else, including arms control initiatives.

An arms control bureau, even at the under-secretary level, would inevitably and perhaps constantly be at odds with the regional bureaus, especially over proliferation and arms transfer issues. Even in the Political-Military Affairs Bureau, arms control often loses out to other foreign policy priorities. The potential for internecine warfare within the State Department detracts from any assurances that the secretary would become a stronger advocate for arms control. Without an ACDA, arms control issues may not be raised at the highest levels of government as forcefully or as regularly as they are now.

Furthermore, the capability to foster arms control-oriented, high-quality, creative analysis might also be crippled. High-level arms control experts would find their jobs taken by rotating, advancement-seeking Foreign Service Officers (FSOs), unless these positions were not reserved for civil service slots. Arms control issues would then be in the hands of FSOs with little background in the field. Entry-level positions in arms control might also suffer.

If ACDA's strengths--its institutional memory, expertise, and sole focus on arms control--are not retained elsewhere in the executive branch, future presidents will find their ability to pursue arms control crippled by both bureaucratic inertia and disagreements between cabinet members over arms control policies. These very circumstances spurred Kennedy to create ACDA. According to one former government official, "The world would go on without ACDA, but you might have to re-invent it."<sup>20</sup>

### **Arms Control "Czar"**

- **Definition.** Making ACDA an autonomous line agency with considerable authority to implement its decisions, similar to the Federal Reserve Board or the Harold Stassen White House arms control office of the 1950s.

### Advantages

Clearly, ACDA has an impressive charter. ACDA's problems are rooted in the reluctance of presidents, secretaries of state, and members of Congress to give ACDA the authority and additional resources to carry out its charter. As one interviewee stated, "ACDA is a classic case of all of the responsibility and none of the authority."<sup>21</sup> From the outset, ACDA was no match in challenging the "equities" of the departments of State and Defense.

Eisenhower recognized the potential of arms control objectives to be slighted in favor of stronger institutional interests.

He felt there was such opposition to disarmament talks among the military establishment that such an arms-control agency should be located within the State Department. But he wanted a man to head it who "would have stature roughly equivalent to that of the Secretary of Defense."<sup>22</sup>

The legislation proposed by the Kennedy Administration acknowledged the prerogatives of the State Department in the foreign policy aspects of arms control by having the ACDA director report to the secretary of state, but it also tried to provide leverage and stature by giving the agency's chief a direct line to the president. In practice, no ACDA director has enjoyed presidential access on a par with cabinet officers.

If ACDA were given the authority and the resources to carry out its charter, arms control initiatives would have greater weight in the interagency process, prodding the United States toward more far-reaching proposals. An arms control czar would have the wherewithal to short-circuit endless internal debates. A czar might be given the authority to set timetables for certain decisions to be made and an ability to cut the wasteful verification R&D programming of other agencies. To toughen U.S. non-proliferation efforts, the czar could be granted a veto power over all conventional arms sales abroad and dual-use technology licenses.

A refashioned ACDA could be modelled after the Federal Reserve Board, an agency with autonomy and

considerable power to implement its decisions. Multi-year appointments to the agency would be made from slates of Democratic and Republican candidates.<sup>23</sup> Alternatively, ACDA could become a semi-autonomous office with policy-making powers attached to the White House. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative might be an appropriate model for what would be, in effect, an updated version of the arms control staff led by Stassen during the Eisenhower Administration. Either course would endow ACDA with greater authority and the chance to fulfill its charter, an opportunity denied under present circumstances.

### **Drawbacks**

After a certain period of time, all governmental agencies develop parochial interests; institutional survival depends on how well turf is guarded. ACDA is no exception to this rule. Like the Defense and State departments, ACDA has equities too. If ACDA were given more authority in the interagency process, decision-making could become skewed to the detriment of U.S. national security--whether the agency were "captured" by the far-right or far-left. Arms control must be an integral facet of national security policy, not a transcendent objective divorced from other legitimate considerations.

Thus, the proper balance is to have arms control issues weighed in concert with other national security perspectives. ACDA should be represented at all interagency arms control deliberations and should chair or co-chair backstopping and other working-level groups, when appropriate. When equities collide, the institutionally disinterested NSC staff may be most appropriate to resolve disputes, taking into account competing interests. Arms control is too sensitive, complex, and central a matter for presidents to delegate to a sub-cabinet officer or just one "line" agency.

Even if a president were to give ACDA a decision-making mandate, the agency would be unable to implement its decisions without greatly expanded resources and personnel. To enhance ACDA without duplicating the functions now taking place in other agencies, resources and missions would have to be ceded and consolidated within ACDA. Significant alterations of the status quo would spark new bureaucratic turf battles that would hamper

policy-making at a time of critical importance for arms control. Any ACDA attempts to capture major policy formulation responsibilities will run afoul of the secretary of state, just as Stassen did with John Foster Dulles. Similarly, ACDA efforts to regain the lead in the verification research will lose out to the Defense and Energy departments and the intelligence community. Tough problems that cut across agency lines of responsibility do not lend themselves to czars, and when czars are appointed, they do not succeed very well in the executive branch.

In other words, a czarist transformation could not be accomplished with just the stroke of a pen. Presidential and congressional decisions would have to be followed with vigilant oversight to ensure that the mandated changes take place and then that bureaucracies comply rather than revert to their old ways. Without consistent high-level support, an arms control czar is likely to be that in name only. In the end, as one interviewee observed, "The real players in this game are people with guns, and ACDA has no guns."<sup>24</sup>

Finally, the absence of an arms control czar did not prevent the Reagan and Bush administrations from negotiating impressive arms control agreements. Nor would the presence of an arms control czar guarantee innovative policies or quicker negotiations. As one Pentagon official noted, "If you have good people, there's no need for a czar; if you don't have good people, a czar won't help."<sup>25</sup>

## **Arms Control Advocate/Whistleblower**

- Definition. Charging the ACDA director with external as well as internal advocacy responsibilities and giving ACDA the authority to review arms control programming throughout the government to identify wasteful spending, excessive programming, and institutional biases blocking progress in arms control.

### **Advantages**

One of the underlying assumptions behind ACDA's establishment was that the agency would speak out

forcefully for arms control, at least inside the executive branch. Arguing that progress can be made in arms control only with a strong institutional supporter, some of ACDA's proponents, particularly on Capitol Hill, have also wanted the agency to be an advocate of arms control outside the executive branch.

In practice, ACDA's perceived and perhaps real need to be a "team player" has tempered the agency's advocacy. Numerous times, high-ranking ACDA officials favored a team player approach over that of advocate, innovator, and initiator--to the detriment of arms control. Whether ACDA has been an advocate or not, U.S. arms control policies have always been more subject to the institutional influences of other departments. The resulting arms control policies have rarely pleased ACDA's most vocal supporters or critics.

If ACDA were a more forceful agency, U.S. arms control policies could avoid bouncing between extremes of timidity and boldness. Washington could receive more diplomatic support for its positions and be able to capitalize on opportunities that were missed in the past. A stronger internal advocate might be a counterweight to institutionally-driven, short-sighted policies, such as the decision to deploy multiple-independently retargetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).

One suggestion for strengthening U.S. arms control policies would be to have ACDA's director and officials function as whistleblowers within and outside the executive branch. The ACDA director, with an arms control-oriented, long-term viewpoint, would review and critique the defense programs and arms control policies of the executive branch. Unlike a czar, the whistleblower director would not have veto power over the defense- and arms control-related activities of other agencies, but would be charged with identifying wasteful spending, programming contrary to arms control objectives, and institutional biases blocking progress in negotiations. The director would also be responsible for pushing the policy and technical communities to expand the envelop of existing arms control and disarmament regimes. Upon request, ACDA could also submit hard-hitting reports to Congress. In short, ACDA could be the catalyst for vigorous debates on policy-making, negotiating, and

technical issues that would inform and improve U.S. arms control activities.

### **Drawbacks**

Ultimately, presidents set policies, as well as the boundaries within which key officials can lobby within and outside the administration for preferred options. Tensions can easily arise when high-ranking administration officials play the roles of team player and advocate. Endless debates are likely to erode support for chosen executive branch policies on Capitol Hill and undermine their coherence. As a result, presidents usually have a low tolerance for zealous advocacy and almost no tolerance for external advocacy that goes against administration policy.

ACDA can and should be an advocate for sensible arms control initiatives, but its advocacy--like that of other executive departments--must not overstep appropriate bounds. Once contending arguments are presented and White House decisions are made, the president's principal advisers need to close ranks or the United States will present an incoherent picture to the world. Officials who flout this rule risk losing whatever influence they may wish to have on future decisions, or perhaps even dismissal. If the ACDA director cannot in good conscience support administration policy, a resignation might be in order, to express opposition publicly.

Congress, which already has several analytical arms, does not need another to support its oversight functions. The Congressional Budget Office, the Office of Technology Assessment, the Congressional Research Service, and the GAO have each issued many reports on arms control issues, from the budgetary implications of proposed agreements to the technical capabilities to monitor treaties and the performance, or lack thereof, of the interagency to conduct the entire panoply of arms control activities effectively and efficiently.<sup>26</sup> Congress may be frustrated at its relative inability to influence an administration's arms control policies, but its lack of influence cannot be attributed to lack of staff support. Congress and other parts of the executive branch have also liberally saddled ACDA with reporting requirements. ACDA's metamorphosis into another oversight organization will not

necessarily improve congressional oversight or executive-legislative relations.

Positioning the agency as a "friend of the Congress" is likely to make ACDA a pariah within the executive branch. One ACDA official called this model "a recipe for irrelevance."<sup>27</sup> On paper, ACDA would be part of the system, but in reality ACDA officials would be regarded with increased suspicion. ACDA already faces an uphill battle for a seat at the table with other departments leery of the agency's potential to interfere with institutional interests. Legislative attempts to strengthen ACDA's ties to Congress and play the role of in-house critic would further reduce ACDA's influence. As one interviewee noted, "ACDA is a creature of Congress, but no president will let ACDA be the Congress' friend."<sup>28</sup>

The arms control achievements of the last five years indicate that the executive branch has taken major steps toward incorporating arms control as a regular tool to enhance U.S. national security. Greater acceptance of arms control reduces the need for outspoken advocacy and whistleblowing.

## **Rejuvenation**

- **Definition.** Strengthening ACDA with resources and an updated mission so that the agency can be the focal point for addressing the arms control issues of the post-Cold War era.

## **Advantages**

The arms control agenda for the future is enormous. At the top of the list is the consolidation of gains already made: implementing treaties that will control, dismantle, and destroy thousands of nuclear, chemical, and conventional arms. Strengthening the non-proliferation regimes for weapons of mass destruction, reducing conventional arms transfers, ending nuclear testing, economic conversion, and introducing confidence-building measures to tension-filled regions are among other items on the agenda.

If the United States does not act aggressively on these arms control issues, the new world order may quickly fade and become a term of derision. According to Dante B. Fascell, recently retired chairman of the House Committee

on Foreign Affairs, "...a comprehensive arms control policy is still sorely needed, not only to manage the emerging new world order, but to prevent it from turning into disorder and disarray."<sup>29</sup> Several pressing domestic and international problems will be vying for attention at the White House, but arms control must not be lost in this stampede. According to one current government official, this logic supports a rejuvenation of ACDA:

ACDA does not have to make trade-offs between missions, asking which one is more important for particular problems. Arms control is the mission. The fact that the agency has only one mission enables it to concentrate on that mission, tenaciously at times. There are good people in other parts of the bureaucracy, but they all have other missions.<sup>30</sup>

As Morton Halperin noted, "There's a difference when your organizational interest is served by arms control and when your organizational interest is arms control."<sup>31</sup>

A stronger ACDA would help sustain and improve interagency coordination to enable the United States to be pro-active, not reactive. With the global balances of power in flux and regional tensions on the rise in several areas, the international situation can change quickly. The United States can ill afford to have far-sighted arms control initiatives stifled by the State, Commerce, and Defense departments for narrow institutional reasons. U.S. arms control policies should be driven by national, not parochial interests. Towards that end, a rejuvenated ACDA could serve as a counterweight to the State and Commerce departments on non-proliferation issues. ACDA needs a seat at the table to make sure that arms control issues are fully aired at the highest levels of government.

ACDA has unique assets to contribute in the pursuit of post-Cold War arms control agenda. ACDA's technical expertise and institutional memory are singularly important in the area of multilateral arms control. The agency was a central force in the conclusion of the NPT and the CWC. This unique expertise relates directly to the important arms control issues of the 1990s. No other agency of government is organized to take the lead in non-proliferation matters,<sup>32</sup> and the stakes are too high for the



U.S. government to have a poorly conceived and executed non-proliferation policy. When nobody is in charge, the results are predictably lame. ACDA should be rejuvenated and given leadership responsibilities in multilateral arms control because the costs of a passive U.S. proliferation policy could be staggering.

Furthermore, as noted above, substantial amounts are being spent in the name of arms control verification and non-proliferation R&D. Managers of these R&D programs, housed in different parts of the government, have been directed to coordinate their activities, but in practice the amount of coordination boils down to what each individual chooses to reveal to the other about present programming and plans for the future.<sup>33</sup> The present interagency system is not designed to assess the legitimacy of these research programs. The offices in charge of these programs have each fought intensely against central management, indicating that institutional protectiveness is at work and some budgetary discipline is probably in order. ACDA is well-suited to set priorities for a national research program and identify which R&D programs are needed and where cutbacks are merited. A stronger agency could foster a coordinated program that provides forward-looking research through creative competition.

ACDA cannot accomplish these tasks in its current weakened condition. An essential part of the rejuvenation model hinges on variables such as how individuals will interact with each other. As one veteran of the executive and legislative branches observed, "Personalities play a huge role, for after all, people determine what organizations are. Personalities determine policies and also the relative influence of the agencies they represent."<sup>34</sup> ACDA has to have the support of the president and its director must have the confidence of the secretary of state. These two factors could start ACDA on the track to rejuvenation.

The appointment of highly-qualified, well-regarded senior officials could begin a top-to-bottom revitalization of the agency's staff. Skilled scientists and program managers could be recruited or temporarily assigned to the agency during this transition, and early retirement inducements could be offered to generate desired staff turnover. ACDA officials could chair more interagency groups, especially those dealing with non-proliferation

issues, and guidelines for how OSIA gets its instructions and reports to the interagency could also be modified. The Office of Management and Budget and Congress would have to work toward providing ACDA with a verification research budget. The agency need not grow to become more powerful; it would draw its power from a highly-respected new leadership, an infusion of skilled staff at all levels, additional resources for research purposes, and the chairmanship of key interagency committees.

### **Drawbacks**

In Darwinian terms, the fittest have survived and prospered. Whereas ACDA's fortunes may have fallen over the last decade or more, the interagency process still works reasonably well. Other agencies have filled the voids that have opened as ACDA's hold on arms control affairs has slipped. The growth of arms control expertise and institutional memory elsewhere within the executive branch provides a soft cushion against ACDA's continued demise. Rejuvenation may be nothing more than duplication since the agency no longer holds a monopoly on arms control expertise.

Now that arms control is an accepted part of U.S. national security policy, outspoken advocacy is no longer as crucial. The executive branch and Congress may find it difficult to muster enthusiasm for rejuvenating the agency, given other pressing concerns that require greater attention. Rejuvenation might also require that the deadwood be cleared out of ACDA, moves that could leave the new administration open to charges of a politically-motivated purge. Congressional support for any suggested modifications in ACDA's charter and for more resources could be met with a lukewarm reception. Even some of the agency's most stalwart supporters now talk of their frustrations with ACDA's performance.<sup>35</sup> Rejuvenation may be more trouble than it is worth, and there is no warranty that it would work.

A concerted effort to rejuvenate ACDA might yield some immediate benefits, but over time, the agency could slowly revert to a weakened state. After all, ACDA will always be at the mercy of more powerful agencies. ACDA has served its purpose by doing most of the spade work for a procession of arms control agreements that cover all types of weaponry. Precedents have been set in the

nuclear, chemical, and conventional areas, in on-site, regional, and remote monitoring, and in various forms of confidence-building measures. In the near term, emphasis will be on implementing the agreements already signed, and this mission is firmly in DOD's orbit. Over the long term, the future for arms control rests on presidential leadership and State Department initiatives, not ACDA's technical expertise. If policy-making and implementation are to remain outside of ACDA's grasp, then rejuvenation may be a short-term phenomenon--if it is at all possible.

### **Assessing the Models**

We reject the stay the course option because important priorities are not being met under current arrangements. Non-proliferation, for example, is growing in complexity and scope, and yet the U.S. government is not well-positioned to coordinate its responses to an increasing array of initiatives--from export controls to regional arms limitation--that currently vie for attention. Correspondingly, multilateral negotiations, review conferences, and involvement in specialized verification agencies (e.g., IAEA and the new Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) are becoming more demanding in terms of resources, institutional memory, and negotiating skill. ACDA retains an important role in this area but it has difficulty operating effectively in its current politically weakened condition, despite recent increases in its budget.

In our judgment, the agency cannot be rejuvenated at this point simply by selecting a strong leadership team closely allied with the secretary of state. Our interviews suggest that the kind of individuals needed to rejuvenate ACDA would be unlikely to take these jobs, absent other structural changes in the interagency process blessed by the president and secretary of state to strengthen ACDA's roles and missions. Moreover, even if a powerful new leadership team could be recruited, the agency's staff resources have been so depleted that the new team would not be sufficiently supported to be able to play a leadership role. This option is no longer viable in our judgment because changes at the top are no longer sufficient or realistic to rejuvenate the agency.

In our view, staying the course is likely to accelerate the agency's progressive deterioration, an alternative that is unpalatable at a time when there is much important work to do controlling weapons of mass destruction. A perpetuation of the status quo will cause ACDA to continue to lose its remaining assets, thereby making it increasingly difficult to carry out its statutory functions. An emphasis on "technical support" will inevitably mean a diminished role in policy-making. This, in turn, will drive more talent out of the agency to more challenging and influential jobs. Rather than accept this fate, it would be better to pull the plug on ACDA and find alternative ways to shore up executive branch efforts in the fields of non-proliferation, implementation, and other areas with evident executive branch weaknesses.

The hope for the an arms control czar, inherent in the impulse behind ACDA's creation, was compromised during the process of drafting and enacting the statute. At first, some rued the requirement for the ACDA director to work through the secretary of state. However, our interviews uncovered no current groundswell of support for ACDA to become the executive branch's arms control czar. Perhaps this reluctance can be traced to memories of the Nixon Administration, when there was something akin to an arms control czar. During this period, Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, excluded key policy-makers from arms control decision-making. This experience convinced many observers of the wisdom of more collaborative approaches.

Attempts by the ACDA director to usurp high profile arms control portfolios from the State Department are inconceivable and would generate interagency turf battles on a scale far in excess of current levels. Even if a president proposed to cede various powers to a new ACDA director, the plan would be doomed to failure, given the equities of other line agencies. A thorough assessment of ACDA by the IG stated the obvious: "Given the position ACDA occupies in the U.S. Government, and the importance of arms control on the national security agenda, ACDA never had a chance of achieving primary responsibility for arms control and disarmament."<sup>36</sup> Ultimately, no president can cede the authority for arms control, which is a highly political act with important ramifications for the national security and foreign policy of

the United States. Therefore, it would be most inappropriate and unwise to appoint any individual as an arms control czar.

The whistleblower/advocate model is advanced by those who believe that to earn its keep in the executive branch, ACDA must be a problem-solving, envelop-pushing, advocate for arms control and disarmament, both inside and outside the U.S. government. To be sure, the agency must offer a perspective that, from time to time, will be at variance with the policy recommendations offered by the other departments. ACDA clashed with State over the wisdom of the NPT during the Johnson Administration, with DOD over the deployment of MIRVs during the Nixon Administration, and with Commerce over the blessing of breeder reactors during the Carter Administration. When ACDA does not do its job of internal advocacy, the agency loses its *raison d'être* as well as its congressional following.

Some members of Congress who strongly support arms control want something more: an external advocate and a friend of the Congress. This sentiment was behind the requirement to produce Arms Control Impact Statements detailing the problems posed by weapons systems approved by the president. This view is diametrically opposed to that held by critics of ACDA who view the agency as opposed to national security.<sup>37</sup> In our view, both perspectives are deeply flawed and assume that basic conflicts between arms control and defense policy cannot be bridged by internal mechanisms. Our interviews confirm what most students of government and bureaucratic behavior have learned: It is unrealistic to expect ACDA to play the role of whistleblower or public advocate against executive branch policy. These are roles for individuals and outsiders, not government agencies engaged in policy formulation.

## ENDNOTES

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1. Bush's pledge was made on 28 September 1991 and was reciprocated by Gorbachev on 5 October 1991.
2. Confidential interview.
3. START, CFE, Defense and Space, and Open Skies ambassadors have worked out of the State Department. The CWC ambassador has remained in ACDA, but with only nominal ties to the agency.
4. Confidential interview.
5. DOE's Verification and Control Technology budget reached \$138 million in 1988. DNA jump-started its verification R&D program in 1988 with \$2 million and had a \$76 million budget in 1991. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s ACDA's research budget hovered at the \$250,000 mark. ACDA plans to ask for \$5 million in FY93 funding.
6. After quoting the 1961 Act and subsequent amendments that purportedly strengthen ACDA's role, the 1989 IG's report concludes that: "ACDA's internal research and analysis program is weak and decentralized. ACDA is consistently behind, and starts most of its research on verification measures after arms control negotiations are well underway; verification thus becomes an afterthought to be considered during the completion phase of negotiations." Inspection of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, op. cit., p. 37. Adelman questions comparisons of the agency to other departments in Does the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Have a Future?, op. cit., p. 8.
7. As noted in chapter 2, ACDA ran a sizeable and far-sighted verification research program for ten years, from 1962 to 1972. Many of the on-site and aerial inspection technologies and strategies examined by ACDA's Cloud Gap and Field Operations programs were revisited as the United States prepared to implement the INF, START, CFE, and Open Skies treaties.
8. Confidential interview.
9. Confidential interview.
10. Former ACDA Director William Burns was selected to head this effort. The Nunn-Lugar amendments have authorized the use of \$800 million for these purposes. See House of Representatives, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Conference Report, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1 October 1992), p. 260.
11. Confidential interview.

12. Confidential telephone interview.
13. These personnel figures do not take into account the scientists and soldiers working in the U.S. Army and other services on such matters as the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles.
14. OSIA Public Affairs Office, telephone interview, 30 November 1992.
15. These staffs perform a synthesis function for the intelligence community, gathering data and analysis pertinent to each treaty. Therefore, this total does not reflect the number of intelligence analysts working in different offices on arms control monitoring. Interview with Douglas MacEachin, 30 November 1992.
16. During ACDA's start-up period, Foster had the ear of both the president and Secretary of State Rusk, who claimed that arms control always "stood among the top three items on our foreign policy agenda" during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Foster or one of his subordinates attended morning State Department briefings. Dean Rusk, As I Saw It, (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), p. 251. The only other ACDA director who had a close working relationship to the secretary of state was Warnke, who had forged ties to Carter administration State Department officials during a previous stint of government service in the Johnson Administration. Does the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Have a Future?, op. cit., p. 10.
17. The Disarmament Administration was created by Eisenhower's executive order on 9 September 1960. By late summer of 1961, Secretary of State Christian Herter's arms control staff had 85 people and a budget of \$800,000. Some of these staffers became the nucleus for ACDA, when it was formed. See Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, "Negotiating with the Soviet Union," and Saville R. Davis, "Recent Policy Making in the United States Government," both in Donald G. Brennan, ed., Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security (New York: George Braziller, 1961).
18. Interview with Max Kampelman, 2 November 1992.
19. Interview with Lucas Fischer, 28 August 1991.
20. Confidential interview.
21. Confidential interview.
22. See The Chairman, op. cit., p. 488.
23. Senator Paul Simon is a proponent of this approach.
24. Confidential interview.
25. Confidential interview.

26. See Arms Control: Improved Coordination of Arms Control Research Needed, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GAO, April 1992); Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: Stronger Actions Needed to Improve Personnel Management, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GAO, September 1990);
27. Interview with Lucas Fischer, 28 August 1991.
28. Interview with Edward Lacey, 20 August 1991.
29. "Future of U.S. Arms Control Policy," Statement before the Committee, 30 July 1992.
30. Interview with Joerg Menzel, 24 February 1992.
31. Interview with Morton Halperin, 10 January 1992.
32. Confidential interview.
33. The Arms Control Research Coordinating Committee submits an annual report to Congress detailing R&D programs throughout the government after they have been completed. Coordination of active and planned programs is supposed to take place in a low-level interagency group called the Verification Technology Working Group, but interviews revealed that this group's participants are still very preoccupied with protecting their budgets and their research priorities. Confidential interviews.
34. Confidential interview.
35. Interviews with Senator Paul Simon on 27 April 1992 and Representative Lee Hamilton, 30 January 1991.
36. "Inspection of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency," op. cit., p. 5.
37. Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC) was in the critics' corner at the agency's creation, declaring "It would be the same as abolishing the police department in the face of an intense crime wave." (Congressional Record, 8 September 1961, S.2180.)



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**Two Basic Choices for ACDA**

ACDA is at a crossroads. The time has come to make basic choices about the agency's future. Established thirty-one years ago, the agency has accomplished many things, including path-breaking agreements on nuclear and chemical proliferation as well as strategic arms control. ACDA has also been a continuing source of frustration for both advocates of arms control and their opponents.

In our view, and in the view of many others, the agency is no longer fulfilling its intended purposes very well. Much of this is due to circumstances beyond the control of ACDA officials. The agency's statute is a prescription for interagency conflict, pitting ACDA against far more powerful bureaucracies. Most secretaries of state have viewed the ACDA director as someone to watch closely rather than as a trusted adviser.

Not all of ACDA's misfortunes, however, have resulted from the awkward compromises reflected in the agency's statute. ACDA has also suffered from weak leaders and from poor management decisions that have contributed to the loss of statutory functions. ACDA has also suffered grievously from the intense political passions generated by arms control negotiations with the former Soviet Union.

In our view, there are only two real options for ACDA at this point in time. Each of these preferred courses of action will require significant changes in existing bureaucratic practices, as well as reallocation of resources. We recommend these options, despite the difficulties involved, because we believe the executive branch needs to strengthen U.S. efforts to deal with the arms control agenda of the post-Cold War period.

**Choice Number One: Rejuvenation**

Our first choice would be to rejuvenate ACDA with a clear and practical mandate to energize U.S. Government

policy in dealing with a range of post-Cold War issues that now require greater attention. In the aftermath of the demise of the Soviet Union, there is even more need, and more opportunity, for the government to focus on the issues of non-proliferation, regional arms control, export controls, and treaty implementation, each of which tends to be displaced from the top of the U.S. national security agenda by the competing priorities of other executive branch agencies.

The U.S. Government's record in dealing with these issues is spotty, at best. We believe a rejuvenated ACDA is needed to ensure that these questions, and others like them, receive the policy attention they deserve.

We do not call for ACDA's rejuvenation to fix things that are not broken. We do recommend, however, fixing executive branch ways of formulating policy when bureaucratic structure and process lead to repeated embarrassments or worse: situations dangerous to U.S. national security interests, as was the case with lax export controls to Hussein's Iraq.

While ACDA's decline has not prevented the negotiation of important arms control and disarmament agreements, the agency's poor state of health has almost certainly contributed to the U.S. Government's checkered performance on proliferation problems. We cannot state unequivocally that a stronger ACDA would have resulted in more prescient and effective U.S. policy in combating proliferation. Instead, our case for a rejuvenated ACDA rests on the agency's ability to make important contributions in this field, even in a weakened state, as well as on the evident need to improve U.S. performance in non-proliferation efforts. We therefore endorse the rejuvenation of ACDA around the most compelling arms control issue for the 1990s--the mission of controlling weapons of mass destruction. If the agency deteriorates further, we believe that U.S. efforts to combat proliferation, in both its supply- and demand-side aspects, can be unnecessarily impaired.

The fight against proliferation has always been ACDA's strong suit, with the negotiation of the NPT arguably being the agency's finest achievement.<sup>1</sup> ACDA's director at the time, William Foster, did not believe that the NPT could have been achieved had the arms control function resided in the State Department, which was then

institutionally inclined to support bilateral relations with European allies that wanted to keep open the nuclear option.<sup>2</sup>

ACDA has also provided invaluable support in the long struggle against chemical weapons proliferation. Aside from the U.S. Army, which must deal with chemical weapons defense and the destruction of the U.S. stockpile, there is no reason to expect that other agencies of government will take more of an interest in this subject than in the past. The recent negotiation of the CWC is but one step in a long journey to garner world-wide adherence, monitor export controls, and establish standards of behavior conducive to strict compliance. These efforts require precisely the same traits--institutional memory, scientific expertise, and policy advocacy--that led to ACDA's creation in 1961.<sup>3</sup>

Other executive branch agencies have proven to be too bureaucratically conflicted or distracted to deal effectively with nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile proliferation, as well as the problems posed by the export of dual-use technologies. The Commerce Department cannot reasonably be expected to muzzle its institutional interest in promoting exports, even though this advocacy role occasionally harms U.S. national security interests.

Nor can the State Department be relied upon to champion non-proliferation issues. State is institutionally geared toward bilateral and regional issues, not multilateral problems that cut across regions. Two functional bureaus and a special ambassador's office share the non-proliferation portfolio at State. While competing among themselves for jurisdiction, they also all must compete with powerful regional bureaus that habitually seek ways to improve bilateral relations with potential or actual proliferators so as to be in a stronger position to influence their behavior. These bureaus then compete to gain the ear of one of two under-secretaries of state, whose portfolios also overlap on non-proliferation issues. This is not an organizational apparatus or bureaucratic milieu that generates confidence in improved performance or more concerted action on non-proliferation issues.

With widespread recognition of the danger to forward-deployed U.S. forces posed by the spread of deadly weapons and dual-use technologies, DOD can become an important bureaucratic ally on proliferation issues. Other

issues, however, must necessarily preoccupy Pentagon leaders. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is inadequately staffed and structured to focus on proliferation issues, which are divided at present between the offices of two assistant secretaries and the principal deputy to an under-secretary. In the Bush Administration, the office within the JCS dealing with proliferation questions was headed by a colonel.

We endorse ACDA's rejuvenation in large part because we believe that while the State and Defense departments might be able to restructure and beef up their non-proliferation capabilities, they can not change their basic preoccupations. Nor should they. Proliferation will always be one of many bilateral and regional concerns that State Department must juggle. Likewise, the problems posed for U.S. forces by proliferation will always be a lower priority concern for DOD than properly equipping and training the armed services and, if need be, deploying them to regions of tension.

The case for ACDA's rejuvenation rests largely on the need for one agency of government to deal effectively with complex proliferation problems, by being able to give them the highest priority. This need is, arguably, no less critical today than at the time of ACDA's creation. A disjointed response to proliferation problems can increase U.S. foreign and national security problems in the years ahead.

A second reason for rejuvenating ACDA is that a significant part of the post-Cold War arms control agenda could entail multi-lateral and regional negotiations. Success in these negotiations can help relieve demand-side proliferation pressures. These issues tend to conform with ACDA's remaining strengths, and they also do not receive sufficient bureaucratic interest within the State and Defense departments. ACDA has provided essential policy inputs and staff support for negotiations in the CD and its predecessors, where the CWC and NPT were negotiated. Of course, ACDA's institutional memory and technical expertise could be transferred to other agencies, but there is good reason to believe that multilateral and regional negotiations would receive less attention and priority in the future if they did not have an institutional advocate within the executive branch.

A number of post-Cold War arms control agenda items could fall within this framework, such as negotiation of a comprehensive test ban (CTB) and a global cut-off in production of weapons-grade fissionable material. Other vexing issues, such as conventional arms transfer restraint, tighter export controls on dual-use technologies, and maintenance of the London Suppliers and Australia Group guidelines for nuclear and chemical exports will require prodding and dedicated staffing within the executive branch.

In addition, the UN and its specialized agencies have become a focal point for important arms control initiatives, including transparency in arms transfers, arms control in peacekeeping operations, and most importantly, actions by the Security Council and the Secretary General to promote or enforce treaty regimes. At the same time, international financial institutions and several states, led by Japan and Germany, have begun to promote the idea of conditioning decisions on development assistance to a recipient state's security behavior. Many of these issues, which fall under the jurisdiction of major UN organs and specialized agencies, are not systematically tended to by the State Department, and are rarely visible on the Pentagon's radar screen.

In aggregate, these issues--export controls, transparency, arms transfer restraint, economic conversion, and conditional economic assistance--will help determine the security and stability of the globe in the post-Cold War era. They all need a dedicated advocate within the executive branch to combat bureaucratic inertia elsewhere.

A third reason for rejuvenating ACDA is the need to focus on proper implementation of existing and new arms control agreements. While ACDA's past record on implementation has been uneven, the new political circumstances of the post-Cold War era make the agency better suited than before to carry out this function.

Faithful implementation of agreements cannot be taken for granted in an international environment where hopeful developments co-exist in large measure alongside political and economic upheavals. Recent progress in reducing Russian and U.S. nuclear arsenals can all too easily be interrupted, and at least partially reversed, by political events.

The State Department, which has taken a strong leadership role in negotiating nuclear reduction agreements, is not well staffed or institutionally inclined at present to engage in the nitty-gritty of dealing with arms control implementation and compliance issues. A rotating corps of FSOs has difficulty mastering these obscure issues; by the time an FSO begins to feel comfortable with his or her portfolio, it is almost time to begin training for a new assignment. OSIA, which has developed an admirable track record in carrying out inspections, is currently enjoined from moving beyond operational to policy issues. As a result, ACDA, which has the statutory responsibility for implementation and compliance policy issues, has managed to retain these negotiating and backstopping portfolios, even during its decline.

Working on implementation and compliance policy is a thankless task, which also helps explain ACDA's continued role. But the detailed regulatory nature of this work validates the agency's future role. During the Ford and Carter Administrations, agency officials adopted a problem-solving approach to SALT compliance issues, prompting bitter attacks for minimizing Soviet misdeeds. During the Reagan Administration, ACDA officials championed the role of vocalizing Soviet misdeeds--both real and grossly overdrawn--while making little effort to negotiate solutions to the problems identified. Moreover, at the same time Reagan Administration officials were calling for strict Soviet compliance, they were proposing lax rules for U.S. compliance, such as a conveniently "broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

ACDA's institutional turn-about on compliance issues may well have strengthened the agency's role in designing verification protocols, as some interviews have suggested.<sup>4</sup> But the costs were considerable: Soviet compliance did not improve, ACDA's relations with Capitol Hill soured, and the agency's role in policy-making circles was marginalized. As Victor E. Alessi, director of DOE's Office of Arms Control and Non-Proliferation and a former ACDA employee has noted, "ACDA cannot be to the right of the secretary of state and therefore a problem to him." In Alessi's view, "When the secretary does not have confidence in ACDA, he creates his own ACDA."<sup>5</sup>

The agency's continued interest and statutory authority in implementation issues is not misplaced, since

good faith compliance is absolutely necessary for a successful long-term process of arms control and disarmament. The U.S. government needs an institutional advocate for strict standards of compliance, both foreign and domestic. If ACDA fails to play this role, another agency, less well-positioned and more distracted, will have to be given this authority.

If a rejuvenated ACDA is to play this role, however, it must not engage in actions that can broadly be perceived as either apologizing for misdeeds or as pursuing a hidden agenda to kill arms control. A rejuvenated ACDA must not only call for strict standards of compliance, but also work as hard at solving compliance problems as calling attention to them.<sup>6</sup>

A fourth reason to rejuvenate ACDA is to help provide a more policy-relevant, focused arms control research program at a lower cost to the tax payers. A successful verification R&D program requires that the policy and technical communities work in tandem, but present arrangements encourage disconnects between the two communities. During its early years, ACDA carried out this work effectively and efficiently in a program jointly sponsored with DOD. This effort, called Cloud Gap, ended in 1968, and by 1972 ACDA's involvement in the nuts and bolts of verification R&D had evolved into the sponsorship of analytical studies. ACDA's input and influence continued to decline with the exponential growth in the technical and policy-making offices involved in arms control elsewhere in the executive branch.

Scientists that develop tomorrow's verification technologies must look past contemporary realities; research is very future-oriented and requires long lead times to evaluate different monitoring strategies. Policy-makers want and expect alternatives from the technical community, but they often question and even undercut the scientific process required for such support. While engaged in negotiations, policy-makers have a very short-term focus; they tend to be swept up in daily battles to influence the direction of U.S. policies and international negotiations.

One side effect of bureaucratic infighting in the past has been cuts or other impediments to research initiatives that have not conformed with preferred policy or negotiating options. Subsequently, when U.S. policies changed or when negotiations took an unexpected course,

policy-makers have found themselves poorly served by narrow, institutionally-driven verification R&D programs.

For example, near the conclusion of the INF negotiations, the Soviets agreed to on-site inspections, and the technical and policy communities had to scramble to see what the United States had on hand to do the job. The technical community was forced to deliver on short notice technologies that were on the shelf and quickly adapted for the purpose at hand, with decidedly mixed results.<sup>7</sup>

At present, the two largest providers of research for on-site verification are DOE, whose primary missions have been building nuclear weapons and ensuring that the United States has sufficient energy to meet future demands, and DNA, whose primary mission has been the study of nuclear weapons effects.

DOE, and to a lesser extent, DNA, have initiated important arms control research, but both organizations would be hard-pressed to defend some of their programs to taxpayers. In particular, DNA's programming has received very poor marks from scientific and program management peers. For example, DNA decided to build its own "laboratory" in Newington, Virginia, to test and evaluate verification technologies. This contractor-run operation has produced only paper studies, leading others in the community to question its necessity.<sup>8</sup>

DOE's verification R&D programming used to be centered in three laboratories--Los Alamos, Livermore, and Sandia--but has now spread to laboratories in South Carolina, Washington, Idaho, Illinois, Tennessee, and New York. While DOE's program managers argue that this is standard practice to encourage competition among the labs and produce the best results, they also acknowledge that this investment strategy may be motivated, in part, by a desire to increase the department's constituency in Congress.<sup>9</sup>

More importantly, DOE and DNA are not the right institutional homes and should not be the exclusive domain for some kinds of arms control research. For decades, DOE and its predecessors have conducted hundreds of nuclear tests. Yet, in 1990, Energy Secretary James Watkins told Congress that his department needed ten more years to study whether the U.S. nuclear deterrent could be maintained if additional testing limits were undertaken. Not surprisingly, DOE has spent large sums of money for



monitoring arrangements that have suited its institutional bias, such as hydrodynamic yield measurements supporting a continued program of nuclear testing, rather than an accelerated research program to support a CTB.

Verification R&D programs sorely need greater discipline, paring, and oversight. Approximately \$215 million is being spent on projects for which there is a public record. While this sum is modest compared to military budgets, the return on investment and cost-effectiveness can be readily questioned. Yet, the executive and legislative branches continue to provide additional funds to solve verification R&D problems seemingly unaddressed by the current system.<sup>10</sup> DOE and DOD budgets have swelled to deal with verification and non-proliferation, while ACDA, by charter the arbiter of verification R&D, has been shunted aside and has not benefitted from this largesse.<sup>11</sup>

There is good reason to expect institutional prerogatives to continue to influence programming decisions in the offices that sponsor R&D. Interagency coordination purportedly takes place through the Verification Technology Working Group (VTWG), but several interviewees characterized this low-level group as mostly a voluntary show-and-tell club.<sup>12</sup> The VTWG does not have the power to originate, redirect, or cancel R&D programming.

We do not recommend a czarist approach to arms control research within the executive branch.<sup>13</sup> One of the saving graces of verification programs partly driven by institutional biases is that agencies of government can engage in research that others are too short-sighted to support. Nor are we against some duplication in research programs; occasionally, competition between the laboratories can produce excellent results. What we object to is ACDA's complete lack of an arms control research program worthy of the name. As Alton Frye has noted, "If ACDA is mostly disconnected from verification research, it's hard to see what purchase the agency could have on the problem."<sup>14</sup>

## **Steps to Rejuvenate ACDA**

If the new administration chooses to rejuvenate ACDA, the following steps might usefully be taken:

**First**, high-level staffing decisions for the State Department and ACDA should be made shortly after one another, and the secretary of state-designate should be centrally involved in the choice of the ACDA director, with the understanding that the director would be the secretary of state-designate's principal agent in promoting all aspects of non-proliferation.<sup>15</sup> During presidential transitions, the selection of the ACDA director has typically been an afterthought. Late appointments for high-level ACDA jobs and delays in Senate confirmations have accentuated ACDA's disadvantaged position in policy formulation and interagency deliberation.

**Second**, to underscore the commitment of the new president and secretary of state to focus on proliferation problems, as well as the commitment to rejuvenate ACDA, these two individuals might appear together, with the ACDA Director, to make a public statement about the high priority they intend to give to this issue. Such a statement might include organizational initiatives that would signal the new administration's strong intent to match words with deeds. This would send an important signal at home and abroad that the new president fully intends to pursue vigorous steps building on recent successes, address weaknesses in existing non-proliferation regimes, and deal forthrightly with states that seek to acquire or deploy weapons of mass destruction or states that facilitate such actions by others.

To underscore the new administration's commitment to non-proliferation, we recommend that the director of ACDA issue a series of annual reports on world-wide proliferation activities and their consequences. To reaffirm the partnership between State and ACDA on non-proliferation issues, we recommend at least one joint appearance of the secretary and the director devoted to this subject annually. One such appearance could usefully be at the opening of the 1995 NPT Review Conference; another appropriate occasion might be upon the entry into force of the CWC.

**Third**, to strengthen the new administration's non-proliferation initiatives and ACDA's role in this arena, the new president, secretary of state, and ACDA director might all be present to announce the appointment of two special ambassadors, one for nuclear weapons' proliferation and one for chemical and biological weapons' proliferation.

These special ambassadors would fill the two slots now allocated to ACDA for such purposes. Both individuals would report to the secretary of state through the director of ACDA. Tasking orders to both ambassadors would be coordinated through the interagency community, led jointly by ACDA and the State Department.

The individuals chosen to carry both non-proliferation portfolios must pay continuous attention to detail and must rely on a highly specialized staff with long institutional memories--qualities suggesting ACDA appointments. Yet, these individuals must also have the full confidence of the secretary of state so that when they make representations to foreign officials, their *démarches* will be accorded sufficient weight. These job descriptions underscore the need for a close working relationship between the ACDA director and the secretary of state. If the former is not chosen to be the principal non-proliferation adviser of the latter, the arrangements suggested above for ACDA to house the special ambassadors for nuclear and chemical non-proliferation will not work and should not be attempted.

We do not recommend that ACDA retain a leadership role in nuclear arms reduction negotiations with Russia. This heavy burden has fallen on every secretary of state since the Ford Administration. Given the overriding importance of bilateral U.S.-Russian relations and the essential role of nuclear negotiations in this relationship, we believe that it would be unwise for ACDA to retrieve the ambassadorial appointments it once held to negotiate nuclear arms reductions. ACDA can and should, however, be a full partner in interagency efforts to help with the safety, security, and dismantlement of weapons in the former Soviet Union.

**Fourth**, we recommend providing joint ACDA-State Department staffing for the two special ambassadors to promote coordination and to strengthen U.S. non-proliferation policy initiatives. In the compartmentalized world of the U.S. Government, individuals usually possess arms control or regional expertise--but not both. The State Department ought to be able to combine these skills in the same office, but rarely does. ACDA has just begun to recruit regional specialists, but needs added help in this area. The quickest and most effective way to staff the special ambassadors is to draw personnel on a temporary

duty or limited term basis from both ACDA and the State Department. ACDA could also draw to a lesser extent, on staff expertise from DOE, the Commerce Department, and the intelligence community.

**Fifth**, we recommend that ACDA's role be strengthened in interagency deliberations on export controls by having the agency's representative chair interagency reviews of the licensing of proliferation-sensitive exports. This would provide a needed counterweight to the Commerce Department's institutional imperative to promote exports. This step would send a strong signal that lax licensing reviews of the kind that led to serious problems with Iraq will not be repeated in the new administration.

**Sixth**, we recommend that ACDA again assume responsibility for leading the U.S. delegation to the critical 1995 NPT Review Conference and its preparatory meetings. This responsibility would follow from the secretary of state's designation of ACDA as his executive agent for this work and would be in accordance with previous practice.

**Seventh**, we recommend that formal procedures be put into effect whereby ACDA is represented in interagency deliberations on the design of new intelligence collection systems and the targeting of existing systems for information related to non-proliferation problems. ACDA's Verification Bureau has been kept at arms length on many issues by the intelligence community, which for justifiable reasons, has not accepted an ACDA role on intelligence matters. This separation, exacerbated by personality conflicts, has extended to ACDA's Non-Proliferation Bureau. Given ACDA's expertise in non-proliferation issues, its continued exclusion on questions relating to the design and tasking of collection assets is most unwise, particularly given the slowness with which some troublesome proliferation developments were detected by the intelligence community.<sup>16</sup>

**Eighth**, we recommend that ACDA staffing be strengthened and expanded in the critical areas of multilateral and regional arms control. The increasing importance of UN forums suggests that ACDA should have a presence in New York at the U.S. mission to the UN to provide more systematic contact with the Secretariat than has been the case in the past. ACDA officials in New York

could work under the direction of the U.S. ambassador, but also report to the agency's director.

**Ninth**, we recommend that ACDA resume the lead in formulating administration strategy for a comprehensive test ban and, in the event a decision is made to negotiate a CTB, take the lead in such interagency preparations for negotiations. The State Department does not have the technical expertise to support this effort. DOE, which has expertise aplenty in its national laboratories, is ill-suited to lead this effort, as is DOD, which has opposed additional testing limitations.

We further recommend that, in the event of a decision to pursue a CTB, consideration be given to the appointment of a special ambassador of considerable stature who would be viewed as the president's personal emissary, similar to Kennedy's appointment of Governor Averell Harriman to negotiate the LTBT.

**Tenth**, we recommend that ACDA resume the lead in preparing interagency position papers on whether to propose a global cut-off in the production of weapons grade fissionable material. Should the new administration decide to pursue these negotiations, we recommend that an ACDA official lead the U.S. delegation.

**Eleventh**, we recommend that ACDA be designated by the president to be the U.S. "national authority" for domestic implementation of the CWC and act as liaison to the U.S. Army, OSIA, and the domestic chemical industry. In this capacity, ACDA would also be the lead agency for policy implementation questions and for participation in the two year Preparatory Commission for the CWC.

We do not recommend at this time that ACDA assume the responsibilities of carrying out or escorting inspections associated with the CWC or any other agreement. We recognize, however, that by statute OSIA's responsibilities belong in ACDA.<sup>17</sup> In practice, OSIA appears to be carrying out its responsibilities effectively and efficiently under DOD's orbit. Working from the assumption that, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it," we do not now propose a major reorganization of OSIA.

We do, however, recommend abolishing OSIA's supervisory Executive Committee (ExCom), consisting of staff representatives from the policy and acquisition shops of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the JCS.<sup>18</sup> OSIA was designed to serve the interagency community

and its tasks are expanding across departmental jurisdictions. We believe OSIA's guidance should not come from a single agency. We therefore recommend the formation of a new ExCom for OSIA that consists of representatives from Defense, State, and ACDA, with support from the intelligence community. The ExCom should operate by consensus and, when it cannot, disputes could be resolved by the president's national security adviser.

As for the future, we leave open the possibility of an ACDA/OSIA merger. OSIA was initially staffed almost entirely by military personnel, but is now approximately thirty percent civilian. For example, the portal at Votkinsk for the INF Treaty is manned by a civilian contractor, Hughes Technical Services, under the direction of OSIA inspection team leaders. The civilian component is likely to increase over time as the nature of OSIA's responsibilities broaden to include implementation of the CWC and the Open Skies Treaty. If strengthening measures are adopted for ACDA in the field of implementation and as OSIA's responsibilities grow, policy-makers might want to reconsider the relationship between the two agencies.

**Twelfth**, we recommend that ACDA staffing be beefed up to deal with the panoply of post-Cold War arms control issues that do not now and are unlikely to receive adequate attention in other agencies of government, such as economic conversion, conventional arms transfer restraint, and ways to strengthen export control regimes. When ACDA was created, it had an Economic Bureau, but agency analyses relating to defense economics and conversion have all but lapsed. This capability needs to be reconstituted.

World-wide transfers of conventional weapons have traditionally been one of the most difficult subjects for administrations to tackle, yet they are becoming increasingly important in the post-Cold War world. The agency could provide useful services by helping the UN make these transactions more transparent and by publishing in-depth analyses of conventional arms transfers based on annual data collections on world military expenditures. In so doing, ACDA could help lay the ground work for executive branch initiatives in this field. In addition, ACDA must have improved capabilities

to analyze existing arms and dual-use technology transfer practices in order to propose corrective measures.

**Thirteenth**, we recommend a reduction and restructuring of arms control verification research within the executive branch and the establishment within ACDA of a farsighted, innovative research program connected in large measure to the national laboratories. We recommend that DOE continue to manage a sizable verification R&D program connected to that department's missions, but that DOD's executive agent role for verification research be transferred from DNA to OSIA, whose inspectors have hands-on experience in the field.

This streamlined arrangement could preserve DOD's strong voice in the development of technologies used to monitor its forces. OSIA and the service offices already active in arms control could work with ACDA and DOE to help ensure that verification equipment and strategies under development are as non-intrusive as possible and receive appropriate field testing.

We believe that a reduction and reallocation of verification research funds is in order. We recommend that DNA funding for research activities be limited to that agency's mission, and funds previously allocated to DNA for verification research be divided between ACDA and OSIA, with the lion's share going to ACDA. OSIA's role in this streamlined interagency process is not to be a primary funder of verification R&D, but to identify gaps in programming and recommend projects to ACDA. We further recommend a shift of funding from DOE to ACDA of the former's verification R&D programs that are beyond DOE's missions.

The primary beneficiary of funds shifted from DOE and DNA to ACDA would continue, in large part, to be DOE laboratories, especially Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia. Enormous talent resides in these labs, which should continue to be applied to verification research and engineering problems. However, we believe it appropriate for these institutions to become national laboratories, not extensions of DOE's policy preferences. We are not sanguine that such a shift can be achieved unless and until the percentage of work at the laboratories funded by other agencies of government increases.

Sadly, ACDA does not now have the expertise required to manage effectively the arms control research

funds transferred from DOE and DNA. Consequently, we recommend that managerial expertise from DNA and DOE be transferred at least temporarily to ACDA's Office of the Chief Scientist, which was created to help with interagency verification program management. This temporary infusion of personnel will provide for continuity in the management of ongoing programs while ACDA builds up its own scientific and management staff. In the long term, the Office of the Chief Scientist will require additional in-house or detailee slots for scientists and program managers.

ACDA's program managers must keep the technical community informed of the progress made in negotiations, but at the same time try to structure verification R&D programs to cope with changes in U.S. policy or on-going negotiations. To help ACDA's chief scientist formulate a purposeful program, we recommend that a special subcommittee of the GAC be appointed to assist the chief scientist in reviewing R&D initiatives.

**Fourteenth**, we recommend a number of steps to improve the professional expertise within ACDA, apart from needed changes in the agency's public affairs and congressional liaison offices:

- The GAC might be transformed into a true advisory body consisting of individuals of outstanding accomplishment. The GAC might be constituted into a series of subgroups working on specific problems like verifying a cut-off proposal, or strengthening the BWC. Each subgroup could recruit staff support from ACDA and other agencies of government. The GAC could therefore provide near-term professional advice of the highest caliber to help the director and the secretary of state with vexing policy issues. This is, after all, what the GAC was created to do--and did do during the Nixon Administration, in particular--before being transformed into an investigatory body on Soviet compliance breaches in the Reagan Administration.
- The Congress should provide ACDA with additional slots to recruit professional staff in order to reconstitute lost expertise and to provide entry-level slots in critical areas, many of which are "old" issues



of renewed salience, such as the development of improved nuclear safeguards, economic conversion, conventional arms transfers, and UN affairs.

- As discussed above, Congress should authorize the transfer of personnel from other agencies on a temporary duty basis or as full time detailees to assist in the rejuvenation of ACDA.
- The Congress should authorize the greater use of consultants by the ACDA director pending implementation of more time-consuming measures to reconstitute ACDA's in-house expertise.
- ACDA should make a more concerted effort to recruit regional experts and train them in arms control issues to support more effectively demand-side approaches to proliferation problems in tension-filled areas.

## **Choice Number 2: Merge into the State Department**

The strongest argument against rejuvenating ACDA is that it would require considerable effort, and that the return on such an investment may be questionable. Moreover, unless real political budgeting resources are applied to the effort, there are no guarantees against a subsequent relapse over time. In this sense, ACDA is caught in a vicious circle fourteen years in the making: Recruitment of the kind of people necessary to turn the agency around is unlikely without a high-level commitment to rejuvenate, and without such a commitment, leadership recruitment will be difficult. With arms control and non-proliferation efforts expanding during the period of ACDA's decline, the Clinton Administration might simply decide to forego a painful process of rejuvenation and opt for staying the course.

We believe the status quo is unacceptable. If the rejuvenation option is not chosen, a far better approach than the agency's continued decline, marginalization, and exclusion from policy-making would be to transfer ACDA's

assets and functions to the State Department and OSIA. If the option to merge ACDA into State is chosen, however, crucial compensatory steps must be taken to help ensure effective executive branch policies in non-proliferation, treaty implementation, multilateral and interregional arms control, and verification R&D. Without such compensatory action, the executive branch will invite problems in its post-Cold War arms control agenda.

Thus, the first reason to merge ACDA into State would be to ensure that the agency's remaining expertise would be at the direct service of the secretary of state. To help ensure the proper utilization of ACDA's expertise, we recommend the creation of an under-secretary of state for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. We further recommend a consolidation of ACDA and State expertise on these matters, as described below.

Our proposed merger would resemble what the Senate advocated during the congressional debate over ACDA's creation in 1961, as described in chapter 1. At that time, Kennedy's adviser McCloy envisioned the director as an individual who "should report directly to the secretary of state, without going through any intermediate authority, but with appropriate liaison with the interested bureaus of the Department."<sup>19</sup>

The second reason for a merger would be to facilitate marriages of regional and arms control expertise within the U.S. Government, a cross-fertilization that will become increasingly important in the post-Cold War environment that will place a premium on confidence-building and arms control measures.

Third, any non-proliferation initiative undertaken by a strengthened State Department would have far more weight than one proposed by ACDA with lukewarm support or minimal resistance from Foggy Bottom.

Fourth, a merger would simply recognize the bureaucratic reality of ACDA's decline and State's ascendance in the conduct of highly sensitive arms control negotiations. Rather than buck these trends, this approach would acknowledge and reinforce them.

There are clear drawbacks associated with merging ACDA into State, as noted in chapter 3. Of particular concern would be the loss of a separate "seat at the table" that represents a strong arms control focus in cabinet and lower levels of government decision-making.<sup>20</sup> A separate

seat is only worth keeping, however, if the individuals sitting in it are willing to speak forcefully and have the authority to influence decisions. Paradoxically, many who made the case for a separate arms control agency also stressed the importance of working through State rather than advancing "ACDA initiatives."<sup>21</sup> If ACDA's powers have been so weakened that the agency only has the ability to influence policy through State Department channels, the argument for a separate seat at interagency deliberations loses force. ACDA deserves a separate seat only if steps are taken to rejuvenate the agency.

A clear drawback of merging ACDA into State is weaker executive branch policies in advocating non-proliferation, providing appropriate support for treaty implementation and interregional arms control initiatives, and fashioning a more cost-effective verification R&D program. According to this school of thought, the secretary of state is simply too preoccupied by other matters to pay much attention to the arms control agenda. However, secretaries of state--even those who displayed initial coolness toward arms control--have invariably been drawn into this arena, whether by worried allies or by the political and military significance of weapons of mass destruction.

Many factors make merging ACDA into State a better option than the agency's continued decline: ACDA no longer serves as a significant catalyst for arms control initiatives; the agency's interlocutors abroad are well aware of ACDA's declining status and tend to accord officials from other departments higher credibility; the agency has lost considerable institutional memory; other parts of the government have built-up arms control expertise and have the ability to hire qualified staff; and arms control has become far less contentious in interagency deliberations.

Arms control has not, however, become any easier abroad. The politically volatile situation within the former Soviet Union suggests that there will be many twists and turns along the road toward a long-term process of disarmament with Russia. The linkage between Russian and Ukrainian nuclear arms reduction will be another preoccupation for U.S. political leaders, as well as the much discussed "loose nukes" problem. The arms control issues raised by the break-up of the Soviet Union will require continued attention at the highest levels of the U.S.

Government, effective diplomacy, and strong coordination with foreign governments--more reasons for placing ACDA's remaining assets at the direct service of the secretary of state.

A newly-elected Democratic president committed to the agency's mission could endorse merging ACDA into State far more easily than a Republican president skeptical about the utility of arms control. Furthermore, Congress is likely to give a new administration considerable latitude in deciding ACDA's fate, particularly since the agency is now viewed with such ambivalence by members of Congress and key staffers. According to Representative Lee Hamilton, "I'd be tempted to vote to abolish just because I don't know what it's doing."<sup>22</sup> To merge ACDA into State without expending large amounts of effort and political capital, the new administration would have to undertake effective consultations on Capitol Hill, persuasively defending the action on the basis of improving executive branch support for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. Most importantly, an integral part of this proposal must be the institution of safeguards to help ensure that difficult non-proliferation, implementation, and other arms control issues get the attention they deserve at high levels of the executive branch.

### **Safeguards Associated With a Merger**

To minimize risks associated with a merger of ACDA into State, we recommend safeguards to ensure that arms control issues across a broad spectrum receive high-level attention and support; that attention to non-proliferation issues not be deflected in traditional State Department fashion; that a cadre of civil servants possessing technical expertise and institutional memory be maintained and promoted within a bureaucratic culture oriented toward rotating FSOs; and that compensatory steps be taken to help ensure proper attention to arms control implementation and verification research. The House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees, which have jurisdiction over the State Department, must be prepared to carry out effective oversight to protect these safeguards or the downside risks described in chapter 3 could haunt U.S. national security policies.

**First**, undertake a new division of labor at the under-secretary level and create a new under-secretary of state for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. This restructuring would necessarily be part of a larger post-Cold War reorganization of the State Department that would create a powerful organizational basis to tackle proliferation and other arms control problems. In this reorganization, the new under-secretary would be staffed by ACDA's remaining personnel assets as well as appropriate staff from the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, the Bureau of Oceans, and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary for Non-Proliferation Policy and Nuclear Energy Affairs, and the Office of Defense Trade Controls.

This new under-secretary would necessarily have the confidence of the secretary of state and would be guaranteed direct access to him or her--critical considerations meant to apply to the ACDA director that have lapsed over time. Although some of the State Department's organizational tensions would doubtless remain, particularly between the traditional fault lines where functional and regional bureaus contest issues, this reorganization would strengthen the hand of functionalists concerned with non-proliferation issues by providing them with an unfiltered voice up to the under-secretary level.

**Second**, create a special ambassador within the department for chemical and biological non-proliferation matters alongside the existing position for a special ambassador for nuclear non-proliferation matters. The creation of a second special ambassador for chemical and biological non-proliferation could usefully give this issue added visibility within the department and compensate for the loss of ACDA's special interest and expertise in this area.

To give the special ambassador positions added weight and help foreclose turf battles within the department, both positions could be dual-hatted: these individuals could also serve as assistant secretaries of state, working directly for the under-secretary and supported by staffs drawn from ACDA as well as the above-mentioned bureaus. By having direct access to the new under-secretary and, as needed, to the secretary of

state, the special ambassadors could speak from authority when conducting diplomatic missions.

Proper implementation of arms control agreements will be a central concern during the 1990s, and the U.S. Government cannot afford a disorganized or haphazard approach. The State Department is particularly ill-suited, for example, to act as a liaison to the U.S. chemical industry for implementation questions associated with the CWC. The Pentagon, however, has several compliance and implementation responsibilities. The Office of the Under-Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (OSD/A) is charged with seeing that the United States meets the requirements of arms control treaties. OSD/A works with the services and OSIA to enforce high standards of domestic compliance. OSIA is currently enjoined from encroaching past the margins of policy issues; its current role is expressly confined to operational matters such as the conduct of inspections.

**Third**, we recommend that OSIA become the lead U.S. agency dealing with implementation policy issues, broadening its current mandate beyond the conduct and escort of inspections. The revamped OSIA would then become the "national authority" for overseeing domestic implementation of the CWC. Additional responsibilities would flow from the START and CFE treaties, as well as other current and future assignments.

As the new agency would be engaged in policy as well as operational issues, the existing bureaucratic arrangements for OSIA, which is staffed largely by military officers and reports to an executive committee of Pentagon officials, would become inappropriate.

**Fourth**, we recommend that the revamped OSIA become a semi-autonomous agency of the executive branch rather than a defense agency. OSIA's director would continue to be appointed by the president after consultation with the secretaries of state and defense and the Chairman of the JCS. These officials, along with the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,<sup>23</sup> would appoint senior officials at the new agency.

Future directors of the revamped OSIA might be senior active duty military officers, retired military officers, or civilians. OSIA's director would participate in cabinet-level discussions in which arms control implementation issues were discussed, just as lower-level representatives

of the agency would be full-fledged participants in sub-cabinet interagency deliberations. With ACDA's merger into State, a review of procedures would be in order to ensure coordination between DOD's compliance and implementation activities and the State Department, so that U.S. activities would establish a strong basis to press for high compliance standards abroad. More civilians would be brought into the revamped OSIA in accordance with its new responsibilities. Recruitment efforts could focus on qualified ACDA personnel, new hires, and detailees from other agencies of government.

**Fifth**, we recommend that the revamped implementation agency be given a research budget keyed to its prospective needs. Much like our recommendations above with respect to ACDA's rejuvenation, DNA's verification R&D budget and personnel would be merged into OSIA. The new research office at OSIA would coordinate its work with DOE, the other main source of R&D for cooperative monitoring technologies, and with the State Department. In terms of the perspectives needed to maintain a successful R&D program, OSIA and DOE have strengths that complement each other. DOE would be able to sponsor long term, fundamental research that is necessary to create technical options. OSIA, with its wealth of field experience, will help DOE focus its R&D so that monitoring equipment is ready to be deployed when new treaty requirements arise. Close coordination will be needed between DOE and OSIA to ensure cost-effective programming.

**Sixth**, if ACDA is merged into State, we recommend that the GAC be transferred to State to provide the new under-secretary with policy and technical advice. The under-secretary can utilize this group of advisers for particularly difficult problems or to complement the work of in-house staff. The GAC, in turn, can provide an in-house monitoring function, reporting to the under-secretary whether in-house or congressionally-mandated safeguards are being observed.

**Seventh**, we recommend a number of steps with respect to personnel in the event of a merger of ACDA into State:

- ACDA's lawyers, perhaps the agency's most important asset, should be retained as a distinct

group established as a separate office working directly for the new under-secretary.

One of the down-side risks of a merger is the increased possibility of "politicized" legal judgments with respect to U.S. compliance. For example, during the Reagan Administration, the State Department's Legal Adviser concurred with a conveniently "broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty supporting the Strategic Defense Initiative. On this occasion, ACDA's General Counsel was permitted to state legal arguments to the contrary at high-level interagency meetings.

If ACDA were merged into State, there are no guarantees that counter arguments would be heard to legal opinions that are at variance with the negotiating record. On the other hand, there are no future guarantees that the principal arms control legal adviser will forthrightly oppose politicized legal judgments. There are no optimal organizational "fixes" to this problem, other than to retain the ACDA corps of lawyers as a group.

- If ACDA is merged into State, it would also be wise to designate a fixed percentage of office director and deputy assistant secretary of state-level arms control jobs for civil servants. If the State Department's FSO-oriented bureaucratic culture captures these positions en masse, the department's ability to perform at senior-level interagency meetings will suffer, and the expertise carried over from ACDA will be badly under utilized.

In the Office of the Secretary of Defense, high-level positions have been secured for civil servants and not rotating military officers on assignment. We recommend this model for a fixed percentage of senior assignments dealing with non-proliferation, implementation, START, CFE, the CWC, and other arms control-related briefs. Intense and long-term congressional scrutiny of the post-merger State Department staffing decisions will be required to prevent inappropriate personnel placements at senior levels.

- Entry-level positions must be continuously filled to develop arms control expertise within the civil



service working at the State Department. ACDA has been able to perform this function in the past, and the U.S. government will be ill-served if this pipeline dries up.

- Any reduction-in-force at ACDA before the agency is merged into State must be carried out with great care so as not to be perceived as a politically-oriented purge of highly trained professionals. Appropriate guidelines of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) should be followed, and incentives might be given for early retirements. OPM might work with a non-partisan personnel review board convened by the under-secretary of state to review ACDA's personnel records and the staffing needs for the merger into State.

## ENDNOTES

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1. For ACDA's role in prodding President Lyndon Johnson to pursue the NPT, Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years, op. cit., pp. 131-146.
2. Ralph Stuart Smith, "Is There a Future for Arms Control?" Foreign Service Journal (March 1981), p. 16. Lawrence Weiler believes that the NPT "would never had succeeded without the resources and persistence of ACDA. Indeed, in the first two years of negotiations, some in the largely negative State Department gave the treaty no chance of success." See "The ACDA Scandal," op. cit., p. 2. These comments might be discounted, coming from an ACDA official at the time, but they have been affirmed in interviews and recounted at length in Stemming the Tide, op. cit., pp. 131, 169-185.
3. The rationales for a separate agency in 1961 were endorsed by two of ACDA's founding fathers as late as 1988. See George Bunn and Philip Farley, "ACDA's Role in the New Administration," Arms Control Today (November 1988), pp. 15-16.
4. Interview with Edward Lacey, 20 August 1991, and confidential interviews.
5. Confidential interviews.
6. In cases where compliance is questionable but not clear cut, problem-solving approaches are warranted to clarify common rules of permissible behavior. In addition, compensatory steps, if warranted, could be taken to address disadvantages resulting from questionable activities. In cases of clear non-compliance, problem-solving approaches must include corrective action.
7. Cargoscan, which X-rays railroad cars coming out of the Votkinsk production plant to ensure that missile stages prohibited by the INF Treaty are not inside, was designed for an automated, not a manpower intensive environment. Another prominent and very expensive illustration of this impasse between the technical and policy communities is CORRTEX, which enables on-site hydrodynamic yield measurements of nuclear tests for the TTBT. Policy-makers and scientists alike recognize these technologies as political white elephants, but each side blames the other.
8. Confidential interviews.
9. Confidential interview.
10. Verification and non-proliferation have been likened to the magic words that contestants would say on the Groucho Marx show to receive prize money. Confidential interview, 30 November 1992.

11. According to the March 1989 Inspector General report, "There is no way that ACDA can influence to any significant degree the way other government agencies spend Federal research dollars." Inspection of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, op. cit., p. 8.

12. The Arms Control Research and Coordinating Committee, which is chaired by ACDA, rarely meets. The main product of this group is an annual report that details the research conducted in the preceding year. Confidential interviews.

13. For this and other options, see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, "Verification Technologies: Managing Research and Development for Cooperative Arms Control Monitoring Measures," OTA-ISC-488 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May, 1991). This report contains no recommended solutions.

14. Interview, 2 October 1992.

15. "ACDA's Role in the New Administration," op. cit., p. 16.

16. Confidential interviews.

17. Public Law 87-297, section 2. This statutory provision tracks closely with the recommendation of Kennedy's disarmament advisor, John J. McCloy, who wrote:

The tasks of inspection will probably be specialized and will require training of a type not always available at present. The new Agency should plan for the fulfillment of the United States role under an arms control treaty by providing for the initiation of training programs for personnel. It should establish, operate, fund or otherwise assume the responsibility within the U.S. Government for any inspection and control systems resulting from U.S. disarmament activities. See John J. McCloy to President Kennedy, "Memorandum For the President", 9 May 1961, p. 8 (mimeograph copy of original).

18. The formal members of the ExCom are the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the Under-Secretary of Defense for Acquisition. After a few initial meetings, these principals started sending replacements of much lower rank.

19. John J. McCloy, Advisor to the President on Disarmament, "Memorandum For the President, Subject: Creation of a New Disarmament Agency," (24 May 1961), mimeograph copy of original, p.4.

20. In 1979, Duncan L. Clarke believed this to be the strongest reason against a merger. This argument and the ones that follow can be found in Politics of Arms Control, op. cit., p. 214.

21. Confidential interviews.

22. Interview on 30 January 1992.

23. The FBI's deputy director at OSIA is responsible for overseeing escort duties during inspections conducted in the United States.

## Appendix A

### List of Individuals Interviewed

Kenneth L. Adelman  
Former Director, ACDA

Victor Alessi  
Department of Energy

Ralph Alewine  
Defense Advanced Research  
Projects Agency

William Ashworth  
Senate Foreign Relations  
Committee

Marvin C. Atkins  
Science Applications  
International Corporation

Kathleen Bailey  
Lawrence Livermore National  
Laboratory

David Barton  
House Subcommittee on Arms  
Control, International Security,  
and Science

George Berdes

Robert Berg  
U.S. ACDA

Paul Boren  
Science Applications  
International Corporation

Richard Bowen  
Department of Energy

Sheila Buckley  
Department of Defense

McGeorge Bundy  
Carnegie Corporation of New  
York

George Bunn  
Center for International Security  
and Arms Control, Stanford

William Burns  
Former Director, ACDA

Albert Carnesale  
Harvard University

Andrew Carpendale  
Department of State

Nicholas Carrera  
U.S. ACDA

Fred Celec  
Defense Nuclear Agency

Pierce Corden  
U.S. ACDA

Anthony F. Czajkowski  
Department of Energy

Barry Daniel  
Department of Energy

Maj. Gen. L. Eugene Daniel  
U.S. Army

Peter Daniher  
VTWG

Col. Robert Davie  
U.S. Army, Defense Intelligence  
Agency

I. M. Destler  
Maryland University

Richard Doyle  
Naval Post Graduate School

William Dunlop  
Lawrence Livermore National  
Laboratory

Lewis Dunn  
Science Applications  
International Corp.

Ralph Earle II  
Former Director, ACDA

Fred Eimer  
consultant

Robert Einhorn  
Department of State

Col. Peter Engstrom  
U.S. Air Force, XOXI

Col. Michael Evenson  
U.S. Army, Defense Nuclear  
Agency

Philip Farley  
Center for International Security  
and Arms Control, Stanford

Dante Fascell  
U.S. House of Representatives  
(Ret.)

Douglas Feith  
Feith & Zell

Raymond Firehock  
U.S. ACDA

Stanley Fraley  
Sandia National Laboratory

Lucas Fischer  
U.S. ACDA

Stephen Flanagan  
Department of State

Roger Fritzel  
PSR Services, Inc.

Alton Frye  
Council on Foreign Relations

Frank Gaffney  
Center for Security Policy

Sherman Garnett  
Department of Defense

Charles Gellner

Edward B. Giller  
consultant

James Goodby  
U.S. Institute of Peace

Thomas Graham  
U.S. ACDA

David Hafemeister  
Senate Governmental  
Operations Committee

Morton Halperin  
Carnegie Endowment for  
International Peace

Thomas A. Halsted

Lee Hamilton  
U.S. House of Representatives

Stephen R. Hanmer, Jr.  
U.S. ACDA

Ambassador Lynn Hansen  
U.S. Mission, Vienna

Joseph P. Harahan  
On-Site Inspection Agency

Scott Harris  
RAND

Janey Hatcher  
House Subcommittee on Arms  
Control, International Security,  
and Science

Terry Hawkins  
Los Alamos National Laboratory

Michael Heaney  
Meridian Corporation

Mary E. Hoinkes  
U.S. ACDA

Kim Holmes  
The Heritage Foundation

Sally Horn  
Department of Defense

Michael Hritsik  
consultant

Edward Ifft  
On-Site Inspection Agency

Fred Iklé  
Former Director, ACDA

William Inglee  
Department of Defense

Max M. Kampelman  
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver &  
Jacobson

Ken Keating  
On-Site Inspection Agency

Spurgeon Keeny  
Arms Control Association

Max Koontz  
Department of Energy

Sven Kraemer  
Global 2000

Edward Lacey  
U.S. ACDA

Maj. Gen. Roland Lajoie  
U.S. Army

Betty Goetz Lall  
Council on Economic Priorities

Paul Lambesis  
U.S. ACDA

Ronald F. Lehman II  
Director, U.S. ACDA

Albert Lieberman  
U.S. ACDA

Franklin Long  
University of California, Irvine

Thomas Longstreth  
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

George Look  
Defense Department

Mark Lowenthal  
Congressional Research Service

William Lynn  
Office of Senator Edward  
Kennedy

Douglas MacEachin  
Arms Control Intelligence Staff

Donald Mahley  
U.S. ACDA

Sherry Mannix  
U.S. ACDA

Dennis McDowell  
U.S. ACDA

Jack McNeill  
Department of Defense

Jack Mendelsohn  
Arms Control Association

Joerg Menzel  
On-Site Inspection Agency

Matthew Meselson  
Harvard University

Robert Mikulak  
U.S. ACDA

Frank Miller  
Department of Defense

Lee Minichiello  
Department of Defense

Roger Molander  
RAND

Catherine Montie  
Defense Nuclear Agency

Louis Nosenzo  
Meridian Corporation

Preston Olinger  
Pacific-Sierra Research  
Corporation

Maj. Gen. Robert Parker  
On-Site Inspection Agency

Claiborne Pell  
U.S. Senate

Albert Pierce  
National Defense University

Alan Platt  
consultant

Bennett Ramberg  
UCLA

Stanley Riveles  
U.S. ACDA

James Roche  
Northrop Corporation



Robert Rochlin  
U.S. ACDA

Michael Rosenthal  
U.S. ACDA

Eugene Rostow  
Former Director, ACDA

Gen. Edward Rowny  
U.S. Army (Ret.)

James Rubin  
Office of Senator Joseph Biden

George Rueckert  
Meridian Corporation

Dean Rust  
U.S. ACDA

Gary Samore  
Department of State

Paula Scalingi  
House Select Committee on  
Intelligence

Barbara Seiders  
U.S. ACDA

George Seignious  
Former Director, ACDA

Alan Shaw  
Office of Technology Assessment

Paul Simon  
U.S. Senator

David Sloss  
U.S. ACDA

Ivo Spalatin  
House Subcommittee on Arms  
Control, International Security,  
and Science

Barbara Starr  
U.S. ACDA

Jonathan Stein  
Office of Senator Paul Simon

Howard Stoertz

Paul Stokes  
Sandia National Laboratories

David Sullivan  
Staff, Senate Foreign Relations  
Committee

John H. Sullivan  
Development Associates, Inc.

Jack Swearengen  
Lawrence Livermore National  
Laboratories

James Swingle  
Department of Defense

William Tobey  
National Security Council Staff

Richard Toye  
PSR Services

Jennone Walker  
Department of State

Paul Warnke  
Former Director, ACDA

Lawrence Weiler

92

Jonathan Weiner  
Office of Senator John Kerry

Michael Wheeler  
System Planning Corporation

David Wollan  
U.S. ACDA

Thomas Wright  
Sandia National Laboratories

Norman Wulf  
U.S. ACDA